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August 19, 1975
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25X1A App.roved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010037tRIWe INTERNAL USE ONLY This publication contains clippings from the domestic and foreign press for YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use of selected items would rarely be advisable. 22 AUGUST 1975 NO. 17 GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS GENERAL EAST EUROPE WEST EUROPE EAST ASIA LATIN AMERICA PAGE Destroy after backgrounder has served its purpose or within 60 days. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4 1 29 34 37 40 46 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4 WASHINGTON STAR 19 August 1975 #4P-Acr17111 riTv:tticapary By Orr Kelly Washington Star Staff Writer A neatly printed sign hangs on one wall of the suite of offices occupied by the FBI's Freedom of Information Unit in the new J. Edgar Hoover building. It says: WHEN IN DOUBT CROSS IT OUT James Farrington, director of the bureau's FOI unit ? which has grown 1,000 percent since nevi amendments to the law went into ef- fect six months ago ? seemed a little taken aback when the sign was pointed out to him and he quickly as- sured a reporter it was not official policy. But ?in a court deposition earlier this year, FBI Agent Richard C. Dennis Jr. described how the when- in-doubt-cross-it-out policy works in practice: "We would take a black grease pencil and. . . probably would delete in most instances all the names men- tioned in the file unless . . . I was positive that the information had been made public, that there was absolutely no invasion of privacy. "I?would probably delete the name of the individual it was about or who . . . gave us the information, and I would delete information which would tend to identify any of those individuals, based upon the fact that it possibly could be an invasion of the individual's privacy." . THE FBI, along with the CIA and the Internal Revenue Service, is among the worst in complying with the law designed to open up many government records to public inspec- tion. At the other extreme,'surprisingly, is' the Pentagon, which is often cited as doing one of the best jobs in com- plying with both the letter and the spirit of the law. A recent Army bulletin, for exam-, ple, advised officials dealing with freedom-of-information requests that it is better to "err on the side of waiving fees than to charge exces- sive or inappropriate fees." "And remember," the bulletin said, in contrast to the sign at the FBI, "the key principle about col- lecting FOIA fees is, 'When in doubt, dont.'" Since the new, more liberal, amendments to the act went into ef- fect six months pgo today, agencies throughout the government have been buried by a blizzard of re- quests for information ? far more N sands of requests, the bureaucracy has responded in typical fashion ? by expanding. When the amendments weat into effect, the FBI's FOL office was inconspicuously located in two small rooms in the main Justice Depart- ment building with a total of some 700 square feet. Early in March it ex- panded to 1,500 square feet. By early May it had moved into the new build- ing, ballooning to 10,100 square feet. And by mid-July it was up to 11,200. square feet and growing. At the CIA, the new task of provid- ing information to the public occupies the time of between 50 and 80 full-time workers. In the week of July 3-10, 130 clerical workers put in 1,648 hours handling FOI requests and 154 professionals put in 2,223 hours on the same job. "I THINK you will agree those are enormous figures," said a spokesman. for the agency. Despite that effort, the CIA seems bogged down in a morass of requests. In the first Six months of the year, 4,038 requests were re- ceived. But as of July 10, 804 of those requests had not even been logged in ? dated and stamped as hav- ing been received. In al- ' 'most all cases, the agency was failing to meet the law's requirement that the person, requesting informa- tion get a yes or no answer ?within 10 working days. : Still, the law has resulted in some major disclosures of information that would otherwise have remained ,hidden away in the bureau-: ?cratic woodwork. . 7 It was in response to a suit filed under the FOI law by Morton Halperin, a for-. mer government official and one of the most active. users of the law, that the' CIA gave up CIA Director William Colby's report to President Ford on problems within the agency. But the report was deliv- ered to Halperin's attorney at his home at 8 o'clock one night and then immediately distributed to the news media with no indication that the release was in re- sponse to an FOI suit. Halp- erin suspects the agency hoped to get credit for the release of the information requests than anyone had expected. without calling attention to - And, to attempt to handle these thou- the fact that the FOI law Approved For Relevgi6s20014'08Y08 MI-AIRDP77-04 that are reluctant to release information. Because the amendments are new and untested, there are sharp differences in the way requests are handled by different agencies. At the Department of Health, Education and Wel- fare, any employe can grant a request. But only 16 officials in Washington and 10 regional offices have the authority to deny a request. Thus, even though HEW agencies get an enormous number of requests ? an average of about 1,800 a week to the Social Security Administration alone ? the average requester receives a response in less than 16 days. AT THE FEDERAL Trade Commission, the policy is just the opposite. Requests come to a Free- dom of Information Office at the rate of 15 to 20 a week. But that office cannot grant requests ? it can only deny them. If any of the nine exemptions under the law applies, the decision on whether or not to release the information must be made by higher officials in the agency. "If you have everyone giving out information, someone is going to make a mistake" said Barbara Van Wormer, supervisor of the agency's FOI office. There is, in fact, some justification for such cau- tion. Regulatory agencies such as the FTC and HEW's Food and Drug Administra- tion are increasingly aware of what they call "reverse FOI law" ? cases in which someone, usually a corpo- ration, goes to court to pre- vent the release of informa- tion. There were 222 lawsuits related to requests for information under the FOI law being handled by a new office in the Justice Depart- ment's Civil Division in the first half of this year. But there were also some 90 other cases in which the government was in court defending the release of information that someone claimed should not be 32R000100370003-4 ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4 released. MOST OF THE WORK of the litigation section, how- ever, is obviously devoted to defending in court the decision of some agency to withhold information. Jef- frey F. Axeirad, who heads the office, says he now has six overworked lawyers ("I came in one Sunday," he says, "and the others were already here") and hopes to get more. Mark Lynch, who runs a freedom of information unit for Ralph Nader and is one of a growing number of specialists in FOI law, says Axelrad is goiag to need them, at the rate things are going. "Some of these agencies are taking a really arro- gant, independent atti- tude," Lynch said. Charles Hinkle, who has long headed the Defense Department's office of se- curity review and who now has taken on the responsi- bility for clearing FOI re- quests received by the secretary of defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff, agrees that the number of suits filed is a good measure of how well an agency is doing. He is proud, he says, that the department has not been sued under the law ? an indication that informa- tion has been denied only when there are solid rea- sons under the law for doing so. By this measure, the IRS is clearly a problem area with 25 cases now in the courts. Louise Brown, of the Public Citizens Tax Reform Research Group, tells of one request that produced some 800 pages of docu- ments after months of delay. When Brown protest- ed that there was an unex- plained gap in the data, the IRS agreed to do some more checking. Finally, much later, the agency coughed up another 2,000 pages. "This is just another method of keeping se- crets," she said. 'They give you a partial answer but they keep the really significant documents." Lynch and Thomas M. Susman, chief counsel of the Senate subcommittee on administrative practices and procedures, who has been involved in FOI legis- lation-for years, like to tell horror stories of experi- ences with some of the more recalcitrant agencies. SUSMAN TELLS of the person who had a long ex- change of correspondence with the FBI -- demands' for additional identification, demands for more detail on the subject and then a de- mand for a notarized 'copy of the person's signature. The result was the release of two insignificant news- paper clippings. Lynch recalls the experi- ence of Daniel Ford, direc- tor of the Union. of Concerned Scientists, in Cambridge, Mass. Ford said in a telephone interview that his group asked for information from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on its ultrason- ic technique for finding cracks in pipes and got 38 pages of documents. They were told that the search for more information would cost $39,000. "We appealed' ? and. caused the agency some embarrassment,' Ford said. "They agreed to waive the fee and then pro- vided us with something like 39 more pages of docu- ments. This material was enormously interesting. It revealed that the ultrasonic technique is unreliable and that the agency didn't tell Congress the technique doesn't work." Another incident recalled by Lynch ? not so much a horror story as an illustra- tion of how useful the law can be ? involves the at- tempt of Advertising Age magazine to get informa- tion from the Army. Early this year, the Army put out a fact sheet touching on the highlights of a five-volume inspector general's report on a $40 million advertising con- tract, John Revett, senior, editor of The magazine, re- called. "They said it sum- marized the report. We filed an FOI request for the parts of the report we were inter- ested in. BY THAT TIME the new amendments to the law had gone into effect and the Army had a new general counsel. "What we got was sub- stantially different from the, fact sheet," he said. "We would not have known what really happened if we had not gotten the documents." If it had not been for the successful use of the law, Revett said, the magazine would probably have been at a dead end in its pursuit of the story of the contract because its sources in the Army had been scared into silence. In one particularly fla- grant case, Lynch said, a State Department official certified in a court affada- vit that some documents were properly classified. It was later learned, Lynch said. that the official had not examined the docu- ments ? and that he could- n't have read them if he had because they were printed in French, a language he did not know. Barbara Ennis, who has headed the State Depart- ment's FOI office since April, said she hadn't heard of that case. But she said she hoped those Who say the department is doing a bet- ter job now than it used to are right. ? The law requires reports from the agencies and from the attorney general next March to tell Congress how the law is working. At this point, no one in the govern- ment knows the total num- ber of requests received nor how many of those are denied; no one knows the total number of persons in- volved in handling FOI re- quests, although it is cer- tainly several thousands, and no one knows how much it is costing the gov- ernment to provide infor- mation under the FOI law, although the cost is certain- ly many millions of dollars. But there is a general feeling, both among those seeking information and those handling requests, that the law is providing significant amounts of information, not primarily to the news media, but to individuals and businesses. IT IS OBVIOUS, from the experience of both large organizations such as the Pentagon and HEW and smaller agencies, such as the Energy Research and Development Administra- tion and the Drug Enforce- ment Administration, that the law is workable. It is also obvious, from the ex- perience of agencies that say they have had problems complying with the law, such as the FBI, CIA and IRS, that the appeals procedure and the chance to go to court will eventual- ly result in the release of information for the persist- ent requester. In the first six months, the law has resulted in the release of Red Cross docu- ments on Vietnamese prisons; the Peers report on the My Lai Massacre; the Colby report to Ford; docu- ments on the FBI's Cointel- pro operations; a CIA study of "Restless Youth;" a virtually uncensored ver- sion of the Pentagon Papers; the Pumpkin Papers ? and one page of the FBI phone book. But none of the informa- tion disclosed so far seems to have justified fears with- in the administration that national security would be endangered by the release of information under the law.. CHRISTIAN .SCIENCE MONITOR 8 August 1975 I- Rusk disclaims recent charges against CIA Santa Fe, N.M. Former Secretary of State Dean Rusk says he is convinced "that no foreign leader was killed by a smoking gun in the hand' of any-employee of the CIA or agent of the CIA." Mr. Rusk, now a law professor at the University of Georgia, - also told newsmen Wednesday that during his tenure as secre- tary of state under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson he never discussed the possible assassi- nation of Cuban Premier Fidel Castro. "I must say I was fully sur- prised to learn that somebody might have turned to the Mafia at some point. How in the world could anbody put the leaders of organized crime in the position to blackmail the government of the United States by getting them involved in something of that sort. It's stupid." He said the role-of the CIA in foreign affairs has been exag- gerated. Mr. Rusk was in New IViexico'to visit his son, David, and his family, who live in Albu- querque. Approved For Release2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100'370003-4 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Aug. 18. 19M Both Sides of Debate EW LW T R "Leakage of Secrets Poses a Great Danger" USN&WFI Interview With William E. Colby Director, Central Intelligence Agency Q Mr. Colby, in your view, is a new law needed to protect official secrets in this country? A Yes. We need a new law because the present legislation is inadequate to protect our intelligence activities. The present law applies essentially only to people who turn secrets over to a foreign power with intent to injure the United States. It does not apply to employes or former employes of the Central Intelligence Agency who deliberate- ly, leak to the press the names of intelligence agents or information concerning some very sensitive technical system that we operate. Q Is that a serious problem for-you? A Yes. A former CIA official is publishing a book here that names every individual, foreign and American, with whom he worked - while he was employed by the Agency. He obviously includes in that list the names of many of our officers, many people who worked with us in foreign intelli- gence services, and many private foreign citizens who worked with us at various times. As a result, some' of these people have been exposed to possible legal action in their own countries. Others have been exposed to terrorist action. 0. And there's nothing you can do about it? A The CIA attorneys tell me there's practically nothing I can do about it?certainly nothing as far as criminal prosecu- tion is concerned?even though all of us at the Agency signed secrecy agreements as a condition of employment and as a condition of getting access to sensitive material. Unlike a number of other Government departments, there is no law which the Justice Department may utilize to bring criminal proceedings against an employe or former employe of the CIA who merely reveals our sensitive material.' Q Do you mean that the CIA has even less power to protect secrets than ordinary Government departments? A Very much so. An Internal Revenue Service employe who reveals your income-tax return without proper authori- zation can be prosecuted. A member of the Department of Agriculture who releases cotton statistics to some friend is guilty of a crime. A member of the Census Bureau who reveals an individual census return commits a crime. 