Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
June 21, 2001
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
February 27, 1975
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360007-1.pdf7.27 MB
25X1A pprove, or e ease ii i i: I M. CONFIDENTIAL -I I, II . III - ? NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES INTERNAL USE ONLY This publication contains clippings from the domestic and foreign press for YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use of selected items would rarely be advisable. No. 5 1975 GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS 1 GENERAL 26 EASTERN EUROPE 28 WESTERN EUROPE 30 'NEAR EAST 35 AFRICA 36 EAST ASIA 38 LATIN AMERICA 44 Destroy after backgrounder has served its purpose or within 60 days. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360007-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R00010060007-1 WASHINGTON POST 27. February 1975 Hitli Panel Will Seek IA ata ? By George Lardner Jr. Washington Post Staff Writer , The new Senate Select Com- mittee on Intelligence Opera- tions will ask the Rockefeller Commission for all of its se- cret records on the Central In- telligence Agency, committee' Chairman Frank Church (D- Idaho) said yesterday. Church said he hoped the request would be granted so that the Senate inquiry into alleged abuses of power by the CIA and other government in- telligence agencies could get off "to a" running start.". He said he did not think it would be in the public interest ,to have a "protracted investiga- tion.' . A spokesman for the White House Commission headed by Vice President Rockefeller, which was established last month in response to charges of illegal domestic spying by the CIA, declined to comment on the proposal. , At a closed meeting yester- day, the Senate Committee also approved 18 staff appoint- ments for the investigation, in- cluding that of New York trial lawyer F. A. 0. (Fritz) Schwartz Jr. as chief counsel. A member of the Wall Street law firm of Cravath, Swaine & Moore, Schwarz, 39, plans to begin working full time on the inquiry within two weeks. He previously repre- sented International Business Machines Corp. in government antitrust litigation. Church said that gave him considera- ble experience "in extracting evidence from government agencies." Burke Marshall, a 'former assistant attorney general in the Kennedy and Johnson ad- ministrations and later gen- eral counsel for IBM, was named a committee consultant and will assist in organizing the investigation. He is on the faculty at Yale law school. Pressing for cooperation from the administration on various levels, Church will meet today at 10 a.m. with CIA Director William E. Colby, partly to seek a waiver of the pledges of silence that the agency requires of its em- ployees. 'Texas Sen. ',John the committee, is 'expected to Tower, ranking Republican on THE WASHEN'GION POST Friday,1;eb. 28, 1975 - ill Lift CIA Secrecy Pledge To Cooperate With Senate ?robe the agency's authorization. , same time to Make public as sources and methods" Without. much information as possible' Church emphasized that 1 during the course of the inves- Colby agreed to drop the re-1 ; tigation. quirement only fiat' the I "Our rule of thumb," the !`purposes of this Senate in- 1 senator said, "will be to hold quiry." However, a similar public hearings whenever we waiver probably will be pro- can and closed hearings when- laded to a new House commit- ever we must." He indicated tee that has also been as- that the committee would pur- Signed to investigate the gov- sue allegations of illegal or -ernment's intelligence agen- :improper activities by the CIA and other agencies in public, while conducting its examina- tion of "legitimate national security" operations largely in , executive session. Eiy George Lardner Jr. Washington Post Staff Writer The head of the Central In- telligence Agency agreed to -cooperate with Senate investi- gators yesterday by lifting the ipledge of secrecy that the CIA requires of all its -employees. , CIA Director William E. 'Colby promised the waiver at 'a closed meeting on Capitol Hill yesterday morning with :Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho), ',chairman of the newly formed Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Operations, and Sen. John G. Tower (R-Tex.), the committee's ranking Re- Publican. ; Church told reporters after- Wards he was 'satisfied that Colby plans to provide all the information the committee 'flee& for its investigation of CIA activities, including Charges that the agency 'en- gaged in. illegal domestic spy- ing on American citizens. The CIA requires everyone It hires to sign an agreement Promising not to disclose any information they might ob- tain concerning "intelligence attend the closed session. Church said he plans to ask Colby about the status .of a 50- page report the CIA submitted to President Ford in early Jan- itarS7. The CIA director last week refused to supply a copy to a House Appropriations Subcommittee, saying that he, was "not authorized" to re- lease it. . A government official famil- iar with the Rockefeller Com- mission's work said all of its records are classified "top se- cret," including nearly 1,000 pages of testimony from past and present CIA officials and a substantial number of inter- views with CIA employees. The Commission, however, re- portedly has been inspecting raw files at the agency's head- quarters and thus possesses very little documentary mate- rial. Ultimately, the official added, it will be up to Mr. Ford to decide on any congres- sional request for the Commis- sion's files.. But he said there was no understanding with the CIA that would prevent their turnover. Church said he and Tower also expect to ask the Presi- dent to issue a directive call- ing on all government agen- cies. Later in the day, in a lunch- eon speech at the National Press Club, Church voiced doubts that the White House Inquiry into the CIA's activ- The committee chairman ites, under acommission 'called the investigation long headed by Vice President overdue, pointing out that Rockefeller, could resolve the neither the CIA nor the FBI, allegations that have been !made against the agency. "The executive branch can- not, with sufficient credibility, which also will be scrutinized, have ever undergone a thor- ough congressional inquiry. Promising strict precautions investigate itself," Church de- against news leaks, Church dared, He said he hopeii it said any committee staffer who discloses unauthorized in- formation "will be fired on the spot." In response to a question, ;he acknowledged that there was no way to control what senators on the committee might say, but said they were all mindful of the need for strained" inquiry and not "a !restraint. television extravaganza,". Church said he intends at the Newsweek, March 3, 1975 would wind up its work soon "and make its records avail- able, as a starting point, for the more comprehensive con- gressional investigations to come." Promising a "muted and re- THE SHRINKING CIA? A number of senior hands in Washington's intelligence community are becoming convinced that the CIA can- not survive the current investigations in its present form. They suspect that the job of analyzing and evaluating intelligence data will be given to the State Department; that paramilitary operations, like those carried on in In- dochina, will be handed over to the Pentagon, and that covert political operations are obviously out for years to come. They also sense that CIA director William Colby has erred badly by talking too openly about CIA opera- tions, and they believe he will soon be replaced. Senate inquiry. After that, Church said, the two senators will seek a similar 'meeting with Vice President Rockefel- ler to ask him for the Commission's records. The Select House Commit- tee on Intelligence, which also Approved#Pdr kleleMelteOttliticffie: ca4kitrivtf6ni2FWl1V6 the government's "intelligenc community." had a brief meet ing yesterday afternoon In what Chairman Lucien Nedz (D-Mich.) called an "informa discussion" of procedural an staffing requirements. No de cisions were made, Nedzi said. 601007-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360007-1 NEW YORK TIMES 27 February 1975 Erasing the By Ray S. Cline' . g WASHINGTON?At the end of 1974, Congress enaeted and President Ford -slgried into law restrictions on the Central Intelligence Agency's overseas operations that virtually put the C.I.A. 'out of the business of giving covert po- litical assistance to friendly, foreign governments or political groups. The, White House did not make an issue' of the legislative restrictions, nor did the C.I.A. A great many critics of United States policy in the 1950's and 1960's, especially the young ones who grew up in the era of retreat from Vietnam and of worldwide detente, have ap- plauded United States withdrawal from the clandestine inernational political arena. They consider covert activities incompatible with international law, morality and the fundamental princi- ples of our open society. And yet, there lingers an uneasy, doubtful feeling about the wisdom of this move in the minds of manK Washington officials, especially career public servants in the "national se, curity establishment" and political figures who remember the dark days of Europe in the time of the Berlin airlift (1948-1949) and the military invasion of South Korea (1950). By and large, they are not confident that "detente" with the Soviet Union has eliminated the dangers of Soviet efforts to dominate smaller nations, some of which are important to the United States security. They also doubt that it is really moral for the United States to be too high-minded to help friendly democratic govern- ments threatened with one-party dic- tatorship. Covert political action is a way of aiding governments threatened by a foreign-supported take-over with- out sending in the marines. The "realists" of the "national se- .curity establishment" argue that covert action ought to be taken in those rela- tively few cases in which world events can be turned' in a direction more favorable to the United States by a crucial marginal boost from the C.I.A. 1-eee-e4piete?eal ? ? C' 'Covert for moderate constitutionalists. Proponents of selective covert poe litical action abroad believe that all great nations try to influence political developments in other .countries. when their strategic interests are affected. The Soviet Unfelt; and China both have a well-defined political philosophy of intervening in non-Communist areas to promote violent revolutionary ac- tion and overthrow existing regimes. The "realists" say that C.I.A. sup-, port helped the Christian Democratic- centered majority in Chile stay alive' and resist the: minority rule of Presi- dent Salvador Allende Gossens, which would. have brought Chile to total, ruin. They are not particularly happy that a military junta rather than a parliamentary regime has taken charge, but they believe military regimes are, impermanent whereas .establishment of. a Communist-dominated dictatorship with Soviet support is a one-way street. The Soviet "Brezhnev Doctrine," in- voked to justify the military occupa, tion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, guar- ?.antees in, perpetuity the security of pro-Soviet regimes within the com- monwealth of Communist nations. Serious foreign policy. experts now point out that an excellent strategic case could be made for covert aid to, non-Communist groups in Portugal. The fall of the decaying authori- tarian regime there left the country with virtually no organized political ? structure except for the Communist underground. The armed forces are divided between conservative and rev- olutionary wings. The latter seems to be dominant and is generally tolerant of Communist demonstrations, political strikes and physical harassment of dem,ocratic politicians. The advocates of coyert political action say the national security of the United States is at stake, since con-' tinuing Portuguese permission for American bases in the ? Azores is vital to antisubmarine reconnaissance and defense systems in the Atlantic. Loss of these bases, they say, would also make impossible prolonged American NEW YORK TIMES 15 February 1975 Majority in Poll Opposes Rockefeller C.I.A. Inquiry By a 49-to-35 majority, Amer- icans believe President Ford. was wr9ng -to appoint . Vice President Rockefeller to heacra special investigation of the :Central Intelligence Agency, the Harris survey reported Thurs- day. A cross-section of 1,532 adults felt that a .cominissioni In.- omplete Se uri3 military assistance. to Israel in the event of another. Middle East, war.. Finally, it is noted, the Mediterranean flank of the North Atlantic Treaty Or- ganization might fall apart if a Soviet-. influenced Communist-dominated re-. gime gained control of Lisbon. It this happened; say the national security professionals, what does the' United States do? Retreat to Western Hemisphere quasi-isolationism? Spend massively on economic and military - ?aid to shore up NATO's Mediter- ranean flank? If necessary, send in the marines? Might it not be better to let our covert. operators quietly try to assist the moderate center in Portu- gal to establish a working multiparty. Parliamentary system, countering So,- viet moves to help the loeal Cortunu- fists, who are undoubtedly a minority but an efficient political force? Among these unattractive Choices, some of the old hands, argue, covert political ac- tion is the best. Later, American options may shrink to a choice between military interven- tion and strategic retreat from south- ern Europe and the Mediterranean. To ? avoid this harsh dilemma, whether in the case of 'Portugai or some other threatened nation, the United States ought to have an option of covertly aiding constructive constitutionalists and resisting the rise to power of dic- tatorships hostile to American interests. Some observers of the international scene think American strength is so -great that it materially affects what happens in the world, whether the United States acts or fails to act, uses diplomatic and economic pressures, ? or military aid or covert assistance. There is no way to shirk this awesome position, and the vital thing is to use all American assets in a stabilizing, peace-preserving role. Ray S. Cline, executive director of studies at The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, was from 1969 to 1973 , director of the State Department's ' bureau of intelligence and research. He was the C.I.A. Deputy Director for Intelligence from 1962 to 1966. }independent of the White House: 'shollel have the fisignmentti -The Assoc:cted P7es9 reper:ed. Sixteen per cent were not sure. The survey showed that 43 per cent ,of 'those queried thought the Rockefeller inves- tigation would ,end up as a cover-up similar to that of Wa- tergate; while 33 per cent, thought the inquiry would get to the root of any C.I.A. wrong- doing. Twenty-four per cent were unsure. roved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360007-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360007=1 NEW YORK TIMES 21 February 1975 C.I.A. Chief Says Charges Ini peril Intelligence Work By JAMES M. NAUGHTON specie to The New York Times WASHINGTON, Feb. Senate and House and by a William E. Colby, the director White House commission. of Central Intelligence,. told Congress today that "exagger- ated" charges of improper con- duct by the agency had "placed American ' intelligence in dan- ger." ? i In rare public testimony on Capitol Hill, Mr. Colby said that "misrepresentations" by critics of the C.I.A., in the news media and elsewhere, had jeopardized / relations with intelligence agen- ,cles, in other nations,?raised the specter of peril to American 'spies abroad and lowered mo- rale in the C.I.A. "The almost hysterical excite- ment that: surrounds any news story mentioning C.I.A., or even referring to a perfectly legiti- mate activity of C.I.A., has raised .the question whether secret intelligence operations can be conducted by the United !States," Mr. Colby said. I At the same time, however, he confirmed in his testimony before the House Defense Ap- propriations Subcommittee that the names of four members or former members of Congress, including "at least a couple" of unnamed opponents of the Vietnam war, had been entered in C.I.A. files. . He said that with the excep- tion of one file on a deceased Congressman, which is still ex- tant," the files were either in- active cr destroyed in 1974, He I did not identify any of the Congressmen. . Mr. Colby's appearance be- fore the subcommittee appeared designed, both by the agency and most members of the panel, to afford the intelligence direc- tor a friendly forum to reply to published allegations that the agency had violated a legal ban on domestic activities or had engaged in other question- able practices. ' , The subcommittee has House jurisdiction over the C.I.A.'s, secret annual budget. Normal-, ly, intelligence directors testify; only behind closed doors and, rarely do they even make pub-e lic the texts of their prepared; 'remarks. Today, however, Mr. Colby read a 20-page statement anal answered questious for nearly three hours as television came-1 ros whirred and repOrters andi some sightseers looked on in a Capitol hearing room. Mr. Colby said that he wel- comed an examination of the purposes and conduct of the United States intelligence com- munity by the select commitl Approv ! But he declared that "a num- ber of responsible Americans are concerned that a degree of hysteria can develop that will result in serious damage to our country's essential intelligence work by throwing the baby out with the bath water." , : Allegations Challenged Colby specifically chal- lenged, as either "false" or as "misrepresentations," several allegations about C.I.A. activ- ities, including the following: CHe said he could find no evidence to support an account published last month by The New York Times, quoting an unnamed former C.I.A. under- cover agent's description of clandestine surveillance of dis sident American citizens in the New York area. Mr. Colby' said the reporter who wroe: the article may have been "the victim of what we in the in- telligence trade call a- "fabri- cator." clie denied speeulation Charles W. Colson, the former counsel to President Nixon, that', the C.I.A. had prior knowledge, of the Watergate burglary inj 1972. Mr. Colby said that Mr.! Colson, recently released from a prison sentence that resulted from the Watergate scandals, had a "lack of credibility [that] should cause the charge to fall of its own weight," but that it was not supported by any ? Watergate investigation either. CHe said various published adcounts that police depart- ments in the United States pro- vided false credentials for C.I.A. agents or otherwise as- sisted in 'domestic C.I.A. in- volvement had "warped" the agency's "friendly liaison rela- tionships" with police forces. CHe said a charge that the agency was planning to spy on allied nations in contracting for studies of overseas transporta- tion developments had stemmed from "an dangerous misunder- standing of the true nature of modern intelligence." Mr. Colby did not state that the charge originally was made by Senator Richard S. Schweiker, Republi- can of Pennsylvania, a member of the new Senate Select Com- mittee on Intelligence. Mr. Colby said that shortly before The New York Times published its account of alleged C.I.A. activities, "he [the Times reporter] contacted me stating he had obtained information of great importance ' indicating that CIA. had engaged in a massive domestic intelligence activity, including wiretaps,; break-ins, and a variety of, other actions." "In response to his request,"! Mr. Colby continued, "I met with him and explained to him: that he had mixed and magm-1 fled two separate subjects, the foreign counterintelligencel 3 d For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360007-1 effort properly conducted byl C.I.A. and those few activities, that the agency's own investi-; gation had revealed and termi- nated in 1973. He obviously did, not accept my explanation and, instead, alleged that C.I.A. had conducted a 'massive illegal, domestic intelligence opera-: lion.' - "I am confident that the in-1 vestigations of the President's commission and the select com-! mittees will verify tile accuracy fie my version of these events." Th.e intelligence direc.or con- tended that such "exaggera- tions and misrepresentations of C.I.A.'s activities can do irre- parable harm to our national inelligence apparatus and, if carried to the extreme, could blindfold our country as it looks ahead." Mr. Colby did not specify in much detail what risks he be- lived were entailed in the public discussion of the agency's con- duct. He did say, however, that "a number of the intelligence serv- ices abroad with which C.I.A. works have expressed concern over its situation and over the fate of the sensitive information they provide to us." Mr. Colby also stated that "a number of our individual agents abroad are deeply worried that their names might be revealed,: wtih resultant damage to their lives as well as their liveli- hoods." He told the committee that seven of eight companies in- vited recently o bid on a co- vert ? but, Mr. Colby said, proper?C.I.A. contract had re- fused, apparently out of con- cern that their businesses might be embarrassed by subsequent disclosures. Conversely, though, Mr. Col- by said that applicaions for employment with the C.I.A., normally about 600 every few weeks, had climbed to 1,700 in the first two weeks of January as an apparent consequence of public interest in the agency. Mr. Colby stressed that he believed the intelligence com- munity's ability to help main- tain international peace "can decline if our intelligence ma- chinery is made ineffectual! 'through irresponsible exposure or ill-founded exaggeration." Most members of the essen- tially conservative subcommit- tee spoke sympathetically of Mr. Colby's efforts to improve the agency and to end what the director insisted had been "mistakes" that were "few and far between." Mr. Colby submitted to the panel a cony of testimony he had given Jan. 15 to a Senate committee, along with five pages of additional information about C.I.A. activities in the United States. Data on Congressmen The new information includ- ed the statement that, "over the past eight years, our coun- terintelligence program holdings ;have included files on four :members of Congress." "With the exception of one file still extant on a deceased Congressman, those files are inactive," the statement. con- tinued. "Two of them were destroyed in 1974. None con- tained any material that origi- nated in C.I.A., except for one travel cable and two cables quoting press announcements of conferences." Mr. Colby did not elaborate on the presumably still active file on the deceased member of Congress. Mr. Colby had told the Senate last month that there never had been any surveillance of Con- gressmen and that, with one technical exception, no files existed containing data on members of Congress, as had been stated in a New York Times article last December. Under questioning today, Mr. Colby said that such files were the natural consequence of in- telligence gathered by the agency on conferences overseas and that names of members of Congress had been noted mere- ly among those who took part in the meetings. Asked by Representative Jack F. Kemp, Republican of upstae New York, if the files dealt, as Ithe account in The Times had alleged, with "at least one avowedly antiwar member of Congress," Mr. Colby said that "at least a couple" of the mem- bers fit that description. The rarity of the public testi- mony was underlined by the opening remarks of the sub- committee chairman, Represent- ative George H. Mahon, Demo- crat of Texas. He noted that there would be the customary closed budget hearirg tomor- 'row and that the open forum today was "not as usual." Mn Mahon praised, by name, each of the men who has served as C.I.A. director since the agency's inecption in 1947. While not condoning any "mistakes" the agency might have made, Mr. Mahon said, "I do want you to know you are among pt:'+tole whet believe in the in4plligence mechanism." The only sharp questioning from the panel came front Representative Robert N. Giaimo, a Connecticut Demo- crat who is also the second- senior member of the New House Select Committee on Intelligence. "I have yet to have heard one word from anyone on your side of the table or ours," Mr. Giaimo said at one point, about whether activities of the agency might "infringe upon rights of American cittzens." ? Mr. Colby replied that he, too, was determined to safe- guard rights of citizens and,- end any improper practices,: but that such practices had been rare. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360007-1 NEW YORK TIMES 18 February 1975 EX CIA, OFFICIAL TESTIFIES 3 HOURS WASHINGTON, Feb. 17 (AP) ?Accompanied by an attorney, Howard J. Osborne, the former security chief for the Central Inteddigence Agency, was .queg- tioned ? for more than three hours today by the Rockefeller commission about the agency's domestic surveillanve activities. Mr. Osborn, whose office con- ducted an operation that Wil- lian E. Colby, director of Cen- tral Intelligence, has said, in- filtrated agents into American radical groups in the late nine- teen-sixties, was the first of the dozen witnesses who have appeared before the panel to. be represented by an attorney. ? According to knowledgeable sources, an inter-office memo dated Feb. 6, warned agency employes that they might be prosecuted for past practices and advised them to retain pri- vate counsel. Vice President Rockefeller, the. commission chairman, in- dicated that Mr. Osborn had not invoked the Fifth Amend- ment against self-incrimination. Mr Osborn refused all com- ment to reporters. saying he had "never commented or talked to the press." ? His lawyer, John W. Debelins, when asked who was paying his legal fee, replied, "The, agency most certainly is not." Two other former C.I.A. of- ficers, Raymond G. Rocca and N. Scott Miler, also testified before the commission at its sixth weekly meeting. Mr. Roc- ca and Mr. Miler served under James J. Angleton, the agen- cy's former counterintelligence chief, who last week reportedly told the commission he had been kept in the dark abbot the activities of a secret unit that Mr. Colby has acknowl- edged kept files on 10,000 Americans. The commission operated for most of the day at half- strength, with four of its eight members, including Mr. Rocke- feller, absent. The Vice Presi- dent joined the hearings in midafternoon just as Mr. Os- born was completing his; testimony. Asked for his reaction to a Harris poll indicating that a majority of Americans think the commission will cover up any wrongdoing by the agency, Mr. Rockefeller said, "I can assure anybody that we're not" conducting a whitewash. For the first time in five weeks, former Gov. Ronald Reagan of California was pres- ent for a commission meeting. Mr. Reagan said he had read transcripts of all the sessions he had missed and that he was confident that he had "a grip" on the material. Mr. Osborn, who headed the office of security from 1964 to 1974, is regarded as a? central figure in both the Rockefeller inquiry and past investigations of C.I.A. involvement in Water- gate. ? NEW YORK TIMES 21 February 1975 Excerpts From the Statement by Colby Spedal to The Neer YMie Times WASHINGTON, Feb. 20? Following are excerpts front a statement by William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, at a hearing to- day by the Defense Subcom- mittee of the House Appro- priations Committee: Mr. Chairman, in May, 1973, Director Schlesinger is- sued a notice to all C.I.A. employes instructing and in- viting them to report to him or to the Inspector General any matter in .C.I.A.'s his- tory which they deemed ques- tionable under C.I.A.'s char- ter. This instruction has been made a matter of regulation within C.I.A. and is brought to the attention of each em- ploye once a year. ? Times Article Cited As a result of the May, 1973, memorandum, various incidents were collected and 'brought to the attention of the chairman of the House and the acting chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committees. They were then used as the basis of a very specific series of internal in- structions issued in August, 1973, directing the termina- tion, modification, or other appropriate action with re- spect to such incidents in or- der to ensure that C.LA. re- mains within its proper char- ter. These instructions have been carried out and are periodically reviewed to en- sure continued compliance. It appears that some ver- sion of these matters came to the attention of the New York Times reporter who wrote th article of Dec. 22, 1974. A day or two before the article appeared, he con- tacted me stating he had ob- tained information ?of great importance indicating that C.I.A. had engaged in a mas- sive domestic intelligence ac- tivity, including wiretaps,? break-ins and a variety of other actions. In response to his request, I met with him and explained to him that he had mixed and magnified two separate sub- jects, I.E., the foreign coun- terintelligence effort proper- ly conducted by C.I.A. and those few activities that the agency's own investigation had revealed and terminated in 1973. ? He obviously did not accept my explanation and, instead, alleged that C.I.A. had con- ducted a "massive illegal domestic intelligence opera- tion," I am confident that investigations of the President's commission and the select committees will verify the accuracy of my version of these events. I also believe that any seri- ous review of my report to the Senate Appropriations Committee will show that I essentially denied his version rather than confirmed it as some have alleged. The sen- sational atmosphere sur- rounding intelligence;howev- er, encouraged oversimplifi- cation and disproportionate stress on a few -missteps rather than on the high quali- ty of C.I.A.'s basic work. Mr. Chairman, these last two months have placed American intelligence in dan- ger. The almost hysterical ex- citement that surrounds any news story mentioning CIA., or referring even to a per- fectly legitimate activity of C.I.A., has raised the ques- tion whether secret intel- ligence operations can be conducted by the United States. A number of the intel- ligence services abroad with which C.I.A. works have ex- pressed concern over its sit- uation and over the fate of the sensitive information they provide to us. A number of our individual agents abroad are deeply worried that their names might be re- vealed with resultant danger to their lives as well as their livelihoods. A number of Americans who have collaborated with C.I.A. as a patriotic contri- bution to their country are deeply concerned that their reputations will be be- smirched and their businesses ruined by sensational mis- representation of this associ- ation. And our own employ- es are torn between the sen- sational allegations of C.I.A. misdeeds and their own knowledge that they served their nation during critical times in the best way they knew how. WASHINGTON POST 20 February 1975 Common Cause ? Seeks CIA Report Associted Peets Common Cause, a citi- zens lobbying group, said yesterday it has asked CIA Director Williant? E. .Colby for access to the report on CIA domestic surveillance of U.S. citi- zens that was given. Pres- ident Ford in late 1974. Mr. Ford requested the report from Colby after published reports of 'un- lawful CIA surveillance. 4 WASHINGTON POST 11 F.E13 1975 ? By Maxine Cheshire -I Now You See It, Now You Don't It could be a scene from a spy movie about the CIA: A caller looking for E. Howard Hunt's old "public re- lations" office, a block from the White House, gets off the fifth-floor elevator these days and finds a blank wall. There is not even a door where the public relations firm of Robert Mullen & Co. once rented space. ? The: company, identified as a CIA cover operation whose ties to the Watergate scandals are -still being scrutimted, quietly went out of business months ago. .That was shortly before a report on Mullen & Co.'s CIA involvements was released by Sen. Howard H. Baker Jr. (R-Tenn.). Among other things, the Mullen firm was under contract to provide a corporate cover for CIA opera- tives in Singapore, Amsterdam and elsewhere. Baker's report also claimed flat the CIA helped former agent Hunt get a job with Mullen and the company's president, Robert F. Bennett, knew in ad- vance of the Watergate break-in as a White House op- eration. Bennett, the son of Sen. Wallace F. Bennett (R-Utah), has moved to Los Angeles to become the public rela- tions director for billionaire Howard Hughes' Summa Corporation. Bennett handled Hughes' account previ- ously at Mullen. