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December 29, 1974
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--Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003.-6 CONFIDENTIAL INTERNAL USE ONLY This publication contains clippings from the domestic and foreign press for YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use of selected items would rarely be advisable. CONFIDENTIAL 20 January 1975 Destroy after backgrounder has served its purpose or within 60 days. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6 GOVERN'4ENTAL AFFAIRS GENERAL WESTERN EUROPE NEAR EAST AFRICA EAST ASIA LATIN AMERICA Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6 RADIO TV REPORTS, INC. 4435 WISCONSIN AVE. N.W.. WASHINGTON. D. C. 20016. 244.3540 PROGRAM Issues & Answers December 29, 1974 1:30 PM STATION ABC Network Washington, D.C. AN INTERVIEW WITH SENATOR PROXMIRE BOB CLARK: Senator William Proxmire, Democrat of Wisconsin, here are the issues: Will charges of widespread domestic spying destroy the CIA? How can Congress tighten its control over intelligence operations? Will Congress vote an anti-recession tax cut? ANNOUNCER,: Senator William Proxmire, who has demanded an investigation into alleged domestic spying by the CIA and has called for the resignation of former CIA Director Richard Helms, Ambassador to Iran, will be interviewed by ABC News Capitol Hill correspondent Bob Clark and ABC news correspondent Bill Gill. BILL GILL: Senator, in this week of charges against the Central Intelligence Agency on alleged domestic spying you have had a research staff at work. Now most of the char have been from unknown or unnamed sources in news reports. gas Have you been able to determine exactly what the Central Intelligence Agency may have been guilty or not guilty of? SENATOR WILLIAM PROXMIRE: Well, I think I can say on the basis of the information I have, and I think it's very good information, very reliable people that I've found to be reliable in the past, that the stories and the allegations in the New York Times about the 10,000 -- the file of 10,000 names of people who had been under investigation by the CIA, ,about the surveillance -- surveillances, I should say -- about the breaking-and-entering, and about wiretaps, that those are accurate and correct. 1 think I can confirm that on the basis of the information that I've had, and I think, as I say, that's good information. GILL: Well, the latest report is the Central Intelligence Agency was shadowing or putting under surveillance Congressman Claude Popper, Supreme Court Justice William 0. Douglas, some other of the highest-ranking American officials. Can you confirm that? quite a bit, especially the Douglas surveillance. So information on that. don't have GILL: Well, suppose you evaluate that kind of action by the Central Intelligence Agency. for a moment that they might have investigated, s tsunde surveillance these two PPtunder particular people, Claude Pepper a congress m alp &v leor4&le d 2balWaMB8, : GIlI1-f~DR7 @04r,9BAOC 1~0 r99.03-6 holding office; William Douglas, aSupreme Court'Justice.. Is this part of the CIA's province? . this is exactly what your question implies at the end, this is not part of the CIA's responsibility or their legal.right..- Th_ CIA is responsible for foreign intelligence-gathering, primarily, and-they have absolutely no right to engage in this kind of surveillance, and not only with respect to United States senators, but any American citizen in this country. It's Wrong. And I think I should be very careful in saying, that I do think that internal security essential function. I t has to be performed. t?te don't live in a Sunday .school world. The Russians undoubtedly have their agents in this country and they should be under the closest kind of surveillance, but that should be done by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. And it's most important that the CIA, which is a secret agency-- we d-on't even know its budget. It has hundreds of millions of dollars, tans'of thousands of people working for it -- that if this agency begins to engage in this kind of thing without.the controls the'FBI has, without court orders. for mail cover, for example, and wiretapping, then we're in a very dangerous position.. And I think that distinction has to be made. CLARK: Senator, as you know, we don't even know the 'budget of the CIA ' and ;,then you eny "'1.ie_ " you the J ?, J- _I J 11Y , 4V_ 111-"11 the U.S. Congress. There are a few members of the House and Senate who form subcommittees on the Armed Services Committees and the Appropriations Committee who theoretically oversee the CIA budget. But...- SENATOR PROX!-;IRE: Im theoretically.. .1 mean it's pretty theoretical. They don't... CLARK: That's sort of the heart-of the question.-. I know these rarely meet and they're dominated by two or three senior rnembers.*- But what do you do about it? How does Congress tighten its control over the CIA so it knows .:hat it's doing and what it's spending? SENATOR PROXIUI RE : Well, .number one -- . I think: there are a number of things we should do. Number one, we should clear up this so-called gray area that you have. We should make it absolutely clear by law that the CIA cannot engage, must not engage in any kind of domestic police activity at all, any kind of domestic activity. I got that kind of an amendment through the Senate and Senator Stennis cosponsored it with me, the Proxmire-Stennis Amendment. It was unfortunately dropped in the House, but I think we can get that adopted in the coming year, thanks very largely to the story in the New York Times, the series of stories and exposes in the New York Times. So I think that's number one. But that's just the.beginning. 'I think, in addition to that, we must act to establish an independent special prosecutor' with subpoena powers who will prosecute every illegal action by CIA agents, past or present. CLARK: Now are you talking about a special prosecutor under the Justice Department or under Congress, as a creature of Congress? 2 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6 SENATOR PROXMIRE: No. What's outrageous about -Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R0001. 00350003-6 SENATOR PROXMIRE: Well, I think it ought to be a creature of Congress. I think it ought to be created by us. I think it would be workina with the Justice: Department, but I think it ought to be independent, and I stress the independence. I think we have a framework for that, of course, in the Watergate situation, where we had both Cox ' and Jaworski in this position, where there was a Justice Department responsibility, but where it was clear that the independent special prosecutor could not be fired without informing the Congress about it and giving the Congress an opportunity to act. It must be independent of the Executive because this is where the problem has developed. CLARK: Well, would you have this special prosecutor conduct the investigation that almost everybody agrees is now needed of the CIA? SENATOR PROXMIRE: Well, I think that's part of it. I think he should conduct the investigation of illegal activities, but I think that's only part of what has to be done. And in addition to that, I'd like to see the establishment of a joint committee that has the exclusive job and the sole job of investigating this whole operation and what's been done in the past. You see, we've had these flurries of saying "Let's control the CIA" again and again. We had it when the Bay of Pigs thing happened. We had it with the U-2 fiasco. W;- had it with the secret war in Laos conducted by the CIA. And nothing happens. People complain about it for a few days or a few weeks,' and it goes away. So I think we should take action to make sure that -you have that kind of a committee established with the responsibility, a limited responsibility, but a specific responsibility, in this case. Then in addition, I think it would be desirable to have an oversight committee that would be permanently assigned to oversee the CIA, because as you implied before, there just isn't the kind of congressional control of the CIA that we must have. GILL:. Wel I , Senator.. . SENATOR PROXMIRE: In addition to that, one other thing. I introduced legislation and got substantial support in the Senate, although it didn't pass, that would provide for an overall budget of the CIA so that we know how much money is being spent. And we have the word of both Schlesinger and ' Col by, the former directors, that this would not have a serious effect in compromising the security of the CIA. GILL:-.- dust so that we -- for clarity, up until this past week the central criticism of the Central Intelligence Agency over recent times has been covert activity in foreign countries a la Chile, the Bay of Pigs, the Laos war, with a great sentiment being expressed by some that even this should be absolutely prohibited. But now we're concentrating on a new area and that particular phase of the CIA operation seems to have faded away for the moment. SENATOR PROXIMIRE: No. Bill, these are very, very closely related. I think the covert activity should be stopped, the so-called -- the paramilitary activity, the murder,.the kidnaping, or that kind of thing to destabilize, Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CjA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6 overthrow governments. It's wrong. It's counterproductive. It failed with the Gay of Pigs. It failed in the Chilean situation. It's failed over and over a-gain. It's succeeded sometimes, but even where it succeeds, I think it erodes. our... [Confusion of voices] SEF;ATOR PROXiiIRE: ...throughout the world. GILL: '.:ell, didn't it succeed in such places as Turkey, Greece, Iran... SENATOR PROXNIRE: It succeeded in some places, that's correct. But even where it succeeded, it's something teat leaves such a bad flavor and taste and attitude toward this country that I think it's wrong. We have no right to play God. The reason it's related, however, is because if we're going to have people with that kind of experience, that kind of knowledge, that kind of ability engaging in subverting foreign countries, then we're asking for it here in this country. I think one of the most serious threats we have to our free system is subversion from trained subversive ,agents who've been trained to do the job abroad and then transfer that ability here. 1 think the Watergate experience is one that should remind us of this. GILL: What I'm asking you pointedly is can you briefly give me your concept of what Central Intelligence should be? .. SENATOR PROXMIRE: Yes. Briefly, what the Central Intelligence Agency should be doing is gathering intelligence, gathering information, gathering it in every way they know.. And, of course, the technological advances we've. had in recent years, where we have satellites that can be a hundred miles above the earth, can photograph something literally inches in size, has given us the most reliable kind of objective information about what's going on in foreign countries. And I think that that kind of intelligence-gathering and any other kind of foreign intelligence-gathering is right, useful, desirable; we have to have it. But the paramilitary action abroad that Congress knows nothing about is, I think, vicious, wrong and unjustifiable, and we ought to stop it. CLARK: Senator, let me play devil's advocate here for a moment, and I know the position you're taking is essentially that of Chairman Fulbright as he leaves the Foreign Relations Committee, that the CIA should confine itself only to gathering intelligence. But the rebuttal that is made to that is that we live in a dangerous and sometimes a dirty world where it takes a dirty tricks operation to remain competitive with the intelligence operations that are manned by the iron Curtain countries. How do you answer that? SENATOR PRUUII RE : Well, I'd answer that by saying that this is -- we've always lived in a dirty world in which tough and mean, cruel people operated this way. That's the way the world has been. There's nothing new about that. I Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6 got along without the CIA operation for most of our history, th_ great majority of our history. When President Truman discovered that this covert kind of operation was going on, he expressed real shock. He was concerned about it. He thought it was wrong. And I don't think that there's -- it's ever been shown that his is necessary. or that this kind of activity has at any time been really useful in the long run for the interests of. our country. I think we can protect ourselves with our defense establishment. I think we can protect ourselves by getting information about what's going on, which is what the CIA should do. And we do not need to engage in that kind of activity abroad. I don't think it works for us; I don't think it works for other. countries trying to operate in this country. CLARK: I want to get a little clearer on your views as-to--what sort of an investigation should be mounted into the CIA. Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State Kissinger, who is .also the chief. wheel of the private oversight operation within the Administration of the CIA, Committee of 40 -- but he reportedly favors an investigation by a panel -- a blue- ribbon panel, so-called, of private citizens. What would you think of that idea? SENATOR PROXMI RE : Well, now we've had an investigation by the CIA itself of itself, and I think we have to discount that, although I have great respect for i?lr. Colby, who I think s doing a good job, on the basis of everything 1 've seen, as Mr. Schlesinger did. He's a good man. But I think that the CIA to investigate itself obviously isn.t it. Now-if you have a panel -- we have a panel, 'a board', an intelligence board whose job it is to brief the President on ,what's going on in the intelligence community, .and it just hasn't worked. We wouldn't have situation that has just.been exposed by the New York Times. What. I'm concerned about is that if the President appoints a panel, with Mr. Ki ssi nger's advice -- and Mr. Kissinger, as you say, is partly responsible for the CIA -- that it's likely to be a whitewash. I just wouldn't have faith that they would do the job. I think, in addition to that, you should have what I have suggested, which is a vigorous independent special prosecutor with the job of going after what's wrong and illegal. and. taking. action, and a congress ioiial -committee with its specific responsibility for acting here. I wouldn't have any objection-to that, but I don't think it'.ll do much. finding. CLARK: Senator, you are going... SENATOR PROXMIRE: I wouldn't have any faith in their CLARK: In the new 94th Congress you're going to move on to a new job as Chairman of the Banking Committee. We want to ask you a number of questions about that.... GILL: Senator, before we go on to your new duties as Ch airmaApprrovtOFoBftle*1 2Q1JICWCBtt A,-FW%7-Q 2~RMOYIWBA6that 5 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6 you mentioned is rather intriguing,' I think, and I'd-like to ask you this: If you were to have a special group of oversight action created in the Congress, could the CIA, under your premise, then come to that organization for sanction of its dirty trick operations, its paramilitary operations, if it felt that it's absolutely essential to the country? Would there be any mechanism at all that they could get the permission or the consent or the agreement of that legislative body to go ahead with such a paramilitary operation? Or are you speaking of making it absolutely prohibited? SENATOR PROXMIRE: Well, I'm saying I'd like to h l get t e egislation adopted prohibiting that kind of activity. As I say, I don't think it's worked. But obviously, at any time the President of the United States or the CIA or anyone else wants to come before the Congress and ask for permission to do this, they could get the law changed to permit them to do it,.and I think that that should be the requirement. GILL: But then it would have to go before the entire Congress and be laid out on the table, and then there is no secrecy to it. Aren't you really getting to the point now where you're in danger of just totally emasculating the CIA in some foreseeable future when something such as [unintelligible] is absolutely necessary? SENATOR PROXMIRE: No. I don't think -- this is the way free societies perish. I think by getting into activities t- Z ~ th they 4.rc+ devour ~~~~i ~.~~ are so J VYI on l~, 1.he -..ea.-.s are so wrong, 4.14J ~MJ .. u~.? your ends. I think what we have to do is recognize that this country survived very well for 170 years without any CIA. We also have to look at what the covert activities have told us for the last 20 years or so since we've been engaged in them. What is the result? It's been counterproductive. It.has not given us a single instance which, it seems to me, Americans can be proud of in advancing our position. Sure, we have gotten a little more friendly governments in one place and another, but we're playing God when we do that. How can we possibly justify removing a government that's been elected, or, for that matter, any other government? I think that this covert activity is wrong. and it's really a more likely threat to the free institutions than the invasion of a foreign power. And I just want to make one more thing clear: I feel very strongly about internal security. I think we do live in a tough world, but I.think that the FBI has the professionalism, the competence, the track record and they can protect this country WASHINGTON POST 10 January 1975 eportedldT Asked ,r'~s to S . r month linked the CIA to' P1 u-; .The Central Intelligence ,Agency recently asked Ameri- can firms to engage in.indus- trial espionage on civilian transportation systems in Brit- ain, ' Canada, France, West Germany;. Japan and the Soviet Union, it was asserted .yesterday. Sen. Richard S. Schweiker (R-Pa.) charged that research egntract proposals sent by, the tions." ~ project said "the emphasis i tion why this information isn't The CIA document outlin- will be placed on the identifi- ing the proposed study said i cation of specific foreign de. said "the U.S. may be faced velopm ents in transportation with competitive threats, inltechnology that could provide both the U.S. and interna. the most serious economic tional market, evolving from competition for the United rapid technological advances States." in other countries." Schweiker said in his state- A copy of the CIA's seven- ment "I do not question our rage document requesting government's interest in for. . . r being openly obtained by the Departments of Commerce or Transportation instead of sec- retly procured by the CIA. "This latest discovery adds new weight to the charges t that the CIA has exceeded its charter and established an in- visible government of its own," Schweiker said. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-004321l000i00350003-6. Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6 NEW YORK 20 Jan. 1975. By Tad Szulc "... Nixon tapes would speak for themselves. The C.I.A. will tell the blue-ribbon panel. as much, or as little, as it chooses ... 55 i 'President Ford no sooner said that he wished to know and tell the whole truth about the illegal domestic opera. tions of the Central Intelligence Agency than he placed this investigation in the hands of an eight-man blue-ribbon commission whose immediate problem may tie in its own unreality. Its chair- man, Vice-President Nelson Rocke- feller, and several of its most knowl- edgeable members have long, intimate, and protective ties with the U.S. in- telligence community, which could con- ceivably lead them to see the C.I.A.'s controversial doings in a relatively charitable light. The crucial question to be answered by the commission is this: who knew about the C.I.A.'s portion of what John Mitchell characterized as the Nixon While Housc "horrors"? Was it n ?~,?L 1\(ll- ard Nixon himself, orchestrating a com- prehensive plan to push the United States toward a police state? Was it for- mer C.I.A. Director Richard Helms? Was it General Robert Cushman Jr., a close associate of Richard Nixon's and, at the time, the agency's deputy direc- tor? Or was it Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, the man who, in effect, runs the entire U.S. intelligence community? Charity may not be the most necessary attribute for a group whose mission includes determining whether sufficient safeguards surround the C.I.A. In any event, this commission can hardly do its work adequately unless, along with the Watergate special prose- cutor, it gains access to the treasure trove of Richard Nixon's materials held back by the Ford White House because of Nixon's own legal challenges. Federal investigators are convinced that among the 900 reels of tapes (add- ing up to some 5,400 listening hours) and 42 million documents in the White House complex there is ample evidence to verify how and why the former president and his associates went about misusing and abusing the American intelligence community for their own political ends-at the expense of the civil rights of American citizens. The C.I.A. and military intelligence have been snooping around the United States for a long time, but there has been nothing quite like the carryings- on under Nixon. These activities far transcend in importance recently re- ported "massive" C.I.A. spying on antiwar militants., if it really occurred. They included direct domestic police functions in support of local police forces, White House-directed surveil- Approved lance of selected individuals for politi- cal reasons, considerable cooperation with the "plumbers," and the manage- ment of a $200-million-a-year top-secret C.I.A. corporate empire. The existence of this vast internation- al corporate empire has a new rele- vance, presumably of interest to the Rockefeller commission. Present for- eign aid legislation prohibits the fund- ing of covert C.I.A. operations abroad unless the president certifies to Con- gress their need for U.S. national se- curity. The availability of funds in C.I.A.-owned and profit-making busi- nesses could circumvent the intent of Congress. Net:' York Magazine has learned details of these and other hidden in- telligence operations through recent research and wide-ranging interviews throughout the United States intelli- gence community. A presidential com- mission seriously interested in getting to the bottom of things surely could do much more. Curiously, though, the contents of . the Nixon cache, which would be the most vital aspect of its investigations, were referred to by neither Ford nor any other senior ad- ministration official in the course of an- nouncing formation of the commission. The commission's present plan is to in- terview C.I.A. Director William Colby as its first witness, then move on to Kissinger and others. The Nixon tapes would speak for themselves. The C.I.A. will tell as much, or as little, as it chooses to the blue-ribbon investigators, a potentially sympathetic group. The chairman, Rockefeller, served on the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, theoretically a supervisory group for U.S. intelligence-gathering activities. from 1969 to 1974. Its membership includes such old friends of the C.I.A. as former Treasury Secretary C. Doug- las Dillon, former California Governor Ronald Reagan, and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Lyman Lemnitzer. As J.C.S. chairman, General Lemnitzer was on the White House's "303 Committee"-now known as the "40 Committee"-which super- vises the most secret United States for- eign covert intelligence operations. The A.F.L: C.I.O., whose secretary- treasurer. Lane Kirkland, is on the pan- el,. provided in the sixties an umbrella for C.I.A. activities in Latin America by setting up the American Institute for Free Labor Development. Kirkland is to his tapes and documents constitute a legal cover-up. It is aimed at.voiding an agreement signed last November between the Ford White House and the special prosecutor to make the pertinent files available for the prepa- ration of additional Watergate. indict- ments. Inasmuch as one of Nixon's suits challenges the constitutionality of a recent congressional act which ratifies, in effect, the Ford-special prosecutor agreement, the case may go all the way to the Supreme Court, indefinitely delaying all the investigations. The blue-ribbon commission must report by April 4 (even though it is unlikely that litigation over Nixon's materials will be resolved by then). The White House tapes and docu- ments are also believed to contain juicy material that would document other areas of Nixon abuses - most notably concerning illegal wiretaps, violations of the Internal Revenue Ser- vice's statutes on the secrecy of tax returns, and other startling attempts to subvert the functions of government departments for the former president's political advantage. If the tapes are obtained, the spe- cial prosecutor hopes later this year to come up with new indictments against, among others, those who during Nixon's reign installed what are be- lieved to have been illegal national se- curity wiretaps against administration officials and Washington newsmen. Federal Bureau of Investigation agents, Justice Department Internal Security Division officials, Washington police officers, or even C.I.A. operatives may have done the work. Should the wire- tap case go to trial, the special prose- cutor is certain to call as witnesses Kissinger and his former deputy, Gen- eral Alexander M. Haig Jr., who is now commander-in-chief of NATO forces. Both have already acknowledged rec- ommending the names of those to be wiretapped. The Nixon tapes might also explain why the Nixon administration late in 1972 created a mysterious military in- telligence office known as Defense Investigative Service (D.I.S.) located in the Forrestal Building in downtown Washington. The D.I.S., reportedly staffed by a number of ex-C.I.A. agents from domestic intelligence units, re- ports directly to the Office of the Secre- tarv of Defense, significantly by-passing also a member of Rockefeller's earlier the Defense Intelligence Agency. commission on "critical choices." Inquirers at the Pentaron about the For Releastdt'2~s1) 'bguitCIA-RDF 7a0?'4$2F 00f~10035000 -611i`'t this office cen- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6 tralizes security clearance for defense contractors. But there is doubt that this is its- only function. Until his re- tirement late in 1974, the D.I.S. was headed by Air Force Brigadier Gen. oral Joseph Cappucci. formerly chief. of the air force's Office of Special in- ves6eatio.n. Insiders say that clearing defense contractors would hardly be a task given a senior military intelligence officer. Political intelligence within the air force was a responsibility of the Office of Special Investigations. Officials familiar with the situation suggest that new disclosures from the Nixon materials may create acute em- barrassment for Henry Kissinger. Inas- much as the C.I.A. reports to the president of the United States through the mechanism of the National Security Council, headed by Kissinger since 1969, and since he is chairman of the N.S.C.'s "40 Committee," concerned with the most secret intelligence opera- tions abroad, it is a valid question how much he might have known about the agency's secret operations. Privately, many officials further argue that Kissinger probably had to be aware. of the C.I.A.'s domestic activities. For example, the dividing line between the agency's foreign and domestic counterintelligence work- the tracking' of foreign intelligence operatives-is completely blurred,. par- ticularly since J. Edgar Hoover, the Federal Bureau of Investigation's late director, suspended all counterespio- nage cooperation with the C.I.A. in 1969. If indeed other C.I.A. units aside from the Counterintelligence Staff be- longing to the office of the Deputy Di- tectoryof Operations (D.D.O.). also known as the Clandestine Services, be- came engaged in purely domestic operations between 1969 and 1972, it would have been an affront to Kis- singer to keep him in the dark. It must be remembered that from the moment he moved into the White House. in 1969. Kissinger insisted on maintaining full control of the C.T.A. to the point where successive C.I.A. directors had no direct private access to Nixon: the present director, William E. Colby, usually sees President Ford . in Kis- sinaer's presence. After Ford requested a report from Colby on the C.I.A.'s illegal activities following publication in The New York Tulles on December 22 of the `-`massive spying" charges. it was Kissinger, as the head of the N.S.C. mechanism, who was instructed to transmit Colby's re- sponse to the .president. In this sense, then, Kissinger is part and parcel of the whole intelligence controversy. As of now, sods his friend and benefactor, Vice-President Rockefeller. There are also some reasons to sus- pect that the whole affair is immensely more complex and sensitive than the simple possibility that the Counter- intelligence Staff ran private spying operations against the antiwar move- ment. There have been a number of unexplained moves both by the C.I.A. and the White House suggestive of a no-holds-barred power struggle within the intelligence community, possibly involving Kissinger himself. Ford's de- cision to "get to the bottom" of the present C.I.A. affair-an abrupt de- parture from past White House prac- tice in C.I.A. matters-is an element in the mystery. One possibility, insiders say, is that the need was perceived at the. highest levels of the government to hide the real C.I.A. enterprises during the Watergate. era-such as undertaking direct police functions and dirty work for the Nixon-White House. Because bits of information were beginning to surface, these insiders say, it was judged less damaging to go along with the limited charge of "massive spying" against the antiwar movement. A related possibility is that the "mas- sive, spying" disclosures last month were the result of deliberate C.I.A. leaks. Their objective: to help eliminate James Angleton, the head of the Coun- terintelligence Staff, one of the C.I.A.'s most powerful and independent senior officials and long a thorn in Colby's and Kissinger's sides. Angleton and his Counterintelligence group were initially singled out as cul- prits in the spying scandal despite the high probability, as it now appears, that an entirely separate C.I.A. branch, the Domestic Operations Division. con- ducted domestic operations. Published reports early this .;.glide indicated that both Colby and Kis- singer resented Angleton's personal control of all intelligence liaison with Israel. Unlike all other cases involving foreign intelligence, the C.I.A.'s rela- tions with Israel were handled by Counterintelligence rather than a geo- graphic division of Clandestine Services. Some knowledgeable State. Depart- ment officials say that Kissinger felt that Angleton's operations interfered with his Middle East diplomacy. Counterintelligence was apparently the only area in the C.I.A. that resisted Kissinger's sway. In addition, Angleton was known to hold a low opinion of the detente engineered and negotiated by Kissinger with the Soviet Union. .. Angleton himself told. newsmen that Colby had asked him to resign in the wake of the domestic spying charges (although he was to remain with the agency as "a consultant" while the Counterintelligence Staff is being re- organized and a new chief named). Three of Angleton's deputies were also asked to resign. But New York Maga- zine has learned that Colby actually moved to fire him two or three days .before The Times published its report on domestic spying naming Angleton as the man responsible. I f this theory is correct, we may be facing an extraordinary combination of a cover-up of the C.I.A.'s domestic activities on Nixon's behalf with esoteric intrigues within the agency itself-indeed, within the entire Ameri- can intelligence community-a combi- nation. that cannot help but affect the conduct of American foreign policy. The very structure of the agency's "Clandestine Services," the secretive Directorate of Operations (see table on page 33), helps explain how such thing .are possible. So that perfect security and secrec may be assured, the agency frequentl insists on the right hand's not knowing what the left hand does-the princi- ple of "compartmentalization." In all D.D.O. operations, knowledge is con- fined to those with "the need to know" -.and it can't even be ruled out that in some cases the C,I.A. director him- self may have looked the other vcay on the theory, as a C.I.A: veteran put it, that "what you don't know don't hurt you." During the Nixon period-until his removal early in 1973-the C.I.A. director was Richard Helms, a lifelong clandestine operator. His deputy direc- tor of Central Intelligence (D.D.C.i.) was Lieutenant General Robert Cush- man Jr., once Nixon's military assistant and now commandant of the marine corps. Helms and Cushman were sup- ported by four C.I.A. deputy directors, one of whom was the deputy director for plans (recently the title was changed to deputy director of operations). This post was held until early 1973, by Thomas Karamessines. He and his deputy. Cord Meyer Jr., were in charge of all clandestine operations. The direc- torate was divided into four main branches reporting directly to Kara- messines. (A fifth branch, the Science and Technology Office, was subse quently added.) For specific operational purposes; however. Karamessines also ran two parallel groups of divisions, one foreign and one domestic. These were hier- archically separated from the special staffs such as Counterintelligence or Covert Action. Six regional divisions supported by subregional and country desks formed the geographic group and worked with the special staffs on specific overseas operations. On the domestic side, the directorate had-and still has-four divisions. In varying degrees, they were all involved in Nixon-era secret domestic operations. The little-known Domestic Opera- tions Division (D.O.D.) and the mys- teriously named "Division D" (now renamed "D Staff") carried out the bulk of domestic activities, ranging from wholly legitimate ones to some that were quite shady. They were ': zistically aided, as the rest of the C.I.A. is, by the specialized Technical Services Division' (T.S.D,) and Rec- ;-ds Integration Division (R.I.D.). The Domestic Operations Division is :-t charge of a network of C.I.A. offices :acated in at least fifteen American ::ties. Some of these offices are overt and even listed- in local telephone Directories (under "Central Intelligence Agency"). The' division's so-called offices, for example, concentrate on debriefing American travelers re- -:lrning home from trips to countries :n which the C.I.A. has a special inter - est. Inasmuch as the Counterintelligence Staff worries about foreign agents, such as Soviet K.G.B. operatives, entering the United States, it may. occasionally request the D.O.D. to lend a hand in ,Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6 _ tracking them. Such interceptions were once made by the F.B.I., but when Hoo- ver gave up his counterespionage func- tions, this follow-up was made by C.I.A. Counterintelligence or the D.O.D. That which C.I.A. officials speaking privately have conceded to be the "gray area" of operations is the sur- veillance of American citizens sus- pected of contacts with foreign intelli- gence. Although the 1947 National Security Act, which created the C.I.A., specifically forbids domestic police functions by the agency, it is argued that such activity is simply an exten- sion of foreign counterintelligence. It is widely known in Washington intelligence circles that the C.I.A., and especially Counterintelligence, sus- pected a number of dissident and radi- cal American groups of ties with Communist intelligence services-and not only in the antiwar movement con- text. The Black Panthers, for example, were under close C.I.A. surveillance based on the suspicion-never proved -;hat many of its members traveled to Algeria and Moscow for ideological indoctrination and then to North Korea for sabotage and guerrilla training. Similar suspicions surrounded young 'Americans who had visited Cuba. The C.I.A. increased this surveil- lance under Nixon even though the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, formed by former President Jc nson. had concluded that there was no foreign subversive conspiracy be- hind racial riots. The C.I.A. had worked closely with the commission. Cord Mey- er. the Clandestine Services' deputy chief, was the agency's liaison official. But 'although it engaged in financing such. groups as the National Student Association for intelligence operations abroad, and publishing houses, maga- zines. and news agencies for foreign propaganda in pre-Nixon days, former Director RichardHelms -and the C.I.A. ,drew a line at "targeting" Americans at home. Nor would the C.I.A. busy itself abroad on essentially domestic matters. In the 1960's, for example, Helms per- sorally refused a request from the In- ternal Revenue to establish surveillance in South America on a tax evader, an American citizen, who had skipped overseas owing hundreds of thousands of dollars in back taxes. Under Nixon, however, the climate changed totally. In December, 1970, Helms fitted- the C.I.A. into the secret Intelligence Evaluation Committee at the White House. The unit grew out of the secret domestic intelligence plan drafted for Nixon by his aide Tom H:sion six months earlier. Under enor- mcus White House pressure, the C.I.A. bc_an to become involved in domestic activities, often in clear violation of its o'.vn. statute. For example: 1. Police functions. During the 1969- 1972 period of massive antiwar demon- strations. particularly in Washington, t'- C.I.A., responding. to White House r_,;uests. trained and advised local police departments in the arts of in- ?e''.igence and communications. The C.I.A.' Domestic Operations Division, Technical Services Division, the Approved Records integration Division, and the. "D Start" were all involved. The "D S: fr" was in charge of communica- as and intelligence collection for .al police forces. This presumably in-luded direct surveillance of Amer- ans, but as an ancillary rather than p acipal function. The R.I.D. helped with computer read-outs from files kept by the C.I.A.'s Counterintelli- gence, the F.B.I. (which did work on domestic riot control), and the military intelligence services. The Technical Services provided highly sophisticated equipment, such as devices showing whether a person had held metal-a gun-in his or her hand hours earlier. The C.I.A. doesn't actually deny its training and equipment support for the Metropolitan Police Department in Washington. The C.I.A. claims, per- haps lamely, that it had acted in the belief that it was meeting the require- ments of the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act. There is no question but that this C.I.A. police function, also carried out in New York and Chicago, specifically vio- lated the National Security Act. C.I.A. training of U.S. police forces ended early in 1973, after a New York Times article alluded, in general terms, to such assis- tance. 