0. The CIA has been operating for 28 years. Why has this problem suddenly become so acute as to require a new law? A The main reason stems from the various investigations now going on. In these investigations we are taking an over- all look at our intelligence system in order to update the old image. In the process, the amount of leakage of sensitive secrets poses a great danger to running an effective intelli- gence service in the future. O. In what way have these leaks damaged your intelligence operations? A A number of countermeasures have been taken by other countries because they learned of certain activities of ours. These countries have been able to frustrate our contin- O. Senator Cranston, why are you opposed to a new law ued access to that particular form of information. that would provide additional protection for official secrets? We're in a situation where we are losing agents. There's no A I believe that we already have more protection for Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIAIRDP77-00432R000100370003-4 j question about it. And I am sure there are situations in which a number of foreign intelligence agencies have considered whether to Dive us a particularly delicate item, and they've said: "Well, these days, no. It might leak." We are developing a reputation in other intelligence services of not being able to keep secrets in this country. O. Isn't there a danger that a new law to protect intelli- gence secrets might be used to cover wrongdoings by CIA? A I think we are going to eliminate the potential of cover- ups in several ways as a result of the investigations now going on. Looking ahead, I think we are going to have clearer lines of direction of the CIA and much better supervision within the executive branch and by Congress. The better the external supervision, the better the internal supervision_ This will tighten up everything and would prevent the use of new legislation for anything other than a good reason. Moreover, I think we've had a rather rich lesson in the last couple of years of the dangers of trying to cover things up. In a big Government bureaucracy you really can't cover up, because somebody always writes a memorandum or leaves the service and tells about it, and an enterprising reporter finds out about it. a Who would determine what are real intelligence secrets that require legal protection?the CIA itself? A No. I would have no problem in demonstrating to a judge in chambers, if necessary, that any case brought under a new law involved a sensitive intelligence matter and was not an arbitrary or capricious prosecution. Only after a judge had established that fact would the case go to trial?in public. That would determine whether the defendant was guilty of communicating the secrets illegally. The secrets themselves would not be exposed in open court. ; O. In your view, should the press be held liable for publish- ing intelligence secrets? A I don't believe that I should be able to prosecute a newsman who picks up something and then publishes it, and the new law I proposed would prohibit such a prosecution. I do think the individual within the system who gave it to him should be punished, however. I am not in favor of the sort of Official Secrets Act that Great Britain has, which makes it a crime for anyone to release secrets?whether officials or newsmen. O. What are your chances of getting the kind of legislation that you advocate to protect secrets? A Well, if I were asking for this legislation on my own and in isolation, I admit the chances would not be good in the present climate. But in the process of taking a fresh look. at our intelligence structure as a whole, we Americans cannot responsibly consider how to run an intelligence organization without resolving this problem of how to keep a few Ameri- can secrets. "We Aire dy Have More Protection Than We Need" Interview With Senator Alan Cranston Democrat, Of California Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4 official secrets than we need. My main concern is that classification of information by the Government is out of control. Too many different people have authority to classi- fy?and they often do it with excessive zeal to protect themselves and people higher up. They often seem more interested in job security than in national security. Not long ago someone with direct experience testified that mote than 99 per cent of classified material should not be treated that way. We would open up a very dangerous situation if we started to write laws that anybody who transmits or receives any classified information without proper authority is guilty of a crime. Q What should be done to protect Government agencies against wholesale leaking of secret documents? A I'm more concerned about the need for protecting reporters and the free flow of information to the public than I am about the need for protecting Government agencies. I think that we need a shield law to exempt reporters from prosecution for refusing to reveal their sources. A great deal of the information that the American public gets about what its Government is up to does not come out in formal press releases. It comes from digging by the press and from leaks by officials who think the Government is doing Improper things. If you close that off, you would threaten the free press and the ability of the people in this democracy to , know what is going on. Q Do you consider the leaking of official secrets desirable? A Yes?if the official secret is information that the Gov- ernment is improperly hiding from the public and which the public has a right to know. That is a very important part of democracy. A free press is an essential restraint on government; it is basic to our constitutional concept of a government of limited powers. I think the Founding Fathers had a very acute understanding of that when they wrote the First Amendment. They were more concerned about protecting people against the abuses of government than enabling the government to do things for people?or to people. Of course, there are areas where I am very strongly opposed to the revelation of classified information. But I want to be certain that the information is properly classified. O. How would you do that? A Well, it's necessary to define very precisely the categor- ies of information that are really vital defense secrets. In my opinion, these would be limited to cryptographic informa- tion, plans for military-combat operations, information re7 garding the actual method of operation of certain weaporiS systems, and restricted atomic data. The disclosure of infor.7 mation in these categories obviously would be very damag- ing to the United States and should be against the law. - CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 14 August 1975 'Afterthoughts On the CIA' In his good column, "Afterthoughts on the CIA," Joseph C. Harsch wrote: "It is noteworthy that many newspapers both in the United States and abroad assumed that the Rockefeller Commission report would be a whitewash, and some rushed to a whitewash conclusion on the first day after publication. Only after reading the text was it generally realized that this was a remarkably honest job." The comment needed to be made, and I am glad to see it in the Monitor. Many news- persons are still freaked out and trigger happy from their Watergate high: This hyped-up state causes them to display a distorted perspective in many areas of reporting and comment ? to the disservice of the public: Denver Philip Lattimore Carpenter 4 There are other areas of information involving national defense where disclosure would not necessarily be damag- ing?for example, cost overruns on weapons development. I ? think it would be proper for somebody to blow the whistle on that if he were aware of abuses. In this category of informa- tion, we need the tightest possible definition of what can be classified as secret. Also, we must take into account the intent of anyone who reveals this sort of information. I am absolutely opposed to any catchall phrase?like national security?to cover information that should be classi- fied as secret. We've learned in the Watergate and other scandals that the term "national security" is subject to the broadest possible stretching to cover up wrongdoings. O. What about the CIA? Is additional legislation needed tn prevent officials or former officials of that Agency froth revealing names of agents and similar secrets? A The CIA should have adequate protection, but we have to think out very thoroughly precisely what that protection should be. I think the naming of agents is improper. But if an agent acts in violation of the law, that's something else again. In a case of that sort, it's a matter of individual judgment whether or not it should be made public. Basically, it's my view that the CIA has had too much power?and this has led to a lot of abuse. You can't really, draw a distinction between the use of power by the CIA to protect sensitive information and the use of that same power to do almost anything they choose and then cover it up. We certainly need more control over the intelligence agencies? and that control must include a greater ability by Congress to decide what should and should not be classified as secret. 0. The news media have revealed a number of intelligence operations?such as the salvaging of a sunken Russian sub- marine and interception of telephone conversations between Soviet leaders and the Kremlin. Should the press be liable for compromising such espionage operations? A No. I would leave the decision whether 'or not to publish to the professional judgment of the press. I don't think that you can start writing definitions of information that it is illegal for the press to publish, without making ; governmental restrictions on the availability of information subject to vast abuses. O. Is it possible to operate an effective intelligence organi- zation in this country in those circumstances? A Yes. We obviously need an intelligence community, but we don't want to subvert what we are supposed to be protecting?which is our fundamental democracy?by giv- ing Government agents power that is too sweeping. Basically, I believe that because Government is getting bigger and bigger and ever more powerful, we have to be very much on guard against giving it authority and secret power without proper, constitutional restraints. BALTIMORE SUN 13 August 1975 if ass e fin d r Saxe s ys s CIA neildlin New Delhi (AP)?Declaring he is "fed up" with leftist charges of CIA involvement in India's political crisis, William B. Saxbe, the United States am- bassador, said yesterday he has told Prime Minister Indira Gandhi he would resign if he learned of any U.S. meddling. Mr. Saxbe, departing from the low profile he has main- tained since arriving in March, said he has met in Washington with "the highest authorities in all agencies that might he con- cerned," and "I have .assured myself there is no agency of the U.S. government that is in any way interfering in India." Furthermore, Mr. Saxbe said, "I have told Mrs. Gandhi that if I found out to the contra- ry I would resign." The former attorney general and Republican senator from Ohio made his remarks in an in- formal interview after appear- ing in an embassy variety show where he donned judicial robes and sang a brief part from "Fiorello." Mr. Saxbe said he is "fed up with some of the wild charges the radical left was making,.. that the state of emergency was brought on by the actions of for- eign governments." Mr. Saxbe said that in Feb- ruary and again in June he met with officials from the State Department and other agen- cies, and he was assured there was no "interjection or inter- e will quit in India ference" in Indian affairs. Asked specifically if he had met with Central Intelligence Agency authorities, Mr. Saxbe replied: "I had a close relation- ship with the CIA when I was attorney general and there was no problem with that." Regarding the U.S. position toward Mrs. Gandhi's June 26 declaration of a state of emer- gency and suspension of civil liberties, Mr. Saxbe said the In- dian government has said the crackdown is temporary, and "for the time being we have to accept that." Mr. Saxbe said India had "substantial problems" and' that only time would tell if Mrs. Gandhi's method of dealing ' with them would be effective. ApPrOved Foe ReleaSe-2001108/08-:-CIARDP77-00432R000100370003-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4 CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 20 Angus t 1975 iv] -ser rights vs. protecting S secrets By Robert P. Hey . , Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor Washington A spotlight has been thrown anew here on a basic conflict; the right of the government to keep important information secret vs. the right of Americans to know all the facts they can. The conflict occurs in an important section of a major bill now before Congress. In its entirety, this bill for the first time in years would recodify the nation's federal laws. But the controversial section, as now pro- posed, would punish ? possibly by jail sentence ? any government employee who discloses any classified government informa- tion to anyone not authorized to have it. Proponents say this provision is important to protect important secrets from disclosures which could harm the nation's interests by providing important information to potential enemies. , Opponents say the section is so sweeping it would endanger the public's right to know government information not essential to na- tional defense. They say that if legal punish- ment automatically awaits government offi- cials who provide this information to the public, often by "leaking" it to newsmen, these officials will stop providing important but undam aging information which the public should have. Without such leaks, they say, the facts about Watergate-related activities of Nixon adminis- tration officials might never have become known. The man now aiming the spotlight is Indiana's Democratic Sen. Birch Bayh. A supporter of the basic recodification principle, he wants to separate the problems of legiti- mate national security from bureaucratic withholding of information the public should have. To accomplish this he proposed Tuesday changes in the existing bill. Senator Bayh proposes that it "be an offense to transfer any classified information directly ? I The Was gtelm itgerry.GoZtound gin By Jack Anderson and Les Whitten CIA chief William E. Colby has complained that the investi- gations into CIA activities are impairing US. intelligence ef- forts. - . ' This is disputed by our sources on the inside, who insist that the CIA hasn't been seri- ously, hampered in gathering the intelligence that really counts. Most vital information needed to safeguard the nation is pro- vided by planes, satellites, ships and stations loaded with tech- nological wonders. Through these magic eyes and ears, the CIA has been able to eavesdrop on conversations in- side the Kremlin, photograph Soviet naval movements clearly enough to identify individual sailors and calculate where ev- ery factory in Russia is located, what it produces and how much it produces. ,The hullabaloo over CIA abuses hasn't stopped the spy satellites from spinning around the earth several' times a day and photographing the sights below. Nor has it kept the spy planes from completing their usual missions. :In aerial photographs of So- malia, Africa, for example, ana- t r to a foreign power or agent thereof With intent to injure the United States." But the more difficult question, Senator: Bayh notes, is "what type of information is s essential to the security of the United Stops that the government can legitimately pnnigh, its disclosure by anyone, the First Amenx ment notwithstanding." ? In his amendment he proposes a two- pronged approach: "First, it very precisely and narrowly defines the type of infermation. covered; and, second, it adopts an additional, requirement taken from the Supreme Court's1 decision in the Pentagon papers case that the information's disclosure must pose a 'direct immediate and irreparable harm to thesecu- rity of the United States.'" ' Senator Bayh would restrict to these areas the "vital defense secrets" whose disclosure; could result in criminal punishment: "Our basic code mechanism"; operating plans for military combat operations; information re- . garding the actual method of operation of weapons system; "general atomic energy secrets." First test for the Bayh ?amendment is expected to tome late next month or early in October, when a subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee takes up the amendment ? and others to differing segments of the omnibus bill, which the Indianian and other commitee members are proposing. THE WASHINGTON POST. Monday, August 11, 1975 la to e) lysts first spotted a huge hole on the side of a hill. The aerial shots of Soviet ships in the area also disclosed some peculiar packing crates that the CIA had seen before. Nations, like Individuals, have certain habits, and the So- viet Union had a habit of crating technological gear in special crates. A whole section of the CIA is devoted to what insiders call "crateology." ?? By examining the *phot-o- graphs of the crates and noting a new excavation site, the CIA concluded that the Soviets were establishing a missile storage base in Somalia. The Soviets are 'now . fully aware of the techniques that the CIA used to spot, their missile storage site, for that Matter, the Soviets know far more about CIA. operations than do the American people, The investigations on Capitol Hill may hamper the CIA in abusing its powers but not in collecting intelligence. The CIA never Iliad a license to violate the law. BY overstepping its?le- gal and proper bounds, the CIA brought the ? spotlight upon it- self. Strange Story?American au- thorities on Guam have called for an investigation of charges that several refugees ? were drugged last spring to prevent them from returning to their homeland. The refugees, now awaiting repatriation, insist they were ?doped and hauled to.Guam un- der duress. Their strange story sufficiently impressed Norman Sweet, then the top refugee au- thority on Guam, that .he fired off a confidential cable to the Stateljepartment requesting a "therougliAnve.stigation? of /the charges.!! cablewhich was sent thfougit military channels on Thly 26:. included a detailed statement;from 13 refugees. Ac- cording ste their account, they had been caught up in.the evac- uation from :Vietnam but had re- considered andhad? asked to be ?? sent home. ? lnstead,;.:!'three.., . American colonels" toldthem they' would have to continue' with 2,000 other refugees from Thailand to Guam. When the 13 protested, the colonels allegedly "claimed they would send us to jail ... We agreed to be sent to jail inThai- land. They stated they would shoot us. We knelt down accept- ing the execution." Later that evening, the disaf- fected refugees charged, the 'Americans "hand-locked each of us and .carried us to a room where we received sleep-ill:hie- te ing injections . . . after we're" awake (the next day) we real-: ized that we were lying on a red- - colored ground, full of dust.: We're then told that we arrived": in Guam. ? They complained that the In- jections had caused pain and ? paralysis. So they were taken WI .- a dispensary where, they said.' "an American Dr. Captain asked us what kind of sickness. We . told him about the story of. our .{ sleep-inducing injections. Un- fortunately, he did notbelieve I that. . . "He asked us to undress so that he could see the injections. After discovering four injec- tions on each of us, two on the arms and two on the thighs, then_ ; he believed the story and under-' stood our situation." . Footnote: A spokeswoman for the refugee program -lar charges had been raised ear- lier by Vietnamese airmen.