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360007-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100"360007-1 NEW YORK TIMES 1/1- February 1975 The Right Focus on the CIA. ? Official documents just published by the State Department disclose that in 1948, President Harry Truman?then facing dim re-election prospects him- self?approved a secret recommenda- tion that the United States "make full use of its political, economic and, if necessary, military power" to prevent a Communist election victory in Italy. ' Published records do not as yet de- tail to what extent that recommenda- tion was carried out, or what role might have been played by the fledg- ling Central Intelligence Agency. But Mr. Truman's order of a quarter-cene tury ago finds an unpleasant echo in the word Richard Helms, the director of the C.I.A. in 1970, says was passed to him that year by the Nixon Admin- istration?that- the overthrow of the Government of Salvador Allende Gos- sens in Chile was "a thing that they were interested in having done." Mr. Allende, a Marxist, already had been elected, although not by a ma- jority, and was awaiting confirmation by the Chilean Congress, so in that respect the Nixon policy was far more drastic than Mr. Truman's. The latter President, moreover, might reasonably be considered to have had more justi- fication, in the era of Stalin, for his concern about Italy than Mr. Nixon had, in the era of d?nte, for his opposition to Mr. Allende. The net effect, in both cases, still was official Government sanction for United States intervention in the in- ternal affairs of another nation, to be undertaken clandestinely and for the purpose of containing or rolling back Communism. And however different the circumstances in which the two interventions were approved, they underscore the enormous difficulties of the task now being undertaken by the special Senate committee appointed to. investigate the, operations of the American intelligence community. .The Truman documents show that the seeds of the investigation lie deep WASHINGTON STAR 15 February 1975 '0 ? Lij By Jim Squires cNcngo Tribune The Central Intelligence Agency has warned em- ployes they may be prose- cuted for past "agency practices" and reminded them of their "constitution- al rights to remain silent" if questioned by the Justice Department. In an interoffice memo- randum, the agency said it "hopes no one will be charged with a criminal of- fense." But the. memo ad- vises employes to retain "private counsel" and im- plies that in case of prose- cution they will be on their own. The two-page directive, dated Feb 6, was signed by David Ii. Bice, deputy director of the agency's, clandestine operAitardPlYgu " 110?????111?11CaMMINICIMMIk IN THE NATION By Tom Wicker in the origins of the Cold. War. But in the mere eight months allotted to its operations, the Senate committee cannot possibly rummage back through the history of the past thirty years to examine every covert operation undertaken abrOad?even if the rec- ords were clear and easily obtained, which they aren't, and even if cir- ctunstances had not so greatly changed. It would be difficult even to cover such ground back to, say, 1960; and the task is made infinitely more complicated because the com- mittee also is investigating the F.B.I. and numerous other Federal agencies concerned with intelligence (Senatoe Howard Baker of Tennessee says there are nineteen such agencies al- , together). The committee is charged with looking into the operations of these agencies at home and abroad, but the concerns that led most directly to its establishment were domestic? disclosures that the C.I.A., in apparent violation of its charter, had been con- ducting surveillances of, and keeping records on, American citizens. It would be natural, therefore, if the caminnitee were to place its major emphasis on uncovering and prevent- ing unlawful activities threatening the rights of American citizens, rather than in investigating covert opera- tions abroad; the latter, in any case, present delicate problems of interna- tional relations that the committee will be reluctant to rais. Statements by Senator Frank Church, the chairman, and Senator John Tow- er, the senior minority member, sug- gest that the committee will place its major focus on domestic violations. sion, which has been ac- cused of carrying out illegal domestic spying. MANY EMPLOYES of the clandestine services, the so-called "dirty tricks" sections of the agency, have interpreted the memoran- dum as another sign that CIA Director William S. Colby is unwilling to back employes who now might face prosecution for carry- ing out the orders of their' superiors. Others interpreted it sim- ply as a warning to the clandestine operators to keep their mouths shut. CIA sources said the long- standing feud between the agency's clandestine em- ployes and the "overt" side (intelligence gathering and analysis). has i_n_te EfitiERe4IVSNAM ri Fl-trF1 It can hardly be argued that that is not a vital subjct of investigation and, in the case of the F.B.I., the primary one. Senator Church, more- over, is privately determined to ex- amine the record of covert operations abroad in sufficient depth to develop guidelines and policies to control them in the future. Still, the danger seems clear that in demanding so much of this single committee in so short a time, and even with the best efforts of its members and staff, the Senate may get far less than it or the nation expects. The question of domestic violations of law by the C.I.A. is already being studied, for example, by President Ford's so- called "blue ribbon" commission under Vice President Rockefeller; and while' the makeup of that panel does not inspire confidence that it will conduct a searching inquiry, over-concentration on the same area by the Senate com- mittee is bound to cause much dupli- cation of effort. Yet, the wording of the Rockefeller commission's charter so tightly limits it to investigating C.I.A. domestic operations as to foster the belief that the Administration has good reason to fear any probing by the commission of' the C.I.A.'s covert operations abroad. Indications mount that those opera- tions?as in Chile?have been exten- siva and unsavory, to a degree, un- dreamed of by most Americans. The record of these operations should be subjected at last to the most searching scrutiny?not that the past can be redeemed but that the future may be guarded. If Senator Church and his committee find them- selves unable to single out covert operations to the extent necessary, they should have no hesitation in recommending further investigation, and for as long as it may take, of this dark chapter in American history. Vi.7A1 under fire for illegal domes- tic activities. NOW THAT the clandes- tine side is in trouble, the weight of the director (Colby) has come down on the overt side," said one source. "It has become very clear that management is no longer with us." The 13iee memo implied but did not specifically state that the. agency would not help employes accused of crimes. "It is understood that the agency will supply attorneys in civil matters," said one agency source. "But if it is a criminal of- fense, each employe must get his own lawyer." The Blee memo, sent to supervisory personnel, sug- gested that all employes are past agency practices to see if they conflict with crimi- nal statutes" and that "they may be asked to volunteer information." THE JUSTICE Depart- ment has been reviewing previous CIA activities for the last few weeks to deter- mine if any agency em- ployes should be prosecuted. The probe centers on two areas of CIA operations, the agencys. counter-intelli- gence division and the office of security, which is charged, with protecting agency secrets. Colby has acknowledged publicly that both sections of the agency carried out some questionable domestic ? activities, including surveil- lance and infiltration of +Conti-war dissi- tlitlegal entry. 04-#04-411,11M000 IAI Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360007-1 NEW YORK TIMES 16 February 1975 ES, CITIZENS USED By F113.1. ABROAD Bureau Confirms Practice,- Authorities Say lt -Does Not Violate the Law ? By JOHN M. CREWDSON Spc..iat to The New York Tim, WASHINGTON, Feb. 15?.-The ,Federal Bureau of Investigation periodically dispatches Ameri- can citizens on intelligence- gathering missions outside the United States, according to a 42-year-old. Florida man who ?pays he and others have been used for that purpose. The man, Joseph A. Bur- ?ton, who for more than two years, beginning in May, 1972, posed as a Marxist in order to .infiltrate revolutionary groups here and abroad, told The New York Times that he had made "abbot 10" sorties into Canada at the F.B.I.'s direction. - Another undercover ppera- tive, a woman. with Whom Mr. ,Burton occasionally worked, confirmed in a separate inter- view that she had made a month-long visit to China near- ly four years ago in connection with, her work for the bureau. The F.B.I., according to a for- mer high official there,-has "no !right to run [intelligence] oper- ations in a foreign country? that's the C.I.A.'s jurisdiction." But neither he, nor legal au- thorities in and out of the Government who were asked about the practice, could point to any statute prohibiting the bureau from gathering intel- ligence overseas. James Murphy, a spokesman at F.B.I. headquarters here, confirmed in a telephone inter- view that the bureau has in the past sent American citizens abroad for intelligence purpo- ses, but he declined to discuss. specific cases. ? ? Mr. Burton, an auctioneer and I. antiques dealer who lives in! Tampa, Fla., told The Times; that he ended his relationship With the F.B.I. last summer at- ter becoming concerned about the legality of some of the tasks he had undertaken, in- cluding the Canadian ventures. He said that, last month, his doubts led him to write to. ClarenceM. Kelley, director of the bureau, seeking assurances that his work outside the Unit- ed States was 'legal 'and pro- per." He has received no, reply to that letter or to an earlier one. F.B.I. officials will not say whether a reply is forthcoming. Apart from bis concern that he may have violated the law, Mr. Burton's account, of his ac- tivities, and that of his fellow operative, provide an insight into a little-known aspect of the F.B.I.'s operations at a time when the agency is coming un- der increasingly stringent scru- tiny. Last month, the Senate set up a select committee to examine intelligence-gathering by Feder- al agencies, including the F.B.I. and the Central Intelligence Agency, whose occasionally overlapping jurisdictions have created some difficulties in the past. Talk of Albania Although his forays outside the United States were con- fined to Canada, Mr. Burton said, "There was some talk of my going to Europe and also going to Albania. The bureau would have let me go to Alba- nia. They wanted me to go." i He was in the process of se-I curing an invitation to visit the tiny Communist country, he said, when he decided to break off his relationship with the bureau. Mr. Burton said he was once asked by an F.B.I. superior whether he would "like to go to Mexico, walk into the Chinese ? embassy and say that you've got this organization in Tampa and that you want to work with the Chinese." Mr. Burton then headed a sham "revolutionary" group in Tampa, called the "Red Star Cadre," that, he said, had been set up as a front for his F.B.I. work. He said he told the in- quiring agent that he would not "insult the Chinese by trying to pull something that stupid on Ahem." During the Canadian trips, he recalled, his instructions were to develop contacts with mem- hers of the Canadian Commu- nist party's pro-Chinese wing, and to report to the F.B.I. on their activities, including any signs that the organization was !passing funds from China to !Maoist groups in the United ;States. On two of the trips, he said, ; he was accompanied by an ' !American woman who had !adopted a similar radical pose ,in the New Orleans area, and who told him that she had visit- ed China to gather political in- telligence for the bureau. The woman, a 36-year-old- housewife and mother, con- firmed in an interview in the Southwestern city where she now lives that she spent four weeks in China in 1971 with one of the first groups of Amer- icans allowed into that country after President Nixon's an- nouncement that he would visit there. When first asked about that trip, the woman said, "It's bet- ter riot to discuss any F.B.I. operations outside the coun- try." But after being assured ano- nymity, she conceded that she had entered China "before Nix- on". as part of a "delegation made up of American radicals," and had made "four or five" trips into Canada as well. The woman asked that she not be identified for fear of re- 6 prisals from the left against her or her husband, with whom she had worked in penetrating left- ist political organizations in Louisiana and elsewhere. 'A Detail Specialist' The reports she submitted to the F.B.I. upon her return, she said, were filled not only with information about her traveling companions, but also with her observations of Canton, Shang- hai and Peking, the Chinese capital, where, she said she had been introduced to Premier Chou En-lai. ? "I was concerned about ev- lerything," she replied when 'asked what sort of information i she supplied to the bureau. "1 ;was a detail specialist." Asked whether she now en- tertained any misgivings about her work, her voice trembled as she said, "I spent a month in China, wondering if I was ever going to go home again: won- dering if they were ever going to find out what I was doing. "I feel like I've put my life on the line for a good cause, and I don't feel like that all ought to go down the drain because someone wants to make a sen- sational story." The former F.B.I. intelligence official said he had read the woman's reports on China, but could not recall whether any of the information had been shared ;Yid: the C.I.A. Hoover's Strategy for 'Glory' On more than one occasion when the F.B.I. sent a covert operative abroad, the official said, J. Edgar Hoover, then di- rector of the bureau, would "in- struct us not to advise" the C.I.A. of the intelligence that , was produced. "He wanted to outscoop the C.I.A. " the man said. "He wanted the F.B.I. to come back with valuable information :which he would give to the President over his signature, so he would get the glory." Added the official: "He was wrong." When first asked about Mr. Burton's activities, officials of the bureau here said that all queries should be addressed. to Nick F. Starnes, the special agent in charge of the F.B.I.'s 'Tampa field office, under whom Mr. Burton had worked. Mr. Staines, who last week was notified that he was being transferred to the bureau's Washington field office, said repeatedly in a recent interview that he would not respond in any way to Mr. Burton's disclo- sures or charges beyond the following statement: "Joseph A. Burton volun- teered his services to the Tam- pa F.B.I. office in May, 1972, and was able to establish con- tact with several ? Marxist- Leninist groups. "He was paid for his service in providing information and expenses incurred in connec- tion, with its acquisition. "During his periods of assist- anct to the F.B.I. Burton was ;instructed not to engage in any !illegal activities and we have no linformation indicating he did eneage in illegal activities. I , 'Burton's services were dis- continued in July, 1974, at his own request, as he indicated he desired to provide security for his family and because he was no longer willing to be associat- ed with the Communist revolu- tionary movement." The former F.B.I. official said that the bureau maintains, agents in a number of foreign' capitals who serve as "legal at- taches" and who have their of- fices inside American embas- sies. But he said that their role was officially limited to per- forming a "liaison" ? function with foreign policy agencies and that they were barred from "positive," or active, gathering of intelligence, Not Special Agents ? ! Mr. Murphy, the spokesman :for the bureau here, said that ;the F.B.I. was "not operational outside the country," and, without confirming that either ,Mr. Burton or the woman had !ever traveled abroad, he point- 'ed out that neither was a spe- 'cial agent of the F.B.I. Asked how he would describe the pair, Mr. Murphy replied that they were considered "paid informants." A spokesman for the CIA., which is charged by law with the gathering of intelligence outside the United States, said his agency would have no com- ment on any reports concerning the F.B.I.'s external intelligence operations. ! Told of the bureau's descrip- tion of him as an "informant,"1 IMr. Burton bristled. "What information did I sell ;them?" he demanded. "When they called me and told me to :go to Canada, was I selling !them information? When they 'asked me to set up 'Red Star,' I was I selling them information? ! "If the bureau asked me to go i to Canada or Pennsylvania or, anywhere," he went on, "at first they would say, 'Po You want to go?' After a while they just said, 'You're going to Can- ada." Full-Time Help Both Mr. Burton and the couple from New Orleans paint- ed out repeatedly that they had worked virtually, full time for the F.B.I. Mr. Burton Produced a letter from Mr. Stames showing that, in addition to travel and other, expenses, he was paid $2,113 for his work for the bureau din- ing the first seven months of last year. The New Orleans couple said that during their service as un- dercover intelligence operatireee they received an average 51 "about $16,000" a year /17UM the bureau. Told of Mr. Murphy's eWan- ation that, because he had ryl: graduated from the F I !Academy as a special agene was officially considered an !"informant," Mr. BI:n9,1 !laughed and replied: "The only thing I didn't teern [by not attending the acadenyj is how to pick up a phoet and say, 'This is not your F.B.L We didn't do it, no, we don't know them, thank you for not calling us.' "That and the karate course, think, are the only two things I missed." Dismissing an informant 1"; ."somebody who, asks, 'Hum Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360007-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000106360007-1 much Will you give me for some information,'" Mr. Burton em- phasized that he received in- structions from and made re- ports to his F.B.I. superiors on a daily basis, and that he was directed both here and abroad to act "in other than a passive role." As his first Canadian assign- ment, he recalled, he was in- structed to attend a conference of the Canadian Communist party's ' pro-Chinese wing, an organization of which he said he eventually became a voting member and to which he peri- odically donated funds supplied by the F.B.I. I Without seeming to do so, Mr. 'Burton said, he had been able to cause a "rift" among some of the leftist organizations repre- sented at the conference. Upon his return to Tampa, he said, the bureau "congratulated" him on his success. Displaying anger at what he deemed attempts by bureau of- ficials to play down the impor- tance of his activities, Mr. Bur- ton asserted that last July, just 'before he broke with the bu- reau, he was told by an agent: "If you want to do a book on your association with the bu- reau someday after this has all settled down, we would be more than happy to help you, and we will supply you with a publisher." Mr. Burton said he declined the offer, saying that, "By the time you cut out everything I want to put in, there wouldn't be any book." ? NEW YORK TIMES 28 February 1975 House Unit Votes to Block 2 C.I.A.-Inquiry Resolutions WASHINGTON, Feb. 27 (Up) ?The House Foreign Affairs . Committee voted 19 to 9 today to bury in committee two reso- lutions calling for investiga- tions of the Central Intelligence Agency in connection with the coup that toppled the late Chilean President, Salvadore Allende Gosseus. . Chairman Thomas E. Morgan, Democrat of Pennsylvania, said the resolutions by Representa- tive Michael J. Harrington, De- mocrat of Massachusetts, were unnecessary because other committees of Congress were going to investigate the matter. White House lawyers and the State Department's Congres-. sional liaison official both ureed the committee not to ap- prove tile Harrington resolu- tions. 7 WASHINGTON STAR 21 February 1975 S ys CI al mew btA By George Lardner Jr. Washington Post Staff Writer ? The head of the Central in- telligence Agency yesterday protested that American intel- ligence operations have been jeopardized by "the almost hysterical excitement" over CIA missteps. Testifying before a House' Appropriations subcommittee. for nearly three hours, Wil- liam E. Colby cbtriplained that allegations of legal or impro- per domestic spywork by the CIA have been blown out of all proportion and have placed its legitimate activities in dan- ger. At the same time, the CIA director submitted a series of what he called "minor? changes" in a report that he, gave the Senate Appropria-! tions Committee last Month. Continuing investigations, Colby said, showed that the agency's counterintelligence files over the past eight years "have included files on four members of Congress." He said under questioning that "at least a couple" of these unidentified members of Congress turned up in counter-! intelligence dossiers because; of their anti-Vietnam war ; activities, but denied that any; of them had been under "active surveillance." In his report to the Senate last month, Colby had said that only one former member of Congress had appeared in , the CIA's counterintelligence program files. Colby strongly defended his beleaguered agency and main- tained that its missteps were ! "few and far between . . . and in no way justify the public outcry which has been raised against CIA." Flanked by two aides at the public hearing, which will be followed by a closed session ;today, Colby said the !furor has touched off chagrin among - cooperating intelli- gence agencies abroad, fears among a number of individual CIA agents that their lives might be jeopardized by public disclosures, and con- cern among Americans who have collaborated with the CIA that. th&T businesses might be ruined by "sensational misrepresenta- tion" of their work with the agency. Within the CIA, Colby said, "the morale, to be perfectly honest, right now is bad." Just a couple of weeks ago, he added, the agency asked eight firms to hid on a CIA con- peratio s ? 4?,.. frekie legit9 with the trouble the CIA is in today." The CIA's domestic activi- ties are under investigation by a special presidential commis- sion headed by Vice President Rockefeller. The agency also faces broader inquiries, along with the rest of the nation's intelligence comthunity, from select Senate and House in- vestigating committees that have been created in the past month. Addressing himself to some specific allegations, Colby de- nied a report in The New York Times quoting an anonymous ex-CIA agent as declaring that he and other agents had taken part. in telephone wiretaps and break-ins in the New York City area. The slim, gray-haired CIA director said the agency had been unable to identify any such ex-employee and as a re- sult suspected that the Times reporter, Seymour Hersh, was "the victim of what we in the intelligence trade call a fabri- cator." Colby also denied what he 'described as charges that the CIA manages a $200 million-a- year corporate empire "which could circumvent the will of Congress." He acknowledged that the agency maintains "certain corporate support structures" as a cover for- its operations, but insisted that they are meticulously man- aged and audited by CIA officials. The CIA director declined, however, to discuss at the pub- lic session reports that the agency worked with the Bu- reau of Narcotics and Danger- ous Drugs in the early 1960s to bug apartments in various metropolitan areas as "sex traps for foreign diplomats?' "I won't say sex and intelli- gence never got together," Col- by told Rep. Bill D. Burlison (D-Mo.), but "I'd really like to talk about the relationship with the BNDD privately if I could." Under questioning by Rep. Joseph P. Addabbo (D-N.Y.) Colby also refused to give the: subcommittee a copy of the 50.: page report on the CIA's do- mestic activities that was sub- mitted to President Ford al few weeks ago. ? ! Colby said the report con- ; tained "essentially" the samed facts he was giving the sub- committee in summary fash- ion. 1 But as for the report to 1Mr. Ford, he said. "I am not authorized to release that." Colby refused to elaborate cm the reasons. ? I I In his report to Ihe Senate tract, and seven of them de- IA poropriat ions Con?nittengetl in, a A.(0 ht._ . APproAlicri#30.40AVUOtigh08 ilehrE)1177c00432R0004003of- 0ake l ) e so first time that CIA ficers had occasionally spied' :on American journalists and :political dissenters, opened the mail of private citizens. 'planted informers inside do- mestic groups and assembled the agency's own secret files on more than 10,000 Ameri- cans. In the updated -eport sub-. mitted yesterday, he also said; the agency conducted tele- phone wiretaps on 27 persons,i including foreigners: in the United States between '195L and 1965, when the practice P was stopped?instead of 21 in-! dividuals as previously re-i ported. But he denied again that. any of these activities amounted to a "massive, il- legal domestic intelligence operation" in violation of its charter prohibiting such activ- ities. Rep. George H. Mahon (D- Tex.) interrupted: "You denied. the allegation that it was a massive effort, but you didn't, deny something happened." - Colby replied that the CIA, had conducted what it con- sidered a legitimate counter- intelligence effort "directed? at possible foreign links to American dissidents . . . in: response to presidential cone cern over this possibility." ; The CIA -director also sug- gested that the files on the four unidentified members of Congress had been rather in- gress had been rather in- nocuous and occasioned large-1 ly by their attendance at anti,' war meetings in foreign coon- t tries which the CIA moni- tored. : "They were not under sur- veillance by the CIA in any ; case," Colby said. and then added, "They were not under, active surveillance." He said two ? of the ? files were de- stroyed in 1974 and none COP- tained any material that origi- nated in the CIA except for one travel cable and two ca- bles quoting. press announce- ments of forthcoming confer- ences. Except for one counter iri- telligence file "still extant o!. a deceased congressman," an': CIA director reported that remaining dossiers have bee!_ shipped to a CIA records cen- ter and thus classified as "in- ! active." 1 Despite the poor morale a' :the agency. Colby did a.- Iknowledge ' one silver that he attributed to reecti! publicity. Normally, he said. the CIA gets some 600 job in - gullies every couple of weck.A. but in the first two weeks (if January there were 1,700 aq them. recruits these day-. he said. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360007-1 l'1114SWEEK 17 FEB 1975 INVESTIGATIONS: The FBI's Turn . When the furor over "domestic spy- ing" first broke several weeks ago, the Central Intelligence Agency was in the eye of the storm. Of late, however, the resulting inquiries into the U.S. intelli- gence establishment have broadened out ?in Congress and in the press?bringing the Federal Bureau of Investigation into some heavy weather of its own. Unlike the CIA, the FBI is empowered by law to conduct surveillance and other intelli- gence-gathering operations in the U.S. But a recent spate of seamy revelations has raised ques- tions about the bureau's tactics and . the way it has used?and abused?the in- formation it gathers. Under .the leadership of J. Edgar Hoover, the FBI stooped to some squalid strat- agems. In the mid-1960s, NEWSWEEK learned, the FBI planted electronic "bugs" in two houses of prostitution in the Washington area. "There was a national-security ra- tional.?:e" explained a highly placed source, "The bureau hoped to obtain tapes of for- eign diplomats in compromis- ing situations, to be used pos- sibly in blackmailing them into working for the U.S." But sometimes the bugs also picked up congressmen and other important Americans. Hoover, according to NEWS- WEEK'S source, passed such information to. Lyndon John- son ,who enjoyed placing a stack of FBI dossiers conspicuously on his desk while subjecting vulnerable con- gressmen to. some political arm-twisting. 'Club': Hoover could play the same ambiguous game. In the mid-'60s, the FBI discovered that an Eastern congress- man was among the victims of a ring of blackmailers preying on homosexuals. Hoover, NEWSWEEK learned, personally assured the legislator that he would be spared any publicity. Hoover extended the same courtesy to other congressmen the FBI had found in compromising situ- ations. Such promises of protection were no doubt comforting, and indeed it was the FBI's job to shield people from black- mail. But the mere fact that the agency had such information could have been, as Rep. John M. Slack of West Virginia put it, "a way of getting a congressman under a club." Among the .more serious charges of FBI abuse focused on a fifteen-year -counterintelligence" program: (COIN- TELPRO), which was aimed at both political fringes and at black and white extremist groups. Before the program was terminated in 1971, the bureau had, by its own reckoning, mounted 2,370 sep- arate "operations"?digging up or simply fabricating derogatory information about their subjects and then leaking it to "friendly news media" or other recipients in order to get the subjects fired, evicted from apartments, denied credit or other- wise harassed. In one such case, accord- ing to court papers filed on behalf of several members of the Trotskyist So- cialist Workers Party who are suing the FBI, agents visited a Florida shipbuild- ing concern and told an official there that one of his employees, SWP sympathizer Ernest Able, was a Communist. The com- pany fired Able, allegedly citing the FBI visit as a reason for dismissal. COINTELPRO's tactics were as vari- 1,0 namese. That story was gleaned from testimony before the Senate Watergate committee in 1973. Similarly, the Times's Seymour Hersh discovered a 1973 al- legation before the House Armed Serv- ices Committee that former CIA director Richard Helms had withheld from the Depai tinent of Justice letters written by Watergate break-in conspirator James McCord, who warned that Nixon cam- paign officials were planning to pin the burglary on the CIA. Such stories may be only the start of a deluge.' All told, five official committees are or will soon be investigating various aspects of U.S. intelligence: Vice Presi- dent Nelson Roekefeller's commission on the CIA, select committees in the House and Senate and two House sub- committees. An expansion of the Free- dom of Information Act, enacted over President Ford's veto, will; take effect 4 Oliphant 0 1975. Denver Pa., 'Of course I brought them with me?how do you think I got here?' ous as its targets?ranging from "dirty tricks" to what Massachusetts Rep. Rob- ert Drinan last week described as down- right "1,.w1essness." In the late 1960s, a former government official told NEWS- WEEK, the FBI hired a prostitute with venereal disease to seduce several New Left leaders in California in the naive belief that contracting VD would dis- credit them with potential campus fol- lowers (she purportedly met with at least some success). Deal? Many of the recent disclosures about the FBI and the CIA come from once-secret Congressional testimony. Two such stories have surfaced about FBI bugging of Martin Luther King's telephone and bedroom. The New York Times reported that LBJ ordered?and Hoover approved?an FBI check of five of Spiro Agnew's phone calls during the 1968 campaign to determine whether the Republicans were trying to make their own deal with the South Viet- next week and will make the files of all government agencies more accessible. The FBI and CIA vill get a taste of the same treatment they seem to have given some citizens: invasion of privacy. ?JAMES R. GAINES with ANTHONY MARRO and STEPHAN, LESH ER in Washington wpm, STREET JOURNAL 21 F 1975 ?COLBY SAID CHARGES against the CIA: are exaggerated and could harm it. ' The Central Intelligence Agency director? 'told- a House subcommittee that. "the almost hysterical excitement that surrounds any news story mentioning CIA . . . has raised the question whether secret intelligence, operations can be conducted. by the U.S." Colby said agents abroad fear their names' will be disclosed, endangering their lives: -Although. the CIA has made "a few miz- steps," he said, operations against antiwar dissidents focused on possible foreign ties and were "neither massive, illegal nor do- Colby withheld' for closed hearings his discussion of reported' WA sex traps ? to 'gain data front foreigners. But he comntented: "I won't say that sex and ? intelligence never got together." - - Colby corrected testimony he gave the Senate earlier, saying the agency had files. on four members of 'Congress,, not one, and: has done four break-Ins in the U.S.. not three. He denied any CIA Involvement In, Watergate after contacts with the Water- gate burglars prior to the break-in. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360007-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001004360007-1 THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Tuesday, Feb. 11, 1975 1 The Hornets' Nest at Langley ? By ROBERT KEAThsv WASHINGTON ? By now the United States must have the world's most-publi- cized secret spy service. , The Central Intelligence Agency's deeds and misdeeds are spread through the daily press. Its ex-employes publish books and articles?some telling . all, others loyally covering up some things for "the com- pany.'" As usual, assorted foreigners still blame it for causing trouble by exploiting such varied folks as Cambodian Buddhist monks, Ustashi terrorists, Panamanian students and the entire Austrian army. More importantly, an eager Congress and a reluctant Executive Branch are into the act. Several congressional committees threaten to strip away CIA secrecy in search of alleged illegal domestic and un- wise foreign activities. Meantime, a new Vice President, until recently an official overseer of the intelligence game, heads a presidential commission appointed to do much the same. And Nelson Rockefeller already concedes "violations or abuses" of the CIA charter did occur. All this produces hard times at Lang- ley, Virginia. That's where the CIA has its headquarters and most of its staff. And that's where William Colby, as direc- tor of Central Intelligence, manages?nom- inally, at least?the entire American intel- ligence community, including the Penta- gon's Defense Intelligence Agency and other organizations. Agency morale is down and there's gloom about the future. A kind of "what-did-we-do-to-deserve- this?" atmosphere pervades. Despite the repercussions, though, there's wide agreement that scrutiny is Overdue. CIA (and other) ventures into for- bidden domestic police work may not be as "massive? as alleged, but transgressions did occur. More than one President called on his secretive snoops to investigate, and even harass, political foes. Meantime, newer members of Congress complain that committees charged with overseeing intel- ligence operations were negligent, and they're out to change that. They complain the old boys on Capitol Hill deliberately went too easy on the old boys in the spy trade; where the money went, and why, Congress didn't want to losow. For example, the late Senator Allen El- lender of Louisiana for years was one of five Senate watchdogs. Yet when ques- tioned once on the floor about secret fi- nancing of war in Laos, he made it clear he hadn't been 'told much. s "I did not know anything about it. . . . I never asked, to begin with, whether or not there were any funds to carry on the war in this sum the CIA asked for. It never dawned on me to ask about it," he said. According to many critics, that was typi- cal of the rather casual supervision of in- telligence operations by Congress. -But no more. Many legislators now de- :nand accountability, and the Executive P.ra.nch realizes it must be provided. The CIA itself concedes times change, and it must be more open. "The employes of the agency and I are *holly committed to being responsive,". Mr. Colby recently told a Senate committee. Another Casualty of Vietnam Ip part, this change reflects a broad disenchantment with many aspects of for- eign affairs. The origins of that may lie in Vietnam. For years, Congress acquiesced Iii war there and financed it regularly. But today's legislators, determined to prevent a rerun of that conflict anywhere, search suspiciously for signs of new American in- volvement in unsavory foreign climes. This produces laws which inhibit and dis- may Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who believes Congress is meddling mis- Thievously in his affairs. And it makes the CIA?which has often conducted clandes- tine "dirty tricks" in foreign countries?a prime target for congressional wrath and suspicion. ? "It's all part of the general attack on foreign policy," complains an agency ? hand. Yet this shouldn't be surprising. This is the age of official detente, and many Americans think it's time to scrap Cold War leftovers. They no longer feel they're Sighting world communism, rushing into every perceived breach with guns and money. This creates more dispute about what the government does abroad (as at home, thanks to Watergate). Because of its supporting role in foreign policy, plus do- mestic misdeeds, the CIA and other intelli- gence agencies no longer get their reveren- tial treatment of ()Id. But the many investigations under way .do raise troublesome questions. Issues in- volved include those of what should be the The CIA has attracted a ? swarm of critics, but is it- possible to have internation- al arms control without good intelligence capabili- ties? size, mission and control system for the in- telligence community. There also are lesser questions of who should ? be in charge, and what are the possible long- term adverse effects of the investigations on morale and efficiency. For example, there's dispute about how Congress should oversee intelligence activ- ities in the future. Capitol Hill's conserva- tives might prefer the old way of knowing little; the new activists, however, want to know all, But if they learn all, will they also tell all?to the detriment of national security? Keeping some secrets is essential to the intelligence trade. Thys some administra- tion officials worry about how to reconcile congressional desire to keep informed with their claimed need to classify certain in- formation. An agreement on supervisory procedures, as well as a trust which doesn't how exist, will be needed. Congress is also looking at the size and diversity of the intelligence community, which may include bits of some GO govern- ment agencies. It seems likely a smaller, less overlapping structure will emerge, probably with tighter controls within the Executive Branch as well as more strin- gent congressional oversight. Mr. Colby of- ficially manages all intelligence activities already, for example, but officials say he doesn't really control the Pentagon's DIA, among other agencies. New legislation could tighten the cornmand and control system. Meantime, Mr. Celby has given Con- gress an additional problem. He, says there are "good" secrets (the names of agents, for example) and "bad" secrete (Informa- tion which would embarrass the govern- ment but wouldn't damage security if re- vealed). While he promises to be more talkative than his predecessors, he also wants new laws to keep ex-employes from sa6s ttios talking too much. He their revf 8 can injure the national interest. "To improve this situation," he told e Conress, "we have proposed legislation, and ''I invite this committee to support the strengthening of controls over intelligence secrets." Already, the idea?which hasn't been detailed yet?has been denounced as an unconstitutional effort at prior restraint of free speech. Meantime, some agency hands oppose it on tactical grounds; they think Mr. Colby is compounding CIA prob- lems unnecessarily by seeking such contro- versial laws now. ? And that raises another issue: Should Mr. Colby keep his job? . He isn't universally admired within his. own shop, and there is sniping at' him from outside. Mr. Kissinger, it is rumored, be- lieves the CIA boss told Congress too much, making possible various press leaks which got it into trouble. Others say Mr. Colby is a bad manager of the huge intelli- gence community. Some of his employes think their boss should have a broader background in analytical work, which 'is the CIA's main activity (Mr. Colby's some- times daring career has mostly involved clandestine operations). Meantime, others believe a new chief is needed to restore credibility. They don't necessarily criticize Mr. Colby; they merely contend that an impressive outsider must be recruited if Intelligence work is to regain public re- spect. Another fob in jeopardy is that of Rich- ard He, Is, CIA director while much of its dirty Work occurred and now Ambassador to I.ran: There are indications Mr. Hclms placed his personal concept of the national interest above the need to tell Congress the truth; that could get him fired. A Mammoth Reappraisal More basically, the whole- concept of clandestine operations is in trouble. Though officials claim it has done the country much good, the public knows mainly about operations which have gone wrong?the Cuban invasion and assorted Indochina operations, for instance. Mr. Colby argues that the capability to pull jobs in foreign countries must be retained as a useful foreign policy tool; others say clandestine actions no longer make sense, if they ever did. Even some former spies doubt the wis- dom of keeping a clandestine division on the payroll for emergency use. Like most bureaucracies, it might create work to jus- tify its existence, causing trouble overseas. One old hand suggests that keeping such a unit in reserve is ludicrous; it would prob- ably never be used anyway because it lacked appropriate skills. Therefore, Con- gress must decide whether to retain the capability whigh has produced the stuff of countless spy novels, or to give it up. There's also doubt about the future ef- fectiveness of other intelligence branches. Some employes wonder if they can attract new blood once the civilian job market nears normality. "We don't all run about with submachine guns in our briefcases," laments a retired operative, but he fears that image may keep bright recruits away. If so, the CIA's main work could suffer. That is the analysis function, which seeks to make sense of random bits of informa- tion, most gathered by open means, so pol- icyrnakers can reach decisions with some knowledge of what they're doing. One concerned official is Fred C. Ikle,. director of the U.S. Arms Control and Dis- armament Agency. He says an effective CIA is needed to help prepare for strategic arms control talks with the Missions, and to monitor the results. Approved For Rylease 2001/08/08: IA-RDP -0 4321460n 60131060_1aid recently, "that Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP7%083M011B08a0007-1 25 FEB 1975 In our zeal to. expose Improprieties of they past, we might damage beyond repair the ability of intelligence organizations to do their job in the future. If that happened, arms control would . come to a dead end. . We cannot have arms control Without good intelligence capabilities." Thole are future possibilities. Already, it's said, the intelligence dispute is having Immediate effects on operations. Foreign Intelligence services are supposed to be re- luctant about passing -along information for fear confidences won't be kept. With CIA morale down, some employes seek other work. Bureaucratia ways spread within the agency, annoying some and de- laying clandestine assignments of others (a good 'thing, gay critics). An outsider can't judge the validity of such complaints, but they raise ,issues the investigators -must consider as they probe and poke into -the intelligence community; ? What will come of it all is uncertain. ;But more adverse publicity for the Ameri- can spy trade seems unavoidable. , A smaller, more centrally? controlled commu- nity alSo seems likely. But as the many in, .vestigators delveanto the intelligence busi- ness, many officials hope they will keep in mindethe difference between doing it over and doing it in. Mr. geaticy, a member of the Journal's Washington bureau, covers foreign affairs. LONDON T DIES 3 February 1975 Deportation vinav au Iasi of alleged CIA man By STaw:otrtir MP s TendI et. i to ask the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to deport Mr Cord Meyer, the American diplomat named recently as the leader of the Central Intelligence 'Agency in Britain. Mr Thomas Litterick, 'MP for Birthinaharn,,Selly Oak, also wants government action on -CIA work in Britain. He has tabled questions-to Mr Callaghaa and to Mr Jenkins, the Home Secretary, for answer this week. Mr Jenkins will be asked if he is' satisfied with security arrangements andabout CIA 'activity. The main business of the CIA is disruption and sub- version", Mr latterick said yes- terday. "The- CIA has been entertained by British govern- ments in this country for 20 years." Britain had helped it be- cause the CIA was an agency of a friendly state but the CIA did not recognize any state as friendly, ",not even the United States Mr Litteriek said hiformation about the activities of the .agency . had ..come - to light recently through hooks and statements in Washington. He Ii ad no inside source .of informa- tion. ? Mr Meyer was -named in an American magazine Counterspy last week labour specialist on temporary assignment ? to oversee the British situation". The CIA's pub.lic:relations William E. Colby, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, has taken on a tough public-relations job. He is trying to reenlist public support for the agency at --a time. when people have been jolted, by charges that it illegally spied on American citizens. He is also trying to persuade Congress to be gen- erous with its appropriation for the agency, just after admitting- that the names of four past or present members of Congress had been entered in CIA files. In a rare public appearance at Capi- tol Hill Thursday, Mr. Colby warned the House defense appropriations sub- committee that there is some .question whether the CIA can keep doing its job. Be acknowledged that the agency had- been guilty of. "some small missteps,". -but Said that "exaggerated" news re- ports and "hysterical" reaction to them were threatening to cripple the nation's intelligence system. _ - Mr. Colby' probably lost some points with the House panel in one respect: He cited four mistakes that he said the CIA had found in his earlier testimony, before the Senate Appropriations Com- mittee. In each case, the new informa- tion on the CIA's "missteps" made them seem slightly more serious than the previous report had done. IL devel- oped, for instance, that the agency had been keeping files on four congress- men, not one, and had tapped the phones of 27 persons?not 21?between 1947 and 1965. One wonders if further investigation would uncover still more serious errors. ? ? Mr. Colby's principal point, hoWever, is unchanged: that the CIA should not be penalized for its past mistakes te the point of losing its effectiveness in the future. The point seems to us valid. It needs to be weighed, however, against the NEW YORK TIMES 16 February 1975 COUNTERSPY EFFORT BY C.I.A. IS REPORTED ? --- ? WASHINGTON, Feb. 15 (UPI) ?The Central Intelligence Agency infiltrated the Atner- ican antiwar movement in an effort to get its own men, mas- querading as radicals, recruited by Soviet intelligence, a former deputy C.I.A. director said to- day. Describing the double-agent gambit as "an error .in judg- ment," Ray S. Cline said the- agency hgd edone it because President Johnson and Nixon were "absolutely obsessed" with the belfef that the Rus- sians were manipulating the Vietnam protests. never able to establish a "Rus- sian connection" within the equally valid worries of those who do not want the. CIA's intelligence-gather- ing skills, turned against American citi- zens, tho our own government had secretly declared war against dissent- ers. ? ? Trying to balance Theseopposing scon- cerns,. we come up 'with the following conclusions: ? . The CIA has a job to do that is im- portant to all of us?namely, finding out what ? foreign governments .and movements are up to so that our own planners may take their intentions into account. To do this it has' developed specialized skills which. are by nature 1. :extralegal, .apd are consequently very . ?haid- to, control by -law.. The problem, put bluntly but. realistically, is to- set rules- for the CIA whicji will enable it to Skirt the laws of other governments while adhering faithfully to the laws of otir own. ? ? - We know of no way to-do this except the way that has-in fact been used: to expose, fully and mercilessly, CIA transgressions against the rights of American citizens. If this has, caused problems for the- CIA, the solution, is plain enough. It is to stop doing the things that cause it embarrassment and, concentrate exclusively on the job it's supposed to do. ? We' have no 'interest whatever in making it less risky to commit crimi- ' pal acts or to tamper with. the rights of- American citizens. Foreign' intelligence agencies and secret police are often as ?willing to trespass on the rights and privacy of their own citizens as they are on those of foreigners, and the citi- zens of many foreign countries take this imposition as a matter of course. The American people will not accept it, and should not. Mr. Colby must under- stand this if he and the CIA are to suc- ceed in their public relations effort. American dissident movement. It is now under investigation itself, to determine whether it broke the law- by spying on Americans. Mr. Cline, a C.I.A. ,employe for 27 years and a deputy di- rector from 1962 to 1966, dis- closed details of the infiltration- operations in an interview that enlarged on information al- ready made public by William E. Crdily, ftp Director of Cen- tral Intelligence. Mr. Cline said the counterspy operation?in which one intel- ligence agency puts out an agent as "bait" to be recruited by a rival agency, and to work within it as a double agent? appeared at the time to be "a classical counterespionage oper- ation." Now, he said, he con- siders it "an error in judgment." Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360007-1. 'VS1 ( Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360007-1 WASHINGTON POST 23 February 1975 ? 'INSIDE THE COMPANY: CTA Diary. By Philip 4gee. Penguin Books, Lon- don. 640 pp. 95 pence By PATRICK BRESLIN WHEN VICTOR MARCHETTI wrote The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency censored 339 passages and a judge upheld 168 of the deletions. The book was published last year with intriguing blanks where mate: rial deemed too sensitive had been. There are no blanks in Philip Agee's e1nrnce With this review of Philip Agee's CIA diary, Inside the Company, Book World is departing from its usual practice of reviewing only books available in the United States. We are doing so because of the unusual interest the book generated when it appeared in London Janu- ary 2, and because of its relevance to the current investigation of the aims and methods of the Central Intelligence Agency. Because of copyright restrictions, the book cannot be bought at stores in this country, although it will be available in an American edition later this year. It is now available in England and Canada in Penguin editions selling for 95 pence and $2.95, respectively. For more on this subject, see Joyce Illig's Book Business col- umn on page two. in the late 1950s, vaguely dissatisfied, un- which communism thrives." side the Company: CIA. Diary. This enthusiastic about going into a business densely detailed expose names every CIA career, facing two dreary, wasted years in officer, every agent, every operation that the army. Bid at Notre Dame, he had Agee encountered during 12 years with learned patriotism, and that the enemy "The Company" in Ecuador, Uruguay, was communism. One of his proudest mo- Mexico and Washington. ments came as chairman of the exercises Among CIA agents or collaborators; in which the school's patriotism award Agee lists the current President of Mex- went to then Strategic Air Command ico and his two predecesSors, a former chief General Curtis Lemay: Agee re- president of Uruguay, a former vice pres? called with respect rather than irony Le- ident of Ecuador; U.S. and Latin Amen- may's Strangelovian cadences: "If we can labor leaders, ranking Communist maintain our faith in God, our love .of Party members, and scores of other politi- freedom, and superior global air 'clans, high military and police officials,. power..." and journalists. There is grist for a hun- The U. S. was the bastion of democracy, tired Latin American 'Aratergates in these with the energy, the wisdom, and the re- pages. sponsibility to make other nations in its Agee tells of CIA interventions in elec- image. But time had to be bought. The tions in Guyana, Brazil, and Chile. -In the communist menaCe had to be held back Dominican Republic, he says, the assassi- long enough to give democracy a chance nation of Trujillo was carried out by CIA in the poor nations around the globe. agents using weapons sent through the Bored with the prospects facing him at diplomatic pouch. He relates almost hi- home, seeking something meaningful, larious instances of incompetence. In hoping to avoid the draft, Agee joined Buenos Aires, the officer in charge of op- the CIA in 1957. Four years later he might erations against the Soviet Embassy have joined the Peace Corps. The motive- couldn't find it while driving his Wash- ton would have been the same. ington superiors around the city. To faci- litate breaking into automobiles, one ea- After a stint as an Air Force officer (for ger beaver in Ecuador cluttered the CIA cover) and CIA training, Agee arrived in office with 200 poods of car keys. One Ii- Quito, Ecuador in late 1960. During the nally understands why the Watergate glory years of the Alliance for Progress.. bunglers were caught. and the New Frontier, he fought the holy In his book, Marchetti sought to reform war against communism by bribing politi- cians and journalists, forging documents, the CIA, to argue that it had strayed from its purpose, to criticize bitingly but con- tapping telephones, and reading other structively. Agee's aim is different; he people's 'mail. He learned that a bought , .wants the entire operation dismantled. and paid for senator in Ecuador was The CIA managed to delay the Mar- worth $700 a month, raised to $1,000 when chetti book, and then to censor it. Agee he became vice president. side-stepped the CIA by publishing in CIA goals in Ecuador during those England through ? Penguin Books. His. years were to disrupt the Left and to con- book is available since last month in most tribute to the isolation of Cuba by forcing of the English-speaking world except the Ecuador to break relations. In pursuit of U. S. On its paperback cover is a picture these goals, every political group was of the bugeed typewriter Agee thinks the Penetrated and corrupted, riots and dem- CIA planted on him while he was writing. onstrations in which people were injured A hardcover edition is expected to be were encouraged and supported. Two ci- published here within the next few.. vilian governments fell but relations months. with Cuba were finally broken. Agee left Inside the Company, more than an ex.- in 1963 confident that the ?necessary so- pose, is a unique chronicle of the 1960s, cial and democratic reforms could now that decade of disillusion. Like so many 'take place: "CIA operations promote sta- young men, Agee emerged from college bility through assisting local govern-. ments to build up their security forces ...? and by putting down the extreme left... Through those programmes we buy time for friendly governments to effect tho re- PATRICK BRESLIN was in the Peace Corps in Colombia and has worked and studied in other Latin American couri-. tries, including Chjle for most of 19'72- forms that will eliminate the injustices on But what if the friendly governments are not really interested in reforms? .What if improving the security forces ac- tually lessens the chance of reforms? Agee's next station was Montevideo, Uru- guay'. He was there for three years, and would learn that "these Uruguayan poli- ticians are interested in other things than land reform," that Uruguay was the "model of corruption and incapacity." .. Nevertheless, CIA doctrine said strengthen the security forces first. Agee would complain that the main problem vial local military intelligence was "the Uruguayan militalia tradition of keeping aloof from politics.? There was a silver lining, though?the Deputy Chief of Intelligence, "a rabid anti-communist whose ideas border on fascist-style repression,"Yould some day, Agee hoped, be chief of intelligence. Meanwhile, another. CIA officer kept close to a "very wealthy fascist-oriented 'lawyer and rancher ne : active in trying to persuade military leaders to intervene inpolitical affairs." ' ' What the CIA did in Uruguay;' accord- ing to Agee; was prop up'a corrupt, decay- ing government by making it capable;of crushing a widespread and- growing movement for radical reform. In the pur- suit of "democracy" the CIA pushed the military into politics. Uruguay today is run by the military through a civilian fig- urehead president,- Congress is closed. there is no free press, and there are no re- forms. e. It was in Uruguay that Agee startee wondering about what he was doing. On; morning he sat in the office of the chief c-' police. From the floor above came . screams- To-f someone being tortured the screams increased in intensity, te chief turned up the volume of the seer. game on the radio. Agee learned Ire - that the torture victim was a commenn: ? whose name he had turned over to the re; lice a few days earlier. "Hearing thn voice ... made me feel terrified and hz.qi: less. All I wanted to do was to get aw:,. from the voice and away from the police. headquarters. Why didn't (we) say ane- thing? ... We just sat there embarrassed and shocked. I'm going to be hearing that voice for a long time." But it was a faraway event which seems tO Th ave disturbed him more. Lyndon Johnson's invasion of the Dominican Re- 1973. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-22432R000100360007-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360007-1 jattlalic in 1985 was an overreaction Agee Couldn't accept '"It can't be that I'm against intervention as such," he mused, "because everything I do is in one way or another intervention in the affairs of other.countries. Partly, I suppose; it'.s the immense scale' of this invasion- that 'shocks." Agee and his fell OW CPA officers ? thought Johnson's explanatiOn for the in- vasion?that 58 trained communists were ahonfto take over in Santo Domingo?so absiud . they adopted it: "Fifty.-eight trained communists' is` our new Station Password and the answer is 'Ten thou- sand marines'" . The'invasion led Agee to question all CIA efforts in Latin America. Counterin- surgency seemed to hive stemmed the Communist threat. But where were the. reforms? "The morel think about the Do- ininican invasion the more I wonder whether the politicians in Washington reallY want to see reforms in Latin Amer- ice.' Agee began to think about leaving the-Company. ' ' 1966 he was transferred to desk duties in Washington. The. paper, work was dull and he jumped ata chance-to-go to Mexico the next year under the cover of an embassy attache working on the 1968' Olympic Games: Rather than controlling agents and running operations, his job in Mexico was to meet people and make con- tacts. It provided him with a way of estab- lishing distance from The Company. By. the time the Olympics were over, Agee had ended his CIA career. He resigned with the conviction that he had become "a "servant of the capitalism I rejected" as a university student. "I became one of its secret policemen. The CIA, after all, is nothing more 'than the secret police of American capitalism, plugging ui:v leaks in the political dam night and day so that shareholders of U.S. companies operat= jag in poor countries can continue enjoy- ing the rip-off." _ , . In the next couple of years, Agee de- cided to write this reconstructed diary to tell everything he knew. Not only would he expose the CIA; he would work against it: "I have also decided to seek ways of getting useful information on the CIA to revolutionary organizations that could', use it to defend themselves better." He spent the last three years writing the book in. Europe, , making research The Trashhaglon Merry.erso. und .==a?R, meow romams CIA Weiq t Aetio trips.ito Cuba, and dodging the CIA.J.At one point he lived on money advancedz,by-_ a woman he believes was a CIA agent try- ing to gain his confidence. His training in, deceit served, him well. .during thos,e years. , -,, f ?,` The appearanoe of Agee's, book now,.as several committees in Washington are he-.; ginning to investigate the CIA, poses an. interesting challenge. Until recently, our elected representatives have generally managed to stay in the dark about what the CIA does. Until recently, former CIA Director Richard Helms's plea that"Tote- ve just got to trust us. We are honorable men" was enough. With the revelations or domestic spying, it no longer is, and; everyone concerned is loudly and right-. eously opposed to CIA activities at home,: Agee has provided the most complete 'description yet of What the CIA does abroad. In entry after numbing entry, I?T.. S. foreign policy in Latin America is pic- -tured as a web of deceit, hypocrisy, and corruption. Now that we can no longer- plead ignorance of the webs our Spiders 'spin, will we continue to tolerate CIA wc- tivities abroad? _ - - ? THE. WASHINGTON POST - Thursday, Feb. 27,1975 ? ? ' Jack Anderson ? and Les Whitten Top CIA officials.are debating whether to bring legal action. against Philip Agee, whose ,book about his life in the CIA has caused havoc. Agee listed everyone who had worked with. him in the CIA in Latin .America. He also added names provided, he said, by "a small group .of Mexican com- rades who I trained to follow the comings and goings-of CIA peo- ple before I left Mexico City." It has cost the CIA "several million dollars," according to inside sources, to transfer the agents who had been fingered and to protect its operations in Latin America. ? The CIA, however, couldn't protect all the local people whom Agee, listed as CIA "col- laboretors." Among them were many who had only routine dealings with the CIA in such le- . gall/late activities as drug con- trol, anti-hijacking techniques and anti-terrorist operations. A number of them have been bar:6sec' with threatening phone calls. 'One reported that his daughter's. life had. been I threatened and the wall in front of his home had been defaced. In Uruguay, a taxi driver , whose name appeared.in.Agee's book stopped at a traffic light. Another car Pulled alongside him, and an assailant emptied a pistol at the taxi. The driver mi- raculously escaped injury. ? In Ecuador, an engineer on Agee's list appeared at the U.S. embassy to plead for protection. CIA officials doubt that they can bring legal charges against Agee as long as he stays out of the country, our sources say. Agee told us by transatlantic telephone that he hopes to re- turn home but that he will wait until he gets the green light from his legal adviser. He is represented by Melvin Wulf, en American Civil Liber- ties Union attorney, who said he will withhold his advice until he talks to the Justice Department and learns its intentions. "The only action they could 'bring against 'Agee," Wulf told us, "would be an espionage charge, and that would be' a fruitless prosecution." Indeed, this may be precisely what the CIA has in mind. Our own CIA sources say Agee has been kept under surveillance and that he has been spotted in the company of Cuban intelli- gence agents in Paris and Lon- don: Agee doesn't deny .this. "I have seen them in 'Paris and London," he, acknowledged to us. "I go straight to the Cuban embassy. Whether they were Cp.- ban intelligence officers or not, I don't really care." - nst Agee 'He added meaningfully; "I support -the Cuban revolution." He emphasized, that he had never been de- briefed by either the Soviet KGB 'or Cuban intelligence. But on his own initiative, he told us, he had gone to insurgent lead- ers and had informed them of his CIA activities against them. "I am for the liberation move- ments," he said. _ ? One source showed us docu- mentation, which suggests but doesn't prove that Agee is under Cuban discipline. A press re- lease, which Agee issued in London on Oct. 3, 1974, appears to have been written by the Cu- bans. Our source showed us lan- guage peculiarities, which indi- cate it was translated from col- loquial Cuban Spanish. This is denied by Agee. "I wrote that," he declared, "right on my own typewriter in Corn- wall (England)." But he ac- knowledged that it had been du- plicated for the press in the of- fices of a left-wing Latin Ameri- can publication in London. Our CIA sources also believe that Agee pulled his punches on Mexico's President Luis alley- erria after ? receiving instruc- tions from Havana. On Oct. 3. Agee denounced the Megi Call press for omitting his account' of a "close relation- ship" that he, claimed existed between a CIA official and . Echeverria. "Mexican comrades have torn. me," said Agee, "that the refer-I ence to Echeverria's relation-- ship with (the CIA man) was: probably omitted by official- censorship order, in itself not: uncommon there, in order to' save embarrassment to the in- cumbent." Agee carefully' added that Echeverria "may have broken with the CIA when he became president." . A subsequent Agee interview, linking Echeverria with the CIA, was published in the De- cember issue of the Colombian: magazine "Alternativa." Fidel Castro, eager to con- tinue his good relations with Echeverria, sent a member a' the Cuban politburo,'? Carlos Rafel Rodriguez, on a secret,: one-day visit to Mexico City on: Dec. 18 to placate the Mexican' president, according to our CIA* sources. ? Not long afterward, Agee got. together with the interviewer, Gabriel Garcia Marquez. a left-. wing. Nobel Prize writer. in ? Spain, say our sources. Both . men issued syternents exoner- ating Echeverria. Agee denied to us that he re-. ceived aby instructions from. Havana to soften his attack on the Mexican president.. ?1073, United Feature Syndicate Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360007-1 _ WASHINGTON POST _93 1 75 Book . .Business Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDF'77-00432R00010036000/-1 By JOYCE ILLIG' Shaft for Strciight Arrow CONFLICT over the United States publi- cation rights to Inside the Company: CIA Diary, the former CIA agent's book re- viewed in this issue of Book World, may deflect Straight Arrow's plans to publish the book here in May. An oral agreement was made last October between Straight Arrow and Penguin, the book's London publisher, but no contract was signed. Now, the ? oral agreement is being by- passed and new arrangements made for ArneriCan publication of the book. The first signs of trouble appeared about two weeks ago when Philip Agee, the author, visited Canada to promote the publication of his book there. Diane Cleaver, managing editor of Straight Ar- row, went to Canada to discuss final de- tails of the contract with him; then, dur- ing the discussion,- Penguin released North American rights to the author and Agee decided that he should get an agent. "I said that would be fine," said Cleaver, "and I gave him some names. They didn't include Scott Meredith, The , next thing I knew, Meredith was handling the book and offering it to other publish. ers." *, ? : . The outstanding problem in the Octo- her agreement was-over the mass paper hack rights, which Straight Arrow claimed and Penguin denied had been in. eluded in the deal. "That's when the prob- lem. started," according to Cleaver. "We ,would never have made an agreement at that time, when we were the only pub- usher willing to publish it, that did not elude mass market paperback rights.". 