2. Plumbers. The record of Water- gate investigations shows that acting on a telephone call from John Ehrlichman, then Nixon's chief of the Domestic Council, the C.I.A. provided one of the plumbers, Howard Hunt, with disguise equipment on a "one-time basis." This was authorized by General Cushman, then the C.I.A.'s deputy director, and the material was provided by the Tech- nical Services Division. But private investigations suggest that in addition to the help obtained from the C.I.A. headquarters on this par- ticular occasion, the plumbers were equipped for other missions by the agency's clandestine offices in Miami and outside San Francisco. The so-called "green light" group in the C.I.A.'s lvii- ami office reportedly provided Hunt with some of the equipment for the June, 1972, Watergate break-in. The C.I.A. office in Burlingame, near San Francisco, apparently did likewise in connection with the plumbers' break-in, in 1971, into Daniel Ellsberg's psychia- trist's offices. In 1973, when investi- gations uncovered the agency's role in equipping Hunt, a senior officer of the Technical Services Division, Howard Osborne, was quietly fired from the C.I.A. In Las Vegas, Nevada, where the plumbers had planned an operation against newspaper publisher Hank Grcenspun, the C.I.A. maintains one of its largest domestic clandestine of- fices, run by the D.O.D. It remains un- clear why Las Vegas, hardly an espio- nage center, rates a big C.I.A. station. 3. The corporate empire. This is one of the C.I.A.'s most sensitive secrets. The network of C.I.A.-owned companies was created in 1950, at the height of the Cold War, to. provide fireproof cov- ers for overseas operations. In the 1960's, it was used to disguise the fi- nancing of such enterprises as the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, the use of 'anti-Castro Cuban pilots and B-26's in the Congo, the "secret army" of Meo tribesmen in Laos, and a variety of other covert activities. Under Nixon, funds for domestic operations, includ- ing some plumber-type operations, were channeled through the C.I.A.'s "pro- prietary" or front corporations. The most famous, though not necessarily the most important, of. them was the Rob- ert R. Mullen & Co. in Washington, where Hunt was "employed" after leav- ing the C.I.A. The holding company for the C.I.A.'s corporate empire is the Pacific Corpo- ration located in Washington. Pacific, whose subsidiaries are said to employ some 20,000 people worldwide, was incorporated in Dover, Delaware, on .July 10, 1950, by the Prentice Hall Corporation (no kin to the publishing firm of that name), an incorporating agent for hundreds of firms that enjoy Delaware's tax advantages. A C.I.A. official familiar with the Pacific Corpo- ration explained that in this and every other case where a C.I.A. company is in- corporated in a state capital, the local secretary of state is informed of the true nature of the enterprise to avoid tax or any other inquiries. Thus Dela- ware's secretary of state refuses to dis- close the names of Pacific's directors at the time of the incorporation. The Pacific Corporation owns such operational C.I.A. companies as Air America, Inc., whose planes supported all the agency operations in Indochina; C.A.T. (Civil Air Transport) Co., Ltd., a Taiwan-based airline often used by the C.I.A.; Air Asia Co., Ltd.. special- izing in aircraft maintenance; the Pa- cific Engineering Company; and the Thai Pacific Services Co., Ltd. The Pacific Corporation and these five other companies have headquar- ters in a third-floor suite at 1725 K Street, Northwest, in Washington. Oddly, all six are listed in the build- ing directory and in the Washington telephone book. But to a casual visitor to the K Street building lobby, all these names are wholly meaningless, as are those of nine officials listed under Suite 309. Curiously, however, the name of based on the suspicion-never proved -that many of its members traveled to Algeria and Moscow for ideological indoctrination and then to North Korea for sabotage and guerrilla training. Similar suspicions surrounded young Americans who had visited Cuba. The C.I.A. increased this surveil- lance under Nixon even though the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, formed by former President Johnson, had concluded that there was no foreign subversive conspiracy be- hind racial riots. The C.I.A. had worked .closely with the commission. Cord Mey- er, the Clandestine Services' deputy chief, was the agency's liaison official. But although it engaged in financing such groups as the National Student Association for intelligence operations abroad, and publishing houses, maga- zines, and news agencies for foreign propaganda in pre-Nixon days, former Director Richard Helms and the C.I.A. CIA-FbP77-00432R000100350003-6 A rgvedAFor Release 2001/0?/0? : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6 drew a V- at "t er p ~ g i e i g mericans at agency s can estine offices in Miami home. Nor would the C.I.A. busy itself and outside San Francisco. The so-called abroad on essentially domestic matters. "green light" group in the C.I.A.'s Mi- In the 1960's, for example, Helms per- ami office reportedly provided Hunt sonally refused a request from the In- with some of the equipment for the ternal Revenue to establish surveillance June. 1972, Watergate break-in. The in South America on a tax evader, an C.I.A. office in Burlingame, near San American citizen, who had skipped Francisco, apparently did likewise in overseas owing hundreds of thousands connection with the plumbers' break-in, of dollars in back taxes. in 1971, into Daniel Ellsberg's psychia- Under Nixon, however, the climate trist's offices. In 1973, when investi- changed totally. In December, 1970, gations uncovered the agency's role in Helms fitted the C.I.A. into the secret equipping Hunt, a senior officer of the Intelligence Evaluation Committee at Technical Services Division, Howard the White House. The unit grew out of Osborne, was quietly fired from the the secret domestic intelligence plan C.I.A. drafted for Nixon by his aide Tom In Las Vegas, Nevada, where the Huston six months earlier. Under enor- plumbers had planned an operation mous White House pressure, the C.I.A. against newspaper publisher Hank began to become involved in domestic Greenspun, the C.I.A. maintains one activities, often in clear violation of its of its. largest domestic clandestine of- own statute. For example: fices, run by.the' D.O.D. It remains un- 1. Police funclions. During the 1969- clear why Las Vegas, hardly an espio- 1972 period of massive antiwar demon- nacre center, rates a big C.I.A. station. ' strations, particularly in Washington, the C.I,A., responding to White House requests, trained and advised local police departments in the arts of in- telligence and communications. The C.I.A.'s Domestic Operations Division, the Technical Services Division, the Records Integration Division, and the "D Staff". were all involved. The "D Staff" was in charge of communica- tions and intelligence collection -.for local police forces. This presumably included- direct surveillance of Amer- icans, but as an ancillary rather than principal function. The R.I.D. helped out with computer read-outs from files kept by the C.I.A.'s Counterintelli- gence, the F.B.I. (which did work on domestic riot control), and the military intelligence services. The Technical Services provided highly sophisticated equipment, such as devices showing whether a person had held metal-a gun-in his or her hand hours earlier. The C.I.A. doesn't actually deny its training and equipment support for the Metropolitan Police Department in Washington. The C.I.A. claims, per- haps lamely, that it had acted in the belief that it was meeting the require- ments of the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act. There is no question but that this C.I.A. police function, also carried out in New York and Chicago, specifically vio- lated the National Security Act. C.I.A. training of U.S. police forces ended early in 1973, after a New York Times article alluded, in general terms, to such assis- tance. 2. Plumbers. The record of Water- gate investigations shows that acting on a telephone call from John Ehrlichman, then Nixon's chief of the Domestic Council, the C.I.A. provided one of the plumbers, Howard Hunt, with disguise equipment on a "one-time basis." This was authorized by General Cushman, then the C.I.A.'s deputy director, and the material was provided by the Tech- nical Services Division. But private investigations suggest that in addition to the help obtained from the C.I.A. headquarters on this par- ticular occasion, the plumbers were equipped for other missions by the 3. The corporate empire. This is one of the C.I.A.'s most sensitive secrets. The network of C.I.A.-owned companies was created in 1950, at the height of the Cold War, to provide fireproof cov- ers for overseas operations. In the 1960's, it was used to disguise the fi- nancing of such enterprises as the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, the use of anti-Castro Cuban pilots and B-26's in the Congo, the "secret army" of Meo tribesmen in Laos, and a variety of other covert activities. Under Nixo^. funds for domestic operations, includ- ing some plumber-type operations, were channeled through the C.I.A.'s "pro- prietary" or front corporations. The most famous, though not necessarily the most important, of them was the Rob- ert R. Mullen & Co. in Washington, where Hunt was "employed" after leav- ing the C.I.A. The holding company for the C.I.A.'s corporate empire is the Pacific Corpo- ration located in Washington. Pacific, whose subsidiaries are said to employ. some 20,000 people worldwide, was incorporated in Dover, Delaware, on July 10, 1950, by the Prentice Hall Corporation (no kin to the publishing firm of that name), an incorporating agent for hundreds of firms that enjoy Delaware's tax advantages. A C.I.A. official familiar with the Pacific Corpo- ration explained that in this and every other case where a C.I.A. company is in- corporated in a state capital, the local secretary of state is informed of the true nature of the enterprise to avoid tax or any other inquiries. Thus Dela- ware's secretary of state refuses to dis- close the names of Pacific's directors at the time of the incorporation. The Pacific Corporation owns such operational C.I.A. companies as Air America, Inc., whose planes supported all the agency operations in Indochina; C.A.T. (Civil Air Transport) Co., Ltd., a Taiwan-based airline often used by the C.I.A.; Air Asia Co., Ltd., special. izing in aircraft maintenance; the Pa- cific Engineering Company; and - the Thai Pacific Services Co., Ltd. The Pacific Corporation and these five other companies have headquar- ters in a third-floor suite at 1725 K Street, Northwest, in Washington. Oddly, all six are listed. in the build- ing directory and in the Washington telephone book. But to a casual visitor to the K Street building lobby, all these names are wholly meaningless, as are those of nine officials listed under Suite 309. Curiously, however, the name of Hugh L. Grundy, who is president of the Pacific. Corporation, . Air America, and Air Asia, is not listed anywhere. C.I.A. insiders say that the Pacific Corporation may own dozens of other companies elsewhere in the United States and abroad. It may-be impossi- ble to unravel all the corporate ramifi- cations of the Pacific firm without a de- tailed inspection of the C.I.A.'s books, something a determined presidential -commission could do. It is known that the Pacific Corpo- ration had about S200 million in "sales" in 1972. This fact emerged when the Price Commission, engaged in classify- ing companies by their size for report- ing purposes, came upon the Pacific Corporation's tax returns. Tax returns? Of course. Because the corporation serves as a C.I.A. cover. it as to behave like all other companies. Thus it pays taxes. The C.I.A. real- zed. however, that the Pacific Cor- poration's cover was in jeopardy if the Price Commission applied to it 'the rule that all companies with sales in excess X50 million annually must report their Accordingly, the Pacific Cor- poration sent a letter to the Price Com- :7ission advising it that its domestic s::les were below S50 million-that the balance was in foreign operations. All American citizens living continu- ously for eighteen months abroad, ex- cept for government employees, have a S20,000 exemption from their taxable income. To maintain their cover, the employees of the Pacific Corporation and its subsidiaries theoretically enjoy this advantage. But because they are in fact government employees, they must pay the tax differential to the C.I.A., which, in turn, refunds it to the Internal Revenue under a secret arrangement. The final irony is that the Pacific Cor- poration actually makes a profit on its different operations: the problem is how to feed it back, discreetly, to the U.S. Treasury. The empire also finances secret overseas operations. To disguise the movement of a large volume of dol- lars-as was the case in Vietnam and in the preparations for the overthrow of the Chilean regime in 1973-friendly American banks and currency houses discreetly handle this flow of funds. Other activities emanating from the C.I.A.'s Domestic Operations Division have included the use of Cuban exiles. many of them former or present agency employees. to picker the diplomatic missions in the United States and else- where of foreign countries dealing with the Castro regime. In this instance, the C.I.A. was both carrying out its private foreign policy toward Cuba and ille- gally engaging in domestic operations. Break-ins into foreign embassies and United Nations missions are justified on counterintelligence grounds. (On one oc- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00l100350003-6 . Hign;, ccmpa"- mentai,z'O. -tn r'ar- ?^`3t'o' paSSeO 3.Ouna cn;y On a reed :a-know Casa. tha C.LA.'s ~ireLtorate of Opera'ions also .n,wr1 as Canaesstine Services, ^.33 a'.T.s that OOn't ^ecessartly Know w;at ,tier arms are doing. Cc^-rass dcesn t k:tOw a. Some of the 3-ms e%a'. REGIONAL AND COUNTRY DESKS aes aOt appear c. DIRECTOR G;: CENTRAL i?,TELLIG'ENCE tD.C.t.) -W!i_L, \f,r E. COLBY- EP!.;71 C' -CTOR OF CENTn.a_ INTELL;GENCE (D.D.C.i.) -LIEUTENANT GENIER AL VERNON WALTE'HS- DEPUTY DI'-R=CT Cr?. OF O?ERATIONS (0.0.0.) (Also called ~ndastine Services) -WILLIAM NELSON- FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE STAFF (F.l.) SOVIET BI:.OC CIV. (5.3.) REGIONAL AND COUNTRY CE S NEAR EAST DiV. (N.E.) COVERT ACTION STAFF (C.A.) AFRICA DIV. (A.F.) REGIONAL AND COUNTRY DESKS .REGIONAL AND COUNTRY DESKS FAR EAST DIV. (F.-E.) REGIONAL AND COUNTRY DESKS REGIONAL AND COUNTRY DESKS may have been dealing directly with senior C.I.A. officials friendly to it and willing to twist the statute to please the president. But at this point in time, as they say. the C.I.A. looks very much like a public agency of awesome power that is now beyond effective public con- trol. And there is reason to wonder whether the Rockefeller commission ma-, be up to the lob of checking it and providing the safeguards promised by President Ford. casion C.I.A. raiders found S300.000 in purloined stock certificates instead of diplomatic codes in the safe of a Latin American diplomat in New York; they left the certificates in the safe and fled.) The same explanation applies to one or two break-ins into the homes of C.I.A. officials suspected of leaks or other ties with foreign intelligence services. As we have seen. one hand at the C.I.A. often doesn't know what the other does. This surely applied during the Nixon period,when the White House WALL STREET JOURNAL 13 JAN 1975 TECHNICAL SERVICES Div. (T.S.D.) RECORDS INTEGRATION DIV. (R.t.D.) DOMEESTIC OPE TIONS 00.. OFFICE NEW YORK TIMES 5 JANUARY 1975 SCIENTOLOGY CHURCH GIVES EDICT TO C.I.A.1 'WASHINGTON,' Jan 4 (UPI) ---The- controversial Church of Scientology said today that it had delivered to the Ceneral Intelligence Agency a court order forbidding the agency to 'destroy any files it has on the church. The temporary restraining order was signed in December. .by a Federal judge in Hawaii after the church was found to 'be..on the Internal Revenue service's list of 99 organizations considered "enemies" by Presi- dent Nivxon's administration. ,The court order prohibits any "government agency from de- stroying files on Church of .Scientology organizations in :the United States. "Although we will be serv- j irig each agency covered by the court order,"' a church spokes- man said, "we have servied the C.I.A. first. They are presently under heavy fire for domestic intelligence activities and we want to make sure they don't destroy incriminating evidence :relting to their activities against our church or parishioners." The spokesman said the church or parishioners." . The spokesman said the church had been a target' of '.:'C.I.A. misinformation and spy- ing tactics similar to . those. American citizens." World-Wide CIA INVESTIGATIONS by five groups will get under way this week. The Rockefeller commission appointed by President Ford will convene today to ;look into press charges that the intelligence agency has repeatedly violated its 1947 'charter ban on domestic oeprations. The panel is expected to question CIA Director ,William Colby, ex-director Richard Helms and Secretaries Kissinger and Schlesinger. A Des Moines lawyer, David.Belin, is to be named executive director of the eight=mem- ber commission. If there appears to be doubt whether certain, activities are barred by the CIA charter, Beiin told the Des Moines Sunday Register, "that doubt will be re- solved against the agency." Four congressional committees plan CIA hearings soon after the 94th Congress opens tomorrow. Sen. Robert Byrd of West Vir- iginia,.the assistant Democratic leader, sug- gested on ABC's "Issues and Answers" that a single joint committee be formed. He'ex- pressed a fear that vital CIA operations could be exposed through "one-unmanshin" Itpdf tvL e_,2Q01/08/08.: C1A-RDP7?-00432R000100350003-6 COUNTER- IN TELL ICENCE STAFG (C.I.) ISRAEL INTELLIGENCE STAFF AO?S1ETAR: {:.LA.-~.vr~ad comp "'ias) WESTERN He Nl!SPHERE Approved For Release 2001/08/08 CIA-RDP77-00432R000101350003-6 BALTIMORE SUN 6 January 1975 Vice President Rockefeller chairman of a new 'corn- mission to investigate allegations that the Central Intelligence Agency illegally spied on American citi- zens within the United States. Mr. Ford also disclosed the names of seven other. -men who will serve on the commission, established. .Washington-President Ford yesterday named Ica tn Uku fll.: velkstmati By ALBERT SEHLSTEDT, AR. Washington Bureau of The Sun Saturday by the President, to 'determine whether the CIA violated its charter with opera- tions inside this country. The commissioners, as a group, have backgrounds in 'business, the military, labor, academe and government. Among them is Ronald Reagan, the retiring Governor of Cali fnrni, vrhn k o~4nninln,4r, 4 4n, 1 have an interest in running for, the. presidency in 1976. e J. Lane Kirkland, secre-1 tary-treasurer of the AFL-CIO; since 1969 and a graduate of the, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. Mr. Nessen was asked if General Lemnitzer might have had dealings with the CIA in. his military work, and replied; "Not in a sense that would L.-.-- L:_ 1_ _.- AL- Iicul1} VJ. ilia rVlc Vii Luc 4'Vlll- mission." The press secretary; also was Ron Nessen, the White House reminded of the friendship be- press secretary, said each of tween Vice President Rockefel-' the commissioners was con- ler and Henry A. Kissinger, tacted personally by President- the Secretary of State, who has Ford, who wanted "respected dealt with the intelligence public citizens without any community as head of the Na- NEW YORK TIMES 6 JANUARY 1975 8 on the President's Panel Span ide`Pange of Belief =Members Include Former Government Aides, Retired General, Gov. Reagan, Educator and Labor Official By PETER KIHSS The eight members Of ,& com- mtssion named yesterday by -President Ford to investigate ,alleged domestic activities by .,the Central Intelligence Agency include redoubtable spokesmen for cold war policies as well as, -crusaders for civil liberties. Perhaps . the least-known member is Edgar F. Shannon Jr., 56 years old, who retired as president of the University of Virginia last year after 15 years to resume teaching 19th-, century English literature. Under Professor Shannon's) lyeadership, the all-male, all white institution admited wo- men and blacks. Professor Shannon quoted Thomas Jeffer- son at his inaugural: "If a na- tion expects to be ignorant and free in a state of civiliza- tion, it expects what never was and never will be_" Erwin N. Griswold, 70,. was a member of the United States Civil Rights Commission from 1961 to 1967 and Solicitor Gen- eral of the United States from .796T to 1972. As dean of the Harvard Law School from 1950 to 1967; he affiliation with the CIA." tional Security Council. )from Congress, Mr. Nessen! Other members of the com- . Mr. Nessen? was asked if that tsaid. mission, ordered by the Presi- friendship might present a po- The press secretary said the dent to make a final report on tential conflict in the commis- list of commissioners was its. inquiry by April 4, are: sion's investigation. "The Pres- drawn up by President Ford. ? John T. Connor, the chair- ident didn't think so," Mr. His original list was slightly man and chief executive offi- Nessen replied. I longer than the one announced cer of the Allied Chemical Cor-, [A spokesman for Mr. Rock e- lyesterdav, but Mr. Nassen did poration, who was secretary of feller, who was at his West-1 (not disclose who was elimi- commerce in the administra- (chester (N.Y.) estate yester-I I nated or who might have de- tion of Lyndon B. Johnson and, day, said the Vice President dined to serve. counsel to the Office of Naval! was "talent hunting" on the: , President Ford's executivel Research from 1945 to 1947. ( telephone for people to serve on order of Saturday directed ? C. Douglas Dillon, the !the commission's staff, accord: ' I each department and agency 1chairman of the executive com- ing to the Associated Press.] !of the government to give the ~mittee of Dillon, Read & Co., a The principal job was finding commission any information New w York investment firm, who a person to be executive direc- or assistance necessary to was secretary of the treasury from tor of the commission, a post carry on its investigation. 1961 to 1965, and before that held two high posts in the that Mr. Ford's executive The commission, in turn , State Department. order of Saturday said will be will give to the attorney gener- a Erwin N. Griswold, now designated by the President. al any evidence "which may t Harvard Law School and ' a ' Ro-kefeller. der. The commission was estab member of the United States! fVr. Nessen, asked about the lished by the President follow- Civil Rights Commission. ?n., Pt and size of the commis- ling published reports over the ? Lyman L. Lemnitzer, thet sion's staff, had no ready fig. past two 'weeks. that the CIA chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1960 to 1962, and ` ~1 -s? The eight commission: carried out burglaries during m .-Nmhers each will receive al 1 the 1960's and early 1970's, and supreme allied commander in. ,,~.,vltard's fee of $138.50 ai that it spied or kept files on as Europe from 1962 to 1969, wheni day on days worked. many as 10,000 Americans, par- he retired. Money to for the investt-I titularly persons o ? Edgar F. Shannon, y pay pled to Vie dent of the University o f Vir- I ?ation could come from either Vietnam war, y a White House contingency fn addition to the presiden- ginia until his retirement last' uad or from a supplemental tial inquiry now under wa at year and a former member of y' i appropriation that President least four committees of Con- the Harvard Universit facult However, t:we re;-omnlenda- . I relate to offenses under the formerly solicitor general of ; 't'on for the jo', o' executive I srawtes or the United States," the United States, dean of the ( lire:'tor will come from Mr, , according to the executive or- y y .Ford would have to requesti greys are expected to conduct probes of their own. 12 opposed the late Senator Joseph R. McCarthy's attack on the use of the Fifth Amend- merit against self-incrimination by persons refusing to nswer questions about alleged" Com- munist ties. .. If we. take these rights for granted," Dean Griswold said, "if we accept them as a matter of course, we may simply frit- ter them away and end by los- ing them, and possibly we de- serve to lose them." - Vice President Rockefeller, 64, commission chairman, activitiesd as at a least-some e of the 11-member President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board as late as last year under Presi- dent Nixon. As special assistant to Presi- dent Eisenhower in 1955, Mr. Rockefeller set up top-secret seminars at the Marine Corps School in Quantico, Via., Ito de- vise cold war tactics and' stra- tegy. One of there led to the "open skies" proposal to allow unarmed Soviet and American planes to fly over each other's territory to check on military, preparations and disarmament.i . '68 Rockefeller Rival i Ronald Reagan, 63, who steps' down today as Governor of California after serving since 1967, was a rival with Mr ., Rockefeller for the Repubican Presidential nomination in 1968, won by Mr. Richard M. Nixon. Both Mr. Rockefeller and Mr. Reagan have been mentioned as possible candidates for the '76 nomination. Mr. Reagan has been a favor- ite of the Republican party's conservative wing. He was president of the Screen Actors Guild from 1947 to 1952 and again in 1959. He headed a 'successful 1959 strike over tele- vision residual pay for actors, and fought to eliminate Com- munist influence in movie in- dustry. unions. C. Douglas Dillon, 65, is; chairman of the executive com mittee of Dillon, Read & Com-I pany, investment bankers. He' was Under Secretary of State .in the Eisenhower Administra- tion from 1958 to 1961, and served as President Kennedy's Secretary of the Treasury from 1961 to 1965. As Acting Secretary. of State, Mr. Dillon let his press officers ,put out a report in 1960 that a C.I.A. U-2 spy plane over the Soviet Union was on weather reconnaissance. He took part as a Kennedy !Cabinet member in planning in 11962 in the crisis over Soviet i The C.I.A. and the Cult of Intelligence," by Victor Mar- chetti and John D. Marks, Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-004'32R00011Y0350003-6 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6 which. was published last year said Mr. Dillon presided over off-the-record meetings at the Council on Foreign Relations in 1968 when former intelligence professionals and others dis- cussed the C.I.A. role in foreign .policy and apparently C.I.A. re- lations with private institutions. Oldest Commissioner Gen. Lyman L. , Lemnitzetr, aldest commissioner at 75, was a high-ranking commander and staff officer in World War II and the Korean war, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1960 to 1962 and then then supreme commander of North Atlantic Treaty Organi- zation forces until he retired in 1969. He presided over' the Joint Chiefs when they were briefed in 1961 on ill-fated C.I.A. plans for an invasion by exiles'seek-i ing to overthrow Fidel Castro in Cuba and when the chiefs agreed there was a chance of success. . John T. Connor, 60, is chair- man of the board of the Allied Chemical Corporation and was Secretary of Commerce from 1965 to 1967. As president of Merck & Company, pharmaceu- tical manufacturers, he had earlier helped collect millions of dollars of drugs to ransom the Bay of Pigs prisoners from Cuba. non, the Virginia educator,I weie among vigorous. public opponents of the invasion of Cambodia and both, urged ai quick end to the Indochina war.! The youngest commissioner,; Lane Kirkland, 52, has, been secretary-treasurer of theI American Federation of Labor and Congress 'of Industrial Or- ganizations since 1969, and a member of its staff since 1948.1 Mr. Kirkland, operating quietly and behind the scenes, served eight years as executive assistant to George Meany, the' labor organization's president. NEW YORK TIMES 7 Jan. 1975 EX-C.1.A. AIDE CITES JOHNSON AND NIXON PARIS, ' Jan. 6 (Reuters)- Victor Marchetti, a former of- ficial of the Central Intelli- gence Agency, said in an in; terview today that Presidents Johnson and Nixon had pressed the agency into domestic spy- ing activities. In an interview with the weekly magazine, Le Point, Mr. Marchetti said, "I saw very well how the agency, pushed by the White House and espe- cially Lyndon Johnson, began to mount its operations in the United States, even spying on such organizations as, the civil rights' movement. "Nixon carried on In the same way and there 'was noth- ing astonishing in the fact that a growing number of young officials like myself should be- come indignant at these prac- tices." Mr. Marchetti resigned from he agency in 1969 and later wrote a ' book on its ac- tivities. WASHINGTON POST .6 January 1975 q,. land Evans and Robert Novak The Tragedy The crisis of the Central-Intelligence Agerjcy' that may wreck its effective- ness with tragic consequences for the nation can -be traced back to a secret, politically inspired command from a troubled President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1968. Johnson's order to CIA stemmed from his political fear of anti-Vietnam dissidents, eroding his presidency and endangering his Vietnam policy. He wanted CIA to establish a link be- tween the Soviet KGB or other Com- munist intelligence apparatus and vio- lent .anti-war activity in the United States., No link was established, but the CIA's legal counterintelligence op- erations fatally overlapped into the forbidden area of internal security. Now, that this overlap has been re- vealed, the CIA's ability to fulfill vi- tally necessary functions in a still dan- gerous world is deeply compromised. "There never was real substance to Johnson's fear of a link to foreign agents," an American intelligence ex- pert told us, "and the CIA bitterly re- sented his order." While pursuing LBJ's command diligently until the anti-war movement died out,, CIA never once established "conclusive evi- dence" of. foreign control over any American student dissidents. . But in his zealous pursuit of the elu- sive link, CIA's Counter-Intelligence Counter-Espionage chief, the . super- conspiratorial James Angleton, went to extremes. Known American anti-war agitators, including the notorious Weathermen, were placed under sur- veillance during contacts with leftist student leaders in Europe and then kept under CIA surveillance when they returned to the. United States. This suveillance, including bugging clandestine anti-war meetings, created a huge file of names which was stored routinely in secret CIA vaults in Lang- ley, Va. Much of this stemmed from FBI Di- rector J. Edgar Hoover's bitter feud with CIA, choking communications be- tween the two agencies. CIA special- ists say there was often "no bureau- craic way" to turn domestic surveil- lance over to the FBI once an anti-war activist returned to the United States. Instead, Angleton's counterintelli- gence agents continued the job started abroad. A full briefing on the "worst case" examples of this highly illegal CIA ac- tivity was given more than a year ago to congressional watchdogs by William Colby, then newly appointed CIA di- New York Times 1!1 Jan. 1975 Pravda Says C.I.A. Spurs Activities in Middle East MOSCOW, Jan. 13 (UPI) - The Communist party news- paper Pravda said today that the Central Intelligence Agency was increasing its activities in the Middle East. The article was the latest in of the CIA rector. Since these abuses had occur- red years before, no public airing was.. demanded. The reason: A full-fledged CIA scan- dal in the midst of Watergate (which itself tainted the agency) would se- verely damage the CIA and most par- ticularly its counter-intelligence opera tions. . , Now, that damage to CIA's credibil- ity and efficiency in the wake of The New York Times expose is in full bloom, ironically abetted by the ouster -of Angleton and the sympathy resign- ations of his high command: Ray Rocca, William Hood and N. Scott' Miler. Angleton's suspicious conspiratorial nature had brought him into high-level disfavor long ago. Yet, that aspect of his personalty was essential to his in. valuable connections with such foreign intelligence agencies as the West Ger- man BFW, the British MI-5, the French Deuxieme Bureau - and, most inti- mately, the Israeli Intelligence Serv- ice. Angleton's single most valuable post- war heist- the first Western copy of Khrushchev's historic 1956 attack on Stalinism at the 20th Soviet Party Con- gress-resulted directly from his se- cret contacts with Communist and Is- raeli agents. Such brilliant exploits tend tq. be shrugged off today as relics of another world. But intelligence experts here say dismantling the top echelons of Angleton's, operations alone will prove priceless to the Soviet, KGB and im- mensely costly to the United States. That, however, is but the first cost of CIA's tragic errors of the late 1960s. CIA's scandal, following a blackened eye from its Chilean operations, now threatens to close off not only foreign intelligence sources but routine infor- m;ition from traveling American citi- zens-invaluable the past 20 years. In addition, morale at CIA today is at quicksand levels with recruitment endangered. Worst of all, CIA's credi- bility as a tight ship - vital to every aspect of its work - has been griev- ously undermined. The first results of this will show up early in the new Congress. Efforts that have failed in the past to cut down CIA may now succeed. To a generation that never knew the cold war, that will be welcome. In truth, it.may cost this country dearly in the grim world of 1975. a new press campaign against the agency. Pravda said an American es- pionage network had recently been exposed in Southern Ye- men, a group acting on instruc- tions from American intelli- gence had been arrested in Iraq and an anti-Government conspiracy inspired by the C.I.A. had beon uncovered in iAfghanistaii. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-Rl 77-00432R000100350003-6 WASHINGTON POST 6 January 1975 CIA and Cult Technology - Bulk of Intelligence Gathered by Equipment 'tftseli' with bureaucracy, anc together they ride k'roughshod over reason' and logic. The result is a mad- dening, -s e I f - perpetuating -chaos which has distorted the entire intelligence proc- ess to the point that technoi- By George C. Wilson nuclear bomb (they do) and phones clamped on their ess has.: become the goal ogy Washincton Post Start Writer i are their nuclear-capable heads listen hour after hour, rather than the means to a The five-story yellow building with the Jericho missiles targeted on talkiforeign fighters pilots goal . Our almost limit-, shrouded- windows at 1st and M streetsEgypt's Aswan Dam (they talking ground command- less ability to collect infor- SE-just down the hill from the Capitol- 'ogee were) so Cairo and the ers. ination has prompted only a Nile valley could be flooded- Both the successes and few-to question the utility of llig f the C t l I t h ra ence en n e ere much o is w Agency's super-secret and super-valuable if all seemed lost? failures of,technical intelli-' :the information that is col- work goes on. ? Is Russia mobilizing for. gcnce have been spectacu- lected... Technocrats in the spy business. note War (a constant question)?, lar. The U-2 was both.-,It, "The results are frighten- with pride that most of the windows are. ? Is Russia building a brought back the hard infor ing - , . As the programs ex- cemented over - to foil any enemy agent new missile system or just thaVon on Soviet missile pand, they defy rational who might try to record conversations improving the old one. progress-although Sen. management. And we have inside by focusing a laser beam on win- (photographs showed the John F, Kennedy (D-Mass.) international incidents re- latter)? How many intercon- kept charging "missile gap suiting from collection pro- vibratvowpanes to detect and make an the tinental ballistic missiles even as U-2s were bringing grams designed to provide l visitor would m the akand bombers do the Soviets. back contrary evidence in information that will allow To the ine voices casual yellow edifice have? flights from 1956 until 1960. the United States govern- of secrecy is "Building 213". For some . 0 Could U.S. Green- Be- .. And it was a failure in. the meat means to avoid such reason, the -public is not supposed to sense that its intrusion info incidents. Intellige nce today know what the Soviets' counterpart rets rescue American prison- Soviet airspace f o in almost? the u 1 t j m a t e agency, the KGB knows-Building 213 is the ers from the Sontay prison prompted CIA's National Photographic Interpreta- camp outside Hanoi? Premier Khrushchev to can- irony .. . tion center, known to insiders as N-Pic. N-Pic, in answer to that, eel the 1960 summit confer- One man who had' a lot to t ence with President Eisen-. ado with making technology i an N -Pic is just one arm of the mechanical last question, made a g montage of' the Son bower. ' ~. so imperious within the CIA Son- giant the United States has built to spy photo. Even . without failures, specifically and intelii= on the rest of the. world. This giant also, fay camp and proudly. technical intelligence has its genes. community generally has eyes in space, ears all over the globe, showed it, off to CIA train-. Said one former is Richard Bissell, the for- each operation that costs billions of dollars ees to demonstrate what the limitations. head of the CIA's U-2 each year - dollars that are only mini- agency could do inside the high "What ranking ing CIA Idoesn' executive; is t prmer ogram wf the from of f mally accountable to anybody outside the intelligence factory on Al. technology CIA. Street. do,.won't do, and can't do is - cial grace because of his tell you what peoplb are role as operational director It is this mechanical giant - not the The Pentagon, in : turn James Bonds of the CIA who meet for- , ~_t rr_n;e's montage to thinking and what . their of the Ray of Pi ;s invasion eign agents at bars at midnight -, which build a replica of Sontag at plans are. We can't read of Cuba by Cuban exiles gathers the most valuable information for Eglin Air Force Base in Flo-1 minds with technology, but in 1961. the United States. . rida so the Green Berets that's our business-reading Bissell, now an executive "Technology has revolutionized the in- could rehearse the POW res- minds. The -whole purpose at Pratt and Whitney Air- telligence business, there's no question- cue. The Sontay replica was, of espionage is to find out craft in Hartford, Conn., in about it," CIA Director William E. Colby taken down during the day what people are thinking an interview traced the birth has said. so Soviet satellites would. and doing." of the U-2 and how its sue- "If I had to rate everything we did on, not see it and tip off Hanoi He could have added that cess blazed the way across een- ortiori such systems, ther tech-like an A through Z value scale," said a CIA's -testimony to this era of the the clearest m the eal sky y for executive who quit the agency a few' open ' skies where super satellite not tell photograph States t s the l toll and systems, months ago, "I would give A through U powers keep track of, each to technical intelligence" - gathering' other through camera eyes what weapon the Soviet Un Back in 1954, Bissell re . information by satellite, plane, ship, sub-. in space. ion, or China is working on called, lames R. Killian Jr. marine and eavesdropping radio outposts. ' N-Pie's effort proved in under the laboratory roof. was asked by President Ei- Next in terms of productivity, he listed, vain, however, because Ha-- But neither the failures- senhower to head a commit- reading foreign publications and analyz-. not had moved American like the U-2 incident, Lib- tee which would recommend ing them in a systematic way. Last, the- prisoners out of Sontay by erty attack and Pueblo cap- ways to preclude another CIA alumnus named covert operations: the time the raid was ture-nor the built-in limita. Pearl Harbor-type surprise like buying information from foreign, launched on Nov. 24, 1970. tions have kept the intelli- attack on the United States. agents. Thus, it can be said that gence community's technical "The intelligence panel of "On a scale of 100," said another former the' N-Pic arm of the intelli- giant in bounds, according that committee," Bissell CIA officer in an interview,, "I would give gence giant stretches all the to its critics. said, "became convinced at least 70 per cent to technical intelii- way from M Street to the Wrote former CIA officer that we needed an over- In his flight capability. They also cold void of outer space, Garvey M lit k J i t . c . ers- r Pa c gence; 25 per cent to reading open ture and assessing information obtained where both American and book, "C.I.A.-The Myth came on the U-2 design as through diplomatic contact. No more than Soviet cameras look down and the Madness'-": it had been submitted" to 5 per cent to all the covert stuff." through portholes of space- g the Air Force in 1953 or The counterintelligence operations' craft whipping around the "In intelligence, the rever- 1954 by Clarence L. (Kelly) Johnson. of Lockheed. which lave provoked the current contro- earth once every 90 minutes. once accorded technology, is, versy-with allegations that the CIA has' Other parts of the me." to serious questioning "In the autumn of 1954," chanical giant require per- - The vaguest hint that Bissell said, "the members producing put Americans anything under at su all for the rveillance country," sonnet inside-such is the something new will afford of that intelligence panel - he said. "It's just looking up each other's surface electronic intelii- an, opportunity to open an- and d with them the whole sleeves-personnel management in the gence (FLINT) ships that other peephole into a paten- Killian surprise attack com- whole creepy, backroom world." took over from the ill-fated fiat enemy's domain mittee - endorsed a pro He added. "It's time to drop all this U.S.S. Liberty and U.S. prompts the loosing of intel- posal that a high altitude re- Mickey Mouse." Pueblo; the American sub- ligence money and the ap- connaissance aircraft config: In the bland looking yellow building, N- marines which remain close proval.of `feasibility tests'- ured exclusively and ex- Pic has processed film from high-flying spy to foreign shores, recording which invariably lead to pressly for reconnaissance It lh levelo ment tests' b d tl c Pell ' e c '- i satellites. These satellite and other reconnaissance pictures, analyzed by photo interpreters, have helped answer such questions as these asked by anxious Pres- idents and other top govern ment officials: ? Do the Israelis have the y be built ass on messages and radar signals; iu the U-2 reconnaissance' and finally implementation Johnson concept - and that plane Francis Gary Powers of a new collection program. it be built with maximum flew over the Soviet Union . "Critics of these efforts security and maximum and its higher-flying succes- are few," McGarvey added, speed." , sor, the SR-71; community, "for few wish to confront 'rlie concept was to put tions intelligence (COMINT). 'the national security' arc gu- glider-like wings on a jet outposts around the world ment flaunted by supporters aircraft so it could fly in the tubers specialists with ear of intelligence ... In intelii? thin air of high altitude, out has allied Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6 of the range of anti-aircraft guns and rockets. Also, the theory was that the new spy plane would be safe from other interceptor fighters because their engines could not push them to the 14-mile altitude of the U-2. Put in direct charge of the U-2 project Bissell in the spring of 1955 placed an or- der with Lockheed for 20 U2s at a total cost of $21 million. The U-2 contract may have been the last time a. military plane was built for less than the agreed upon amount. Bissell said "there -was a $3 million underrun." Today, each reconnaissance plane and satellite - like the Big Bird satellite lofted into space this year by the giant Titan IIIAD rocket- costs more than the whole $18 million paid for the first 20 U-2s, minus engines. With the U-2 on the way CIA photo-interpreters, I ke the one in Building 213,. studied photographs of the Soviet SA-2 G u i d e l i n e rocket that Russian gunners would shoot at the U-2 if their radar detected it. The missile's fins, the specialists concluded, were too small to guide it accurately in the thin air where the Z;2 'Wei-lid f!y. "This was one of those things they call a calculated risk," said Bissell in discuss- ing the conclusions about the threat of the SA-2 to the U-2. - . The CIA's U-2 started fly- ing over Russia in Jurle, 1956, Bissell said, and en- joyed success until May 1, 1960, when one of those sup- posedly inaccurate SA-2, rockets shot Powers out of the sky and into a diplo-; matic uproar. Looking back over the whole U-2 program and ac knowledging its value in set- tling the missile gap ques-I tion, Bissell said "the great-: est value" for the country was the "proof you could learn as much as you could by looking down from above. "It whetted the appetite of this government and in- creased its willingness to de _`'velop systems of this sort of intelligence collection," Bis- sell said.' ,,,Given this appetite, the Soviets' Sputnik I, launched. on Oct.. 4, 1957. looked ap- ?caling' as another way to look down on the other country. Aerial intelligence-collec- tion in the two decades since the U-2's birth quickly advanced to the SR-71 and an entire family of satellites ranging from the compara- tively simple Samos to the sophisticated Big Bird which can take pictures and do various other things-like intercept communications. The technological explo- sion also advanced to intelli- gence-collecting from ships, . submarines and land listen- ing posts. The CIA, National Security Agency (NSA) De- fense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Army, Navy, Air Force. and the military-in- dustrial-scientific academic complex have become en- ,meshed in the American in- itelligence collection effort ver the last 20 years. The citizens commission :'resident Ford has named to investigate the CIA is ' bartered to focus on the bartered domestic activities, dot the overlaps in the American intelligence com-? nnunity as a whole. But Con- press is expected to look ,into the duplication between CIA, Defense Intelligence :Agency and the National Se- eurity Agency. NSA is the sprawling intelligence com- cglex headquartered at Fort Meade, Md., which is be- lieved to have a worldwide payroll of 100,000 people, one big reason the total. bill for American intelligence agencies is estimated at around $15 billion, not coun- ting the missiles and ships and other support the Pen tagon furnishes. The intertwining charge congressional and other crit- ics, is inefficient, costly, and sometimes fatal. The over- lapping showed up embar- rassingly for the intelli- gence community when NSA's warning against send. ing the Pueblo out on a mis-. sion off North Korea in 1968? got lost in the DIA maze in the Pentagon. Also, the post-mortems on the Pueblo spy mission failed to show that the trip was necessary from an elec tronic intelligence stand- point-bitter news for the Navy crew imprisoned and North Korea for 11 months and the family of the sailor who was killed during the ship's capture off Wonsan in January, 1963. The late Sen. Allen J El. lender (D-La.), while chair- man of the Senate Appropri ations Committee, told a re- .porter that the amount of money the intelligence com- munity spends for informa- tion nobody has time to process or read is "a na- tional scandal." The next few months will tell whether Congress, dur. ing its reapprisal of the CIA, will attempt to rein ins the technical giant. In the meantime, It will he business as usual at places like N-Pic within the CIA's far-flung complex. "Honest, Sir," said the po- liceman at the gate of N-Pic. "I don't know what that place is other than Building 213." By contrast, two women behind the gate said, "Yes it is," when asked if the place was indeed N-Pic. WASHINGTON STAR 03 January 1975 By Mark Hosenball special to the Star-Ne-. LONDON-A disillusion- ed ex-CIA agent, in a book he has made clear in recent interviews is deliberately intended to hurt his former employers, has bared a host of agency activities in-Latin America, where he served in the early 1960s.. "The conflict with my residual loyalty to the CIA is far outweighed by the peo. ple who have been killed or tortured as a direct result of CIA operations," .says. Philip Agee. "Exposure of CIA meth- ods could help the American people understand how we got into Vietnam and how other Vietnams are germi- nating whereverthe CIA is at work," says Agee, whose "Inside the Company-CIA Diary"was published here this week. ? Agee claims the CIA had him followed after it was discovered he planned such a book and that, at one point, he discovered a bug- ged typewriter had been planted on him. Attempts by him and his British publish- ers to have the book pub- lished in New York failed, but in late October, Straight Arrow, the book division of Rolling Stone, bought the American rights and re- lease in the United States is planned in May. AFTER JOINING the CIA in 1957, Agee was post- ed to "stations" in Quito, Montevideo and Mexico City, where he served eight years as a full-fledged, apparently dedicated ca- t reer spy. But he said he became disillusioned with such things as CIA support of the Brazilian military junta and U.S. militajy intervention in the Dominican Republic, and in 1969 he abruptly left the agency. Since then, he has pro- fessed himself a revolution- ary Socialist. He spent four years in libraries preparing his day-by-day account of life as an "operations officer." He has sprinkled the It doesn't take the skill of James Bond to get inside the lobby of Ni-Pic, note the CIA employees on coffee break in the cafeteria and read the Christmas greeting of "peace, peace, peace" and "joy, joy, joy" on the wall behind the guard. pages with what seems to be' every name he could recall, including some of men still chiefs of station in various capitals. His aim, he said in an interview, "is tot neutralize these people com- pletely.- GEORGE MEANY, president of the AFL-CIO, and the late Joseph Beirne, who headed the Communi- cations Workers of Ameri- ca, are accused by Agee of having been "effective, wit- ting collaboraters" in promoting CIA interests within international labor circles. He says the CIA arranged "-with Beirne" for conver- sion of a CWA school at Front Royal, Va., for the use of the American Institute for Free Labor Develop- .ment, which he said was organized in 1962-with Meany and Beirne on its board of directors-to "organize anti-Communist trade unions in Latin America." Three Mexican presidents -Gustavo Diaz Ordaz, Adol- fo Lopez Mateos and Luis Echeverria Alvarez-are among those Agee says col- laborated closely. with the CIA. All were close friends of the station chief in Mexi- co City, he says, and in re- turn for such favors 'as, being led daily CIA intelli- gence reports and having a secret communications net- work set up for their use, authorities were coopera- tive when the CIA needed to. tap phones or check traveltt~ ers-in some cases to the point of being provided photos of every traveler to a, given point. - IN URUGUAY, after bugging the headquarters of the Communist party in Montevideo,, the CIA bug- ged the Egyptian Embas- sy's code room-by using the ceiling of the U.S. AID office on the floor below in the same building. Agee said this also brought in messages from Egypt's embassies in London and Moscow, which were on the same cable circuit. He claims he participated in CIA activities which help-' ed cause Uruguay and Ecuador to break diplomat- ic relations with Cuba, and ,says he came across CIA dealings with American bank officials to get Chilean currency to Uruguay so it could be sent back into Chile to help opponents of the late Salvador Allende. His first assignment in Mexico City, Agee wrote, was to spot potential CIA agents among the competi- tors at the 19GS Olympics- foreign and American, coaches and officials. "WE'VE BEEN IN every Olympics since the Soviets appeared in Helsinki in 1952." he wrote. ; --Approved-Fo?r-Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R00a100350003-6 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6 fE NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, JANUARY 14, 1975 BOok byEx= C: I. A.Ma n Links La tins to5pying.. By RICHARD EDER Special to The New York Times - LONDON, Jan. 13-A for- term "collaborator" appears mer employe of the Central to indicate a more voluntary Intelligence Agency has pub- imparting of information or, lished what he describes as a assistance than in an agent's detailed, almost day-by-day case. Presumably, the "col- account of his work and that laborator" dealt with the of his colleagues in three C.I.A. as the most appro- Latin-American countries. priate representative of the The author, Philip Agee, United States Government for who has been interviewed a particular purpose, not be- widely before publication, cause he was under the served successively in Ecua- agency's control. dor, Uruguay and Mexico In his index, Mr. Agee re- from 1960 to 1968. He then fers to George Meany, head resigned and, after going of the A.F.L.-C.I.O., as an briefly into business in Mex- "agent collaborator." Ques- ico City, began a series of tioned about this today, Mr. trips to France, Cuba and. Agee said that he was re- Britain, seeking research ma- ferring to the close coopera- terials terials and a publisher. tion between Mn Meany's He found both in London. "organization. and the intelli- At the beginning of this gence agency, and that per month, Penguin Books pub- haps simply "collaborator" "Inside the Company: C.I.A. Diary." Straight Arrow Press, a San Francisco house linked. to Rolling Stone magazine, is planning to bring it out in the United States this spring. No contract has yet been signed, however. The book, in the form of a diary, describes the author's, disillusion, both with C.I.A. methods in particular and more largely with United States policy around the world. The writer, originally a conservative Catholic, has become a revolutionary so- cialist. Mr. Agee says that his book is intended as a contri- bution to the cause of world revolution. He sees in the C.I.A. an agency designed to frustrate revolution and pro- tect capitalism. The book contains a list of nearly 250 persons he identifies as C.I.A. officers, local agents, informers and collaborators. Inside Political Parties Besides revealing the names of dozens of members of the agency staff, most of whom operated from United States embassies in Quito, Montevi- deo and Mexico City, the book identifies local busi- nessmen, labor and student leaders and politicians as C.I.A. agents. In Ecuador, for example, Mr. Agee says that the agen- cy had men in leading posi- tions in several of the major political parties -- including the Communist party - and controlled virtually the en- tire top leadership of one group, the Popular Revolu- tionary Liberal party. Mr. Agee lists as collabo- rators such figures as two former Presidents of Mexico' -Gustavo Diaz Ordaz and Adolfo Ldpez Mateos-and the current president, Luis Echeverria Alvarez. in Mr. Echeverria's case, according ? to Dir. Agee, the relationship existed only while he was Minister of the Interior. ..In Mr. Agee 's u?age, the., propriate term. Tributes by Ex-Colleague A considerable if grudging tribute to the book was paid by Miles Copeland, formerly a high-ranking C.I.A. man, himself. In a review published: in The Spectator, Mr. Cope- lanA assailed Mr. Aoee_. for. in effect, betraying all his for-; mer associates: But, hel added: "The book is interesting as. an authentic account of how an ordinary American or Brit- ish 'case officer' operates."Mr. Copeland went on to say: "All of it just as his pub- lisher claims, is presented with 'deadly accurac ee sent In the years Mr. Agee spent working in Latin America, the' main objective of C.I.A. stations around the hemi- sphere was to counteract the ? effects of Cuban influence. He tells of his own awk- ward attempt to recruit the leader of an EJcouad Maria. Castroite group, e Roura. When Mr. Roura was. freed from jail and expelled. Mr. Agee arranged to sit next to him on the plane. C.I.A. stations, writes, made it a- point to get the close coop- eration of local airline execu- tives. The plane was virtually empty, however, and Mr. Agee felt it would be too ob-, vious to sit right next to his quarry. So he sat several.. rows away, trying miserably: to think up an excuse to strike'up a conversation. "I felt more and more glued to my seat." he writes. "I was going into a freeze and beginning to think up ex- cuses, like bad security, to offer later for not having talked to Roura. But some- bow I had to break the ice, and I finally 'stood up and' began walking back to Roura's seat, in mild shock as when walking into a cold sea" Mr. Agee did manage to get talking, and thought that ."we seemed to be develop- ing,'a little empathy." How-. Cover of book by former American spy, published by. Penguin in London. A San Francisco publishing house: may bring it out in the U.S. this spring. ever, Mr. Roura refused to take up the suggested con- tacts, and later Mr. Agee learned that the. Ecuadorean had complained about his C.I.A. seat-mate and threat- ?ened to kill him if he ever saw him again. Most of the work was' duller, however. A lot of time was spent reading mail between Ecuador or Uruguay ? and Cuba. Local postal of- ficials were a priority target for C.I.A. recruitment. Another target was local builders. When a Czecho- 'slovak or Soviet delegation was due to take up resi- dence, C.I.A. teams would arrange with the builders to install microhpones before they arrived. Managers of hotels and apartment houses were enlisted. On Tape, a Tryst Mr. Agee writes about bugging an apartment in Montevideo that was to be used by an Argentine woman arriving on behalf of a far- left group. It turned out that a main purpose of the visit was to meet her lover, and the tapes duly took it in. , He writes of making a reg- ular visit to high Uruguayan police authorities, with whom the C.I.A. was cooperating to put down revolutionary groups. Mr. Agee and his col- leagues had turned over names of suspects to Col. Ventura Rodriguez, the chief. Upon a second visit, he wrote: "As Rodriguez read the re- port, I began to hear a strange low sound which; as: it gradually became louder,' I recognized as the moan of a human voice. I thought it might be a street vender. trying to sell . something, until Rodriguez told Ra- mirez"-another police of- ficer-"to turn up the radio.' The moaning grew in inten sity, turning into screams. Mr. `Agee was horrified at what his work had led to. "I don't know what to do about these police anyway," he writes. "They're so crude and ineffectual. Hearing that voice, whoever it was, made me feel terrified and help= less. All. I wanted to do was to get av ay." 15 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6 CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 7 January 1975 THE ECONOMIST JANUARY 11, 1975 h. E) we, j% I A panes '''" Secret agent INSIDE THE COMPANY: CIA Diary ,The naming of a public commis- By Philip Agee. - sion to investigate charges of do- Penguin. 640 pages. 95p. mestic spying by. the CIA is, a Few people would raise an eyebrow if welcome step. President Ford has they read, in some' anonymous revo- swiftly served notice that he does lutionary newspaper, that President .not want to cover up any abuses of Echeverria of Mexico, President Lopez power or "dirty tricks" by an Michelson of Colombia and President executive agency that by its na- Figueres of Costa Rica were CIA agents ture has not always been subject or collaborators. The allegation would to the closest scrutiny. have scarcely more effect if it appeared That said, however, some mis- ' in one of those handy guides to "Who's givings might be voiced about the Who in the CIA" that are printed from composition of the panel, which time to time in East Berlin. But, crop- as a wide professional but less ping up in a 600-page book by a man l varied ideological spectrum. Such who served with the CIA stations in Ecuador, .Uruguay ad Mexico between members as Ronald Reagan, Gen. 1960 and 1969, it is guaranteed to make Lyman Lemnitzer and Douglas everyone who suspected that agency's Dillon, while men of proven abil- skulduggery is behind most things that ity and stature, nonetheless are of happen in Latin America leap to his conservative bent and generally feet and cry, "I told you so." committed to past U.S. policies. Mr Agee may not make his fortune Some might be concerned, too, with a book well timed to cash in on the about Vice-President Rockefel- post-Watergate appetite for revelations 1er's close personal ties with on the CIA (now domestically under Henry Kissinger, who heads the heavy fire in the United States, see page 43); but he has certainly made high-level intelligence panel, the some prominent people's faces red, and 40 Committee. Nor will it go unto- not just in Langley, Virginia. His book ticed that there are no women in comes as a godsend to the anti-American the group. ' left throughout Latin America: it names This is not to suggest that the names, it catalogues the wide range of eight appointed Individuals should infiltration and "destabilisation" tech- .,, t~,a 1 k , the !`TA it not be on the panel. But a larger - i:iue3 e?"i--~~ ~- > , -- and politically mere divergent eludes that inter-American security, -make-up might have served the as defined by successive governments purpose better. in Washington, is merely "the security In any event, it is important that . of the capitalist class in the US"-and Congress also press forward with the picture must be authentic because it is by a man once on the inside. an investigation of the CIA. Or must it? There is little reason to The formation of a joint House- doubt Mr Agee's account of the routine Senate committee, as proposed by operations of the stations to which he Senators Baker and Weicker, was assigned. The basic modus operandi makes sense. It would eliminate is confirmed by other people's revela- the duplication of effort that would tions (and notably those of the former result if a plethora of congres-. Bolivian minister of the interior, Antonio sional committees pursued their Arguedas). The priorities prescribed own investigations. for the 'CIA in the 1960s were much Such a congressional committee the same throughout the. continent: to neutralise (and, if possible, secure the should have a broader mandate expulsion of) the communist embassies; than the President's panel, which to support counter-insurgency; to pene- regrettably is limited to looking trate all major political groupings; and Into the domestic spying allega- to identify and undermine those in tions. As we ha?e stated before, it government suspected of anti-American is time for a thorough study of the ' leanings. In pursuit of these ends, the CIA with a view to an overall CIA colonised local intelligence services restatement of its mandate and and frequently succeeded in creating a functions. Congress should probe, flow of information on left-wing groups, for instance, whether the subver- and much else, that was far superior sion of foreign governments Is an to anything the local head of state could acceptable CIA activity. hope to gain from. other sources. Mr Agee quotes many cases, for example, It would also be well for Con- where, through agents in immigration gress to keep watch on the inquiry departments, post offices and airports, of the Ford commission..By per- the CIA had first crack at intercepting forming a watchdog role, it can "interesting" foreign correspondence. help assure that there will be the His picture of the daily grind of a CIA station in Latin America is often reveal- ing, particularly on the scope of black propaganda operations designed to discredit or divide the left, on the emphasis placed on funding and manipu- lating trade unions, and on counter- intelligence operations against the Cubans-in which Mr Agee became a specialist. Mr Agee suggests that the CIA helped to topple the left-leaning President Arosemena ' in Ecuador in 1963, but then that president hardly needed anybody's help to fall over. The first two-thirds of Mr Agee's book are so stuffed with pedestrian detail and so barren of personal com- ment or political analysis that one tends to swallow them whole-although the style is a constant reminder that this is not a diary at all, but a reconstructed chronicle. But in the last part of the book, the tone alters. Mr Agee starts forgetting names as he gets closer to the present day; he devotes only a brusque 10 pages to a 15-month posting in Mexico City, compared with 210 pages for a three-year posting in Quito; and he starts complaining about the morality of operations. His conversion to his new (and now, confessedly marxist) position is not adequately explained. On page 408, he uses a stolen key to start dipping into the secret correspondence in his boss's safe. A dozen pages later, he is worried about the ethics of the invasion of the Dominican republic. He then starts quoting United Nations statistics on the distribution of wealth in Latin America (collected by the UN, it should be noted, in 1970, after Mr Agee left the CIA). But his final decision to leave the Agency seems to have been related more to marital problems than to a political awakening. He admits to two visits to Cuba-in May 1971 and May 1972-where one is surprised to find a man who spent most of his career service spying on Cuban embassies being received warmly and helped with "research materials". His disenchantment with his former employers now seems to have turned into a crusade; at a press conference in London last October, Mr Agee was already updating his book, issuing a list of 37 alleged current agents of the Mexico City station. Mr Agee's book is inescapable read- ing for those interested in recent Latin American history and the way intelli- gence services operate.