- It:- was determined that they were under the control of the Thais at. ? all times. The United States,: therefore, had no part in their drugging if it occurred. The 2* repatriates who have now ?brought charges, she saidonay be some of the original com- plainants. If so, the previous in- v e.stigatlon will stand. *WM, United retttilre Approved For Release 2001/08/085: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4 SATURDAY REVIEW 9 August 1975 Failed Patriots Inside the Company: CIA Diary by.Philip Agee Stone/till, 639 pp., $9.95 Reviewed by Harrison E. Salisbury So much has been written about the CIA in recent months that it is time to pause a moment and reflect on pre- cisely what the Central Intelligence Agency is and how it got that way. There is a lesson in the origins and evolution of CIA that we must absorb if we are ever to cope with the critical problem it now presents. There is no point rush- ing into half-measures to try to "curb" the CIA if we do not comprehend the fundamentals of the problem. In this task, Philip Agee's comprehensive, often tedious, prolix, thoughtful, and remark- ably illuminating study can be of great assistance. _ CIA, it should be firmly stated, was not founded by evil men. It was not created as some kind of dark con- spiracy to subvert American democracy. Quite the contrary, it was established by brilliant, intelligent, patriotic Ameri- cans who had accumulated substantial experience in intelligence and covert operations during World War II. To- day's scandal is rooted in this very cir- cumstance?the founding of the agency by men who won their spurs pulling off incredibly daring parachute entries into Norway, spiriting valuable scientists out of Nazi-occupied Europe, filching Nazi secrets out of the Wilhelmstrasse, and enlisting eccentric nationalists like Ho Chi Minh in the Allied war effort. The objective of these men, founders of the romantic, quixotic, remarkably success- ful OSS during World War II, was a simple one: to defeat the enemy?Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, jingoist Japan. In war anything goes: the dirty trick, the criminal deceit, blackmail, torture, brute force. When CIA was established in 1947, its basic cadres and leadership came al- most intact from OSS. These men saw their objective in 1941 terms. Only now the enemy was the Soviet Union. It was not yet hot war, but the Cold War was far advanced. The Soviet Union and its pre- sumed allies, Communists and Commu- nist states wherever they might be, were an enemy precisely as deadly as Nazi Germany. Maybe more so. When their task is conceived in these. terms, what was more natural than that these clever, sophisticated, often uncon- ventional men should seek to fight fire Harrison E. Salisbury is author of the forth- coming novel The Gates of Hell, a pan- oramic study of Russian life in the last half- century, to be published in October by Random House. ? with fire? They knew, or thought they knew, a great deal about the Russians and the operations of their covert agen- cies and intelligence branches. The men of CIA set out to create an operation that could fight fire with fire?meet the Soviet intelligence networks, the KGB, and all the others on their own terms. If KGB bribed and subverted, so would CIA. If KGB had its execution teams, so would ? CIA. If KGB infiltrated democratic insti- tutions, CIA would infiltrate Communist institutions. If KGB set up false-front organizations, so would CIA. One has only to flip through the pages of Agee's book?only now released in this country because of earlier fears of CIA legal action?to see how successful CIA was in creating a mirror image of the Russian intelligence forces. In coun- try after country, CIA penetrated the power structure of the local government, staged or encouraged coups d'etat to put "reliable" men into power, bribed the press, falsified the news, manipulated lo- cal politicians, subverted elections. And all of this, CIA and its leaders thought, was good. It was protecting America, protecting democracy, holding back the red wave of subversive Com- munist plotting that threatened to end our way of life. These words are cliches. The goal and thought of CIA was not. If the law had to be bent, if dirty hands had to be used, if scurrilous schemes had to be invented?these were all, means to a noble end: the survival of the United States and the confusion of its enemies. How THIS WAS DONE Agee details in page after page. He was a lower-echelon agent working in Latin America, but reading his account one soon realizes that it makes no difference which country he happened to be working in, because the story was always the same: be alert against any manifestation from the Left; support the military and the dictators, for they are the only persons upon whom we can really rely?they can be bought and will stay bought. Slowly the terrible truth begins to emerge: the men who fought KGB not only imitated and improved upon its methods; they began to think like KGB. Only in Russia, and only among the most hard-line Stalinists, have I heard the kind of reasoning that CIA, em- ployed to justify its terrible means. A process that only an Ionesco could de- pict began to occur. The loyal, thought- ful, patriotic mcri of CIA began to look and act more and more like their coun- terparts?the ogres of KGB. Gradually, even the goal of CIA be- gan to disappear in the mirage of bureau- cratic momentum. Its life as an on- going institution became more impor- tant than the adivities in which it was 6 nominally engaged. CIA did not really notice that thanks to its efforts America's "friends" around the world more and more became the antithesis of democracy?the military dictators of the Middle East; the pur- chasable colonels of Latin America; the Francos, the Salazars, the Shahs, the Chiang Kai-sheks, the shabby rulers of South Korea and South Vietnam. With- out noticing, the CIA became more and more distrustful of the essentials of democracy?free choice, free speech, the democratic process. Our allies in West- ern Europe began to arouse concern. Were they really safe? What if a left- wing government came to power in France? Who could say whether the British Labor Party was really secure? As Agee notes?and the point can be stressed again and again?the CIA by its ' charter is not an independent agency. It is an arm of the President. It can un- dertake nothing on its own. It is a secret pair of eyes, an extra daring pair of arms for the White House. It is the Presi- dent's instrument, nothing more nor fess. Congress from the beginning abdicated its responsibility to oversee, and that is the way the CIA wanted it and still wants it. THE PRESIDENT, whoever he may be, thus cannot escape responsibility for CIA. If CIA murdered foreign leaders or plotted to murder them or provided logistics to murder them, the responsi- bility is the President's. The CIA is pre- eminently "The President's Men." They have no life or responsibility of their , own. The CIA policy of supporting cor- rupt, rotten, dictatorial, anti-democratic elements has now come home to roost. By aiding the suppression of normal po- litical give-and-take and of normal, growth in the political process, and by suppressing wherever possible any manii festations from the Left or procedures leading to social change, the CIA has created a situation in which violent change and violent revolution become almost inevitable in the "backward" countries of the world. If the lid is slammed shut on the pot too long, the pot will eventually explode. And this is precisely what CIA has brought about. This situation can obviously not he cured by a new congressional "over- sight" committee nor by any number of Rockefeller investigations. It can be cured only if Congress and the President comprehend that CIA must be their joint instrument in the furtherance of Amer- ican policy, and if both work hand in hand to lay down guidelines which en- sure that in fighting communism CIA does not succeed in destroying democ- racy at home as well as abroad. 0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-064-32R000106370003-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100170003-4 SOVIET ANALYST 7 August 1975 ? uestions of Evidence c by ROBERT.. CONQUEST!i A recent short piece in. the-London Times .(25'::"' they remain 'quite' idiosyncratic. Indeed he, him- July- 1975) on the revelations". Of 'the:Czecho';, slovak Secret Police defector, Josef Frolik, put .forward a; curious: argument for rejecting them,- ?Frolik, the correspondent Brogan) argued; .had.on-reachine 'the,West got in 'touch With the CIA:: Anything h,..s_e'cilly,..a_s_124eretoTe-iiis) Times - Times :writer demonstrates, in a truly exem'plary manner, the. pervasive way. in .which-myth Ape,. . . ? _comes the accepted thing .in the media. ? j6; t :? t ? ? ? s .s.t 1 - .A It is not the: purpose of:thipiece:to-discus's Frolik's: allegations, nor. even to ,note that the ,iPatrick Brogan -:formulatiori must automatically 'lead 4ci' the' dismiSsarof 'all information frorn' Soviet official since these-are'alWaySin itobch?With'the-CIA'. FOr'-the 'Times man gave one .substantive argument, or -rather assertiorV'He -asserted- quite" flatly 'that' the "Penkovsky''Papers -sufficiently 'illustrated the unreliability 'of any material 'which' could'bonceiyebly have passed ? 4 ? ? '';??.. Now,. it. is certainly true that some: documents ? relevant to-Soviet activity are dubious, any 'rate touched up. The, existence of such documents is often put forward as refuted genuine' ones .of almost identical . content. The Zinoviev- ,;Letter was.a. few years.ago once again "exposed", with 'no fresh arguments or evidence whatsoever;, .,by:a team -of' journalists: (In 'fact; the real issue .:was not the genuineness of the documentsamuch .as th.e? use or- abuse made of it-by the Conserve; -Alves in the ;1924 election).. Though. even on:this; :real proof still; lacking the. document itself;:on ..the ,baiance. of probability,' appears not to bean authentic original But all of its substance and \AN. ? luelly...alhof _its .phreseology come from genuine documents issUedby. the Corhintern;-;'-' .1 her,recept:rn.emoirs, .the widow of the late' politburq .rae...rnber:Ottor Kuusinen tells-of; how,- when rponoglot British left-wing: invesv, tigateraoof, :the, matter went to Comintern head- quarters, the?more secret of these cJoctiments were .understendably..removed before they were shown the.file, to the aMusement of all participators). ? :This 'is relevant to present-day ma tters,las there ,is0 certain parallel,here,:of soit.seems,:with the document: recently' published by the: Portuguese. Socialists,-. which purported 'to be instrUctions from the 'Soviet Central- Committee:to :the:Portu- guese Communist Party.. Appearing' in Parisin the, absence ofany Socialist newspaper in-Lisbon,:this was-! instantly denounced .:as -'the forgery: iby ..French Communists.:1.P 1-e c; )-1 ? ? , They have now abandoned this line of argul client.; since it can be shown without question that the instructions were' preciselythose given Udder the signature of Boris Ponomarev to the Western Communists 'as: 'whole, so that, the ','forgery'' would amount' in any, case to no more -than- the 'Specification of Portugal and the Portuguese Party as recipients. (see Soviet Analyst, Vol. 4, NO. 14) ? to the Penlaw. ski)" PaperS,"it is quite untrue that`they,have been shown to be falsified in any r. ictor Zorza, it is true, urged this view: Fr-froM his arguments being generally accepted, self,' much to his credit,' is including in'. his next . . collection: (the forthcoming appearance of which is-another advert to the matter) a brief summary ioff:..the!objectioos. made; to ,,his iyieNN?st An automatic acceptance of any 'advocacy 'Lend- ing to Support a correspondent's view. as being absolute established fact' is-;?-unfortuliately,'One of thoset things..' which, se4en to-be inseparable frdm 'partisan journalism.: BUtthe cas. ei'otthe PenkOvsky. Paper'ts!Worth-:fevie-wing. once"agairfisince!apart froni. friereitinforma don they ;ConStitute-, onerof thoe dOcurnent?llikelho-Of SVetlaria' -AllilueVa and Milovah flajilas),in'.thefr time,)whicht-give-a particUlaril/piofthind insightintiiithe-vvhole'nature and, conductra!the Soviet ruling caste ?and'if .hoti genuine) c-otirte, ,1' 7;b1rt's fi7r1F4 r+.:1=} colonel .,:Perikovsky,,: it be -:reniembered, transn-iitted,a vast. amount. pf..information,,ta:the West, before. his. arrest and execution:qhe Rpers- ?naturally. .da not include the sensitive intelligence -side.of his rePoits: They- are; rather,- that .-section pf his -cOm.munications, in which he, as he.madeit clear himself, tried to put on record b.is2rn. :experiences, :and. judgments. To. that.,extent?.prid. Unarguably -theY, have been 'edited":".''' " ? - PenkcivskyV rribtivation Ci 1IfWeVii "idn ?rlii ? ," ? ???--?-?? ? -? - .1, ,,d?" IVIrf2cirza, g,-arguments?against.the .authenticity of these Papers'is.two-pid: general end partcular. His:sgeneral-argument: is little?more'than'to.,..the effect .that 'PenkoVsky'"Would not have dane:SOL end-so or so-and-so. He would not have'Sentany: thing but intelligence reports, owing.tothe'greater? .1P6F3:,:r ??1' ' 1r, .?BUt itis:cjear.that.Penkovsky. wished to!put on record in.:the:West with great.urgency ;everything he,could.:.copvey about jife. in Russig..,Thee-iption tha toverie; couple of.. years he would have :ref rain7 ocI;,frpm, or-been ,unab.le. to, intermingle straight, intelligence:Teporting a good. deal- ot.this othermateriaj seems.baseles.s.. N.or;cap it sensibly be,held.that this',could have brought: pim .greeter risk,than. he was running -already:: the.idiscoyery of.A,manuscript,or,microfilm,.of hostile gossip in his drawer would have been a trifle compared with the military information. and espionage equipment. . . . -?.- On the other hand, such conditions of:reporting account for the repetitive and sometimes strained and emotional nature of his communications ? the ('often !discursive, 'verbose, -almost ?conver- Mr.. Zorza thinks, is the opposite of what, one: would- expect in material. written undee difficult circumstances.: On the contrary,, it is con- cise and careful writing ?that.;is.?thprod.uct :of, calm and time. ? ? * '''''''''' ? '1,V.?' Zorza continually says thato manlike Penkovsky-'.'vvould not have" done.this, that or:the other, in circumstances in which others feel that he :mightwel.ljeave...P.cnovsky's-. description, of.his earlier rcareerr:whic'n :shows every sign ? ofibeieg written Under less pressure:than otherparts'of:the book,- includes a few pages. on'the:course 'of the war in Russia and his part in it write, ? ? ? ? . ? ? . Approved For Release 2001/08/08 :7CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4 quite -unCompromidingTh'foUndjand-'entirely natural-if originally planned as the background to a" more coherent' autobiography:than proved posi? sible...butrforAVIrieZoria?even'this'is-suspect?.;P, It..does?seem.possible?thatet, least;some of .the reaterial?Toapheve .been ,taped directly during. his jnterviews.!?in., London:- if,,Tso,..-its? inclusion! can objected ,to, (.1t:vvould,...however,,:rnean -that -'there wa.i,no-Russian-?manusCript!;. ',The 'stress .which-Mr...Zorza lays on.:the.negative point of,,the non-production of:such a manuscript seems anyhow. misplaced :S even thevyritten?rnaterial. would;presurpably: be: intermingled,,withi.intelli;. genc reports, and unlikely to be released.) In.fact,? Iry general;it? does'not.seem'that any weight'nf:sed be attached. tO,these ekternalYcriticisrnswhich ,ie the rrieresteSsurnptiOn&;Irt6":sx-v?-1-3?72;!??91trwki-', .f);.;??? .?? "?ili6t- Zoria..a..;interna/;:, textual, _criticism ,is :';curnulati\re";.and we must .deal,with a:number of .the: first . place,..some, of. hi,s5rpoyitare , .dycarcely, points ot?.all, ? *-1. .: ?? : ? ? . ? . ? : ei"r11 ??1r), ? (a) ? Penkovsky says he learned! of-the- Berlin Wall four daysbefore East Berlin.. was actually Closed? Off;* but,' says Zorza; he,vvas'' London at that time In'facLhe.was"in Moscow on 10 August end .the Wall- Went. LIP On'the-13th,:a;discrepantyman' coOnt'c'iritteri ,: ? da ?? . (b) ? M,? Zorza condeinns--ejeference to Mr; an .'"RSFSR Communist Party leader" on the grounds. that?there? separate Communist Party of the ? RSFSR. But?there e separate Party Bureau: for .the RSFSR and'the *official described (Churaev) was-lts. Deputy .Chairman;i. ?So the: 'both. correct and natura0 .i.:r.(6)' "'Of a' number'Of..PhiaSeS;-Mr.' Zorza simply ?. says tharthey are not.the usual, Convention.a 1-*Parti/ ? expression :' But 'whY'-shoUld'they be?'ll'Khrush.: , ? ? ? ,? chev? had -spoken' of-,ZnuKov s ? "Bonapartist 'ten:? dencieshowr? does''thiSr'stop. PenkovskY 'from .describing this as an accusation of ';Napoleonic cksaracteristics!!?_' ?'.(d).-} 'Russians do, in fact, speak on occasion. of "Europe" when .they mean non-Russian Europe,. 'as against Zorza'sessertion to thecontrary': c' (e)."Mr:Zorza's.' remarks that reports5hat 'sSeveral' SoViet- leundhes- 94)%18.4d putniks/ took .the lives -of' their .cr., would 'have -detected this throdWi't?:, Akiidrirq of ship-ground signals indiatirrovi-i'l'aritVedailii Penkovsky is quite explicitly not aSENr-tiribi-W3111 only. reporting ? vvhatphibbasi hearigi tembinca ?sentenceyvhich ?,e,spc/clay; the. pejo p?-forgery might).?gptu'obanIc?cs;.qe,,the reeniJoring argument-could:not possibly disprove the pOint,-? ? ad-the majority ? of -rocket accidents take?place:on or nearthe launching pad.'. 1 .%?? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ^ ?? ? ? ,.! .1?1,5 ..e,i?4,.11-14:1.1E.r,, ? 'Strategic view misunderstood -? Above all;Tit?is my- impression thats:Mr: Zorza has largely, misunderstood Penkovsky's chapter . on strategy, which is central to his argument. Pen- kovsky is stating a case indeed: he is deeply con- cerned with the ? common ' "first str ike"'.view? of nuclear war prevalent' in Soviet military' circles: But he: does-not,. as Zorza implies, claim that 'it was' not opposed:: On 'the. ,centrary he frequently says that' many.' generals. 'did oppose ''the 'first strike",-? theory,-maintaining only that it ? was': the 'theory .that "the -dominant faction -was'coming -.round tol'in :Krushchey'stime. This' might be .disputed,.but it-fits in with most other information:. , tr?., ?--,- ,? ? -? . Certain other; of Mr, .Zorza's objections seem, if anything, to prove the opposite of-what he imagines. For example; (1) ,Penkovsky' ironically describes seeing in uniform with some genuine soldiers*."e certain N. S.' Khrushchev"' whom he had not 'seen before. But of course (Mr.'Zorza points out) he must have known of Khrushchevs'at that time First Secretary', of the'Ukrainian .Perty:, ?Yes, and what of it?)