'Straight Arrow was not interested in mak- ing an offer to Meredith for hardcover rights alone. - Cleaver said they had an agreement to pay Agee a $12,000 advance, offered a60- 40 split on the paperback and had a set advertising and promotion budget.. (Originally, Penguin aecepted an advance offer of $8000, according to Cleaver. Then when negotiations started, Straight Ar- row decided to "make a concession" and go to $12,000). "There has never been 'any question that we would publish until the agent came on the scene," said Cleaver, "and then I thought what would happen would be that the agent would negotiate with us for some satisfying thing for Agee so that he wouldn't feel that he wasn't getting the right exposure." . Meanwhile, the Scott Meredith Literary Agency, which had been offering the hardcover and paperback rights sepa- rately to such New York publishers as Doubleday, Praeger,, New American Li- brary lnd Bantam,. was expected to close a deal for simultaneous hard and _ .?_ soft- cover ytwiC aatavst the cud LUC week. The book is listed in the Straight Arrow catalogue, and salesmen for Simon & Schuster, Straight Arrow's distributors, have been selling it and orders are com- ing in. "We're all scheduled to go and 'could have the book out in eight weeks," said Cleaver. "We're taking a firm stand that we have a right to publish consider- ing a-commitment since last October:, [Penguin Books Canada Ltd. reports a large number of requests for the book from congressional staff members fr 'Washington, and an order of 3000 copie' from the Harvard Coop which could is be filled. The Canadian distributor is ex pecting a shipment of 15,000 copies Iron 'England this week and has ordered 10,00C copies of the third printing, which will hr available in March. The first Penguir printing of 25,000 copies Was quickly sal out in England and in Canada, where 11,- 500 copies have been sold since the end a January with back orders for 7500 more.] Lack of Forsyth .-- WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY Jr. is in the SWiSf Alps writing what he calls "my first nove and almost certainly my last." Buckle: goes to Rougemont, a small village nem Gstaad, to ski and write his books. So far be has finished about 140 Pages about E :CIA agent who was recruited in his senioi ,year at Yale. Ne began to plan "a Freder- ick Forsyth type thriller": a few months ago in New. York in discussions with Sam Vaughan, president of Doubleday.: After serving in the army, Buckle.yis protagonist is given a very mysterious mission in London, "details of which are unspecifiable at this point," according to the author. Buckley had intended to fin- ish his novel with the Bay of Pigs but said "I'm having a little trouble trying to fig- ure how to stretch it out that long beraus I'm only in 1952. So I.might have to get ?sort of foreshortened grip on the resolu tion." Buckley's own background in intelli gence should provide solid material fo his fiction. According to Gary Wills,a for rner associate, he is an ex-CIA agent a his association with E. 'Howard Hint i well known. - JOYCE RUG writes regularly on th publishing scene for Book World. - 25 PPR 1975 Us2r1 but Necessary Mechanism BALTIMORE SUN b William L. Colby's opinion that CIA transgres- -Sions "in no way justify the public outcry which has - been raised" can and should be dismissed as just that?his opinion. It is an opinion tinted by a career :of loyalty to the agency; the Rockefeller Commis- sion and the House and Senate select committees will come. to their own opinions on precisely the same subject after their investigations. -- Mr 'Colby's plea for a responsible and systematic ?approach to the three parallel investigations cannot and should not be similarly dismissed. The lingering pain from the Watergate trauma should not lead the nation to conch* that government agencies oper- ate at all times as the White House did under Ri- chard' Nixon. Nothing has appeared yet to suggest that the investigators will find in Mr. Colby either the cavalier disregard for truth or the arrogant con- tempt for Congress and public that characterized ;the Nixonian guard. On his record thus far, Mr. Col- :by. whatever his opinions, has been relatively forth- 'coming when questioned by congressmen. At times, he has even told them more than they thought they were asking.. His performance has been in sharp contrast with that of. his predecessor, Richard Helms, whose distorted priorities have forced him into a series of embarrassigiow 23 N u n AlleERAIKEV . rt-rd realize that only through co-operation with Congress and the Rockefeller. Commission can he re-establish public confidence in his agency. ? ? While these investigations go on, he will have the job of running and maintaining an agency that is, by ? the nature of its assignment, a delicate and difficult mechanism. It is also, to many Americans, an. ugly mechanism, a reminder that persons and nations are less civil and less civilized than they like to think they are. Free societies need to take a skeptical look at such agencies from time to time, and the look now- getting under way in America is surely long overdue. The investigators must not flinch from their job of determining the extent to which the rights of citizens may have fallen victim to opera- tions of the CIA and other intelligence agencies. But what is most important now about these investiga- tions is that they are in fact getting under way under a .mandate to dig deeply into the serious questions that have been raised. While they proceed, it is worth remembering that much of the CIA's work, distasteful as it may be, happens to reflect realities that show no sign of disappearing soon from interna- tional life. The persons charged with that work de- serve a sympathetic hearing when they ask that i d ofesdio ally and dispas- drgIA-FiMelMh6618* 067-1 ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360007-1 WASHINGTON POST 24 February 1915 Alsop The KGB's 'Safe House' Thus far only one fact Of real im- portance has emerged from the rump, .us about .domestic surveillance by the --CIA and FBI. This country, in fact, turns ont to be shockingly vulnerable to the Soviet Union's ruthless, omni- present KGB *because of a shockingly incompetent and ill-advised counter- ' intelligence system. , As. an illustration, consider the truly bizarre ukese issued by the .late Edgar Hoover toward the end of the 1960s. By order, the director of the PBI provided .a gigantic; gloriously -convenient "safe house" for the KGB's' ? all too numerous agents and any other 'spies happening to be in Washington... 'A "safe house," of course, is the Intelligence community's lable for a place where foreign agents can meet. their local contacts in perfect security to make payoffs or to transmit orders Or to pick up information. Just to add an extra touch a fantasy, the Hoover- provided safe house was no less than the second center of -the U.S. govern- ment, the huge U.S. Capitol with all its grounds and dependencies. . Under the terms of the Hoover ukase, the Capitol complex was put strictly off-limits for all the FBI's ? countointelligence men.. Yet the 'FBI- has a legal monopoly on all Counter- intelligence Within the territorial limits of the United States. Hence Hoover's ukase meant that known SO- ? viet- spies, who were known to be about to make an American contact known to be dangerous, could still be sure of doing so with perfect im- punity?provided they just named a rendezvous in the -off-limits part of Capitol Hill. 'All this seemed, downright incredi- ble to me when it was first reported by Ron Kessler of The Washington Post. My own check has fully ? sus- tained KesSier's story, however. There is only one significant point that re- mains in some doubt. It is no ? more than 95 per cent certain that the Hoo- ver ukase !remains in full force and that Capitol, therefore, continues to be a KGB safe house. That 95 per cent certainty is too close for com- fort, one must add. Furthermore, I think .I know why ,Hoover issued his ukase. For back- ground, you must first understand that the KGB maintains an enormous. number ofispies in this country. As a measure, remember that we are prior- ity No. 1, Whereas Great Britain is no more than priority No. 4. Yet when the KGB greve over-bold in Britain, the Foreign Office had' to expell 105 well- r_ authenticated KGB men. _ Second. von muSt understand that with such -ample human resources, , the KGB. tuls long given a lot of its men part-tithe or full-time assignments on Capitol By the rit1-1960s, there were somewhere between 20 and? 30 KGB men dealing with the U.S. Congress or with the countless staff people the, Congress and its commit- tees -emploY., This does, not mean that KGB were constantly seeing senators and representatives. On the contary, they were known to concentrate rather heavily Ott the lawmakers' personal staffs and also, on the committee . Joseph Alsop, who until the first of the -year wrote a syndicated col- - unin that appeared on. the opposite page. three times a week; is 71-0W writ- ing a syndicated monthly- column. This is the second of Mr. Alsop's .new columns. staffs. But this is almost a distinction with- out a .difference. Nowadays, in truth, domineering and able staff members . largely control the thoughts and acts of all too many lawmakers, especially in the Senate. Great numbers of .lett of center staff members on the Sere ? ate side of the Capitol also constitute a quasi-independent power bloc. They all Work together, all Protect one ane other and often join to extend their. blOe's power by planting friends and allies in new senatorial offices. I myself believe that this unknown, unseen power bloc ls an unhealthy new political growth. Yet I must hast- en to add that it was not and is -not necessarily improper for these people s-sor indeed for anyone else on Capitol Hill?to' see the -KGB men who have swarmed there for se -long. The KGB men, of course, were all masquerad- ing, and still are masquerading, is .rnass ?correspondents, embassy secre- taries, trade expert and, so on: ParticUlarlY on the left of the poli- tical spectrum, however, the FBI watch that J. Ed-gar Hoover staffed with his ukase showed an astonishing number of KGB contacts on Capitol Hill. It would have looked remarkably bad if anyone had made a public issue of them. Furthermore, President John- son was tempted to do just that toward the end of his second term; and Presi- dent Nixon actively wished to do just that in 1969. It Was about' then that the Hoover ukase was issued. I feel sure, there- fore, the aim was to suspend the FBI's former careful watch on the Capitol 14- rjj erder 'to be protected from Con- gress' if the White House went too far in its revelations. So there you have it?a horrifying story which is pretty likely to be go- ing on this minute. The story is hor- rifying, of course, because foreign esp- ionage is a damnably Serious busi- ness, even in a free society like ours. It is so serious, in turn, because it is dangerous to have a government, a press, an academic world and the ranks of science all bristling with people like Kim Philbey; Guy Burgess and Don- ald MacLean. I hope and think this is not our situation; but this is certainly the situation the KGB has been going all out to produce ever since the Unit- ed States, became the unique giant power in our- half of the world. If you reflect upon this story, you And that its main lesson is the singu- larly unprofessional character of the FBI approach to counterintelligence? at 'any rate under the leadership of the' aging J. Edgar Hoover. Nor is this at all surprising. To have truly profes- eional counterintelligence you have to know the story from the' beginning, which is in Moscow in the case of the KGB. The CIA, of course, is supposed to know all about- Moscow. But another appalling revelation of the current CIA-FBI rumpus is the bloody bitter,- mess of the FBI-CIA feud. The two agencies never worked together until new liaison arrangements were made by new leaders a year ago. This Idnd of crippling non-cooperation can too Tee"-, tt,so. Again. the rumpus nas glaringly re- vealed the ? recurring dominance of do- mestic, politics in the FBI counter- intelligence work, at any rate in the Hoover era. It was politics that caused the former FBI director to create the KGB safe house. It was politics, too; ? that caused him to ignore President Johnson's order to have a look at the- peace movement's foreign links, there- by spurring Johnson to call in the CIA. In short, the foolish may credit the argument that the CIA-FBI rumpus has uncovered a grave threat to our civil liberties. But more sensible peo- pie will instead perceive an open invi- tation to the KGB. THE GUARDIAN MANCHESTER 11 February 1975 Helms may have to leave Iran From HELLAi PICK Washington, February 10 The Administration may soon have little alternative but to put Richard Helms on pro- longed leave of absence as US Ambessador to Iran : or'it maY even have SO find a replacement, for him. The Adininistration is deter- mined be avoid any ackhowledg- 'tient that 1,1r Helms may have, acted improperly in his pre- vious post as director of. the CIA. But it May be able to hide its embarrassment behind the fact that Mr Helms mill he in such frequent demand for the various investigations into. the CIA's conduct that he -cannot devote .himself as fully as he should to his ambas- sadorship. ? Mr Helms is in growing trou- ble. And his 'troubles may engulf other members of the Nixon Administration, includ- ing Dr Kissinger., Lawyers are today weiehing up the,questicn of whether Mr Helms commit- ted perjury in his testimony to -the Foreign Relations Commit-, tee two years ago, when he din- correctly said "No" in replY to a question whether the CIA was. ?involved in at to overthrow the Allende Govern- ment in Chile. The Committee has now pub- liSheet testimonyebV Helms in trhieli he admitted CIA i.neol- 'venient, and also volunteered the information that " there : was. no doubt" that .the Nixon Administeation wanted the Allende regime oyerthrown. This may spell more frouble for Dr Kissinger, who heads the so-called Forty Corimuttee, which is supposed to superviso. and direct the CIA's subversive activities overseas. Approved For Release 2001/08/08': CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360007-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000106360007-1 'NEW YORK REVIEW 20 FEB 1975 A New Soluti n f r the CIAi Stalin did establish one useful prece- dent. He made it a practice ?to bump off whoever served as head of his secret police. He never let anybody stay in the job too long. As a successful dictator, Stalin seems to have felt that anybody who had collected so many secrets would be a No. 1 menace to security, if he ever went sour, Stalin thought it safer not to wait. I think we ought to take Stalin's example one step further. I think we ought to get rid of the CIA altogether, lock, stock, and burglar's kit. We know from recent revelations how J. Edgar Hoover in his lifetime tenure as FBI chief collected dos- siers on the sexual and drinking habits of congressmen and high officials. The mere rumor that such secrets were in his files made Hoover the most feared man in the capital, the untouchable of US poli- tics. A similar character could build up a similar empire of fear in and through the CIA. Those who think it enough to establish new oversight committees should remember that there have been CIA committees in Congress since the agency's formation and they have, invariably overlooked the abuses they were supposed to over- see. As for forbidding the agency to engage in "dirty tricks," how en- force such a restriction against an agency so secretive, so far-flung, and so habituated to doing-iri political leaders of whom it disapproves? It is hard enough to keep a tight rein on public 'agencies right here in Washington.' How to control, some- U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, March 3, 1975 In spite of ,the Central Intelligence Agency's top-level co-operation with investigations into its operations, one official offered this comment: "Before Congress rears away the secrecy of the intelligence community, it had better decide first Why the secrecy was estab- lished in the beginning. The chief of the KGB in ;Moscow must be rolling on the floor of the Kremlin with laughter." tone r;.Li. )....444,,44.41.14144?4446tomiimpiia4:4 times 10,000 miles away, the kind. of adventurers, screwball; and in- triguers an agency like the CIA' . I naturally attracts? The US government is inundated daily by tidal waves of intelligence. We have a mysterious electronic ! NSA which taps and tapes all the communications systems of the world; its huge "ears" in Pakistan.: and Turkey. record the slightest Kremlin sneeze. Even in remotest Siberia, no babushka can milk her cow without being caught on candid camera from US Satellites on eternal ' patrol. . In the Pentagon are separate intel- ligence branches of the army, air force, and navy,.each with its own military attaches abroad, and over all of them is a defense intelligence agency, a DIA. The State Depart- ment has its -own intelligence and research. division; fife Foreign Serv- ice is its eyes and ears abroad, The departments. of Commerce, Labor, and Agriculture have attaches of their own in. many US embassies. Businessmen and Washington torre- spondents who use their publicly available studies on countries and commodities know how much more reliable they are than the spooks. The Treasury has its narcotics and other agents. Internal Revenue, Cus- toms, and the Post Office have their oi.vn gumshoe men. There is the FBI and there is the Secret Service. Nobody seems to know how m?uch all this costs or how many are employed. Congress does know that CIA expenditures hidden in certain .crevices of the budget add up to. several billions of dollars. The exact amount iS unknown. .__Vriginally we were told when the'i CIA was established by Truman in 1947 that it was necessary?as its name implied?to "centralize" all! these intelligence activities and sum-. marize for the White House the' information flowing in from them. We were not told, and perhaps Truman never intended, that the CIA would soon be engaged in James Bond melodrama around the world, making and unmaking gov- ernments not ? to our Jiking, and irt the process sentencing other is tions' tiOns' leaders like Mossaddeq of Irani and Allende of Chile to death.. Watergate has already shown us that to practice such crime-as-politics' abroad is to invite its application sooner. or later to politics at home. As an intelligence service the CIA has been a bust. The Bay of Pigs and the Vietnam war are only the Most dramatic demonstrations that public officials would have been better informed?and adopted wiser policies?ff they had simply read the newspapers and put all that "classi-. fied" information in the waste- basket. The CIA has made "the US look like the world's. biggest Mafia' while helping to trap it into one serious mistake after another. Never have so many billions been squan- dered on ? so much misinformation.1 In its twenty-seven years of exist- ence?even at' $2 billion a year?this' giddy operation must have cost upward of $50 billion. Why not get. rid of it before it can . do more damage? liven when, occasionally, the CIA analyses were accurate they have gone into the bureaucratic Waste-; baskets because they conflicted with ?what officials higher up wanted to hear. . One example is the sour fePterts about the Vietnam war which turned up in the Pentagon Papers. Another example- (see the exclusive in The Christian Science, Monitor, January 23, 1975) was the studies showing there was "no evidence to suggest" that the anti- Vietnam war movement was insti- gated from abroad. The Nixon White House nonetheless ordered the agency to go,,abead and compile a list of 10,0004g::.iess-,-peaceniks suspected of being foreign agents. A. government, like an individual, hates to heat 'what it doesn't want to believe.' This is why no intelli- gence agency in any society ever really understands?or can afford to let itself understand?what is going on. The bigger the intelligence agen- cy, the more powerfully its sheer inertial weight reinforces the mis- conceptions of the ruling class it serves. Hence the paradox: the' more "intelligence" a government buys the less intelligently it oper- ates. The ?CIA will go down in the books as a vain attempt to change history by instittillonalizing assassi- nation. It deserves a dose of its own favorite medicine. 0 Ap'prOVed. For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360007-1 , . Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360007-1 Behind the CIA purge An American Correspondent writes:- ? ? ? - - - With the left wing American mess launching a massive attack against the CIA for "domes!ie spying", which has resulted in the recent resignations of four leading officials, a deliberate smokescreen or deception operation has been set into motion to deceive the public as to the true situation inside the upper hierarchy of the Central Intelligence Agency. The . belated news media attack has been carefully managed by the liberal element to exploit the Watergate fiasco and tighten the grip of Director of Central Intelligence, William Egan Colby, over various CIA officials who do not agree with him and the official Kissinger policy of d?nte with the Soviet Union. In a managed stage-play sequence, similar to a Charlie McCarthy-Edgar Bergen act, the New York Times belatedly gave the cue for a general attack when left wing reporter Seymour Hersh "broke" the story of illegal CIA. activities. According to plan, the resulting press furore "prompted" -President Ford to request a report on the situation from CIA director, Colby, which did indeed corroborate the fact that the CIA engaged in domestic surveillance activities in violation of its charter?something known for years by most Americans and previously reported by Intelligence Digest (November 1972, "Crises in Western Intelligence Agencies"). Using this Pavlovian reaction, Colby then ordered the resignations of four top officials in the CIA'S Counter-intelligence Division. These were James J. Angleton, division chief; Raymond Rocca, assistant .chief; Newton S. Miler. chief of operations; and William J. Hood, executive officer. What the managed press failed to report was that these "resignations" were in fact a purge by Colby which resulted from a long-standing difference in' policy over d?nte with Russia. Ang.letoh, and his top subordinates disagreed totally with Colby over the interpreta- tion of CIA intelligence from heffind the Soviet bloc. This intelligence does not support the contentions of Secretary of State Kissinger. The power behind President Ford This latest purge by Colby' reflects the attitude of Kissinger as expressed through President Ford. The so-called Ford- Kissinger policy is.nothing more than an extension of the Nixon-Kissinger policy. In reality, this should be termed the Rockefeller-Kissinger policy?as it actually has been from the beginning when Kissinger was brought into the Nixon administration. At any rate, an already weak CIA has been further weakened and will be weakened again in the future when, amid the glare of publicity, four Congressional com- mittees begin further inquiry into covert CIA operations. In line with the Kissinger policy, Colby and the liberal faction in the CIA seek to continue the purge of the anti-Communist element, particularly those, connected with the overthrow of the Allende Marxists in Chile. It is difficult for the human mind to grasp the foil extent* of the power wielded by Vice-President Nelson A. Rockefeller, THE INTELLIGENCE DIGEST FEBRUARY, 1975 WASHINGTON POST 23 February 1975 his family and his collaborators. A recent report, submitted to Congress by two University of California Professors, revealed that 15 members of the Rockefeller family are directors of 40 corporations which have total assets of 70 billion dollars. 1 he boards on which the Rockefellers serve .have interlocking directorates svith 91 major US corporations controlling combined assets of 640 billion dollars.. . This is indicative of the gigantic Rockefeller power behind the Purse- strings of America. It is real power?the power of the . Almighty Dollar! It is now being brought to bear againSt the CIA faction opposing the dangerous course of d?nte. CIA evaluations for 1075 Regardless of the opinions of President Ford, Vice- President Rockefeller, and Secretary of State Kissinger, several CIA intelligence analysts are forecasting a determined political offensive by Moscow in 1975 to exploit the Western World's economic and political weaknesses and to strengthen and further the international Communist revolutionary movement. Soviet military strength will continue to grow, especially .its Strategic Rocket Force which already has throw-weight superiority over the West. The Soviet military clique is steadily gaining more power and influence in the Kremlin. The CIA analysts believe that d?nte may slip into disaster for America and the West. ' Kissinger policy projections There arc definite indications that the Kissinger policee will call for the transfer of full sovereignty over the Panama Canal to the left wing government of Panama by tfle end of 1975?contrary to the opinions of many American military and business leaders who desire to retain it under US control for at least another decade. The Kissinger policy also allows for joint US-Soviet .intervention in the Middle East should the situation become "grave". This, of course, would be a gigantic step and would call for US seizure of select oil fields in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and possibly even Iran. Russia would occupy select regions in Syria, Egypt and Iraq and NI ould secure control ?ler the Sues ? Canal. There could even be a joint Soviet-American occupation of Iran. Such events are very remote?but within the realm of strategic planners. It must be clearly pointed out, however, that any joint intervention in the Nliddle East will be primarily to the advantage of Russia since that nation atone has the present force to carry out such an operation effectively. It is also expected that Kissinger, with the full consent of Rockefeller, ? will urge diplomatic recognition of Communist Cuba before the end of 1975. American forces are gradually being with- drawn front Taiwan and full diplomatic relations may be extended to Peking later this year. These are all potential fruits of d?nte?a hazy pipe dream which has necessitated the further silencing of opposition in the CIA and elsewhere. Q. It is my understanding that several years ago the CIA planted an agent named Tracy Barnes in the .office of Kingman Brewster, president of Yale, to spy, on student activities. Is that so? Has another CIA agent succeeded Barnes? What happened to Barnes??H. T., New Haven, Conn. A. Tracy Barnes, veteran CIA agent, suffered two coronary attacks and died in Saunderstown, R.I., in 1971 at age 60. Prior to that he was involved with Richard Bissell of the CIA in the planning of the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, When that operation failed, the CIA assigned Barnes and an associate, Wally Lampshire, to set up a new depart- ment, the Domestic Operations Division at 1750 Pennsylvania Ave., Washington, D.C. with the dbjec- tive of infiltrating and obtaining intelligence from various foreign groups in the United States. In 1967, the CIA offered Barnes early retirement which he accepted. He then returned to his alma mater, Yale, where he worked as a special assistant to Kingman Brewster, specializing in alumni and community rela- tions. At no time did he spy on Yale students or their activities. .16 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001003600Q7-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360007-1 CHICAGO TRIBUNE 16 FEB 1975 ?? ? ? ? - ?e. t - ? : '011-A;SIOGTONn-Sniin. in.-. the.. gold : hreacf of rumor mills anc the silver mr-ne. of Phantom::: spiders,n the tales, 3pt6C1- like. steam. froni:the.,sewera and so.UndS: from; the ?.keyhole'S. ? ? ' ',They. are born pool of. fact spoken by :innocent: who, want, to, help. and fic-' anni.;Whispered by-.-the. guilty :who Seek Thse often-told,:nfrequeritly embet- 1jh? .and. as yet ?'unPro.Ven stories.: are nourished in the tortured brains of reporters,. .politicians,' 'and. conspiracy freaks who believe, the full story of the icandai-which felled a President has yet to surface :? ? -.PEW' HAVE .ever: appeared in print . . . eei fact, or: fon-that matter, ever- will. But they have taken on lives of their own and their- newsworthiness is hardly a gauge of-money and manpower spent in pursuit of them.- ? As simple as homemade sin or bizarre ? to test .the wildest ireanination, these tales almost always center around "it"?"it" being what "they" were try- ing7tO:coVer up with all that 1y-ng, and "they" being whoever was lying at the Lixner- ? With the investigation.s into the Cen- tral ? Intelligence Agency [CIA], the spookiest of all spooky things in Wash- ington, has come a whole new rash Of clues; leed?, and tips?all- of which, of course, lead to "it." The principal characters in most of them are former.. President Richard Nixon, who bears the ultimate responsi- ? bility for keeping "it" secret; Richard Helms, former CIA director .and now U. S. ambassador to Iran, whose ac- counts of his own participation are as plentiful as Mother Goose nursery rhymes, and ex-CIA man E. -Howard Hunt, whose failure to get anyone to believe him may make him one of the most mysterious characters in Amen- an history. history. . .! ? ? .One of the hottest "new" scenarios is an old one. The real reason the White House tried so hard to cover up the. Watergate burglary is: - The Hunt Connection?A close person- al relationship developed between Hunt and Nixon when, Hunt was.the CIA po- litical liaison in the planning of the Bay of Pigs iovasidn and Nixon was head- ing the National Security Council as Vice President in 1960. SUPPORTING evidence if plentiful. In a *conversation five days after the Watergate break-in, H. R. Haldeman,: Nixon's chief of staff, tells the Presi- dent that the CIA and Helms will coop- eras in coverup efforts because "itj and tracks back to the Bay of Pigs atergate: ?ice trut ? ; ? ? the whole Hunt problem": '" ?At leaSf One.' INVatergate--ccinneOted: lawyer has piece of brush for this Lire. His client,: be discreetly tells .asso- ciates; liedeabout the- CIA- because. Nix- on was. more afraid of the "Hunt prob- lem" than anYother. .'? - And there are numerous witnesses -who Were involved in the. Bay of Pigs -affair- who say they are sure Hunt -briefed the then-Vice President Nixon several: times. Some say he also briefed - President John F. Kennedy, who was let in on the planned invasion?to Nix- on's dismay, shortly ,before the 1960, Presidential election.. ? But the connection runs into trouble when: [1] Nixon: denies it; [2] Hunt denies it, and [3] -nobody who was con- nected with the Bay of Pigs operation can say they remember seeing Hunt and Nixon in the same. meeting. The list of "ifs" is endless. Some are epic. - In the same conversation which spawned The Hunt Connection, there are indications that CIA Director Helms was more than .willing to go along with the coverup. But he didn't, or at least he says he didn't. ?-, The Helms Connection?There are as' many theories about Helms, complete! with supporting evidence, as there arei differing sworn accounts by. CIA oh-!cials. ? One line being pursued by some fair- ly credible investigators is that Helms ? ? indeed was willing to go along. This is ?supported ? by sworn testimony that Helms ordered other CIA officials to withhold evidence from , the ,FBI and. indications that he committed perjury on more than one occasion. Even more damning is evidence that the agency was being kept informed of Hunt's activities in the White House; both by Hunt and by another member of the Watergate break-in crew. Euge-, nio Martinez, who Was still on a CIA, retainer. 