- But one must be careful to read between the lines as well. The author is remarkably good at unveiling CIA operations and contacts (including many that one might have thought that a junior officer would have been kept in the dark about) without giving much away about what the Cubans or the Russians were doing. As his book makes clear, he was in a position to know all about black propaganda. fullest accounting possible of the 'dignity." The charges made are needed to protect the nation's CIA's past domestic conduct. sweeping in nature but so far little security. Warning of such a possi. Meanwhile, it is to be hoped that substantive detail has emerged to bility former Attorney General support them. Nicholas Katzenbach comments, form the newly created panel will per- "I think the agency and, its task with thoroughness as M One thing the current wave of assume still is the Most objective Rocke with re and forller stated, enthusiasm for delving into the analyzer of intelligence that there due g the "Nksic CIA must not do - and that is to concepts of freed and um i is on the Washin o scene and it' rove orr 11aAeuse ~1 t9~~1~e1 043$1 Qk~$Q ~jQg preserved." of an Institution that is greatly 4 J gWVor Release 2003/O%> ryCC1A?RDP77-00432R000100350003-6 Secret police? Washington, DC The fog of suspicion that swirled around the Central Intelligence Agency during the period of President Nixon's decline and fall has thickened to a point at which a- formal investigation, conducted on a grand scale and independently of the administration in office, looks like the only way to dispel it. Put crudely, the suspicion is that the agency has assumed some of the character of an American secret police. This charge is more dan- gerous to the agency than any amount of exposure on the usual lines-bungling at the Bay of Pigs, provoking the Rus- sians with U-2 flights, or meddling in the politics of Chile or Guatemala. Those were merely reproaches of bad judgment. A system of domestic espionage, which Js what the CIA is now accused of having conducted, would be a flagrant breach of the act of Congress by virtue of which the CIA exists. The National Security Act of 19471 provides that the CIA "shall have no police, subpoena or law enforcement powers or internal security functions". Those functions belong to the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the powers of the CIA start at the water's edge. An ambiguous area does, however, exist in which foreign agents or foreign money may be fostering conspiracy, espionage and sahntaoe on American soli Pres!- dent Nixon and his men were inclined to use external security as a pretext for harassing and spying on domestic "ene- mies", and the atmosphere of the late 1960s, when anti-war protest was ve- hement and radical, lent itself to such .evasions of the spirit of the law. What has to be established is whether, and how systematically, the CIA joined in this constitutionally dangerous game. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 7 JAN 1975 Meanwhile .. the KGB prowls in Far East By Daniel Southerland Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor Hong Kong The Far Eastern Economic Re- view, in a cover story on Soviet secret agents in Asia, has concluded that Russian espionage activity in this area is "expanding steadily." But the weekly maga.;ine's corre. spondents throughout Asia also found' that the Russians are more often than not crude and inefficient In their efforts to pry secrets from Asian sources. This is partly because governments are alerted, it said, but also because the bureaucratic structure of the KGB, the Soviet equivalent of the .American CIA, has proven "ex- osop,'s?es vels probe CAf !or BY Elizabeth Pond exactly the United States from which Staff correspondent of ? come accusations against the Soviet The Christian Science Monitor 'Union and other socialist countries of 'absence of democracy;' 'persecution MOscOVV of diss, etc for the U.S., the Pravda's turgid prose Is enlivened authors a of r such s concoctions, of these days by a first-rate spy serial: course, think that the American the CIA scandal, society is the summit of democracy. The contrast could not be greater "However, the revelations of the with Soviet noncoverage of the unfold- persecutions of dissidents in the U.S. Ing Watergate scandal from 1972 are appearing one after another .. it through the resignation of President turns out that this organization [the Nixon in 1974. The difference could CIA), whose task was only a 'noble arise from the welcome chance to activity' of foreign espionage, did not cudgel the U.S. Central Intelligence hesitate to undertake real surveil- Agency. or to attempt to show readers lance and compiling folders on dozens. that the. Soviet Union is not the only of thousands of persons in the U.S. country that hounds its dissidents. "Now It turns out ... that already Or the difference could stem from since the middle of the 1950's a the degree of involvement In the continuous program of espionage has scandal of the American President been conducted with weapons of mi- with whom the Kremlin wants to crophones, eavesdropping . on tele- continue doing business. phone conversations, and other elec- When Mr. Nixon was implicated in tronic devices.. Watergate, Moscow . protected him "Thus the highly praised bourgeois and tacitly justified its own willing- democracy in practice turns out to be ness to deal with him. With President a system of total.. surveillance and Ford not implicated in the present spying." affair, Moscow does not have to shield Despite any possible backfire on its him. own system, however, the Soviet Still, the subject is a ticklish one in press has been carrying fairly full -'?':cSC' because of the inirror image sUi ii-varies of developments in the It casts on the Soviet secret police and CIA scandal. ' intelligence agency, the KGB. West- ern specialists say the KGB main. ? Initially, Pravda and Izvestia spoke tains exhaustive surveillance files on of CIA spying on "progressive and Soviet citizens. democratic" elements - a term re- One of the leading Western experts served for those supporting policies nn tha TT C e n g Robert Conquest, estimates that 20 More million Sovi t . e citizens died In Stalin's secret-police purges and forced coI- ?lectivization.' And Soviet secret police inter- rogation, torture, and forced labor camps have been vividly described for Western readers in Alexander I. Solzhenitsyn's "The Gulag Archi- pelago."-(Soviet citizens must either read an illegal manuscript of the novel or listen to the Western radio broadcasts of the book beamed to the -Soviet Union. ) Soviet commentators are aware of the* comparison. Pravda's weekly in- ternational review of Jan. 5 made a point to ridicule the comparison. Tomas Kolesnichenko wrote: "It is pointed out that "the CIA filing system was started not only on repre. sentatives of democratic forces of the country." Senators, congressmen, and a Supreme Court' justice were also spied on, the papers reported. The resignation of four top CIA officials because of their excessive use of police power - an unheard of possibility here - has also been carried in the Soviet press. And on Jan. 6 Pravda reported that President Ford has ordered an in- vestigation of the "illegal actions of the CIA, which ... practiced large- scale secret spying on thousands of Americans, thereby flouting their civil rights and freedoms. pensive and ineffectual." The Soviet cloak-and-dagger men keep a "sharp watch" on American activities in Asia, the Hong Kong- based magazine said. But some time ago the Russians' main target became the Chinese rather than the Americans. 18 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6 WASHINGTON POST 5 January 1975 '6y William Grelder Ind Thomas O'Toole Washington Post Staff Writers . Inside the supersecret agency of gov- ernment, it is known as the Bluebird, and, in some ways, the CIA is as obvi- ous as that little blue bus which putts around Washington, dropping its bu- reaucrats at their unmarked office buildings. One ex-official, who rode the bus and played the CIA's secret games, re- marked dryly: "There is much less dif- ference between the agency and the Department of Agriculture than peo-, pie would have you believe." On its way downtown, the Bluebird winds through the high-rise offices of 'Rosslyn, past the CIA's Foreign Broad- cast cast Information Service, which cranks out translated digests of overseas radio news. The same building houses the old Domestic Contact' Service, which picks up tidbits from thousands of- Americans who travel abroad. Only now it is called the "Foreign Re- sources" branch, because "domestic" has become a scare word within the CIA. Around the corner on Lynn Street, the Bluebird stops at the unmarked home of the Office of Basic and Geo graphic Intelligence, the shop which turns our encyclopedic "national intel- ligence surveys," everything you ever wanted to know about the other guy. Another building houses the recruiting office for ordinary out-front employ= ees. Farther out Wilson Boulevard is "Blue U.," a big blue office building owned by former congressman Joel Broyhill, where CIA technicians are trained. In the city itself, the bus swings up 23d Street and lets off passengers at the training building tucked behind the Navy Medical Center, where they used to give new recruits the series of lie-detector tests to measure their met- tle. CIA posts are scattered all over the capital, though not on the Bluebird route - the so-called safe houses used for clandestine contacts and secure storage of enemy defectors, the field office on Pennsylvania _Avenue a few blocks from the White House, the blank-faced yellow factory on M Street Southeast where agency analysts scru- tinize high-altitude photos of Russia and China and the Middle East, count- ing up the rockets. When the Bluebird Tolls home to Langley, Va., and the seven-story mar- ble fortress, shrouded by suburban for- est, it is at the headquarters of the mystery. When the building was opened in 1961, agency officials put a sign out front, "Central Intelligence Agency," like any other government bureaucracy. One of the Kennedys told them to take it down - inappropriate for a bunch of spies. The road signs are, back in place now, but the mystique lingers on. Na- we -W V-1 Arm I m than Hale, a bronzed Yalie who was America's first martyred spy, stands brooding in the courtyard, his statue erected by another Ivy League spy, the, present director, William E. Colby, Princeton class of '41. "Moses sent a man from, each tribe. to spy out the land of Canaan," Direc- tor Colby solemnly explains the tradi- tion to interviewing reporters. "Nations have the right for their self. protection and self-interest to do things abroad in a different fashion from the way they want to run their country at home. Intelligence has been collected in that way for, thousands of years." i It is the same speech the director makes to new recruits, the Career Trainees, who also get instruction in breaking and entering; telephone tap- ping, steaming open other people's mail, disrupting public meetings, foul- ing up automobiles and sabotaging printing presses. . Inside the gray and vacant lobby at headquarters, the CIA added a poign- ant touch several months ago-31 stars engraved on the marble wall for the anonymous agency officers killed in action over the past generation. Their stories are still secret, where they died and how, even their names are officially unacknowledged. - .Outside the agency, a social mysti- que surrounds it, too. From the start, it has been run by men of breeding, Ivy League alumni who live in the smart homes of Georgetown and McLean, men who mix the coolness of their class status with the bravery of bucca- neers. A former FBI agent, once` explained: "We had the Fordham boys, they had the Yalies." On the lobby wall, opposite the 31 stars, the agency has posted its creed, of intelligence, taken from a non spy, St. John: "And ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free," Can the CIA be truthful about itself and still survive as a secret intelli- gence agency-? That is its dilemma right now, as Congress and the public clamor for a fuller accounting of what this agency has clone in the world and within the borders' of the United States. For 27 years, the CIA has prospered in secrecy, 'shrouded by tales of der- ring-,do, protected by official evasions. Now it must come in from the cold, at least enough to quiet the criticism. The "truth," as it unfolds in congres- sional inquiries and other investiga- tions, might de-mythologize the place for its own good. Or, if the staunchest critics prevail, it might leave the CIA a mere shadow of its former shadow. Some men who served within, who are still loyal to the agency, believe this process may be good therapy for the CIA and for the republic. For in- stance, listen to the "magic wand" the- ory held by one man who served in key CIA posts in Europe and Asia: "The problem faced by the agency ever since it was formed is the idea that covert activity strikes many Americans in high places as the an- swer 'to everything - like a magic wand - as the solution to problems which aren't solved by the methods we are used to using. "Thus, if you have a country that doesn't like our economic system, that doesn't want our aid, that doesn't talk to our leaders, that thinks it can get more from the Soviet Union, their you turn to the CIA. Ahah, the magic wand. I think that attitude has ac-, counted for much of what has hap- pened. The problem is the magie-wand doesn't always work." Others from the intelligence commu- nity are fearful that this period pf probing may compromise the future ef- fectiveness of the CIA, an arm of gov- ernment which they consider vital, es- pecially to an open democracy. in a world of closed adversaries. "The country has a lot to learn about how it wants to live with the. CIA," said one ex-official. "And' the .CIA has a lot to learn about how it ought to serve the country." ' The idea that something "inagic"' lurked behind the marble fortress has sustained Washington cocktail gossip for a generation, fed by incredible sto- ries filled with danger and wit-and often success. There was the caper in Monte Carlo, ielite ember, W ILU1n the CIA rigged up a urinal in the casino to collect a sample from King Farouk because somebody in Washington was interested in his health. And then there was the Bhuddist demonstration in Saigon, when the po' litical action branch sent South Viet- namese into the crowd with egg-size' bombs of itching powder. Or the time in Moscow, when a CIA operation named "Gamma Gupy" inter cepted the radio-telephone chitchat from the limousines of top Soviet offi- cials, picking up masculine gossip about a masseuse named Olga, plus valuable insights into the Russian lead- ers' temperament. Some of the stories ended uphappily. During the Korean War, the agency trained Taiwanese and parachuted them into mainland China where they broadcast out information on troop movements. A lot of them disappeared without a signal. Some made their way to the Manchurian foothills, where they were scooped up in baskets by a low-flying C-47 with a hook.-On. one such flight in 1952, the Chinese were waiting. They shot down the plane, executed the spy, and two Americans, Jack Downey at)d Richard Fecteau, spent nearly two decades in a Chinese prison. Back . in 1963, when the CIA was helping to change governments in South Vietnam, things took their nat.:- ral course and the agency's new clients rhurdered the agency's old client, Ngo Dinh Diem. In Laos, the CIA ran a secret war for 10 years, fought by its own "Armce Clandestine," with as many as 35.000 recruits from the native populace. The agency congratulates itself for the cost-effectiveness of this operation and the small number of U.S. casualties- though the secret war virutally deka- mated a generation of 1leo tribesmen. To grasp the full range of CIA ac- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-R6P77-00432R000100350003-6 Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432RQAQ1, Q 'y6 are "getting the'fufl' tivity, however, consider this-sample of countries where the agency has played. an effective role in a change of. government: Iran, Guatemala, Soma-: lia, Brazil, Ecuador, Chile, South Viet- nam, Laos, the Congo, Indonesia; ac-; cording to the testimony of ex-officers, scholarly studies and the acknowt- edged history of the agency. Does the CIA kidnap people? Does it torture? Does it assassinate? No, no,- no, the Old Hands insist. "Our world is; full, of assassins," one retired officer. maintains, "who never killed any- body." Another high CIA official, how- ever, was less reassuring on, assassina- tions. 'fl don't want to make a flat state- ment that we never did such'a thing," he explained. "There were some things- that were a little close to the edge." - Years ago, such artful disclaimers from the agency were swallowed with- out much question. Now, because'of a combination of factors, a new skepti- cism has developed. The CIA's chummy connections with the Water- gate burglars, its denials, followed by belated admissions, upset even the agency's defenders on Capitol Hill.. Further, the fresh disclosure of CIA involvement in toppling a foreign gov ernment-this. time in Chile-renewed old arguments over its "covert action'.' abroad. Then, more recently, a report by The New York Times that some of the agency's overseas espionage techni- ques were being used at home against: American citizens produced additional shock waves. N^ dozen-s of ^ , ,lntio - are pend ing in Congress fora grand inquiry of some sort, or even a new oversight committee to exercise greater control. Some critics want to outlaw the agen- cy's "dirty tricks" altogether and rer strict it solely to intelligence-gather- ing, a task which is done more and more by electronic marvels in the sky . rather than human spies. One of the doubters is Rep. Lucien Nedzi, chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Intelli- gence, which expects to draft legisla- tion redefining the CIA's charter and perhaps narrowing the range of "covert operations." "A larger number. of purists will say, ?. and perhaps rightly so, that we got no' business getting involved in such activities, "Nedzi explained. "But my view of a Congress as a whole is that there is a lingering feeling that the world isn't so neat and tidy that we can afford to tie our hands in this - way." Nedzi describes himself leaning to- ward the "purist" camp. "I'm inclined to think we ought to stay out of covert operations," he said. "I want to empha- size I'm not persuaded 100 per cent. At this point, I have such serious doubts that you can maintain secrecy, so, . if you going to be involved somewhere, do it openly and support it publicly." The congressional debate gets a bit confused, however, because only a handful on Capitol Hill really know what they are talking about (and most of them won't talk at all). In 1949, Con- gress "freed" the agency from regular appropriations processes. It; activities and spending are reviewed in private by. a few inenlbers from House and Senate committees on Armed Services, Appropriations and, more recently, Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs. The rest of Congress is kept in the dark. So are most people inside the CIA. - . . CIA is now an agency with about 15,-` 000 regular employees, a figure shrunk by inflation and budget holddowns, just like other federal agencies. About' 4,800 of those people work in' "clandestine services," the secret spies here and abroad, but the agency hires thousands of foreign "agents" to, gather information too. The CIA spends about $750 million a year (not counting the very expensive satellites and spy planes operated for it by the Pentagon), which makes it more costly than the National Science Foundation, but less expensive than. the State Department. The CIA won't verify that budget figure, but when former agency offi- cial Victor Marchetti published it .in his book, "The CIA and the Cult of In- telligence," the agency tried unsuccess- fully to censor it. Langley operates or supports a bi- zarre collection of enterprises. It has bankrolled two radio stations-Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty-plus several news services to distribute propaganda. It owned several airlines -Air America, Air Asia. and Southern- Air Transport. It whipped together its own air force of B-26s for war in the Congo. It has some 200 agents under "cover" overseas as executives of, American businesses. It has, by the last estimate, several dozen journalists on its payroll abroad. Its West Point is "The Farm," codename ISOLATION,' at Camp Peary, Va.,. but it has also trained --`oreign mercenaries in Saipan and Okinawa and at the International, Polley Academy in Wnghinotnrl. In' the 196Cs; the agency penetrated .scores of domestic institutions, mainly with its money, by financing overseas' activities by labor unions (Retail Clerks, . Communication Workers, Newspaper Guild, to name a few), and private organizations like the National Student Association and the National. Education Association and dozens of tax-exempt foundations.. It now avows that those days are over.-though for some, like international labor organi- zations, the. government has replaced- secret CIA funding with "overt" money. The CIA was born with the National Security Act of 1947, the same year as the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. Quartered at first in old Tempo buildings along the Tidal Basin, it flourished with the Cold War, picking up the FBI's responsibility for overseas surveillance but foreswearing any in- volvement in domestic spying, a re- striction on which the ate J. Edgar Six months ago, the Senate debated over whether to make the CIA present its budget figures in public, but de- cided against it. The agency's view is. that if you divulge the budget one year you will have to do it again the follow- in, - thus signaling too much in- formation to the opposition. "If you have a very important tech- nical system which can be countered fairly easily," said Director Colby, "in Washington today, you're going to let- as few people know about it as possible. Why? Because somebody will make a mention of it, just to show how impor- tant he is, sometimes. Or the 'reporter will pick it up and he'll run it and somebody will turn a switch and we will no longer get the benefit of it.' That has happened. So you hold it as narrowly as you can." But the penchant for secrecy even leaves people within the agency uncer- According to one reliable source, thei 'story. The CIA is organized so the'left ,hand won't tell the right hand what : it's doing, not to mention ordinary con- gressmen. When the "covert opera- tions" people were organizing the Bay ,of Pigs invasion in 1961, they did not tell the agency's own deputy director: of intelligence, Robert Amory, who might have figured out that the whole, trip would be a bummer. When the "covert" people wanted to, check out a Chinese espionage pros., pect with the agency's established contact man in Hong Kong, they didn't, send one name. They sent half a dozen .-so that no one in between would: know with whom they. were doing, business., Even communications between CIA people is garbled in a heavy language of cryptonyms. Nobody ever uses the right name for anything or anybody.. The U.S.A. is ODYOKE, according to ex-spy Philip. Agee's account. ODACID is the State Department. ODEARL is 'Defense. KUBARK is CIA. They have a RED series to cover anti-Soviet operations-REDWOOD, REDSOX and REDSKIN (which means legal travel- ers into Russia). ` The CIA is especially proud of its . claiim that its ranks have never been penetrated from the outside, an accom- plishment of the agency's counterintel- ligence section, the one now under fire' for Rs alleged domestic ' activities. "They are the real paranoids of the agency," said one former officer. "They don't trust anybody." If the CIA does not tell the straight story inside, how can anyone outside -be sure they are getting the truth? That question was given more sub- stance late last year with the release of testimony by the late CIA Director Allen Dulles before the Warren Com- mission in 1964. Dulles assured the. in- vestigators that, as CIA chief, he might well lie to them or anyone else, except the President 'himself, to pro- tect the identity of a CIA agent. When former CIA Director James Schlesinger was trying to figure out the CIA's connection with Watergate, he assured the congressional oversight committees that the agency was not fit contact with the burglary team's wire- man, James McCord. Months later, Mc- Cord's periodic letters to the agency ;turned up. , - "He said, 'I'm so damn mad. I just learned about this,'" recalled Rep. Nedzi. "After going into the matter, it became clear that someone way down the line- had these letters tucked away." The CIA is also effective in keeping 'secrets from its diplomatic counterpart -the State Department. Yet, the CIA uses diplomatic cover for most of its overseas officers. They show up on the regular embassy, rosters, usually with bland titles which conceal their real influence. "Informers want to talk to diplomats," one agency veteran ex- plained. "They don't want to talk to Coca-Cola salesmen." The Russians, of course, use the same system. In a way, it protects both sides, because, as one CIA alumnus ex- plained, governments don't arrest dip- lomats. The worst that will happen to any operative from KGB, the Soviet spy apparatus, or the CIA is exposure and expulsion. In terms of quantity, the business of "runnin;,, agents" in foreign countries is a minor part of the CIA's game, producing a small fraction of the total ;intelligence. In terms of quality, there Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432RO001003500A3-6' ' Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6 are strong differences'amdng CIA melt" themselves over whether it is worth much. For the old Bands, who grew up with. the agency, it is the heart of the busi- ness. "It's the only part of the job that counts," one of them said nostalgically. For others, especially among the younger officers, it is an elaborate game of "Mickey Mouse" that pumps out lots of reports, mostly. worthless to' American policy decisions. "Meeting people in bars at midnight' -that gets old fast," said one young ex-officer. "The first time it's fun, but, it gets old. When you get done, you, have to go back through the bureauc. racy. Write a report, file an expense-' chit." The traditionalists argue, that spy' `satellites are good for counting missile,' silos, but they do not help with read-' ing minds. "The people tell you about political dynamics," a high official ex-. plained. "It's terribly important to know what's ,going on within a closed society, comparative 'political forces, strengths of the military group, party. apparatus, the government, the youth movement. You're not going to get that out of a machine." The skeptics don't think the CIA is so hot at getting those kind of insights either, especially from China and the..? 1 Soviet Union. ' "The bulk of the overseas jobs are. anachronistic game-playing," said one. of the disillusioned. "Running agents - that's a crock. Its minutia. It's re- cruiting low-level and middle-level pol- iti.Cians and paying diem for reports. A Mot of times, the report turns flout to be something the agent copied out of ai newspaper." It also can be expensive. One retired officer said a busy station like West Germany could spend as much as $3 million a year, taking care of defectors and supporting local politicians, even ones who are temporarily out of office. "So he won't go broke," the officer ex- plained. One CIA official, who prizes the sys- tem of agent information, explained, why it can be costly: "Sometimes to run a good case in volve's quite a few people on our side., Because if you're going to meet thel fellow, you have to have somebody, watching you to see who else may be watching you and then watching him because somebody else may be watch- ing him, so somebody has to be watch- ing him to see who may be watching him when we make the meeting." If that sounds like dialogue from TV's Maxwell Smart, the business of CIA penetration is no joke to foreign governments. "Inside the Company," an ex-officer's book scheduled for pub- lication in England this month, pro- vides an exhaustive portrait of how it is done: the tedium and scope and risk of American spies trying to pry their way into another country's politics. .Philip Agee, a CIA man for 12 years, 'has set down the most minute details of his service in Ecuador, Argentina, and Mexico, naming names and caus- ling a considerable reshuffle of CIA personnel in Latin America. A lot of energy was expended In try- ing to tap into Communist bloc embas- sies or to compromise their employees. In Mexico City, he recounts, the agent 'LICOWL-1 ran a tiny grocery across; from the Soviet embassy and reported Iiiteriireted 'to include some domesic" operations. The CIA has offices in at least 15 American cities, according to one for- mer employee, where as many as 500 .people. interview. scientists, business= ,men and college professors either bound for Eastern Europe or just re-' turning. The agency asks them to look out for mundane intelligence like the crop reports or esoteric technical gos- sip like the status of new technology-' Among ex-officers, it is widely be- lieved that the agency's counter intelli-. gence has on occasion "bugged" its own employees to check their security. The spectre of widespread electronic eavesdropping in the drawing rooms of Georgetown is not so widely believed. The agency's pursuit of "foreign" in- telligence has also led to some state- side burglaries, according to one for- mer officer, who said the CIA had brio ken into embassies in New York and Washington, mainly to photograph for eign codebooks. . Director Colby - insists that the agency does not have any "gray areas"' in its charter which allow it to break U.S. laws. But then he muses aloud over the question of a burglary of the' Japanese embassy, say, two days be- fore Pearl Harbor. Would the CIA be justified in doing it? "That's a close case," the director said, "a very close case." I One limitation to CIA activity within the United States has been its natural bureaucratic rivalry with the FBI, When Hoover was alive, he persist- ently protected his own turf and blew: 'his stack in 1970 over a minor episode when an FBI man passed to the CIA the whereabouts of a college president on his way to Eastern Europe. Hoover demanded the name of his own agent and the CIA refused. The FBI director retaliated by cutting off "all liaisgn with Langley. "There were a lot of people is, gov- ernment," said an ex-CIA official, !-'who were asking God at the time to. take Mr. Hoover from us:" , The Watergate scandal suggested that, contrary to tradition, the CIA' could be persuaded to help out with domestic spying aimed at American citizens. It began with a telephone call from White House aide John D. EhrI- iclfman to CIA Deputy Director Robert Cushman, suggesting the agency give "carte blanche" to E. Howard Hunt Jr.,, the former agency officer working for the White House "plumbers." When Hunt called on him, Cushman taped the conversation and turned over ex- otic paraphernalia-a wig, a mous-. tache, a fake identification card, a speech-altering device, a camera con- cealed in a tobacco pouch. Hunt and his friends did a couple of burglaries for the White House before they were caught. Meanwhile, the CIA helped out again with a psychological profile on Daniel Ellsberg, the antiwar critic who surfaced the Pentagon Pa- pers. ' When the scandal broke, the agency successfully deflected White House suggestions that the CIA was somehow responsible. Still, the episode left trou- bling questions. It was learned, for in- stance, that McCord was reporting to a CIA "case officer," a relationship which implies that McCord was doing domestic work for the agency. How much does anyone in Congress that Silnikov, the embassy's adminis-. but a loophole provision also directs know about this sort of thing? Are sen- tration officer, was ripe for entice-' it to protect national securit sources ators briefed on embassy break-'-"s? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-lQP17-00432R000JLQD3&MG3-mow that the U. S. I.ox- tnent, ' r : - --. . . zli ky "The station decided to recruit a young Mexican girl as bait'," Agee re- ported. "An appropriate girl was ob- tained through BESABAR, an agent who is normally targeted against Pol-? ish intelligence officers .... By loiter-, ing at LICOWL-l's, store, the girl at-' tracted Silnikov's attention and a hot. necking session in a back room at the' store led to several serious afternoon sessions at the girl's apartment nearby-,- obtained especially for this operation. Silnikov's virility is, astonishing both the girl and the station, which is re- cording and photographing the ses- sions with the knowledge of the girl.. . Eventually it will be decided whether' to try blackmail against Silnikov or to: provoke disruption by sending tapes', and photos to the embassy if the black" -mail is refused." In Ecuador, the CIA was .plugged' .into the police, politicians, the post of- fice, the airports, the government, la- bor and student groups. Here, for example, is Agee's recital of the agents recruited there in the, early 1960s: .? ECSIGIL, two independent o p e r a-' tives within the Ecuadorean Commu- nist Party, each with his own "cut, out," another agent who served as go- between so they would not have to meet directly with CIA people. ECFONE, another Communist Party agent, sending five or six reports a week. RCOLIVE, an agent inside the' 'Revolutionary Union of Ecuadorean Youth. ECCENTRIC. a doctor friendly. with the president. ECAMOROUS chief of intelligence in the National' Police. ECJACK, an army intelligence' officer who wanted to resign from his own country's ineffective service and., join the CIA.full-time. ECSTASY, a postal worker in Quit0 who set aside mail pouches from Cuba, ,Russia and China for his brother, who delivered them to the U.S. embassy for, inspection. ECOTTER, an airport em- ployee who passed on passenger lists. ECTOSOME, an Oldsmobile : dealer who reported on his Czech friends. ECOXBOW, a retired colonel and vice president of the Senate, getting $700 a month plus a luxury 'hotel room for fun and games because his access was so good. AMBLOOD, an agent trained to pen- etrate Cuba where he was later caught and confessed to an assassination plot aimed at Fidel Castro. The list goes on and on-a newspa-' -per columnist, political candidates, a. cabinet member, student leaders, even a socialist in the Chamber of Deputies. - But, as Agee laboriously recounts how the CIA used these people, it be- comes clear that passive intelligence- gathering was only a small part of the game. There was constant agitation against the government's recognition of Cuba, against the leadership of do' mestic organizations, against any Ecua- dorean forces which the CIA station chief perceived as hostile to American interests. In agency terms, the action succeeded. Two governments fell in quick succession, thanks partly to the clandestine agitation, and were suc- ceeded finally by a military regime. The controversy over foreign activi- ties has been matched in the last two years by unanswered questions about 'what the CIA is doing inside the gathering foreign intelligence abroad, Approved For Releag 0aHJ21/n Q1Stg ng ~1pR sYt1r ~p7 oA2R~A ope estimate '*a q~ q$~akvlafibns. If any= 7ernirieiif aecording Approved i s the President. The NSC spending at least $11 million in the. Relations members too. Marchetti tells one does, it early 1960s to change governments in in his. book about the time in 1966 issues; lots of directives about the -Ecuador? According to the CIA, it when the Senate appropriations sub CIA's noncontroversial bureaucratic faithfully reports all of ,its ."covert ac= committee was prepared to ask tough functions, he said, but the sticky, clan-- tivities" to the select few entitled to. questions about technological costs: destine stuff never gets written down. know, but even the agency admits that The agency bedazzled them with a dis- The ;Foreign Intelligence Advisory it does not volunteer any grisly details play of James Bond gadgets -a cam Board,: consisting of nine prominent -, if nobody asks the right questions. era in a tobacco pouch, a transmitter citizens, many closely attached to the Director Colby explains: "If you look- concealed in false teeth and so forth 'defense establishment, is likewise got back over 25 years, you see degrees some of the same equipment which the. -regarded as a serious 'check. One CIA later provided to the White House highly regarded CIA alumnus said:. ? and variations of Congress's supervi-. .. Sion, so that I think that some of the burglary team. Those guys are almost-without excep senators can properly say they didn't- On the House-side, Rep. Nedzi said : tion more hawkish than the guys in .hear of some thins. In some cases, he has been briefed regularly about- the agency. The tone of those guys is:- their chairman heard, about them. In CIA activities ever since he became 'If there's anything wrong, blow 'em 0 others, the material was perhaps cav-, chairman of the oversight subcomniit up. Bred "in our annual appropriations tee two years ago, and that nothing on If Congress does opt for new over-. briefings in which the matter was con- A he scale of the Chile. intervention has sight machinery, it will still face the ered in general terms and then de- occurred in that time.. How does he dilemma of how to operate a secret scribed to the degree requested." know for sure? agency in an open democracy. "All of "The answer is that I don't," Nedzi -the clamor," said Nedzi, "is based on When Congress turns fo its debate said. "I'm not going to vouch for what the premise that somehow, if Congress on CIA oversight, it will have to face they're telling me. But I want to em-, had known about all these things' they one nettlesome reality: in a lot of?situ- phaiize that' l have no reason to be-: wouldn't have happened. To me, that ations, Congress did not want to know. lieve that they're lying to me, at least doesn't follow at all ... If a spooky operation succeeded, fine. at the ton levels." "There's a very difficult problem Sen. John Stennis '(D-Miss.) who for more than a year about the CIA in its pure form yet. hat is the moral chairs the Senate's joint oversight domestic spying which caused -the cur; obligation of a congressional overseer committee; once expressed his own rent flap. He was briefed on it by, if some information comes to him, ambivalence: "You 'have to make up Colby and kept it to himself..Nedzi which indicates a direction in which.he your mind that you are going to have was assured, he said, that the question, doesn't feel the agency or the country an intelligence agency and protect it able had been discontinued. "It . was 'should be going? Does he have the. ,as such and shut your eyes some and historical," he said. - right to blow the cover off the proj- take what is coming." If congressional oversight 'has been ect? Does he have a duty to. blow the The Stennis committee rarely meets, tweak, some experts think the same is 'cover? If your answer is yes, is it rea- though the senator has pledged more true of the executive branch. One for. sonable to have a secret agency in the vigorous supervision in the wake of mer official.said the National Security hands of so many masters?" Watergate. The new foreign aid bill re. Council, despite the popular mythol: 'ogy,.about it, exercizes, very, little corl- WASHINGTON STAR 10 January 1975 olhy Assures s Envoys ? U Cooperative By Jeremiah O'Leary Star-News Staff Writer In an unprecedented appearance before all U.S. ambassadors to Latin American nations here this week, CIA Director William Colby gave assurances .that he would instruct agency station chiefs around the,. Western Hemisphere to make the fullest disclosure to the envoys of information and appraisals generated by, the CIA. . Colby attended the final session of a three-day closed-door meeting of the ambassadors at the State' Department on Wednesday, it was learned. He assured William D. Rogers, assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, and the ambassadors that the' CIA is "running no operations" in Latin America. today. Under questioning by several of the ambassadors, Colby acknowledged that not all CIA station chiefs - nominally under control of their ambassador - fully shared information acquired by the agency or the esti mates and policy recommendations sent to CIA head- quarters. THE STATION chiefs, who are "light cover" on embassy-staff lists, have separate and secure channels of communication with their Langley, Va., headquar-, tiers, and there has peen no prior requirement for CIN officials abroad to fully inform the ambassadors about the information they send to Washington. Colby said the wiser station chiefs do make it a, prac- tice to keep the ambassadors informed generally of . what.they learn and what they report. - Several ambassadors asked Colby if he would issue instructions to make this information-sharing manda- tory and the CIA director said he would do so. How- ever, Colby said that obviously the CIA stationiefs', would not reveal the names of their secret sources in, Latin America even to the ambassadors. The Star-News was told that ambassador to Chile'. David Popper said that even after a year in Santiago he had not been able to discover exactly what role the _ CIA played in the September 1973 revolution or events preceding it. Several 'members of Congress have com plained that Colby's secret testimony before the Senate Arms Services Committee on CIA's'Chilean operations is still so closely held that other members of Congress, have not been allowed to see it. BUT COLBY assured the ambassadors that the CIA was not involved in the successful uprising of the Chi- lean armed forces which overthrew the Marxist-domi nated regime of the late Salvador Allende. He also said the CIA did nothing to precipitate the truckers' strike that paralyzed Chile for two months shortly before the revolt. There has been no public. disclosure of exactly how the CIA spent an estimated $8 million that was ap- proved by the White House "40 Committee," headed by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, for expenditure in Chile in the period before the Allende's overthrow. There has been, however, public testimony of CIA collusion with the International Telephone and Te- legraph Co. in an attempt to' influence the political' turn of events in Chile at the time of Allende's election in 1970. Approved For Release'2b01r0/`':? C~=Ir1fi=il'043'2`R00'01fl035a003-6 If it failed, then everyone could holler. On the other hand, Nedzi has known 'here that fortunately I haven't come to 'Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R090100350003-6 L 5 ANGELES TIMES 12 January 1975 i ith its'authority in investigating the legiti- macy of the complaints it received. Cases of questionable or clear illegality would be for- warded to the judiciary committee or to the .attorney general and given publicity within -the bounds of proper security. One can only speculate on whether such an ombudsman would have served a useful pur- hPor 20 years the exposure of secret CIA operations has automatically elicited public ,outcries for "a thorough investigation" and' cmore congressional oversight" These expo-. sures have, until recently, focused on CIA's covert ? operations abroad in such fields as technical intelligence collection (the U2 over- Retired after 23 years in Central Intelligence Agency operations, Harry Rositzke is the au- i'hor of 'U.S.S.R. Today." 'flight program), paramilitary operations .against Guatemala and Cuba, political action operations in Iran and Chile, and the use of private American organizations and dummy foundations to support a propaganda program against the Soviet Union abroad. Now the CIA joins three other elements of the executive branch accused of carrying out improper or illegal counter-intelligence ac tivities inside the United States during the ?ixon Administration. First, the White House -itself witii its plumbers' squad and the aborted Huston plan, in which a former White House suggested widespread :intelligence- gathering, including breaking and entering: Second, the. Pentagon with its compilation of dossiers on American civilians. Third, the Federal Bureau of Investigation with its coun- ter-intelligence programs directed against radical groups involving not only inv'estiga- lions but the provocation and -harassment of individuals and organizations. - The CIA case in this lineup is unique in two. respects. First, its charter specifically prohi- bits the agency from carrying out internal se- curity operations within the United States, a function falling within the exclusive province' of -the FBI. Second, the CIA has for some time, long before Watergate, been loosely and vaguely suspected of importing it's 'dirty' tucks" from abroad, of becoming a domestic' Testapo.' , The facts of CIA's "domestic operations" and on whose authority they were carried out, will be made clear by the President's blue-rib,- bon panel and by the investigations already. promised by Congress. Together these should= provide the public with the facts-but, as .usual, after the fact. . The principal limitation of Congressional, oversight, however earnest or competent, is simply this: it serves only to detect or expose what has already happened. For 20 years, Congress has been able only to hold postmor- tems: after LL Powers' U2 was shot down, of-: ter Castro wiped out the invaders at the Bay; of Pigs, after the secret army in Laos had ex= fisted for years, after covert support of anti- Allende elements in Chile had stopped. Placing historical facts on the record serves some worthy purpose, not the least of which Is to warn the executive branch to observe -greater caution in the future, but it cannot ef- fectively control improper or illegal actions in - the present. The main issue is: how can illegal internal -security activities by the CIA or other arm of the executive branch be detected or pre- vented in the future? ivuga iormer uLA Director Richard Helms It can't be adequately done by Congress be-' have referred the White House request for a cause of the very nature of intelligence-gath profile on Daniel Ellsberg to an ombudsman? ering organizations. Their files are highly' Might former FBI Director Patrick Gray have classified and closely guarded, their employes revealed to him his conviction that the Pres- are trained in secrecy and highly disciplined ident was being misled by his subordinates? and they are in the habit of dealing only on at Might White House Counsel John Dean have "need to know" basis. Congressional oversight gone to an ombdusman weeks h or mont s be- committees,, faced with this mixture of built- fore he found good reason to talk to the in secrec and inte l b ' y rna ureaucratic control; grand jury? - are simply, inadequate to the job of controll- More important, perhaps, are thefracitizenm s ing executive branch security organizations. whose rights are violated. Whether the Another problem with Congressional over- right 'or the left, black or white, radical or sight involves national security. In any public militant, the targets of domestic counter-intel- inquiry into a secret operation there is inevi- ligence have the greatest right to be heard. tably a fallout of information that is not es- When they discover that they are being sential to the inquiry and which should be tailed, bugged. or denounced without legiti- kept secret in the national interest. To expose mate cause they should have a place to lodge such secrets in the search for illegality or im-. their complaints. Now they have nowhere to propriety is to give comfort to those hostile to go but the,courts, a slow and expensive pro- us and to . feed anti-American propaganda cess. Would they go to a man in Washington around the world. ' they could trust? I think many would. If oversight is not the solution to detecting violations of our civil rights at home, what is? America's investigative journalists have one answer would be to employ against those contributed a gi-eat deal to the exposure of of- who abuse or misuse their legal authority one ficial corruption, but they are at a serious dis- of their own favorite counter-intelligence advantage when itcomes to obtaining unvar- techniques-the encouragement of infor nished facts on counter intelligence. WV'hat is mints. needed in the present case is the whole story- What might serve that purpose is to have a factual and objective, as only an ombudsman federal ombudsman in Washington, a man of or permanent commission could provide it. impeccable credentials with a small staff of An open society cannot be closed by a two or three investigators who would invite handful of plumbers, but it is healthier-with= any federal employe to get in touch with him out them. There is no foolproof way in a in complete confidence to register complaints democratic country to keep it free from exec,o about the improper investigations of Ameri- utive excess unless citizens participate-be can citizens. Such -an ombudsman, or per- they federal employes or suspected "radicals" manent commission, would properly come un- The least we can do is give them the tele- 'der the. Senate, Judiciary Committee and act phone number of. an honest and powerful watchman. _ WASHINGTON POST 15 January 1975 Press Reports on CIA Hit States. I the incidents that may have Schlesinger, who served as occurred during the CIA's CIA director for six months1 more than 20-year history. early in 1973 before taking Schlesinger said misdemea. over as head of the Defense I nor is a legal term that should Department, declined to pro- be avoided until it is deter- vide any details on CIA do. mined by the President's blue mestic activities that may+ ribbon investigative panel if have been questionable over any illegalities did in fact take the years, but he commented, I place. "I think. that in relation to his. All bureaucracies have a torical standards, that there tendency to stray across the were' not activities in such line," he said. e Central Intelligence Agency had files on 10,000 American Secretary of Defense James I number or so surprising as to R. Schlesinger yesterday de- be a source of national tur- scribed as "overblown" press moil." accounts alleging that the Speaking at a Pentagon! press conference, Schlesinger sought to retract the term "misdemeanor" that he us d Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RIM77-00432R000100350003-6 NEW yORc TI proved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6 12 JANUARY 1975._ relaxed attitude toward such S Furor Over C violation's here than there is in rUa;. ? ?I. s the United States Mr.; Ehmise told Die Zeit in an interview .Is a Puzzle to Europe Mast October that he thbug t ? the service would be justified) in keeping files on a German) ,By CRAIG R. WHITNEY BONN, San. 11-The contro- versy over charges of'domestic' spying in the United States by the Central Intelligence Agency has aroused considerable inter- est in West Germany, where similar activities came to light. last October. But in Bonn, as in Paris,' Rome, and London, occasional disclosures of questionable ac -tivities of security agencies have few lasting effects, and the intensity of public reaction in the United States always surprises Europeans. "You .don't have a country over there, you have a huge church, a diplomat here remarked.-`_- Italians take it for granted that if they have \any social oz, political. standing at all, their telephones will be tapped by one secret agency or another.; Thousands of prominent Italians were discovered listed in the files of Rome's military intel- ligence service in a scandal six years alp In Paris, the police were caught last year installing bugs in the office of a satirical weekly, Le Canard Enchaine. In Britain, which is in a war- time-like condition because of Irish Republican Army bomb- ings in Northern Ireland and England, the public expects M.l.5; the- security service, and M.I.6, the secret. intelligence service, to be discreet in their handling of domestic and for- eign?spying. The Spy in Brandt's Office . ` Cases of abuse seldom come to light in the British press because of the Officials Secrets Act, which makes disclosures like those made in The New York Times in recent weeks almost impossible. The West Germany weekly journal of' opinion, Die Zeit,1 pointed out a similarity be- tween the Times reports that the C.I.A. had illegally investi- gated about 10,000 Americans from the nineteen-sixties until last year, and disclosures that were made last year about the West German Federal Intel- ligence Service. These were made in October, during an investigation of the security services' botching of! the case of Gunter Guillaume, the East German agent who worked in Chancellor Willy Brandt's office until last April and contributed to Mr. Brandt's resignation the next month. The former chief of the Brandt Chancellery, Horst Ehmke. said in parliamentary hearings that he had discovered I in 1970 that the. intelligence) service had illegally kept files on 52 German politicians, rang-, ing from the Opposition leaderi Franz Josef Strauss to the man behind the Brandt "Eastern Policies," Egon Bahr. According to Die Zeit, "the causes of the violations are identical. Here, as there"-in the United States-"the secret service justified itself and created its own laws outside the laws of the commonwealth. Here, as there, existed the dangers Thomas Jefferson once said threatened every . free state: That uncontrolled power can easily become, all-embrac- ing power." Report Due Next Month Mr. Ehmke's disclosures pro- voked a few newspaper articles, but whatever spying, had gone on was four years in the past. He told the parliamentary-com- mission that some of the files no longer existed-he had or.- dered them.. destroyed-.- Mr. Ehmke : said' he believed the files were kept by Christian Democrats in the secret serve- ice' who; hoped to use them to embarras the new Social. Dem- ocratic Government. in power since 1969'. ' The parliamentary commit- tee's continuing examination of the Guillaume case is expected' to produce a report some time: ,next month that may result in suggestions for a reform of the entire intelligence system. It has been made clear in (public testimony that Mr. Guil- laume rose to his position as Chancellor Brandt's assistant for party affair; even though strongly incriminating evidence against him had been in the Government files for nearly 20 years. The various bits ' and pieces were never put together for the authorities, who ap- proved a top-secret security clearance for him in 1970. The responsibility for the failure' s still a matter of dispute. The German Bundesnach- richtendienst, or Federal Intelli- gence Service, was built up after World, War II by Gen. Reinhard Gehlen, the intelli- gence genius of Hitler's Wehr- macht. At firs,, ha worked! 'directly under American occu- pation authorities, and after 'West Germany b? inde- pendent lie cooperated closely with the American services. Like the C.I.A., which was created in 1947, the German agency was limited to foreign. intelligence. A second agency,.] the Federal Office for the Pro-i tection of the Constitution, was: created for domestic security. Keeping of files on German pol,1 iticians, therefore, was clearly: a violation of the Federal In telligence Service's charter, as, !C.I.A.'s monitoring of American, civilians would be a charter vi-i olation in the United States. There is, essentially, a more) politician if he was making' contacts with. foreigners here-t just , the thing that critics of the American service say is it legal in the United States. Germany is perhaps a special case, because of the division into capitalist and Communist states, and as Gunter Guillaume; oroved, it is comparatively easy! for an East German agent to pass himself off as a loyal! West German citizen, The linen between "domestic" and "for-1 eign"? intelligence in West Ger-] many., therefore are easily blurred. The C.I.A. is known to con- sider the German intelligence services so .riddled with East German agents that the Ameri- cans do not share real "top secrets" 'with it. Estimates of the number of Communist spies of various; sorts in West Ger- many. run. as high as 10,000. WASHINGTON POST 17 January 1975 Refill Na' I)li,eei?r 0.1 CIA. Panel united Press International , . } President Ford 'yesterday appointed, David W. Belin, who was counsel to the War- ren Commission, which inves- tigated John F. Kennedy's as- sassination, to be executives di rector of the . eight-member commission investigating charges of illegal domestic spying by the CIA. .Belin, 46. has been a senior partner with a law firm in Des Moines since 1966 and is said to be a long-time acquaintance of Mr. Ford. In his work for the CIA in- vestigating panel, which Mr. Ford created Jan. 4 under di- rection' ' of Vice' President iiockefeller, Belin will draw 536.000 a year. The c ommis- sion is supposed to finish its mission within three months. Rockefeller appointed S o l Neil Corbin as his special counsel serving as his liaison with the commission. Corbin also served as c o u n s e l to Rockefeller when Ire was gov- ernor of New York from 1962 until 1965. Belin was counsel to the Warren Commission in 1961:. The' White House said he has, concentrated in his private law' practice on corporation work and court cases, includ ing constitutional issues. . In Franc,'a cool sense off "raison d'etat" often ' justifies .:espionage . activities, which most conservative Frenchmen assume are conducted as a mat-, ter of course. When the late !Soviet, leader Nikita Khrush- chev, visited France in the early nineteen-sixties hundreds, perhaps thousands of people were either detained or shipped to Corsica for the duration of his stay, as security risks. ? Last year it was learned that many different French authori-' ties have the right to order wiretaps and that government ministers had taps put on their mistresses' phones as well as on those of their political rivals. After President Valery Gis- card d'Estaing' was elected in May, he promised an end to such wiretapping and said the files would be destroyed. Some files were burned, but it is generally conceded in Paris that (domestic spying still goes on- The Italian Parliament passed legislation outlawing telephone tapping last year. But recently, an allegedly illegal monitoring center was discovered on the outskirts of Rome, indicating that the practice is probably continuing on a large scale. WASHINGTON POST. .9 January 1975 A', Y. Times, Time Asked for CIA Data.' From News Dispatches Rep., Lucien Nedzi (D-' Mich.), chairman of a CIA'. "oversight . subcommittee, . '-'yesterday asked the edi-' tors of The New.-York-- Times and Time magazine to' suggest witnesses for a: House inquiry into alleged CIA domestic spying. , Both publications in the' last two . weeks . have car- ried extensive dispatches claiming the CIA had breached its charter by carrying out surveillance of American radicals and.' dissenters within the United States.. The New York Times .:turned 'down the request.' On grounds that it was .given information 'for its 'stories on a confidential basis. A spokesman for Time -magazine said in a state- rnent' "This was obtained from confidential sources? and for that reason we ' cannot comply with the re- . quest." Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432Rcb'MbO350003-6, Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001003~0Q03-6 BALTIMORE SUN 12 January 1975 By PAUL W.'BLACKSTOCK. Columbia, S.C. It is a truism that "intelligence is the first line of national defense," since im- portant foreign policy and military deci sions affecting the national security are based, at least in theory, on the best in- formation available. The collection, evaluation and dissemination to policy- makers of such information is the pri- agents who collect information abroad using clandestine techniques. The task of counterintelligence or counterespionage is to block such efforts. When police agencies, such as the FBI, take over these functions they are called security police. In the 'U.S.S.R. counterintellig- ence is carried out by the proper divi- 'sions of the GRU (Chief Intelligence Di- rectorate of the General Staff) and the civilian KGB (Committee for State Se- curity of the Council of Ministers). The KGB is thus a combined national intel- ligence and security police organization. However, surveillance of political dissi- dents is widespread in the U.S.S.R., not only on military installations but throughout the entire state and society. The amount or degree of such domes- tic spying is a basic criterion in distin- guishing police states from open socie-. ties. Indeed, any such surveillance is rightly regarded as a threat to demo- cratic freedoms. The authors of the Con- stitution and Bill of Rights cherished, such freedoms so highly that they delib- erately imposed restraints on the power of the President and the Congress even in,matters affecting national security. The Constitution and Bill of Rights were meant to protect the privacy of the individual in his personal life and to guarantee his freedom from political surveillance by government agencies. Under the Fourth Amendment, the mary function of the intelligence com- sanctity of the home is guaranteed munitv. , against illegal search or seizure by the Unfortunately_ the Central Inteilig. police-and by police there is no ques ence Agency has had a bad press for tion that the intent was to include all po-. years as a result of such covert opera- lice agencies, including what later be- tions as the Bay of Pigs fiasco and past came our national security police, the military interventions abroad which FBI. have little, if anything, to do with the Senator Ervin's investigation re-: primary function of intelligence. Recent revelations that the CIA has been en- gaged in political surveillance (domestic spying) on so-called subversive elements which it regarded as a threat to domes= tic or internal security have distracted public attention from the essential and proper functions of the agency and tend to give intelligence in general a bad name. Back in 1970 Army intelligence also came under a cloud when the Senate subcommittee on constitutional rights under Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (D., N.C.) investigated military counterintel- vealed that at one time various military counterintelligence units kept political card index files on 25 million American' citizens and extensive dossiers on many thousands of others. Similar charges have been made that the CIA has kept ligence agencies which had expanded turbances and urban riots of 1967. Ghet- their normal function of protecting mil- ton were burned and buildings bombed. Lary installations to include political sur- Military forces were called upon to res- 'veillance of suspected civilian "subver- tore order in the emergency situations sives." The Ervin investigation brought thus created, a perfectly legitimate a halt to these extra-legal activities, but function of the armed forces. After all, excellent as it was, its report left unan- George Washington himself called upon swered such fundamental questions as: the militia of several states to put. down What are the legitimate functions of the Whisky Rebellion of 1794 and per. :counterintelligence and security police. sonally led the forces. agencies in a democratic state and so- These were military operations and ciety? How do they differ from similar their commanders felt that they were agencies in totalitarian or police states? simply doing what they regarded as an What are the constitutional safeguards essential task at the time-collecting against their illegitimate expansion? the information needed for emergency All national intelligence agencies operations, The job was done with char- have one or more subdivisions that re- acteristic zeal amounting at times to cruit and manage networks of espionage military "overkill," since in an atmos. phere charged with political and social Dr. Blackstock is a professor of interna- tensions, one man's liberal became an- tional relations at the University of other man's subversive. The situation South Carolina, and an intelligence and would have been ludicrous had it not psychological warfare research special- ist. menacing. He served in Army intelligence dur- m ees ave ing World War If, and has written nu- A basic principle is at stake here the entire Defense Department to over. merous books and articles relating to which cannot be too strongly empha- see, a subject with political appeal the intelligence field.proved For size d Release 0 : 01Y6 /o :eelik-gt@"i- O R000100350003-6 p some 10,000 civilians under surveill- ance. Such situations would have been considered "unthinkable" by the authors of the Constitution. The justification offered for thisio- lation of constitutional rights by the De- fense Department was that it needed files on "politically subversive ele- ments" during the widespread civil dis- police- agencies of a democratic state ex pand the definition of "subversive" to in- clude anyone who opposes government policy, the intelligence base of these" agencies becomes identical with that of police-state dictatorships. When this happens, the constitutional framework, of the democratic state has in fact been eroded, regardless of whether or not such erosion is tacitly accepted by the public, as was the case in. Nazi Ger- many. The threat to the Constitutional order is far more serious when, under a man- tle of secrecy, the counterintelligence components of a national intelligence agency assume internal security police functions, thus following the Soviet mod- el. This is true whatever "presidential mandate" of legal pretext may be in- voked either secretly at the time or later by way of attempted justification. According to Lyman Kirkpatrick, a former Inspector General and Executive Director of CIA writing in The U.S. In- telligence Community: "By law, the CIA. has no police or subpoena powers nor. does it engage in any internal security activities-other than those affecting its own personnel or operations." In connec- tion with the Watergate affair former CIA Director Richard Helms has repeat- edly affirmed this principle, and has de- nied that under his directorship the CIA engaged in any extra-legal political sur- veillance of alleged subversives. Serious charges have been made that counterinteiii enee or `"special opera- tions" divisions of the CIA carried out widespread domestic spying during the late 1960's and early 1970's. The subst- ance of these charges has been publicly admitted by the former head of Counter- intelligence of CIA. The full story of how the agency got mixed up in political sur- veillance in clear violation of its charter and the constitutional principles in- volved must await investigation, which should be immediate, thorough and free of whitewash. Not only the vital, legitimate function of intelligence as the first line of nation- al defense is at stake, but also the foun- dations of our democratic state and opens society. As Watergate has demonstrated these may be undermined from within by political zealots who are capable of rationalizing almost any crime in terms. of. their own paranoid perceptions of "national security." The congressional committees can, demand action and usually get results if they want to be tough. But it should be remembered that these bodies are ex- actly what their chairmen want them to be. The constant refrain that nobody in Congress knows the amount of the CIA budget or where it is buried in the over- all budget is simply not true (unless the subcommittees have not bothered to ex- amine the budget). The congressional subcommittees on CIA (one each in Ap- propriations and Armed Services in the House and Senate) not only can know all of the details of the CIA (and the intel- ligence community) budget, but all of the activities and operations. . One question that must be answered is: How much time do the committees wish to devote to CIA and intelligence? The Armed Services Com itt h Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6 -bases, contracts, jobs, . constituents.,' names would. be 'publicized they would; -on a confidential basis to* raise ob_ Appropriations must pass on the federal never work fbr the United States. tions with the President before ' the; budget of which intelligence is less than m broad throne tha rnrr,,ittana rrnrcf mounting-of an onoratonn thev daamad+ 6 pel cum'. There appears to be little merit to ad- ding another committee just to oversee. intelligence activities with each senator. and congressman already sitting on one or two standing committees as well as special committees. Nor would there, seem to be any use in establishing a `Joint Committee on Intelligence if the- Armed Services and Appropriations Committees continued to exercise juris- diction over the intelligence agencies. This would only add to the competition and rivalry between committees. A Joint Committee would be advisable on- ly with exclusive jurisdiction and mem- bers and staff with time available to do the job. . Another question is: To what degree t should the Committees examine the de- tails of intelligence operations? It is not easy to persuade foreign nationals (and they are the only ones who are clandes-' tine agents) to engage in highly danger- ous work in which their lives may be at stake. If such people believed their: be told enough about the work of the in telligence community so they may re-- sponsibly assure the American people. that the system is working properly. The: Congressional Committees never shouldi be misinformed or uninformed. More specifically, in the areas of es- pionage, counterespionage and covert political operations the committees should know what is going on and wheref but should not ask for details of operav' tions or identity of agents. In counteres~? pionage, the never-ending struggle-tar protect our own secrets, the oversee%?s should be told in general which agency. r carrying out the operations in. the Unitea States. . In the area of covert political opera.;, tions, the. suggestion made by.Preside'tif Ford that the "40 Committee", his body, for reviewing in advance proposals:ipr such activities, advise the congressional committees of contemplated -acBblt'' seems to make good sense. This would give the congressmen. an . opportunity' LOS ANGELES TIMES 14 January 1975 unwise. However, if such information. were to become a vehicle for political' opponents of the President's foreign pot- icy to attack it, the partnership would` . , end. One thing should be obvious: The ii1V' ingness of the President to allow frank 'discussion of intelligence operations' with congressional committees in execu .tive session will be in direct proportion' to the responsible handling of that infor= mation by legislators. Neither branch= of.' the government is in a good position to! "cast stones" on the subject of leakage of classified information. Nor can we ex.' pect leaks to be eliminated by anything except responsible performance in both, branches of government. But foreign in telligence assets are too perishable- id irretrievable to be destroyed in the pur- suit of partisan politics. Most important" at this moment in our history is for?the' Congress to assure itself and the Amen: can people that the intelligence and-se curity .genies are working properly. THOSE IN THE KNOW ARE `CbNCERNED` NOT' HYSTIERICAU -i 11c; '1 VY 111 .111 V U,%_5 L1d UII k%J dear LEW till. BY J. F. terHORST take action or be open to accusations of ig- WASHINGTON-Advance communication poring the problem, Marsh said. between the White House and Capitol Hill Nedzi advised Marsh that Congress could indicates strongly that neither Congress nor not delay, either-and for the same reasons. the Administration intends to let investiga- Indeed, the White House learned, Nedzi in- tions of alleged CIA domestic spying turn tends to begin his CIA hearings within two into a publicity-generating vendetta that weeks, and-hopes to conduct them with full i could permanently cripple the agency's vital- press coverage. CIA chief William Colby al- intelligence-gathering mission. ready has been alerted to have himself and other agency witnesses ready to testify by Several days before President Ford an- then. _ nounced the Rockefeller commission to check' . Marsh got essentially the same response into charges of CIA spying on American po- from Sen. John C. Stennis (D-Miss.), who litical dissidents, a key telephone conveysa- heads the Senate Armed Services Committee, tion occurred between presidential counselor and from other Democratic and Republican John 0. Marsh, a former Virginia Democratic leaders of the two chambers who do not in- congressman. and Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi (D- tend to delay their congressional inquiries Mich.), chairman of the armed services sub- until the Rockefeller commission completes ,committee. its 90-day CIA investigation. Those in the White House and on Capitol Will wh k th b w t o no a su s ance of the allega- Marsh advised Nedzi of the President's in- tention to appoint a special inquiry board, of them, "concerned but not alarmed orf hyone s- and solicited Nedzi's opinion, because his sub- terical." CIA violated its charter against domestic sur veillance or whether it merely extended it legitimate foreign intelligence gathering int the home front in an effort to see whethe there were links between American citizen and some hostile powers abroad. There were widespread suspicions withi the top echelons of government back in th 1960s and early 1970s that foreign mone was bankrolling some of the antigovernmer activities within the United States. If the presidential panel named by M Ford and the congressional hearing acco push anything, they should at least answe the persistent implication that antipathy an rivalry between the late FBI Director J. E gar Hoover and the heads of CIA were th cause of the problem. The FBI supposedl conducts domestic surveillance, but repor are that Hoover would not take on cases r ferred to the FBI by the CIA. Practically speaking, it probably wouldn if h b ,e "ee nveuzl, for example, was apprised of some eing unit charged with monitoring the nation's in- alleged CIA spying on domestic antiwar cretly investigated by the FBI or the Cl! telligence apparatus. groups more than a year ago, during his but it makes a lot of diffference.nowada~' Nedzi advised Marsh that it might be wiser closed-door probe into CIA involvement in when the CIA is rather widely suspected i, for Mr. Ford to delay the naming of his spe- ? the Watergate coverup. He did not make it young persons and older conspiratorial typ cial group until House and Senate investiga- public then because he was convinced that it of running a secret, sinister supergovernrne tions into the CIA had been completed. was not'directly related to the Watergate within the United States. Marsh replied that the public outcry and scandals. In fact, some of the alleged CIA Responsible lawmakers that the CIA and public official the nature of the charges made it impossible spying activities dated back to the Kennedy are confident that the Cinvestigations wi for Mr. Ford to abstain from ordering a probe and Johnson presidencies, he was informed. disprove these suspicions to a majority . Americans, even though a fanatic fringe Brie of the agency. The President would have to The gut issue in all of this is whether the . "whitewash.".' 143 Approved For Release 20tl1i1/08 Cllr7"' tl 'RCIb'tl''0'0350003-6 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6 . LOS ANGELES TIMES 12 January 1975 'ATCH OGS WENT TO SLEEP BY DAVID WISE -Profound ironies underlie the current de- bate in Washington over charges that the Central Intelligence Agency violated the law and turned loose its spies, spooks, wire tap- pers and "entry" men on American citizens in- side the United States.. Those who have urged greater control over the CIA and warned of the dangers of secret shower in a democracy have been repeatedly assured that the CIA always operates under tight presidential supervision. The official. David Wise is the coauthor of "The Int-S,ible Government," a critical study of the CIA. claim is that no covert operations are under- taken abroad without the approval of a high- level White House committee and that Con- gress' and an outside civilian review board serve' as vigilant watchdogs, barking in the alight at the slightest sound of an illicit clan- destine footstep. Unless there were considerable substance to- he allegations of CIA domestic spying, Pres-:, ident Ford would hardly have found it neces- sary to appoint an eight-man commission, headed by Vice President Rockefeller, to con- duct an inquiry. If the CIA indeed were under .Iidht nrocirlantiol rnnfrri 11(ir T.'nrra ..m,9.i have needed a report from CIA Director Wil- liam E. Colby and a commission to investigate CIA domestic spying-he, would already have known all about it. President Ford, however, is a relatively re- cent occupant of the White House, and per- haps he was unaware of CIA domestic spying. Reportedly these domestic activities were sus- , ended around the time Watergate broke open in 1973. Perhaps Colby neglected to brief the new President on what had been going on. But in that case, what about Secre- tary of State Henry Kissinger? For five years, Kissinger served as Richard Y\Yixon's national security adviser and chief of me staff of the National Security Council,: ;titles he has retained as secretary of state. '.Under the law, the CIA is directly supervised. 'uy the NSC. Yet 24 hours after the CIA story` idn't. Know, broke, a spokesman for Kissinger said, "The secretary' has never seen any survey of American citizens by the CIA and he doesn't. know if any such surveys exist." If Kissinger, the man with direct responsi- bility over' the CIA since 1969, really knew. nothing of CIA domestic spying, there is yet another paradox in the case of Nelson Rocke- feller. The man chosen by President Ford to investigate the CIA has been a member since 1968 of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. For years, starting with the late Allen Dulles, CIA directors have claimed that this board of civilians has access to whatever it wants to know about the CIA. If so, Rockefeller would already possess full knowledge of any CIA domestic spooking-he would not need an eight-man commission . to ascertain the facts. As for Congress, if the four subcommittees responsible for watching over the CIA were ..being properly informed; there would be no'_ need for the various new Congressional' probes now under consideration. On the face of it, then, the current' con- troversy has raised grave new doubts about the familiar claim that the CIA operates un- der strict control by the executive branch and Congress. But, as' the Watergate scandal demonstrat- ed, there is another side to the coin. While there are great dangers to a democracy when a secret intelligence agency operates out of . control, there are equally great dangers.when a President and his men exercise improper control and misuse power against political en- emies or dissidents: The central importance of Watergate was this abuse of power and the misuse of government agencies-particularly law enforcement and intelligence agencies, in- cluding the CIA and the FBI-against indivi- duals. . Richard Helms was director of the CIA from 1966 to 1973, a period when much of the al- leged domestic spying took place. In a 1971 speech, he said: "We do not target on Ameri- can citizens" Yet the Senate Watergate hear- ings and the House Judiciary Committee's im- . peachment evidence indicated that the CIA idn't 1t9 while Helms was director twice violated the law confining the agency to overseas opera- tions. Helms agreed to outfit Nixon's plumbers. with a wig, a camera,' a voice alteration de- vice and other spy equipment, and Helms per- sonally approved the preparation by the CL of a psychological profile on Daniel EilsberOn June 28. 1972, Helms obligingly wrote a memo asking the FBI to "confine themselves, to the personalities already arrested' an? avoid expanding the Watergate investigatic into "other areas, which may well eventuall run afoul of our operations." The CIA cooperated for a time with Nixon'-s attempt to use the intelligence agency eb block the FBI probe of the Watergate burg- ry despite the official denials. It is also verb. possible that the CIA followed presidential White House orders in carrying out domnst: spy operations. The problem of controlling the CIA i& therefore, a dual one: To make certain tha-11 the agency operates under strict supervision of the. executive branch and of Congress, but by the same token to be sure that it is no misused by, a President or his advisers. and turned into an illegal secret police. It is possible. that. a much-needed general reform of the CIA will emerge from the cur- rent investigations. As a first step Congre~ s should outlaw all covert operations by the CIA overseas and confine the agency to gash-. ering and evaluating intelligence-the mis- sion which Congress thought it had assigned to the CIA when it created the agency 1947. Second, Congress should specifically prohibit any CIA domestic operations and pre- cisely define that term. The legislation shoul+f include strict safeguards against presidential: .misuse of the agency. Third, 'Congress should ' establish a' joir:t committee to ride herd on the CIA, scrappin the existing informal, shadow subcommittee:. In the words of Sen. Stuart Symington (IL Mo.) a member of the Senate Armed Service. .Subcommittee on CIA: "There is no ?cder , agency in- our government whose activiti . receive less scrutiny and control than th CIA" WALL ST=, JOURNAL 3 JAN 1975 CIA FIIItM NT graves-and not just be- cause of durnestic-spring char.-;es. -The agency emphasizes scientific snoop- ing by satellite or electronic eavesdropping; director Colby deemphasizes "dirty tricks." The trend to detente angers CIA veterans) whose careers advanced when the Commu- nists clearly were the enemy. Today's rela-I tive openness about CIA work contributes to' a general sag in morale. Chances are stronger than ever for con-' gressionat restraints on the aency. Corning- 0 urely find a par- Capitol Hill inquiries will surely, tial basis for reports of illegal actions in the past. Some forbidden domestic spying evi- dently took place under former Director Helms, with Vietnam-war protesters the main targets. Colby Will surrire as 'CI.' chic/ 'for now. But a respected outsider may be brought, in later on to restore the agcn- cy's_ reputation. 27 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6 ificialdom' 17 January Aoved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6 Baker Reports"-CL" . Compiled ~o ss ers on o Former Senate. Aide and a Private New Fork Investigator t'$ NICHO LA y a M. HORROCK. April, 1972, that they might be Special to The New York Times the subjects of a sophisticated WASHINGTON, Jan. 16-1 electronic surveillance Not. Senator Howard H. Baker Jr. Mr. Fen'sterwald said he had a!aid today that his investiga- no "independent" knowledge- ;taon into any Central Intel- that the C.I.A. had a dossier on ligence Agency involvement in him or that it had ever investi- :Watergate had - disclosed that gated him, but he speculated the agency had compiled dos- that he might have come under siers on a former Senate aide r agency scrutiny when he was land a New York private investi- working for Senator Long's in- gator. vestigation of wiretapping and In a telephone interview 'at bugging in the mid-1960's. s home in Huntsville, Tenn., "We were getting into C.I.A. Senator Baker, a Republican, wiretapping, pushing the -Free- said that his investigation had i dom of Information Act and in M ound that the agency hd d aos- siers on Bernard Fensterwald,?a Washington, D.C., lawyer and iformer aide to the late Senator Edward V. Long, Democrat of !Missouri, and on Arthur James Woolston-Smith, an officer of a New York City investigation and industrial security consult- ing concern. "These were but two of the numerous indications our inves- tigation turned up that the C.I.A. has engaged in wide- spread domestic activity," Mr. Baker said' A spokesman for the C.I.A. declined to comment on the Senator's allegation. A report on the agency's domestic activities released yesterday by. William e.. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, acknowledged that the agency had kept files on several mem- bers of Congress and numerous dossiers on American citizens collected both by domestic spy- ing operations and through f agency employment checks. t Senator Baker said that his inquiry into C.I.A. activities, brought to an abrupt close by the demise last year of the Sen- ate Watergate committee, of which he was vice chairman, had uncovered five areas that he believes require further in- vestigation by a bipartisan se- lect Congressional committee or some form of permanent in- telligence oversight committee. Mr. Baker said that he was "unabashed" in his desire to be part of a Congressional com- mittee to investigate the agen- cy. He added that though "I feel it may sound immodest, I think I'm one of the best quali- fied men in the Senate to delve into C.I.A. because I was one of the first to hear the 'animal crashing about in the forest."' ? Senator Long's Activities The Senator was referring to his suspicion in 1972 that there might be illegal intelligence and espionage activity going on in had found indications that the T-.. ;C.I.A. might have tapes of tele-1 phone and room conversations) throughout its headquarters in! Langley, . Va. He pointed out,, for instance, .that a tape of a conversation 'between Marine Gen. Robert E' ? Cushman Jr.,. then deputy director. of'. the C.I.A., and E. Howard Hunt Jr., to do electronic surveillance, Mr' Baker reported. The refer-i rals were made by the chief of the agency's external employ- ment assistance. branch, which aids former employes. "I think we must establish whether these referrals -were authorized by the director and, who was convicted for his role if not, who decided this was an in the Watergate burglary had appropriate job referral for the, not been destroyed. The agen?. agency to make," Mr. Baker cy, he said, also "appeared to said. have- a taping capability from . One former Senate investiga the main switchboard." - . . .. tor said that the external assis- vestigating a U.S. Government! - Mr. Baker said that,, in"addi- tance operation was "virtuall y plot to assassinate Fidel Castro' tion to the tapes, the .I.A. had the switch plate of an old-bo , and any one of these things reported that several dos-j network -for former C.I.A.1 could have attracted their at- uments had been destroyed. J agents." The discovery of. the' tention, Mr. Fensterwald said. , A second area to investigate, Last month, Time magazine re-! Mr. Baker said, is -the domestic ported that the C.I.A. had creat- role of Eugenio R. Martinez, a ed a dossier on Senator Long Watergate burglar. The C.I.A. during the same period. acknowledged that at the time The report on domestic acti- of the Watergate burglary, Mr. vity released by Mr. Colby, cur- Martinez was receiving a $100 rent director of the C.I.A., ack a-month retainer as an -opera- nowledged that the agency had tive in Miami. Mr. Baker said -voluminous files on American ! that .in addition to reporting on specialized dossiers. on antiwar' activists first revealed by The New York Times on Dec. 22. Though a file on Mr. Wool= ston-Smith may ha,e ended up in C.I.A. data vaults. as -a, _- a'-.' al ? 1, ,.d telligenceG work, the fact that there was a dossier on Mr. Fen- sterwald struck Senator Baker tion. "We had no indication from the - C.I.A. that Mr. Fen- sterwald had been involved in any foreign intelligence," he Mr. Baker, discussing, the need for further -investiation, said that one of the five pro= posed subjects was the de- struction of tapes and doc- uments. On Jan. 24, 1970, Richard Helms, then director of the C.I.A., ordered the- destruction of tapes of his personal office and telephone conversations dating back over several years. The tapes included conversa- tions with President Nixon and other Administration leaders, according to Mr. Baker's Watergate report. ? The destruction was carried out despite a request from the Senate majority leader, Mike Mansfield, Democrat of Monta- na, that the C.I.A. retain all evidence pertinent- to the Watergate investigation. Mr. Helms later testified that the tapes had contained no Water- gate material. "We ought to have'further testimony-on this Both Mr. Fenstetwald and Mr. from the custodian of the Woolston-Smith said that 'they tapes," Mr. Baker said. had no knowledge that the . Mr. Baker said that the vol- C.I.A. had maintained dossiers, ume of material destroyed was on them. "I don't doubt it and I so great that "it took them sev- don't care," said Mr. Woolston- eral days to scissor the tapes Smith, a New Zealander whoi and burn them.: .said his coincern had done in- telligence work for the United States Navy. Mr. Woolston- Smith, an officer of Science Se- curity Associates, Inc., said he .had warned the Democrats in "I don't charge Mr. Helms with any wrongdoing," he said. "I'm only sorry the Congress has been deprived of the oppor- tunity to review the material." I He said that his investigation Hunt referrals fed the suspicion` that many C.I.A. men continue' to work- for the agency long af- ter appearcng to resign or re-- tiring. Mr, Hunt-testified that, he 'retired'.; once in the mid 1960's as. a cover story for spying assignment in Spain. The Hiring of Agents tinez was assigned to learn) (would irwolve covert domestic) about possible demonstrations, Iagents. Mr. Baker said that "fart by Cuban-Americans at the, more must be learned? about` Miami political conventions. the C.I.A.'s hiring of secret (investigators asked the C.I.A.! ,? about 'this -apparently complete-1 ly. domestic assignment, presu g mably forbidden by the Nation-I in Washington on a $250-a- ,al Security Act of 1947, they! 'month retainer. Lee Pennington were told that the agency was! Jr. was the C.I.A. operative sent -responding to. a request from ;to the home of James W. Me 'the Secret. Service which had) Card Jr.', convicted Watergate the responsibility for candidate burglar, two days after the safety. Mr. Baker said there break in -and the man who was no clear reason why the) assisted, in the destruction of Secret Service should have papers that might have linked asked the C.I.A.;. for such Mr. McCord to the C.I.A. domestic intelligence. Mr. Pennington died of a Support for Hunt heart attack last year, but not befor te if i e st y ng that he had Moreover, Mr. Baker said, . when he attempted to interview been retained by the agency to Mr. Martinez's case officer dur- gather information in Washing- ing the crucial period in 1971 ton. Mr. Baker said he had, and early 1972, he was first found indications that there told the officer was "on African were "other Lee Penningtons." f i" sa ar and then was later told. he was unavailable because he was serving in Indo-China. Mr. Baker said the agency had also withheld numerous documents concerning Mr' Martinez's acti- vities. The third area proposed for investigation is the support fort Mr. Hunt. Mr. Baker's investi.j gation disclosed that, in addi- tion to providing Mr. Hunt with disguises, false documents and hidden cameras, the C.I.A. had referred Mr. Hunt to former agency personnel who might be willing to become involved in espionage operations. Upon Mr. Hunt's request he was given the name and loca- tion of a "lock picker" and men agents in the United States. It was his investigation that first of a domestic agent operatin Finally Mr. Baker would in- vestigate fronts and proprietary companies. The Baker investigation un- covered indications that the C.I.A. had retained and possibly fully supported private investi- gation agencies in the United States that could conduct domestic surveillance opera- tions under the guise of private investigations. Mr. Baker said this evidence coupled with his findings on the operations of the now-dc- ifunct Robert Mullen Company Irequired that Congress "learn a ,great great deal more about the A.'s investment in private industry, and its use of -private firms for cover operations." Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350'O03-6, - Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6 LONDON TIMES 16 December 1971i- Muted voice Is the Voice of America going soft on . Communism ? The thrust of a Time magazine article last week was that Henry Kissinger's detente policies have muted America's official over- seas broadcasts, particularly those in 16 Soviet and East European languages. Provocative stories are sup- posedly being avoided. Read- ings in Russian of Solzhenitsyn's Gulag Archipelago were vetoed. VOA correspondents abroad complain they are being sup. pressed when they try report- ing internal dissidence, accord- ing to the article. ington. Some staff on news and current affairs see nothing to complain about if the "Voice" is at last losing its ideological stigma, - They claim, perhaps extra- vagantly, that for plain news they have long been on a par with BBC overseas services. The propaganda tag of cold war vin- tage has long irked them, as being a deterrent to listeners. If the. United States Informa. tion Agency director, James Keogh, has put a stop to the aggressive anti-Soviet commen- taries which his predecessor, Frank Shakespeare, urged on them, they are not grumbling. The grumbles which Time re- ported may come from emigres in the East bloc services, who feel they are losing their anti- communist crusade. Whale policy lines come from the State. Department, through USIA, working news staff claim they are not excessively inhibit- ing to ingenuity. When Keogh, for example, gave a directive that unnamed source Watergate stories attacking the Nixon Ad- ministration were not to be used, the news reports simply quoted the White House spokes- men denying the offending stories, which were then told at length. Officially, the VOA will not admit that the voice of ideo- logy has been muted. Officials assert that it has not been there for some time. Yet Ruth Walter, VOA spokeswoman, said: "When our Government's foreign policy changes, we have to change, too." Time had one damaging quote. It said that Pavel Lit- vinov, an exile speaking to Soviet Service VOA - staff, declared: "The quality of your broadcasts to my country has declined 500 per cent in the last few years." And the staff applauded. Miss Walter says he never said it. The tape of the talk has neither that quote nor the applause, she insists, although Litvinov did accuse VOA of having less to say about internal events in Eastern Europe. She points out that the CIA's Radio Liberty in Germany, now openly financed by Congress, is speci- fically there for a propaganda purpose. VOA people seem happy to be called soft if it makes ,them a harder news organization. .. It has had interesting reper- cussions at VOA headquarters, Fred Emery reports from Wash. NEW YORK TIMES 17 January 1975 Soviet Trade Fiasco` .- C bL -. a... .. Frv.rn 1-, vivid TT 'o . rCpuu.a:l.,7-. nivi aLSULL v1 talc t a- a- emigration compromise negotiated by Secretary Kissinger i with Moscow and Senate leaders, the country should learn some important lessons. The first .is that a' superpower cannot be pushed around by a Senator, even a superpower's senator. Senator Jackson's amendment to the trade bill undoubt- edly helped Mr. Kissinger obtain, by quiet diplomacy, a. huge increase in Jewish emigration to about 35,000 in 1973. But by dragging out the issue for two years. and insisting on public "assurances" from Moscow=- against the State Department's strong advise-Mr.. Jackson overplayed his hand and, as President Ford has noted helped to achieve results. quite t11e opposite from those he intended. The second lesson is that the Congressional role in overseeing the Administration's foreign policy is that of advice and consent, not taking negotiations into Senatorial hands or tieing the hands of the officially designated negotiators. The Stevenson amendment limit- ing Export-Import Bank credits to the Soviet Union to the insignificant sum of $300 million over four years undoubtedly grew out of the atmosphere of "victory over Moscow" that Senator Jackson created, but it carried the error a disastrous last step. 'Instead of . permitting the President to relax the restrictions when convinced that Soviet-American rela= tions and the future of d?tente would benefit, the final version of the amendment adopted by the Senate re- quired further Congressional , approval for each credit i. Increase over the ceiling. This. clearly was the straw that. broke the Soviet camel's back. The third lesson is that detente is still too fragile a thing to carry the kind of load some Americans seek to put on it. It has been evident since 1971 that the (basic transaction in the new Soviet-American relation- ship has been a Soviet offer of detente to obtain Western :technology and credits and an American offer of trade and credits to obtain detente. All elements of detente, . including strategic arms control, the, Middle East, Viet- `nam, and progress in human rights, such as Jewish emi- gration, are unavoidably linked to trade and credits. One is not politically possible without the other. But the linkage must be flexible, rather than rigid, and the quid pro quo in trade and credits must be there in sizable amount. The Senate repudiated the Kissinger compromise when it passed the Stevenson amendment. The tragedy is that Moscow could not wait for the Ford Administration, in the current session of Congress, to try to reverse it. The fourth lesson is that the Stevenson amendment must be quickly reversed because it not only shackles the Administration's efforts on the emigration issue but son all negotiations to assure a. peaceful world. Trade can continue to expand despite the failure of the trade pact. The Soviet Union's hard currency earn- ings abroad have been increased by the rise in oil, gas .and mineral prices, and Moscow. is in less need of ,credits for short- and even medium-term purposes. But some long-term projects, each of which would have to be weighed on its merits, will be unable to go forward' ,until long-term credit facilities are created. Emigration undoubtedly will continue to be linked to trade and detente, as from the beginning. The Soviet Union demonstrated a refusal to be pressured by re- ducing emigration to 20,000 last year and it continues to drop. A turn-around will depend on the whole state of Soviet-American relations.. A dangerous period has opened. Far more than trade and emigration is involved. In the Mideast peace nego-' ;tiations, the Soviet view has never been identical with that of the United States, except on the determination to avoid a nuclear confrontation. If the prospects for detente continue to dwindle, the chances for a moderate Soviet policy in the Mideast may dwindle with it. There is less danger of a breakdown in arms control .negotiations. Here both countries have identical interests. But in other fields, such as mutual force reductions in .Europe and efforts to resume peace negotiations in Viet- nam, as well as the Middle East, hope for a more peaceful %world will ride on the Administration's new efforts to revise Congressional trade, and credit restrictions. Approved For Release' 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6 29 - Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6 NEW YORK TIMES 12 JANUARY 1975 : PARIS SPECULATES mand of from the the North Ath Aanti mend tlantic Treaty Organization and her g~ expulsion of all United States. ON U. S. ~j~!PIES military units. Criticism by Communist Officials on both sides said that this represented no change Desert-Warfare Exercises -in French policy toward NATO or military cooperation with and Kissinger 's Remarks the United States. Nonetheless; Stir Questions on Oil the exercises were not generally known and the aisciosure brought a sharp attack on the By FLORA LEWIS Government from the Commu- SpCiat to The New York Ti- nist leader, Georges Marchais. !dip ?. mat dent Valery Giscard d'Estaing's has compounded the problem of s s inger the gunboat diplomat failure to denounce Secrete communications, making'it har- Peaaceceeded Priza e w winninnerer? the Nobel of State Kissinger's public] Secretary: der for many officials and diPlo- P" the an- 'nouncer on a French television statement that United States 1 mats as well as newsmen to ob- -newscast asked this week. ' military intervention in the) tain needed information. He was commenting Tuesday Middle East was "not ruled A number of French and West night on a news film clip show out' meant that Paris had given German diplomats are com- ing a, landing exercise on a tacit approval to American plaining-as American diplo- Mediterranean beach involving. policy. mats have complained through -1,000 marines attached to the' The Communist leader said out the Kissinger years-that United States Sixth Fleet. The' more than tacit approval was they are being kept in the dark implication appeared to be that involved in the French Govern- by their own Governments. land in ment's willingness to permit The recent NATO meeting in the marines were practicing to ( United States exercises at Can- Brussels and the European sum- Arab oil-producing; 'countries. juers, "in geographical condi. mit conference in ? Paris were However, the program's di- tions like those to be found in cited by some officials as ex- rector, Michel Texier, said sub- the Middle East." amples of the problem. rector, y that it was simply "It is veritable collusion, Secretary of State Kissinger intended to show "part the deliberate," he added. said at a news conference at intended show openly the Officials said there'was a 10- the end of the meeting of conti rec- ognized by the plans of day- marine exercise at Can- foreign ministers of the North, -State 'so as to be prepared for juers, a relatively new base,.in January, 1974. The marines .all eventualities." L- ., __ L__ ,______,_.. The newscast, which, has vpora`e "ere, by themselves, although facilities 'at the base provoked some renewed' con- and its firing ranges are cern here about United States manned by the French. intentions in the Middle. East, Other exercises have taken followed by, several days the' place at the ' Foreign' Legion publication of Secretary of base at Lovo-Santo in Corsica, State Kissinger's remarks sug- where United States marines gesting that force might be and French legionnaires join used to solve the oil problem in in assault landing. practice. The a case "where there is some last such exercise was in Octo- actual strangulation of to beg, 1974, and lasted four days. industrial world." "The marines show the Ready for the Desert legionnaires new tactics and Until Mr. Kissinger's remarks techniques for amphibious about the possibility of inter- operations, and the . French vention, the widespread specu- show us the latest in com- lation in Europe about possible mando tactics," according to American military action against Comdr. Gene Wentz, spokesman Arab oil fields was based main- for the United States Naval ly on television films of Ameri- Command in Europe at. its Lon- can troops practicing for desert don headquarters. warfare in the western part 'of The French television clip on the- United States.. the Sardinia exercise was an The French film; made about extract from a 20-minute seg- two weeks ago, showed Ameri- ment about the Sixth Fleet can marines from the Sixth shown Thursday night as part Fleet landing on the Italian is-, of an hour-long current events land of Sardinia. However, the review. It included an inter- speaker said that they planned{ view with the fleet's com- further training exercises in mander, Vice Adm. Frederick France. Turner, who described his mis- Military sources here said the ? sion as maintaining and safe- exercises would be held at Can- - guarding United States . inter- juers, a French tank and artil- ests in the Mediterranean. lery base near Toulon. While At one point, the French in. the exact dates were not offi-` terviewer sought to learn from cially made public, the ships) a marine officer whether he bringing the contingent, about 200 marines were due at'Saint- Raphael yesterday. and were to leave on Jan. 20, the, officials said. It was learned on inquiry from.French and United States military sources that, small units of marines have been training on French soil for some years, despite France's with- to die for oil wells" and elic- ited the reply "Yes," suggest- ing that the motivation for a military operation existed. But when pressed, the offi cer, identified only as Captain Germain, said that in the pres- ent situation he did not "think an intervention would be nec- e.,sary." NEW YORK TIMES 23 December 1974 SUMMIT PARLEYS - HAMPER ENVOYS Are Said to Curb the'Flow of Information to Diplomats By FLORA LEWIS. Spedal to The New York Times PARIS, Dec. '22-The growing trend -for direct personal con- .press spakesmenr _ - -~ Apparently, Mr. Kissinger understood "discretion" to mean a refusal to tell the press what was said. The delegatiae of the Netherlands, which has aE Policy- of generally. open infor-i mation, interpreted it to me=, giving a. fair summary of tile} ,speeches since there had been' nothing-' particularly sensitise; Or embarrassing that seemed to warrant concealment.