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February 2, 1975
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25X1A s Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350001-8 CONFIDENTIAL NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES INTERNAL USE ONLY This publication contains clippings from the domestic and foreign press for YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use of selected items would rarely be advisable. No. 4 18 February 1975 GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 1 GENERAL 34 FA7ERN EUROPE 36 WESTERN EUROPE 37 NEAR EAST 38 EAST ASIA 41 LATIN AMERICA 46 Destroy after backgrounder has served its purpose or within 60 days. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350001-8 - Ariproved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350001-8 NEW YORK TIMES 2 February 1975 ? elms Order to Withhold atergate ata Reported former Sub rdinate in C.I.A. Also Told H use Panel That Justice Department Was Denied Access to Key Witness By SEYMOUR M. HERSH Special to The New Yet.% Times WASHINGTON, Feb. 1 ? Richard Helms, while Director af Central Intelligence, ordered a, high official of the agency to withhold Watergate informa; tion and deny Justice Depart- ment access to a key witness in the first six weeks after the break-in on June 17, 1972, ac- cording to previously unpub- lished testimony. The official, Howard, J. Os- borne, who was director of se- curity for the C.I.A. before he retired in late 1973, told a House Intelligence subcommit- tee in May, 1973, that Mr. Helms decided that a series of letters sent to the agency by James W. McCord Jr., a mem- b-r ^f the te"na +11-t: broke into Democratic party headquarters at the . Watergate complex, should not be forwarded to the Justice Department Hunt's Role :. Mr. Helms made his decision at a time when the agency was under subpoena from the Jus- ace Department to forward "all communications" 'related to Watergate. ' The McCord letters, sent be- tween July 29, 1972, and early January, '1973, warned the agency that officials of. the Committee for the Re-Election of the President were planning to contend that the break-in was a C.I.A. operation. In one of the letters. Mr. Mc- 1 Cord said, "I have the evidence of the involvement of [former Attorney General John N.] Mitchell and others sufficient to convince a jury, the Congress and the preis." I Mr. Osborne also said that Mr. Helms had instructed him not to inquire into the agency's involvement with E. Howard Hunt Jr., another Watergate participant.. Mr. Helms further directed, MT. Osborne said, that the Fed- eral Bureau of Investigation not be permitted to' interview 1 Karl Wagner, a C.I.A:, employe, who had knowledge that John ID. Ehrlichman, then the chief, White House adviser on domes-- tic affairs, had authorizedAlbrir agency to establish a working. relationship with Mr. Hunt hi July, 1971. "You forget about that," Mr. Obsorne quoted Mr. Helms as having told him in late June, 1972. "I will handle that. You 'take care of the rest of that." At the time, Mr. Osborne had been designated by Mr. Helms as the official directly respon- sible for coordinating and expe- diting the C.I.A.'s communica- tions with the F.B.I. about Watergate. Mr. Helms ?and other high- level C.I.A. officials repeatedly stressed in their public state- ments that their actions regard- ing Watergate were. not illegal, but legitimate steps to protect the agency frc.:In p3SSible ad- verse publicity and to prevent the leak of highly classified in- formation about the agency's operational procedures. Mr. Osborne testified before the House subcommittee? that he had told Mr. Helms he felt "very strongly" that the first McCord letter should be turned over to the F.B.I. However, Lawrence Houston, the general counsel to the C.I.A., testified that he had advised Mr. Helms that the agency had no legal responsibility to do? so. Ehrlichman Link The three United States At- torneys who originally prose- cuted the case for the Justice Department did not learn of the' Ehrlichman link to the C.I.A. for five months. They also were not told of the McCord letters to the C.I.A. until May, 1973. The House subcommitee be- gan hearings in the spring of 1973 shortly after, C.I.A. in- volvement with the White House "plumbers" became known. The panel eventually concluded that the agency had been misued by the Nixon Ad- ministration. The testimony was declassi- fied late last year, without public announcement, by Rep- resentative Lucien N. Nedzi of Michigan, the subcommittee chairman. Mr. Helms told the Repre- entatives that "everybody was instructed to help with the F.B.I. investigation in the agen- cy, and every lead was checked . . . All the records were gone through and all the things were etvetecibr Release 2.001i0 Mr. Helms was not airect y asked about Mr. Osborne's alle-, 'iatIons, but William E. Colby: then Mr. Helm's deputy and now Director of Central Intel- ligence, repeatedly told the sub- committee that the agency's failure to provide all known in- formation to the F.B.I. was based on its concern "that it would somehow be' involved in the Watergate case and there was quite a lot of publicity and public- information in the press . . . I think the concern [was about leaks to the press." ? Mr. Helms, who headed the C.I.A: from 1966 to 1973 and is now Ambassador to Iran, could not be reached for comment. A State Department aide said he ,was traveling and would not re- turn to his post in Tehran, from which he has been on leave, un- til later this month. , Widespread Pattern Mr. Osborne's testimony about the initial high-level C.I.A. reaction to Watergate was part of what a New York Times inquiry has shown to be a more widespread pattern of C.I.A. noncooperation than pre- viously known. The inquiry, which included interviews with former Federal investigators - and an analysis of published C.I.A. Watergate testimony and documents, was begun shortly after the published allegations last December of C.I.A. domes- !tic spying.. I No evidence was found link- ing the C.I.A. to advance knowl- edge of the Watergate break. in but the testimony and doc- ume.nts indicate that the Intel- ligence agency followed the course it did in part because of a fear that some of its domestic cover firms as well as its 1971 domestic activities on behalf of the White House would be un- covered. The C.I.A. is currently facing intensive investigations by House and Senate committees stemming from its admitted in- volvement in "questionable" domestic spying activities. In addition, an eight-member com- mission set up by President Ford and headed by Vice Pres- ident Rockefeller is in its sec- ond month of hearings into the domestic spying allegations. Among the key new findings of the inquiry were the follow- ing: 9A number of high-level C.I.A. officials, including Mr. Helms and 'Mr. Colby, were in- formed on June 19, 1972--two days after the break-in ?that a , transcript of an internal C.I.A. Rape recording showed that Mr. Ehrlichman had authorized the iagency in 1971 to begin its sup- 'port activities on behalf of Mr. Hunt, who was then a member of the White House security force known as the "plumbers," then investigating Dr. Daniel Ellsberg. The transcript was discussed at a C.I.A. meeting that day. 9Mr. McCord had served as a member of the C.I.A.'s counter- intelligence branch since 1952 and was involved with prevent- ing the penetration of the agen- cy by agents from the Soviet Union. Mr. McCord was work- ing for the agency's office of' security in 1967-68 when, ac- iosoyehat-RDMiv't - i'Rc I 10 month, it trailtrate. agen into . radical groups in the, 'Washington area -in? apparent violation or the C.I.A. charter barring it from domestic activi- ties. At least four former,high- level C.I.A. counter-intelligence officials have resigned since the first published allegations of ,C.I.A. domestic activities. 9None of the high- level C.I.A. officials, including Mr. Colby,. informed Federal authorities of the repeated White House ef- forts in June, 1972, to involve them in the successful attempt to limit the initial F.B.L Water- gate inquiry. The officials also, did' not immediately disclose, that they had been asked to provide bail funds for the ori- ginal Watergate defendants. , ,? 9None of the high-level C.I.A.' ; officials involved in the initial ,deliberations after Watergate informed James R. Schlesinger, who replaced Mr. Helms as Di- rector of Central Intelligence in 'February, 1973, of the extent of the agency's domestic activities on behalf of the White House in 1971. Mr. Schlesinger learned of Mr. Hunt's plumbers role from a C.I.A. liaison officer in early May, 1973. Questions Left Open The inquiry also left open questions about the objectivity and thoroughness of the initial inquiry by the House Intel- ligence subcommittee. In its re- port on its hearings, published Oct. 23, 1973, the subcommittee did not note, for example, that Mr.-Helms 'ordered Mr. Osborne. not to turn over the McCord, letters. ? The C.I.A. also did not in- form the Justice Department that in July, 1972, it had re- ceived confidential information onthe Watergate break-in from' Robert F. Bennett, the president' of Robert 'R. Mullen and Com- pany, a Washington-based pub- lic relations firm that provided "cover" for C.I.A. employes -overseas and had hired Mr. Hunt afte rhis retirement from the agency in 1971. According to a report pub- lished last .year by Senator Howard H. Baker Jr.,. Repub- lican of Tennessee, the C.I.A. paid half of Mr. Bennett's at- torney fees stemming from his grand jury appearance after the Watergate break-in. . , In a recept interview, Sey- mour Glanzer, one of the ori- ginal Watergate, prosecutors who retired last year after serv- ing 14 years with the Justice Department, characterized the C.I.A.'s post-Watergate actions as the efforts "of an intel- ligence agency serving some alien Byzantine power rather than one devoted to the best in- terests of the people of this country." "Most of the facts may be, known to the Government now," Mr. Glanzer said, "but the public isn't aware of what- the C.I.A. has done. The whole venture was one of keeping in- formation from us. "I frankly was amazed by the conduct and the mentality I found in the C.I.A. Anyone who believes in candor must appear to be naive to them. And 11-8nust have appeared to be naive to them. The most critical, C.I.A. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350001-8 'tire, Mr. Glanzer' iald,-was the" agency's decision not to pm- ;Wee the six letters sent by Mr. McCord after being served with ,a Justice Department subpoena ;compelling the agency to pro- duce "all communications" re- lating to Watergate. "The McCord contacts would have been vital," Mr. Glanzer said, because Earl J. Silbert, the principal United States Attor- ney investigating Watergate, "had selected McCord as the 'weak link?the only person who had information and might ' lbe made willing to talk." i "The letters were an indica- tion that there was some way of reaching the man," the for- mer prosecutor said. Mr. McCord, who? had earlier rebuffed an attempt to begin plea bargaining, repeatedly warned the C.I.A. in the letters that attempts would be made to place the blame for Watergate on the agency. Upon learning in May, 1973 of the . McCord - letters, Mr. Glanzer said, the prosecutors told one high-level C.I.A. offi- cial?not Mr. Helms?that he was a potential . target of a grand jury investigation. The official resigne& within days, Mr. Glanzer said. 1? ? Cox Takes Over _ . . At about the same time, however, Mr. Silbert and Mr. Glanzer were succeeded in the Watergate investigation first by Archibald Cox, - the Watergate special. .prosecutor, and the C.I.A. actions did not become a public issue. . In Mr. McCord's first letter to the C.I.A., which was sent to the office of Mr. Helms six weeks after Watergate, Petit O'Brien, an attorney for the Nixon re-election committee, was quoted as having said that committee officials had initially informed him that the break-in, was a C.I.A. operation. "He says he did not know otherwise," Mr. McCord's letter said, "until one of the defend- ants told him the facts and he says he blew up over it." The letter said that there would be an 'attempt to depict the Watergate break-in as a C.I.A. operation and suggested that the Watergate 'prosecutors Were leaking anti-agency mate- ,rial to the press. i . Mr. McCord closed the letter With the following statement, which, given his extensive knowledge of counterintel- ligence operations, may have led to varying interpretations; inside the agency: ._ "The fact remains that I have rved in Washington-, since 1942 ,and know certain things about the District of Columbia . from: 'first-hand knowledge, having lived there in the past, that I wanted you to be aware of." , The letter initially was dis- missed as crank mail, Mr. Os- borne told the House subcom- mittee in May, 1973, but -.was. subsequently identified through Mr. McCord's handwriting. Mr. Osborne then recounted the fol- lowing events: "I showed the letter to Mr. Helms: I told him. that I felt very strongly that the letter should be turned over to the Federal Bureau of Investiga- tion. Mr. Helms, after some re- flection.; decided that he. would like to*Ibave legal opinion eitt the matter and summoned Mr. Lawrence Houston, general counsel of the agency, to his of- fice and had him read the let- ter. 'Legal Obligation' "After he had finished read- ing the letter, the ensuing dis- cussion; to the best of my recol- lection, centered about whether the agency had any legal obli- gation ta forward the letter to the Justice Department or the Federal. '. Bureau of Investiga- tion. . "Both' Mr. Helms and Mr. Houston decided that there was no such obligation, and I was told to take no further action on it. Mr. Helms instructed me to restria knowledge of the ex- istence of the letter to an abso- lute minimum - number of people." Wherie'Mr. McCord's subse- quent letters were received at home by a C.I.A. employe in late December, 1972, and early January,, 1973, they were brought to Mr. Osborne, Who, as he told the subcommittee, was authorized by Mr. Helms Ito .file them. - i The letters were turned over to the Watergate prosecutors in May, 1973, after Mr. Schlesin- ger ordered all C.I.A. employes to come forward with any. !evidence or information in con- nection with the White House plumber S or other domestic C.I.A. inyolvement. Mr. Osborne acknowledged to The committee that he had been troubled by 'Mr. Helms's order Inot to forward the McCord let- Iters. . l "We had been working very Iclosely.with the F.B.I.," he tes- tified. 'I, have always given them everything. I have never held anything from them. ,. 'He Was My Boss' "At the time I don't think I really agreed with it [the deci- sion to withhold the letters]. But, you know, I worked for Mr. Helms, he was my boss. I would do the same thing with Mr. Schlesinger." A review of the published testimony indicates that Mr. Helms was never specifically' asked about his request that the McCord letters not be for- warded. Mr. Houston, however, was questioned by the House sub- committee about his counsel to Mr. Helms after receipt of the. initial McCord letter in August, 1972. lit defended his action by noting that he had been in- volved in many cases where persons ' under indictment threatened or hinted at a? C.I.A. involvement. In the case of the McCord !letter,. he added, he considered it to bp a similar warning or ithreat that there "might be an .actual attempt to involve he agency in the defense of those !arrested in the Watergate in-, Icident." ' I Since-the C.I.A. had no prior Involvement in the Watergate break- in, Mr. Houston ex- 'elained; and .since any threat of bluff was best countered, in his opinion: by ignoring it, "I there- fore advised the Director of Central Intelligence that we had no legal responsibility to pass the letter on to any other 'authorities and that we would iwork with the United States Attorneys when the defense Be- i ttutIlY,rnade a formal attempt to Involve the agency at the trial. The Director agreed." Mr. Houston -subsequently acknowledged under question- ing, however, that when Mr. Silbert and Mr. Glanzer re- quested the C.I.A. to supply in- formation in October in antici- pation of a C.I.A. defense at the Watergate trial, the agency still withheld the letters. Nedzi Interrogates Then there was the following 'exhange with Representative Nedzi. NEDZI: Isn't this really' suppressing evidence? HOUSTON: No, sir, I did not consider it evidence at all. NEDZI: 'ewes not evidence . of agency involvement, but it ? was certainly information that could very well have been useful to the conduct of a complete investigation, and I think that the agency's obli- gation goes beyond just de- fending itself. Mr. Osborne also testified that he was ordered by Mr. Helms not to inquire into Mr. Hunt's links to domestic C.I.A. activities in 1971. -1 After being assigned to find out what possible, involvement, if any, the C.I.A. had had in the Watergate break-in?an assign- ment he received ' from Mr. Helms on the evening after the break-in?Mr. Osborne recalled being approached by a young C.I.A. officer, Mr. Wagner. Mr. Wagner had served in .1971 as an aide to Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr., the C.I.A. Dep- uty Director at the time and the recipient of Mr. Ehrlich- man's 'request for agency help for Mr. Hunt. Mr. Wagner learned at a staff meeting that Mr. Osborne had been assigned to the investiga- tion, Mr. Osborne said, and "called me and said he had something he wanted to tell me but he had to check with the Director . first. The Director called me on the telephone that same day and said, "You forget about that. I will handle that. You take care of the rest of it.' "I was specifically excluded'.' from knowledge of the C.I.A. involvement in the Ellsberg burglary, "and I am delighted I . was." Mr. Colby told a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing in July, 1973, then con- sidering his nomination to be C.I:A. Director, that a tran- script of a July 7, 1971, Hunt- Cushman conversation ? in which Mr. Ehrlichman's role was mentioned?was discussed at a high-lever agency meeting on June 19. 1972. Fact Not Relayed However, Mr. Colby said, when the C.I.A. formally in- formed the F.B.I. three weeks' later that it had supplied false 'documentation and other materials to Mr. Hunt and 'G. Gordon Liddy, another Water- gate defendant, it did not relay the fact that Mr. Ehrlichman had been involved with Mr. Hunt one year before Water- gate. Instead, the Senate testimony showed, the C.I.A. said only that the materials had been supplied to Mr. Hunt in re- sponse to a "duly authorized ?'extra-agency request." - At one point during the Sen- ate hearings, Mr. Colby told' Senator Edward-M. Kennedy, Democrat ' of Massachusetts, that the information- was not supplied because "it was not all that important who male .the. phone call from the White House to General Cushman 'about this little one as.Istance ?for Mr. Hunt." V? ? Mr. Ehrlichman's name was provided to the Justice Depart- ment on Nov. 27, 1972, in re-i sponse to a specific question; from Mr. Silbert. In a later memo about that meeting, Mr. Colby wrote that he "had danced around the room sever- al times for 10 minutes tatty to avoid becoming specific on this." Mr. Colby further disclosed during the Senate hearings that on June 28, 1972, ,Mr. Helms has issued an order -requesting that the F.B.I. not interview Mr. Wagner and another C.I.A. offi- cial who also knew of some C.I.A. aid to Mr. Hunt in 1971. At the time, Mr. Helms justi- fied the order, according to the Senate testimony, on the ground that the F.B.L should' "desist from expanding this in- vestigation into other areas which may, , eventually, run afoul of our operations." 'A Lot of Leaks' ? In 'his July, 1973, tesliniony before the Senate Watergate committee, Mr. Helms referred to that order, telling the Sena- tors that "there was stet/big to he a lot of leaks out of the "F.B.I. for the first time on mat- ters of this kind." Mr. Helms later had this exchange with David M. Dorsen, an assistant chief counsel on the committee: DORSEN: And to your knowledge, was any relative information withheld by the C.I.A. to the F.B.I. and Jus- 'tice .Department, information that you were aware of while the events wereetaking place in June, July or August of 1972? HELMS: Sir, I do not be- lieve so. Does the record show that there was any- thing of this kind? ? DORSEN: No. I am not suggesting that at all. I am just asking for your knowl- edge. I have no knowledge t to the contrary. HELMS: Well, I do not either, but I just want to be ; sure that my recollections tracked with the facts. In his earlier, testimony be- fore the House subcommittee, though,. Mr. Helms said he had prevented the F.B.I. from in- terviewing Mr. Wagner, whom he did not mention by name, 'because he had not wanted in- 'formation about Mr. Hunt's !involvement with Mullen and Company, the public retations firm, "from being spread all 'through, the Government, that we had people under cover ther "ever, -no evidence- wasi 'However,' presented in any other hearing suggesting that Mr. Wagner, it questioned by the F.B.', would have discussed anything but Mr. Hunt's reliance on the C.I.A. in 1971 ;in connection with his White _House plumbers work. Furthermore, 1-C.LA. docu- ments published, last year by, Approved For Release 2001/08/08 ; CJA-RDP77-004:32R0001003500018_ Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350001-8 `the Mouse Judiciary t tee's impeachment inquiry showed that information about. the secret use of Mullen and' Company was supple by the. ,C.I.A. to the F.B.I. on June 21, 1972, four days after the Wa- tergate burglary. Colby Testifies ' During testimony before the House and Senate in 1973, Mr. Colby, who had been placed by Mr. Helms in oVer-all charge of .,.he C.I.A.'s handling of the Watergate inquiry shortly after The break-in, made a number of apparently contradictory state- tieuts During the House Intelligence subcommittee -hearings in May, 1973, Mr. Colby was asked why tne C.I.A. had not been more responsive in providing infor- mation to the F.B.I. He again cited C.I.A. concern over pos- sible press leaks and said the .aganey had decided to "handle AS much of the material that was subject to misunderstand- in an oral fashion rather than in a written fashion." Yet, Mr. Nedzi, in discussing the meeting between the C.I.A. and the Watergate prosecutors in October, 1972, asked Mr. Colby whether he thought the iustice Department had been made "completely aware of all tthe facts that you had, is that I right?" Mr. Colby responded, _"yes, WASHINGTON POST 2 February 1975 ?ri ,1","PP iff). they were totally informed!: " Mr, Colby was then executive director of the agency. ? In subsequent testimony be- fore the Senate Armed Services Committee in July, 1973, Mr. Colby said that he had known of the White House attempts the year before to get the C.I.A. to provide bail funds for the Watergate defendants, and about other contacts, but had not told the Justice Department during the October meeting. 