! ? ': ?? ;71' . .' (2) Penkovsky speaks of Khrushchev's removal in 1957; of the ,"Anti-Party Group of Molotov, Malenkov, and..Bulganin",; but Bulganin;though involved in the Group, was not actually removed until 1958. This, too, is a fact known the, most superficial student of Soviet affairs :i ' In both these? cases, one can surely take. for. granted .that an organisation disposing' of num.: bers of independent experts would excise the solecisms, if only on the ground that they drew unnecessary suspicion. In a genuine manuscript, however, they are not in the least unnatural, being at most hasty :condensations.. What Mr. ? Zorza (who otherwise seems 'to. rely on what looks like minor translating slips) is asking us to believe is that an, organisation . capable, .of, large-scale ,bio7 graphical :.cletail :Of minor; military%and` politica figures is ignorant of, or incapable of producing: the most widely, known .facts_ of ,Soviet. . ? 3,0 .; . history... "'?-? - ss` ? ? ? ? --.???.;. t . I-, S.; That Mr. Zorze'serguments are unsound does not,'? of, course,- prove the ? authenticity.; of the Papers.. Indeed, it is difficult to see how "proof.: could .be forthcoming., But, the. considerations in . favour', oVauthenticity are very weighty..A large -amount of. ,factual detail, is given;,none of which has been., shown-, to be false.-.The general,?concerns much less the high officials who would__ be ; the ?best sensationalism-value,'. than (apart from the soldiers) men, like? Churaevsand Gvishiani, of great interest to students but almost unknown .:to the public. The description of Soviet society is 'similar' to (though 'more detailed than), _accounts given by 'a variety' of Russian .writerS, The tone is extremely consistent, 'and the 'mores... sion. of a single 'personality angry, urgent; under' heavy 'dtress 'and full of determination ? .,.? Mr. ZorzaZf seeks to impose on this real Pen- kovsky an imaginary "efficient spy" who-would not" have written in this way,, and clearly to. find that this impersonal figure is incompatible with the 'material is to prove nothing. Unless prevented by "arbitrary incredulity", it seems that we should accept the authenticity of, the Penkovsky papers,. at least until far more cogent reasons are.give.n.for, :..,... ? , not doing so. . . . . _ Meanwhile, even in the present Washington ?climate of moronic CIA-bashing, it is a little odd tto find "the'fact of one expert on Soviet affairs :thinking that a document put out in the name of a. 'Idead man was fabricated being taken as destroy- ing the credibility of evidence 'advanced more than a decade later by a living defector ? which is quite obviously "authentic" in the 'sense 'that ? Zorza claims' the Penkovtsky Papers. are not: for.' there is no doubt that he in person is actually put- ting it forward. Josef Frolik's statements must be ljudged on their!' merits.... So must newspaper Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4 NEW YORK TIMES 13 August 1975 SECOND U.S. PLAN :ON CHILE IS CITED - ?Proposals to Use Military Diplomatic Pressure to - -,--Bloolc Allende Reported --By'INTICHOLAS M:HORROCK Special to The Sew York Times ;WASHINGTON, Aug. 12- -The Nixon Administration ,planned a covert campaign to ?keep Salvador Allende Gossens fronl becoming President of ,Chile .in 1970 through military and diplomatic channels sepa- mtee from operations of the Central Intelligence Agency, au- thoritative Government sources .S6aid today. According to these sources, The Nixon Administration Planned to prevent Dr. Allende from assuming the- presidency through the C.I:A. on one hand, as reported earlier in The New York Times, while looking into the possibility of , applying tra- ditional, though secret, military and diplomatic pressures on the other hand. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is examining both channels through witnesses from the C.I.A. and military 'agencies.. The outlines of what one Government source called a "two-track" approach was en- compassed in a subpoena issued today by the Senate committee. The comMittee is attempting to obtain documents, tapes and other materials from Presiden- tial papers of Richard M. Nix- on covering events between Sept. 4 and Nov. 3, 1970. The subpoena requests any materials: relating to a series of Meetings between Mr. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger, who Vas then his adviser on nation- gal security affairs, and various Officials of the State Depart- Ment, Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency. The papers are not in Mr. Nixon's custody. Congress en- kted a 'law stating that the papers, tapes and other materi- als accumulated by the Presi- dent while he was in the White House were the property of the people. Mr. Nixon is contesting this in court. Meanwhile, cus- fody is temporarily held by the White House. 4.7116 subpoena was directed to Philip Buchen, counsel to the President, and arthur Sampson, director of the General Services , A, dministration, who has tem- pbrary custody. Part of the Nixon Admin. ihrtion's approaches in 1970 wera?outlined by authoritative Government sources to The New York Times last month. Eleven days after Dr. Allende, a Marxist, won a plurality in C44,ilean elections o nSept. 4, 1970, President Nixon met with Richard Helms then the Direc- tor ot Central Intelligence. According to these sources, he forcefully ordered Mr. Helms to make every effort to come up with ideas to keep Dr. Al- lende from taking office. Three days later Mr. Kissinger met privately with Thomas Kara- messines, then chief of covert operations for the C.I.A. , This meeting, not previously disclosed, was held at Mr. Kis- singer's request, according to one knowledgeable source. "Mr. Kissinger was concerned about the harsh orders given by Pres- ident Nixon," this source said. There are no minutes of the meeting, but the Senate com- mittee has interviewed Mr. Ka- ramessines about its content and has obtained his handwrit- ten notes, this source said. Economic Steps Discussed i,Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Kara- messines discussed "economic methods" of taking action against Dr. Allende, this source s-aid. ?,'Later, the Government sources have said, Mr. Karamessines told Mr. Kissinger of a plot of \ retired military personnel and other rightists to kidnap Gen. Ren?chneider, chief of the Chilean General Staff, and thus lay the base for the military to step in to "restore order.' Kissingen, these sources joined with Mr. Karames- sines in the conclusion that this pfain could not work and re- jected offering support for it. *Mr. Kissinger testified before tlie Senate committee for over three hours today on this sub- jet. In a brief meeting with reporters; he declared that dur- Mr, the Nixon Administration ere was no policy to assas- sinate any foreign officials or laders or any plot to assassi- nate any foreign leaders." The Senate committee today sUbpoenaed any materials from Mr. Nixon's papers "including pans for a military coup, the passage of machine guns, other weapons, gas masks, gas can- isters, or the kidnapping or death of Gen. Ren?chneider, the bribery of Chilean politi- cians, the use of propaganda, including media personnel on the payroll of the Central In- telligence Agency, and the use of: private business interests." .According to authoritative sciurces, during this period of planning with the C.I.A., the Nixon Administration was also examining whether it could apply what one source called "more traditional pressures' to keep Dr. Allende out of power. :On Sept. 22, 1970, a White House meeting was held by Mr. Kissinger. It was attended by U. Alexis Johnson, then Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, David Packard, Secre tary of the Army, Mr. Helms, Adm. Thomas Moorer, Chair- man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Viron?Peter Vaky, a staff mem- ber of the National Security Council, John N. Irwin, Under Secretary of State, and Mr. .Keramessines. LONDON TIMES 25 July 1975 The extraordinary Czech - spy caper' Washington Mr? jesef Frelik, a major in-the ? Czechoslovak secret police who defected to the West in 1568 with an accumulation of dos- siers giving names and records of all Czech spies in the West, has made in a book* a number of sensational claims about his success in winning agents among leading members of Bri- tish trade unions, and men- tions ;three Members of Parlia- ment : who he claims were Czech spies. ? According to Mr Frolik, who Was "labour attache ". in the :?embassy in London from 1564- 66, there was a plot to lure Mr, Edward Heath?then an up- and-coming Tory Minister?to '.'Prague. and there incriminate ,him. , Mr ? Frolik, . who now lives in ; ? ,anonyMous obscurity in. , America, says the Czechs con- - duct a very extensive spying operation in Britain, presum- ? ably to supplement the activi- ties of the KGB. He regularly changes jobs and aliases, and ?believes that his former corn- miles found his hiding place recently :and tried to murder him. Such an act of revenge' is not -very ? surprising if Mr Fro- Ilk's Memoirs . are to. be believed_ He does not ?name his MPs, although the identities of two ofthem, are perfectly clear. No-r does he name the union leaders, although at least one of them is easily identifiable. The allegations are, so . serious, and in the nature of things cannot ? be substantiated, that Mr Frolik's testimony must obviously ? be treated with the ' utmost caution. ..Furthermore, be is under the ? wing of -the CIA (he WriS welcomed on Ins arriral iii Washington by the Director of the - CIA, Mr Richard Helms himself) and the Penkovsky papers are a sufficient example of the need to treat CIA mate- rial,' ex-CIA . apents and CIA proteges with much scepticism. Mr Frolik says that his evi- dence against the three MPs was hearsay: he 'did not con- trol their, activities himself. Ile was a witness at the trial of Mr Will Owen, MP, under th2 designation "Mr A ". ----- Mr Frolik emerged briefly into the liiceright le it December (he says that the story was leaked by the British Secret Service) when he was said to have suggested that Mr Joan Stonehouse had probably defected. He admitted in an interview here that ire had made that suggestion to 'a representative of MIS who flew to America to ask him for any suggestions he might have of Mr. Stonehouse's whercano4;t3. - He will not reveal the iden- tity of his third MP, ce.cept to say that it was a woman who is no longer in the House. He names no names in his baok, for fear of libel and to do his new British friends a favour, he Says. 'What ? he is claiming is that three or four of the dozen most important union leaders in .Britain, gen- .eral secretaries, of huge organ- izations who. are not known to be communists, arc KGB agents. e' ' He says'that they ire not spies but that they ate ready to ? disrupt the British economy or bring- it to a complete halt on orders from Moscow. " Mr .? was a great friend of mine. We often talked z'oeut this ", he sold. But he offers no substantiaeian beyond his own memory and his own . ?The..." Heath caper.", _accord- ing to Mr Frolik, consiLeied of bringing a distim-,,aelied Ceeelt musician, Professor lareslev Reinberger, to London and get- ting him to invite Mr Heath to Prague to .try out the organ in the Church of St ' James's there. The idea was to pro;-}:e Mr Heath to 'commit. some folly, - and then to b!aciemail him. - ? Mr Frolik says the invite_on was at first accepted and then, at the urging of British coun- ter-intelligence, rejected_ The rest of Mr Ft-Wes book is the more usual stuff of 'spy stories. He claims that Isis ee I- leagues had a " Czech Phiiby " In a special section of British Intelligence which deiet with Czechoslovakia, who betrayed the whole network . to the Czechs in the 1950s.? saes that this chanter was heavily censored by MI6, but that he will restore the cuts in the A mercan edition. ? Again, this would be more convincing if Mr Frolik were not, already suspect because of his unsubstantiated charges aeainst trade unionists. The Frolik Connection. by Josef- Frolike. published by Leo Cooper, ?3.93. Patrick Urogart WASHINGTON POST (PARADE) 10 August 1975 Q. The sins of the CIA--is it not fitting and right that these should accrue to the various Presidents ;of the US. under -whose 'authorization the 70X per- formed acts both legal and K. K.-, Falls . - Church, Va. -A. it is fitting and right. The CIA did not and does? 9? not perform major operations without the approval- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : g'43t148tY01160370003,4 ? -. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4 CHICAGO TRIBUNE 13 JULY 1975 ? Komityet Gosudarstvennoy? Bezapase nosti. the Committee of State.'Securitee or the KGB, is the most important -sin- gle institution in the-Soviet Union. It is the powerful secret .force that keeps,So-- net Communism in power and seeks`to keep . foreign governments and , their leaders under observation and control. Inside the Soviet Union it is referred to. in whispers. Outside .it is an object. of curiosity and 'terror.. The KGB . may have as many as 90,000 agents around the world. Today and on ?Monday the.? mysterious KGB will be examined by 1 Robert Conquest, a leading British au- ? thority on Soviet affairs and -author of ."GreatTerror".and "Power and Policy) In the U.S.S.R." ? ? ? ? ? L. retent appointment of-a-. new Sovietambassador to.. Iceland,: mayl not sOurid like a every impOrtant. event, : But vheri oiie adds' ;that thereisanseiii.-1 question, Gcorgi Ferafanov, is aeKGB I officer specializing i-t politiealeSubveeg,=1 Sion :anclewhen. one; Considers :.the _efforts beininide Simultaneously'. in-shisbon to. neutraliie. NATO's other keie'Atlaritic.1 outposts' in 'the..AzoreS, it falls inte:placei as one More highly,SignifiCant ?mOVe.-in a worldwide .secret war against the non- Soviet riatigns.:7,:;? . -Meanwhife'e the last few mohths have seen, t r a Ord i tie r velOp in thel formation DepartMent has', contrived 'tO; get published' in!minor Arah?PeriOdfcals, to be 'then, W`Cightily.: reported ,inthe Moscow press,- streng.? .euggestiOns,ethat!; the .CIA was responsible for. the :aSSaSSi'.1:; nation of King Faisal 0:Sandi Arabia: Apart from :the. massiVe- buildup of. KGB Operations :based in Lisbon,'South 'America has been swept 'by rumors of ; strange CIA- aetivity, while Washington ' itself is full of' investigators apparently - ..determined, to, obtain and publish, that-: organization's allegedly dreadful secrets. ; . . Thee etteMpt, to 'put responsibility ! for the murder of King..Faisal on the, CIA' went as follows: Pravda [in its In. lernational -Review March' 30,-:1975; and again in' its CoinMentator's''column. on March 311 publicly launched the sug- gestion. :Without flatly:. asserting it, Pravda used such expressions as "many observ- ers" and "commentators in a number of :foreign newspapers" who were allegedly asking,.-"Was- not-the -long arm of the ?CIA inv.olved-in the:shots in Riyadh?" ?. This -etory::?which, as -.evei7????possible ' political aridAtiler.7Consideratiort: makes. quite' certainly-untrue;:is a type pr*luct Of the,KGB's important,Dis.. :information DePartraent;?-hich' has been 'particularly active- lately. 11 [and its .Czechoslovak and Polish subsidiaries] is ,puttingr a-massive effort into planting :false information about various individu- ,.: . :.als and organizations regarded as hostile 'See/let interests. The targets upon. which the department, now appear ? to be 'concentrating are the CIA; Radio Liberty; ,end. Various Russians now in the yest?'! ;!Alexander-SolzhenitsYn fer,peeee; ? !nth' e seems little doubt that,.naany-Pf 1.tbe: current campaigns against the 'CIA .cettaineceuetries.!!are largely spon- ? sored, by the. ;Disinformation Depart:;- ,rneptThere. is. nothing new. .in this, As:, ;long' 'ago ? as 1964; :a .niimbereof forged -!documentS were passed to.the .Indonesi;, :an government ptirPorting -Ito -prove a ?CIA assassiriation plot on President Sue ItarliO'S life, Lind even a plahried Anglo4 '.Arherican:leVasion. of Indonesia ieeThiS: was largely done theW aoCz,ech- -eplovakintermediary, ,and fult!details of .the .operetion .:,became knowii ,after.1963. when Oteiof the Czech deceptien,Speciali .Ladislav?'..Dittman,.? defected .to. the. West r One -major disinformation,- operatien now being-currently waged?undercover. of the idea of detente?is that' against ,Radio Liberty and?Radio Free Europe... The channel here has normally been the. Poles. And the method is a reliance .on .forged documents in implicating somed the radio steetione'Eastern Europeans in' pro-Nazi activities. It has been possible lit recent cases to expose the forgeries:- e These attacks' on individuals are part'. of a larger scale campaign to destroy or emasculate the "free" radios.' The Ra- dio Moscow and Radio Wars e;w contime:. ally pump out mit-Western Propaganda. ?on their English language and other for-7 ? eign services, these counties' represen- tatives in the.. West spend much ' effort - treing to persuade Western statesmen-- like former Sen. J. W. Fulbright [De . Ark.)-ethat beaming to. their own popu- lations. opinions, not approved bY.,their government.... is bad for. international amity. " ?".. :.? _ . . . ? There is also -Sante 'Indie'itiOn ;that :a few- Of ?;thei.more':aaiVefigures' 'in. the U. 8.',8tate. Department 'lend .teWard rej; itticting these libertarian erbieeS ? in the' hope 'of obtaining some sorted' illusory. "detente" advantage from the Russians..::, .; The Disinformation Department is Of Course, only eneeofs the ? variouS divi- ssions into which the. KGB's.sovast _appae .ratus is organized:That body hasite headquarters at the notorioui.. LybYana; ka Prison, scene of some of.lheereost notorious executions .of the Soviet Perio,d and an easy walk' froth Moscow's:. Main tourist area. ,There, its chief;;Yuri!An:e; .dropov, sits in the third-f]eor offinefeoM? which no less than 'five of:. his .sors, have been dracE,,eci to the cells be- low, and later. to the execution cellars' , still further. down.-'' 10 10 ? HIS ESPIONAGE and terror activities! abroad are run by his First Chief Direct.