7 After all, didn't Helms once approve a S20,000 Joan from agency funds for Hunt and didn't ho help Hunt get a job with Robert It. Mullen & co., a public relatione firm in Washington that served as a CIA cover? ? . But if all that Is true, why was Helms fired by Nixon? Why didn't the CIA ultimately take responsibility for the break-in? Wasn't it CIA resistance that helped uncover attempt to ob- struct justice? ? ? One high-ranking CIA official, who was in a position to know, offers this explanation: Helms was fired for refus- ? ing to claim the Watergate burglary team and to use secret CIA funds to buy their silente. man in Washington,"'sayS thosofficlal. "Ile wotild automatically do everything' he could, to make the White House 'be- lieve he was cooperating and at the same time figure out a way not to do it. But when he got the call from the President asking him to use the money, there was nothing left to do but refuse, , .That call is What they're trying to coy- er up." ? . ? , : t That's "it," all right. Helms became "Deep Throat" for Washington Post re- porters Carl Berstein and Bob Wood-- .ward, feeding information to the news- paper personally or. thru -Robert Ben. net, *a Mullen company official' in the ,pay of tho CIA. ? .,?', . f Did the CIA official hear the ? call? No. Did Helms tell him about it? No. , "Hell, no," says an associate: "All Helms was trying to do was protect the, agency. What Helms was really afraid 'of is what is happening now. Investiga- tions- of the CIA uncovering violations": of its ,charter. What the CIA feared imost is that everyone would find ,out it was carrying out domestic spying." . The CIA has obviously been trying to cover up something: What is At"? _ ? The Mafia Connection ?"What you rd" nit.3-t3te1y pia on the CIA if you E-Es t-ail," assures an old CIA erez-y, "Ls Murder One. The New York Times th'e!e-r. there were four of. 'em. C-c-t names ned everything. Mafia's le=1,-;eg contracts from the CIA." wl-o's been killed? Fifty voices unison: i_Volin Kennedy. .Robert F. Kennedy. Martin Luther 1,-n7-7. and don't forget the shooting of Gorg Wnueee. Didn't Tony tilasewice ;????egate ..krthur Bremer? Wallace tl-intes- C. R. E. E. P. is respon- sib:e.." - sAnt about The Hoover Connection? They $ay, Z. Edgar Hoover lmeri about the CIA. When he L'ed poise was found in his toothpaste and he "was carried out in a blanket and kept hidden uetil the funeral" by 'CZ?. C1,1'.7?2.7-* S. The Cuban Connection?Hunt was the genereement's political contact with the C7E:ans. The Cubans were training itr Neer Orleans to attack Castro. Lee Har- vey Oswald trained with those Cubans. Teeee, the CIA trained the killer of Ke.anedy. "No, it Corrects a CIA an Cubans. "You don't under- 51 the agency ECLA]. You're taking Cza -s:olclor. apple just like Helme wants y-?n to." . . 1-1:e Golden Apple Connection? An???:.?,:ii-e? to the Golden Apple, Fietens was willing to do ar.p.hing to. -p:ote-ct Cae. agency even if it. meant 1-:1;.1z.g a -The V.-atergate burglary .and all this destic spying business is exactly what they at Congress to look at;" the Golden Apple says.. 'Thee Congress: won't look at the fact that the CIA isi really one big illegal clandestine opera- bi-:in. Everything they do abroad is pat- Ontly illegal and if -anyone stops tong Approved For ReleasaloiY1Y64/6iFIliki4i5M26642R10700100360007-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360007-1 enough to examine the law,.tbat will be the-end of the CIA." - ? . Tbe Iranian Connection says our L11111- eace in the -Middle East is now th most crucial goal of the nation's for- eign policy. Iran and .Saudi Arabia are the most vital to the U. S. roIe...The CIA is the dominant force in both cOun-. "It -trains the palace. guard in both, countries, says the. proponeht of .the Iranian 'connection. "Whoever protects. the king controls tile country and Helms is the most effective 'single force alive in Iran. He installed the shah.. Why do you think he hasn't been indiCted?". , . . . . Well, what ? about Henry ?KiSsing,e.r? Doesn't he control foreign policy?: - The Kissinger Connection?as the top-. national security adviser and secretary.4 of State, Kissinger is in a position .to--; control. the .clandestine CIA operations.' The CIA sins are his. That is "it." That is ,that. .'they.". have been protecting. "NO," SAYS a. former Kissinger staff member. "Henry has been . locked in mortal combat with the CIA. He has.1 been used by them for their own ends.. He'll be out in skt months because he'll I be useless to them." . ? , Who is ."them." Who's running this.; whole business?. Who's responsible?'-; Kissinger is Helm's boss, Isn't he? .. "I'm not sure," says- a-retired. Penta- gon official who professes the Kissinger ! theory. "I'm convinced the CIA is a I computer,. a human computer. Do you ; know what I mean?"' , U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT 24 FEB 1975 .With critics nipping at their heels, the senior officers. of the Central Intelli- gence Agency are finally?and grudg- ingly?going.along with Director Wil- liam Colby's view that the Agency must be less secretive. Previously, any kind of "open door" policy was unthinkable. Now it is seen as needed if CIA is going to survive its troubles. 1Some diplomats are spreading the un- diplomatic view that Richard' Hehns's testimony before Congress on. CIA activities while he was the Agency's Director have proved so embarrassing both at home and abroad that he should be asked to resign as U. S. ; Ambassador to Iran. 1 Word from a Stare Department offi- cial: "The Communists are about to' take over Portugal and" we can't even considerany form of covert action that might help prevent it?not in the present political climate." co,n1 NEW YORK TIMES 23 February 1975 The C.I. And Its Critics By Tom Wicker . Every time the Pentagonwants more money, it starts talking about the dan- gers of war. And every time any_so- called "national security" agency finds. itself being criticized, it replies that the national security is being endangered. . Director William E. Colby- of the Central Intelligence Agency has taken to that classic bureaucratic pattern, claiming that "exaggerated" ,charges against the C.I.A. have resulted in "al- most hysterical excitement" that has "placed American intelligence in dan- ger." But who's hysterical? Mr. Colby' sounds nearer- to it than anyone else. In fact, Senator Frank Church of Idaho, who will chair the special Sen- ate committee to investigate the "in- telligence community," said in a statement following Mr. Colby's though not specifically in response to it?that he was "surprised in recent days at the hysteria of those who are fearful that this committee is out to ? wreck these agencies." So should any- one be- surprised who knows Mr. Church's moderate temperament, the. responsible makeup of his committee, IN THE NATION the 'fact that its senior Republican member is the conservative, military- oriented John Tower of Texas, and that another member is that stanch de- fender of national security, Barry Goldwater of Arizona? Some wrecking, crew! Who's being hysterical might also be 'judged by the fact that Mr. Colby was not forced to call a news conference or to issue a press release to get his fears for the national security on the record. The House Defense Appropria- tions Subcommittee, which "oversees" the C.I.A. budget to the extent that anyone does, provided him a hospitable forum and three hours in which to state his views openly?something C.I.A. ,directors rarely do except when they want to sell the public on the great job they say the C.I.A. is doing. The subcommittee did not, predictably, provide searching cross-examination. Nevertheless, since Mr. Colby was clearly trying to suggest that the C.I.A. is being maligned and the nation endangered by irresponsible criticism, certain responses have to be made? aside from that excellent., pieee of. country wisdom that "bit dogs bark loudest." For one thing, the oldest bureaucratic defense knoWn to man is' to try to shift the focus of attention from the substance of charges to 18 ?those WhO Make them-to convince' "the public that *the critics are the -problem, rather than the thing. being criticized. Even before that friendly House .,subcommittee, for example, Mr. Colby 'conceded that' the C.I.A. at one time or another had kept files on four members of Congress, some of them "anti-war." How do we know there were not others? For that matter, how does he know? And just recently, in an interview with Barbara Walters on "Today," Charles Colson made a strong case that the C.I.A. knew in advance Of the break-in at the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist. Saying that -was "beyond dispute," Mr. Colson continued: ' "They processed the so-called 'cas- ing' photos, the 3 provided all the equip- ment . . . it's very clear to me that they knew abofat that and actively participated in it and assisted it, pro- vided the means for it, helped with the operation from beginning to end . . . some of the memos I saw certainly ' went as high as Mr. Helms." (Richard Helms was director of the C.I.A. in .1971, when the break-in took place.) ,Mr. Colby has questioned Mr.. Col- son's credibility, which is indeed ques- tionable---but 'more so than that of the C.I.A., whose way of life is secrecy, and undercover operation? More se than that of Mr, Helms, whose testi- mony on several points. has, been misleading. or incomplete? The point is ,that a multiplicity of such allegations. of plainly illicit activities:?not just by the C.I.A. but by the F.B.I. too?have come to public attention. The sub- stance of those allegations needs to be examined and verified; and if any. of them can indeed be verified, perhaps others must be sought. In the course of doing that, questions of the credibility and responsibility of those who make the allegations will answer themselves. One does not need to take Mr. Jeb Magruder, for example, as a pillar of. credibility to be' struck by his re- mark in a lecture this week that had it not been for the Watergate expo- sures, the Nixon Administration would have become a "perpetual Presid- ency." By 1976, he said, according to the Associated Press, "we would have been in the position to elect whom- ever we wanted to elect. Once you learn to use the levers of power it becomes easy." Were the F.B.I. and the C.I.A. such "levers of power"? Could they ever be? - Mr. Colby does not seem to under- stand that the question really is not the difficulties presently being caused for the C.I.A. The question is about what Representative Lucien Nedzi of Michigan has called "the alipromiate role of secret institutions in a free, democratic society." The C.I.A. is not a value in itself, to be protected or fostered at whatever expense to sucn a society. It exists only to serve that society, and it does not do so if it undermines, threatens or ignores the rights of that society's citizens, no .matter what "national security') justi- fication it tries to plead. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360007-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010060007.-1 CHICAGO TRIBUNE 9 113 1975 LONDON TIMES 30 January 1975 Magazine names CI chiefs abr ad From Fred Emery Washington, Jan 29 - On the eve of the new Senate committee's investigation of , American intelligence a radical periodical in Washington- has published the names of the sup- posed Central Intelligence -Agency chiefs in 101 cities round the world. The quarterly, Counterspy, claims that it is doing no more than to make Americans aware of what host countries already know. More luridly, Mr Philip Agee, the former CIA officer who has vowed to undo the CIA in the cause of world revolution, Writes in his first article printed in America that the "key is secrecy and when it is peeled away there, standing naked and exposed for all to see, is the CIA secret policeman ". Mr Agee's book Inside the Company was recently Published in, Britain. A CIA spokesman today sighed: "There is very little we can do about it, except neither to confirm or deny." An informed agency source. suggested that the list was out of date: the magazine claimed it was accurate as of last June and contained as many staff "working under diplomatic cover as we were able to locate ". The list is interesting for some omissions: apparently there is no CIA station chief in Peking, or he is still unknocvn. Likewise no one is listed for either Tirana, or Ottawa. And their men in Havana and Jerusalem are unknown. But their man in Moscow is there and many others in East Europe, as well as in Nato. countries and the Third World. For London the well-known Mr Cord Meyer is listed but it is stated that he is due to be transferred in June. According to Counterspy, he was a "labour specialist on temporary assign- ment to oversee the British situation ". Mr Agee claims that the quoting of names in his book has caused hasty replacements. Senator Frank Church, the newly elected chairman of the Senate select committee to in- vestigate the CIA and all other intelligence agencies, has spoken of the need to avert disruption of the CIA as an intelligence body. However ? he has also spoken of the threats various abuses have posed at home. He stated today : "There's a terrible threat to freedom implicit in a federal police that is operat- ing secretly and outside the law and conducting investiga- tion and surveillance over lawful activities of American citizens." Mr Church's committee?as well as the House judiciary committee?will have before it the example of an Arizona pro- fessor who lost his university job. Approved F ? im Squires. 17?774.4:4--ce-z .7"77 - ! t't sty n s WASHINGTON?Henry 'Kissinger is pouting again because Congress keeps; making foreign policy and Jerry Ford's eyes are sad and bleary from reading his own economic predictions.. . But the. real Problem In this town, and the only one that's really any fun, belongs to the new Senate select com- mittee appointed to investigate the mis-1 behavior of the nation's spies. . Consider the dilemma. Who will do' ? the investigating? IN THE PAST, if a congressional committee wanted to investigate the: White House, it could round up few ex- FBI 'agents or former members of the., Central Intelligence Agency and say,' "Go get 'em." ? ' . If the FBI was the target; .then CIA agents would gladly do the job. If the CIA gede d? investigating, ex-FBI. agents could always be trusted with the task. ' - ? . But the new intelligence committee is rlinrgo.r1 wif ;rt?recillgof tng hail the FBI and the CIA and anybody else who might have been spying when they shouldn't have been. - At first the committee thought of bar:- rowing a few iavestigators from anoth- er federal law enforcement agency, for instance, the Drug Enforcement Ad- ministration which carries out fancy cloak and dagger operations all over the world. Oops! Not them. 1 Fifty-three of DEA's top agents are ex-CIA ?men. Everybody knows that only ex-priests and former Mouseke- teers ,have stronger loyalties to their past. Then someone suggested that if de- tente is really all its cracked pp to be, the Soviets would let Congress borrow a few of its spies. They seem to know what's going on in the FBI and the CIA .! anyway. But ales, a lot of Soviet XGB agents really are CIA or. FBI agents, and simply cannot be trusted. ' - When in need of manpower, official Washington usually -looks to the pill- tary. But not for spies. The Pentagon's top investigator for the last several years is a former FBI agent. Beside?s he has been accused of trying to use les? ? ? information he gathered in his last-big case to blackmail his way back' to a- top FBI job. . Some of the best sleuths in town are newsmen. So, why not arm them with subpena power and turn them loose?' Okay, which ones? Some journalists. are ex-CIA agents. Other journalists are current CIA agents: And most jour- nalists ;Can't tell .agent from 'Mary Poppins. The committee has looked around for a few good ex-cops. But the best ones have all become' big city mayors and the worst ones are in jail. Almost all the rest were either hired by the Re- publicans in 1972 or have already been retained by the Democrats for 1976. Sen. Howard Baker [R., Tenn.], the only Watergate committee. veteran on the new panel, has suggested rounding .up some of the Watergate committee's old gumshoes. But there's a problem there, too. Some of the hot topics of interest in the new investigation are things the Watergate committee prob- ers passed over lightly and saved for their books. - BY WEEK's end the new committee bad only one staffer, but it was still hopeful. _This problem is not entirely new. It was the same one faced by the Nixon administration back in 1971 when it was trying to find out who was lealdng government secrets and couldn't trust a single one of the regular government spies to do the job. A check with old hands from the Nix- on White House had turned up one promising lead. It seems that Charles [Chuck] Colson, you remember him, has this friend, E. Howard somebody or the other, who has a lot of other friends who do jobs like this. They are all experienced and looking for work. WASHINGTON STAR NEWS 19 FEB 1975 Foncia "Wail Read The federal government acknowl- edged yesterday that the Central Intelligence Agency intercepted the mail sent from abroad to anti-war activist Jane Fonda in the early 1970s. Justice Department officials said the "mail cover" placed on the ac- tress would be explained, possibly later this week, in a brief filed in Los Angeles federal district court. Miss Fonda is suing the gcvernet, ment for 52.8 million damages, , charging there was a conspiracy by the government to harass her for her anti-war work. The .1wig list of defendants includes former Presi- Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-004A1*30666bdk1r2i. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360007-1 VIE NEW REPUBLIC 1 1975 Covering Intelligence On Sunday, December 22, 1974, The New York Times led its front page with a 4000-word article by Seymour Hersh that began: "The Central Intelligence Agency, directly violating its charter, conducted a massive illegal domestic intelligence operation during the Nixon administration against the antiwar movement and other dissident groups in the United States, according .to well-placed government sources." In his next paragraph Hersh added that "intelligence files on at least 10,000 American citizens were maintained by a special unit of the CIA. . . ." No series of news stories since Watergate has had sO quick an impact on government, while generating so ! much discussion among journalists, as the Hersh pieces that began that Sunday and continued to appear over the next three weeks. The way the stories were written, their 'placement in the paper by the Times' editors, the response by the executive and legislative branches and the impact on other newsmen all tell a lot about the state of post-Watergate journalism. Because of the way the first story was written, many newsmen, including me, doubted whether Hersh really could document the serious charges implied by his dramatic lead paragraph. In the six columns of type that followed, Hersh did present a plausible story of how James Schlesinger looked into the Alleged domestic activities after taking over as CIA Director from Richard Helms in early 1973. He also reported the concern felt by current CIA Director William Colby, who succeeded Schlesinger. What Hersh didn't do, however, was to name any individuals or organizations that had been subject to surveillance or infiltration as part of the "massive" program. Investigative reporting is a highly competitive field. When one newspaper publishes an exclusive story its competitors are likely to concentrate initially on comments from those who dispute the published allegations. That process happened to some degree here. But no flat denials were made by the CIA or the White House. Hersh had covered those bases. Hersh noted in his first story that CIA Director Colby "had been informed the previous week of the inquiry by The Times." How much Colby had been told of what Hersh knew or planned to write is hard to say but one later paragraph of the story offers a clue: "When confronted with the Times' information about the CIA's domestic operations earlier this week, high-ranking American intelligence officials El take this to mean Colby or an aide] confirmed its basic accuracy but cautioned against drawing 'unwarranted conclusions." It is hard to believe the Times would have published the story it did without such an assurance from someone at the top of the CIA What the Times and Hersh did to follow up that first story reinforced the impression that they had solid but unpublishable evidence. At the same time, however, they.created additional doubts among newsmen that the story was as firm as portrayed. The next day no new facts or allegations were printed. Instead the Monday, December 23 Times led with a call from Sen. William Proxmire for Helms' resignation as US ambassador to Iran and Proxmire's demand for "an investigation by .the Justice Department of alleged domestic spying by the CIA." The Proxmire story was the first of several to run during the next week that were generated by calls from Hersh seeking comments on his initial story. Hersh, in fact, had called a Proxmire aide in Washington the day his first story-came out, soliciting a statement. Monday's Times also carried an article that tended to blur criticism of Hersh's piece.' In a separate front-page story from Colorado where President Ford was skiing, Times White House correspondent John Herbers reported Colby had called the chief executive andi "assured him 'nothing comparable' to what was described in the article was going on now." In Tim Washington Post that same morning, Mr. Ford was quoted as telling newsinen that Colby assured him "nothing comparable to what was stated in the article was going on over there,. . ." a statement that cOuld apply to the ,past as well as the present. The President also said he 'told Colby he "would not tolerate any such activities under this administration," the remark that apparently justified the Times' second page-one story. On Tuesday the Times did some more questionable editing. Helms was reported to have denied categorical- ly that the CIA had conducted "illegal" domestic spying when he was director. But directly following that statement, Hersh wrote that, James Angleton, the agency official who had run the counterintelligence office and who was now retiring "agreed with some of the allegations that were published Sunday by The New York Times ." Angiet^n's which had 1-,een giver. t-? United Press International ? not to Hersh ? was that there was "something to it," meaning Hersh's first story. What Angleton had also told UPI ? and what was left out of the Times ? was that the published story had been exaggerated. Hersh thereafter quoted Rep. Lucien Nedzi, chair- man of the House CIA oversight committee as saying on television, "there's been an overstepping of bounds" by the CIA. Only much later, in the jump of his story did Hersh complete Nedzi's statement: "There was some 'overstepping of bounds,' Mr. Nedzi said, 'but it certainly waSn't of the dimension that we're led to believe . . , of what has appeared in the newspapers." In subsequent days Hersh front-page stories contin- ued to appear in the Times, some of them containing relevant but hardly fresh or important information. Hersh's aggressive searching for additional informa- tion did turn up one new source ? a former CIA agent who talked of carrying out domestic surveillance in New York city. It was the only new information on alleged CIA activities Hersh was to bring forward prior- o the CIA's official statement. Nevertheless the impact of the original Hersh article plus his constant search for publishable comment brought important reactions. The President, for one thing, created the blue-ribbon Rockefeller panel to investigate the CIA. On January 15 Colby appeared before a Senate Appropriations subcommittee and save the CIA's detailed response to the Hersh allegations.. He specifi- tally denied a "massive illegal domestic operation," and the facts he presented supported his denial. The CIA had put together files on 10,000 civilians between 1967 to 1974, but 6000 of the names came originally from the FBI for overseas checks. Colby confirmed that 10 agents had infiltrated dissident groups in 1967-65 as pail a A prograin to protect agency facilities in 20 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360007-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360007-1 Washington, and another 12 or so were placed in groups in the 1970s 5o they could travel abroad to gather information on radical activities overseas. He also said that in 1971 and 1972 newsmen thought to be getting leaks of classified information were tailed. Hersh's charges had not been fully corroborated, but he had come close. Where was the rest of the press? During the early Watergate days the press had held back. Reporters good aloof from the CIA story too, in part because it seemed not to be a developing story, except for the moves to investigate the original charges. One other possible motive needs to be examined, and it has for me a personal side. While I was assembling material for this p!ece on the press and CIA, Sy Hersh, who is a friend, suggested that perhaps I am too close to the subject to 1....-rite about it. That may be true. I have strong feelings about investigative reporting and the responsibilities accompanying it. I also have past ties with the CIA'. In 1959 I unwittingly was part of a CIA-sponsored elelegation that attended the Vienna World Communist Youth Festival and a year later, with a CIA-paid-for plane ticket, I flew to India to attend a Youth Congress ?arty meeting as the American representative carrying greetings from President-elect Kennedy. In between t--.eo events I was offered but turned down a job with the CIA. On two occasions in the 1960s when I ran :r...n.aressional investigations for the Senate Foreign Reiations Committee, I had to deal directly with a number of CIA personnel, including Richard Helms. . I stipulate my association not as a mea rulpa for what :o'.:ows. I'm doing it because to understand the press :overage of the CIA, the FBI and other intelligence agencies, the public should realize that over the past 20 years; for many newsmen, these organizations were Most often sources of information for stories, and not stories in themselves. For foreign correspondents, in country after country, CIA station chiefs were often the best men around to give an estimate of local conditions. Reporters almost never attempted to find out what the CIA was up to. In Washington there are other newsmen`, editors and columnists who, like me, have past connections to the CIA or its officials. - These connections do not mean that reporters never have written critically about intelligence. My articles about the CIA and Watergate ? and former Director NEW YORK TIMES 21 February 1975 AFRICANS DRAFTING A PROTEST ON DAVIS Special to The tlew York Times ADDIS ABABA, Ethiopia, Feb. 20?Foreign ministers of 43 African countries were prepar- ing a resolution here today to express their opposition to the appointment of Nathaniel Davis as the United States Under Se- cretary of State for African af- fairs. Africans have exprassed wa- riness about Mr. Davis's assign- ment to Chile during the time a rightist coup overthrew the re- gime of President Salvador Al- ? lende Gossens. They suspect that the Central Intelligence ? Agency was involved in the overthrow and that Mr. Davis 'might have been involved in the Approved For Release 2001/08/08 Helms' questionable role in that affair ? speak for themselves. With the Hersh story, however, I remained cautious, believing that the CIA had been drawn into domestic activities, but not convinced that these involvements were either massive or illegal. Other journalists have taken different tacks. For example The Washington Post's editorial page editor Philip Geyelin worked briefly for the CIA more than 20 years ago. He, too, has been uneasy about the Hersh articles. When the Rockefeller commission was appointed, the Post editorialized that the panel's makeup was sufficient to a task that did not involve treating "a gaping wound in the nation's side.. . ." Because of the Post's editorial line, rumors quickly circulated that Geyelin's CIA bias was showing-. When the Post later ran a story about a 1950s CIA mail cover on then AFL President George Meany intended to make sure that agency funds were going to the correct trade union people, Hersh called Geyelin to see if he were the source of the story. He said he wasn't. What are we to draw from all this? First that the post- Watergate press is more openly critical of itself ? in its questioning of colleagues and in writing frankly and critically of how it operates. Second that the grey Near York Times has decided to undertake what I consider advocacy journalism in its news columns. Times managing editor A. M. Rosenthal denies that. He firmly told me the first Hersh story was not played"in order to bring about an investigation," and those stories that followed were only carried on page one because they C intrinsically- interesting or important." Rosenthal sees it, an editor who sets out in a series of articles to influence events"becornes a participant," and he is opposed to that. I believe Rosenthal is wrong. Like it or not, he and his. counterpart in The Washington Post are participants. Their front-page story selections set an agenda for government. The Hersh story makes the point. It was ? vulnerable to criticism. The White House, CIA or congressmen could have nailed the overstatements and tried to ride out the storm. There was, however, enough truth in the Hersh piece and credibility in the Times' presentation to force serious, quick action which, one hopes, will be of a positive sort. Walter Pincus coup. The resolution is to be made public at the final meeting of the 24th session of the minis- terial conference of the Organi- zation of African Unity tomor- row, a delegate said today. The delegate, from a black Arrican country, said "we do feel strongly about . this?it seems to us a deliberate affront ?to our interests by the Ameri- can Government." ? ? He said this was the first time the organization, formed in 1963, had attempted to in- fluence American foreign poli- cy. The resolution would fallow the objections to Mr. Davis that have been expressed by Repro- sentive Charles C. Diggs Jr., chairman of the House 'Foreign Affairs subcommittee on Afri- ca. : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360007a Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360007-1 RADIO TV REPORTS, INC. 4435 WISCONSIN AVE. N.W.. WASHINGTON. D. C. 20016, 244-3540 _ .PROGRAM The Ten O'Clock News DATE STATION WTTG TV February 11, 1.975 10:00 PM CITY Washington, D.C. COMMENTARY ALAN SMITH: The Rockefeller Commission is but one of several panels set up to probe the CIA and.other U.S. Intelligence Agenci;es. The other committees, either in operation or gearing up, are on Capitol Hill. And their possible impact on national security is the concern tonight of syndicated columnist and Metromedia commentator Robert Novak. ROBERT NOVAK: The many congressional investigations of the Central Intelljgence Agency have just begun and already there's two obvious and profound effects on the CIA. First of all, the Agency's covert operations, the so-called dirty tricks around the world are absolutely dead. The real question. that they -- there could be .a very useful CIA dirty trick operation in Portugal today where there's a tremendous danger of a Communist takeover. And a communist takeover wouldi movelthe U.S./with 0 strategic bases in the Azores islands. klf!-1JQ1 Secondly, the undercover agents for the CIA all over the world are going in to their CIA superiors and telling them, I quit. In other words, they're unwilling to risk their lives when there's a chance of them being blown out of the water. How, this is just the begining of these congressional investigations. The Agency's going to be criticized, uncovered and taken apart in the weeks to come. And so I think there's a good chance without the covert operations and without the undercover agents, and the CIA turning into a bunch of clerks sitting out in Langley reading for.,ign newspapers and foreign magazines. And I think it's about lime for Congress to ask itself this question: has detente extended far enough that this is kind of CIA that the congressmen really want. SMITH: Bob, I believe it's Senator Russell Long who has some reservations about the ability of some members' - of the Senate committee to keep their mouths shut about what they hear in these closed sessions. Do you feel Senator Long's concern is warranted? NOVAK: Absolutely. I think that this is the greatest danger to the CIA. The officials are worried about it because congressmen are notoriously incapable of keeping a secret. SMITH: Syndicated columnist Robert Novak. 22. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360007-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360007-1 1E NEW YORK Trmis, SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 1975 Data on Oswald Apparently Withheld From Key Warren Investigation Aides By BEN A. FRANKLIN 5pKia tThworTims WASHINGTON, Feb. 22?J. Edgar Hoover sent a memoran? dum to the State Department in 1960 raising the possibility that an imposter might be using the credentials of an American de- fector named Lee ? Harvey Os- wald, who was then in the So- viet Union. This memo from the director of the Federal Bureau of Inves- tigation and two subsequent State Department memos relat- ed to it were apparently not shown to investigators of the Warren Commission, which ex- amined the assassination of President Kennedy and deter- mined that Oswald, acting alone, was. the assassin. - The late Mr. Hoover's warn- ing of the "possibility" that an impoSter could be using Os- wald's identification data, in the Soviet Union or elsewhere, came more than two years be- fore the murder of the Ameri- can President in Dallas on Nov. 22, 1963. The imposter theory was rejected, by implication but not .directly, in the pub- lished eeport of .the Warren Commission, and its signifi- cance could not be determined. The body Of the man who the commission concluded had shot the President?and who was shot to death by Jack Ruby two days later?was identified by his mother and other relatives and also by fingerprints and other physical features as that of Lee Harvey Oswald. But the apparent withholding of information from the com- mission supported a theory of some critics of the commis- sion's final report that the pan- el had come to its conclusion regarding Oswald without hav- ing had all the facts. A spokesman for the F. B. I. said, in response to questions; that "we can 'definitely state, without hesitation, that a copy of the Hoover memo was shown to a member of the Warren Commission staff in the pres- ence of an F. B. I. agent." How- ever, the spokesman said that he could not identify the com- mission staff member to whom the memo reportedly had been shown. Neither J. Lee Rankin, the former general counsel of Ithe commission, nor any of his .former staff aides who were most involved in investigating .Oswald's background said they 'could remember seeing it. However, Howard P. Willens, now a private lawyer here, himself in an interview today as tile commission lawyer who hed reviewed the F.B.I. file. Mr. Willens, who was then com- mission's special liaison officer to the Justice Department, said today that "while I do not think that anyone can state now with the necessary precision whether or not he saw the Hoover memo, it is my best recollection that I did, in fact, see -that memo." "1 do not want to be in a public debate with my old col- leagues," Mr. Willens said, "but I know that tehere was discus- sion of this among other on the staff concerned with the activ- ities of Oswald abroad. I am concerned with continued public references to the notion that the commission overlooked ob- vious facts." - Suggests Reopening Inquiry Shownsthe F.B.I. memos and the two. State Department documents?discovered in the National Archives here by a private resercher ?W. David Slawson, a lawyer who checked out rumors about -Oswald for the commission in 1964, said he thought the assassination in- quiry should be reopened. - Mr. Swanson, who is now a' law- professor at the University of Southern California, said he and other investigators had never been shown the memos. "We were the rumor runner- downers, and we certainly should have seen this material, as we did a great deal of other stuff that we showed to be un- founded," he said. "It may be more significant that we did not see it, in terms of a possible cover-up and the reasons for it, than if we had seen it." he continued. "I mean; I don't know where the impos- ter notion would have led us? perhaps nowhere, like a lot of other leads. But the point is we didn't know about it. And why not?" At the State Department, a spokesman said there would be no comment because all for- mer officials who might have knowledge of the Oswald file had died or retired. Mr. Slawson said in an inter- view that the investigation should be reopened also "be- cease the interposition of an imposter, if that happened, is apartment's Soviet desk. The political act." other, dated March 31, 1961, And after all. this [the as- I :was sent from one section of sassinationl was not just anothi the Passport Office to another. er murder," he said. "It was, by I Concern on Passport definition, a political murder." The latter memo indicated Two other commission staff 'concern that a revalidated pass- members shared with Mr. Slaw- 'port to be issued to Oswald in son the responsibility for !preparation for his return to checking out rumors. Neither the United States in June, 1962, recalled specifically having not be mailed to him through the Soviet postal system but be delivered to him "only on a per- sonal basis" at the Embassy in Moscow. Officials there could berg, who wrote the gossip- then be satisfied that they were puncturing "Speculations and dealing with the real Oswald. The Warren Commission sub- sequently developed that in Ju- ly, 1961, Oswald's passport was handed hack to Inc man who Moscow Embassy officials were satisfied was the same Oswald - 'they had first met in 1959, when he angrily announced his intention to renounce his ci- intention to renounce his citi- zenship, The Stat,. Department had ruled by then that he had superior at the commission, and who, was nominated last month by President Ford to be Secre- tary of Transportation, was asked . during an interview whethet he bad seen the; memos. "It's been 10 years," he said,, "and I don't remember one way' or the other." . He recalled, however, that his duties "required me to see ev- erything that Oswald had done as a defector to the Soviet; Union." Mr. Hoover's memo was dated June 3, 1960. Its contents suggest that the F.B.I. director raised the possibility of an im- poster because of. certain facts the memo recounts. ? It cited a Foreign Service dis- patch concerning Oswald's dec- laration in Moscow on Oct. 31, 1959, that he would renounce his citizenship and noted that he had surrendered his pass- port- It also cited a report of an F.B.I. agent in Dallas of May 12, 1960, which said that Os- wald's mother, Marguerite C. Oswald, "stated subject had taken his birth certificate with him when he left home." The agent's report indicated that Mrs. Oswald was appre- neesive about Lee Son'S safety because she had written him three letters and they had all been returned to her unde- livered. Mr. Hoover concluded: "Since there is a possibility that an im- poster is using Oswald's birth certificate, any current infor- mation the Department of State may have concerning subject will be appreciated." Two internal State Depart- ment memos transmitted Mr. Hoover's warning. One, dated June 10, 1960, went to the de- seen the memos, but they tend- ed to discount any thought of a renewed investigation. One of them, Dr. Alfred Gold- Rumors" section of the com- mission's report; said in an in- terview: "I don't have any recollection of having seen that [Hoover) memorandum. As a matter of fact; J am fairly certain I didn't. "While I think we might have done more had we seen it?we might have engaged in more re- search, we might have looked for more, wemi ght have asked for more from the State Depart- not actually given up Ins cite- mem and the F.B.I.?in terms of the outcome, I don't believe zenship. None of these documents? it would have made any differ-1 -not the Hoover memo or either ence." of the State Department memos Willia.m T. Coleman Jr., who ?was in the department's Os- was Mr Slawson's immediate v.,ald file as it was given to the Warren Commission in 1964, Approved For Release 2001/18/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010036 7a.Ccording to Mr. Slawson.-' - After the commission pub- lished its report, thousands of pages of unpublished conimis- sion records were declassified by the State Department and ,placed on public file in the Na- tional Archives. Among them J. G. Harris, a 45-year-old New Yorker who has spent nearly. a decade in Kennedy assassination re- search, found the Hoover and State Department memos. How the memos came to be missing from the State Depart- ment's Oswald file given to the commission but included in the same file the Archives remains unclear. Mr. Slawson, citing recent tdisclosures about domestic ac- tivities of the Central Intel- ligence Agency, said: "It conceivably 'could have been something -related to the C.I.A. I can only speculate now, but a general C.I.A. effort to take out anything that reflected on them may have covered this up." Mr. Slawson added that he had been "impressed at the time with the intelligence and 'honesty of the C.I.A. people I dealt with." ? A C.I.A. spokesman deny- ing that the agency had ever had any connection with Os- wald, said the agency had 'no record of ever having seen the Hoover memo and had not ere; gaged in a cover-up. A former State Department official who, was familiar with the Oswald file supgp:sted that Mr. Hoover himself might have ordered his memo removed from the file before it was sent to the commission, to avoid em- barrassing the bureau. The former official, Rich- ard A. Frank, now a lawyer here with the Center for Law' and Social Policy, said in an in- terview that as the depart- ment's assistant legal adviser in 1963-64 he had been unaware of the Hoover memo, although he had a major responsibility for assembling the Oswald rec- ords to be sent to the commis- ion. I He Said it seemed possible !that the memo "was so unsup- portable by anything the F.B.I. had on Oswald that, when the Oswald file suddenly became the object of a most intensive search and review, Mr. Hoov- er and his friends in the secur- ity operation at State simply made it disappear." - A former senior F.B.I. official who worked on the assassina- tion inquiry said in an inter- view that he could net recall such a mernce_as.part. of the case file. At the C.I.A. a spokesman said there would be no com- ment on Mr. Slawson's sugges- tion of ,a cover-up. The State Department had no comment either. Abram Chayes, the depart- ment's legal adviser in 1964, who assured the commission in testiniony then that "very aggressive efforts" had been a made to collect and transmit the full Oswald file, was inter- viewed by telephone in Mos- cow, where he was attending a legal conference. He said lie had no memory ef any imposter memo in the State Department files. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360007-1 THE WALL STREET JoURNAL . 'Wednesday, 'Feb; 19, 19 As of Today, Getttmg Federal Documents Will Be a Lot Easier To the Bureaucracy's Dismay, New Rules Make It .Harder To Keep Information Secret e By ARI,EN J. Law; Staff Reporter. of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL WASHINGTON?Uncle Sam will be bear- ing from Clarence Ditlow today: Mr. Ditlow, one of Ralph Nader's troop- ers, pestered the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration .in 1973 for copies of its correspondence with Detroit, on auto- safety defects: Invoking the Freedom of In- formation Act, Mr. Ditlow took the bureau- crats to court. He lost. Now Congress has changed that law, .and. the changes -become effective today, So Mr.? Ditlow is renewing his request for-the docu- ments, and he expects to. Win this time. Gradually and grudgingly, the govern- ment is opening up. Watergate gave secrecy a bad name. Congress keeps thinking of new ways to compel the Executive Branch to op- erate more openly. On- Capitol Hill itself, more committees are writing laws in rooms. open to.lobbyists, the press and the visiting high-school class from Hoboken. The Senate later this year probably will allow its floor sessions to be televised, possibly putting Senators in competition- with afternoon soap operas. The broadening of the 1956 Freedom of Information Act is part of the trend. Con- gress wants the public to have access to more kinds of documents currently locked in government files. Among the possible beneficiaries is Wil- liam Taylor, director of the Center for Na- tional Policy Review at Catholic University here. He has been trying to see reports? on the Department of Health, Education and Welfare's enforcement of desegregation in Northern schools, but he has also been los- ing in court. Now he is. asking a federal judge here to reverse the decision in light of the amended law. Courtroom tactics aside, Mr. Taylor hopes that the bureaucracy will show more enthusiasm for complying with the informa- tion law. "We're all going to be interested in seeing whether there's going to be a change in the spirit of administering it" he says. Bureaucratic Resistance ? The history of the Original 1966 law shows that the open-government spirit was want- ing in many agencies. "The bureaucracy did not want his law," writes Harold Re- lyea, a Library of Congress analyst, in a current article. He says this resistance has resulted in "excessive processing fees, re- sponse delays and pleas of ignorance when petitioned for documents in terms other than an exact title." Tho law laid down the general rule that documents are to be made public unless ,they are covered by any of nine specific ex- :erriptions, such as defense secrets, medical ?files, trade secrets, internal policy memos. anti -investigatoty rec'ords. To the surprise of the law's sponsors, it hasn't been used imuch by the press. But public-interest law firms and trade associations have invoked it repeatedly. A frustrated official at the Jus- tice Department hotly threatened to use it against felloW bureaucrats to get a copy of ;the FBI phone book. Some document-seek- ing members of Congress have taken the government to court, mostly without suc- cess. tSeveral ink court cases and the' tiniku-1 cracy's stalling tactics prompted Congress! last year to tighten up. The coverage of two! of the exemptions was? narrowed, agencies., Were given deadlines to respond to requests, excessive copying fees were banned, and fu- ture winners of court cases were authorized to have lawyers' fees paid by the govern- ment_President Ford vetoed the bill at the alarmed behest of the whole Executive Branch, but the veto was overridden. The Clock Watchers . . With these provisions becoming effective today, officialdom is looking to its defenses. The new law gives an egency 10 working days. to make its first response to a free- dom-of-information request, and some offi- cials are preparing to fight for every min-. ute. They have decreed that the clock doesn't start running until the letter reaches the right desk; time spent lost in the mail room doesn't count. To play the game, ap- plicants are asked to write "freedom-of-in- formation request" on the outside envelope. In a memo of advioe to other agencies, the ,Justice Department has warned that "an ef- ficient system or date stamping for incom- ing matter is essential." _ Many agencies 'expect a surge of re- quests starting today because of the two substantive changes that Congress made: in . the law. Courts had ruled that the exemp7 tion for investigatory files covered such things as Mr. Ditlow's auto-safety docu- ments and Mr. Taylor's HEW reports. Congress sought to restrict this protection to. actual cons:and-robbers categories of inves- tigations, and even some of these may be- come narrowly available if there isn't any invasion of personal privacy. Hence, the FBI is getting ready to, show an individual. what's in his own the, after screening out anything that would identify an informant. An applicant will be asked to? go to great lengths to prove his identity, in- cluding possible submission to fingerprint- ing., Other investigatory records -that are likely to be requested under the new law in- clude data from President Kennedy's au- topsy and the Justice Department's file on the Kent State investigations. The new law overturns a Stipreme Court ruling that forbade federal judges to inspect classified documents in testing whether they are covered by the execption for defense secrets. Now, ?a judge will have authority to order the secrecy stamp removed from all or part of a document if he decides that the classification was improper. That is expected to attract requests to see CIA Director William Colby's recent re- port to the President of his agency's domes- tic spying activities. Morton Halperin, a for- mer National Security Council staffer, plans to invoke the new law to obtain previously unpublished chapters of the Pentagon Pa- pers As well as official U.S. forecasts of Soviet strategic-weapons strength. "To some extent, the national, mood has changed," says Mr. Halperin, who now works for the Center for National Security Studies here. "There's a general feeling in Congress, in courts and among the public that a lot of things stamped secret aren't really classified." Philip and Sue Long, a Bellevue, Wash., couple who successfully used the old law to obtain tax-auditeguidelines from the Internal Revenue Service, think that the new .defini- tion of investigatory' files could force the IRS to give up more material, Mrs. Long says it Would be useful for taxpayers dicker- ing with the IRS over disputed sums to see how similar cases were settled, but these records have been classed as investigatory files. She thinks that the new definition might open them up "but it depenos On how the courts go." The new rule allowing fudges to order, 'the government to pay' lawyers' fees of site:3' ?cessful seekers for documents will "dramat- ically" increase the number of court chal- lenges, predicts Mark Lynch, another Nader associate. Mr. Lynch observes that so far the number of lawyers specializing in free- dOrnsof-information cases has been rela- tively small and that they have generally drawn 'a careful bead on government se- crecy abuses. With more lawyers moving Into the field, he expects "we're probably going to have , some pretty harebrained cases." The Advisory. Committees ? Congress also .has' been trying to require more openness in the work of the 1,118 advi- sory committees of outside specialists that give policy coaching to federal agencies. Pressed by Democratic Sen. Lee Metcalf of Montana, Congress in 1972. sought to require !advisory committees to publicize their :meetings in advance and to open them to the public. The law says a meeting can be closed only if the subject matter discussed falls into one of those nine exemptions to the Freedom of Information Act. The Derense Department promptly closed the doors on meetings of its advisory ? committee on women in the armed forces, contending that the talk would deal with the same subjects covered in internal polity memos. A federal judge ruled that this wasn't ,a valid reason, complaining sharply that "the penchant for unjustified govern- ment secrecy repeatedly evidenced in cases under the Freedom of Information Act seems to be present here." Despite this and similar court rulings, critics of the 'advisory committees say there Is still too much secrecy and not enough ad- vance notice of the meetings. Chester War- ner, a self-described,, "open-government nut," last year was the official monitor of advisory-committee practices in the White 'House Office of Management and Budget. A check of committee meetings in December showed that about 45% were closed, he re- ports. After a, dispute with OMB higher-4s about the makeup of an Interior Depart- ment advisory committee on oil, Mr. War- ner quit last month. Congress Opens Up These congressional open-government laws ironically don't apply to Congress it- self; the Freedom of Information Act couldn't be legally invoked to get an early committee draft of a bill, for example. Rut the point is increasingly moot because mere bill-drafting sessions of congressional com- mittees are being held with open doors. Pending in the Senate Roles Committee is a proposal backed by influential members, of both parties allowing floor sessions of the full Senate to .be televised. Cameras of any kind currently are taboo in that chamber. The TV cameras would be run by the Sox- ate, but commercial networks would be al- lowed to tap into the Capitol's closed-circuit System. The motive primarily is a political reac- tion to the low public esteem in which Core gress is held. Republican Sen. J. Glenn Beall of Maryland says he hopes that increased familiarity with the processes of, government will boost confidence in con- gress while making Senators more account- able to their constituents." Florida's Senators especially make a Ug point of demanding "government in the mu- shine," Democrat Lawton Chiles is the lead- ing crusader for open committee mecums, while his freshman colleague, Richard Stone, goes even further. Sen. Stone refwes to attend the still-secret caucuses of Senate Democrats, and, In the ultimate symbol of !open government, he has taken his office !door off its hinges. 24 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360007-1 'Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360007-1 NEW YORK TimEs Fts 1975 , The New Rules n Freedom f Informatiq By MARTIN ARNOLD . Next week, on the 19th, over the objections of President ? Ford, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Pentagon, the State Deliartrnent and, in fact, probably over the objections of almost every rank-?. iag,member of the Federal bureaucracy, 17 amendments to. the Freedom of Information Act go into effect. .. - The results could be important, particularly for journalists*; who under the old act usually did not press their legitimate . demands for Government information simply 'because the - process took so much time. The Reporters Committee for Freedom, of the Press in ! Washington estimates that there were only a half a dozen or so major press attempts to get information through the provisions of the old act. It -was put to perhaps its most ! spectacular use by N.B.C.-T.V.'s Carl Stern. He broke the ! story of the Federal Bureau of Investigation counterintelli- zehce goup that infiltrated the New- Left. It took the per- , SIstent Mr. Stern 20 months of litigation. Under the prodding of consumer groups, such as Ralph! Nader's, and of the media, the original Freedom of -Infor- mation Act was passed in 1966 and signed by President Johnson. Then, as now, it was opposed by nearly every de- I pertinent and agency in the Federal Government, but most particularly by those involved in criminal investigations_ and in gathering foreign and domestic intelligence. The 1966 act permitted private persons to file complaints in Federal District Courts to 'force Government agencies' to produce information they were withholding. Exempt from the act were medical reports, an agency's internal rules and regulations, confidential trade secrets, and foreign' policy and national defense information that had been classified secret by Presidential Executive Order. That bill simply didn't work. The process was not only lengthy but so costly that unless a citizen was wealthy or had the 'financial aid of an interested group,- he? could go broke trying to get information out of the bureaucracy. Finally, the law put the burden on the citizen and his surrogate, the reporter. The effect was that of an implicit rejection of the philosophical point that the government is, after all, us, not them, end-the information-.belongs to us .not them. Why should people have to struggle so hard LOS ANGELES TIMES 15 February 1975 CA Fonda en ail, wyer Says BY KENNETH REICH Times Political Writar An attorney for actress Jane Fonda said Friday he has -been informed by the U.S. Justice Department that the Central Intelligence Agency is now ready to admit in a paper to be filed in U.S. District Court here that It opened. .mail arriving for Miss Fonda from abroad. -- Leonard Weinglass, the attorney, said he had been told .by Ed Christianbury, a Justice Department attorney in -Washington, that the CIA would drop its denial, made in a court filing six months ago, that it had involved itself in investigating Miss Fonda. "This is the first time in a legal proceeding that the CIA" .has admitted taking action .against an individual in the States,* Weinglass declared. Approved For Release 2O1/08/08: to get information? The question was brought home to many through the Watergate disclosures and the more _recent.disclosures of apparently illegal spring on citizens by the Central Intelligence Agency. Ironically, the act also effectively restricted not only the- rights of the people, but those of the legislative branch. Senator Howard Baker Jr, the Tennessee Republican, has said recently that he 'and hil colleagues on the Watergate .Committee were Unable to get the C.I.A. to declassify its Mies on persons Who had knowledge _about Watergate.. Few claim thad the new amendments will lead to more' disclosures :with ithe impact- of Watergate. But the ' new amendments, designed to make it easier, quicker and less_ costly to get Government information, are in 'a sense a product of the atmosphere of Watergate. They passed Con- gress overwhelmingly, and were vetoed by President Ford on Oct. 17, ,1974e About a month later, Congress _overrode the Vresident's veto; again overwhelmingly. ? .The exemptions in the original act still stand. But one of' the amendments- gives ,a. Federal. judge the authority to review in private :classified foreign policy and' national _defense information,, at the behest of a petitioner, to de- termine whether it should, in fact, be classified. Another key amendment sets a strict timetable for 'the Government's response to a request for information. In general, an agency have no more than 10 days to make the information available or to deny it, with 20 additional working days to decide on appeals. ? - . That amendment wbs objected to by the President, as-was a third that awarcV court costs- to an individual who successfully brings sUit to force the disclosure of informa- tion or documents. There is even -a_for.ea of punishment.for officials who withhold _them. *e..? - ? -? ? . . The punishment ;clause could be the' one that really 'speeds up the .flowl of information from the Government to the people. A ',successful litigant can get the Civil Service Commission ...to sus7end 'wifiaout- pay for 60 days a bureaucrat who arbitrarily withheld information. Based on past e?pPrienrP, no nne? really expects the Government to live easily with the new amendments. But under the new act information will be more accessible' to the public even if it takes a .year or so of constant law suits to get the bureaucracy to- begin to cooperate. Still, among the press, the- feeling is that in the new _amendments Congress did a good job of balancing one of the inner tensions of a democratic society: the people's right to know vs. the Government's need to protect legitimate secrets. Surely, most Federal judges will be just as sensitive to national security, and probably just as sophisticated in deciding those issues, as are the;.Cabinet officers and their Undersecretaries who control the many thousands of Navy ensigns and Air Force lieutenants who have the authority _ to stamp documents classified,. and the many more thousands of Government- clerks who now casually turn down citizens' requests for information. .Martin Arnold is a New York Times reporter who -Special ? izes in press affairs. 7 It's rather curious that they first make a flat denial and then, after the Rockefeller Commission makes a few inter- views, the government comes in and withdraws the deni- al" = The Rockefeller Commission is investigating allegations, 'of illegal domestic activites by the CIA. Attempts to reach Christianbury for comment were un- availing. ' availine% A woman identifying herself as his secretary in- ? -dicatedhe declined to return calls. Miss Fonda has a suit pending in U.S.-Dist. Judge Mal- colm M. Lucas' court here asking the courts to enjoin a va- riety of czovernment iig.Pocio,, from engaging in surveil- lance of her activities and asking for monetary damages exceeding S2 million. The act res.,. long active in the antiwar movement. re- mains poliicoll.v invoi%-ed in a number of dissident causes. Weinglass said Miss Fonda's original complaint, filed in 1973, had named the director of the CIA. The CIA, along with other government agencies, subsequently admitted keeping files on her, but it denied it had actually initiated the collection of any information. However, Weinglass, said, Christianhury telephoned him this week to say that the CIA denial was in error. "Christianbury acknowledged that they had opened mail - coming in to Jane Fonda from overseas," Weinglass said. "That would have been in violation of the law." CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360007-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360007-1 WASHINGTON POST 8 February 1975 Rbbert Karen Fighting the Tide of Torture In the winter of 1945 in northern R- aly, the Gestapo ? picked up a young Italian resistance worker and tortured .her for 45 days. Convinced that giving them information of any kind would make her immediately dispensable, she never talked and in the end was made to type her own death sentence. How- ever, on the day she was to be execu- ted, two men in Gestapo uniforms took her away for some "final questioning." ,Inexplicably, they left her at a hospital and in two years she was fully re- covered. Today, almost 30 years later, Ginetta ?Sagan has become one -of the major or- ganizers for Amnesty International, the London-based group that."adopts" and fights for the release of political pris- oners.the world over. Founded in 1961 Mr. Karen, former press secretary to New York City Councilman ?Carter . Burden, is now a free-lance. writer. This article is adapted from a piece' which appeared originally in The Nation. ? by a British lawyer, Peter Beneson, Amnesty has 38,000 members in 32 countries and claims responsibility for the release of more than 10,000 politi- cal prisoners. Sagan became involved with Amnes- ty International 1967, when the Greek junta took power; it was the first time since the war that repression and tor- ture again touched her life. "I had a lot of friends who were in jail because so many of them had studied in France when I was there. My former professor there had just met Christos Sartze- takis, who is the judge portrayed in the movie Z. They were sending me file after file of prisoners and horrible, horrible stories, of torture. I remem- ber one in particular. the dean of a university who was 80 years old and given the falanga?tying a person to a table and beating the soles of the feet until they are ..swollen. So painful, dreadfully painful." In 1971.Sagan prevailed upon Melina Mercouri and . Joan Baez ?to come to Berkeley for a concert to benefit the Grcek relief fund. A crowd of 10,000 attended and Sagan has since proved that direct action to salvage individual lives can generate the kind of personal commitment that seemed to haye faded with the anti-war ,rnoyement.- In the three years since, that first;.Berk- eley concert, Amnesty's West Coast membership (concentrated in Califor- nia and Texas) has. shot up from 52 to. almost 52,000. Today the San Francisco office at 3618 Sacramento Street has four full- time staff members, including Sagan and Kit Bricca, formerly with the Farm Workers. The region now counts for about half of Amnesty's 100 U.S. groups, and the leadership under- standably believes that similar organiz- ing elsewhere in the country would produce comparable results, _Recently LAmnesty hired Joel Carlson, a South African civil ? rights: lawyer- 'who was forced to leave his country in 1971, to be-full-time national coordinator, an investment which it hopes will lead to the creation of regional offices in Chi- cago, Denver, Atlanta and some place in Texas. ? All this activity for human rights. would be a cause for celebration were it not for the historical events which. ?have helped to' generate it. In the short time since, Ginetta Sagan began organizing for Amnesty, there has been a marked increase in political re- pression and a severe upswing in the use Of torture. In the last few, months, Amnesty papers on Chile and North Korea and a worldwide survey called. "Report on Torture" have revealed. that not only is freedom of speech and association endangered by state ?JUL= but torture, remarkably similar tto the kind the Gestapo practiced in Italy and throughout occupied Europe, Seems to be spreading in epidemic pro- portions across the continents. "When talking with the victims of torture today, I have a sense of deja vu," says Sagan. "The same thing?in- terrogation, beating, fear, insult, deg- radation. They really want to destroy you as a human being, to reduce you to the level of a groveling animal." The data Amnesty has-gathered over the past 10 years on the detention poli- cies of some 62 nations indicate that torture is a perennial form of political oppression. It would be impossible to enumerate all the, methods now in use. Old stand- bys from near drowning and suffoca- tien to pulling out the fingernails are still prominent. But "Report on Tor- ture" also enumerates modern develop- ments. The omnipresent electric shock Is probably the key contribution of ad- vanced technology. Psychological and manipulative techniques, such as sen- sory deprivation, isolation, exhaustion, degradation and threats (of permanent injury, disease, economic retaliation, 'or harm to one's family) are more widely and sometimes more cleverly applied. Sagan relates that in Brazil and the Soviet Union the secret police have been known to torture people while showing slides of members of their families, creating an association .of family with pain. ? ' Perhaps . the most , important new weapons aVailable to modern torture are the scores of drugs which terrify and melt the will of their victims. None of these drugs can force anyone to reveal what he has the courage to withhold; most, if the victim surviVes, 'will have no lasting physiological ef- fects, though the emotional damage is frequently severe and permanent; and virtually all have some legitimate med- : g ?al use.. But the fears of the victim, the threatening' atmosphere and the extremely unpleasant physical sensa- tions make these medicines a potent form of terrer. ? While a sadist is the most likely can- didate for a career in interrogation, re- cent clinical tests seem to demonstrate that many peonle, normally indisposed' to cruelty, will nonetheless administer pain if told to do so by someone in au- thority. That is a crucial point when one considers the scores of doctors and nurses?some of whom are presumably not sadists?who, in the ultimate per- version of their professional roles, show up at secret police villas to act as consultants and practitioners of the black mechanics of interrogation. -"Torture could not take place without the cooperation of physicians," says Sagan. "It is the doctor who examines .the prisoner before interrogation, it is the doctor who says, how far they ca:n go, it is the doctor who treats the vic- tim of torture and who remains si- lent." It must be understood that torture is a very inefficient means of gathering Information and for the most part is' not used for that purpose. That fact is reflected in the black humor of South Vietnamese interrogators, who have been heard to- say, "If they're not guilty, torture them until they are!" 