'Edge of Propriety' , Asked why, Mr. Colby said he had not considered the White House's contacts to be pocential wrongdoing. "Their requests were, it seemed to me, on the edge of propriety," he said, "and. the C.I.A. responsibility was to hold itself very specifically to the facts and act within its proper authority, and the C.I.A. did that." It was those actions, revolv- ing around the efforts of Mr. Ehrlichman and H. R. Halde- man, then the White House chief of staff, to get the C.I.A. to attempt to 'halt theF.B.I. in- quiry into Watergate, that led to President Nixon's resignation last August. A White House tape recording showed that Mr. Nixon had directed his aides to attempt to involve the C.I.A. in the,cover-up. ? While supporting the actions taken by Mr. Helms in the months after Watergate, Mr. Colby also told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the basic decisions involving C.I.A. policy had been made by Mr. Helms. . "The basid philosophy of keeping the C.I.A. out of the misunderstanding of being in- volved and consequently han- dling the material through the top level of the F.B.I. and the Justice Department [and not through F.B.I. field agents and United States Attorneys] was a decision in which I shared," Mr. Colby testified. "It was ob- viously Mr. Helm's decision because he was in charge." The fact that Mr. Schlesinger, who is now Secretary of De- fense, had not been briefed by Mr. Helms and other high-level C.I.A. officials about the extent of the agency's involvement with Mr. Hunt and the White House plumbers was made ex- plicit in a statement published last July by the House Judiciary Committee's impeachment in- quiry. Schlesinger Told In the document, a C.I.A. of- ficial who was serving in a liai- son position at the White House in May, 1973, recalled how he apparently was the first to in- form Mr. Schlesinger about the C,I.A.'s involvement in the -preparation of a psychological profile on Dr. Ellsberg and other matters. . "He seemed surprised and unaware of any such link," the unidentified C.I.A. official said. "I was sure that someone had compiled the facts about- the agency's involvement with Hunt and the Watergate and that it ' should be available somewhere in the agency if he had not already seen it. "He seemed dismayed and bewildered that something like this could have happened and that he did not know about it." On May 9, 1973, a few days after the discussion with the C.I.A. liaison official. Mr. Schles- inger issued his order calling upon all C.I.A. employes to:pro duce any evidence of domegtIQ .ao wrongdoing. - It was this request, reVable sources say, that not only led to the discovery of the Mctord letters and more ' Watergate links, but also produced the, evidence of other domestio. activities?such as the infiltraz.- tion of C.I.A. undercover agents into dissident groups and the accumulation of files on more than 10,000 American citizens who were opposed to the Viet- nam war-4?that are being inves- tigated by the Senate,_,:the House and the Ford Adrninistra-e r frFpnSwirmorts elms _yr By William Greider ; Washirizton Post Staff Writer For that .small circle- of influential people, the ones who help shape Amer-, lea's foreign policy and share national. neerets, the intimate dinner party the other night in honor of Richard Helms was an especially tender moment. "Touching and moving," said one, who was there. , t Assembled in the Chevy Chase. house of. columnist Tem Braden and 'his wife Joan were some perennial notables: ? . Averell Harriman, ? the patrician Igtatesman; Stuart Symington, the sena- tor from Missouri; Robert S. McN-, mare, who once ran the Pentagon and now runs the World Bank; Henry A. Kissinger, whom everybody knows. 'Even the outsiders were prominent' ones: NBC's Barbara Walters and Isra- el's Ambassador Simcha Dinitz, among ? others. ? They were gathered to cheer up an old friend, a comrade wounded by re- cent events, the former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, who is now confronted with embarrassing questions about the secret agency's do- mestic surveillance activites. After the smoked salmon and crown roast of lamb, the glasses of rich red ? .wine were raised in his honor. Sym- Ingtorr toasted the "splendid job" ? which Helms had done in seven years as America's intelligence chief. Hard- ;man seconded those sentiments. But the high point was the brief and- melodramatic speech of Robert Mc- Namara, Deiense Secretary during the ,iong strpggle in 'Vietnam,, a man .who shared with Helms the anguish of the Johnson years. McNamara wanted all in the room to know: whatever Dick. Helms did, 'whether it was over the line or not, the former Secretary of Defense supported him fully. That moment of fraternity moistened some eyes around the table. 'According to the etiquette of impor- tant dinner parties, no one is supposed to speak afterward of what was said by whom, especially to the press. Yet,' somehow, the- story of McNamara's toast is circulating, confirming what many already suspected?that Richard -Helms has been shaken by the current: CIA controversy and that the estabi 1ishcd circle is drawing the wagons up .-Close in his defense. That message was already whispe leg around Washington, in part be- 'cause the Secretary of State was telling 'friends and associates on the dinner- party circuit that he was dismayed by, What has happened to Helms. ? "An honorable man," Kissinger says solemnly, then he adds a word or two or private rebuke for the present CIA Di- ctor William E. Colby, who made the public disclosures of CIA domestic ? lapying, and even for Defense Secre- , lary 'James Schlesinger, who investi- gated the subject when he held the ...CIA job briefly before Colby. These are glimpses of the private' and almost visceral political currents. Which now surround the CIA contro- yersy, a struggle as intangible as smoke, yet with real significance for the players. Helms is in foremost jeop- Approved For FkgeNgb tivities of debatable legality happened' ',during his tenure, but also for what he said or didn't say about CIA activities ivhile under oath before various con- gressional committees. On a political level, the situation is Perilous for Colby too, wh,o now must 'answer the agency's critics More fully- - at forthcoming hearings without to- tally alienating the CIA's traditional friends or his own troops within the agency. In a secondary sense, the Struggle threatens Kissinger and, Schlesinger too, who now represent the natural institutional rivalry be- tween the Defense and State depart- ments, who both played a direct hand, in the CIA's past. As one close partisan described it:, "A fairly byzantine happening by some fairly byzantine People." - Helms' difficulties stem from his bland .assurances, given regularly in recent years to congressional inquiries, that the CIA did not do such things as ?penetratirig domestic political organi- ?-zations or spying on radicals. Then, af- ter the New York Times acdount of do- mestic spying was published Dec. 22, . , -Colby eventually made a public recita- tion on the subject, acknowledging' what Helms seemed to have denied. According to close friends, Helms is se concerned about the arguable 11- legality of any surveillance activities which occurred under his direction or even by his recorded statements deny- ing that the CIA conducted domestic spying. Those questions are loaded with ambiguities, they point out, which smilitpme:nosf4bry7_00ATAtittaidniefali1alii" difficult fo pursue. ? ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350001-8 But Helms has been more worried , about his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on CIA Involvement in Chile, back when he was confirmed as ambassador to Iran in 1973. Sen. Symington, a member of that committee, asked Helms then: "Did you try in the Central Intelli- gence Agency to overthrow the govern- ment of Chile?" ss, "No, sir," said Helms. ? "Did you have any money passed to the opponents of Allende?" ? "No, sir," said Helms. "So," Symington asked. "the stories you were involved in that war are ? wrong?" "Yes, sir," Helms answered. "I said, to Sen. Fulbright many months ago that if the agency had really gotten in behind the other candidates and spent a lot of money and so forth the elec- tion might have come out differently." When Colby appeared in private last spring before the House Armed Serv- ices subcommittee on intelligence, he told a ? different . story?that the CIA had provided $11 million for "covert action" in Chile Aimed at blocking Sal- vador Allende's election in 1964 and ..1970, as well as "destablizing" the gov- oernment in 1973 when a milirary coup toppled the Allende government. " Helms appeared again before the Foreign Relations Committee two weeks ago to explain the discrepancy. .Now on his way back to Iran, he is con- ? Vinced, according to friends, that he 'satisfied the ,committee members that no perjury had been committed. The various issues/ however, must still be explored by others. The circus now has, three rings?select committees on In- telligence in both the House and Sen- ate, 'plus the presidential CIA commis- sion. ? The difference between Helms and 'Colby is partly a question of personal styles, but it is also the changed cli- mate in post-Watergate Washington, where both Congress and the press pursue hints of scandal more zealously than when when Helms was director from 1966 to early 1973. In broad outline, their careers seem quite similar?t-lvy League educations, veterans in World War II, lifetimes de- voted to climbing the secret career lad- der inside the "Company," as the CIA ? is sometimes culled among friends. ? But, though both served in "Clandestine Services" and both held the post of deputy director of opera- tions, Helms and Colby came from dif- ferenct sides Of the spy shop. Helms was schooled in the; "intelligence ' end," " Colby was a "political actibn" man, two subspecies with an inherited distrust of one an- other. The intelligence folks collect and analyze, while the "political opera- tions" men run secret guerrilla wars and "covert action" against foreign governments. They tend to regard the Intelligence types as ivory tower ten- ants, removed from the real world; while the intelligence people often look on them as a bunch of wild men. In any case, the personal relationship between Colby and Helms over the 'years was correct and cordial, never more than that, according to associ, ates. ? When old colleagues describe Helms, he emerges as a man of deeper Intel- lect, more flexible, more cynical, quite skilled at crossing the sliding sands of' Washington's bureaucratic struggles. Colby is more obvious, more straight. ahead and even moralistic, according ? to friends and nonfriends. Helms is the 'urbanity of the Chevy Chase Country, Club; Colby is the Boy Scouts in Springfield, Va., where he lives. "Dick is resentful," said one ex-offi- cer. "He resents the change in per- Iformance with regard to Congress, to -the press, to'openness which he never engaged except in the coziest way." While Colby opts for on-the-record Interviews with the news magazines,' Helms' style was; more often, a friendly off-the-record lunch at the old' Occidental Restaurant. On Capitol Hill, Helms left behind a reputation as masterful at salving both hawks and doves during the war in Vietnam, as well as never revealing too much About what the CIA was doing. When the House subcommittee wa.s .questioning him privately on Water- gate in 1973, Helms displayed the charm which won such praise. After a lot of back-and-forth about what was .legal or illegal for the CIA, Helms fi- nally closed the subject with this ap-? peal to personal faith: ? "Gentlemen, don't you honestly be- ? lieve, all of you, as I do, that you've Igot to be honorable men to run any- thing like this, particularly an intelli-' gence operation?" The notion that "honorable men" 'Could be trusted to run the CIA, with- out much questioning from Congress, was badly shaken in the Watergate epi- sode, when it was disclosed that the CIA under Helms alternately ivent' along with and resisted various ques- 'tionable demands from the Nixon White House. Rumors lingered and the traditional secrecy of the agency' helped them grow. Helms, for instance, has been dogged by stories that somehow a closer link existed between him and E. Howard Hunt, Jr. one of the Watergate bur- glars, including the yarn that the CIA ? director prsonally lent Hunt $20,000 or - $30,000. As it happens, Helms ex- plained that in secret testimony at the time: "The guy was in very serious finan-- cial straits. In an organization like , CIA, particularly in the clandesine ,side of it, anybody who gets in debt constitutes a vulnerability. I mean for a recruitment from the other side, if nothing else. All drunks arc a threat. ,Drug people are a threat. Homosexuals are a-threat. Anybody who has a really 'distinctive blackmail possibility. ? "So the logical thing to do was to make available those institutions in 'the Central Intelligence Agency to. help out employees who unintention- ally get in some kind of financial diffi- culty and one of the ways of doing this Is something we call the Public Serv- ice Aid Society, which contains a fund 4' Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350001-8 of monei?'idministered by some direc- tors into which people give voluntarily to build up a fund so that people in jam can get this stuff without :paying interest and so forth," ? , ? The members of Congress also. learned something qf the intrigues in- volved in operating the agency, like' the tape recording syStems in Helms's' office and the "Frencii ROom". next door where cenferences were held and another in the deputy director's of- . fice. Helms had that one dismantled when Gen. Vernon Walters, a 'Nixon man, became deputy director because "I thought at the time I didn't know Gen. Walters 'very well. I wouldn't have any control over it." When Helms was, cleaning out his files after 25 years in the agency, he destroyed all of the non-Watergate 'tapes, including one conversation he recorded with President Johnson. "I do recall at one time having a very active conversation with Presi- dent Johnson about a whole lot of things he wanted me to do about Viet- nam," Hes told the sub committee, "and my finally, in desperation, push-. ing this button in order to get straight what he was trying to tell me to do." After Helms was abruptly fired by President Nixon a month after the 1972 election, the popular assumption was that his resistance to letting the CIA take the rap for Watergate was a special motive. It was also widely as- sumer! that Henry Kissinger approved the move or at _least acquiesced in it, "particularly the subsectuent shake-up of the agency which was carried ,out by Schlesinger. Helms professes not to know, what the motives were for his abrupt dis- missal. (His friends say he has never blamed Kissinger). But he did tell the Armed Services subcommittee this much: - "I was never on the team. I was left-' over from President Johnson's admin- istration and I had served in four years in President Nixon's and I rather gather they wanted their fellow dn the job. I put the 'their' in quotes." ? At this point, the.plot gets much too byzantine to explain fully. Schlesinger, an outsider, took charge of' the CIA with expressed orders to "shake it up," 'which he did. The personnel level was trimmed sharply ("brutally," according to some old hands), and, among other. things, Schlesinger ordered a full au- dit of the CIA's domestic activities. That produced the documentation which through no apparent fault of his, eventually surfaced in public. When Colby succeeded Schlesinger in the, fall of 1973, he inherited the new leaner look which Schlesinger gave the agency, plus its new problems of public relations. When Rep. Lucien Nedzi, chairman of the House Intelli- genee subcommittee, called Colby for an examination on Chile, the new CIA director told all. When it leaked Out Helms was the embarrassed one. Now, however, Colby is presiding over a sharp division within his own ranks, not to mention the hostile politi- cians outside. As one associate put it:' "A lot of people think he's gone too far already. He's made a lot of concessions which will be very hard to reverse, later on. Worse, there's a great disillu- sionment within the agency- They all feel unappreciated and exposed." , On the other'hand, many see Colby: Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350001-8 is a-skillful CIA "political operator,".; trying to navigate through the treach- erous waters, to ameliorate the new preAsures from Congress and the, press, without sacrificing the agency's essential powers. "He is the essence of. a political op-. crater who goes to a country overseas and tries to find the levers of power and hopes to influence them," said one former colleague. "He's very much a realist. He asks: who's running the country? It's.not the President and the. White House it's Congress and the press. Well, how do you influence them? You can't do it with the old Cold War rhetoric or by telling the, WASHINGTON POST 3 February 1975 forn B-Fa imueriat press ft has no business knoWilig about' intelligence activities. So Colby is try- ing to get a handle on these political, ?and social .realities. He's operating on the same principle he would in Af-' .ghanistan." ? Even Colby's admirers, however, can envision an unhappy ending for the di- , rector if he misreads the pressures, if' he tells so much to the inquiring mem- bers of Congress on Capitol Hill that his own bureaucratic strength is ex- hausted downtown. Among other questions, for instance, ?the investigators will pursue whether. Kissinger, as Nixon's national security .affairs adviser, had any part in order- ' 'Ing the CIA to siVon'reporters in 1971' and 1972 because of national-security leaks. Schlesinger, as Defense Secretaty, has been standing back from the fray but his department, the Pentagon, has an important stake in what Congress winds up doing to the CIA and the "intelligence community" generally. In short, while the dinner-party chat- ter enlivens the struggle, it is a defeni sive game at this point. One former .CIA official described the situation: "Everyone, to use one of Helm's phrases, is hunkering down and look-: ? lag out for himself." 2esidents and the CIA I'm going to keep very quiet," said Richard Helms, speaking of the inves- tigation into the Central Intelligence Agency. "But if it looks as though it's all going to be my fault, I shall have a great deal to say." There is an implication here which recalls another Helms remark, made when he was summoned home from Iran two summers ago to testify on the subject of the wig and the camera lent to Howard Hunt and on Richard Nixon's attempt to use CIA as a foil for halting the investigation into Watergate. "Who would have thought," Helms said then, "that it might someday be judged wrong to carry out the orders of the President of the United States?" ? They hint?these two remarks?at the Imperial presidency which- historian Arthur M. Schlesinger has described. They hint of Lyndon Johnson, large,. powerful, domineering, thinking of himself as law. They hint of Richard Nixon, sly and stealthy, plotting how to. retain beloved trappings of power. Johnson, one can imagine, would order the thing done without a thought as to whether the thing was legal. Nixon, one can imagine, had more consciousness of evil, He would sneak the thing through. The end was the same: The end was corruption. WASHINGTON POST 14 February 1975 Itockefetaer Capsanalis4on ' It is all very well to say that Richard Helms should have risen to the occasion: "Mr. President, I won't do that. If you insist, Mr: President, my only course is to resign." ? When authority gives an order it is easy to find reasons why authority may be right. More important, the President is the Commander-in-Chief. Does a soldier quit the field of battle when the general orders a foolhardy. attack? ? Maybe the problems of the CIA are battlefield related. Its leaders were steeled in war and most of them were steeled in a very special kind of war. Most of them came out of OSS, as the wartime secret intelligence agency was called. This meant, first of all, that they had volunteered to carry out very unusual orders. It also meant that they were unusual people, given to taking great personal risks, desirous of operating alone or in the company of two or three others, Impressed more than most soldiers can be impressed with the absolute neces- sity for secrecy and the almost certain penalty which awaits the slightest breach of it. It meant one more thing which may be important to the CIA story. The OSS men, who became the CIA men, thought of themselves as their country.' Dropped alone in groups of two or three onto unfamiliar and ertgmy-occu- pied lands, they were, whetnr in Nor- way or in Southern France, in Holland or in Thailand, all that there was of ' America. And while they may well have been on the run, hunted and ,harried from one hiding place to another, they took more pride than most soldiers learned to take in the fact of what they were., h warea A Trl ante 'T'h 4; I, th death pill in their pockets were all they had. Is it not possible that men who have learned to do everything in secrecy, who are accustomed to strange assign- ments and who think of themselves as embodying their country are pecu- liarly susceptible to imperialistic - Presidents? Have they not in fact trained themselves to behave as a power elite? "For 28 years," Richard. Helms re- marked the other day, "I had the idea certain that I was serving my coun- try." That's a proud thing to be able to say. What a shock it must be to such a man to be told that from time to time during those 26 years he was wrong. 0 1975. La AIII10110 num . 