- torate with its main 'offices outside Mos- cow, well away from foreign viewers. [Operations against foreigners in the U. S. S. R. come under ? the Second Die; rectorate.) This First Chief Directorate is divided into 23 subciirectorates, cial Services, Special- Departments, and: OrdinareeDepartments. Ten of these lat- ter ?Cover: the world on a geographical, basis.? ? . .. ? - In .addition, there is .GRU, the intelli- gence arm of the Soviet armed forces,. theoretically an independent organize -- tion. There was ? always a certain amount .of rivalry between the KGB and the GRU. ?? , ,;-The secret police shot two successive 'heads of. military intelligence in Stalin's Buts the GRU' is considerably .smaller *organization than the KGB; And' 'since the discovery in 1963 that the GRU had itself been penetrated by the British :and Americans thra C.ol. PenkovskY; the smaller ,organization 'virtually lost its independence, S and -may now be regard- :ed as little more than a branch of the'. ? The First :Directorate cohducts ? the 'major parted its foreign 'operations then' Soviet' embassies. All reports indicate' that approximately 40' per cent of .Soviet diplomats and other citizens abroad are: full-time employes of. the KGB, while! ..the others are .on 'call -for assistance when tequired.',.: .S. ? s _ . ? Even- an- ibaSSidorS 'May. be -KGB. of& "cers.L-in fact.:Soviet secret policemen. :are given, major-posts. in all sorts of :,.organizations, and in the most casual-, 'looking and unembarrassed sort of way. 'Just as they thought; nothing' of ap- pointing a couple of secret police gener- als to the, Supreme' Cburt in 1967, so we 'find such extraordinary figures as that 'Of. KGB Geri. Pitovranoir as senior vice -president of the Soviet chamber of corn- in'iree.-. His: previeeel 'activities '.inclUded'I top espionage 'essigninent?. in' .! and a post as KGB 'resident In Peking. Now he turns,' Up ',at ? trede fairs. and congresses for the' protection: of patent eigete.e. An even edderezapPointir.ent;e: if ? that' were possi5letie: thate:of .'Dzhermeri Gvishiani as vice Chairman-Of the. State' Committee On Selene .Technology, withe special responsibility . for foreign' eco- nomic negotiationseJle. formally. .served in the GRU,/ not only a lifelong professional secret. policeman [his father M. was 'one! of ? Beria's most ? notorious assistants),' but- he ?is a meat.- her of that caste to the extraordinary extent of having an artificial first- name composed of the first syllables of the two first -chiefs of the Secret Pollee, Dzherzinski and Menzhinski. It- is .natu- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4 ' ? rat enough that Western businessmen in contact with the U. S. S. R.. should be regarded as prime KGB targets, but this . . sort of thing seems to 'indicate a marked contempt for them?in. many cases only to well justified. ??? . ? Whether a top diplomat is the KGB "resident" or that post is held by 'a -"chauffeur," he ivorks in a locked and closely guarded room, the Referenturn,1 from which. even the' ambassador less himself a' serving KGB officer]. is., barred, -* ' ? ? ? ? ? . ?- ? ? ? ? .7 .!???? ...MIS. VAST' -effort' In. intellIgenee and. subvetsion? is the -main -reason for- the eruirmeusiy inflated size': of the ? Soviet recresentation-abroad:. There have re.? cehtty been. complaints?typical, enoughl ?ones?from Thailand, that the total staft: 'of the Soviet embassy. in Bangkok is 250.! The Thais have five at their mission in; Moscow. It is true that there are only 251 --that is -only 'five times as many?whol are- listed :as .:"cliplomats": in the Soviet angkok?setup, but unlike the Thais ini MOSCOW, the-Russians in Bangkok use; Soviet, citizens for. every, .conceivablel post such as maid or driver. The Thais; dre.thus in the unhappy position that alt the ancillary staffers of the Thai Em-",1 bass!, in Moscow consist of KGB agents;j while, with 'notable lack of reciprecity,: those in the Soviet embassy in .BangkoXi .are KGB agents, too. ? . , The Thai case is a glaring one and the Thai newspapers have personally listed: not only embassy figures such as the; seCond secretary, Anatoly Smirnov, est 'CHICAGO TRIBUNE 3_4 JULY 1975 rKeGprBesoenffting.:tty:440ni, c,oltlitehel?rt.. Tasovsis:i .felt s ot..itiiiipepiganiirfilzinaert.olTLheansod f vet-.. o tkre;Irde- compound in houses ./e- fEa'acil,nz,ket.h.oBkycos t: them em and e -of rin ds e Between I trede. ??? ? ?.? ? .? . e. ? . At least, in legal.. can raise .is SE; I millionsworth 1J,. 1- But thruout the, I PorPortion betweeewthreldntuhneirbeerisOfasditalsf-- i members operating in -.Russian &abase. I sies in a given country compared with, 1 that country's embassy in Moscow. The' 1. British solution?of throwing out at least. that section of the surplus -which is' known to be engaged in active espionage, ?is clearly the right one. But in. recent, practice, almost everywhere, there has been a large increase in the. Russian.,' representation.. This . came,. naturally-. enough, with detente,, ? ,'- --The director of thePBT, Clarence M. ? Kelley; noted that Soviet bloc official,, ' representation in the United States has:: tripled during the last 15 years, while Soviet intelligence agents ? have in-- _ Creased fourfold:. They had the added,. 'advantage, he. pointed out, of..a great -increase of cultural and commercial del- egations, Of which contained int'elti- ?gence personnel.. - ? . - When one considers: that. the FBI's- total-field force, which of course has to cover a large number of other types .of ...crime, is limited to 8,500 and that .there are now about 1,100 Soviet citizens living. the United States and employed by I'afficial Soviet agencies; it is'remerkable Rating the CIA and KGB .that god results are still obtained.: :. . . . ? . ? : " ? ONE 'SUCH . was the recent.--thrtne- years-olci. .? operation . in which a *translator at the ?United Nations...was- . caught -red-handed trying to obtain sie? .cret information at the other end of tie. country. [The Soviet permatenteet 7 - Tat the United Nations form a part:it:dm: 1 -ly useful KGB-"center and severalUf Ets) 'leading officials have been identified .` , i]-:.... .-:. ,???-?:, ?.-.- ?, ,-?-.? .,,,,,...-.* ?7-:, : -. In addition tO.the "legal" resident,c0r, ..ating from his; security room -in eaciti- embassy, the:KGB maintains an,!`illetizri. -resident.. These Men have no contact* ?' the ordinary course of events, with42E4 .- cial ISoviet . representatives,. and theirl. ?.,;. ...messages. and .information go to-? from Moscow-by other means,' thin dio or highly illegal, couriers. ?They.baft-; included such well concealed and eFiec- five. characters as Col. Rudolph Abel-'.---' .: - : . A significant 'point about ,KGB viz- lions is' their extraordinarilyema: scale, with which their rivals cat compete. Well over 2,000 Soviet citizegs have actually been identified to tagE part in clandestine operations -abrord;? and this is to say 'nothing of sat : . .. . ., . ? agenti, arid of recruits in. the countries? '. concerned. The* West German ? F'-ovesn4 i,m th ent; -which estimates that 'e're4re. 'about 11,000. agents operating in its-- Iritory,. has recorded 35,000 . individual:44* ]rtempts to recruit -West Germans ?dig i-the-last 20 years. ?-,*-1-;-,-!.;---.?'.-? ? -?.?.....1? - - .. ?_ iy ;' ? ? . The KGB, the Cornmittee of..? ' Suite ?SecuritS,,- is the most ?; z? important single institution in . - the Soviet Union. Its dual role is to keep the Communist Party. In power to control foreign governments. .. _Robert Conquest, a British .. -authority on Soviet affairs, . described on Sunday how the KBG moves to discredit its.- - free-world opponents. _ Today, he compares the ? KGB with the CIA. By -.Robert. Conquest LONDON?If the KGB is compared with its main opponent, the American CIA, various differences: emerge. It is, of course, an enormous advantage to the KGB, that there is never any question of its coming under public -Criticism in the U.S.S.R. , - To illustrate the difference, try to imagine recent events in the United States happening in the Soviet Union. - An employe of the Soviet government . hands .over.? secret documents to Pravda; Pravda prints them; and.the man, in question is tried on a minor .charge and acquitted:--that. would be the Russian 'equivalent of the .Daniel ? Ellsberg case: ? - A member of the Supreme Soviet? the equivalent of Michael Harrington ?discovers and prints confidential in- formation 'about KGB arrangements in,? say, Chile; these are printed in Pravda and lzvestia: and the result is that KGB' boss ?Yuri. Aridropov is 'forced to appear before a committee of the Supreme Soviet, to try to justi- fy such conduct. . ? . 'In:that light it can be'seen that the CIL& operates under constraints which would be regarded as laughable to the point of lunacy in Moscow. - ? ? ? - UNLIKE THE CIA, the- KGB also .operates?and on a far' vaster -scale again?inside Soviet territory. While the Americans divide their intelli- gence -activities into two autonomous 'bodies; ? the CIA and the FBI, the KGB is a highly coordinated organi- zation with considerable overlap even between the departments working at home and abroad. ? - For example, a foreign: diplomat [as in one-:case including a French ambassador], .may ? .be , compromised sexually by agents in.MbscoW 'with a view to becoming a tool: back home: of the KGB external services. Nor' would there be' any of.'the"curiou jurisdictional jegalisms by ? which the CIA" is now ?'charged with activitY* against American citizens while in ? America. , How anyone With a trace of com- mon sense can imagine that it is suit- ' . able for: surveillance of a suspect, .perhaps on the briefest trip home, to cease at the airport and be handed over to .a .different organization unac- customed to his habits, is a mystery. This is one of the 'many problems the:CIA has; but which does not af- -lea the KGB. The latter is, more- overe? a body .exerting inicomparably .more political weight in its own right than its American counterpart, with ,its head, Yuri, Andropov, ranking. as a full member of the Politburo. .Recent allegations against the CIA Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RIDPIT-P-00432R000100370003-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4 ;have been made by "defectors" from sit; such as Philip Agee. and -Victor Marchetti. Much of our knowledge of ?the KGB also *comes from "defec- tors." Bur again, we find a difference which is well worth noting. KGB defectors have to be carefully bidden. given false identities and placed where their late employers cannot find them. ? A number of those for whom inade- . qtiate-PrecatitiOns '.Were- taken have been, found dead in mysterious, and :sometimes not so-mysterions, circum- ,stances?Poisoned, ',shot,: pushed out of windows': The new batch . of CIA ."defectors" on the other hand,live in comfort in Countries allied to the Un- ited?States; write their books and even. have them published in New York. . The mere thought of a KGB man 1settling in Hungary,: exposing his em- ployers (let alone having ..his 'work printed in Moscow) does not begin to make contact with' reality at any point. . . " erIii--the competition with the CfA, :the icGp has many other advantages. :?,With hundreds of thousands of Eastern ;Europeans entering America ? in the last few- decades it is clearly much !eaSier. for the Soviet authorities to 'Vut?in trained ."illegals,", or to main- Lain "sleepers." In the comparatively. ? easy-going political circumstances of the non-Communist countries, there must always be a proportion of peo-: pie who ..will *simply Mali= pro-Sovi- et Vie;vs;: arid: be 'at. least potential: Soviet agents. ? _BESIDES, FEW Countries have the' huge police forces, "internal pass- 1:iorts" and registration agents availa- ble to the Soviet security authorities.'? Then again, while there is no doubt that large numbers of Soviet bloc' subjects would eagerly assist enemies, of their government in any way-pose ;sible,. the KGB can prevent or monitor, 'every such contact, ? ? y Foreigners in the U.S.S.R. are pro-?, portionateiy few compared with 'the., security forces available to cope with them. From countries like the United PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER 12 August 1975 e States there are hundreds of thou- sands of visitors to all parts of :the world, where it is not difficult for them to be contacted without supervi- ? slop: But Sovietevisitors -abroad are limited both In 'their numbers and their tested loyalty-quotient; ,?... - This does not always, work, as' the U.S.S.R. seems to be fairly unpopular even. with its Most. loyal subjects. It is estimated.' that. about 2,000-Ameri- cans are- contacted overseas ,every year by the KGB with a view to re-- cruitment, while similar attempts.on ? Soviet subjects are rather few. .e ??? .Few, burnot negligible. And-mor- over, the. successful contacts of, the -CIA and other.- Western services -in- clude KGB men themselves. For one of the :vulnerabilities of the _KGB. is' the extraordinarily high rate of .defec- lion ? t?he .WeSt. This apialies not only to minor figures, but 'to some of its major' operators, including-illegal residents. These men, carefully_ se-, lected and ? checked and .. counter- checked for highest political reliabili- ty, nevertheless come over at a-rate which time. and time 'again' destroys KGB- networks and gives:infor- mation to the West. ,r THE WAYS in which the CIA-is ncit being hindered and hampered' by its* own people are quite astonishing. it is already much smaller, and, dispos- es of much fewer 'resources,. than its. giant opponent: -It. is. not -only a, David fighting a Goliath, but.a David: additionally handicapped by a heal/14 ball and chain, and dazed' by the..oce casional half brick hurled at. him by] one'of his alleged supporters.- On the! face of it, one would expect-'2.'walk:.! over for Goliath-KGB. The?remarka-:i ble thing is, even granted some ter.: rifle KGB successes, how well...bal-, enc-adthe combatants are ???? As for current anti-CIA hysteria.inl certain eountt:ies, . it might be.-.worthi referring-. its -sillier ? sponsOrse_ti the! following analysis, from-ea.: sourcei Which even they might find authorita. five?the:official organ of a'.'Coxtimu:ei would be Most unfortunate," Said Rep-. Robert NIcClory?of Illinois,.rank- ing RepUblican-. bn.' the- j-Riuse Select Committee ,gri??-:Intelligenbe;- "if. even ?the appearance:_of refusal to cooper- ate with. this committee was given:" the appearance is the'. reality so far. Central Intelligence Agency Director William E. Colby, ap- pearing before the committee, has re- fused. to give it much of the informa- tion it wants, on that familiar ground' of "national security."..... - . ? -.Let,us say right off that the fact that. the "national -security",rationale been...r.nuch..-abused to cover up: rime .and corruption does 'not mean., that thereare- no such -things- as. legi- ,timate .-ecrets.? ?That,, however,- does tat. resolVe, the; conflict _between 'gen-- *_ ecura :iiine--"riational: security and -account- -ability- under- the .Constitution. -,-? H:The;commuttee has,. after been -dUlY" authorized by the House to .con- duct ? its. -investigation?an , investiga- tion.- Which itself -has. a-great deal to .do.with. protecting our n,ational secur-. ,ity..and the right, of American citizens 'against-.'abuses: by. our intelligence ,agencies.- . ? ? ? ..nist Party: - "Among all the-information and sto.-e: ries circulating in the country,; esp-e-1 daily recently,' there are many-which; jnsist that many of our problems- and! difficulties are either inspired,i?or:?dise redly created by the CIA's aclivity.-1 ?.??. However;.?when the sources and'; objectives of this kind of 'confidere:t Hal' information, and studied more; closely;' and..when we' analyze them! More thoroly;'? it will not ? be .diffie cult for"us'to find that the "CIA -ob-: session!,'.is:being spread and 'encour- aged in our country by At this point the Belgrade official .newspaper, Borga [Oct. 31,- 1967) goes on to blame a variety. of ene- mies including, especially, pro-Soviet elentents:T.-ee .7 ? ?1 :AND SO!' There r-ea-lly is-a world- wid e confrontation .between the KGB: on -the one .hand and the CIA and the' intelligence services of the other non-Communist cou.ntrieseon the oth- er. ' The present compar?v& relaxation in ? international tension*. has in no tvay resulted. in .any relaxation of: presstire by "the, the- , larger- of Soviet c.itizens ? and the setting up of new Soviet consu- lates has given it greater opportuni- ties. The CIA, 'harassed at horn& and 'thinly -spread -in the field, 'has con' ducted largely a defensive operation, even tho accempanied by occasional . brilliant forays into the Soviet side. On the whole, and' -partly ? 2s the -resulteof the KGB's blunders, the CIA -probably has the slight advantage in spite of, everything.. The various .re- cent sUCcesses of Russian and Com- Munist foreign policy. are in'the main due to other reasons. The KGB, some , of the Soviet leaders seem ?to, feel,.is e not really, pulling as full ? wei ght..Th is may ha;.ie something .to, do with the ' current major attempt to? destroy the . CIA's effectiveness by concentration an the attacks now being launched. ' against it. by naive- for. worse) .ele- ments in .the United States itself.., Robtrt CortquesT ? ? _ ?The'-basic principle_ is that no man. Can be judge in his own cause, and no jnstitution; either. The worst abuses 'of national security, in fact, arose out of the Executive Branch's arrogating to. itself the sole right to define what 'national security is. ':-How is the committee supposed to function if it doesri't- ask questions? :realistic to expect it to take only such information as those investigat- ed_choose to give:It? Congress did not 'buyithat principle during theimpeach- ment of Richard:Nixon, and it cannot be expected to buy it?nowi. WASHINGTON POST ( POTOMAC ) 10 August 1975 SEE THE WORLD - Applications for employment at the Centred Intel- ligence Agency tripled last January and have con- tinued to increase steadily, a CIA spokesman con- firms. The bleak job market is surely a reason, but the Agency partially attributes the increase to the unprecedented publicity the CIA has received since disclosures of some of its exploits. Seems some folks outside of Washington didn't even know the Langley giant existed. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : C1A-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4 Approved For Release 2001/0 CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 14 August 1975 Charles W: Yost -00432R000100370003-4 Time for the verdict on CIA Washington The Central Intelligence Agency has now been under intensive investigation for about a year ? by the Rockefeller Commission, by a special Senate committee, most recently by a special House committee. How long is it necessary or desirable that this public washing of dirty laundry go on? Certainly there has been plenty of dirty iinen. The investigation has shown that clearly enough. Things were done by the CIA in the 1950s. the 1960s, -even the 1970s, for which the American democracy finds it very distasteful to be reminded that it bears the responsibility. Foreign officials, political parties, and newspapers were sabventioned, or bribed if one wants to put it crudely, foreign govern- ment agencies were bugged, pilfered, or otherwise penetrated, coups d'etat were orga- nized which overthrew governments or, more often, failed to do so, assassinations of foreign leaders were canvassed, though there is no evidence any were actually committed. Even ,counterespionage or countersubversion inside the United States was carried on occasionally, in violation of CIA's basic charter. Many of these and other CIA activities cost huge sums of money which were spent with practically no surveillance by the Congress and certainly no public knowledge of what was going on: Only a very small number of officials in the White House and the State and Defense Departments were privy to all of this vast and dubious enterprise. Certainly the - Soviet Government was far more cognizant of it than was the American public. Of course the justification for these prac- tices was that they were indulged in on an enormous scale by the Soviets, America's adversaries in a deadly cold war, that the U.S. had to fight fire with fire, that covert operations and intelligence must by definition ,be carried out in secret, else they will fail of _their purpose. IneWashington Star ? It is, moreover, almost certainly the case that, while many aspects of implementation were known only inside the CIA, all major opefations of all kinds were authorized by high authority in the White House, the State Department, or the Defense Department. Indeed many of them were inspired and directed by those authorities. These now widely known facts, however, do not answer our opening question ? has the investigation now_gone far enough? No doubt the two congressional conimittees, if they should continue for another year or for five, could continue to unearth further sen- sational evidence of activities now held to be nefarious, even though at the time they were held by presidents and secretaries of state to be fully justified. Very probably the com- mittees have only scratched the surface. ? What, however, is the object of the in- vestigation? Presumably it is not just for public titillation, though one must admit that the appetite of the American media and public for spy stories, for scandal in high places, even for self-flagellation, seems almost insatiable. Presumably the investigations are not merely to provide publicity and platforms for members of Congress and their staffs seeking political exposure and popularity. What then is the object? One would suppose one object to be to inform the American people, at long last, of the highly questionable activities in areas of covert operations and intelligence gathering which have for so many years been carried out by their agents in their name without their knowledge. The purpose of their being informed, more- over, would be to enable them to decide, through the Congress, whether they wish to terminate all these activities, whether they wish to preserve some, if so which ones, and ? what machinery should be established to ensure, insofar as possible, that only those Thursday, August 7, 1975 535 watch ogs? Secrecy, like power, tends to corrupt and absolute secrecy corrupts absolutely ? except, ? of course, in the House Democratic caucus. On that Actonian principle, Rep. Otis Pike and the House select committee now investigating the CIA might have an unanswerable case for fore- ' ing that agency to make budget insiders of all 535 members of Congress. But the principle doesn't apply: The secrecy of the CIA budget is not absolute. Thirty-eight ';members of Congress know, more or less, how ? much money the CIA spends and for what. ? Hence, if Mr. Pike's committee concludes that ? the chosen 38 have done a bum job of guarding the national interest and of steering the CIA away from idiotic misadventures, it might properly call for their discharge and the substi- tution of 38 others. But it is absurd to suggest, as some of Mr. Pike's hearties are doing, that the CIA can have 535 budgetary watchdogs while conducting effective.secret operations. Mr. Colby is right in fearing that their barking could alert the bur- glars. It is a fact that there are some members of Congress who don't want a secret intelligence agency in the first place, and some among them would unhesitatinglyleak all the secrets out of activities of kinds sanctioned by Congress and people shall be carried out. If these are indeed the objects of the investigation, it seems high time that the investigators resist the temptation to prolong the striptease in which they have become involved, and that they buckle down to the more serious and necessary task of drafting policies and machinery to govern these mat- ters in the future. It seems reasonable to presume that they -will decide that the United States needs to. maintain some sort of an intelligence appa- ratus abroad, even though they may well conclude that some of the methods used in the past were unwise or unnecessary and should henceforth be banned. It is even conceivable they might decide that some capacity for covert operations should be retained, even though to be used' very rarely and under severest safeguards. If these presumptions are reasonable, it is not reasonable, nor in the public interest, so to blast the reputation of the CIA that no one abroad, even in friendly countries, will wish or dare to be associated with it. Intelligence apparatuses are delicate instruments.. Once broken, they are very hard to repair. So indeed is the good name of the American Government, in its "intelligence" capacity as well as any other. So I should strongly urge the prosecution that sufficient evidence is now in, that the jury ?.that is, the Congress ? should be asked to render its verdict before the end of this year at latest, and that that verdict should not be punishment for the past but sound policy for the future. -% The author of this article writes from a background of 40 years as a United States diplomat. fo 1975 Charles W. Yost What seems to be going on now, among the more zealous congressional assailants of the CIA, is a bad case of overcompensation. It is no doubt mortifying to reflect that until an enter- prising New York Times reporter rubbed con- gressional noses in CIA folly Congress had slept blissfully on. Now that the pendulum has swung so sharply and the lights have come on there is a real danger that Congress could wreck the agen- cy in the name of correcting abuses. The CIA director, William Colby, shouldn't have to explain anything so elementary as the need for reasonable secrecy in intelligence work ? if only because the lives of agents might be at risk. That he must not only explain the need for secrecy but actually defend that need in the face of the deliberate obtuseness of the Pike commit- tee is remarkable. There are hundreds of sensitive federal agencies, all more or less vital, whose budgets and functions are a complete mystery to most congressmen, perhaps even to Represerillative Dellums. That is why we have a system cf dele- gated authority. If Congress has impa kd :nay delegated that authority, let it be redelegated. But even if the fact disappoints Representatives Pike and Dellums, it is too late to go back to .13 misguidAPie Qrralicape 2001/08/08 : CIA-RIDdairall4341000100370003-4 Approved For WASHINGTON POST 4 August 1975 .A. Forum' Defended ' Your newspaper has carried a lengthy item from Bernard D. Nossiter in London, about the alleged involve- ment of .the Central Intelligence Agency in Forum World Features, a news service which I created and ran for 10 years. -Not surprisingly, since the story is based on a highly inaccu- rate and tendentious article in Time Out, Mr. Nossiter's contribution is a ?curiousInixture of fact, smear and fan- tasy. To say that Time Out is "a weekly that blends leftist political sommentary with an entertainment ? guide" is one way of puttir g it: the eu- phemistic way. It would alto be accu- rate to say that it is the favorite Lon- don vehicle for drop-outs, Marxist ac- tivists and the drug and hippie culture. In a recent issue, it carried an article In. defense of paedophilia?better known as child molestation and a crime in all civilized countries. I cannot comment on matters upon which Mr. Nossiter claims to have greater knowledge than I. I hope, how- ever, that you will allow me space for one or two comments on points of de- tail. In fact, during the whole of my period at Forum World Features, we never, once carried an article that could be described as "propaganda," except in the eyes of paranoiacs. If Mr. Nossiter can produce a single example, I shall be very surprised. I cannot an- swer for items that appeared in the Congress for Cultural Freedom's previ-, oils give-away, service. ,. . ? arfic Nossiter describes me as "a well- known British-- 'writer of rightist views." Well, it depends on where you draw the center line, doesn't it? My late boss, Geoffrey Crowther, used to describe the politics of The Economist (on which I served for 10 years) as 'extreme center." I wish I had coined that phrase, as it precisely reflects my, own political position. But when one stands as far over to the trendy left as Bernard D. Nossiter, then I suppose the center does appear to be "rightist." Mr. Npssiter siva, correctly, that I hung up on him. The reason for this .was that he had thought .fit to adopt a hectoring and inquisitorial tone, which . I fo-ind offeisive and boring. I am a busy man. He attempts to prove me a liar by quoting a Department of Trade entry showing me as the "person running the business" when Forum World Fea- tures discontinued its service. I cannot help it if dilatory solicitors or an in- competent public service did not duly :note the change of management. In fact, I wrote. my/letter of resignation to Richard M. Scaife on 18 March 1974, and it became effective at the end of June 19'14. Finally, Mr. Nossiter says that the Institute for the Study of Conflict "puts out low-keyed reports on tactics to deal with 'subversives' at home and abroad." In fact, the ISC?an inde- pendent, nonprofit making institute? provides realistic and factual guides on situtations of conflict all over the world, and from the right as well as from the left, but has never yet pub- lished any practical guidance on com- bating the phenomena which we de- scribe. INWIN)1/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4 Sept 1975 London. Brian Crozier, 14 5117;17:17.;?4 , yet, incredibly, no one in Congress move against the agency, and it continued born ing and sending young Laotian men into th meat-grinder of war. Now, two years after a cease-fire end the war in Laos, much of the CIA's activit there remains classified "Top Secret" as th agency continues to enjoy a position of un accountability shared by no other segme of our government. ? The CiA says that all but its usual intelli gence-collecting apparatus has bee pulled out of Laos. But given the agency' success at concealing its activities in Lao - zzb, ;;, j 4 AORF THARTEN:.YEARS .CINC.7.0NDUCJEC! AN ILLEGALWAR_ THAT -OST-BILI IONS. 05:DOLLARS: P THATCOVERED, ? ? , - r_ -1 DG r- -1--colNTS - know for certain that the CIA is not at war a --i ? in the past, how can we know? How can V/ this very moment in some other far-off plac Warn. e rec.ora :haf few Americans have heard of; a war tha .is an intettigence agency. . . - - most Americans want no part of, secret o 'cr-a?:-....)'.-rt:, agency to :con- otherwise'? .Ouct.war;lt:,.Ves an agendy to r'P ter - At its peak, the secret war in Laos cos .;_gende-..7.Se.natoriStu-art'Syrninototi. of American taxpayers some 5500 million a combat an arrny of nearly 40.000 Meo and year. as a fel,v hundred CIA agents sent into t he, i ritCit f arts ing other hill tribesmen they 'nad recruited and thersenot%,vithstanding..theage.ncy oiLrocl trained. The CIA's "irregulars" were superb- headlei:g .iintia a.11.:11.-scale-wai, in the rernotE.,. ly outlitteci with American-style fatigue uni- forsns, M-16 rifles, grenades, mortars, ma- chine guns, recoilless rifles, and howitzers; and they were backed up by American bombers, which the agents directed in massive raids that scorched the verdant Laotian countryside: obliterating whole Vil- lages. slaughtering tivestock, and devastat- ing crops. Most of the bOrntsing was done by ? United States Air i=orce and Navy jets. But some of the early strikes were flown by CIA-hired pilots and throughout the secret war the CIA flew its own transports and heli- copters to shuttie troops into battle and re- supply them. There were few spectacular battles against the Communist Laotian insurgects and the North Vietnamese regulars, but casualties mounted steadily. In despera- tion, as their units became depleted, the CIA's irregular commanders began.forcing . ten- and eleven-year-old boys into the army. Finaliy, when there were no more children to draft. the CIA went to Thailand and hired more than 21.000 -volunteers" to keep the war going. By 1970 large groups of tribesmen, weary of the fighting, had begun deserting the CIA army. They wanted the war to stop. Prince SouvE...nna !Mourne the prime minister of Laos. also yearned for peace. But by then Laos had become an In-:Portant adjunct of the war in Vietnam?North Vietnamese were pouring through the country to infiltrate South Vietnam and the Americans were at- tacking them with waves of bombers. The Americans believed that if there were a cease-fire, public opinion would compel them to stop bombing, but the infiltration could continue because it was so difficult to detect. So re6ardless of what the Laotians wanted. the Americans kept bombing. In those days the United States was being torn apart by angry debates over the war in Vietnam, and President Nixon. in reaction, had started sending American troops home. But there was no outcry at all against the equally brutal acts ol war being perpetrated in Laos becauSe no one knew about them. Presidential fascination with Laos was kindled in the cold war days of the late 1940's and early -60's. Because of its.strate.- gic location, sandwiched as it was between :Southeast-Asiari -counthp.of' Labs. -It ..was- a ? ;Secret .war?never..d.ectared,---neve'n?,and'cften deniediha raced for. r.:ane, 'Mbre.than.ten:-Years as -6.tt6ntion fccLised O. tf-tejfghling-Jrt fteighboring.Vietnem:Tens di, Anolisaads-Aver.e.-killed dollars -zrciy.9:61-.4):a.--des6er.ata-atternbtltd,:''sav6nt.::: ----iOnly.tne'erestoents;,vhddl'ected the CA 1c2osee:Itrste.-.isenho?:yerrithen.,kerineby;*-..% aild.Misted:"thel; f e`i7i-C a n oeoote ano preenaecit!,:ie.,; ?le r6', Actually, nothing could have been more contrary to the public interest. For by trans- forming the, CIA into a personal hit-squad, the presidents robbed the people of a voice in the affairs of their country. short-circuiting the very essence of democracy. The secret war in Laos was a flagrant abuse of power by the Executive and the CIA, as were such illegal intrusions as the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. the support of mercenaries in the Congo. and the instiga- tion of uprisings and coups elsewhere in the world. What set the CIA operation in Laos apart. however, was its scope and size?it was one of the biggest and most expensive under- takings in the history of the agency. As the richest and most powerful single force in Laos, the CIA virtually charted the course for the entire country, inflaming a war that Was more important to a handful of Washington officials than to many Laotian villagers. and .fueling it long after the Laotians were ex- hausted and aching to quit. It was a war that might well have been shortened had it been open to public scru- tiny and had the CIA been under effective supervision and control by Congress, in- stead of being able to operate as an inde- pendent, almost private organization. ' Until last December, however; when the New York Times reported large-scale do- mestic spying by the CIA. there had been little public sentiment for restraining the agency. Senator Stuart Symington, for ex- ample,, exposed some of the CIA's deeds in Laos in Senate hearings in 1969 and 1972, ApproVed kir Refease-2601/06168 : 1A-R-D1577:66432k0-00106-3-603-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4 3 China. North Vietnam. South Vietnam. gaVe the appaiaraece of sending home the- game. They were content to quietly furnish Cambodia. Thailand. and Burma. President 100 Green Berets who. under CIA direction theachips of ?.ver to the Pethet Lao and North Truman was Con?anceci Laos was the place had been building the secret army in the Vietnamese to keeo the fighting in balenc-e. in -Southeast Asia to draw the line agz:iinst back coentry Ii fact, many of the Green So vinat result.ed was =3 kind of warring 'e toe dread "tide of Communist aggression." Pr' es simply shucked off their fatigue uni- trality in which onlv :he Laotian pecele President Eisenhower saw Laos as ane first forms, slipped into civvies, and went on hurt n nd only the American in in a c'nain Of dominoes vihich. if lost to the about their business of turning tne opium- the dark. -lhere were occasional tirades ?,...notrt telto to zhe ot gr owing hill people into riflemen. In the be against Arnerican vioietions of Laotian neu- -Free ,,vor!,:t?? iii cc tr'Ido. ginning they extended the, charade by treaty in Communise radio broadcasts'. and spending their nights in Thailand. so they they were frequently quite accurate. But als could say they were not stationed in Laos. what American would belies/ea Communist American offici i.v.r4r: caugat in k-artme. thouela al the one hano triev want- di- The story that eventually leaked out was that broadcast? (That's ,,veat we all said when i. to eep Lao ou of ne hancis of these men had retired from the military and the COMMUniStS broadcast tne first reports c ks t t' the ? "Reds." but on the ether. dtdn., ta had become contract emplbyees of the CIA. .of the. My Lai massacre.) _ But in any case. th w ey ere in violation of the Because Washington decided to proceed eommit American troops to a 1;-.1nd ar i" Asia (:rat mistake was latr made in soades 1962 agreement because, if they were not in Laos with a ccmbination of force