'Torture is a weapon, widely perceived as a proper response to domestic or colonial insurrection, and sometimes openly advocated by counter-insur- gency strategists. All told, according to the Arimesty report, at least 31-.1 na- tions use torture as an administrative routine and have given free rein to men and women who achieve personal gratification from the destruction of other human beings. These torture states share information, educate tor- ture trainees from less developed po- lice states, and have even produced films on the subject (one found in the secret police headquarters in Portugal was made in part to instruct prison -doctors). Unfortunately, many victims of tor- ture, including Sagan, have been un- willing to discuss their ordeals. Tor- ture victims are often deeply ashamed of what has been done to them and what they have been made to do. Many have lasting and often disastrous emo- tional disorders. "I wasn't able to talk about it for many years because of the humiliation and the degradation that they forced on me," says Sagan. "That is why I feel strongly that the Amnesty project of help to care for the victims of tor- ture and to rehabilitate them psycho- logically is an urgent- and crucial one. I wouldn't want anyone to go through years without being able to share, to talk, and to be -assured that we are hu- Man beings still. It is hard for any psr- son to think himself still human after they strap you to a table, after they-?n- suit you, and after they force on you these unspeakable, unspeakable, un- speakable, unspeakable actions." Sex, degradation and power form a special weaveln the torturer's mental- ity. An obsession -with excrement and urine and forcing prisoners to smear themselves is common. So is rape and 'demeaning sexual positions. What Amnesty offers the politica prisoner and the victim of torture is the promise that his case will not be forgotten. Its basic organizational unit, the "group," is responsible for three _ Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001003600074 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360007.-1 Prisoners of conscience?one from the Eastern bloc, one from the West, and one .from a nonaligned nation. This careful policy of neutrality has been a key to Amnesty's suctess, and with po- litical oppression so widespread, the meticulous nonpartisanship is unfortu- nately easy to maintain. - Letters on behalf of adopted prison- ers are sent to the United Nations and other international bodies, to the press, and to the responsible govern- ment, Amnesty International sends ob- servers to trials of those accused of po- litical crimes and, when possible, visits prisons and interviews prisoners and ex-prisoners. Its success is a testament to -the power of public opinion. And yet, within and without the responsible state, public opinion iS a difficult weapon to mobilize. "I can understand the fear," says Sagan. "Anything that threatens the status quo or the fragil- ity of our day-to-day existence is better ptished back into the unconscious. It is much more comfortable to go on with our daily lives without worrying about the man in Czechoslovakia who has been picked up, who has lost his -job, 'who is being held some place incom- municado. But the only way to break the power of the secret police is if enough people speak up."' Can it happen here? Amnesty does have 30 prisoners of conscience in the United States, most of them members of ethnic minorities who were caught in situations where racial and/or polit- ical prejudice was evident in the ar- rest, conviction or sentencing. It has also described numerous instances of police and prison brutality. But regard- ing torture, it has concluded: "It would be incorrect to suggest that there is an administrative practice of torture by .the law-enforcement. authorities -of the United States within their own domes- tic jurisdiction." Still, there is reason to be concerned about the U:S. position. As a major supplier of funds and hardware for 'foreign military and secret police, the country bears a responsibility, for how these resources are used. Our govern- ment has never officially condemned the practice of torture in Brazil, al- though there is no disputing its preva- lence, and there is a persistent suspi- cion, bluntly portrayed in the movie CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 18 February 1975 Weatherman links - traced to Cuba, Hanoi Washington Leaders of the militant Weatherman group were trained in Cuba and in North Vietnam in guerrilla warfare tactics, including use of sophisticated military weapons, according to congressional testimony released here. " The allegation of a connection between the radical organization and the Cubans and North Vietnamese was made in a report released by the Senate internal-security subcommittee which interivewed a former member of the Weatherman underground. The witness, Larry Grathwohl, a onetime informer for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, also told the panel that one member of the Weatherman group, Naomi Jaffe, had told him that in addition to Cuba she had been in North Vietnam, where she had been trained to use an anti-aircraft gun. Mr. Grathwohl said the the Weatherman leaders told him that the Cubans and the Vietnamese were more concerned with propaganda and keeping the radical movement alive in the United States than with actively promoting a revolution. "State' of Siege," that the United. States provides the training for many -of Latin America's novice interroga- tors. To bring the issue even closer to home there have been widespread re- ports, abundantly documented by the confessions of repentant GIs, of direct involvement of American troops in the torture of Vietnamese. The very personal quality of caring which Amnesty offers is evident in the title of a new quarterly magazine, Matchbox, which is being published by the West Coast office. The name de- rives from an incident during Sagan's imprisonment by the Gestapo. A few nights after she had been, forced to watch a comrade tortured to death, one of her jailers began cursing her and then kicked open the door to her cell and threw ,in a loaf of bread. "I was hungry, I wanted .to eat, but at the same time the thought crossed my mind that perhaps it was poisoned. But when I picked it up and started eating, I chewed on something hard. It was a little matchbox. There were matches inside and a piece of paper saying: `Coraggio. Lavoricimo per te.' Take courage, we are working for you,": ? . 27 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360007-1 r- Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360007-1 New Statesman 14 February 1975 Dev Murarka light of 41119UMW 171460TIONOMMINWASOMIZI ussia's ip issidents e fragmentation and destruction of a mall world is never an ennobling sight. hen this happens due to avoidable mis- es, it is all the more tragic. That this as been happening to the world of Soviet *ssidence has been obvious for the past ouple of years. Now the process is accele- ting and the last fortnight has revealed, s never before, the serious plight and gony in which the Soviet dissidents now d themselves. The situation is leading to elf-questioning and doubts about the whole pproach to dissidence which came to be dopted during the past decade. More ignificantly, some .of the dissidents them- Ives are now questioning the motives of noisy claque of dissidentologists who have perated in their name abroad and who ear no small responsibility for their estniction: The centr.1 issue before dissidents now whether they continue to believe and -ork on the basis that reforms and change an be thrust down the throats of the oviet leaders by the American Congress d Administration and Western press pro- aganda, or whether they themselves have do something as well beside issuing atements to the Western press at the drop I a hat. The American Trade Bill episode only the latest in a chain of experiences hich have convinced many of them that ^ from bringing deliverance, the Western kage has brought them ruin. It may indeed prove to be the most im- rtant of all fall-outs from the rejection the Trade Bill, with its emigration ause, by the Soviet authorities. Surpris- gly, this aspect of the tangled story of e Trade Bill seems to have received the ast attention. The pundits have been far o busy agonising about whether the erican monopolies would be able to ake huge profits out of trade with the viet Union or not. Is it not amazing, me to think of it, that the original pur- se of the Jackson amendment has been thoroughly lost sight of that only its ended beneficiaries, now its victims, the sidents, remember it at all? That it has become a serious problem the dissidents was made clear in a urageous statement by the dissident torian Roy Medvedev, who roundly de- unced the antics of Senator Henry kson. His acid critique of Jackson called n the American public to judge the tives of their politicians and decide to at degree the dramatic fate of the Soviet s really disturbed Senator Jackson and what extent he made use of the tragedy tens of thousands of Jews in the Soviet ion to aid his personal career and his btful political speculations'. He accused +7014611211=1118aC=POZLICEMNSXMICIEWIMMilli the Senator of being motivated by a desire to impose humiliating conditions upon the Soviet regime, thus ruining a compromise which had .been made possible over a long period and with much difficulty. The essence of Medvedev's argument is that any advance in political reforms in the Soviet Union can only come through a dialogue with the Soviet authorities and not through external pressure, which only backfires in the end and halts any mean- ingful breakthroughs. At the core is Medvedev's belief that the Soviet leaders and bureaucracy are not a monolithic bloc impervious to progress and standing firm against change. In his view, they are approachable and susceptible to persuasion in the matter of changes. Medvedev himself recognises that it is an extremely slow process and the changes may come too slowly for some. But, he seems to ask, is there any viable alternative to it? Besides, in his view, there are different sections of the leadership and the bureaucracy which can provide an internal pressure group against the no-changers. But to put visible, overwhelming outside pressure closes all ranks and makes change much more diffi- cult. Whether the thesis is entirely correct or not, and many dissidents disagree with it now and have disagreed with it in the past, the significant fact is that more dis- sidents and sympathisers are now listening to Medvedev's ideas and some are even ad- mitting that he has proved to be right. Medvedev's thesis is not a new one. Nearly two years ago, he warned of the harm done to the dissident cause by its connections with the Western press and some of its backers abroad. At the time, he refrained from. questioning the motives of such supporters. But his frontal attack on Jackson's motives is intended to have a wider implication since it is not only Jack- son who has waxed eloquent and fat on the Jewish and dissident theme. Dissident- ?logy, in fact, has become a well-established minor and self-supporting industry in the West, with little relevance or benefit to the dissident cause, as distinct from individual dissidents. Medvedev himself will be the last one to deny that publicity abroad has some merit. However, he also feels strongly that its merit is increasingly outweighed by the dis- advantages it brings, the worst being the discredit it brings to the dissident cause in the eyes of the Soviet common people, who are often unable to distinguish between such publicity and collaboration with foreign enemies. This is the crucial dis- sident dilemma now. How can the dissidents hope to make changes if they have no support or credibility with the public at 2.8 home? Some of them now. go even farther and ask themselves: what have we really done to rally support, leave aside deserving it? Indeed, it is becoming .a new source of strong resentment for many of them that some of their potential leaders have been destroyed through being turned into sacred cows by the Western dissidentologists. To be sure, they are very profitable cows for the dissidentologists themselves, but it brings no profit to the dissidents here and much pain and humiliation. It is also resented that through their extensive con- trol and influence over the publicity media the dissidentologists prevent any balanced picture of the problems of dissidence being presented, those attempting to do so being silenced by ridicule, abuse, slander, and other means. Thus a gross misrepresenta- tion of the dissident reality is taking place, in which some established figures are pro- claimed heroes, others are made out to be fools, knaves or non-existent because the armchair revolutionaries in Washington, Paris or London know the dissidents' prob- lems better than the dissidents themselves. It is significant, too, that this time only a feeble rejoinder to Medvedev's statement has come from Dr Andrei Sakharov, the other distinguished dissident still in Moscow. Two years ago Medvedev had warned that to involve the American Administration in legislation about emigration or other in- ternal Soviet issues, as Dr Sakharov and his associates were urging, would prove to he disastrous. Indeed, Mr Sakharov even called upon' the American senator to make these conditions tougher. Now even Dr Sakharov has avoided any praise for Senator Jackson and merely declared that the Congress and the US President should continue on their path of 'principled politics'. Many dissidents are also coming rotmd to think that the whole emphasis put on emigration in recent years is fundamentally wrong. Ultimately, emigration is a denial of and escape from dissidence, not its affirmation. A well-known dissident, mathematician and professor, Igor Shaferevich, who is a contributor to a Solzhenitsyn'anthology of dissident writings, has implied that such emigration on the part of dissidents was a sign of weakness, their inability to with- stand pressure and suffering. Naturally, such a charge is resented and it has brought a stinging reply from Yuli Daniel, still here, and a close friend of Andrei Sinyavsky, the literary critic, who has emigrated to Paris Daniel argued that those writers and artists who have left for the West 'can work for the future and in the future their 'ors will come back to the fatherland'. This may be so, but in the eyes of many dis- sidents remaining behind the emigrants arc becoming irrelevant to their struggle none the less. Such dissensions, tearing the fabric or dissidence 'apart, arc, unfortunately, likely to grow even more' as the movement weakens and falls apart. There is no sign of any new source of vitality yet. If at dissidents do survive, it would be only through self-renewal and a more realistic reappraisal of their means as well as goals. Such change will not be painless and im- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360007-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100-360007-1 mediate results will be practically invisible. But unless it can be done the dissidents, instead of the state, will wither away. Equally, somehow they . will have to dis- card the croSs of dissidentologists which is proving fatally heavy for the health of dissidence to bear. Moscow CHRIST IAN SCIENCE MONITOR 21 February 1975 Jilie Fon a s eaks frankly in Nilo= By Dev Murarka Special to ? The Christian Science Monitor Moscow Jane Fonda, the political activist actress, is in the Soviet Union making a film. And those who have been following her career are watching to see how she will react to her stay here. Miss Fonda is taking part in the first Soviet-American co-production of a film based on the classic tale by Maurice Maeterlinck "The Blue Bird." She plays the princess of night. Most encounters between radical chics and life as it is in the Soviet Union have been mutually bruising because free-wheeling radicalism makes the Soviets uncomfortable. They are bewildered by non-con- formist behavior amidst them, though It is admired from a distance. For the time being, however, Miss Fonda's views, as she explained them In on interview published Feb. 19 in the Literaturnaya Gazeta, fit in with the Soviet perceptions on such mat- ters. Her interview was given to Soviet script writer ?Alexei Kapler , who adapted the story for the film. (Mr. Kapler is remembered by many as the man who was sent to a prison camp as a British spy because Sta- _ lin's daughter Svetlana fell in love with him. Svetlana now lives in the United States.) ' The political undertone of the inter- view was apparent. "I'm not easily scared," Miss Fonda retorted in re- ' sponse to a question about strong feelings aroused in certain American circles because of her activities against the Vietnam war. As usual Miss Fonda was elegantly caustic in her comments upon most subjects, ranging from Hollywood to new-wave films., She spared no one, Newsweek, March 3, 1975 THE RUSSIANS ARE COMING though she took the opportunity to express her thanks "for the assis- tance Which the Soviet people are sending to Vietnam." However, she bluntly pointed out -- underlining the political motives behind the fuss being made about her here ? that "in the Soviet Union people know more about me as a fighter against the Vietnam war than as a film actress." ? She went on to say that of all- her films she liked only "Klute" anti "They Shoot 'Horses, Don't They?" which is the one film of Miss Fonda .well known in the U.S.S.R. "Klute" could never pass the official prudery of the censors which stifles the arts here, particularly the stage and the .screen,. ? But the Welcome being given to ? Miss Fonda is more out of political admiration for her than anything else. This is evident from the comments by Mr. Kepler which precede the Inter- view in which she is described as a '"well-known American actress and political personality." ? ' The title of the interview. tti ."..Tane ? Fonda ? anthstar." ' On Hollywood Miss Fonda said: "At present in Hollywood It. is' becoming/ Increasingly difficult to make films in which it would be possible -to convey something important. " Expressink her philosophy of films,' Miss Fonda explained to the Soviet readers that a work of art should not be meant only for film critics and intellectuals. She went on to -claim that "the country where very inter->. eating films are being made' al present is Cuba."'" 7 Ideology sits heavily on the soviet arts:though it is done in the name Of Marxism. Miss' Fonda ' has yet to realize perhaps that -while Manciiit 'critiques of bourgeois art are Mural= .nating, Marxist practices in the arts ? are with few exceptions boring. t?:? These few exceptions are found mostly in the category of dissident or near dissident art, which is only reluctantly given recognition, as was the case with :the film "Rublev.! Directed by Andrei Tarkovsky, the film about Russia's most famous icon artist received international acclaim at the 1.989 Cannes Film Festival.' ? A swarm of young Soviet diplomats has invaded Capi- tol Hill recently, but the well-schooled and intellectual Russians are making no effort to gather information. In- stead they are working to build friendly ties with young Congressional staff members, those who can be expected to stay and move up into key committee posts. American ,intelligence chiefs are expressing concern about the de- velopment, mainly because of the fact that Soviet dip- lomatic personnel often double as members of Russian intelligence. 29 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360007-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360007-1 ATLANTIC MONTHLY FEBRUARY 1975 AMERICA'S MEDITERRANEAN BUNGLE Cyprus, like Israel, Czechoslova- kia, and Laos, is one of those small spots on the map whose global im- portance far exceeds their size. Thus the ouster last July of Archbishop Makarios, the president of the is- land state, was an incident of inter- national significance. The coup d'etat, staged by surrogates of the military regime that then ruled Greece, touched off a complex crisis whose repercussions are bound to ripple beyond' the Mediterranean for some time to come. Not long ago, when 1 suggested to an Ameri- can official that the United States may have been scarred by the crisis, he replied: "The wounds have to heal before we are scarred." The coup triggered a traumatic sequence of events. Turkey, which had long sought to control Cyprus, used the fall of Makarios as a pre- text to invade the island, thereby upsetting the fragile balance be- tween its Greek and Turkish com- munities and heightening the pros- pect of chronic religious and ethnic tensions similar to those that plague Ulster. Although Greece and Tur- key narrowly averted a direct con- flict, the episode exacerbated tradi- tional animosities between them which are likely to explode over other issues., such as their rival claims to Aegean oil deposits. Dis- mayed by the U.S. role in the af- fair, the civilian Greek government that supplanted the junta withdrew from the North Atlantic Treaty Or- ganization, leaving a gap in the al- liance's southern defenses, where the Soviet Union has been strength- ening its forces. Moreover, the hostility against the United States that has surfaced in both Greece and Turkey makes it unlikely that either country will co- operate in ,American efforts to sup- ply Israel if another war erupts in the Middle East. In Washington, meanwhile, congressional dis- pleasure with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's handling of the situation has diluted his authority on Capitol Hill and revealed the ex- tent to which he and President Ford differ in their attitudes toward the legislature on foreign policy matters. Kissinger holds a large measure of responsibility for the crisis. He deliberately chose to disregard warnings that the Greek dictator- ship was plotting to topple Ma- karios, and, rejecting the advice of State Department and Pentagon specialists, he did nothing to min- imize the impact. of the coup after it had occurred. There is no doubt that he was preoccupied at the time by the impeachment proceedings then building up against President Nixon. But his refusal to bring pres- sure to bear on the Greek generals was mainly motivated by his reluc- tance to ruffle them and, in the pro- cess, court the risk of jeopardizing U.S. and NATO military installa- tions in Greece. In that respect his conduct was consistent with the pol- icy pursued by the United States in the area since the end of World War II. Washington's approach to the re- gion through the years had essen- tially been founded on an estimate of Greece's. strategic value in the struggle against communism and in the quest for equilibrium in the Middle East. The primary American objective in Greece was the preser- vation of U.S. and NATO bases and other facilities there?even if this meant backing autocratic, un- popular, and inept Greek regimes. During the 1950s, therefore, Ameri- can diplomatic, military, and intelli- gence representatives in Greece sup- ported right-wing Greek political figures who promised to maintain the status quo. Presidents Johnson and Nixon carried forth the same? line by aiding the egregious dicta- torship that ran the country from 1967 until last summer. Ironically, however, this policy contributed de- cisively to the very instability it was supposed to prevent. The American tendency to sup- port Greek conservatives goes back to the days of the Communist rebel- lion, when security was a key con- sideration. The United States should logically have encouraged the devel- opment of democratic institutions after the insurgency waned in the late 1940s, but American strategists were turned in the ?opposite direc- tion by two events: the Communist take-over of Czechoslovakia, and the outbreak of the Korean War. Washington hastily pushed Greece into NATO, and, along with this determination to incorporate Greece into the U.S. orbit, the United States also moved to ensure that the 30 Greek government would respond to American dictates. In other words, the realities of Greek politi- cal life were subordinated to broader American imperatives in the Cold War. The American who set the pattern for this approach was John Peuri- foy, the U.S. ambassador in Athens during the early 1950s. A dynamic diplomat, dedicated to the notion that American intervention in Greece's internal affairs was salu- tary, Peurifoy behaved more like a viceroy than an emissary. Seeking a solid Greek personage to manage the government, he persuaded Mar- shal Alexander Papagos to form a political party. With Central Intelli- gence Agency operatives acting as his intermediaries, he encouraged numbers of Greek politicians to join the -.?,w movement, in several in- stances offering them rewards to do so. When Papagos failed to make much headway, Peurifoy bluntly threatened to curb U.S. aid unless Greece's electoral procedures were changed from a proportional to a plurality system. In the 1952 elec- tion, Papagos' party managed to gain control of Parliament even though it won fewer than half of the votes that were cast throughout the country. Obsessed with keeping Greece on an anti-Communist track, American officials supervised their Greek counterparts or indirectly influenced their activities. An American eco- nomic expert attended meetings of the Greek Cabinet, and U.S. mili- tary advisers were attached to Greek army units, most of whose commanders had been trained in the United States. The CIA was particularly close to the Greek es- tablishment. Its agents, many of whom were of Greek origin and spoke the language fluently, created special bonds with the Greek lead- ers. And Queen Frederika was fond of Allen Dulles, then the CIA direc- tor, so the agency carried unusual weight in the palace. It also. exer- cised extraordinary ?authority through the Greek Central Intelli- gence Service (K.Y.P.), which it had organized and continued to subsi- dize. At one point during the 1950s, a former CIA man recalled, the agency was financing all but two of Athens' sixteen newspapers. It would be unfair to assume that Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360007-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360007=1 most Greeks, at least during that period, resented American patron- age. But, as they saw it, this link imposed upon the United States the obligation to further Greek inter- ests; they would later feel disap- pointed, and even betrayed, when Washington abandoned them to a dictatorship or rejected their posi- tion on the sensitive Cyprus issue. By the early 1960s, the Greek po- litical scene was fragmenting as new forces, mirroring changes in the eco- nomic and social landscape, began to emerge. Prime Minister Con- stantine Caramanlis, who had gov- erned for eight years and was re- sponsible for much of the economic progress, finally clashed with the royal family and voluntarily exiled himself to Paris. Elections in 1964 swept in George Papandreou and his brilliant, erratic son, Andreas, a former American citizen who had taught economics at the University of California. The liberal Pa- pandreous, who were enormously popular in the new climate, soon became the focal point of Greek and U.S. intrigues. The Kennedy Administration, which believed that reform was the best defense against communism, ? tried to tilt toward the Papandreous. But President Kennedy's ambassa- dor in Athens could not control the CIA and military advisers in his mission, and they continued to sup- port their own prot?s. A bitter dispute arose, for example, when ? Andreas Papandreou attempted to break the tight liaison between the CIA and the K.Y.P. He was after- ward accused of plotting to take over the government, and although there was no hard evidence against him, King Constantine and his con- servative sympathizers, helped by the CIA and American military men, used the allegations for politi- cal purposes. They spread rumors against Andreas, and by paying pol- iticians to quit his father's party, managed to bring down the Pa- pandreou Cabinet. But nobody else could form a durable government. The king considered setting up a ? right-wing regime under his own aegis, but was warned that the United States would not tolerate an unconstitutional bid for power. So new elections were scheduled for May, 1967. They never took place. As the elections drew near, the CIA learned that the king and a group of generals were planning a coup d'etat to forestall the Pa- pandreous, who seemed certain to win. Anxious to "save democracy," the CIA station in Athens proposed that the elections be rigged to favor the conservatives and thereby re- move the pretext for the coup. But the suggestion aroused little enthusi- asm, either in the U.S. mission or in Washington. The American military advisers in Greece welcomed the rise to power of their Greek col- leagues. The U.S. ambassador, Phil- lips Talbot, opposed the scheme on principle, and he was supported by Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who feared that it might backfire. Thus the American representatives in Athens waited for the coup, while Talbot, in a series of audiences with the king, expressed the hope that it would be gentle. To everyone's surprise, however, the king and his generals were pre- empted by an obscure colonel, George Papadopoulos. Talbot ca- bled Washington, decrying "the rape of Greek democracy," and pleaded for a denunciation of the coup by the State Department. But Rusk ruled against it, instead is- suing a watery statement voicing hope that the junta "will make ev- ery effort to reestablish democratic institutions." His judgment was ap- plauded by the Pentagon, which ar- gued that Papadopoulos might close U.S. and NATO bases if put under pressure. As a gesture to Congress, the Johnson Administration stopped sending tanks, aircraft, and other heavy equipment to Papadopoulos, but continued to give him rifles, ammunition, jeeps, spare parts, and the other materiel he needed to maintain internal security. Washing- ton hoped that the king might somehow restore democracy. But that dream evaporated in Decem- ber, 1967, when the king failed in an abortive countercoup and went into exile. After that, the Johnson Adminis- tration began to fantasize that Pa- padopoulos would- return to consti- tutional government, and by way of placating him, resumed shipments of heavy arms to Greece. But the junta continued to rule with a firm ? hand. Oddly enough, in light of his later attitude, President Nixon ini- tially adopted a tougher stance toward Papadopoulos. He reimposed the ban on deliveries of heavy mili- tary materiel, left the post of am- bassador to Athens vacant, and en- couraged his aides to criticize the dictatorship. In July, 1969, for ex- ample, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird vowed that the partial freeze on military aid "will be continued until progress is made toward more democratic procedures in that. coun- try." But late in 1969, as tensions in the Middle East appeared to in- tensify, Nixon reassessed his policy toward Greece. He named one of his favorite diplomats, Henry Tasca, ambassador to Athens, and that move signaled a major shift in the U.S. line. Not long after arriving at his post, Tasca eliminated members of his staff considered inimical to the military regime, and he directed his subordinates to portray the junta favorably in dispatches to Washing- ton. Visits by prominent Americans to Greece were to become a con- scious ploy filled with deep signifi- cance. Despite his earlier avowal that he would not lift the military aid embargo before the rebirth of democracy, Laird appeared in Athens following the full resump- tion of arms shipments in Septem- ber, 1970; his arrival coincided with a U.S. pronouncement that "the trend toward constitutional order is established"_ in Greece. And when Vice President Agnew traveled to Greece to see his family's village, it appeared that his trip was designed to assert U.S. backing for the junta. By the summer of 1973, Tasca's illusory confidence in Papadopoulos had faded. In July, on the eve of a rigged referendum contrived to con- firm the dictatorship, he warned Pa- padopoulos that U.S. public opinion demanded a free election. In No- vember, when the regime collapsed, he urged Washington to bring back fon-- er Prime Minister Caramanlis. But Nixon personally ordered him to stick by General Demetrios Joan- nides, the military police chief who had taken over the government, and Kissinger reportedly advised him against "interference" in Greece's internal affairs. Tasca obeyed, even though it was clear by early 1974 that Ioannides was doomed because of his own incompetence, and that his downfall would rebound against the United States. Among others, Democratic Representative Donald Fraser of Minnesota foresaw this on a trip to Athens in January. "The present government cannot long en- dure," he wrote. "Marked by inex- perience, its members