9 CIA Pariei Lawyers :Named Nine staff lawyers were ap- pointed by Vice President Rockefeller yesterday to serve the presidential commission Investigating the Central In- telligence Agency. They will serve under David' W. Belin, a Des Moines, Iowa, lawyer who is executive direc- tor. The nine lawyers include two who have served as clerks to Supreme Court juStices and one who is active in the Amer- ican Civil Liberties Union. The four senior counsel: Harold Baker, 45. private at- torney from Champaign, 111.;1 Ernest Gellhorn, 39, a law pro- ' Lessor at the University of t Virginia; Robert 13. Olsen, 48, a private attorney and ACLU board member from Kansas City, and William W. Schwar- zer, 49, a San Francisco trial lawyer who Is a World War II military intelligence veteran. The four counsel: Marvin L. Gray Jr., 29, 55. sistant U.S. attorney in Seat- tie, Wash., and former law I to Justice Thurgood Marshall. a clerk to the late Justice John M. Harlan; George A. Man- fredi. 31, private attorney in Los Angeles; James N. Roethe, 33, private attorney from San i Francisco, and James B. Weld- 32, partner in the Newt York law firm of Rogers .3: Wells. ' Named as special counsel was Ronald J. Greene, 32, an attorney with the Washingtoi,y firm of Wilmer, Cutler and; Pickering and a former cleric' NEW YORK TIMES 3 February 1975 :,CORRECTION The New. York Times, through an editing error, in- correctly reported yesterday that the Central Intelligence Agency was under a Justice Department subpoena in early August, 1972, when Richard Helms, then Director of Cen- tral Intelligence, ordered the agency to .withhold ? informa- tion. The subpoena, ordering the C.I.A. to produce all Watergate communications, was not. in effect at the time. Approved For Release 2001/08/08.: Cltk-RDP77-00432R000100350001-8 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350001-8 INF, WASHINGTON POST' *Itilar:Teki,19/S T a es i C A Files: By Harry Rositzko lositzke, who retired' from the CIA in 1970 after 27 years with the agency and Its predecessor, initiated Its liaison-withthe FBI on Soviet espionage matters. He is author of "The U.S.S.R Today" and "Left On!" THE HALF-DOZEN inquiries into the charges of "domestic spy- ing" by the, Central Intelligence Agency. lace a challenging task on ,a confusing 'terrain. From a wide range of legitimate , counterintelligence activities involv- ing American citizens, the investi- gators will have to sift out those cases in which the CIA violated its ' charter, by using secret ? agents. , against Americans within the United States. ? - The legitimate operations cover a, broad array of activities in which Americans voluntarily or otherwise fall within the purview of the CIA, .with their names properly entering, .its Countless private citizens, for ex- ample, have been "cleared" by the. CIA before they are asked to partici- pate in secret .,or covert operations.-" Thousands ,of Americans have helped establish such CIA-sponsored organi- zations as the Committee for.a Free Europe, .to set up founptions for channeling funds to covert opera."e tions, and to create the proprietary companies that supply logistic sup- port for CIA para military operations. Hundreds of others have helped CIA make contacts with resident for- eigners who are of interest for fu- Jure intelligence use abroad, or in building ?up new identities . and get- ting jobs for. Soviet and other de- fectors being iresettled in this coun- try. In each case, the FBI and other? federal files must be checked, and in some cases a security investigation is carried, out as well, before an American citizen is cleared for con- tact. Any violations of CIA authority in this security-investigative , area can..; be examined by the committees on a: case-by-case basis?an unauthorized telephone inqrcept or microphone, installation, a surveillance conducted to investigate a reported plot against, the CIA director, the use of inform-, ants to report on the plans of Wash; ington demonstrators. FBI-CIA Cooperation - THE TERRAIN is far more con- fused 'in the 'area of secret do- mestic activities of the CIA's Opera- tions Directorate, especially- the Do- mestic Operations Division know the;? Foreign Resources Division) and the ,Counterintelligence Staff. The Do- mestic Division has been carrying out intelligence operations against for- eigners in the United States since the early 1960s.' The Counterintelligence Staff has, since 1946, exercised over- all responsibility for gIA's world- wide counterintelligence program. Both have worked closely with FBI. Internal security, the responsibil- ity solely of the FBI, doesnot in- volve the domestic scene alone. Any country's internal security service must have the cooperation of its for- eign intelligence service to do its work effectively. This cooperation is not always easy, but for those famil- iar with conflicts between the do- mestic and foreign, services in Eng- land, France or Germany, the differ-, ences betwen the CIA and the 'FBI are relatively modest. In any case, they have had only minor repercus- sions on the working level. It is in this area of domestic coun- terintelligence that the committees will find it most difficult to estab- lish normal and proper patterns,' of - FBI-CIA cooperation, an essential first step toward detecting what is improper or illegal. The patterns are clearest in the most specific form of counterintelli- gence ? counterespionage. Heie the targets are persistent and easily iden- tified: the actions of any hostile in- telligence service directed against the American interest. - For 30 years the CIA and FBI have worked closely against the So- viet and East European intelligence services, especially the KGB, ex- changing information about Soviet in- telligence officers and providing each other with leads to suspect agents. In the past 15 years the volume of hos- Hie espionage operations has climbed perceptibly. During the 1960s, KGB officers were making more than 200 attempts a year to recruit Americans .stationed abroad. In the late 1960s more than 300 KGB officers were sta- tioned in New York City. The demarcation line between re- sponsibilities of the two agencies has always been clear in the minds of CIA operations officers. The investi- gation of suspect Americans or for, eigners is the exclusive province of the FBI within the physical confines of the United States, of the CIA abroad. From the operator's point of view, there are no "gray -zones" in this area. CIA-FBI cooperation in counter- espionage matters is mostly a. one- way street, for the -great majority of Soviet, East European and Cuban es- pionage operations-against the United 'States are mounted overseas. From Its own sources abroad, from its liaisons with friendly security serv- ices, from Americans recruited abroad by a hostile service, the CIA has supplied more leads ,for the FBI to fellow up in the United States than conversely. In most cases these do net involve American citizenship. For example: ? CIA/Vienna 'reports from an agent-source the dispatch of a Soviet "'illegal," (a staff officer .under vete Cover) to the United States. The FBI takes over his surveillance at the port of entry. ?/CIA/Parii forwards information on a Soviet espionage net in New York City from a Russian who has walked in to the Paris embassy. The FI conducts the investigation' that' leads to the arest of Col. Abel. Othes cases initiated by CIA in- volve the return of a U.S. citizen from his overseas post: ? An American technician in Italy has been recruited by a KGB officer for the purpose of getting computer data from his home, office. The fol- low-up in Italy is CIA's job; on his return i3O his headquarters, it is the FBI's job. ? An embassy file clerk in Tokyo is approached by a young KGB offi- cer and 'accepts his proposition' un- der the direction of the CIA station. When she is about to return to Wash- ington, the FII is informed, and it . can request that the operation be terminated overseas or elect to take over the handling of the "double" In Washington. A "Chance" Meeting COOPERATION. between the two A.A agencies on counterespionage targets within the United States has been oven closer when the.CIA can, contribute a means of access to a &Met or East European intelligence officer stationed in New York ? or Washington. In elect, the operation becomes joint. A senior East European intelli- gence ,officer in New York, the rest. 6 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350001-8 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350001:8 . _ .dent in charge, Is 'found to have been. 'the deputy of a defector who has itarted a new life in Latin America. The defector is brought to the United States by CIA and telephones the resident's wife, with whom he had an affair in the old days. He is most cordially received, and has several. night-club metings with the couple during which he proposes that the resident cooperate with the Ameri- cans. The meetings are closely ob- - *served by both CIA and FBI officers. ' Another joint operation involved an American citizen whom the CIA was preparing for a Latin American assignment A file-search reveals that at one time he knew fairly well a secret KGB courier who is making a ? three-day stop in New York City. The American is brought from Pittsburgh and a "chance" meeting with the courier is arranged at an airline ter- minal, with both FBI and CIA offi- cers in attendance. These and similar counterespion- age operations against foreigners of- fer a simple paradigm for countering telligence operations against Ameri- can citizens, the immediate issue be-, fore the inquiries. The basic operat- ing rule is the same: Dealing with American dissidents, militants, or ter- rorists within the United States is thei FBI's job; supporting FBI operations abroad is CIA's job. .Here again FBI-CIA cooperation Is mostly a one-way street, but now running in the other direction. Since the targets are Americans on the do- Imestic scene, the main flow of leads _is from the FBI to CIA for overseas action. Only occasionally does a CIA operation abroad come up with a lead for FBI action at home. Over the years the FBI has made' :countless requests for overseas ac- tion on American Communist leaders traveling abroad to determine whom they. visited, what instructions they received in Paris or Prague, what funds they ,might bring back. Other FBI' targets have been reported on by CIA during their attendance at peace rallies or other Soviet front meetings in Europe. In the 1960s these requests mount- ed and broadened in scope as the New Left, on and off campus, began to create turmoil on the American scene. . Thus, a leading anti-war militant m,akes a trip to Paris, apparently to visit the North Vietnamese delega- tion. Whom does he meet? What do they talk about? Any other contacts? A Black-Panther on the run flees .to Algiers. Does he plan to return? With whom is he in touch? Any con- tacts with the Seviet or Cuban em- basses? A student activist in Chicago flies to Bonn to make contact with the leader of a revolutionary German ,student group. Why? These requests can be multiplied by the hundred. They are often easy to satisfy with the help of friendly foreign security services that have as great an interest as the FPI in run- ning down the internatioal contacts of their militants and revolutionary groups. Sometimes the answers can be obtained from CIA agents whom the local station has inserted in the wide-ranging Soviet and other Com- munist establishments to monitor their non-diplomatic activities. Terrorists and Smugglers DURING THE SIXTIES some CIA stations in Europe also began to pay more attention to such non- Communist organizations of the New Left as the "proletarian" socialist parties and the Trotzkyists, Moaists and Castroites, which sprang up in great profusion. Many were concen- trated on university campuses, and CIA agents within, them were able? to answer questions on their outside connections, including those with par- allel orgaizations in the U.S. move- ment. The names of any Americans that cams up in these operations were given the amount of investigative at- tention they deserved?by the CIA while they are overseas, by the FBI when (and if) they came home. It is perhaps also worth noting that this same clean-cut division of labor applies to the handling of coun- terintelligence operations against in- ternational terrorists and drug-smug- glers, with the leads coming 'mostly from the CIA to the FBI: ? A CIA agent in a Latin Ameri- can terrorist group learns of plans for attacking an American embassy (action CIA) or sending a team to New York City (action FBI). ? A CIA penetration of a heroin ring in Istanbul comes up with the name of an American connection. If the connection is in the United States, the action goes to the FBI and Drug Enforcement Administration. , It is against this pattern of normal practice that the inquiries can best assess individual cases in which the CIA (or the FBI) may have over- stepped its authority. Such cases are likely to fall into that narrow area in which CIA officers carry out opera- tions within the United States that are normally handled by the FBI. In a typical case, a CIA officer in Europe develops over a two-year pe- !trod i close relationship with one of his agents, a Communist organizer. In the European maritime unions. The 'organizer is sent for six months to " Baltimore to work with the local maritime unions, and, the FBI is in- formed. After a working-level dis- cusion, the FBI agrees that the CIA officer continue to handle him be- cause of their close relationship. His reporting goes to the FBI, and the FBI asks the CIA officer for any information it wants from his contact with the organizer. Another type of ease comes even closer to the .thin line between CIA ? and FBI jurisdiction. In this situa- tion, an American student is being ' prepared for an assignment to France, where he will attempt to report on Soviet and North Vietnamese contacts with the New Left. CIA helps him develop a cover for his role as a stu- dent activist by having him associate with radical groups on an American campus. With his bona fides as a "radical" established, he will be more readily accepted by student activists on a French campus. In cases of this sort CIA's domestic actions are directly connected with its foreign counterintelligence re- sponsibilties. Whether they fall into a white, gray or black area will be a subtle question for the inquiries to detennine. ? GroundLevel*-Questions THE INVESTIGATORS have., a- three-fold task: to establish facts, judge their legality or illegal- ity, and recommend executive or leg- islative remedies if they are needed. The operational facts come first. The issue of "domestic spying" ,is sur- rounded by so much confusion and suspicion that the inquiries will do the nation little good unless they come up with the facts that will set- tle questions in the public mind.' If tivil liberties were violated, whose, how and when? If the CIA or thefl FBI overstepped its charter bounds, who did what where? If someone broke the law, who did what? - Answers to these ground-level ques- tions may be of more importance to the citizen than recommendations for remedial legislation, tighter over- sight, or broad injunctions to the President to ride closer herd on his secret agencies. ? It is ,only by coming up with hard facts that the presidential and con- gressional inquests can gain public respect and allay public suspicion of their -own and the CIA's competence and integrity. ? Approved For Release 2001108/08 : allk-RDP77-00432R000100350001-8 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350001-8 NATIONAL REVIEW 31 JAN 1975 CIA in Wonderland In the beginning God created Terra, and set her spinning through space and time. More recenttly a mixed crew of demigods has launched a substitute planet, Media, of their own devising. Like those multiple- space-time con- tinuums in science fiction, Media and Terra intersect at various nodes, but elsewhere their realities, in spite of superficial similarities, have little in common: cf. the standard Media rerun of the Vietnam reality?as pre- sented, say, in nightly TV broadcasts?or the two ver- sions of a school busing dispute. The current CIA flap appears to us as a Media _ epi- "Mv god! I was followed all the wa-7. to the office." sode with only the flimsiest attachments to Terran real- ity. In appropriate demigod mode, the New York Times, burning to get even with the Washington Post and Los Angeles Times for their Watergate triumphs, created this new CIA turmoil out of next to nothing, and in 'a trice it reverberated throughout all Mediadom. Never was there a more numerous crop of.anonymous sources and anonymous victims. In Media, no less than 10,000 inno-; cents have been practically shoved into the furnace by CIA storm troops. (In Terra, meanwhile, not one single citizen has complained of personal harm or damage from their vile machinations.) In New York magazine, Media- nite Tad Szulc poured out 6,000 horror-struck words about what "might" be in "the White House tapes and documents," what the Pentagon may have ordered some: time or other, what "one possibility" is according to what "some knowledgeable State Pepartment officials"' say, what "is widely known in Washington," and about "the extraordinary combination of, coverup of the CIA's domestic 'activity. . with 'esoteric intrigues within the Agency itself" that, "if this theory is correct, we may be facing." Interestingly enough, in Szulc's own Medieepic there are two brief intrusions from the Terran continuum:.. "The dividing line between the Agency's foreign ancl.do-` mestic counterintelligence work ; . . is completely blurred, particularly since J. Edgar Hoover, the FBI's late director, suspended all counterespionage scoopera- : tion with the CIA in 1969.... That which CIA officials' speaking privately have conceded to be the `grey area' of _operations is the surveillance of American citizens stispected of contacts with foreign intelligence. Although the 1947 National Security Act, which created the CIA, specifically forbids domestic police functions by the Agincy, it is argued that such activity is simply an ex- tension of foreign counterintelligence." On the basis of which quotations a sober Terran might conclude: even granted the CIA exceeded its mandate, this would seem to be at least as plausibly attributable to differing inter- pretations of the laws and regulations, and to practical necessities, as to the criminal desire of protofascist plot- ters. ? President Ford seems to have estimated this. fume and fuss at its true value. His Blue Ribbon Commission con- sists, for the most part, of solid an4..rOsonably well in- formed types who know what goes on and are able to distinguish real events in Terra from pseudo-events in Media. We may hope and expect that they will gradu- ally anesthetize the frothing patient that the 'President assigned to their clinic. We should note, however, that, once it was raised, many persons here and elsewhere joined this 'hue and cry against the CIA, not to sell newspapers or TV pro- grams. nor to correct abuses dangerous to liberty, but destroy CIA and to make it impossible for the U.S. to maintain any sort of effective counterintelligence and counterespionage function. Ex-agent Philip Agee, the creep whose book, Inside the Company: CIA Diary, has just been published in Britain, is one of those who do not disguise their objectives. He has named hundreds of CIA-- agents, collaborators, and cover organizations he says he came to know about on a Latin American assignment, and he states he has done so with the deliberate purpose ? of blowing their identities and wrecking CIA operations. And this is often the effect of the exposures or alleged exposures (which can be equally damaging) now being made daily by those who insist they have only the patri- otic aim of protecting the citizens of the U.S. from police state practices. You cannot have a confidential agency unless it oper- ates confidentially. Before tossing aside the possibility, it would be well to reflect on some of the things we as persons and as a nation confront at the moment: global and rapidly growing clandestine terrorist organizations; nuclear weapons on land, on and under the sea, and in the air, all immune to direct inspections; international revolutionary and subversive organizations pledged to the destruction of our nation and our society:---to narne a few not likely to be exorcised by Media editorials. *8 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIALRDP77-00432R000100350001-8- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010035000.1-8 ? TIME 10 Fl.,13 1975 THE PRES1DENCY/HUGH MET one man said, that Johnson aides thought they were not fit for the-Pres- L LI and Domestic Spying ident to see. They were sent back to the bureau. Shortly after Johnson took office, the., transcript and tapes of Martin Luther King's bedroom activ- ities were spirited to him. He read the accounts, which an aide described as being "like an erotic book." He listened to the tapes that even had the noises of the bedsprings. ? When a Johnson assistant oncedefended King's antiwar ac- tivities, L.B.J. exploded: "Goddammit, if only you could hear what that hypocritical preacher does sexually." The aide tried to joke. "Sounds good, Mr. President," he said. A huge grin ap- peared momentarily on Johnson's face, but he quickly caught it and returned to his threatening self. An aide remembers being with Johnson and Hoover when Hoover was reporting on important people linked to the gam- bling world. Johnson was fascinated, but hesitant. How did Hoover know these things? he asked. Because of wiretaps, Hoo- ver told the President. Then Hoover would drop a tidbit or two. Johnson was all ears, but he would protest, "All right, all right," as if he wanted Hoover to stop. Hoover did not stop. He kept on talking, and L.B.J. kept on listening. Johnson was hooked and Hoover knew it. Yet for all of this, Johnson sometimes denounced bugging as if it were original sin. "The worst thing in our society would be to not be able to pick up a phone for fearof it being tapped," he told one of his men. "I don't want any wiretapping," he said when he was designing the Safe Streets Act. However, Senator John McClel- lan talked him into including a provision for wiretapping. The Congress then provided more au- thority than agreed open, so son ordered ordered the Justice Depart- ment not to use that power. At one point Johnson became so angry at Hoover and the bu- reau that he ordered his Secret Service detail chief, Rufus Young- blood, to go oyer to Justice and take