and e in Vietnam, of course) and they were deathly. "foreign military personnel," they were con- stealth, the CIA got the military job. The tainly "foreign civilians.' and. both were agency, Or "the company," as it is also afraid oi provoking China and the Soviet - Union into a nuclear war. banned. called, had a well-deserved reputation for The solution thy hit upon was to set up an In his news conference of March 23, 1961. both secrecy and illeeal acts, and it was Presiden.t Kennedy recalled- that the "clear also believed that because it was smaller .0 everything in its power to see that, on inte,rnational con game: Washington e iould premise of Inc Geneva accords of 1954. than the Pentagon, the CIA would be lass paper, Laos was a neutral country. But with w'nich gave the states of Indochina their in- bound up in red tape and more flexible in equal vigor. *strongly relying on the CIA, dependence from France. had been that the field. The CA was in the business of Nashington would see to it secretly that the Laos would be neutral?"free from external running agents and agent' networks brand of neutralism actually practiced was domination by anyone." He added that the throughout the world with only a handful of aro American It as a beautiful scheme - efforts ale Communist -dominated group to Americans pulling fne striags and it was felt : w low-risk, relatively low-cost (it cost S500 destroy this neutrality [had] never ceased." that the same kind of operation could be million a year while the Vietnam debacle calling special attention to a Soviet airlift of used to run thla., war in Laos. grew into an S83-million-a-day habit). and supplies then under way and a reported in- With Alice-in-Wonderland logic:Ameri- 0Waprofile? so there wouldn't be a lot of flux of North Vietnamese military advisers, can officials claimed later that secrecy was assiing with the folks at home, who never He failed to mention, of course, that the necessary in Laos to avoid giving the Corn- seemed to understand foreign oolicy the CIA had brought down at least two Laotian munists a diplomatic advantage-and to give vay the presidents did. anyway. All that was governments?in '1959 and 1960?which the appearance of preserving the 1962 equireci taaexecute the game plao in Leos' had seemed to be "too neutral" and seemed ,agreeme.nts for a tirne when allpartiesgenu- was a lot of lying and cheating. and that in danger of sliding toward the Communists. linely wanted peace. They never mentioned proved to be no obstacle for the CIA and a The 'United States has no desire to. inter- :the ease with which one could move in succession of presidents. se- vene in the internal affairs of Laos," a State cret?the usual second-guessers didn't For openers,. in ordey to get the Chinese Department spokesman in Washington have to be dealt with?nor did they mention ad the Russians to agree to a neutral Laos said, as the CIA was maneuvering to ?get a the value of secrecy in Laos to presidents he U.S. had to pretend that a truly neutrat rpore pro American government into power striving to look like men of peace. Laos was precisely what it wanted, in late 19;0.) Nor did the president mention The CIA's work in Laos was a ciaiight to "First we strongly and unreservedly sup- that Brigadier General John A. Heintges the "cost-effective," cnart- and graph-wield- cot Me goal of a neutral and inrb=p?=rident and nearly two hundred other American ing policy managers in Washington. For at aos, tied to no-outsid power or grouo ,soldiers, posing as civilians in sport shirts the peak of the war only about 400 CIA em- e of owers, threatening no one, and fr,,,e from and slacks. had been functioning as a Mili- ployees were engaged in Laos on the fly domination. ... in the pas; there has tary Assistance Advisory Group (MARC) for ground, comaaared to half a million Amer-- ean any ,00ssible dround for misunder- several ye,ars through the 1950's and early cans next door in Vietnam. Certainly Viet- tending of our desire for a truly neutral 1960s, training Laotian regular army troops nam was a much bigger war, but there was aos, there should be none now.- and equipping them with weapons in direct no denying that the CIA was getting "more That was President Kennedy at a news violation of the 1954 peace agreement. bang. for the buck" in Laos. . onference in Washington on March 23. (General Heintges's name Mysteriously The CIA was onc of several agencies that 961. speaking with full knowledge. that CIA disappeared from public army records in constituted the American -Courary TeaM" ra gents and 400 Green Berets were recruit- 1959, in an apoarent effort to suggest that he Laos. with the ambassador as the chief. But ng and training Meo tribesmen expressly to had "retired." Years later he was back in the CIA was clearly the dominant farce. a nsure that a "neutral" Laos would tilt toward uniform with more stars on his shoulders, had the war, the action. just as MA.CV in he U.S. Some of the agents and Green Be- serving as commander of the United States Saigon had, and thc other agencies si:peed els had been secretly working with the Army Infantry Center at Fort Benning. Ga., into a wedge of support behihri it '-aith ribesmen since the late '50's? and in several important posts in Vietnam, money and men so that ;he CIA haat en.any Kennedy kept repeating the lie and in July including deputy to General Westmoreland. rildre resources than budget SMed tO e , 1962 in Geneva, fourteen nations. including He retired in 19(1.) suggest. 'The United States Agency fer In- he U.S., China, and the Sovit Union Continuing to attack the perfidy of the ternationai Development (6SAID). wee e. igned two documents guaranteeing the Communists. Kennedy also remained silent more than 600 employees in Laos, ?.aes 'ee eutrality of Laos. The second of the two was about the four AT-6 World War li-era trainer largest of the agencies and it provided protocol detailing procedures for the planes the U.S. had fitted with rockets and c_ovtetrnforArraneuricrnabn ssy o ereomf bCalAagaeln,ts,r2rsirpre' vithdrawal of foreign military personnel bombs an ,:i given to the Laotians at the start tila e rom Laos as well as "foreign civilians con- of 1961. in another violation of the 1954 i/Bwuptetrhiceancii, .svtainsctaiosnsigonf ,,,,,dv agencyohitchlost _ ar ected with the supply. maintenanee. and peace agreement. toring and utitiaation of ?war materials." In The. Russians. the Chinese. the North cance. because in practice the whole dr''''on. inc claus which seemd to leave Vietnamese. and the Laotian insurgents. Country Team" was an anti-Communise e e lo aroom for in the protocol viho called thernselves the Pr' flit Lee learn, working for the CIA's objectives. "Ev- ? t o. erbade t'ne introduction of arms and war (which means State of Laos). ,we en't feelee erybody ,,vas sort of paramilitary," said one USAID cfficial whose, job ?.-vas dispatohaie b trie official lies. for their side ?ias le.eling naterials except for "conventional arma-y e t nenta necessary for the national defense of ane cut of the bornbs. and bullets. As it- airlifts of rice and ammunition to tn ribes- and tiv?, men and their families. "There w,esn't any evolved. however. the . aos." ? ? , around a. That was the nature of the shortly after the 1962 agreement was Chinese decided rather quickly that Laos way paa,-,.. ai real estate were-, ask- program." oncludeca the United States withdrew WaS hardly a Take, for example, Edgar "Pop'' Buell, a ing blowing up the world for and they , pore than two hundred advisers from Vien- , lane, the sleepy capital city of Laos. and .seemed rather grateful that the Amer:ctins olksy. grandfatherly, Indiana.. farmer whohad gone to LacIs to work for the Interne- - Approved FoirsR_ _ _ljgal:tiA-Rigrnt1643R00010037000:3-4 - ? ? ieliiiagteAtif/ Approved For R&2 se 20908/08 : CIA-RDP700432R000100370003-4 tonal Voluntary Services after his wife died. airp anes an supplies we would double. nd Iated 'joined USAID. Buell had arranciE.-d the cost of the operation." he first contact between the Meo and the Williamson had it turned around. how- IA. Than, walking, flying, and parachuting ever. USAID didn't have the aircraft; the CIA nrough northeastern Laos he set up a did, unde.r the coverof a company called Air .uiltwork of landing zones and drop sites America. The airline rented its services .to hat were used for delivering rice and arms. USAID which then billed the Department of uell was short and stubby and literally Defense for the numerous missions it flew in ount:',ed with "can do" enthusiasm. H. direct support of the CIA's war. Whether the poke English and Lao in jumbled sen- Pentagon then paid the bill or fon,varded it to ence.s. but he communicated excellently. OA headquarters was not clear. is eyes growing stern behind black-framed . . . - lasses and his brow furrowing deeply The CIA was such a pervasive force in Laos hen he. had a point to make. His uniform that it set the tone for life in the American as khaki shirt, trousers, and sneakers. He community. Laos virtually became a CIA ever carried a gun, but everyone remem- company town. Intrigue, elusiveness, and ars the time he went out with the Meo and mystery became a part of everyone's role, hewed them how to biow up six bridges and they loved it. nd twelve mountain passes along Route 7. When I was there both in 1968 and in 1972 here were countless tales of how he had it was by far the spookiest country in Asia. I raved rifle and mortar fire. to lead hysterical felt it the minute I walked into the bar of the illagers to safety during Pathet Lao and Hotel Lane Xang in Vientiane. The handful of forth Vietnamese attacks; and he was al_ Americans in sport shirts and sunglasses vays there to cheer his side on in a good lowered their voices and turned away. Any- ight. ' where else in Asia, they would have either In July 1961, Brig. Gen. Edward G. Lens kept on chatting or invited a stranger to join ale, a longtime CIA operative and expert in. Making my rounds as a newspaperman n guerrilla warfare, reported in a top secret to the offices of the ambassador and his staff able to Washington that 9,000 Meos had I could feel everyone keeping a polite dis- een equipped for guerrilla operations. tance. No one suggested I drop by for a But he discovered that "as Meo villagers drink or, perhaps, dinner?which was rather re overrun by Communist forces and es standard elsewhere?and when I invited a en leave food-raising duties to serve as couple of officials out to, dinner one nicht uerrillas, a problem is growing..ove.r the their conversation was guarded and they are and feeding of noncombat Meos." hurried off early. Even those officials whose "CIA has given some rice and clothing to jobs Were digging wells and building pig- elieve this problem:" he told his superiors sties wanted to get in on the fun, so they. n the cable published in the Pentagon Pa- &inked around pretending they knew some- ers. but he added he felt that an organized. thing secret, - efief program was needed.. , . Men like Tony Poe. however, had no need Buell's efforts were aimed mainly at rem- to pretend. Their real lives were wild dying the problem Lansdale had de- enough. Poe was the most infamous of the cribed, and refugee relief became one of CIA operatives in Laos. a hard-drinking. SAID's biggest programs, along with a fanatically anti-Communist former marine. arge medical program which, among other tall and solidly built with the constitution of a nings, provided treatment for the Meo sot- tank and the disposition in combat of a ers and their families, i wounded lion. In 1972 USAID officials said they were "The Laotians don't believe he can be. ceding 220,786 "refugees," about half of killed," one American official told Fred horn were irregular soldiers and their de- Branfmah. the co-director of the Indochina endents. The others were pure civiiiane Research Center and a veteran of four years 'ho had been uprooted by the war, to a in Laos. . . arge extent by the American bornbing. , "The guy is an unbelievable piece of here were hundreds of thousands of other .niuscien. the American continued with isplaced persons, but according to USAID Branfman. "The only thing I'd take him on hey had found their own means of subsis_ with is a .45 Thompson and I'd want at least ence. a fifty-yard lead before he got to me, that's Senator Edward Kennedy caused trouble how tough I think Tony Poe is. He's one of the or the American operation in .Laos with most efficient killing machines in the busi- omplaints that the supposedly humanitar_ ness. He gets totally drunk every night, but an relief agency was being used to support yet he can wake up after four hours' sleep military operation, and run fifty miles. The guy has been Shot to Responding to questions about the sena- pieces; he's been surrounded and fought r's charges, Jack Williamson, who was his way out of hilltop positions all over Laos nown as the refugee affairs officer in 1972. for the last fifteen years." xplained that USAiD functioned as "a can- Poe worked closely with the main body of ,ai supply agency" as a matter of expedi_ the irregulars in the mountains of the north- ncy. east for several years. Then he struck off to "CAS needs rice for troops and depen_ the northwest where. among ether things, he ants of troops?an army travels on its ran agents into China and organized local ally," Williamson said. "They're essen_ hill tribes into anti-Communist fighting ally pretty much in the same areas as our units. One of his assignments for the CIA efugees and it makes sense to combine the before Laos was reportedly training Tibet- elivery system." (American officials seemed ans in the mountains of the western United neasy about calling the CIA by its proper States to infiltrate, back into thei'r homeland arne. They often called it "CAS," a eapee_ and drive out the Chinese. ism that meant "Controlled American .Branfman said that to encourage his ource.") . troops Poe once offered a reward for enemy "We're trying to save the taxpayer some ears and hung a plastic bag on his front oney," he went on. "We're not doing any porch to collect the trophies. But he had to anky-panky. If they had to have their own discontinue the practice when he discov- ered then his reen were netting too arabif';eus could find jeet to get th.e ears. Once. Brarifman said. Poe asked e cceple of pilo:s to ielke a present to his boss, Pat.Laoctry. at a CIA office in Thai- lend. The pilots became curious about the horrendously foul odor coming from the package and ripped it open. Inside was a freshiy decapitated head. Tony Poe was not he only blood-and-outs swashbuckler in Laos. But most of the other CIA agents, as well as the U.S. government ? employees who functioned as CIA paramili- tary personnel, were much more like your suburban neighbor. They liked the S20.000 a year or so they were knocking down, they; liked being part of a big team effort, they liked the special status they enjoyed in thel backward country and many repeatedly ax- tended their tours. Blaine. Jensen, aryldaho farmer who spent .ten years working along- side Pop Buell. put it simply. "A bunch of us came over and found it very interesting," he told me one day. "We we were doing the. people some good. The people [the Mao] are a yen./ likeable bunch of people. That's the only way I can explain it." The CIA ran the war from a squat, twee story concrete building with towering an- tennas sprouting from its roof in an 'Amen- ?' can compound in a residential section of Vientiane. The compound was enclosed by *a high chain-link fence, and was patrolled by :units of the U.S. Embassy's 500-man, blue- uniformed private guard force. Nearby in. the same compound were the offices of the :200 or so American military' attaches who, advised individual units and did the high- ' level planning for the Royal Laotian Army and Air Ferce. The regular army Ircops numbered more than 70.000 arid primarily !maintained defeneive positions whne the smaller irregular force led by the CIA bore.' the brunt of the fighting. The compound ale? held the offices of the USAID officials who 'saw to it that the irregulars and their de.pen- * dents received food, ammunition. and med- ical attention. There was an American-style bar and grill where you could get a slice ot. apple pie and a cup of coffee, hamburgers. milk shakes, or perhaps a cold Bud and a side of fres. Next door was a movie house to escape with John Wayne or Paul Niewman. and munch buttered popcorn. Every morning at nine o'clock. except for Sundays, the CIA station chief, the ambas- sador. the army and air force military at- taches. the embassy "bombinie officer," the.; head of USAID. the Chief of transportation: and a few other key officials gathered in a small, bug-proof room on an upper floor of the American Embassy for a daily secret updating on the war. Seated around a rec- tangular conference table, the men would report the significant developments in their special areas. Unfelding his map and flick, ing a silver pOinter over the Fnottled green terrain. the CIA station chief, the American commander of the irregulars. would tick oft ambushes. attacks. and withdrawals; per- haps quickly outline en, assault that was shaping up. The Air Force attache, a colonel in civilian clothes, would plot the latest 3-52 strikes or -Arclights." as they were more cornmcTly called, and report on the nui-nbet of fighter bomber raids that day. The head si USAID would probably give a rundown how many tons of rice had been air, dropped, with possibly the notation that a 116 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4 requently used bridge had been blown up. - Long Tieng at a time when Laos was the and chased them out." He seemed to forget rid sceit went. - major supplier for the GI drug market in as he spoke in 1972 that even with "Uncle' In early 1972, the American ambassador Vietnam. McCoy said, too, that Air America Sam's" help, the tribesmen had been as G. McMenne Godley In, Yale '39. He planes were sometimes used to transport mauled and displaced. vould quietly Scratch at a note pad as offi- the Mao Opium. Fcreigners?that is, nonof- One.theory expressed guardedly in Vier- late spoke in the secret morning briefing, tidal Americans such as newsmen?could Ilene wee that the initial fighting among the eePing a running account of "enemy" ca- visit Long Ting. which was officially de- Meo had been a mailer of, clan disputes. ualties. Then, when everyone had