appear with- out requisite talents for extricating the country from its political and economic chaos. . . . Damage ?has already occurred to American inter- ests in Greece and more will occur before the present situation ends." The inevitable upheaval was to be initiated by the Cyprus problem. The tiny island of Cyprus, which had gained independence from Brit- ain in 1960, presented one of those perennial dilemmas that age statesmen prematurely. Had it been located elsewhere, its 520,000 Greek Cypriots and 120,000 Turkish Cyp- riots might have learned to coexist or integrate. But situated as it is, it became a source of conflict between Greece and Turkey, both of which felt compelled to protect their re- spective ethnic groups. Makarios, who more or less held the island to- gether, pleased neither the Greek Approved For Release 2001/08/0. CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360007-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360007-1 junta nor the Turkish government. The Turks disliked him because they suspected, with good reason, that his long-range aim was to wipe out the Turkish Cypriot community by gradually excluding it from the island's economic development. The &seek generals detested him be- cause, by stalling for time, he in- tended to postpone forever their cherished dream of aligning Cyprus with Greece in enosis, or union. Washington also distrusted him, for he had traveled to Moscow and Pe- king, and he tolerated the large but rather mild Cypriot Communist party. It was feared that he might Drze day allow the Soviet Union to build bases on the island. Some State Department and Pentagon ele- ments, apparently forgetting that he permitted the iCIA to operate moni- toring stations on Cyprus, called him the "Castro of the Mediterra- nean." But America's principal objective in regard to Cyprus was to prevent it from poisoning relations between Greece and .Turkey, both members of NATO. American attempts to fulfill that goal, however, merely strained U.S. ties with its two allies. For example, an idea for partition conceived by Dean Acheson was viewed by Greece as a tricky device to give a part of the island to Tur- key. Similarly, President Johnson in- furiated the Turks when, by threat- ening to cut off their aid, he blocked their plans to invade Cy- prus. Consequently, Kissinger sought to stay out of the problem. During a brief visit to Nicosia in the spring of 1974, he facetiously re- marked to local reporters that, de- spite his diplomatic triumphs in Vietnam and the Middle East, he would never .get caught in the Cy- prus tangle, But if he had been reading CIA reports from Athens, as he presumably was, Kissinger must have known that a Cyprus crisis was brewing and the United States mighebe drawn into it. Papadopoulos had tried at least four times to oust Makarios, and loannides was determined to suc- ceed where his predecessor had failed. Soon after seizing power, he set up a branch of his junta in Cy- prus under the Cypriot National Guard commander, General George Denizis, and it coordinated activities . with a Greek army contingent as- signed to the island. Ioapnides ? also recruited the fanatical remnants of the National Organization of Cyp- riot Combatants, now known as EOKA-B, which had originally been created by the guerrilla chief George Grivas to fight the British. The assault against Makarios was timed for late April, but loannides delayed it because a dispute had flared up between Greece and Tur-. key over oil exploration rights in the Aegean Sea. By mid-spring, de- tails of the plot were reaching Washington from the U.S. mission in Athens, and the first authoritative information on it emerged in late June, when loannides communi- cated the plan to a CIA contact in an apparent effort to sound out U.S. reaction. The State Department immedi- ately instructed Tasca to tell loan- nides that the United States strongly opposed the coup. The envoy de- clined to deliver the message per- sonally, on the grounds that, as he later said, "it was not the ambassa- dor's job to make diplomatic de- marches to a cop." But he assured Washington that loannides had re- ceived the word. The State Depart- ment was unconvinced, however. Another message went out to Tasca, and the same reply came back. Still Washington doubted that Tasca, who had covered up for the junta in ?the past, was doing his job. At that stage, it seems to me, Kissinger might have dispatched a special em- issary to Athens to discourage loan- nides more forcefully. Not only did he do nothing, but some weeks later he denied having had advance knowledge of the coup, saying that infoimation on the affair "was not exactly lying on the street." Makarios, who had watched the conspiracy against himself build up, now calculated that he might dis- courage loannides by making the plot public. On July 2, he wrote to Phaedon Gizikis, the figurehead president of Greece, complaining of the plot and demanding that the junta's agents on Cyprus be recalled to Greece. He published the letter a few days later, along with a plan of the coup. But his tactic misfired. On July 6, loannides ordered his aides to prepare for action and sent Gen- eral Michael Georgitsis to Cyprus to assume command of the operation. At the same time, the government- controlled Athens press announced? that the junta would discuss the Cy- prus question over the following weekend. But that report was a smoke screen, contrived to create the impression that the coup was still in the blueprint stage. On July 15, while the conference was sup- posedly taking place, units on Cy- prus loyal to loannides attacked the presidential palace in Nicosia. Ma- karios miraculously escaped to a British air base on the island, and was flown to London. In his place, ' loannides installed Nicos Sampson, a notorious thug known to have killed several British soldiers and Turkish Cypriots. In Washington, State Department and Pentagon experts urged Kissin- ger to denounce the appointment of Sampson and issue a statement, like 32 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360007-1 that put out by the British, asserting that the United States still recog- nized Makarios. The experts con- tended, among their other argu- ments, that the elevation of Sampson would be interpreted by the Turks to signify a virtual take- over of Cyprus by the Greek junta, and would prompt Turkey to invade the island. But Kissinger rebuffed their counsel, partly because he con- sidered Makarios to be "politically dead," and partly because he feared that the alienation of loannides might jeopardize U.S. and NATO bases in Greece. Accordingly, a State Department spokesman dealt with the situation in an evenhanded manner. As the experts had pre- dicted, the Turks were alarmed. "Pray for me" Bulent Ecevit, then head of the Turkish government, is hardly a bel- ligerent figure. On the contrary, he is a quiet, earnest intellectual who has translated T. S. Eliot and Ezra Pound; his dream is to transform Turkey into a sort of Scandinavian- like social democracy. But the na- tionalistic Turkish army, which had been humiliated by the Cyprus issue in the past, hovered in the wings of his government last summer. Fur- thermore, Ecevit is enough of a na- tionalist himself to have been aroused by the Greek junta's thrust on the island. So, within a day after Makarios fell, he ordered the Turk- ish forces to mobilize for an in- vasion of Cyprus. To give diplo- macy a chance, however, Ecevit flew to London to consult with the Brit- ish, who, along with Greece and Turkey, had guaranteed the inde- pendence of Cyprus in 1960. He presented the British foreign secre- tary, James Callaghan, with four proposals: that Sampson be re- moved; that the Greek soldiers in- volved in the coup be sent home; that Cyprus be given a new federal system respectful of Turkish Cypriot rights; and that negotiations to es- tablish such a system begin immedi- ately. In the meantime, Kissinger had sent Under Secretary of State Jo- seph Sisco out to calm the crisis. Sisco heard Ecevit's proposals in London. He promised to take them to the Greek junta in Athens and to deliver an answer to Ecevit later in the week. But in Athens, all that Sisco could obtain was arr offer by Ioannides to replace rather than re- move the Greek troops on Cyprus. When he carried this response to Ankara on the afternoon of July 19, Ecevit predictably rejected ,it. Sisco then went back to Athens to per- suade the Greeks to do better. They refused, and he returned to Ankara that night to plead with Ecevit for Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360001-1 more time. Kissinger also had a dozen telephone conversations with Ecevit, but to no avail. The Turks would not be deterred unless Greece made concessions, and the Greek junta, which considered the Turkish threat a bluff, believed that Kissinger could stop Turkey just as Lyndon Johnson had. Tasca, desper- ate to prevent the Turkish invasion, appealed to the Pentagon to deploy the Sixth Fleet in the area. Kissin- ger intercepted the message and shot back a cable calling the idea "hysterical." Thus the Turks landed on Cyprus on July 20, and their performance was appalling. They sank one of their own ships, dropped their paratroopers off tar- get, and made little progress ad- vancing from their beachhead. In Athens the next day, Ioannides announced that he would counter- attack along the mainland Turkish border, but his commanders, aware of the odds against them, claimed to be unprepared. By now Sisco was back in Greece, trying to arrange a cease-fire in Cyprus. But Idannides had disappeared, and Sisco dealt with Peter Arapalcis, the Navy chief, who agreed to halt hostilities on July 22. The morning after, Presi- dent Gizikis called in the senior commanders and a group of promi- nent politicians from rival parties. 1:/yr Co?/1.6?N;1,1"/ t11.1/ bnel ?2CITAPII tfl bring Caramanlis back. "Pray for me," Caramanlis said to? reporters as he departed from Paris. The cease-fire on Cyprus had not ended the crisis, however. In re- sponse to U.S. and British appeals, the Turks and Greeks met in Ge- neva on August 8 to open negotia- tions on the status of the island. The Turks, perceiving the Greeks to be weak, were really not in a bar- gaining mood. In the first place, they were clinging to a precarious position on the ground on Cyprus, and they realized that they could not gain at the conference table what they had not won on the bat- tlefield. Secondly, they feared a set- tlement that might prevent them from launching a fresh military drive. Their apprehensions were fur- ther fueled by the fact that the Brit- ish had reinforced their bases on the island with a battalion of Gur- khas and a squadron of Phantom jets. Therefore, when the Greeks asked for a thirty-six-hour adjourn- ment of the conference to study their proposals for a federal system in Cyprus, the Turks spurned the request, and instead began a new military offensive that gave their forces nearly half the island. Be- yond exhorting them to show flexi- bility, the United States did nothing to stop the Turks. Now it was Tur- key's turn to threaten to withdraw from NATO if American pressure were applied, and Kissinger evidently submitted to the tactic. Congress, which had been too busy during the summer with the impeachment inquiry to react to the Turkish actions, went off like a time bomb in September. Arguing that the Turks had violated the law by using American military aid beyond their own frontiers, Thomas Eagle- ton in the Senate, and congressmen of Greek origin such as John Bra- demas of Indiana and Paul Sar- banes of Maryland, pushed to stop U.S. assistance to Turkey. Kissinger unwittingly helped their case by telling congressional groups that "national security" took precedence ? over the law. President Ford vetoed two bills designed to penalize the Turks, and Kissinger, who had learned about relations with Capitol Hill under Nixon, reportedly urged him to veto a third. But Ford ac- cepted a compromise that, by giving the Turks until early December to accede to a Cyprus settlement, ac- tually constituted a victory for Con- gress. It also represented a setback for Kissinger, and it indicated, along with other signs, that he may face increasingly hard times with a new legislature eager to make itself heard in the field of foreign affairs. During this legislative episode, a Greek lobby appeared, which ex- pects to mobilize a significant nuni- ber among the estimated two mil- lion Americans of Greek origin to exert pressure on Congress. By the end of the year, there seemed to be little cause for opti- mism about the future of the east- ern Mediterranean and the impact of the events of last summer on other parts of the world. ? Cyprus, with a third of its pop- ulation rendered homeless by the Turkish invasion, had become a hu- man shambles and appeared to be degenerating into a cauldron of communal strife. ? Ancient hatreds had been re- THE GUARDIAN MANCHESTER 11 February 1975 Fascists ? plotting takeover' Lisbon, FebrUary /0 Southern farmworkers have . accused Portugal's large lan- downers of plotting a Fascist coup, according to a document . published by the Communist Party today. The document, a re.port.prepared at a mass meet- ing of Southern farmworkers yesterday, called for the confiscation of all lands and goods belonging to those who carried out social and economic sabotage. kindled between Greece and Tur- key, and neither could any longer be regarded as a dependable U.S., ally, especially in the event of an- other Middle East war. ? Fresh strains had been put on the Western alliance, and this would benefit the Russians, who have been seeking since the days of The czars to extend their influence into the re- gion. ? Secretary of State Kissinger's credibility, which is vital to his role as an international diplomatic magi- cian, has been shaken as a result of his own miscalculations. In A World Restored, originally written as his Harvard doctoral dis- sertation, Kissinger described the challenge that confronted Metter- nich and Castlereagh in 1821, when the Greeks suffered atrocious repri- sals after revolting against their Turkish overlords. European liberals. of the period were shocked, and Czar Alexander of Russia planned action against Turkey. But Metter- nich and Castlereagh opposed inter- vention that might jeopardize Euro- pean stability, insisting, as Kissinger put it, that "human considerations were subordinate to maintaining `the consecrated structure' of Eu.: rope." Greek lives were thus sacri- fice,: for the sake of a larger order. But that policy crumbled with the death of Castlereagh. Greece, with British and Russian support, gained its independence soon afterward. Although history repeats itself im- precisely, ICissinger's conduct during the summer's Mediterranean crisis strikingly resembles the behavior of Metternich and Castlereagh more than a century ago. Concentrating as he did on the "big picture," he overlooked the fact that the whole is the sum of its parts, and that a tiny island like Cyprus can unhinge a larger power balance. He may also have learned that a strategy predicated mainly on the quest for security is, in the end, insecure. ?STANLEY KARNow the elaboration of revolutionary laws for the punishment of saboteurs and said all large ,holdings whose value had increased at the cost of the people's money should be expropriated. " The great landowners ? discomforted by April 25 (last year's coup) ? are deeply 'involved in the preparation of a coup. to make the 'country return ' to a Fascist-type .regime," the -document said.: ? " The, economic ? sabotage carried out by big farmers since April 25 has a generalised. character, which presUpposes the existence of an, authentic unified plan by the great lan- downers. '' ?The farinwi;rkers said that- unless urgent and energetic measures were taken, .1975* would be. a year of hunger Approved For Releaa11/06a{}1667&? dititfis(7-00432R00010660007-1 33 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360007-1 WASHINGTON STAR 18 February 1975 THE fianra Te anekle* Ano Concerning the develop, ments in Portugal, a- few observations: ' The Communists in Portugal are organized, the non- Communists are not. Power generally flows into the hands of the organized, as distin- guished from the disorganized, party. ' Alvaro Cunha', the leader of the Portuguese Communists, spent nearly 20 years in Prague. He had advantages then he did not have during his exile in Zurich. Cunhal was well look- -ad after by his hosts, and he spent his time creating an organization against the day, when a successor dictatorship' to Salazar's should fall. WHEN APRIL came, Cun- hal was there, ready to plot the subjugation of the Por- tuguese people. That is the proper term for it, as the polls show that the Portuguese are not an exception to the rule that the human species will not elect a Communist dicta- torship if given a choice. The question isn't: Will the Communists win in Portugal at the general election sched- - NEW YORK TIMES , 23 February 1975 NOVEL ON RED COUP SiiRRING ITALIANS ?Readers Amused by Caustic ? Portrayals of Politicians In Anonymous Book By PAUL HOFMANN Special to The Neer York Times ROME, Feb. 22?A political novel that cannot yet be bought 'in any bookstore has already become a political and literary sensation here because of its :theme?a Communist take-over in Italy with support from Mos- cow, Washington and the Vati- can?and because of the myste- ry surrounding its author, . "Anonymous." The title of this book of fic- tion, which uses actual political figures as characters, is ."Ber- linguer and the Professor." The first of the title characters is Enrico Berlinguer, the noble- uled for April 12? The question, is: Will there be a fair general election? The Communists will not Abide by a fair election, any more than Lenin did. Like him, they will simply dissolve the general assembly ?in this case the rump parliament set up by the military ? and pro- ceed with communization. ? . What should we do about it? Anything? My guess is that the CIA is too intimidated these days to do anything. How can it do something to help the Portuguese ,resist en- slavement by the Communists, when to do so would involve the risk of antagonizing America's new isolationists? JAMES BURNHAM, collat- ing the reports of informed, Journals and commentators in Europe, writes that Moscow is sending sums in excess of $10 million per month to Portugal. And why indeed not? At that rate even over a period of one year you are spending less than A single submarine costs you. But the tactical and strategic value to the Soviet Union of Portugal is worth per- haps 1,000 submarines. man from Sardinia who is chief of the Italian Communist party, "The professor" is former Pre- mier Amintore Fanfani, leader of the Christian Democratic party. In the novel no fewer than 27 leading Christian Democrats die in savage infighting among their party's factions before the Communists consolidate their power. ? Guessing the Author Rizzoli, the Milan publishing house, has announced that "Berlinguer and the Professor" will be on sale in a week. But sets of galley proofs and ad- vance copies of the 135-page novel have been circulating for weeks, and Italians who have read the book are chuckling over the sarcastic portrayals of some of the nation's best- known figures and are trying to guess who wrote the book. , The politician who has been suggested most often as the au- thor is former Premier Giulio Andreotti. Mr. Andreotti, who is Budget Minister in the present Government, is the author of works on 19th-century and 20th-century history and has a caustic wit that is not typical of Italian politicians. He also '3- -azores, o? ? It is a pity that, during the SALT talks when Henry Kis- singer and 'Leonid Brezhnev Were balancing off permissible inventories of missiles and submarines and what not, we did not think to include coun- tries. It would have been inter- esting tO see what would have happened if we had insisted that the Soviet Union would have to limit itself to its cur- rent quota of slave-satellites. But one supposes that that would have busted up the negotiations. As to the future, what are we going to do if? the Communists take power, which appears likelier than not at this moment? They would, of course, instantly withdraw Portugal from NATO, and boot the United' States out-of the Azores. Should We accept Cunhal's. orders, and abandon our bases in the Azores? Portugal was admitted into NATO in the '40s not because the European NATO powers loved Salazar, and certainly not as a reward for Portugal's neutrality dur- ing the ?.war. Portugal was heads a -Christian Democratic faction opposed to Mr. Fanfani, Mr. Andreotti has publicly denied authorship of the book, which promises to become a best seller. Killed by a 'Cardinal' In the fictitious events that lead to a Communist take-over, Mr. Andreotti is pictured as seeking refuge in the Vatican, but he is killed by a false car- dinal whose hand he "naively' kisses. Another former Premier, Emilio Colombo, is cast as an exile who is shot down by a hired assassin in Brussels. The present Premier, Aldo Moro, is depicted as escaping the mas- sacre of feuding Christian Dem- ocrats with no more than a facial scar from a knifing. Mayhem ends when Mr. Ber- linguer and Mr. Panfani reach a deal in which the Commu- nist becomes chief of a new au- thoritarian regime and the Christian Democrat is pro-1 claimed nominal president butt retires to a convent. A "Pope' John XXIV" blesses both lead- ers. The idea clearly behind the farcical fiction .is that contin- 34 admitted because, on further consideration, the generals gave out the word: We must have the western coastline of the Iberian Peninsula; and, above all, we must have the Azores. ? ARE WE prepared, in the event of a coup in Portugal (which is what, in effect, it would be), to dissolve NATO, or to accept it as a military eu- nuch? Or would we simply say, as we did when France fell, that we do not recognize the legitimacy of the regime? That, indeed, the full powers of NATO are legitimately sum- moned to resist the coloniza- tion of one of their members by the superpower which NATO was sworn to protect Europe against? It would not be tactful to say it in so many words, but I should think Kissinger could find a suitably elliptical for- mulation for saying: "Your may get away with staging a coup in Lisbon, boys, but if you think the Azores go with it, come on to Washington and talk it over with our admirals." tied disunity among Christian 'Democrats, Italy's largest par- dy, would inevitably bring the '.Communists to power. , ? Communists Seek Power e The Communist party, Italy's 'second largest party, has for Tears offered to become an ally :of the Christian Democrats in governing the nation. , Whoever wrote "Berlinguer :and the Professor" is surely a member of the Italian establish- 'anent, probably a Christian TDemocrat and no friend of Mr. 'Fanfani. The volume is so replete with :"in" jokes and detail familiar only in Italian politics that one :can hardly imagine translations into other languages. ? In one scene, the ? Italian 'Government, still controlled by ,the Christian Democrats, is en- tertaining the visiting President 'of the United States in Rome. ,But the Communists are alrea- dy so strong that they can dic- ',tate what the guest is to be -served at a state banquet? 'spaghetti and sausages. The ;narne of the American Pres- ident just before the fictional :1980 coup in Italy is Henry , 'Kissinger. Approved For Release 2001/08/08.: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360007-1 " Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100.360007-1 :CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR. 25 February 1975 By Razia Ismail Special to ? The Christian Science Monitor New Delhi Whether or not spring comes to ? America and India in its normal annual season, relations between the two nations seem in for another cold spell. Washington's decision to resume arms supplies to Pakistan has in one stroke frozen New Delhi's attitude toward both the United States and Pakistan into one of stiff formality, which will take time and effort to thaw out again. New - Delhi's reaction to Pakistan Premier Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's arms- se-eking visit to America was adverse from the outset. The move was seen as contradictory to the amicable tone of the 1972 Simla agreement signed by Mr. Bhutto and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to normalize ties weakened by decades of periodic war and suspi- cion. ' New Delhi's adverse reaction to initial 'reports that President Ford might lift the arms embargo was seen by some as an irrational flap over an imagined threat. But threat or not, India deeply opposes a revival of the doctrine that arms supply should be the basis for a "balance" in the subcontinent. Reports now reaching here cite the plea by Undersecretary of State Jo- seph J. Sisco that new .weapons to Pakistan are necessary to counter- balance India's nuclear test of last year. This is taken to indicate that the U.S. does not really believe that India will limit its nuclear energy to peace- ful purposes. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger had succeeded in leaving a different impression when he visited New Delhi a few months ago?and.said, "We take seriously India's affirmation that it has no intention to develop nuclear weap- ons." Although.Washington's latest move is unwelcome, this does not mean it was unexpected. A clear hint came last week when Indian Foreign Min- ister Y. B. Chavan had told Parlia- ment he might have to defer plans to visit Washington for the India-U.S. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 25 February 1975 Why arm Pakistan? Washington's decision to lift its 10-year arms embargo against Pakistan undoubtedly was a diffi- cult one. It takes little imagina- tion to perceive the danger inher- ent in an unrestrained arms build- up on the Indian subcontinent,- a region bristling with animosities and conflicts. On the face of it it is utter folly to fuel these conflicts by pouring in more and more weaponry. Indeed, the worldwide trend of escalating arms sales presents dangers that ought to be reckoned with at every point. But there are no simple solu- tions to the complex problem of security, and the lifting of the ban on United States arms to Pakistan must be seen within the large context of what is happening next door in India and all around the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. India has a massive, sophisticated military arsenal built up by the Soviet Union. Even now a high- powered Russian mission, in- cluding Defense Minister Andrei Grechko, is in New Delhi talking arms supply. In recent months, too, India has moved vigorously to enhance its dominant political and strategic position. It has consolidated its hold in Sikkim and, most recently, In Kashmir. And, despite its reas- surances, it has exploded a nu- clear device that leaves no doubt it now has the capability of building an atomic bomb. None of this is to suggest that India has aggressive intentions or designs on its neighbors. But, from his vantage point in Islama- bad, it is understandable why President Bhutto is jittery. In the wake of the breakup of Pakistan his foremost concern has been Joint Commission talks scheduled early in March. Informed sources also say, how- ever, that New Delhi had hoped the arms supply issue might be discussed In Washington by Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Chavan before any decision was taken. The fact that the U.S. would not delay. its decision for a few weeks until after the-.scheduled talks, or until after the arrival in New Delhi of new American Ambassador William B. Saxbe, is seen as a clear Indication of where U.S. priorities lie. Meanwhile, Soviet Defense Min- ister Andrei A. Grechko landed here Monday for talks with Indian leaders. His visit was planned as a goodwill trip two months ago, but now assumes added significance. 35 The informal comment in govern- keep his truncated country to- gether and to build a viable, inde- pendent state. His problems are compounded by separatist strife in Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan, which he suspects is being fueled by the Russians, among others. It is hence to provide Pakistan with ample weaponry for its secu- rity and self-defense that Wash- ington has reversed course. It, too, views a strong, independent Paid- stan as essential to keeping the crucial oil flowing through the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea. There should be no question that the supply of arms to Pakistan must be carefully limited. The State Department promises that military sales will be weighed so as not to intensify an arms race in South Asia and that it will not try to change the strategic balance in the region. All this said, however, it would appear that the change in U.S. arms policy has been most crudely handled. To have the new Amer- ican envoy to India sitting in Bangkok making odd statements while an announcement about the embargo was imminent seems a strange way to conduct diplo- macy. It would have been more sen- sible and tactful to let William Saxbe present his credentials in New Delhi and personally explain the impending U.S. decision to Indian leaders. Then an announce- ment in Washington could have followed. In any event, it is now to be hoped that Mr. Saxbe is in a position to assure New Delhi that the lifting of the arms embargo will not be detrimental to its interests in the region or to U.S7 to Indian relations. ment circles here is that Moscow has always been "very friendly and un- derstanding" about India's defense needs. The steady flow of Chinese arms to Pakistan as well as the new U.S. arms decision will doubtless figure in Mr. Grechko's talks agenda. Greater Soviet support for India's growing defense production capabil- ity may be one outcome of .the series ? of-:events. But this should not surprise. anyone in Washington. . . The tragicomic, tailpiece to tho whole episode is Ambassador Saxbe's failure to arrive in New Delhi on schedule. The American Embassy here first said he was ill in Bangkok, but Mr. Saxbe himself scuttled that excuse by claiming perfect health. He will hardly be able to make that claim about India-American relations, at least for some time. ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360007-1 4 ?"r, Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360007-1 LOS ANGELES TIMES 23 February 1975 Should U.S.' .Resupply 'Ethiopia? BY DIAL TORGERSON ASMARA, Ethiopia?In an Asmara hospital, a doctor pointed out the ci- vilian patients who had lost arms and legs to the high-powered bullets fired by the Ethiopian army. 'Why," he asked, "must the Ameri- -cans keep supplying bullets to an ? Times correspondent Dial Torgerson wrote this article after returning to ? his base in Nairobi from a recent trip to Asmara. army which does this sort of thing?" ? The US. government provided the guns and the ammunition with which perhaps 20,000 government troops have been attempting to put down Eritrea's fight for independence. ?? Now, after more than three weeks - of fighting, the Ethiopians admit they need resupplying. A State Depart- ? ment official says the U.S. govern- ment "is continuing to study" Ethio- pia's request for an airlift of ammuni- tion. Washington has a lot of factors to . study. Among them: ?The Addis Ababa government has used massacre as a technique of 'subjugation. Last summer, the army killed 126 civilians at the village of, Urn Hajar. On Feb. 2, approximately 100 were machine gunned to death against a church wall at Woki Deba, and 700 escaping political prisoners were reported killed by paratroopers- Feb.15 near Asmara. ? ?Military strategists believe that the Ethiopian army is fighting a war. it cannot win?against guerrillas: well supplied with Communist-bloc' arms, backed by the overwhelming support of the civilian populace, and in their own mountainous territory where roads can be easily cut by small-unit attacks. ?The Eritrean liberation move- ment has an undeni.abiy valid caliAe: . The autonomy of the:coastal territo- ry was unilaterally cancelled by Ethiopia when the Addis Ababa government annexed Eritrea as its 14th province in 1962. ?The Ethiopian government, has proclaimed itself socialist and is ex- ploring diplomatic links to the Chi-' nese and the Eastern-bloc nations of Europe. Many persons say that the . ./ Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77430432R000100360007-1 'military junta which rules the coun-:, try, the Provisional Military Adminis- trative Council, is edging closer the Communist philosophy every - ? ??? If the United States resupplies the Addis .Ababa forces, then, it will be. aiding a ruthless, left-leaning Military. junta with dubious chances of milita- - fry spccess... . . On the- other 'hand, the United' States, has a stake. in Eritrea. ,The 00-mile strip of Red Sea' coastline is :among the most strategic areas of the world. It represents a ? longtime US. .investment. Among the reasons why: f-. f?If Eritrea wins its independence, -,:the balance of power along the Red :Sea will shift heavily .to the. Arab ewOrld. The Eritrean liberation groups- ire dominated by Moslems ancl.step-. ? plied by Arab countries. . ?-7.1f Eritrea shakes loose from Ad- - dis Ababa, only the tiny French en- "chive Called the Territory of, the Afars and Issas?and its port, Djibou- ti.--ewill remain open to the West. 'And there will then be strong Arab pressure ta forte the 'French out of Djibouti's' e? ? .