ever the FBI. Youngblood went there, wandered around for a few days, but the order was never formalized. Two of John- son's closest friends warned L.B.J. that Hoover was disregard- ing the civil liberties of many people. It was then that Johnson gave his pungent summation of why he kept Hoover: -I would rather have him inside the tent pissing out than outside the tent pissing in." None of the Johnson men remembers any written orders to the FBI or the CIA on all this dirty linen. The material just came in, and Johnson seemed to understand. But then there came a day when that changed, at leastwith the FBI. After John- son had announced that he would not seek re-election in 1968, he learned from an intelligence report that Anna Chennault, widow of famed World War II Flying Tiger General Claire Chennault and a money raiser for the 1968 Nixon campaign. had got in touch with the Saigon government. It was suspect- ed, at the least, that she was urging them not to cooperate with Johnson in his last days, but wait for Nixon to be elected. The belief in the White House then was that a high Republican trav- eling with Vice 'Piesidential Candidate Spiro Agnew had got to Mme. Chennault to urge her to carry the message to Saigon. When Johnson demanded ' to know who the contact on the Agnew plane might have been, the FBI's proven ability to de- tect such sources suddenly and mysteriously faltered. As one of Johnson's most trusted Men put it last week, "The power had passed." Indeed it had. Another conspirator was about to enter the White House, and the FBI was getting ready for him. As the mists of a decade of White House conspiracy are rolled back, there is a better view of Lyndon Johnson. The new trails Of CIA and FBI domestic spying, however uncertain as yet, lead back to his Oval Office and that towering figure of contradictions. Those ravaged patrons of Richard Nixon are quick to suggest that L.B.J. was as bad as or worse than the dis- graced 37th President. But that has not yet been proved. What seems more likely is that there was an unusual com- bination of people and events in the mid-1960s. There was J. Edgar Hoover, the aging head of the FBI, who kept in his pri- vate safe the hottest files on important people and dribbled the information out to Presidents when it served his power-hungry purpose. Hoover knew his man; Johnson had a voracious ap- petite for gossip. Then there was Cartha (Deke) Deloach, Hoo- ver's deputy, who felt that he might be named Hoover's re- placement under Johnson. Deloach became a courier to the White House of the juicy gleanings from the FBI. And then there was Johnson, schooled in the tangles of Texas politics, tutored by Master Plotter Franklin Roosevelt, tempered in the Senate's school of the deal, and ultimately a man who believed that there were no accidents in politics, only conspir- acies. He armored himself with in- timate knowledge of those he be- lieved conspired against him, which was almost everybody. "I don't trust anybody but Lady Bird," he once said, "and some- -times I'm not sure about her." He never accepted the find- ings of the Warren Commission and believed always that John Kennedy's assassination was a conspiracy by Communists in re- taliation for a reported effort by Kennedy. to have Fidel Castro killed. He believed that the race riots in the ghettos and the peace marches in the streets were being paid for by the Red Chinese. "I know there is Chinese Communist money there," he kept tell- ing his aides. ? L.B.J. was convinced that BobbyKennedy had bugged him all during the time that he was Vice President. He frequently called the CIA "Murder Incorporated" because he believed that the CIA had gone ahead and killed South Vietnam's President Ngo Dinh Diem against Kennedy's wishes. He had a further no- tion that the CIA was somehow linked with the Mafia. ? He read and reported !.yith relish the findings of the Trea- sury in the biggest tax cases. He bragged once that he knew within minutes what Senator William Fulbright, then chair- man of the Foreign Relations Committee, had said at lunch at the Soviet embassy or what Soviet contacts had told other mem- bers of Congress at cocktail parties. He insisted that the So- viets were building Viet Nam oppositiOn in Congress and the press. Fle,slapped his thigh with delight when he got a report from the FBI about a prominent Republican Senator who fre- quented a select Chicago bordello and had some kinky sexual preferences, all of which were reported in detail. The infor- mation came from a madam who was an FBI informer. As the 1968 Democratic Convention approached, the FBI 'sent Johnson almost daily reports on the people and events of that unsettled time. One Johnson aide remembers that there .was information about the activities of Congressmen and Sen- ators. The FBI reports were often included in the President's night reading, and sometimes they were such "garbage," as AP HOOVER & JOHNSON AT THE WHITE HOUSE IN 1967 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : 6IA9RDP77-00432R000100350001-8 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350001-8 rt By Harry Kelly Chicago Tribinge Press Service CHICAGO TRIBUNE 2 FEB 1975 ? WA.SIIINGTONL.The nanie,? :On ? th'n door of the second floor is Intertel.. It is a name of intrigue, mystery, and con- troversY. - ? . ? It inspired suspicion in the heart of White House spy 'Jack Caulfield. He contended Intertel was a Democratic espionage operatibn with ? an. "old boy's network" in all the agencies of the Nix-? on administration; ' -'T? ? e ? ; Intertel, as a blue-ribbon private se? - curity firm, ? has been involved with all ? the 'headline ? 'mites: Howard Hughes, I. T. T., Las Vegas, Caribbean gambling, the, United ? States Drug Enforcement Administration,. and the Mafia. NOW IT IS under .the eyes of two , Senate investigating committees with ? former Nixon assistant Charles Colson telling two senators in an out-of-prison ? Interview that he believes Intertel has . been a Central Intelligence Agency 'Cove. ? -?"That's bull," says Intertel President Robert Peloquin, onetime Navy intelli- gence officereNaticaial Security Agency aide and Justice Department official in,. the Kennedy and Johnson administra- tions. ? : Colson 'reportedly contended in his talk with Senders,. Lowell Weicker 111., Conn.), .and Howard Baker [Re Tenn.) that he once had been warned in the White House that "you can't tell where the Hughes Corporation begins and the CIA ? leaves off." Hughes has been a Major Intertel client. ? ? ? , INTERTEL IS? housed. on the second floor of an office building a short walk from the White House. The building has become a little, aeedy. with age and its , first :.floor has been disemboweled by ?. subway construction. ? ? ? ? ?-? ? Its : appearance, only adds to the shadowy charisma of Intertel, less well known aseInternntional Intelligence inc. It is to Private eyes what the Federal. Bureau' of 'Investigation , is .. to Sane. Spade.. TIME 10 FEB 1975 ? 'Intertel was -organized after Richard Nixon entered the White House as 'a management consulting firm _specializ- ing in security .arid.background investi- gations: -; ? . . .:ITS ROSTER of enipIdyes includes a - farmer supervisor of the FBI's internal security investigations, the deputy di- reetor of 'security for the State Depart- .mat; chief Of the National Security, Agency's special projects section, a su- pervisor. of 'intelligence' activities. for the FBI, chief Of the former .Bureau of Narcotics and. Dangerous Drugs' interne gence division, and chief of. the Internal, Revenue Service's intelligence division. Intertel's director of intelligence is, 'Edward M. Mullin, formerly of the nare ?Cbties.bureau, the FBI, AND CIA. . . ? ; Intertel has been caught in a corner 4. the tangled.web of Watergate. ? ??-? COLSON,' WHO FOR' months has. been trying ? to lay Watergate' at the' door of the CIA, was brought from de- ?tention to the Alexandria courthouse to t'qk to -Weieker? en;1 ?? :.Iii addition to claiming that the CIA' used or owned Intertel, Colson report-: edly contended that when Nixon once ,demanded he investigate the possibility. Of CIA involvement in Watergate, lie: was warned off by J. Fred,13uzliardt, a former Defense Department .! counsel and White House lawyer. . ? 'Sources quoted-Colson as saying Buz- hardt told him some CIA and Hughes operations had intermingled and he should stay away for fear of involving "some important Republicans." ? THE SOURCE'S acknowledge the like- lihood that the CIA used as a cover in overseas operations the Hughes Corpo- ration which also manufactured techni- cal or scientific equipment for the intel- ligence agency., ? . As another background link, a hood- ? lum testified that ex-FBI agent Robert Leapin' Johnson lizards . Re CIA "Revelations and Resigna- tions" [Jan. 131: Wow! For security rea- sons, in '62 during the Kennedy Admin- istration a Domestic Operations Divi- sion (DOD) was set up in the CIA! Holy Democrat! And?wiretaps in the '60s! Leapin' Johnson lizards! Not only Wa- tergates, but also Demogates! Will Bartlett Daver-Foxcroft, Me. ? The information on citizens in the CIA and FBI dossiers [Feb. 31 gives these agencies power over Americans. At the same time, the secrecy,with which these agencies operate denies citizens infor- mation, and therefore_power, over them. ie Mallen, who- managed Hughes' hotel and casino operations in Las Vegas ,Nev., tried to hire him 'to assassinate Cuban Premier Fidel Castro, saying he was acting for the CIA..,..: . Some Intertel people think the reason Colson thinks?or says lie thinks?inter- tel is . a CIA front is that Hughes hired. another firm which was a CIA cover. . HUGHES EMPLOYED as a pUblie relations firm in Washington the 'Mul- len Co., which had close linv-s with the. CIA. It. afforded cover for CIA opera-:, tions, employed fanner' CIA agent and- White /louse -,"plumber" E. Howard. Hunt, and its president, Robert .Ben- nett, reported his ?knowledge of Hunt's activities to a CIA case officer soon :after the Watergate break-in, well be-- fore Hunt's involvement became public.' , As further fuel for the. Senate investi- gation of the CIA, according to sources, classified CIA documents that Baker tied in compiling .an early report on the agency's links to the ? Watergate r. Scandal make several references to In- .3,.._,..3 ? _The sources declined to disclose. what is: said in the still-classified.docu. Meats. ? ? -.?..Reportedly there- is ."no solid evi- dence" in the material?wbich Baker hopes the CIA will _ultimately declassify Intertel was used by the CIA. ? "?-? INTERTEL-- ? OFFICIALS Peloquin' and General Counsel Torn McKeon deny it categorically. . "We are not Owned .by and never in .the existence 'of the organization been... employed by the CIA," Peloquin said. ? . IN THE BACKGROUND is the theory of Senate Watergate investigators, is- sued in a staff reyeirt, that the Water- gate break-in may have been an attempt to :discover whether Democratic Nation-e al . Committee. .(hairman . Lawrence O'Brien hadeeny damaging &cements - linking Hughes and Nixon....0'Erien 'had also been on the Hughes payroll. In the case of the cm, even its budget is secret. The Constitution's requirement that "a legal statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all pub- lic money shall be published from time to time" has simply been disregarded. We need two reforms. We need an end to all political dossier building by the FBI, the CIA and all other govern- ment agencies. We also need full infor- mation on what our agencies of govern- ment are doing. A government with information about us that denies us information about it turns the very idea of a democ- racy upside down. Aryeh Neier. Executive Director American Civil Liberties Union '10 New York City Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350991-8 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350001-8 WASHINGTON POST 3 February 1975 Chilean Cites '71 Kissinger Assurances ? By Lewis H. Diuguid .? Washington Post Staff Writer Former Ambassador Or- lando Letelier charged last week that Henry A. Kissinger aJok the 'initiative to assure him personally in late 1971 of nonintervention by the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency in Chile, although the public rec- rd now clearly indicates in- aolvement by the agency. Letelier, ambassador here or the government of Presi- , azat Salvador Allende, was imprisoned for a year by the atlitary junta that seized power in September, 1973. He is now a lecturer at American University. Kissinger's initiative in ' De- 'ember, 1971, followed allega- tions of a CIA role in the first "najor anti-Allende demonstra- tion in Santiago, the Women's march of the empty pots. ? "Kissinger asked me to as- sure President Allende that there was not a single person !iivolved either directly or in- aiireett, ," Letelier said. Letelier first made the alle- gation in. a televiaion inter- view, saying the assurance of aionintervention was made by a high official. Asked to con- firm that the official was Kis- ;Anger, Letelier did so. ? The meeting took place fol- lowing a dinner at the home of columnist Joseph Alsop. Lete- .3ier said he was told Kissinger would come with a special :message for him. "He drew me ? aside to say that there were no CIA people involved in any internal Chilean problem," said the former ambassador. A spokesman for the State Department said Kissinger "had 0. recollection of any conversa- tion" such as Letelier describes, and does not recall meeting him at the Alsop residence. Alsop does remember the din- ner but he said he did not re- member Kissinger coming. When the 1971 women's po- test against food shortages took place, pro-Allende news- papers in Chile and elsewhere noted the similarity of the demonstration to those b y women in Brazil, allegedly -dvith CIA backing, prior to the 1964 coup ousting a left-wing government in that country. Letelier said he believed Kissinger's assurances, passed them to Allende and used them as a basis for counseling restraint in later instances when his government sus- pected U.S. involvement in Chilean affairs. - ? Kissinger at that time was the presidential adviser on na- tional security affairs. In other encounters, Kissinger in- dicated personal respea foi: Allende and said he was con- sidering a visit to Chile, ac- cording to Letelier. 'However, according to Rep.: Michael J. Harrington (D- Mass.), CIA Director William E. Colby testified' before a 1-louse ' subcommittee 'last, April that the Forty Commit- ! tee of the National Security " Council authorized $5 million : for anti-Allende efforts follow- ing the election of the Marxist i in late 1970. . The government has not specified what form that activ- ity took, beyond a press con- ference statement by Presis. dent Ford last Septemberindia eating that the money went to support opposition parties and newspapers. . State Department authori ties privately contend the CIA efforts were aimed at .keeping an oppressed opposition alive, not at bringing down the Al- - lende government. They deny] that any aid went to. strikes on demonstrators such ? as the i women. Letelier said that in retro-- spect he sees evidence of as wide U.S. role, an "infernal..i 'machine" of outside interven- tion that he contends was deci- sive in Allende's fall. . a Letelier also said he. be- lieves that the CIA was re.; sponsible for the May, 1972,', break--hi at. the Chiienn. em- bassy. No arrests were ever made i?n the break-in, which: came a month before the in truders were caught at the. Watergate. He, noted that: Chile was then' in critical ne- gotiations with the Interne- ' tional Telephone and Tele- graph Corp. on nationalization of its properties. Two months earlier, colum- nist Jack Anderson had pub- lished documents revealing ITT efforts to engage the CIA .in efforts to prevent Allende's ascension to the presidency. Letelier said the only item of importance stolen from the em- bassy was his mailing list, but he said other rifled documents undoubtedly were photograph- ed. - By mid-1973, Letelier indi- cated that Chile had further indications of CIA involve- ment. He cited 'statements by 'an American saying he was a former CIA agent who sought a Chilean passport in return for revelations ofainti-Allende activi ties. Letelier said that he could not recall the man's name, but that Chile assisted him in, reaching Sweden after taking 1 his testimony in Santiago. 1 An American pilot later I called the embassy offering to sell information on flight of . arms to rightist Chilean gnu; . rillas; Letelier said. The offer was turned down but the gen-, era data conformed with the government's own findings of i I alleged CIA activities, he added.. BALTIMORE SUN 4 February 1975 lAn emotional Kissinger ? blasts Post on lying storS7 ? Washington Ell reau of The Sun "to say that there were no CIA people involved in any internal Chilean problem." William E. Colby, director of - the Central Intelligence Agency, testified to a congres- sional committee last spring that the Forrty Committee, which oversees American intel- ligence activities, authorized the expenditure of $5 million for activities against the Al- lende government. Mr. Kissin- ger is chairman of the commit- tee. Mr. Kissinger said yesterday that since the Post carried his denial well into the body of the story, readers would be eft with the impression that he had lied. Washington?Henry A. Kis- singer, his voice strained from emotion, yesterday attacked the Washington Post for its handling of a charge that he once lied to the former Chilean ambassador to Washington. The Post, said in its Mon- day editions that the ambassa- dor, Orlando Letelier, said that Mr. Kissinger had falsely told him in 1971 that the Central Intelligence Agency had abso- lutely no involvement in Chi- lean politics. Mr. Letelier was at the time representing the government of Salvador Allende. He said that Mr. Kissinger took him aside at a dinner party given by Joseph Alsop, the columnist, BALTIMORE SUN 11 February 1975 ? ? CIA Prescience: Domestic spying may not be the only way in which the CIA has viewed its mandate a bit too broadly. A recent CIA move to ,initiate a privately- ,' conducted soidy of mass transit,..cat vh in Europe would seem to be an example, especially since the Department of Transportation probably long since has gathered the information and would give it to the CIA free of charge. But the concern motivating the study makes sense. In a letter outlining the stud- 'y, the CIA says that economic, ecgldgical and other _ concerns may "drastically alter future ground and - ? air transport requirements," and that most new mass-transit technology is being developed abroad. ? ,U.S. industry, the letter says, may be facing danger- ous competitive threats if it doesn't catch up. Na CIA investigation is needed to tell the nation that ,rail and mass transit technology here has been, largely moribund while the Europeans and Japanese ? have been forging ahead with super high-speed trains, magnetic levitation and tracked. hovercraft. But in displaying its interest, the intelligence agenCy is displaying prescience of a kind American industry still seems to lack. During ? that period the Forty Committee chaired by Kissinger authorized $2.5 mil- lion more for Chile, some of it to influence an important elec- tion, according to the Harring- ton account of Colby's testi- mony, Despite the evidence cited by Letelier, Chile made no formal accusation against the United States. Letelier left ?Vashington to become foreign minister and then defense minister. By August, 1973, ,he said, the government ? had taken Up a new- round of talks aimed at settling. differences with the. United States. . Left-wing Socialists advised Allende against negotiating with 'a country they believed was seeking to 'overthrow his. government, but Letelier said Allende went ahead, in part as a concession to the armed forces which sought concilia- tion. The talks in August prod- uced--no public results and the coup came Sept. 11.. . Approved For Release 2001/08/K : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350001-8 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350001-8 ? WASHINGTON POST ' 3 February 1975 _. Meg Greenfield " Everything has its usefulness, in. eluding, I suspect, the muscle-bound and accident-prone inefficiencies of mut' federal government. Consider only the saving incompetence of the Water- * gate crowd. Frustrated in 'their -at- 4empts to !get the great engine of gov-.. eminent to do the dirty work for them, in the end. they foundered on their own weakness for bureaucratic compli- cation and excess: too many records, too many participants, too much organ- izational structure, too much junk. These thoughts are prompted by the current 4ontroversy in Washington over the ,dossier-making and/or file- -keeping issue. iSsue. You do not, I think, have to resolve the still-open questions concerning- the latest charges against the FBI and the CIA to accept one 'general proposition. It is?as any small ? businessman or student-loan applicant or war protester can tell you?that ' government at all levels has long since crossed the 'boundary between legiti- mate and illegitimate intelligence ,gathering and file making 'on Ameri- ;-ean citizens. For the CIA and the? FI are far frdm being unique among Fed- .eral agencies in having investigators in the field or in amassing vast amounts 'rig material of questionable relevance 'and propriety in their files. And that 'is where the saving sprawl and ineptness of government come in. For it may be accounted one of the blessings of our . time. that for all its snoopery and stor- age capacity, the government does not ,necessarily know what it knows?or, even 'how to find out. I offer in evidence a personal remi- ,niscence from the Kennedy years. The episode, -set off by an angry letter 'from -Bertrand Russell to The Nest- :York Times, has always struck me as 'being both illuminating -and oddly re- assuring. Lord Russell, feeling more scourgelike than informative, in effect 'had only this to say: .it was a sad com; inentary on America's pretensions to? democracy. that, for all our talk of freedom, the government had locked up poor Don Martin for expressing his :dissent and now was refusing to let him out of prison?for shame. Don Martin? Evidently Meng with a posse of other reporters, I rang the ap- propriate 'Assistant to the Attorney General and asked who Don Martin was and what the Department of Jus- tice had done to him. "God, don't we wish we knew," came the reply, fol- lowed by assurances from the harassed' aide who was working on it that I would be placed prominently on the "call-back", 'list of . journalists wha wanted to Ictur.v. Tine passed, and so did my faith in my prominence on the list. So I did the obvious, reasonable thing?which is somehow outside government's ' grasp. Figuring it sounded like some- * thing the American Civil Liberties Un- ion would know about, I called a law- yer there and was told at once that Don Martin was a youth who had been jailed for his part in a "row-out" pro- test against Our nuclear-submarine fa- ' cility in Groton, Conn. I was referred to young Mr., Martin's attorney who, after a helpful chat, in turn put me on to the federal judge in the case. The judge discussed the public aspects of the case and then suggested that I seek Justice-Department permission to speak to a person he named over there who was familiar with the status of ef- forts to secure.the youth's release. , No one who works in Washington will be surprised at the greeting I re- ceived from the (now frantic) Justice ? 