- According to NATO sourcces~ ! Mr. Kissinger was furious. Tlse1 United - States spokesman Robert Anderson, held a brief- ing in which he said that re- ports of'.Mr. Kissinger's speech based . on. the Dutch briefing were "inaccurate." But he ae` fused to-,;say anything more or to give an American version of. what had been said.' ' I Information Tightened The Secretary's anger led, most delegations to tighten on the ~>information they dis- closed for fear that full reportsi might endanger future allied:( exchanges, press officers said. I Thus, briefings were held by spokesmen who had to get their information second-hand be- cause they had not- been al- lowed into the restricted sew on Dec. 12 and 13 that it was were restricted to newsmem-t "the ! best NATO JCSsIIJrl.l 114Ve of the nation providing time attended." report. Later, the reporters ex- "The new format of restricted changed hat theth adilear accept sessions makes for a better dia-i tion at one more remove from logue and less formal state-; the source. ments," he said. "`I recognize itj The difficulties. at the F also makes , for ..more erratic' briefings; since not all delega-I roPcan summit meeting in Paris tions interpret the -restrictions in a similar manner, and we will have that straightened out by the next meeting." An Angry Dispute, information policy during the session. - Mr. Kissinger had proposed "restricted -sessions" with all two weeks ago had a similar( effect of making information hard -to obtain. Mr. Giscard.f d'Estaing had insisted that only Government heads and foreign ministers be admitted to the session-so -as to encourage easy exchanges. The governmental press spokesmen were willing to pre vide information, but the tight) schedule of the conference en t abled them to see their top de-i excluded and the usual press Ii legates only for two or three briefing sessions - afterward j minutes after each session. limited 'to statements of "dis-II They had to obtain what news; cretion."- The ministers agreed I they could get on the run arid! to have only two aides present,I1 were unable to answer many-( WASHINGTON POST 12 January 1975 Russell Tribunal BRUSSELS-The second 'session of the Bertrand Rus- sell tribunal's "trial" of four Latin American countries for violations of human rights opened here. Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and Bolivia were found guilty of "crimes against humanity" at the first session of the "trial" last March in Rome. The second session is to ana- lyze the countries' social and economic systems. 00432I4O0o100358003-6 Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDI~7 1I . 411 "Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6 Tuesday, io z. 7, I975 THE WASHINGTON POST By John M. Goshko Washington Post Foreign Service BONN, Jan. 6-The threat of a new Arab-Israeli war- and its potential conse- quences for West Germany Jews. or, Democratic leader, is report. ? Defying the Americans edly the Cabinet's strongest PV-V Luc consideration should be its Arabs, who provide roughly security relationship with 70 per cent of West Ger. the Uni't d St t for Helmut Schmdt s gov- ernment. . The possibility that fight- ing might break out again in the Middle East, bringing in its wake a new oil embargo, is a topic of considerable concern in all West Euro- pean capitals. Even more than the others, Bonn has ,special reasons for anxiety about the situation. Tremendous quantities of American arms and military equipment are stockpiled in- West Germany. in the event of a new Middle East war, any U.S. attempt to resupply Israel would almost cer- tainly involve drawing upon these stocks and transport- ing them from air bases and ports within Germany. about which path they would choose in the event of war. Despite a growing surge of speculation in the German press, the Schmidt government has alternately refused to say anything, is- suing terse restatements of its neutrality, or talked cryptically around the sub- ject. - In an interview published in this week's edition of the I newsmagazine, Der Spiegel, Schmidt said, "I know of no pressure" from the United States to make air bases and port facilities available for supplying Israel. He added that Bonn would not react to such pressure. Beyond that, he said only, "Since I don't re- gard myself as chancellor of a world power, I will, not philosophize publicly about [that] question. That'would be fatally dangerous." But such a move would run directly counter to West Germany's policy of, "strict neutrality" in the MiddleEast. That was made quite'; clear during the 1973 Octo- ber war, when U.S. ship ments from Germany to Is- rael embroiled Washington and Bonn in one of the most ! acrimonious disputes of their long postwar alliance. The Middle East cease-fire enabled the two govern. ments to paper over their . differences before they esca- lated to the crisis stage. But German officials are keenly .aware that a new war would put their neutrality policy under agonizing strains. Bonn probably would not be able to avoid getting caught in the cross-fire' Its dilemma would be a choice between equally unappeal-?, ing options:' ? Going along, at least passively, with the United States, the ultimate guaran- tor of West Germany's cecu- rjty, and with Israel, whfse very existence is the direct result of Nazi Germany's at- tempt to exterminate the, however, about how much backing Genscher has for this position in his own party. The Cabinet's foremost exponent of not offendinz the Arabs is Economics Min- ister. Hans Friderichs, also a Free Democrat and a man who is believed to harbor ambitions about supplanting Genscher as party leader. Starting under former Chancellor. Willy Brandt an~ I as mild and non-provocative as sues that the Secretary had ; marks articularl thos i t h p y e n er- t ey could be adtill b h ,n seon. preted as critical of European been referring to the past, arid1 est. 1-le could not honestl have n t t y o governments, o governments but to in- said, the aide observed, that dividuals, according to a Paris the United States would in no Those comments appeared ink dispatch' to The, New York _an interview with Mr..Kjssin-, Times. The. sam. explanation it ciary mr ficctioones ta countenance mil- n. 32 eac on to Mr. Kissinger s (would rush to the rescue of they remarks, said the Secretar Arabs d h y an t at the Amei( ,rcan considered his comments t b public would not tolerate a newt war. 1 Those who talked about in tervention did so privately or: anonymously. Former Senator. J. W. Fulbright, who retired last week as chairman of the Senate Foreign. Relations Com= Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-0O432R00010330003-6. - Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6 mittee, said he had heard in- tervention discussed at dinner tables and in Capitol cloak- rooms. A major oil executive labeled the discussion `loose talk.' Frank Ikard, president of the American Petroleum Institute, speaking before Mr. Kissinger's interview appeared,' said: "You hear it more in. the form of a question than anything else. I haven't heard it from any- body at the policy level, . any- body who can makea decision on it." Like many others Mr. Ikard; termed intervention `unthink-I able.' Representative John Brademas l of Indiana, deputy chief whips of the Democratic majority in the House of Representatives,, described Secretary Kissinger's. remarks as unwarranted and unwise. Senator Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania, the Senate Re- publican leader, said, on the other hand, that the Secretary was entirely right. . If the United States was in. dire economic straits, Mr. Scott; said on ABC television's "Issues and Answers," "I can't imagine this country not doing what- ever it needed to do, either economic or military, to permit itself to survive, and we wouldn't be worth a damn as. a nation if we didn't." Actually, the question of us- a. ~ of the minds of policy makers since the beginning of the Arab oil embargo against the West in 1973. President Ford men- tioned it obliquely in his speech to, the World Energy Confer- ece in Detroit on Sept. 23. "Throughout history," he said, "nations have gone to war over natural advantages such as water or food, or convenient passage on land or sea." "But," he added in the very next sentence, "in the nuclear age, when any local' conflict may escalate to a global ca- tastrophe, war brings unaccept- able risks for all mankind." Weighed and Rejected The President's energy ad- visers reportedly considered a .military option in their discus- sions at Camp David, Md., last Dec. 14 and 15, but the White House said, their recommenda- tions did not include it. ' . So far the most extensive and closely reasoned public ex- amination of the military option has come from John Hopkins University professor of interna- tional relations, Robert W. Tucker, whose analysis was printed in the January issue of Commentary, published by the American Jewish Committee. Remarking on the "astonish- ing" absence of any meaningful threat of force in the crisis, Professor Tucker examined the technical feasibility of military intervention. He concluded that it would depend on whetner there was a relatively restricted area containing enough oil to provide reasonable assurance that, if war effectively con- trolled, it could break the car- tel of - the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. "The one area that would ap- pear to satisfy these require- ments," Professor Tucker wrote, "extends from Kuwait down along the coastal region of Saudi Arabia to Qatar." It, supplies 40 per cent of present OPEC production and contains 40 per cent of world reserves.* "Since it has no substantial centers of population and is without trees," the article added, "its effective control does not bear even remote comparison with the experience ,of Vietnam." The Public and the Allies The American public, Pro- fessor Tucker said, would assuredly oppose another Viet- nam, but might support inter- vention if it promised success at a modest cost. The United States would have to act unilat- erally, he suggested, but its al- lies could later be won over by "even-handed" distribution of the oil. As for the. Russians, he said they ."still lack the naval forces needed for effec- tive interposition in the Persian Gulf." Against. Professor Tucker's sanguine view must be put other opinions. Secretary Kis- singer, himself told- Business Week that miiit;~ry action on oil prices would be "a very dangerous course." "We should have learned from Vietnam that it is easier to get into a war than to get out of it," he said, adding that it would be reckless to take military action without consid- ering what the Soviet 'Union might do. Conspicuously silent amid this speculation has been the Defense Department. While it may have. contingency plans, the Secretary of Defense, James R. Schlesinger, has pointedly, avoided menttioning any pos- sibility of military intervention. Given the risks, why is the military option tempting? Main- ly because political and eco- nomic measures . .offer no immediate promise of. stopping the financial hemorrhage caused by the quadrupling of oil prices and the threat of another em- bargo in case Israel and the Arab states go to war again. 'The Low-Cost Option' One of the experts at the Camp David conference is said to have passed around a note saying-facetiously or not, "Let's try the low-cost option- war." This alludes to Govern- ment analysts' calculation that at the present rate the oil-ex- porting countries will have ac- cumulated monetary surpluses by 1985 totaling $1.2-trillion- about six times the present monetary reserves of the entire world. Even among' those who fear war there are some who have said privately that it does no harm to let the Arabs know that they are running risks too, for it may make them more amenable to persuasion. Approved For Rase 2001/08/08 : NEW YORK TIMES 12 JANUARY 1975 ARABS QUESTION f peaceful way," he was quoted as having said recently. KISSINGER'S ROLE 1 The reaction has a bearing ~on the attitude of the Arab oil producers, which are actively By JUAN de ONIS Special to The New York Times BEIRUT, Jan. 11-Arabs are beginning to question Secretary of State Kissinger's role as a peacemaker in the Middle Eaat, following his statement on preparing for discussions in Algeria this month on a pro- ducer-consumer conference. The United States has sought prior coordination among the consuming countries before they meet with the producers. In an evident reference to and Japan, which depend heav ily on imported oil, Mr. Kissin-i ger said in his interview that the consumers had to achieve) "financial solidarity so that] individual countries are not so obsessed by,their sense of im- portance that they are prepared to negotiate on the producers' terms." To the arab oil? experts who' have studied the statement, this smells of a "confrontation pol- icy," as one Kuwaiti adviser said. hTe oil producers have also noted the United States refusal to support the proposal of the European Economic Community for an expanded borrowing and leanding facility under the In- . ternational Monetary fund to channel surplus oil 'funds to in- dustrial countries with payment difficulties. . This is regarded as another exampie of American uai'gaiii- ing tactics that set little store by cooperation on reaching agreement with oil producers on a system of long-term lend- ing of surplus funds that would protect the value of petro dol- lars. Without such an agreement, big producers, such as Saudi Arabia, that earn far more than they can currently spend do- mestically, have little incentive to maintain even present levels of output. But if there is a production reduction, for lack of economic incentive, prices would tend to~ rise. The question being raised here is whether this would) move the oil problem toward! the status of "gravest emergen-, cy" that Mr. Kissinger has said' would make military action a possibility. use of. military force against oil-producing countries. They are. wondering what heh really had in mind in his comments in a recent interview with Busi- ness Week. . Mr. Kissinger appeared to rule out military action just to bring down oil prices as "a very dangerous course,." but he sug- gested that it was another mat- ter if "there is some actual strangulation of the industral- ized world" through a new em- bargo or an outbreak of war between Israel and the Arab states. Al Ahram, a Cairo newspaper, that often reflects official think- ing, said editorially that his comments did not indicate that the United States was thinking clearly about the relationship between oil and a political set- tlement in the Middle East. "The policy of recourse to force against the oil-producing countries ignores the funda- mental fact that the use of oil as a weapon is a direct result of United States support of Israel," the newspaper said. "If the U.S. is concerned about the .continued flow of Arab oil sup- plies, it need only deal with the cause of the problem without having to move its forces and occupy the oil fields in the Mid- dle East." A Kuwaiti Reaction Abdel-Rahman al-Atigi, Ku-! wait's Minister of Finance and Oil, said military action was "incomprehensible" from the standpoint of oil problems, "What can be gained by force can also be had in a cheaper way, and at lower prices, in a NEW YORK TIMES 5 JANUARY 1975 .Endearing Indira Prime Minister Indira Gandhi for years has been famous for biting the hands that feed India. But in her latest lecture' to the world's advanced nations, she out- does herself. Mrs. Gandhi last week called it "a new form of arro. gance" for countries that have provided India with mil- lions of tons of grain in the past to be concerned in the present world food shortage with The soaring demands of governments that have not been able to reach neces- sary levels of food production or adequately to curb population growth, or both. The irony is that much of India's present problem stems from the high prices of the oil cartel, which Mrs. Gandhi hypocritically refrains from attacking, knowing that her friends there would be likely to cut off such aid as they are granting. The West, in contrast, has suffered Mrs. Gandhi's own form of arrogance for years, but undoubted) wil i t'n 4 ~jj out of human Cs Qpy7f7P~to iW ff TWs most impor- tant democratic experiment. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6 5 January 1975 by ANDREW WILSON objectives are to a degree T1RF (1RSP.RVF.R has ob- . try's naval havi central auesng centradicuestian on thatAmeer r the ica's ar Ftainea the Iull tCXC Vi uic yvu uic - ??-? e"'vu" C ~~we wvuuwouva, controversial secret docu- ence which cannot be dupli- regimes =the range of of their current racial and ment on United States cated elsewhere in Africa. : options is limited.. On one colonial policies, and through' foreign policy objectives in It also refers to a US. missile hand, it says, the US cannot more substantial economic uthern Africa known as tracking - station ' (since endorse the racial policies of assistance to the black States closed) and to US finance of a So : the white. regimes; on. the, help to draw the two groups National Security Study British installation In Swazi- other, ` our interests do not to-ether and exert some influ=. Memorandum 39. land ` which helps us monitor justify the consideration of. ence on both for peaceful Parts of it have been nuclear atmospheric explo- US military intervention in change. quoted in the US Press, but slons.' the area,' including involve- NSSM 39 goes on : `We the whole goes much further Another installation of meat in the enforcement of explaining the Nixon Ad? major importance' is a NASA sanctions. would maintain public opposi- in ministration's `tilt' towards station for cracking. un- The document outlines tion to racial repression but the Vorster and Smith manned spacecraft. . a number of policy options. - relax political isolation and. regimes, America's concern ` We (also) have an atomic Option One-'Closer asso- economic restrictions on the for continued British use of energy agreement with South ciation with the white white States. We would begin the Simonstown base, and its Africa under the Atoms for by modest indications of this interest in Mr Callaghan's Peace programme; this. is, regimes' is based on the pre- , relaxation, broadening the current efforts to secure a important in influencing mise that, whatever America scope of our relations and does, it can have no signifi? contacts gradually and to. constitutional settlement in South Africa to continue its _ cant effect on the region, and some degree in response to Rhodesia. policy of doing nothing in the that it should simply try to tangible-albeit small and Evidence that the tilt' marketing. of its large produc- protect its economic and gradual-moderation of white continues under President tion of uranium oxide which strategic interests in the policies. Without openly Ford came just before Christ- would have the effect of in- white States. taking a position undermin- mas with the sacking by Dr creasing the number of nut . Option Two-described as ing the UK and-the United Kissinger, the, Secretary of Tear weapons powers. `broader association with Nations on Rhodesia, we State, of Mr Donald Easum, NSSM 39 says there is a both black and white States would be more flexible in our his chief adviser oil African basic consensus in the US in an effort to .encourage attitude toward the Smith I afairc anird an advocate of a Government that US inter- m :deratia n and rcd't:cc tc n- regime.' "? more active anti-apartheid ests in Southern, Africa are sion -is based on the pre- According to the memor policy. It was followed last not vital security matters, and raise that the blacks cannot andum the US would have to week by a report that the US. that most black nations.. gain political rights through ex p rebuffs from both will provide South Africa would tend to judge con- violence. p with enriched uranium for its spicuous US co-operation Option Three - limited Whites and blacks in attempt- first big nuclear power plant. with the white regimes as association with the white ing to develop an atmosphere `NSSM 39' was prepared condoning their racial poll- States and continuing associa- conducive to change in white by a group of experts from cies.But it also admits to a tion with the blacks--is based attitudes through persuasion the State and Defence Depart- basic intellectual disagree- on the premise that a posture and erosion. To encourage ments and the Central Intelli- . ment' within the Administra- on the racial question accept- this change in white attitudes, gence Agency.. It was de- tion on such vital questions able to the blacks need not the US would have to livered to Mr Nixon in 1969 as the inevitability of vio- entail giving up all material show willingness to accept under the direction of Dr lence. - interests in the white States* political arrangements short Kissinger, at that time the ' On Rhodesia, the memoran- Option Four - dissociation of guaranteed progress to- 'President's foreign policy dum says that the sanctions. from the white regimes and ward majority rule, ? pro- devised by 'the British were closer relations with the vided that they assure advise. memorandum begins 'a compromise between force, blacks-is based on the pre- broadened political participa- by listing America's `import- which they were unwilling to mise that America cannot in- tion in some form by the ant, but not vital' interests contemplate largely because fluence the Whites for con- whole population.' in the region-about #400 of domestic reasons, and structive change; that increas- In a move to forestall critic= million worth of investments, doing nothing, which would ing violence is therefore ism arising foam the possible a highly profitable trade , have jeopardised their rela- , likely; and that ` by cutting leaking of NSSM 39, the State balance, and substantial tions with the black. African '.our ties with the white Department. stated in a fact States'-and that the US regimes we can protect our sheet last year that the US political and military inter- co-operated for the same stand on the racial issue in had adopted a policy errs. In addition, it says, the reasons. It deplores an black Africa . and inter- of `communication' in its US has an indirect interest . overestimate' of the effec- nationally.' dealings. With South Africa. in the key role which South tiveness of the programme. -?. Option Five - dissociation This, it said, meant the main- Africa ' plays in the UK NSSM 39 lists the broad ob. from both sides-is based on tenance of formal, if not balance of payments. 'UK jectives of US policy towards the premise that confronta- cordial, relations, with South investment in South Africa is Southern Africa as follows: tion will grow worse despite Africa, while. making clear currently estimated at $3,000 0 To improve the US stand- "any outside efforts.--and that America's ' abhorrence of million (#1,250 million), and ing in black Africa and inter- the US should simply lower South Africa's racial policies. the British have made it clear nationally on the racial issue. its profile in the area. It said ` America would con- they will take no action which 0 To minimise the likeli- The crucial option turns tinue to support 'fully the would jeopardise their econo- hood of escalation of violence out to have been the second UN embargo on arms to South mic interests.' in the area and the risk of US one, for it was this that was Africa, and would not en- The memorandum says the involvement. recommended by Dr Kissin- courage investment there. US has an important interest O To minimise the oppor- ger and which, State Depart- But this has not allayed in the orderly marketing of tunities for the USSR and meat sources now admit, was fears in the UN and in sec- South Africa's gold produc- China to exploit the racial' adopted by President Nixon. tiions of the British Labour tion which is important to the issue in the region for propa In the relevant passage the movement that the US, hay- successful operation of the ganda advantage and to gain memorandum states : The ing modified its former strict two-tier gold price system. political influence with black whites are here to stay and policy on South Africa, is now - On defence it is even more Governments and liberation ' the only way that constructive pressing, in NATO, for an ex- emphatic; `Southern Africa movements. change can come about is tension of the North Atlantic is geographically' important 0 To encourage moderation through them. ' There is no', alliance's responsibilities 'to for the US and its allies, of the current rigid racial and.; hope for the blacks to gain the Southern Hemisphere. particularly with the closing colonial policies of the white the political rights they seek This fear is given impetus by of the Suer. Canal and the in- regimes. through violence, which will a passage in the memorandum creased Soviet activity in the 0 To protect economic, scien- only lead to chaos and in- which describes South ASri- Ind.ian Ocean.' title and strategic interests creased opportunities for the can port facilities as being After mentioning overflight and opportunities in the Communists of `long-term strategic nn- and landing facilities in South region, including the orderly 'We can, by selective portance to the US and its Africa it describes the coup- marketuig of South Africa's relaxation of our stance to. allies in view of increasing 34 ward the white regimes, Soviet activity in the Indian Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001'b03500O3-6' Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-004.32R000100350003-6 CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 24 December 1974 Portugal's oil-rich separatist hotbed By Dev Murarka Special to The Christian Science Monitor 1 Moscow Soviet experts on Portuguese Africa are charging repeatedly that the Central Intelligence Agency and the Gulf Oil Corporation of America are. active in backing separatist move- ments in Angola, particularly its oil- bearing part, Cabinda. The Portuguese colony of Angola is rich in minerals and oil. But it also has a comparatively large population of white settlers, 600,000 out of a total of nearly 6 million. This makes the decolonization a complex one. Fighting erupts Last month Cabinda was shaken by fighting between the Popular Move- ment for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the leading political party there, and the Cabinda Enclave Lib- eration Frnnt (FT.EC.1, IFLEC claimed it wanted to secede from Angola and form a separate state. Cabinda is so rich in oil that this year the revenue from sales is esti- mated to be $400 million or more. The argument used by FLEC, with tribal overtones, is that if the oil wealth was used only by the local tribe and not shared with the rest of Angola, Cabin- da'would become another Kuwait., One of the Soviet experts on Portu- guese Africa who has often traveled behind the guerrilla lines there, S. Kulik, charges in No. 50 of the Soviet . magazine New Times: "The U.S.- operated Gulf Oil Corporation, which exploits Cabinda's oil fields, suspi- ciously hastened to back this idea [of secession] and gave FLEC financial assistance." Troops regain control For the time being, it is reported, the MPLA and Portuguese troops operating jointly, have subdued the FLEC followers and regained control of Cabinda town. The dismissal of many local officials and several senior commanders of the Portuguese garrison in Cabinda followed, for condoning FLEC activities. The problem in Angola, however, is not confined to the dispute between the MPLA and theFLEC alone. There are numerous splinter groups claim- ing a share in the succession to Portuguese rule. Some of them are tied to the white settlers. But the most important,.the Angolan National Lib- eration Front (FNLA), is based mostly in the north, on Angola's borders with Zaire, and is supported by the Zaire government. It is led by Holden Roberto. 'Soviet blame U.S. But the Soviet version puts more of the blame for Angola's problems on the United States. In an earlier New Times article (No. 46), Oleg Ignatyev claimed that "judging by numerous statements of its former leaders, [FLEC] had been r;,;:uay pu V.7lU1(CU by thG U1111C11 States, which also supplied weapons for Roberto's units. "In response to this American con- cern for the national liberation move- ment, the FNLA played the part of a cordon hindering the MPLA's oper- ations in the northern - the richest and most densely populated - parts of Angola." Mr. Ignatyev's account goes on: "Of late the Maoists have joined in this dirty game. Holden Roberto was invited to Peking. Instructors from Peking "The fascist regime in Portugal had already been overthrown when 112 Chinese instructors arrived in one of Roberto's military camps. "Whom are they going to instruct, and in what? After all, the democratic authorities of Portugal have pro- claimed their firm intention to carry decolonization through to the end, and facts show that their words are not at variance with their deeds. "It looks very much as if the plans of the CIA and its backers, the h i 'Al lyold'v-- ul"Ires monopolies, which have enormous capital investments in Angola, coin- cide with the plans of Peking aimed at strengthening. the FNLA as a counter- weight to the MPLA." From this account it seems obvious that the Soviets are fully backing the MPLA, with which they have had good relations and to which they have supplied arms in the past. Moscow would be loath to see a pro- Western or pro-Chinese group come to power in Angola, and evidently it will exercise some pressure in Lisbon perhaps through the Portuguese Com- munist Party, to see to it that the MPLA is given due weight in what- ever settlement is evolved. But more than that, it would appear that a new concern is bothering Moscow - collusion between China and the United States to keep the Soviet influence out of Africa. It is no secret to anyone familiar with developments in Portuguese Af- rica that Pelting has been trying hard to undercut Soviet influence upon the guerrilla movements there. And in the opinion of Soviet experts, Washington would prefer a Chinese presence there rather than Soviet influence because in addition to keep- ing Moscow out, the Chinese may not have any other interest which would clash with Washington's interests. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA=RDP77-00432R000100350003-6 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000f100350003-6. Rowland Evans and Robert Novak- he New VietnamT Crisis The Ford administration decided -Tuesday to seek desperately needed tins from a hostile Congress for be- leaguered South Vietnam based on this secret warning from Ambassador Graham Martin in Saigon: If weapons continue to be rationed at the present parsimonious rate for another three -months, the result will be catastrophic. Thus, policymakers meeting at, the S"tate Department decided on an all- -otitt effort for an immediate $300 mil- 'lign in arms. Most critically needed to stem the dangerous though still local= ized Communist offensive is ammuni tion, particularly for Saigon's ample 'supply of big guns. These guns are now starved for shells to fire. Also in critical short supply is aviation fuel, Well has partially grounded Saigon's st Al air force. These shortages of both ammunition and aviation fuel contributed to Ha- -poi's conquest of Phuoc Binh City, a )t Saigon, in the Communists' most glittering military victory since the 1972 offensive. The latest triumph flowed cirectly from anti-Saigon ani- mus in Congress; other military disas- tth s could follow. t:: Seeking ni`litar,. aid fcr Sa'c' n a ?f9 :midab e first challenge for Presi- tlent Fo 'n fac ng the new Congress, overwhelmingly libera,, and Demo- crat-c..The difficu.ty w,-,s .inpzreW 'o ,the. ein?r ency session Tuesday of Mr. VV,-,d's top officials, includinSecre- tary of State Henry- Kissinger, CIA Di- rector William Colby and Deputy De- fense Secretary William Clements. Their decision, concurred in by the President: Mr. Ford himself will take the leading role in persuading Con- gress. They were left no choice by Martin's stringent warning that shortages of ammunition and fuel were trapping Saigon's forces in a series . of predicta. ble? and ugly defeats against the ene- my's lavishly-equipped tank brigades. Martin's message was terse: High battlefield casualties to South Viet- namese troops defending strongpoints, including district capitals in the high- lands, were causing severe' morale problems. A large percentage of those casualties, he reported, are directly due to limitations imposed on the fir- ing of weapons to conserve dwindling stocks of ammunition. The stocks have been dwindling because of the Penta- gon's allocation of scarce supplies in compliance with- restricted congres- sional funding. . The first crack at Congress will seek an. immediate $300 million appropria-, tion to finance conventional ammuni- tion and. fuel from the Pentagon's do- mestic stocks, both of which are in -plentiful supply. The last Congress ac- tually authorized $1. billion for miti- 'tary aid, to Saigon 'but only appropri- ated $700 million; so. the $300 million sought needs clearance for floor action only by the House and Senate appro- priations committees, - traditionally more riendly. toward South Vietnam 'hall the dovish Foreign Affairs and 2oreign Relations Committees. Despite that slender advantage, Mr. Ford's aides have no illusions about the congressional quagmire they are entering with this week's decision to reopen the inflammatory congressional debate over Vietnam. Sen. John Stennis of Mississippi; chairman of the Armed Services Committee, has agreed to help. But other senior Demo- crats have. not yet been contacted for help in an uphill battle in each house. To line up other leaders of both par- ties; President Ford is planning the usual high-level talks in the White House next week. At first glance, the prospects for get- ting the 94th Congress_ to help South Vietnam help itself seem grim. The freshman liberal Democrats have emerged from an atmosphere of shame and anger over the American role in Vietnam. They have come to Washing- ton to battle recession and inflation. not meddle in the blood feuds of Indo- china. But. Ford administration officials by no means feel helpless. The case to be made for this first installment of emer- gency aid, on its face, is that Saigon has displayed surprising resilience and military skill. Government troops have been holding their own against North Vietnamese regulars supplied by Mos- cow and Peking with tanks, heavy ar- tillery and other st phisticated arms moved south from Hanoi since the cease-fire-in contravention of the 1973 Paris agreement.. If Saigon is given -the means to use its guns and planes, these officials in- sist, South Vietnam will not be over- run. In three months without help, a final countdown will start with its tragic climax quite predictable. That is the choice President Ford is putting before the 94th Congress. LONDON TIMES 2 January 1975 Richard Harris concludes his survey of East Asia The first point to be made about Vietnam is to affirm that it is part of the civilization of East Asia and not part of South-east Asia, an area that lacks any real identity. Ruled by China for a thousand years, tri- butary to China for another thousand, Vietnam's Confucian society did not disappear under the pressure of French colonial encroachment. The period was too short ; the resistance to French rule too strong. In Viet- nam the French met with more violent hostility to their colonial rule than did any other colonial power in any other part of Asia. But having accorded Vietnam a similar resistance to Western civilization and the enclosure within its own world common to other East Asian. countries, it WTISly I T I . ~!~ MI an t becomes necessary to enter qualifications: French rule can- not be disregarded : it left its deposit of outside culture and offered Vietnam all inter- national foothold. Then there is the difference between north and south, unlike Korea. The northern part of the country is the historical base of the Vietnamese people, the part that China ruled in the first millennium, the part that kept its tics with China most closely in the second. But Viet- namese expansion southwards led to partition in the 16th cen- tury. Not until the mid-18th 36 WASHINGTON POST 9 January 1975 far A O are Duties century was the Mekong Delta peopled and brought under con- trol, nor was Vietnam, fully uni- fied again until French aid helped the Emperor Gia Long into power in 1802. Thus the north is the discip- lined, hierarchical, authori- tarian Confucian state in, the full East Asian sense, -where government is seen as the apex and fulfilment of society and where Vietnamese pau?iotisttl is most developed. French rule scurcely had time to make a. dent in these traditions : it served only to create a.. new nationalism. By contrast the south with it ethnic and religious divisions i! anarchic, much less disciplined its Confucian society diluted Given to spurious religions an { tvarlordisnl (and often the tw combined) it was disrupted eve more by 90 years of Frenc rule, 'its upper class seduce into a subservience to th French from which the profited and into a French col ture that absorbed many o them to the point of expatria tiou. The strong solid north and tb weak friable south offered formidable contrast long befor Approved For Release 2001/08/08 CIA-RDP?6t=OO43 00'O1'00,350003,6 W 1975, Fleld'Entenprlses, Inc. `Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6 . the Indochinese Communist similar division after the Party was founded and Ho Chi Japanese surrender only trans- Minh captured the leadership fated into cold war terms a of Vietnamese nationalism in division that had existed long 1945 with the wartime league before. It is not easy to dis- known as Vietminh. To the tinguish the anti-northernism of leaders of that political alliance the south from the anti-corn- the government they formed in ntunism which President Thieu Hanoi in August, 1945, remains drills into his cadres with the the only true representative of same fervour as the party line Vietnamese nationalism whether is injected among the cadres of it was making the claim against the north. i h F h i h renc or, s t e nce, aga nst t e Americans. In its view in the forties, the fifties, the sixties, the seventies and in any fore- seeable decade- the unity of Vietnam depends on the recog- nition of the rights of the gov- ernment in Hanoi as the start- ing point. They are the guardians of tradition, the ex- ponents of a doctrine, the up- holders of true independence. For the only East Asian country once under western colonial rule the independence matters more than elsewhere, or rather it must be more demon- strable. By the same token, the i obvious dependence on the Americans of every government in Saigon since Diem in 1.954 is an unchallengeable justifica- tion for the task of unification to which North Vietnam has set itself. Against this there is the case I to be made for the south. The F historical division of the country has left a southern conscious- ness. The southerners would prefer to be ruled by, southerners (though even in the last 20 years of . .. rf^- the power in Saigon has been held more often by men of the north or the centre than of the south). Unlike Korea which was inopportunely divided by the cut on western power and There remain obstacles tl because they regard the West any speedy unification of Vie:- as a.hinterla.nd a.=,Bust thejcom- nam by the political elision muiii t h b h S h s nort , ot out Korea ar:d South Vietnam will remain politically weak: l ;- -h countr y has a small v'Oca! (:i)r,J:aiiOn to its repressive government and being open to inspection by western journalists such an opposition will be able to make itself heard. Moreover both Perhaps the distinction i countries have been the scene scarcely matters. In a world of of bitterly fought wars osten- new nation states, most of sibly in support of "freedom" which were modernized and gal- 0V " d0 r"^:...... " or some such vanized into nationalism by Western political concept. western rule, a united Vietnam regaining its full independence is as much a goal for the Viet- narnese for reasons of East Asian particularism as it is for reasons of anti-colonial nation- alism. And if one asks how the unification can come about there is only one possible answer ; indeed, there could have been only one possible answer. That the unifying force happens to be communist meanis-as it did in China -that only the communists offered all those ingredients of nationalism, independence and doctrine that marks the East Asian renewal of the twentieth century. Only the north upholds all the East Asian values. As with Korea one cannot forecast the immediate future in Vietnam. In both countries American policy is still impor- tant. The belief in American power rather than the appeal of any ruler holds the south together in both. On top of that comes the authoritarian discip- line that President Park and President Thieu both hold to. But because they are depend- CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 6 .January 1975 U rte elm n n a s n Were the wars fought in- vain ? Of course the pleas of the opposition-however small, urban-based and ineffective- will win support ; theirs is the voice of the liberal democrat against the police repression of the authoritarian ruler who goes on in the old East Asian . way. From time to time there is an outburst of struggle and the deeds of the repressive government are seen to be animated by none of the ideals that the "free world" deems proper. Western sympathy builds up for the churchmen and journalists, the students and intellectuals in Seoul and in Saigon who suffer for their ideals of freedom. Since these are the slender shoots of a genuine discovery of political freedom through contact with the West, western sympathy for the governments in the two capitals will constantly be ia~.bu~ ? communism will seem more and I more empty. They can - ute rams agreements-Wtlic1i = President Thieu shows no si'zns of fulfilliint;-or by anotlr r offensive conducted h"" th'e troops the north has in the south. One is !Hanoi's apprecia- tion of the American temrer and the likelihood of further air intervention. Another is the often acknowledged need ii Hanoi for economic recovery as a priority to any action over the south. Nor will-the Chinese he very generous in aid for a government whose military tac- tics in the Ter offensive of 196! and the 1972 offensive will not have earned them praise in Peking. But not least it should I:e said that the southern co .- monist People's Revolutionara- Government and its Vietcong force is not likely to recover the popular backing that it enjoyed in the early sixties. Its standards were never as high and have fallen far short of the qualities that enablezi China's communist guerrillas to penetrate so deeply into the rural consciousness in China iie the 1940s. - Ideally, of course. both Korea and Vietnam shouid be unified by mutual patience and for- bearance, arriving at the~r own East Asian consensus over doe- trine and disciulir.e. But once launched as they have been i=-r i tne cold war atmosphere neinc4ar side finds it easy to step clear of it. industrialize and export success- Previous articles in this series fully as in South Korea, but, were published on December they will remain politically, 2, 13, 16, 17, 27. unstable. i ? Times Newspapers Ltd, 1975 of grass-roots support. ' "We do have some differences among party members over procedural ~~CT 0 I matters," said Mr. Kim, acknowledging 'A I WASHINGTON POST 7 January 1975 2 Rightists Offer to loin Korea's main opposition political party, are an unitea on the issue of con- says he has gotten used to being under stitutional revision." ~~~t k In an interview, Mr. Kim said he Agence b'rance-Presse constant surveillance by government thought President Park was exagger- STOCKHOLM, Jan. 6 agents. ating the possibility of an attack from Prince Norodom Sihanouk has The opposition politician has been Communist North Korea in order to us- said that several officials of held for questioning by the Korean J us- .Cambodian government, Central Intelligence Agency three times tify his continuing hold on power and including ex-Premier Sirikl over the past 12 years. It's all part of suppression- of the opposition. Matak and Chief, of Staff South Korea's very rough brand of pol- "North Korea alone doesn't have the Sosthenes Fernandez, have itics. capacity to attack South Korea," he ? offered to join his Cambodia Mr. Kim was among those who en- said. "North Korea must have either . United Front. gaged in demonstrations against Park Russian or Chinese help to attack, and Matak and Fernandez are Chung Hee after Mr. Park, then an that is not something they are willing to members of a four-man advi- Army general, took power in a military give now, because they want detente sort' group which advises coup in 1961. As floor leader of the with the United States." President; Lon Nol. New Democratic Party, Mr. Kim later A few years ago, Mr. Kim discovered Sihanouk was interviewed opposed Mr. Park's attempts to pro- how dangerous South Korean politics for Swedish television in can be when someone hurled a con- Peking. where he heads a long his stay in power. government in-exile which A handsome man whose modishly tamer of sulphuric acid into his car. Mr. b Kim, who escaped harm, was never is trying to - oust -Lon Nol. long hair is now graying, Mr. Kim took able to determine with absolute cer- Matak and Fernandez havq over as the opposition leader about tainty who threw the acid. But he de- sent secret messages to himk four months ago. Since then, he has clared that he is "90 percent certain" through friends. Sihanouk; stressed one constant theme: There government agent. - said, adding that they hadl must be a revision of the existing Con- that it was a "not yet received the permis-.1 stitution to allow for the direct election "The worst thing about tieing in my sion of their masters, the of South Korea's president. position is the constant surveillance by Americans ... who constitute Some of Mr. Kim's own party mem- government agents," he said. "But af- an obstacle to a peaceful so- bers are critical of the opposition ter a while you get used to it - the tele- lution in Cambodia." leader's tactics. They say he lacks sub phone tapping and the people follow- Sihanouk s aid he -planned, ing your car - and you get so you - to expand his tlety and political realism. The New government to Democratic Party has long been badly don't agonize over it." include "several representa-I hampered by factio al splits a la Daniel Southerland tives of the right but exciud- i Rpprove~ or elease 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP775 t32F3'p00c OQ3&6 t1Q3&Bors." Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6 NEW YORK TIMES 12 JANUARY 1975 KISSINGER KEEPS' L4IIN AID UPIJUN Goes Counter to Advisers in Extending Military Equipnient Grants By LESLIE If. GELB Special to The New York Time, WASHINGTON, Jan. I1-Sec. almost Kissinunger has rejected State recommendation of his senior advisers to terminate next year the long-standing program of outright gifts of military equip- p g a w uld ment to Latin America, a num- provide an opportunity to- un=; bet of Administration officials) derline a new relationship with4 have disclosed. Latin America. _ According to these officials, The group's position was the reason for the Kissinger' that stopping the military decision was philosophical, not handouts would help to under- financial. It goes to root issues cut accusations about Latin that divide the Secretary from, Governments being simply his c,%vn experts on how to deal; Washington's clients. with Congress and the proper; Last month in the 'Declara- evle of military aid in furei ll. Policy. s 1 iiutl vi iiyacucilv," a lumber The recommendation to ter-; p edgedtlnthmA selve'sn to nations limit minate the military grants toj arms expenditures and not to .Latin America was made to Mr.' acquire offensive weapons. Kissinger last November by Car-: The question of decisions lyle E. Maw, Under Secretary) about the aid program. arose of State for Security Assistance.; last October during the course It was fully supported, the of-; of review of the new budget ficials said, by the Latin Ameri-' within the Ford Administration. can bureau of the State De-: The new budget is to be sub. partment, all of the United mitted in February. States ambassadors in Latin,' The only dissent from the America, the National Security majority view came from the Council staff, and the Office of Pentagon, which argued that Management and Budget. I the aid program was important It was opposed only by the; in. -maintaining close relations Pentagon. which proposed cut-' with the Latin American mill. ting off the program in. Central' tar,'. America by 1979 and in South' The recommendations were America by 1981,` the officials: cabled to ,14r. Kissinger in No-, said. vember while he was traveling] Mr.: Kissinger chose the Pen- in the Middle East, and he tagon"option without any ex- cabled back adopting the Pen planation of his decision, it tagon stance. was confirmed. This was the third year in a The secretary's action, an as- row, the officials revealed, that sociate explained in an inter-: Mr. Kissinger overruled similar view, was based on his convic-, recommendations on the pro- tion that he needs to retain gram. Neither this new recom- every possible carrot and stick rnendation nor previous ones in his diplomatic arsenal.' would eliminate cash or credit The amount of the grant mili- military sales or military train. tary aid program to Latin hig programs.. America is trivial this year- The nine Latin American na- about $10-million to be distrib tions that receive grant military uted among nine countries. aid are Bolivia, the Dominican "But Henry never knows," - Republic, Fl Salvador, Guate- another official said, "when a mala, Honduras, Nicaragua, million here and there might Panama, .Paraguay and Uru- come in handy." And, he con- quay. WASHINGTON POST 29 December 19714. ' Diplomat's Chile Role Cited U.S. 1Vominee Stirs. By Joseph Novitski Special to The Washington post storm of protest here has greeted the nomination of Harry W. Shlaudeman, a ca- reer diplomat, to be U.S. am. bassador to Venezuela. He served in the Dominican Re- public after American troops landed there in 1965 and later was in Chile just before the overthrow of the Allende gov- . ernment. - parties that opposed Allende% attempt to bring socialism to Chile. [Rep. Michael Harrington (D-Mass.) complained that an the same date Shlauden~n testified that . the U n it ed. States had no role in the Chi, lean coup, Harrington was re- viewing secret testimony by CIA director William Colby, who said the agency had set Despite the Protests, the Venezuelan government has agreed to the. nomination. Leaders of President Carlos Andres Perez's party told re- porters yeaterday, in an at- tempt to moderate criticism, ?l~~t +ha ann,4will ha+ aan two governments was more impor- tant than the personality or reputation of an ambassador. Since President Salvador Al- lende's socialist-led govern- ment was deposed in Chile's military coup last year, the Latin American left in many countries has firmly identified Shlaudeman with reported American intervention against Allende. Criticism of. the Shlaudeman appointment began on the Venezuelan left three days ago, but has since spread to all of the country's important political parties, including the governing Democratic , Action Party, at the rank and file level. - Shlaudeman, now serving as -deputy assistant secretary of state for inter-American af. fairs in Washington, must still be confirmed by the Senate before 'replacing Ambassador Robert McClintock here. At one of his last appearances be. fore a congressional commit- tee in June, Shlaudeman de- nied any U.S. connections with the coup in Chile. aside $11 million for anti-.I ende activities in Chile.] _ Shlaudeman was deputy chief of mission, the second- ranking office, in the U. S. eke- bassy in Santiago from June 1969, 16 months before .l lende's election; until a few months before the coup in September 1973. Previously, Shlaudeman had served as political officer in the U. S? embassy in Santo Domingo from 1962 to 19w. He returned after Marines were landed in the Dominican Republic by the Johnson ads niinistration in 1965, and acted as part of the diplomatic team that negotiated the wiW- drawal of American troops um der Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker. Men who watched Shlaude- man at work in the Dominican Republic said he seemed tohe a hard -headed professional diplomat..He was respected by Chilean diplomats under Pres ident Eduardo Frei, Allende=a predecessor. After Allende's election, some members of his coalition of Marxist parties said they preferred dealing with Shlaudeman rather than Am. bassador Edward Korry, al-} though they felt that Shlaude- man was not sympathetic to tt their political ai ms Shiauiie . Five months later. President) man has since been accused of Ford said that the U. S. gov- being an agent of the CIA b1 . ~nment had supported Chi- left-wing Latin American par. -lean newspapers and political ties. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00'01d0350003-6 tinued, "it is a matter of prin- ciple with Henry not to give in to Congressional pressures to tie his hands." . In recent years, Congressional committees' have stepped - up pressures to end grant military aid worldwide and to Latin America in Particular. PU 2nd add . AID Mr. Maw and his supporters; another official explained. " wanted tott i f ge ounront of Congressional criticism, for a change,.., dampen some ;of the Congressional hostility, ` and end the program without be. ing forced to do so." This group also argued, the, official said, that the amduntf of aid, is now so small that it does not provide Washington with any leverage anyway, Rather the group mentioned. that ending the ro r m o : Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350Q03-6 BALTIMORE SUN 7 January 1975 James J. Kilpatrick ro"Arab To ' jos Must Not Get ? Panama. Canal Washington. - Under the treaty of 1903 are directly or indirectly at- An ominous story appeared the United States acquired tributable to the canal. a cod le of week h headed "U.S.-Panama Accord Seen in Early 1975." This was Marlese Simons's lead: "A U.S. concession to surrender jurisdiction over the Panama Canal Zone at the end of five years has led to confident predictions by an authoritative source that a new U.S.-Panama canal treaty would be ready for signature next year." Let us sound the alarm bells and summon such able warriors as Representative Daniel J. Flood (D., Pa.) and Senator Jesse Helms (R., INC.). For the past 20 years, Mr. Flood has been raising Catonian cries in the House; ll included a power and au- thority the United States would possess "if it were sovereign." By direct pur- chase from private owners, the United States also ac- quired title, in fee, to certain lands now involved. - In 1914, after a tremen- dous and costly feat of engi- neering, we opened the Pan- ama Canal to the shipping of the world. For 60 years the canal was operated without an increase in tolls. About 70 per cent of the tonnage through the canal in recent years has originated in, or been destined for, the United States. Apart from its com- seized power in October, 1968. He is pro-Arab and pro- Communist. Before any sur- approved, we should ask our- ama has been made, a line has selves how in the name of to be drawn: No more. And common sense the - United sorry about that. States could benefit from The. treaty of 1903 is not Panamanian control. The engraved in stone. It has been prospect is for nationaliza- twice amended-in 1936 and tion; the prospect is for Gen- 1955. It is entirely possible eral Torrijos to do in Panama that further amendments can what the late Gamal Abdei be agreed to, relinquishing Nasser did in Suez. unneeded land for Panamani. Now, it is understandable an development, further that Panama chafes under the increasing payments to P continued U.S. presence. Sena- ama, and providing for some tor Alan Cranston (D:, Calif.), Panamanian participation in who favors a new treaty, has administration of the canal. askad hnna A.f.e..;..., - -.....-u ninist the Senate h d valuu, the canal has feel if the British still held j smack of abject surrender leader the had immeasurable s prevent of vital p as apt- -perpetual rights along the They smack of appeasement. Flood p pwY a . gaa rights and p pro ert in the : value also. ly called r. j gu lar veinof Erie Canal. Doubtless the They smack of the same ighal Zone. This "concession present situation is indeed a cockeyed judgment that gave Caij to surrender" cannot possibly hemisphere." "source of confict,".and after us the wheat deal with the SO. surrender" s roved. y Panama has benefited i n ye ;;s ^f ... tcinnitt%;nt uc- pp also. More than 40 per cent of gotiations, Ambassador a victory vict union for . That detente. was One called more a We ought to understand Panama's foreign exchange Large Ellsworth Bu t e nker what is at stake in these ne- earnings, according to a State doubtless is correct in saying such victory and we are done gotiations, both as to the canal Department paper last year, ' the Panamanians are "imng for. 5' past and as to the canal fu- and nearly one-third of Pan- tient." pa- ture.- . , ama's gross national product But there comes a time CHR]STIAN SCIENCE MONITOR. 30 December 197)+ uba: a mixe report Cuba under Fidel Castro has yet to become the economic success claimed for it by some of the most ardent supporters of the island's Marxist government. But, at the same time, it is far from the failure seen by- many Cuban exiles living in the United States and by others who vigorously oppose the Castro government. . This is the report that a Monitor correspondent brings from Ha- vana following a recent visit to assess Cuban developments 16 years after Dr. Castro came to power. While Cuba's economy Is still propped up by massive Soviet aid and now given a strong assist by high sugar prices, there is evidence that Cubans have solved some of the problems of in- efficiency and mismanagement which nettled them in the, early p ago m t e rights "in perpetuity" over a What of the-future? Pan-* Washington Post under , a 10-mile-wide zone of Panama- ama is under the iron rule of Panama City dateline. It was nian tart;+n>K, mi _:..i.~. 1 _ . years of the Castro revolution. Moreover, Dr. Castro and his close advisers appear more re- laxed than at any time in recent- years. With the economy working more smoothly, they are allowing a limited, although controlled, amount of democracy - provin- cial council elections aimed at decentralizing the bureaucracy now centered in Havana. On a hemisphere level, Dr. Cas- tro is winning new respectability. Diplomatic ties with Latin-Amer- ican nations are growing. There is also evidence that the Cuban leader would not oppose some. sort of relationship with Washington - but it would have to be based on an end to the decade-old economic blockade. That should not be too hard a step for Washington to take. After all, the blockade never brought Dr. Castro to his knees. Although it made his economic situation difficult, it also allowed him to whip up a sharp anti-United States campaign on the Island. Today, the blockade appears to be an anachronism in U.S. foreign policy that does more harm to the U.S. than to Cuba. This past week. it brought a sharp denunciation from Canada. The Issue involves a subsidiary of a U.S. company which has been forced to cancel the sale of desks and chairs to Cuba because Wash- ington warned the parent com- pany that the sale would violate U.S. law and the company could be penalized. It can be hoped that the new year brings not only a rever- sal of policy in the Canadian case, but also a broad change in U.S. policy toward Cuba. when great powers must behave as great powers. Not evey source of conflict can be removed. Some conflicts must be endured; they must. be lived with. Not every wounded sensitivity can be soothed. 39 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6 CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 27 December 197+ US. and Canada duel over By James Nelson Goodsell di b idi C l ti f Latin America correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor Washington and Ottawa are on a collision course over trade with Cuba. The issue at stake - whether Canadian 'subsidiaries of U.S. com- panies may sell their wares to Cuba - goes to the heart of Canadian nation- alism. It also raises the broad issue of whether Washington has any right to dictate policies in such.cases. For years, the 'United 'States has insisted that the foreign subsidiaries are merely an extension of their United States parent and therefore subject to U.S. law. Hence, because of the U.S. embargo on trade with Cuba, the subsidiaries cannot sell to Cuba. Resistance started Washington's stand has been a sore point not only with Canadians but also with Latin Americans and others. But few foreign subsidiaries have tried to buck the order - until early this year. Both Argentine subsidiaries of United States automakers and the ana an ocomo ve su s ary o a U.S. firm entered into big deals with the government of Cuban Prime Min- ister Fidel Castro. For various rea- sons, Washington was forced to ac- cept fait accomplis in these cases. But now a new case is up for scrutiny and ruffling Canadian feath- ers. It involves a relatively small sale of $500,000 worth of office furniture to Cuba by a Toronto-based subsidiary of Litton Industries of Beverly Hills, Calif. Halt ordered The U.S. parent company ordered the Canadian firm to halt the deal - after learning that the U.S. trading- with-the-enemy act might well be applied against the transaction, a step that would. hold Litton executives responsible if the deal were con- summated. Canadian Trade Minister Alistair Gillespie called Washington's role in the affair "intolerable interference"- and accused Litton of "corporate colonialism." The exact nature of Washington's CHRISTIAN SCIENCE` MONITOR 2 January 1975 Chile rebuts torture charges. By James Nelson Goodsell Latin America correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor Smarting from mounting accusations of prisoner torture, Chile's military leaders have gone on the offensive. Denying many of the allegations, they have put in doubt some of the specifics of the charges by accusing organizations like Amnesty International of being loose with their facts. Fernando Duran, Chile's ambassador to France, said this week in an interview in Paris that three of the places where the London-based Amnesty International claimed torture had taken place were unlikely locations for such activities. One of the places where Amnesty International charged torture was committed is a public building open at all hours to anyone, Mr. Duran said. Another is a private office building. A third simply does not exist, he said. Mr. Duran did not specifically deny all torture charges, but his interview in Le Monde was aimed, according to Chilean officials, at scotching the heavy flow of torture charges now being aired, That flow was boosted in mid-December with the release of an Organization of American States (OAS) study charging the Chilean military with "extremely serious violations of human rights" Including the extensive torture of political prisoners. Many of those said to have been tortured were supporters of the gov- ernment of Salvador Allende Gossens which . the military deposed in a violent coup in September, 1973. The OAS charges were contained In a 175-page document prepared by the Inter-American Commission on Hu- man Rights on the basis of a 12-day tour of Chile last summer by a five- nation investigating team. Attached to the OAS document was a lengthy rebuttal from the Chileans, contending that the report contains "Important and grave deficiencies Cu a trade role in the affair is not clear. The State Department says that "no agency of the U.S. Government has blocked the sale," but it Is understood that the Treasury Department was contacted on an Informal basis by Litton people. Mr. Gillespie said in a press confer- ence in Ottawa that his government. would formally protest the issue in a note to Washington before the year is out - and that he was hoping to clarify just how it happened that .the deal was canceled by Cole Division of Litton Business Equipment, Ltd. What could happen The directors of Cole are all U.S. citizens and residents and therefore, subject to fines and jail terms of up to 10 years if the Canadian firm went ahead with the sale and if Washington were to prosecute. Earlier when a Montreal-based rail- way-equipment firm, a subsidiary of Studebaker-Worthington, Inc., of Har- rison, N.J., signed a $15.2 million contract for locomotives, the deal went through because all of the subsidiary's directors were Cana- dian, and therefore outside U.S. law. and "manifest errors." ' But this rebuttal did not specifically contest charges of individual torture. Use of shocks alleged The OAS investigators, headed by Robert F. Woodward, a former United States ambassador to Chile, did not Identify alleged victims by name, using ' numbers instead, but they were specific on the charges - claiming the military had used elec- trical shocks, threats against close relatives, sexual violence, and beat- ings. Amnesty International's charges are similar, covering some of the same ground, although the two re- ports spring from separate in- vestigations. For its part, the Chilean Govern- ment has manifestly denied the exten- sive use of torture, claiming that while there have been occasional lapses in Chile's traditional concern for rights, the basic thrust of Chile's policy remains one of protecting hu- man rights. But it is obvious that Gen. Augusto Pinochet Ugarte and his fellow mili- tary commanders in Santiago are worried about the charges which have led, at least in part, to Mexico's late November decision to break relations with Chile and to the numerous attacks on Chile in the United States Congress and the threat of military aid prohibitions in. foreign-aid mea- sures on Capitol Hill. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6