'Department aide -whom I .called to- ' The writer is deputy editor of the 'editorial page. This column orgio natty appeared in Newsweek. seek that permission several 'hours af- ter our original exchange. "Look," he blurted into the phone, "we're working on it, and we will call you back. We are 90 per cent certain it's something that came out of the civil-rights dem- onstrations in Albany, Ga., but we' want to nail it down." One cheer, then, for government's inefficiency as keeper arid producer of the files. Even when it ought to know, it often doesn't. Still, one cheer is plenty. For this built-in bureaucratic maladroitness has its limits as a virtue ?and also its potential as a vice. It's not just that fancy computer retrieval systems now threaten to make the util- ization of government files much eas- ier. The fact is that bureaucratic in- competence and point-missing have also managed to stuff government's files with irrelevant, damaging and false information concerning thou- sands of citizens. The late Francis E. Walter, who was chairman of the House Un-American Activities Committee during the time of some of its worst excesses, once told; me that his own name had turned up on one of the committee's dragnet lists of potential subversives, owing to a cOntribution he had made to a Spanish ' 12 Civil War refugee program: Re found. this fact inexpressAly funny. But as.- one who has ever tried to straightna out "a ease of mistaken identity with a credit bureau or who has followed the nightmare experiences of those pubbe and private figures who have sought te expunge from the record half-hiddesr libels that have plagued their careens will know that these things are any- thing but funny. The Fibber MeGeet closet of government-acquired WW1- mation on the personal lives of citizens may be?happily?a model of disorder- 'and inaccessibility, but from time to time someone is going to open tin- - door. The recently enacted federal iirivary statute attempts to diminish some at these dangers. But since it is limited ha scope, and leaves enforcement of new curbs on government agencies largely-- to the agencies themselves, I think its effect is bound to 'be modest. For we can take it as the nearest thing Ire have to an immutable law that instils.: tions involved in intelligence gather,: lug and record keeping can almost at-- ways think of a reason to pursue their -inquiries, and almost never of a makes to close or destroy the files. It is inter- esting to note, in this connection, that -even as members of Congress express their outrage' over the: FBI's pryhg into their private lives, there has been _ no congressional groundswell to dis- mantle ,the notorious files (on other'd of the House Un-American Activities_ Committee, which was allowed to am- ble along, pursuing its inquiries an( making its official notations until just a few weeks ago. , The-sad fact is that there is hardly an agency or branch of government or political group or faction that has not somehow contributed to the condition in which we now find ourselves, in - eluding, I would add, those of us whit have urged an enlarged governmental role in people's affairs over the pad few decades?without thinking abotdi this predictable result. Now we are well beyond the point where inquiriei into the possible malefaction of certain government employees or passage cit modest statutes can have much effeet. For we have to decide not just how we wish to control this intelligence-gather- ing mania in the future but what we wish to do with the mountain of exist ing government files that clearly ex- ceed-the hounds of any decent national. purpose or need. On the theory that we can't count on Washington's in- competence forever, I am for a bon fire. _ . Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350001:8 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350001-8 NEW YORK TIMES 5 February '1975 COLBY WITHHOLDS' DATA ON POLICE AID Asserts Programs of Local .Agencies Would Suffer ? From C.I.A. Disclosure By DAVID BURNHAM Special to The New York Times 'WASHINGTON, Feb' 4?Wil- liam E. Colby, tWe Director of Central Intelligence, has re- fused to identify police depart- ments he says his agency assis- ted'untit two years ago because "such publication could hamper current police programs." . t Mr. Colby, in a letter to Re- !presentative Edward I. Koch, Democrat-Liberal of Manhat- tan, said, "Confidentaility of re- lationships is generally a prere- quisite to good intelligence. If we are forced to violate the trust? and confidence under which these relatios relation- ships were established, our re- putation and effectiveness as a serious intelligence agency will be seriously impared." The Central' ? Intelligence Agency is currently facing in- vestigations of allegedly illegal involvement in domestic intel- ligence activities by committees of the House and 'Senate and a panel established by President Ford. Mr. Koch first inquired about the C.I.A.'s relationships with police departments two years ago following publication ? in The New York Times of reports that high ranking officials in the New York Police Depart- ment had undergone training at the agency's headquarters in Langley, Va. ? For Dozen Departments As a result of Mr. Koch's in- quiry, the House Government Operations Committee initiated a limited investigation that re, suited in the C.I.A.'s admission that it had provided assistance and training to "a dozen city and county police depart- ments." The agency, though it insisted that the contacts with the po- lice departments did not violate its charter, announced, in a let- ter to the House committee dat- ed Jan. 29, 1973, the termina- tion of all such activities. About this time, the identities of several additional police de- partments that had been trained or otherwise assisted by ithe C.I.A, became known. Be- sides New Yak, they included the departments in Washing- ton, Boston, Fairfax County, Va., and Montgomery County, Md. It was a letter from Mr. Ko- chon Jan. 9 ,of this year about the identity of the remaining", seven departments the agency, had assisted that prompted Mr. Colby to refuse to-name them. After making his request, Mr. Koch said, "With the recent press reports concerning the extensive activities of the C.I.A.,. I would think that the Approve BALTIMORE NEWS AMERICAN 2 FEB 1975 . ; 7,16,14iiiR1A7ViVE MEANS Colson & the CIA Probe- During two Gig prison conversations, Charles Colson has given Sen. Lowell Weicker, R-Conn., a. vivid account of White House-influenced covert activities conduct- ed by the Central Intelligence Agency dur- ing the Nixon administration. The senator plans to volunteer the sub- stance of those conversations to the new Senate committee to investigate CIA opera- tions of the President's commission to probe the agency's alleged domestic sur- veillance activities, which is chai Vice President Nelson Rockefeller. When Colson was a ruthless and power- ful White House assistant pulling the strings of some Nixon team "dirty tricks,"Weicker would have nothing to do with him. Their distaste was mutual. But now that Colson is behind bars, convicted. of obstructing jus- tice, Weicker has been to visit him twice.. ? ? ? Furthermore, Weicker has indicated to associates that he is convinced Colson is a. different man, capable of being a credible witness in areas of his personal knowledge. lithe investigating bodies also believe that, either or both may ask Colson to testify. ? After Colson pleaded guilty to one count of obstructing justice in return for the Jus- tice Department dropping all ocher charges pending against him, it-was.widely expect- ed that he would provide significant infor-' ?mation about the Watergate crimes. While a member of the inner Nixon crowd, howev- er, Colson apparently operated somewhat independently of the others. If he knew of any bombshells implicating the president, he never dropped them. Colson- has not been fully Interrogated under oath in public, however, about his knowledge of specific CIA* operations. Ac- cording to sources close to Weicker, Colson has now made several allegations about. -CIA domestic activities, at least one of which purportedly implicates Secretary of . State Henry Kissinger. In the White House, Colson apparently dealt with CIA personnel occasionally.' Howard Hunt Jr.,-a former CIA agent who is one of the convicted Watergate burglars,' !information I am requestint, !could not possibly be consi- dered classified." According to the C.I.A. and the New York Police Depart- ment, 14 New York policemen, including former First Deputy Police Commissioner William H. I. Smith,. received training in the computerized handling of intelligence information during September, 1972. The training for the other de- partments reportedly included. the detection of wiretaps and other secret recording devices, the techniques of secret surveil- lance and methods for finding xplosive charges. ? The C.I.A. said it did not ber lieve the "training activities violated either the letter or spirit of the 1947 law establish- ing the agency, which said it "shall have no police, subpoena, law enforcement or internal se- curity functions" in the United eates. ? . For Release 2001/08/08: ? .. ? operated from an office inside the 'White House listed as under Colson's general su- pervision. John Dean accused Colson of or- dering Hunt to forge a State Department cable linking the assessinanation of South Vietnamese. President Ngo Diah Diem In 1963 with the late President Kennedy, but Colson denied the charge. ??When the grim Spector of prison began to loom over him. Colson 'dramatically be- came a religious convert. Despite the fact he went off to jail clutching two Bibl?.nol.- all those who usedeo know him are satisfied that he has sincerely reformed. But Weick- er appears to believe that new and tnereno- ble impulses now motivate Colson to tell the truth. It is interesting that it should be Weick- er who has become Colson's contact with -the outside world. Weicker was the most outspoken Republican on the Senate Water- gate Committee, the first to denounce the Nixon crowd and the first to call for the res- ignations of H.R. (Bob) Haldeman and John Ehrlichnian. He accused the Nixon .Atire;qn- istration of hurting the Republican Pa- and "dragging politics into the gutter" and urged the internal Revenue Service to et- examine Nixon's tax deduction for his vice presidential papers, all back at a time when other GOP politicians were gingerly pussy- footing around the problem in hopes that it would vanish into thin air. He has done his own investigation i from time to time and independently disded the other day that a former CIA agent had viewed assassination equipment displayed by a Virginia firm which wished to sell it to the government. ? He did not, however, seek a spot ea the new Senate committee probing the CIA.. "I don't want to be known just as an investiga- tor," he told associates. .But colleges point out that Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott, who made the selections, was not pleased by Weicker's Watergate perfse-m- ance and views him:as an untrustworthy : maverick. . It doesn't matter. Weicker runs his own show anyway. . NEW YORK TIMES 4 February 1975 ROCKEFELLER SEES I LONGER C.I.A. INQUIRY - ? WASHINGTON, Feb. 3 (AP)?* Vice President Rockefeller said today that his commission's in- vestigation of alleged domestic spying by the Central Intelli- gence Agency might require more than the three-month period set by President Ford. ? Speaking to reporters at the end of the commission's fourth weekly meeting, Mr. Rockefeller said "we'll do our best" to complete the inquiry by April, but added that "we may have ,to ask for additional time." I The panel heard further testi- Imony from Richard Ober, who once reportedly headed a coun-1 terintelligence group, which the C.I.A. director, William E. Colby, has conceded knt files1 on 10,000 American etizens.! Mr. Rockefeller descried Mr.i Ober as the "former chief of the special operations group of i C.I.A.," but refused to discuss! Mr. Ober's testimony. Mr. Ober, now on the staff of the National Security Coun- cil, again declined to make anyi comment to reporters. It was his second appearance befor& the Rockefeller commission. I Earlier, the commission heard from Lyman B. Kirkpatrick Jr.? formerly No. 3 man at the agency and now a profsor oft political science at Brown Uni- versity.? - t CIA1ADP77-00432R000100350001-8 ? Approved For Release 2001/08/0Q : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350001-8 77714;,3;lay,Feb. 1975 *A7k-Ii&dfog-1,6f1 t From - By Lawrence Meyer ?? Wastithgton Post Staff Writer James W. McCord's letters to the ? Central Intelligence Agency written :lafter the -Watergate break-in Were with- -held from the Watergate pros- ecutors on orders - from CIA 'Director Richard M. -Helms, according to sworn testimony. Helms ordered thel letters held by the CIA, despite the strong recommendation of CIA security director Howard J. Osborn- that they should be 'turned over to the FBI, after! the, agency's general counsel told Helms that the CIA had .no legal obligation to give them to the FBI, according to testimony before a House sub- committee. ? ; The letters, Written between the Watergate break-in and the start of ,the first Water- gate trial, could have had a "significant effect" on the in- vestigation, according to act- ing U.S. Attorney Earl J. Sil- bert, the chief, prosecutor in the first Watergate trial. , The CIAis failure to turn -Watergate conspirator Mc- Cord's letters over to the in- vestigators was called "a sup- pression of evidence" by Rep: Lucien Nedzi, chairman of the House Armed Services Sub- committee on Intelligence.dur- ing closed hearings in May, 1973. Testimony from those hearings was ,recently; made public- ? ? '4 '''Helms ordered McCord's six letters to be held. by the CIA after the agency's general .counsel, Lawrence Houston, told Helms "that we had no le- gal responsiblity *to pass the. letter on. to any Other author-. ites" according to Houston's testimony. Houston testified that in his experience as general counsel to the CIA since 1947 criminal defendants had attempted to construct a defense by involv- ing the CIA, In many cases, ;Houston said, this attempt was 'a bluff.and the ? bluff collapsed when the CIA waited out the situation: - ? - Where the defense was actu- ally presented, Houston 'said,' the CIA countered it by pre- senting documentation or wit- nesses to refute the claim.- 1 Houston did not, however persuade Nedzi during his tes- timony that the CIA' had acted properly in withholding the letters from the 'FBI, the pros- ecutors and ,the ,Justice le o eifers I, Inquiry Told partment. ; In a session that at tithes be- 'came heated, Houston admit- ted that part of his motivation 'was to keep the CIA from be,: ing linked' publicly to the Watergate affair. : Osborn, during his testi- mony orf`- May 24, 1973, reL. counted how a letter signed only "Jim" in an envelope ad- dressed to Helms with no re- turn address had Come to his desk about Aug. 1, 1972?some six weeks after the Watergate break-in;At first dismissing it as "crank' mail," Osborn said he then recognized the signa- ture as that Of McCord, who had worked for Osborn at the CIA. . , , Osborn testified that he showed the letter to Helms and said-" that he was "reasonably sure" it was from McCord: "I told him that I felt very strongly that the letter should be turned over to the Federal- Bureau of Investiga- tion." Helms, Osborn said, decided to get Houston's legal advice on the matter. "I participated, I stayed in and remained in that conver- satiou when Mr. Houston and Mr. Helms 'discussed the legal' aspects of 'it," -Osborn, testi- fied. "At the time, I don't think I really. agreed with it;; but, you, k-nowi r wo'rked for. Mr. Helms, 'he Was my boss," , - In one letter;: dated Dec. 29, . 1972, and addressed to one of McCord's former CIA col- leagues, McCord asserted: "I have the evidence of the in- i I volvemeet. of (former Attor- ,ney General John N.) Mitchell , and others,' sufficient to con- vince a jury, the Congress and ; the Press." ; When Houston argued that the CIA had no legal reSponsiL bility to turn the letters over to the FBI or prosecutors, Nedzi told' him that he agreed "that you had no direct legal responsibility ,at that time to do this," but that "the reason- able thing to have done would have been to immediately noti- fy the FBI that such a le,tter was from a,defendant.... Houston :said that it was "very obvious from the news- papers that any information, that went to the prosecutor'' office was appearing in the pa- pers very shortly after ,that . . .And since, the last thing we" wanted to .: do was interject ourselves into the case and stir tip -newspaper stories and rumors that we had been 'involved, I ,felt that I wantedl to deal with this matter with the Departinent of Justice and I the prosecuting attorney when kthe issue 4rose as it .subst, quently did . .." The issue arose when Sil- bert told the CIA he was con- cerned that a defendant might bring the CIA into the case and asked Houston's deputy, John Warner. a series of ques- tions about the CIA. The answers to Silbert's questions, contained in what Houston described as an "elaborate report." , went not to Silbert but to his superiors at the Justice Department. Houston then did not mention McCord's letters, he testified, because "I honestly didn't think of it." At another point, Houston 'asserted that the letters were ,"not pertinent to the FBI's in- terest." ? ? "Why wouldn't you let the' FBI make that determina- tion?" Nedzi asked Houston.. Houston also attempted to. justify his recommendation by explaining, "I was not askedi ;to give it (McCord's letter), ai Was asked whether we had to! give it, and in my opinion I' said, 'No,'" "Your opinion: in my jude ment," Armed Services Com-) mittee chief counsel Frank M. Slatinshek told Houston, "wag Very, very poor." Nedzi told Houston that he understood the desire to "keep the agency's skirts clean," but he added, "under these cir- cumstances,. the desires seemJ ' 14 40.? 'Ito be somewhat excessive be cause I do think that in effect' there has been a suppression 'of evidence." ? ? , , Osborn:also, told the subcoit- mittee the while investigating the aMtacts of-the Watergate conspirators with the cm,. he had .been 'told .byHelms to "forget about" a matter inVolv-.. lag .the loan by the CIA..of, wig, tape recorder' other materials to Watergate conspi- rator g: Howard /brat Jr. Os- born said Helms told him, "'I will handle that. You take care .of the rest' of it.'" ?-? Helms', sworn testimosnifhe 'fore the, Senate Select Water-1 gate committee appears to con- flict with the testimony given riby Osborn and Houston. Helms' was, asked on Aug. 2, 1973 by. Assistant chief counsel David. Dorsen if "any relative infor- mation (Avis) withheld by the, CIA to the FBI and Justice De- partment, information that you, were aware of while the events. Were taking place in June, July, or August of 1972." "Sir, I do not believe so,"- Helms' replied, "Does the rec- ord show that there was any.; thing of this kind?" Dorsen replied that he hadi no evidence to the contrary.1 "Well," Helms said, "I do not, either, but I just want to be, sure that my recollection, tracked with the facts." 4 NEW YORK DAILY NEWS it FEB 1975 "ABC . News ClOseup," .which plans to present a TV report next May on the Central Intelligence Agency, said yesterday that it had received permission .to take its cameras inside the agency's headquarters in Langley, Va. The program, however, does not ex- pect to reveal any secret in- formation. ? Av Westin, a vice president of ABC- Nevis and director of TV documentaries, said: "The C en t r a I Intelligence Agency has broken a precedent by, agreeing to our request to admit cameras for an extensive look at the agency. We will have access to examine and film spe- cific elements in the intelligence gathering operations." William Colby, CIA director, and other agency officials and employes will be interviewed on. the docnnentary, Westin* said.. "Our purpbse is to develop an' objective, balanced report on the. CIA covering its functions, its policies anti itemethods oropera- tion." Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350901-8 ? -I2HINGTON POST '2 I4-lebraury 1975 Appioved For Release 2001/08/0Nrs-',-RDP77-00432R000100350001-8 ' y Wirliarn creider ? cArtt:z.v-r is a nwin.bev of the national staff of The -Washington Post. - . -nettndals, as they be- ? knowzi one by one, reed 'like' a. -..??.?Igh.`-cirmSt of "1984."7- ' Army was uptight about Oleo ? coffeehouse outside Ft. Hood, r'? ?'tc'Olee Strut was put 'under sax- by Military intelligence agents. 'other things; wai busy to penetrate the Black-Student Union 7:--ennsylvania Military College, a- quiet pus ?In Chester, Pa.- .IRSN:rit scanning the tax return.; of Cumrnirigi- Engine Foundation; looking '7' violations because that' tax-exempt foun- ? some money to black..activists I'Ve*-Left-theoreticians. ' ; `Tric.f.',LA., :which is supposed to -gather'. In- .: on foreign pewers;" instead was- .?;_,Ing columnist Jack- Anderson-and :his L .'"hose disjointed fragments are riow.begin- ???yrg ta forin a more coherent picture: over c-3..kast eight years, the- American govern- ?..22-4 devoted 'enormous energy to a secret tY..----Spying on American citizens. It done with videotape cameras and elec- 'uric..bugs, with _undercover agents and informers, with fancy. computers and Th the tacit consent or even encourage- ? el tWO Presidents from both political As usual, Sam' Ervin, the --retired senator in'_North Carolina, said Unfortunately, in the heat of political cri- L, government And the men that wield its owerhe-Come 'ffighterned by opinions they, Usliike. Their reaction it'vto combat tin* 'ctvS by any power they have at hand --ex- ':the power of -better ideas and better . ?!!.. ? , Feat Reflex . ? ,;-70W?DID 'IT.happen?" What As ...12.,,Vp_rerit _its happening- again? If the .aeOngressional cemmittees on ?-nee seriously confront the complex his-' ...:xyrA:of -these episodes, they will find that - he "in- iiit-"hriportant ' questions are :still ? rgely?i unanswered. . ? she :issues of legality .;Which surround overnment surveillance are -at best unset-, and,-even now, civil libertarians argue at there is no firm legal barrier to prevent imila.e.cOntroversies if the nation finds, it- { elf in a future period of domestic turmoil. What :is' the long-term danger? It may, qound ielodramatie to'invoke the image of George Orwelps "1984." And yet, if society, :ails , on-nigh political Spying or to build tr4n-g, ,Oeventives into theApproiexleFor Reiettsie12601opaioer. orpe-Rtionglio48.21/2oo ? i 00360001-8 enough to envision the eventual acceptance ' of these practices as legitimate' activities, ? not jtist in times of social stress, but always. That path would .surely lead to a. Society. quite 'different from the Ainerican ?ideal,-A ? place where unerthixiox 'ideas and free 'ex- pression -are permanently inhibited by the, gavernment's computer memery; : It is still not'. entirely clear -what deal; sions - Produced Jthis' exploion 'of surveil- epee and dirty tricks :There are at least two 'competing theories.- One, which Might be Called -the -theory' of "spontaneous. combut:: suggests' that these Various' branches of government; Watching the tame frighten- 'ing:eventi; reacted individuallY but in simi- 1,,a-ys thonkr in11q thai the 'CIA bethe'FBI weren't acting irresponsibli' on"theli own passion but were following .orders from aboVe."--- ; Although the factual evidence tied; at least this znuels is clear': .that these activities grew ,out of Coramon.'reflexes of lear,...that:the rgular inhibitions of decent Men Or traditional legal restrainti which are supposed to prevent such abuses of power proved inadequate, not just in the pu: or thelustice Department:or the 'FBI, but in the White House. Cities were burning, Radi- als were, indeed, 'planting bombs-in public buildings. The citizens'? protest movement against the war in V.Ietnam--.--whicir seemed so impotent in terms ilef.chAn.O.ng govern- ment policy?was mOst .iffeetiv, e .in frighten- , ing the 'men who Made that poliek. : .? 'Looking back, the- circumstantial eVidenei, , ,does .suggest that all. of these activities were .interielated, at least tO.- some; degree. In a: ;.ibiase, that it Mitigating testiino-nY for 'the 'individual agencies. If oneconcludes that all nf these bureaucradies 'were responding- to rthe same alarm bells, then it is more diffi- 'cult to portraY the. CIA., or`..the'. FBI - secret police force .that has run -amok' in a democratic societY. ' *. Two Periods of Reactioni:,:': ?1: THE SIMPLIFIED higtory. of events runs " like this were twe; distinct periods of 'fear 'when the federal government mobilized to gather intelligence on society's -tiotiblernak- .? ers, whether they were anti-war demonstra- tors or black activists in, America's central Cities: . The first was in late-1967; after a tuinultu- ous:summer of -nrban riots, 'when the Justice' :Department'under Attorney General Ram: . . tion! and Pruirlant Johnson's 1711,1to House expressed to vaxions departnientt---from the CIA-tO the Pentagon?the 'need ,fOr better intelligence on' the domestic discord.- :'? A lot of things started in those months: In. the ?Iiring of 1968,- for instance,:the'FBI or- d ered offices ghetto Informants," at least one for each of the ha 'reati'S 8,99Q Agents, It alsolannched its now Infamous". COINTELPRO. Operation; 'aimed at ditrtipting New Left groupt. It broadened its regular surveillance,: ineruding wiretap and paid infiltrators, on;both black and' anti- war groups; The Army p , in that same eriod, issned .an "Intelligence collection plan"?distributed to OO 'federal offices?which authorized on' the premise that';riots were :6used .by "militant "agitator'! -Aird.".rabble; ? . rousing meetings ; and .,fiery ? agitation Speechet 'of extremist civil rights .groupl." Military intelligence, was equally interested In' monitoring "subversive": efforts like the, 'Underground ? newspapers . and GI coffee- houses which Were fostering "resistance tr.; the Army" . The CIA, as the public recently learned, also participated in its own limited way: The Intelligence agency ; "Inserted'.'. 10 ' agents inside dissident' gronpi in .the :Washington area, on the pretext' that it wei.. proteeting CIA building against assault, ; ? , . . ? . The tocend time a crisis within the gov- ernment ?which is better known probably because it was well exposed during the Watergate scandal?came in the summer. of: ,1970 *4eA:a. yoting White , House aide named Tom. Huston wrOte' his famous. *ma calling on. all agencies; from : Justice te:the CIA to the Pentagon'S,Ilational Sear: rity Agency,' to sign hp for. a broad and ex-. plicitly illegal campaign of surveillance.'All but J. Edgar Hoover, of the:FBI were will-. ' ing, : ; ? ? CIA,..by its own. account, became. ac- tiv'e planting' a dozen or, so agents in- 'side ."dissident circles," allegedly to .search for foreign ? connections: The Internal Ree nue Service, meantime, had initiated in the. .tummer , of 1969 'its ,own, "special services staff," collecting names of dissen- ters andinvestigating their taxes. 'And the. ;FBI was. sending its agents onto college Campuses,' with orders to start files on every lack Student Onion in the nation. , , . . ? ? `?!? ? ? - TN, BOTH PERIODS, the- record is stud- ? ded with' tantalizing leads,c.' essentially .unresolved, ? which* suggest' that'. these veil- .. out programs . were ,more closely- 'coordhi- ,ated than Anyone has' !quite ? admitted:. roar: ? When 'Ramsey , Clark issued his first _ marching order "for.' the . IDIU, he noted: rlon are free to, consult. with' the FBI and her 'Iritelligenee. 'agencies the governs ?.ment .to draW., on their .eXperience_in' mein- ;taining u.nitt, to;.: explore the:poSsibil: Jties:?of obtaining "infermatien .?yedo?41ot .now.receiVe''. ? A ? ? Clark's 'assistant 'attorney' general fcii: rights,lohn Doar,,stiggested trading 'in 'formation With the povertyprOgram's agen- Cies, the Internal?Revenue Service, the Nar: 'Collet Bureau; the Post'Offiee, and the Alco- hol, Tax and Tobacco unit of Treasury. sey Clark formed its Inter-Divisional Infor- ? ? Tle'.ArrnY't variant intelligence collie- Tantalizing Leads ? ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350001-8 oirs Sliareii their information With justice :Pentagon, for instance, insisted 'later that t regular basis and, indeed, got freqttnefit they were misled by Army intelligence peo- leiquests for ? data.;...After, ?Armr: photogre pie who blandly asserted that the bulk of pheis, posing as "Midwestiricleo," took films the intelligence information was collected ?,f the demonstrators at 1863 Democratid -by the FBI and merely passed on-for Army 'eibpyention'? in Chicago,. Deputy ? Attorney', :analysis. There are a lot of internal docu- ;7fetieral.Warren Christopher :asked for cop- :ments which seem to corroborate that claim. ? ? '?. L On the other hand, Under Secretary of 9 An 'Army "collection plan".issued': in: Defense Paul Nitze approved 100 new slots pm listed the. CIA tinorik the cooperatf for Army intelligence in 1968 (trimming the agencies Wich would Provide information: ' .Army request from 167). What were all 6 The IRS, when it launched its super-se ,'those jobs supposed to be for? And in early ,cret program aimed at radicals, started with ' 1969 Army General Counsel Robert E. Jor- dan tried to persuade the Nixon administra- ..tion to adopt a new inter-agency policy re- stricting the military role and shifting the main responsibility for spying to the Justice ,Department (the effort failed). Why make 'that policy fight if no one grasped what was 'going on? ' ? . Who knew about the Army spying? In the 7 names and quickly grew to a file with 11,- 458 names. About 55 per cent came from the FBI, but IRS also ."coordinated" with the Defense Department and sought Secret Service files. The IRS targets included those on both the left and the right?local chap- ters of moderate civil rights organizations, a Black Muslim temple, a Jewish organization, abor unions, a law students' association,' .summer of 1969, after the change of adminis- bree universities, even a branch of the Re- trations, the new under secretary of the pelican Party. ',Army got a phone call from Fred Vinson, 0 When the CIA got Into the business, it, !former assistant attorney general in Ramsey In turn, the CIA traded its own data 'Clark's Justice Department. Vinson, accord- received names from Justice's IDIU and_the ing to an Army memorandum, "had indi- with metropolitan police departments all na. 'cated that he was concerned about the ' ver the country, most of whom have their Army's role in domestic intelligence activi- own "red squads" tot look after political dis- ties and that he understood the Army had enters. t 'two separate computerized intelligence set- "Atups.'" How did a Justice Department offi- various times; many of these agencies cial know what Pentagon officials claimed -;iere called together to "coordinate," though . officials of each insigted later that they were ? not to know? In short, while investigations have not yet aot. familiar with the particulars of what z pinned down the precise relationships be- mer Attorney General Clark has denied others were doing. Thus, for example, for- ' tween these various surveillance activities, . :mowing about the Army spying, though his it is clear that the traditional jurisdictional "wn IDIU got data from it, or even knowing lines between agencies became almost mean- Wgless. The "files" are interwoven. They fed about the FBI's COINTELPRO, though it Vas in his own department. ? upon each other. The computer tapes tray- Victor Marchetti, formerly a high offi-? eled freely around town, from Pennsylvania a -Avenue to Langley to an IRS computer in al at CIA, recalled recently that in 1967 'Rockville. . resident Johnson was pushing the intelli- Undoing the damage which those files can fence community to pursue the anti-war novement more actively and that Director . Inflict on individual reputations, careers, z ;tichard Helms resisted much of the pres- credit ratings or whatever is nOt so cure. "Helms came in one day [to a daily easy. The Army, for instance, issued what it , CIA meeting] and said the military would regards as very tough regulations in early Andle -most of the 'action and the FBI 1971, halting general surveillance and re- ?quiring all intelligence units to "clean" their would help out," Marchetti related. 'In the CIA, you get the feeling this was a put-off '`files, to reduce the holdings drastically and to re-verify periodically any information which is still there. ? Two years later, however, when Pentagon inspection teams went out, they found some ..curious items. ' At Travis Air Force Base, the intelligence 'office still held data such as an "estimate of Enemy Situations," including reports on sev- ? eral local dissident groups "which were tar- ' geted against Travis AFB and which were - thought to pose a real or potential threat to the base." Another California air base still 'had a list of "enemy forces" covering leftist groups dating back to the Abraham Lincoln Brigade of the Spanish civil war. At the Presidio Army headquarters in San Francisco, the files still contained a listing 'of local personalities whom the local mili- ztary intelligence officers regarded 'as worth watching?Communists, socialists and others. ? At Fort Dix, N.J., the inspectors found -lists of organizations and people dating back to 1964. In Hawaii, military intelligence was !still keeping tabs on "Liberated Barracks," a 'CI underground newspaper which the files proclaimed was "targeted against the mili- tary" and, therefore, subject to surveillance -under the new rules. ? = In Washington, the Pentagon announces -.'periodically that it has discovered yet an- ,:tory, the cover story. I learned subse- quently the agency was training local police 'forces in this country. If you were going into domestic intelligence work, it would make sense to train the police and maybe cnetrate them." ? During the Nixon years, Huston assem- bled all of the agencies at the same table. The Nixon administration claimed that the o-called Huston Plan was never imple- mented, but the same organizations?the FBI, the CIA, NSA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Secret, Service and the White House?met weekly' for two years after- wards under the Intelligence Evaluation Committee, a group launched by Robert Mardian when he Was ?assistant attorney general for internal security. In 1972, after the Army had pulled back from its massive spying, it still lent a hand to Mardian's IEC, ncluding three counter-intelligence analysts ent to help out at the national political' con- enlions. ? he "Deniability" Principle HO REALLY KNEW what was going on? The bureaucratic principle of 'deniability" seems to have permeated the government, and it is hard to reach precise onclusions. The civilian managers at the other file system or-computer bank that was supposed to be purged in 1971. Just a few weeks ago, they found, a microfilm lib\rary on civilians at the Forrestal fInilaing. 'In bureaucratic language, when a file is "purged," it does not necessarily mean that it has been "destr,oyed." Sometimes the ma- terial is simply stored elsewhere in a "non- active" status: The CIA, for that matter, has been "eliminating" names from its own counterintelligence files on 10,000 Ameri; cans, but that does not really settle things. So far, about, 1,000 names have been re- moved from the active index, but Director William E. Colby noted that these "could be reconstituted should this be required." Except for official good intentions, there is ? not muCh, to ? prevent any of these agencies from 'again launching a general surveillance of citizens they regard as "dangerous" to the national survival. The CIA, for instance, has acknowledged halting some activities of dubious propriety, but it has not conceded that ;any of them?from burglary to opening private mail?was illegal. Attorney General .William Saxbe condem- ned the FBI's COINTELPRO as a deplorable , use of government power?but FBI Director Clarence Kelley refused to do so. The Army's tougher regulations require approval for covert operations at high levels in the civilian management, but the rules still permit, something called "Aggressive Counterintelligence Programs," as well as "clandestine" operations defined as "illegal," if Pentagon officials decide the "threat" is serious enough. The fact is that, despite strong opinions on the impropriety of these activities, the questions of their legality have not been set- tled by Congress or the courts. One test of sincerity for the various intelligence agen- cies will be whether they support legislation making political surveillance by them an ex- plicit offense. Last year, when Sen. Ervin proposed such a limitation for the military, the Pentagon helped block the bill. In the meantime, a long list of cases is working its way through the courts, intended to define the citizens protection against an overly cu- rious government. Is it legal for any government agency, for instance, to commit a burglary?entering private premises without a warrant?even to ensure that an employee. is not leaking na- tional secrets? The Fourth Amendment. says not, and there is no law which authoritizes such tactics. The CIA might claim some vague authority inherent in its charter responsibilities?"the protection of intelli- gence sources and methods"?but John Ehrl- ichman lost in court when he invoked a sim- ilar "national security" argument as the de- fense for the Ellsberg burglary. Breaking-and-entering, however, is proba- bly the clearest of the issues. Opening pri- vate mail, for instance, is widely regarded as forbidden without a search warrant, but one government official says there is a national -seeurity exception which might cover the CIA's extended "mail cover" programs. Conflicting .Commands wHAT ABOUT political spying general- ly, or keeping files on citizens who have not been charged with any crime, much less convicted of one? The question, even when applied to the CIA, is more complicated than it seems. It is true that the National Security Act of 1947 prohibits the CIA from any "internal secu- rity" functions, but the charter also author- izes the agency not only to protect Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CbtRDP77-00432R000100350001-8 ApOroved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350001-8 ? ? 'intelligence sources and methods" but to -perform "such other functions"- which the National Security Council assigns it. Thus, the CIA charter has one restrictive com- mand telling the agency to stay out of do- mestic surveillance?and two loopholes which might be used to justify just about anything in the name of "national-security." The question of what those words mean haS been litigated only once, apparently, and the. CIA won. According to Thomas B. Ross cp:. the Chicago Sun-Times, co-author of "The Taivisible Government," a federal judge held in a 1966 civil libel suit involving a CIA agent that the agency does have authority to collect its foreign intelligence inside the United States. "The fact that the immediate intelligence auurce is located in the United States does ::.!.ot make it an 'internal security function' over which the CIA has no authority," Judge Roszel C. Thomsen declared. "The court con- cludes that activities by the CIA to protect .it foreign intelligence sources located in tie United States are within the power granted by Congress to the CIA." When Sen. Ervin's subcommittee investi- gated Army spying, Ervin concluded: "There Is no question that military surveillance of civilian political activity is illegal, at least in The sense that it was not authorized by law.", But William Rehnquist, who was then assistant attorney general, argued that the President's constitutional responsibility to see "that the laws be faithfully executed" gives the executive branch not just authority to prosecute crimes, but also to prevent .them. Under that inherent power, he argued, surveillance aimed at preventing violence ur civil disturbances was legitimate. Rehnquist, as it happened, got another chalice to express his views on the same matter after he became a Supreme Court justice. Over the protest of ACLU lawyers, be cast the deciding vote in Tatum v. Laird, ruling against a challenge to Army spying evhich contended that the mere act of mili- tary surveillance "chilled" the First Amend- anent right of free political expression of Arlo Tatum, an anti-war activist who was "targeted" by military intelligence. the Supreme Court held that a citizen could not sue the government for spying un- less he can prove -that the surveillance dam- aged him in some tangible way. Now the American Civil Liberties Union lawyers are moving forward with new case's intended to show just that. Among the plaintiffs are Americans living in Germany who were un- der Army surveillance in 1972 as members of the Berlin Democratic Club and who had their security clearances held up as a result. "The Army files," says ACLU lawyer John Shattuck. "all state that these people were doing things that might pose a threat to the military. What these people were doing was campaigning for George McGovern." Showing "Probable Cause' . DESPITE THE SETBACK of the Tatum case, Shattuck is generally optimistic about the series of lawsuits now aimed at limiting the government's discretion in sur- veillance, including the one against Secre- tary of State Henry Kissinger for the, 17 "national security" wiretaps authorized- by the Nixon administration in 1969 and an- other to be filed soon against the CIA's counter-intelligence files. "We're trying to have the courts set stand- ards that would prohibit the CIA, the FBI and the Army from having a free hand to do whatever they want to do," Shattuck says. "They are operating essentially without au- thority in all of these areas. The only thing they can point to is the kind of generalized authority." Meanwhile, the ACLU is pushing Con- gress to draw the toughest standards of all. A variety of reform proposals has been in- troduced, ranging from flat prohibition of political spying to strict procedural systems requiring a court warrant for any .sur- veillance of private citizens by any agency. Shattuck wants to have both. ? Thus, if a government agency perceives a possible crime or even a potential crime, it would have to demonstrate "probable cause" before a federal judge to secure a warrant. "If the executive branch is so paranoid that It believes the courts are a security risk, then we're really in bid shape in this coun- try," Shattuck says. The Busing Case INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES in .the past it have successfully resisted any legislation in that direction, partly on the practical ground that the FBI, for example, might have to take every investigation before a judge to prove that it's criminal, not politi- cal. ' LOS ANGELES TIMES 9 February 1975 . ? Beyond that, the distinctions between, criminal and political sometimes become highly debatable. In the 1960s, for example, the FBI penetrated and disrupted the Ku. Klux Klan without much complaint from lib- erals. The anti-busing controversy in South Bos- ton right now offers a better example of the 'dilemma. Nick Flannery, director of the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights, wrote to the Justice Department last month, corn- -plaining that the FBI was* not aggressive enough in its surveillance of an anti-busing organization which he feared would stim4- late violence. ' "At the very minimum," Flannery wrote. "the bureau should have developed infor- mants in ROAR [for Restore Our Alienated Rights] and its agents should be at South Boston High and elsewhere, depending on their intelligence data to act upon violations of law, as they are committed, 'rather than 'investigating after the fact on the basis of complaints." Yet that is precisely the sort of rationale which led the Army and the FBI and others to spy on anti-war organizations and black groups in the tate 1960s?the fear of violent protest. They were "political" ,organizations. So is ROAR. The Justice Department is caught in the middle again. But the close cases are not the heart of the controversy. So much of the surveillance activities of recent years have been So mas- sive and aimless in scope that the connec- tion with possible criminal charges is tenu- ous or non-existent. Sen. Ervin's admonition to tne internal Revenue Service might just at well apply to the other agencies. "The purpose of the IRS," Ervin' warned, "is to enforce the tax laws, not to enforce Political orthodoxy." In a way, the remedy for legitimate law enforcement interests?as opposed to aim- less desires for political surveillance-7- might be just what the ACLU has pro- posed: a clear definition of the purposes for which a government ageney can spy olt someone. If that agency cannot convinnt a third party, such as a federal judge, that it-has in mind a legitimate investigation of crime, then it Ought to keep hands off. Obviously, this would inhibit the investiga- tors and, no doubt, it would reduce the amount of .surveillance undertaken. That is precisely what's needed. U.S. ENV Y IN PERU SAYS CIA A NO HAND IN. RIOTS LIMA, Peru (UPI)?U.S. Ambassa- dor Robert W. Dean Saturday issued 'a* statement denying allegations in Peruvian newspapers that agents of. the Central Intelligence Agency had helped instigate violent riots in Lima. As the representative of the 'government of the United States in 1Peru,.I state categorically that neith- er the CIA nor any other agency of the US. government has been in- volved in any way. in these lamenta- ble events,' Dean said in a commu- nique distributed to all Peruvian 'news media." Twenty Peruvian military judges Saturday began hearing the cases :against 1,300 persons arrested for . Ap I ilaW120 011000/08 -stemming from riots earlier this week that were touched -off by the-army's repression of a police strike. Embassy officials said that Dean's statement was partially motivated by concern for the safety of the Ameri- can community in Lima because of attacks on the embassy during the 'ri- oting. "When you have 47 windows smashed,' an embassy Jeep burnt up, a bullet fired at the embassy and at least two attempts to put the torch to. r the embassy and send it up in flames, you begin to grow concerned about anti-American feeling and want to do what little you can to modify it," a U.S. diplomat said. ? Military justice prevails under the ' tiZt1A0 WRO04324R010141101350Q 1-8 nesday's and Thursday's disturbances, 1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350001-8 NEU YORK TIMES Li February 1975 FOP EX-C.I.A. AIDES HEARD BY INQUIRY ? . By LINDA 'CHARLTON ? ? SPect21 terhe New York Time.) WASHINGTON, Feb. 10? i'ames Arigleton, the former :thief of counterintelligence for the Central :Intelligence 'Agen- iy, was the principal witness enday at the fifth weekly meet- ng" of the Presidential commis- Alan investigating alleged ille- %al dinnestic activity by the 7 Mr. Angleton, who refused to somment before and after the .losed meeting, testified from ilbout - 2 P.M. until 4:45 P.M. qarlier, the panel heard from :rice Mm. William F. .Raborn air., who testified for more than 6.in hour. . Admiral Raborn, who headed lie agency from April, 1965, to tine, 1966, was asked by repor- tiers' if the C.I.A. had underta- r,. .ien any illegal. domestic activi- aes during his tenure. ' ? ? "Not to -my knowledge," he Z.-. In response to another gilds- Jon, 'the. said that he believed he investigation ? would be ,;useful" to the C.I.A. rather fhan damaging. , ? His -appearance was viewed ,Is more or less routine, since lie panel has heard testimony rom all part directors of the gency. ? Mr. , Angleton, however, is Jawed as a key witness' in the ttivestigation. He resigned in "iecember, after 31 years with ,he agency. This followed the *st news articles about the ,gency's domestic activities, .rhich are prohibited by its barter. ! ?K. Six Members Present ? Only six of the eight members 1 the panel, which is headed y Vice Pregident Rockefeller, ',ere present for today's meet- C. Du glas Dillon, former -ecretary of the Treasury, was 43sent for the second week in a aw, and Ronald Reagan, the armer California Governor, iissed his fourth consecutive "ieeting: peaking schedule has permit- e=c1 him to attend just part of he first commission meeting, ffered to. resign. Mr. Rockefel- ? -rx dissuaded hiln, however, pd transcripts ot the testimo- y are being sent to a military )stallation near Los Angeles, there they can be kept in se- re files, for Mr. Reagan's con- lenience in reading them. Mr. pagan is expected to be at text Monday's meeting, as he till be in Washington over the feekend for a conference.. -;In a related development to- sy, Senator William Proxmire, emocrat of Wisconsin, an- ounced that he planned to in- ioduce tomorrow a bill author- ing the General Accounting thee to audit the expenditures I the .C.Iak. and other THE WASHINGTON POST- hief of St David By William Washington Post 8 W. Belin, the Iowa lawyer who is chief of staff for the presidential commis- Mon investigating the CIA, describes himself as "a phil- osophical 'independent con- servative" With polite em- phasis on the "independent." People familiar with Be: lin's career as a Des Moines lawyer and a Republican Party strategist, plus his wide-ranging intellectual in- terests, predict that his -tem- porary tenure in Washing- ton will confirm the point. Belin will not yet discuss the investigative atrategY of the commission's staff, which is still being assesn: bled, but he has set this goals i "The No. 1 requirement to have an independent staff of high caPability and integ- rity." - ? Belin himself has a streak of independence in his past. A Republican party loyal- ist, he campaigned for the Nixon-Agnew ticket in 1968 ..?but declined to do so in 1972, when the GOP victory was overwhelming. On the touchstone issue of U.S. involvement in Viet- nam, Belin was a "dove" long before that became a popular fiolitical position, indeed, even before Presi- dent Johnson's Democratic administration entered the war. ? On legal issues, he calls himself a., "strict construc- tionist," but he played a role in winning.a Supreme Court decision in 1967 that ex- tended the constitutional right of competent legal rep- resentation for the poor. Be- rime agencies' in the 'Federal overnment "The C.I.A.," Mr. Proxmire tid in a Speech prepared for ie. Senate, ;'and other intelli- snce agencies have protected temselves from Congressional !view by not allowing audits !. their programs." Greider taff Writer lin also took a strong hand in the legal fight for reap- portionment of Iowa's state legislature. As a lawyer, he has con- centrated on corpor at io n work but 'his clients also, include two Democratic con- gressmen from Iowa?Ed-' ward Mezvinsky of Iowa . City and Berkley Bedell of Spirit Lake. Among other things, the 46-year-old lawyer helned-. Bedell, a wealthy fishing; tackle manufacturer, organ- ize a private foundation. called the Research Founda-- ton for a Better America, it', has given money to such varied projects as a self-help housing program run by C,hicago blacks zinti Quaker bail-bond release project in Des Moines. Belin's service as one of 14 staff lawyers on the War- ren Commission investiga- tion of the John F. Kennedy assassination is what led to his appointment for the cur- rent inquiry. He got to know Gerald Ford, who was a member of the Warren Com- mission, and is the author of "November 22, 1963: You Are the Jury," a book that examines the assassination evidence and rebuts ,critics of the Warren Commission report, though it also takes- issue with some of the com- mission's own decisions. Last month o Belin was of- fered a job in the Ford ad- ministration. He turned it down, but the White House returned -with a request to take on the staff assignment with the commission chaired by Vice President Rockefel, ler. He and Rockefeller are not old friends, but Beth did provide political advice for Rockefeller's presiden- tial campaigns in 1964 and 1968. " The commission, now a month old,- is still getting se) curity clearances for its: staff, expected to be seven to 10 people, Belin said he took special care in select- ing lawyers of substantial experience. ? 18 "We have to have a Mirk" "concern," he said, "a con-I cern for the protection of ef- fective intelligence gather- ing and for the individual. rights of Americans and I :expect every member of the "staff to share those con- cerns" The commission originally was given a deadline of April 1 but Rockefeller has. hinted that the inquiry may need more time. Belin isn't concerned about time: he in- formed his law firm back in Des Moines - Herrick, Lang; don, Belin, Harris, Langdon and Helmick - not to expect: him back before July I. Belin, Phi Beta Kappa at the University of Michigan and an honors graduate of the Michigan law school, started out to be a concert. violinist. He was born in Washington, D.C., and grew up in Sioux City, Iowa. Af- ter two years in the Army, including service in Japan as a violinist, he turned to 'business and law. Belin's view of the current controyersy is - shaped in part by his close familiarity with the Kennedy assassina- tion, his strong positions on- Vietnam and his subsequent_ concern about Watergate. v "I look back on Nov. 2, 1963, as a tremendous psy- ..chological turning point," Bolin said.,, "During the early '60s, there was a vi- brant feeling in the country, a feeling of hope. about the government and the people. Then with the assassination, followed. by Vietnam, fol- lowed by Watergate, you have so many people w ho say, 'a plague on both your parties.' There's a great skepticism, a great cynicism that people have about gov-' ernment. I don't." The CIA investigation, Be- lin hopes, will "make some' small contribution to the restoration of credibility in .? government." On Vietnam, Belin said he- and his wife, the former Constance Newman from Grand Rapids, Mich., were "doves" dating from the 1950s when she wrote a re- Search paper at Michigan on the impossibility of main- taining French colonialism in Indochina. "I was very, very anti-Lyn- don Johnson and his ap- proach there," Belli]. said. In 1968, he campaigned enthu-- - siastically for Richard Nixon and served as chairman of the Iowa Lawyers for. Nixon. But when they asked, him to take a comparable position in the 1972 cam- paign, Blein declined. "There were many Nixon' policies that were very sound, the rapproachement _approved For Release 2001/08108 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350001-8 _ Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350001-8 4with' hiiia, for instance,"' Belin said. "I felt the domes- tic policy they were follow. ing was wrong, particularly the approach of Agnew attacking young people." Belin is writing a second. book, this one about the Re- ? publican Party and whether, it has a future. "One of my arguments," he said, "is that the Republi- can Party, 'which is ? so, closely identified with busi- ness, does not take a very .business-like approach in the marketplace of voters., We all knew that young vot-' ers were going to be impor- tant, yet Vice President new attacked them. When: the kids were raising cane' about the war in Vietnam, a very legitimate concern, and ,Agnew attacked them, Mr. Agnew and I parted com- pany." Belin voted for Nixon in :1972 but became "very con- cerned" .afterwards as the Watergate scandal devel- oped, partly because one of hit pet interests is openness in government. Belin's work on the Warren Commission: staff taught him how diffi- cult it sometimes is to get information from govern.: meat agencies and he hopes that lesson will serve him in . the CIA inquiry. "When Belin was an - pointed, his hometown news-, paper, the Des Monies Reg- jster, sent him off to Wash- ington with this high praise: "He is a man of integrity and we believe he will insist on freedom to dig out the facts. If he finds he cannot' get the facts from CIA, we believe he will so report to .the public. If the commis-1 -sion does not agree with his. findings, he also will make that evident to the public." All that Belin will say on that question is that he is "a philosophical independent conservative." - WASHINGTON STAR 8 February 1975 g(Le WASHINGTON STAR 13 February 1975 Charles Bartlett: P kli t t The CIA is being poked at like a turtle on the beach. And it will be nice to get it back where it belongs, swimming under water. The turtle-baiters are presently bent on establishing that the intelligence agency and its former director, Richard Helms, were more responsive than any- one admits to the presidential paranoia which caused Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon to push their investiga- tive talent into gray areas. On a story like this, the press moves in like a ship's crew hitting shore on Saturday night. When they spot a joint, they barge in, break up the furniture, rough up the customers and move on. When the joint turns out to be an institu- tion wrapped in mystery, the binge be- comes a crusade. And at the end of the escapade, those who are left to survey the shambles wonder how it all began. Perspective gets lost in the excite- ment. So it is important to make two points about Helms. He was plainly fired by Nixon as director of CIA, a job he dearly loved, because he failed to cooperate in obscuring the Watergate' crimes. Nixon dumped him as soon as the election was over and tried to cover the deed by having two loyalists, John 'Scali and Charles Colson, spread the word that Henry Kissinger, absent in Paris, wanted Helms out. The truth was that Kissinger had argued hard for Helms'a retention. He is said now-to be deeply angry at the present CIA direc- tor, William Colby, for seeking purity by making it easier for the wreckers to move in on Helms, REGARDING HELMS' lack of candor with the Senate Foreign Relations Com- mittee, it should be remembered that' in- the days of bitter divisions over Viet- nam, it was not safe for any executive official to entrust volatile information to the full committee's care. This disarray caused the Senate to make a formal decision against including the Fulbright committee in the congressional review of CIA affairs. Senators are still asking themselves lovried The - nation's ranking arms control official is Con- cerned that U.S. intelli- gence agencies might not beable to do their jobs in the future if zeal to expose. improprieties of the past' damages their effective- ness, Fred C. Ikle, director. of the Arms Control, and Disarmament Agency;)s'aia- in a speech in Cleveland yesterday that the CIA can-- not perform its role in arms control verification unless the law permits it to do flux e Turtle how 'much a politician can afford td" know about the nation's spies. One as- pect of the problem was well put by Sen. Clifford Case, R.-N.J., when he said re- cently, "I have been very skeptical of an oversight committee because I can't see what good a committee does if it. can't tell what it knows." Similarly if Helms had conveyed to the enators all the ugly facts of cash payments to anti-Communist elements in Chile, those preoccupied with their public images would have faced an awk- _ -ward choice. They could keep quiet and share responsibility for the exercise or they could explode and stir an?interna- tional ruckus. The CIA can only be objectively and comfortably monitored by politicians who are not liberals run- ning for president. THE HARD fact is that members of' Congress have not given the CIA enough constructive attention to inhibit presi- dents from misusing its agents. Thus the overdrawn allegation of a "massive, illegal domestic intelligence operation" arose from the agency's penetration of the anti-war groups in the Vietnam era. If these penetrations exceeded the limits of the national security act, it was- because President Johnson kept push- ing. Helms to probe. Helms's status at the White House was not helped by his necessity to keep reporting that he. could find no alien elements. There is a role for Congress and a -need to establish some new rules. But it is hard to see how Congress will solve any problems by poking at the turtle about controversies that arose from the old rules. IF CONGRESS and the press manage to break up the joint, the winners will be the Soviets. Another consequence will be the loss of civilian control over intel- ligence estimates of Soviet military strength. So those who want tight limits on de- fense budgets will be big losers if the turtle doesn't make it back into the sea. veDI CA Pro e, necessary "detective work." Arms control would come to a dead end if the CIA is hamstrung by ongoing investigations, he said. "We cannot have arms control without good intelligence -capabilities," Ikle declared., "Verifiable arms limita- lions, such as agreed to in SALT, give us and our Adversaries a firmer basis on which to predict what forces each side will de- ploy," Ikle said. "Unfortu- nately, the means of yeti-, fication used for strategic' arms limitation cannot necessarily serve to verify other types of arms control agreements." He said the Soviet Union does not make public enough information on its military budget so that' other nations can make esti- mates about Russian mili- tary procurement pro- grams. As an example, he said, the 1974 Soviet defense budget was announced by Moscow as 18 billion rubles, while the U.S. estimates it was about 60 billion rubles. Approved For Release 2001/08M : CIA-RIEW7Srutiatkikr8011100350001-8 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350001-8 WASHINGTONIAN l'EBRITARY 1975 JAMES ANGLETON: The Spy Forced in from the Cold -r".--araneanneeaneasarai One summer evening several telligence agencies. a-a---aaaar -a: years ago, five men stone( cast- "It was a disgrace," said a knowledgeable intelligence sotirce. "Nixon found out about it on taking office but he didn't dare tangle with Hoover. who was popular in the country and on the Hill. Be- sides. Nixon was more uptight about anti-war militants and rioters in the cities than about foreign spies." Angleton, the eye of the current storm, is a most unlikely spy- catcher. Six feet tall, stooped, his thick, grizzled hair parted almost in the middle, he gazes out through his bifocals with the courtly, faintly quizzical charm of a New England professor. He dresses conservatively. His voice is quiet, meticulous, but assumes a faint rasp when he's angry. His character is one of sharp contrasts. Children and animals seem to instinctively love him, but by profession he had to be sus- picious of the adult world around him. He was obsessed with the KGB and with preventing any penetration of the CIA by a "mole" ?the spy who works his way into an intelligence agency, as de- scribed so vividly by John le Carre in the best-selling novel, Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy. He has lunch nearly every day at La Ni?se in Georgetown, pre- ferring fish, particularly fresh flounder, accompanied by n bottle of French wine. Once as a practical joke, someone at the restaurant put a microphone in the flowers on his table. Angleton almost im- mediately noticed it, looked at his companion with a finger to his lips, and removed the vase. For years he has moved in an aura of discreet mystery, an enig- matic character even to his CIA colleagues, though his staff swear by him. His wife Cecilie, grown son, and two daughters long have been accustomed to his frequent, unexplained absences. He claims that for years they thought he worked "somewhere high in the Post Office." As .befits one in his curious trade he often works when others sleep. Not infrequently he will drop in on a friend at ten at night. -sitting until two AM, chain-smoking, sipping bourbon and water, now and then rubbing a hand over his forehead and eyes, chatting tirelessly, his mind fully alert. He is discretion personified, turning :t"aY awkward questions with an elliptical answer. E.-en at two am he sometimes will phone an intelligence contact and, in murmured tones, announce his impending arrival. for weeks he will disappenr, then arrive at the home of friends, bearing a magnificent cattleya orchid raised in his own greenhouse a suburban Virginia. or a bit of semi-precious stone he has been l':;Ii?hing. or an intricate trout fly he has made. Now 57, Angleton got into the spy-catching business by accident. His father, a wealthy executive who ran National Cash Register operations in Italy, joined the OSS during World War 11 and rec- ommended his son. Young Angleton, with a Yale degree and two years at the Harvard Business School. had just enlisted. He was in- terviewed, recruited, and after special counter-espionage training in England was sent to Italy in 1943, where he rose to the rank of major in charge of counter-espionage. It was in Italy after the war that he first met the Jewish under- ground leaders who then were helping fellow Jews escape Europe for British-ruled Palestine. Their friendship flourished. For the past 20 years Angleton has been the CIA official with whom suc- cessive Israeli leaders have preferred to deal. Given the current Middle East situation, these contacts have given him immense re- sponsibility?and also have caused je'alousies within the US gov- ernment, Some observers feel Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and CIA Director Colby have decided to gather liaison with Israeli intelligence into their own hands. Angleton's critics accuse him of having built a virtually unassail- able empire-within-an-empire. There is some truth to this. As steward of the nation's innermost secrets?even the White House tends to leave counter-espionage to career professionals?Angleton has had great authority with all US security agencies. Another charge often heard is that he is a man steeped in hostility to the Communist world, a man who sees spies under every bed. Ile makes no secret in his quiet, professional way that he regards d?nte as a risliy gamble and the Sino-Soviet split of 1960 as a masterly hoax. "There are installations in China that wouldn't be there," says, "if there were a real split." Since 1959, he insists, the KGB and 26 other Communist intelligence services quietly have coordinated their operations and now pool all intelligence about the US and its NATO allies. Of all US leaders, he believes, Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger is the only one who truly perceives the growing Soviet military threat. "In five more years if we go this way." Angleton says, "a crunch will come and the US will have to back down." But those who challenge Kissinger's dream of d?nte nowadays risk thunderbolts from on high, and Angleton's career, together with those of his deputies, has wound to a close. The key question now is the transition: Who guards the portals while the guard is -changing? One who surely will want to know is Juni Andropov, .head of the KGB. In the covert war Angleton has lost?not to An- al! FBI liaison?not only with the CIA but with all other US in- dropov but to a Washington weary of the Cold War. 20 --BENJAM.1N WELLIES Afr?ied For Release 2001/08/08 :-C-I-A-RDP77-00432RGOTIT0035q0Z178-7--, - atz-1-1%---1-vbka' ' ia..e.?-traaasa naaaaaas ? ."-aa-aa-' - re,e_ c.k172.:;4414 - -kit,"?&-:-.?- lag for trout in a secluded Mid- western rivbr. Four were Amer- -1 leans; all practiced anglers. The ,fifth was a Russian, obviously .1 an amateur. His line kept snag- ging on boughs, yet he enjoyed ) himself hugely, standing rubber- booted in the swirling water and nipping vodka from a flask. The host was James Angleton, who recently- resigned after 31 years as chief of counter-espi- onage for the Central Intelli- gence Agency. The Russian was a high official of the KGB (So- viet secret service), who had defected to the US. The others were CIA. In such' tranquil spots Angle- ton a keen student of human ? T tr, .!? psychology, often has reaped his richest rewards. Defectors are fear- if of pursuit and assassination, torn by conflicting loyalties. Angle- ton, a soft-spoken yet firm man, Spends months helping them un- wind, winning their confidence?and eventually extracting valuable information. It was through defectors that he uncovered such top- grade British KGB spies as Kim Philby and George Blake. "Jim's forte is patience," said a veteran colleague. "I've seen him in a river at dusk, the rain coming down, casting slowly hour after hour, trying different flies until the trout strikes. He outwits and outwaits them?as he does with spies." A few weeks ago Angleton and his three top deputies?represent- ing among them 120 years of combined counter-espionage experi- ence?were forced out following New York Times charges that the CIA had staged "massive" and "illegal" intelligence operations against American anti-war dissidents during the early Nixon years. More than 10,000 files on Americans were Compiled. the paper claimed. Angleton's counter-espionage branch was singled out as the culprit. Angleton has steadfastly denied that his relatively small staff had any reason?let alone the manpower?for the time-consuming, on- erous task of running surveillance on Americans inside qhe US. Un- der the law, be has told friends, only the FBI .has the authority and the resources for such work. "He could have cared less about the kids protesting the Vietnam war," one CIA watcher said. However the CIA, in accordance with its statutory responsibili- ties, did keep an eye abroad on dissident groups, such as the Black panthers, who were tracked from Algiers to Moscow to North Korea, where they took demolitions training before filtering back Fnto the US and going underground. Such Americans were reported to the FBI, Angleton has insisted. As to the charge of compiling 10,000 files, CIA colleagues have pointed out that the agency has automatic access to all FBI files? more than 100 million?and would have voluminous files on all Americans who have ever had contacts abroad with enemy or friendly intelligence services. The identification of Angleton's unit in the original New York Times story of December 22 had the earmarks of authoritative guidance from highly placed sources within the CIA. Since then, however, the Times appears to have shifted the focus of its charges to another CIA unit?the Domestic Operations Division?with which Angleton and the counter-espionage staff have no connection. There are grounds for believing that Angleton's dismissal caps 18 months of growing tension between him and new CIA director William E. Colby. Colby's CIA career has been spent primarily in covert labor activities and in the Far East. He has told his staff that he must devote 95 percent of his time to briefing the White House, Congress. and the pews media. He is said to have little time for or interest in the complexities of counter-es6ionaee. Congress, in creating the CIA in 1947. specifically barred it from "police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers 4or internal-security functions." These were reserved for the FBI. But at the same time, with characteristic imprecision, Congress ordered the CIA to "pro- tect" intelligence sources and methods and to perform at the Na- tional Security Council's request additional services of "common concern" and "such other functions and duties" as the NSC might require. The gray areas here are obvious. Since spies and other subversives are travelling increasingly in and out of the US, the system works only when CIA-FBI liaison is good. For 20 years Angleton worked closely With his friend Sam Papich, the FBI liaison officer. But in 1969- the late J. Edgar Hoover, incensed that President Lyndon B. Johnson had failed to defend him from charges by Senator Edward V. Long of Missouri that the FBI was tapping his phone, preempturily ended virtually ? - APproved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350001=8 NEW YORK TIMES 10 February 1975 HELMS SAID NIXON 'SOUGHT CHILE COUP Testimony on the Overthrow of Allende Contradicted ? offigials' Statements ? ? , - ,- . By SEYMOUR M. HERSH Special ,to The New York Times WASHINGTON, Feb. 9? 'Richard Helms, the former Di- Tactor of Central Intelligence, old a Senate committee in testimony released today that there was "no doubt" in 1970 that the Nixon Administration wanted to have President Sal- vador Allende Gossens of Chile overthrown. ? In the days following Dr. Allende's election in Septem- ber, 1970, Mr. Helms told the Senate Foreign Relations Com- mittee in a closed hearing Jan. 22, the overthrow of Dr. Al- lende, a Marxist, "became a thing that they were interested in having done." . 'Incidents' Not Needed . Mr. Helms's. flat assertion about the Nixon Administra- tion's intentions toward the regime of Dr. Allende, who was overthrown in a bloody coup d'etat in September, 1973, con- tradicts sworn testimony and public statements by many former officials of the State Department and other Govern- ment agencies who had insisted . :that the United States scrupu- lously adhered to a policy of aonintevention toward Chile. Dr. Allende failed to gain a majority of the popular vote in the Sept. 4, 1970, election and, under the Chilean Constitution, his plurality had to be ratified by the Congress on Oct. 24. It was during this seven-week period, Mr. Helms testified, that the Nixon Administration sought to find ways to over- throw Mr. Allende. "The Alla.nde Government," said Mr. Helms, "was not even in at the time the probe was made just to see if there were any forces there to oppose Al- lende's advent as president. It 'was very quickly established there were not, and therefore, no further effort was made along those lines, to the best of my knowledge, at least I know of none." ; In a telephone interview, Ed- ward M. Korry, who served as Ambassador to Chile from 1967 until 1971, recalled that the .C.I.A. was asked in late Sep-. tember, 1970, "to find out if there was any real resistance to Allende." "We weren't talking about extremist groups." he said, "but sizeable forces in the political ? WASHINGTON MONTHLY FEBRUARY 1975 ? The Heirs of Walter Lippmann - One of the real problems of the business of being a columnist is the slim factual basis on which most columns are written. Tom Braden, who has not been immune to this difficulty, recently demonstrated, however, how interesting -a column can be when the . columnist really has a story to tell, in this case about James Angleton: Back in the late '40s he was the ideal choice for the counter-espionage work to which the late Frank Wisner assigned him. Painstaking, suspicious, quick to note deviations from the norm, he had the kind of mind one associates with the classic detective. In addition, as those of us who were with him in CIA may recall, he had a capacity for empire-building. From the end of World War II until last week, he built his power within the agency to the point where he was virtually untouchable. ? Successive directors, newly come to the pinnacle, were fascinated at their first encounter with this bespectacled, scholarly looking figure with the stooped shoulders, who walked cat-like into- the office, and, when the door was closed, introduced himself with' some startling and calculated revelation. "I think you'll be interested in this," he would begin with a chuckle, and then proceed to tell his new boss exactly what his new boss's hostess had said about him after the new boss had departed her house on the previous evening. Or he would show the new boss a copy of a private letter written by some employee or agent on the subject of the new boss. It was heady stuff, acquired by such means as the rest of us may imagine, but which only Angleton knew. A fly fisherman by hobby, he often referred to his knowledge of the personal and private as the result "of a little fishing." ? With one director of CIA, himself a fly fisherman, Angleton established such rapport that the two talked of secret matters in terms of fly tying: "I caught it on a little brown bug with lona antenna." Many people in CIA feared Angleton as much as successive directors held him in awe.... But at some point in his long service, Jim Angleton's sharp and studious mind became confused by Jim Angleton's ideology. As the external world chaneed, as it became clear that Khrushchev's policies would not be those of Stalin, that the United States had won the cold war, that rumors of -a Sino-Soviet split were true, Angleton found it difficult to straighten out in his own mind the agency's confused purpose. Ideology told him the cold war must go on, that the Chinese and Russians were faking their feud, that the comings and goings of Aeroflot representatives to new nations revealed a Soviet intent on aggression in those nations, that those who had sold Mr. Nixon on detente were dupes and possibly knaves. He believed his ideology and shaped facts to fit it and his power became dangerous. He is not the last of the ideologists to leave the agency but his departure will help CIA t straighten out its purpose: It is, after all a service, not a weapon in the cold war. While one wishes that Braden had told us about Angleton several years ago. this is still genuinely fascinating material, much more interesting that the predictable pontificating that Braden and his fellow columnists usually turn out. One reason they have so little interesting information to give us is that they simply don't have time to dig it up. There's time for a luncheon conversation, a few phone calls and then the day's 700 words must be ground out. Too often there's no fresh research at all; the columnists rely on their memories, which unfortunately are often faulty. Thus Gary Wills in one recent week wasted his readers' time with an attack on John Kennedy for having failed to offer to remove our Turkish missiles during the Cuban missile crisis?in fact, Robert Kennedy told Dobrynin we would remove both our Turkish and Italian missiles--and an attack on Harry Truman for having starred the imperial presidency in April 1948 with the "non-political" campaign train. In fact many presidents had used p-and trains before, and Roosevelt, in September 1940, had used the nonpolitical campaign train. Mr. Helms, who is now Am- bassador to Iran, was sum- moned to testify before the Foreign Relations Committee because of seeming discrepan- cies in his testimony at hear- ings on his confirmation in 1973 over both the extent of the in-: volvement of the Central Intel- ligence Agency in Chile and in domestic activities inside the United States. The former C.I.A. director conceded that he had erred in withholding information about the extent of the agency's co- vert operations against the Allende regime. "I think I made one mistake in the testimony," Mr. Helms told Senator Clifford P. Case of New Jersey, the ranking Re- publican committee member. "Maybe it is a serious mistake, but I should have probably asked either to go off the rec- ord or to have asked to discuss this matter in some other forum, because you will recall at that thne [February, 1973], Allende's government was in area." ? power trt Chile and we did not Approved For Release 2001/08 0 need any more diplomatic' in- cidents.' During his two-hour appear- ance before the committee, Mr. Helms was pressed to explain his previous testimony only by Senators Case and Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, who is chairman of the new Senate Select Committee on In- telligence. _ During his confirmation hear- ing, the former C.I.A. chief de- nied that the agency had sought to overthrow the Allende re- gime, or had passed any funds :to Dr. Allende's opponents. At ione point in this hearing, Mr. !Helms volunteered the follow- ing statement: "If the agency had really gotten in behind the other candidates and spent a lot of money and so forth, the. election might have come out differently." He testified In a similar vein during hearings later in 1973 before Senator Church's Sub- committee on Multinational Corporations, which was hives-. ligating the links between the 19rnito?4121b168100350001-8 . . phone -and Telegraph- Corpora-- tion and the Nixon Administra- tion's policy toward Chile. William E. Colby, who be- came Director of Central In- telligence in mid-1973, told a House committee last April, however, that the Nixon Ad- ministration had authorized more than $8-million for clan- destine activities in Chile be- tween 1970 and 1973 in in ef- fort to make it impossible for Allende to govern. Mr. Colby said that $1-mil- lion had been authorized for covert use in August, 1973, but that only $50,000 was spent before Dr. Allende's overthrow and death a month later. Mr. Helms defended his ear- lier testimony by telling the Foreign Relations Committee that the 'money authorized for Chile "went into civic action groups, supporting newspapers, radios and so forth . . . 1 cad not realize that [it] went into political parties. I did not think , that it had, at least it was my ;understanding at the time.., If [somebody had said something [else, ,I am prepared to stand . _ _ Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350001-8 rcorrectde." 2 During more than two hours of unworn testimony, the !former C.I.A. chief also sug- gested that the Senators had erred in not asking him more pointed questions in 1973. Last Sept. 19. The New York 'Times quoted intelligence Sources as saying that C.I.A. funds were secretly funneled to striking labor unions and trade groups for more than 18 months before Dr. Allende's overthrow. Mr. Helm's was not asked about that in his most recent testimony, nor Was he pressed to provide- an account- ing of the $5 million that was authorized for so-called "de- stabilization efforts" againit Dr. Allende in 1971, 1972 and 1973. More than half of that money, The Times quoted its sources as saying, was used to provide strike benefits and other means of support for anti Allende strikers and workers. ? After telling the Senators about. the C.I.A.'s unsuccessful efforts in late 1970 to find sup-, port' for the overthrow of Mr.. Allende, M. Helms added, "I cannot ,understand how anyone could Interpret [the CIA's ef- forts in Chile] as an attempt to overthrow the Government or believe that they stood a chance Of doing so. So that is what I meant when I answer [the] question [by saying]. there was really no effort made to over- throw. the Government of He also cautioned -the oom- Mittee bout the words used to describe CIA. plans. "They 'sound exotic, tough, all the rest," he said. "I think when you get the entire story laid out in Chile between 1970- and 1973 you are going to regard that as a pretty pitiful affair. I meal in terms of actually ac- complishing anything." ? During his testimony, Mr. Helms was not asked in any de- tail about the recent allegations of C.I.A. involVement in- do- mestic spying activities. ? WASHINGTON POST 8 February 1975 CI Wins By john P. MacKenzie - Washington Post Staff Wri ,er , The 'Central Intelligence Agency yesterday won back the right?at least temporarily ?to suppress classified infor-. mation in a book about the - CIA's covert activities. -? Reversing a lower court, the Fourth U.S. Circuit Court of, 'Appeals -ruled that former in- telligence officers Victor L.' Marchetti and John D. Marks failed to prove that 168 dele- tions from their book, "The CIA the.. Cult of Intelligence," were improperly excised. The burden had been placed On the government last April in a . decision by U.S. District Iteversial on Book sages were "classifiable" and not that they had been prop- erly classified. But the court ?of appeals said the National Security Council and an interagency committee established by pres- idential order, "far more than any judge, have the back-. ground for making classifica- tion and declassification deci-. sions." For this reason, the court held that the burden of proof established by Judge Bryan "was far too stringent." It or- dered the case retried under new ground rules. Melvin L. Wulf, the Ameri- can Civil Liberties Union law- yer who represents the au- thors, said he will seek Su- Court Judge Albert V. 'Bryan preme Court review. A peti-' Jr. in Alexandria. tion -by_ the book's publisher, Bryan',' who heard closed- Alfred A. -Knopf, Inc., ap- courtroom testimony from for-. Ipeared equally certain. mer CIA Director William B. - ? . One issue the high court ! Colby and his four top depu.1 will be asked to decide is ' ties, disapproved all but 15 of ! !whether the Fourth. Circuit the agency's deletions. He said' ' I I correctly applied the . newly the government had shown !amended federal Freedom. of,, only that the disputed pas. BALTIMORE NEWS AMERICAN 31- JAN 1;75 - ? Eiveirt `et r 'kr ANT ii-Net- 7 tf /771 t7 ? .M II v_itt.p I Information Act. Under- the?' law the government must I convince 'a federal judge dui_ i particular information properly classified and thet judge has clear authority make his own secret examinaq tion and evaluation of tisk documents. Chief Judge Clement Pi Haynsworth Jr., writing foci the circuit court, said the law should be applied to the CILA? case but on the understanC ing that there was "a pse4 sumption of regularity ? performance by public off?-i cials" who have the job se keeping government secretz. Haynsworth. joined by Judges Harrison 'L. Winter: and J. Braxton Craven In,, said the government "was re: quired to show no more that that each deletion item (Bs closed information which was required to be classified is any degree and which was contained in a document bear- ing a classification stamp." Soviet Spies in the U.S. ; .Our battered Central Intelligence Agen- Soviet espionage calls this "re- cy is convinced that, behind the scenes, the grooming." Sakharovsky's agents are first Soviet spy activity in the United States has sent abroad for about a year to familiarize now reached an all-time high. themselves with the target country. Then. We are the only country the Kremlin they are brought home and trained another .really fears and the CIA knows that, with- seven or eight years ?as long as that ? be- out question, the U.S.A. is the Soviet's main fore being returned, say, to the United target. To our CIA the proof ? even me- State, _ chanically ? is self-evident. The American section of the KGB in Moscow is over- whelmingly the largest section in the entire apparatus. KGB chief Uri Vladimirovich Adropov, 60, was Soviet Ambassador to Hungary dur- ing the Kremlin's reconquest of Hungary in 1956. Andropov became KGB chief in 1967, a, year after Richard M. Helms was appointed head of the CIA. Then in 1973 Soviet Com- munist. party First Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev elevated Andropov to the ruling 17-member Politburo, the first KGB chief to be so elevated since Lavrenti P. Beria. The CIA }mows Andropov has organized the 'KGB into 15 directorates. Lieut. Gen, Aleksandr M. Sakharovsky commands the 1st directorate. It employs at least 10,000 se- cret agents abroad. The CIA finds that Sakharovsky relies heavily on the "sleeper" method and that most "Sleepers" are trained in an immense old 15th century czarist chateau at Barkov, 40 kilometers from Moscow, on the Vereyka River. For example, the Soviet's Konon Molody ("Gbrdon Lonsdale") spy ring planted in the British Admiralty consumed 12 years in its "sleeper" status before starting espio- ? The made-over men are "regroomed " into U.S. citizens, equipped with false pass- ports and other false documents: false birth certificates, driver's license, etc., in as- tounding variety. ? Their "Rezident," operating here from a "Rezidentura," directs them into our gov-, ernment; the armed forces, atomic plants, scientific centers, the news media, defense or communications industries or what not. On the side, the KGB pays its placed agents (always cash) as little as $-420 a month. Moreover, it frequently fools them by saying the apparatus will put huge bonus payments for them in a Moscow bank. Then the KBB liquidates the agent for knowing too much. In its inside parlance this is called "implemented interrogation" and the favor. ite point of puncture is the back of the neck. The 13th Directorate has a special noto- riety within the CIA and other Western in- telligence services. James Bond's fictional SMERSH does, in fact, exist, although the true official title inside the KGB is the Chatany Otdel group. The killer squad is under Nikolai Kora. noideals worldwide, Approved FonraRetiteate1001/08/08 : C 77-01aBhada?81313 8001 -id ApProved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350001-8 . NATION 8 if IS 1975 RECRUITING HISTORIANS trzz CIA RN THE f303 A A RONALD RADOSH illiam E. Colby's policy of building a more open CIA was evident at the annual conference of the American Historical Association, held at the Conrad Hilton Hotel in Chicago from December 27 to 30. At just the time when sobs are very hard to find in the universities, the CIA made its first public appearance before the AHA by