finished, scribed as a baseof the Royal Laotian Army, Some took up with the North Vietnamese e would announce the total, his spirits lift- ng visibly if it were a particularly high fig- re. Godley, who had served in the Congo in e mid-1960's when CIA mercenaries, with it support from Cuban-exile pilots, were. ightingtinsurgents, was a huge, hearty man ith a passion for the war and the role he layed as -supreme field commander. His avorite weapons were the bombers, espee sally the B-52's, and his gleeful discourses n them and the "ordinance" they delivered arned him the nickname "G. Arclight Hugh 'ToVar, the CIA station chief at that me, was a slender, sophisticated and intel- gent former OSS officer who had para- huted into Laos at the end of World War Ii rid shared the ambassador's zeal for the ecret xvari As head of the "Cougtry Team," he ambassador was nominally the supe- ior, but as commander of the most promi- nt troops, the station chief gained extra tature,?just as Westmoreland and Abrams ad on the Vietnam Country Team. and in ractice Godley and Toyer appeared to work only by obtaining permission from the and some turned to Vientiarie and the American Embassy in Vientiane, and pereAmericans. The strong feeling was that mission was rarely granted. without- the CIA's arms and encouragement When I arrived in Laos in March 1972, the fighting would never have reached such Long Tieng had been under heavy artillery a high level and that very likely reirommo- fire for several weeks and the CIA. the . dations couid have been made which wore:. ; -a regulars, and their families had retreated have verted the slaughter of the Meo. south to a place that i.vae, marked Ban Xonoe Early on, the clans allied with the CIA the maps but which most of the Americans developed a draft system by which village called Site 272. Site 272 was a dreary flat elders forced young men into the army. Whether the elders were acting-out of cone spot amid the strikingty beautitut lineestone peaks and spires of northern Laos. It vas rnunity spirit or because they were beino dominated by a steehmat runway. The CR Paid a "head price" by the CIA I couldn't had taken over the western side of the field, !personally determine. But McCoy wrote in is book on the narcotics traffic that when thrown up rough-lumber shacks to shelter h !its super-secret electronic gear. and Posted Ger Su Yang, the leader in the village of restricted.' signs Across the metal strip 'Long Pot, refused to send young men. to the ". was a he.ndful of shacks where USAID field irregular army in early 1971. the Americans men Coordinated airdrops of rice, canned stopped dropping rice to his people. meat.' and cooking oil. The USAID hespital. In a hospital bed at Site 272. thirty-sev- that had been at Long Tieng was there, t en-year-old Lieutenant Bounhoun Madera. oo. whose left leg had just been arhputated not far from a steamy shack where -Air 'below the .knee talked about haw he had America pilots i.irere wolfing down ham- b burgers between flights. The field was fre- een "recruited- thirteen years earlier. ?Jou must be a soldier if you are a man because- ! netic. Planes seemed to be fighting to land n almost equal footing. ." . " Well before the briefings begen.! and to take off. No sooner did an aircraft the leader tells you you must he said If _ you don't want to go you are put in prison. 0 screech down than cargo handlers were fil! " vith the morning mist stiii clinging to the . ce paddies, the pilots of the CIA's airline. ir America, in their gray trousers and lhite shirts, had tossed- clown ham and ogs and flapjacks at the airport cafeteria in heir:eerie and were on their way "up con- ry," in lurribering, unmarked C-47's carry- rig CIA field operatiees. armed to the teeth vith the. latest automatic rifles and pistols net tons of food and combat supplies for the rregulars. Until early 1972 a good many of the planes each day headed for the village of Long Tieng in a ruggedly beautiful valley ighty miles north of Vientiane. There for nearly ten 'years the CIA operated' its main forward base for the secret war, training and equipping' tribesmen, iworking out.. daily strategy, and sending them into battle. A mile-long paved runway sliced through the heart of the vaiiey with stacks of bombs, for youe ing it with rice and ammunition and waving you pay someone else to go it off again. Knots of hill tribe women, mainly Nearby in another bed, a fourtn-year- Meos with their baggy black slacks and old soldier with a broken leo said his two older brothers had been taken into the army blouses, coiorfui sashes, and heavy silver before him. Then one of them waskilted. he jewelry; waited ? stoically to beard aircraft ? that would take Ahem to their distant vil- said, "so I had to take his position." lages. "I don't like army life," the boy said. "If there were not so many enemy I would like to Site 272. on the southern Sedge of the _ ! mountains, not far from the flat.Vientiene be a soldier. I'm afraid." Plain, was the end of the line for the tribes- Senh Sai, fifteen. said he wanted to be- men, men, the bottom rung on the ladder of re- come a soldier because of the money. but treat, where they found themselves pantino he added, "the big people asked us to be when the cease-fire came. For them and the soldiers. They ordered us." CIA the war had been a series of costly At a tiny outpost cut into the. side of a 'delaying actions, their few advances fol- mountain top, a ten-year-old boy with !lowed by greater setbacks. Some of the American-made hand grenades clipped to tribesmen had fled from provinces high his belt and an American-made mete rifle in up on the map of Laos edging on North Vietnam his hands was asked if he enjoyed being a and China. Others had come from the Plain -soldier. "I don't enjoy it," he said with a shy of Jars. But all of them had given up a home smile."I want to study. .. : But pressure! into , ? somewhere in the nigh lands under pressiee pushed forklifts for loading them. and a cluster of be a teacher more than -I want toi light." from the Communists. They loved the moue- communications shacks at either end. The It was total war in the mountains of Laos. tains, felt heartsick in the flats, and even shacks were crammed with powerfui, top- with no safe exit for anyone. Recounting the became physically ill there. That was why secret electronic e.quipMent for eavesdrop- losses in one battle, a young, angular-faced they had originally joined forces witth the - ping on the Pat'net Lao and directing. irregu- irregular soldier in camouflaged fatigues many trib CIA, e,srnen told me. The Commu- said that 300 Meo had been killed, mostly' ter troops over great distances. Just back rusts would come into the villages, they from theairstrip were bunches of tin-roofed ! civilians. ? said, organize the people into work parties . hUts for some 30,000 civilians and the. sev.- ! "We use civilians to carry ammunition, 1 to dig trenches or carry !ammunition and i he explained. "We don't have any other way eral thousand irregulars -who had garri- supplies and. in the evenings, lecture them soned theebase.: There was also a 150-bed ! on Marxism. The tribesmen I met didn't like to support our soldiers." hospital maintained by USAID. The airstrip! being bossed around and they didn't care Those who somehow managed not to fight for either the CIA-backed side or the Corn- was not teng enough for jets and was used i? much- for the lectures. So at the first oppor- -I tunity they ran away. When the CIA offered munists sometimes found the shifting war mainly by i the litele, single-engine if-2S bombers of the Royal Laotian Air Force, Air I them.guns they gladly accepted, figuring suddenly in their own village, with ma- America transports. and big-winged he.lio- they could take back their homes from the chine-gun bullets whining overhead and couriers that often landed and took off in a intruders. ? ? mortars and bombs flattening homes. There There was no "arm-twisting" to get the was no choice but to run. It was always har few hundred feet cn the side of steep moim- - tains. But frequently Jolly Green Giant res- Meo to fight, one of the highest ranking going. and exhaustion and disease took Cue helicopters of the American Air Force Americans in Laos told me, annoyed at tne , their toll. Those who stayed alive were often idled thereon-standby foe a "eilay Day" call siiggestion that the CIA had made can came beggars of sorts non confused and disoriented and many be- from an American bomber pilot in trouble, fodder of the tribesmen. !. depE.-ricle:11 upon I Arnerican rice drops. Alfred VV. McCoy, in his book The Politics of "If it (had not been for Uncle Sam' ! s sup- Heroin in Southeast Asia. said the tribesme.n, port," the American official continued, It was a tragedy that ke,pt repeating itself whose main cash, crop had always been Meo would have been destroyed years ago. endlessly grinding the people down. One opium, also operated a heroin factory at ThP Natth-Vi,aWarateR t;,/ni ? ,,,- man of twenty-seven told me his family had Approved i-or Kelease-zoui/uo- Ria-:--cti'A=k60140432R(110p1 0037000374 ' Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4 en uprooted seven times in twelve years. middle-aged woman, whose husband ; ci only son had been killed in the fighting. id she had taken flight five times. Lt. Tsjon said his village had pulled up stakes , panic every year for efe.ven years. We ist everything.- he said without einotee Ve lost some of our family mernheis: too., he enemy captured more fee.) 200 of the 22 people in the villa ...Ie.:. y-seven died. f disease, fever, iiiaiaria and seven by pirits. We really don't like moving, but we ave to." As these "assets.- as the CIA referred to e hill people. withered, the agency in- reasingly looked to Thailand for man- 'ower. despite a legislative ban against .S. support for forces of a third country in aos. (Senator Symington charged that the se of the Thais in Laos violated the legisla- ive restriction "in letter as well as in spirit." tut the CIA continued unchecked with its !legal recruiting.) What attracted the Thais vas money. A private who signed up with he CIA to go to Laos. for example. was paid early three times the salary of a private in he regular Thai army. The so-called Thai 'volunteers" were given Lao names and Lao dentity cards by the CIA. They were sent to aos in Thai units and Stayed in the units ether than mixing with hill tribe companies .nd battalions. After futfilling a one-year contract they were free to go home. About 30 percent. however, tired quickly of the hard living and deserted. One of the things that kept the hill people going so long was their leader, Vang Pao, an ambitious. French-trained soldier who attracted the attention of the first Americans who ventured into the mountains of Laos. As the CIA funneled money and arms through Vang Pao. his stature and power spiraled, eehing hirRahead of the traditional I1/4.4eo leaders. He was mane a major general in he Royal Laotian Army with responsibility or an entire military region, the highest pos- ition a hill tribesman had everiattained, and e became the singular leader of his people. I found tribesmen who loved him. others who despised him, but no one ready to cross him. When he said. "Move out." the troops moved out. Partly to solidify his posi- tion in the polygamous society. the story _ AL...inn. Pao_ ea- poeeeiing CIA money intended for his troops, of shoot- ing men with whom he had differences, and of torturing prisoners. His brutality was never denied, but most Americans claimed the general was less corrupt than other Lao- tian officers with whom they dealt. -fhere were times during the long war when even Vane Pao warite..0 to quit. But Pop, accercling to Dee A. Seim nch-e. who .,,rote te..eel% about Bee: fif-e eiei Ntee) ca;ted ildrieir Pop. , 18 Sceenohe recalled one evening ai:er a !reat when Duel: found Vang Pen alone in his. French colonial villa at Long Tieng. disheveled and in tears. According to Schanche. Buell .listened tiriefiy. then shouted at Vang Pao, "Get hold of yourself! You lost a battle. You-ain't lost the war. And you ain't lost your pec-,pe either. Sure, their morale's all shot to hell right now, but they'll get over it." ? Then. Schanche went on. Vang Pao straightened and looked ruefully at Pop. "I know you speak harshly to me for my own good. my father." he said. "Maybe it is not as dark as I have been telling myself since retreated from Pha Thi. But it is bad. You saw my soldiers when You were there. I took you with ma to insc.)ect the new recruits. Did you not see them? A third of them were only twelve years old. Their rifles are longer than they are. They should be in school, not fight- ing. When you locked at them, couldn't you see?" Again he began to stream tears. "The good ones are all dead. my father. Dead. These are all I have left. It is late. We have fought for nine years. There is no way we can "But you can hold. General, you can .hold." Buell replied., "Hold what?" Vang Pao continued in the same dispirited vein. "it ain't all lost. General. You know that." Buell saig. "We can figure sornethin* out:: Talking v-eth a correspondent tree-,,ere oacia Television once. Buell sei,?s?el: eon- sidered himself and Varic;;Feiaiis partners M- an anti-Communiet ie---eede. They both- felt bad that yuuee uoys were being u-sed as- soldiers, he said. But when he was asked if would like to see a ten-year-old grandson of his carrying a hand grenade made by a foreign power, Buell replied. "I sure as hell would. if he was holding off an enemy such as the North Vietnamese. My oWn grandson. Even at five years old, if he could do it." Buell always expressed his love for the' hei peopie ee he retired from USAID after suffering a heart attack. he settled in Vientiane. working at a school for blind children from the hill tribes. By 1972, the war the CIA had entered as a counter-guerrilla campaign had become, from the American side, largely an air war. Even_ with the Thai reinforcements, the many smaller bombers.- . Laos had been shaken by twice as much bombing as North Vietnam. Sections cf the once-populous Plain of Jars had been turned into cratered moonscapes.- and sur- vivors told of living for weeks in caves and trenches, venturing out only after dark. But during most of -the bombing?from May 1964 until March 1970?PresidentS Johnson and Nixon baldly denied that the air raids were taking place. Even as villag- ers fleeing the bombing streamed into Vien- tiane telling of skies filled with attadcing American planes, American officials in- sisted that U.S. aircraft were only carrying out "armed aerial reconnaissance.-Vrat is.. surveying the land and striking only self- defense. Finally. though. on March 6. 197a. amid what he called "intense public specutation"" over growing American involverrznt Laos, President Nixon went on nation{ tele- vision to put "the subject into pe.rspective...- The president's statement was broadly mis- leading and littered with lies and omissions_ but it did put on record for the first tine tile fact that American planes . had. indeed. been secretly bombing Laos for six vars. Nixon asserted that the bornbirt.) had been initiated at the request of the Royal Laotian Government and that set?.5-eieueel strikes had been flown "only weenireqwest-- eci by the Royal Laotian Gove.rnment.." On the contrary. hcwaver. Joseph a GOUlden, in his book Truth is the Frr-.Casts- a!ty, reported that not only had Soks- vanna Paona not rquE!s,,--ri st.vt bo t- 5.!' but that re- had not been ireorreed teat it was beginnim. a when he. :-.1:scov E.:red the air raids. heter.a..-z-z- erted to resieei unless they ..vere'felted L, t:..vo days. however. Gouijen said. t:z.e. American ambassador in Laos thet. Leon: arc:tint-ler. :-.^.anaged to cairn the c?aceari,J turn his prc-test into an "invitation." furthoec more, dii-_,,lornats in Vientiane told me la 1972 that'Souverina Phourna felt the berr( ' ing of the Ho Chi Minh Trail was of= vetch to Laos and wanted it stooped sob-acct.:L.: proceed witn attempts to make peace we-4: the Communists. But the diplorn saii - Souvanna Phouma had no hopes of.aborn.:- ing halt because of American concern wiz; Vietnam. While forcefully condemning the Con-1 munist vioiations of Laotian nearality Nixon continued, like his predecessors.. ti 'deny that the. U.S. had breached theagrea -rnentse He made no mention whatsa-evero. the Ci;:, end ? a part.of the general armed forces iro-whic.? the Laotian government had "requ..=ste...J.: assistance from the U.S. The president stated flatly that "noArneri. can stationed in Laos has ever been&itted ground combat operations.- but win .4-rieeeae_r_ns:,Incteles_Tirnes fp, undtkafa was being run by a coalition similar to th government the. Laotians had started wit shortly afTe.r independence in 1954,. re dii?ference. however, was that aft- sorn eighteen years of political and mialani tervent:on by the CIA, the Communist cc trolled much more of the population an land and held a stronger position in th, coalition. The CIA's single largest I-Mita effort had been a dismal failure. In the-enci. the CIA was denied even- th gratitude. of tne hill people it had armed - Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000190370003-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003L4 UNION, Sr Diego 6 August 1975 having kept them out of the hands of the Communists. Chatting in the Cod!. dark loboy of the Constellation Hotel one morn- ing in Vientiane. Touby Lyfoung. one of the most inik:ential political leaders of the Mao. !Did me his people would surely have gore i:h the Communists had the CIA not inter- vened. And that. he said, would have been better. --Even if the Communist regime had riot been paradise." he said. our pcpie would not have 'died. There would *nave ttee.a no w ar.: 0 fib article in a series on i;aler- ccr's intelligerce ccrnmrif:iti.) NEW YORK TIMES 19 August 1975 POWER TO SPY HELD A TOOL FOR TYRANNY 4 WASHINGTON, 'Aug. . 17 (UPI)?Senator Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho said Sunday that the spy technology of the Government is so massive that Americans would have "no way to fight back" if a dictator took control. ? ? : , . .:. ' - Mr. Church, chairman of the Senate committee investigating the Central Intelligence Agency and other intelligence gathering !agencies, said his panel is look- ing into the security index ,of 'tbe Federal Bureau of Investi- gation, emergency offices of the Mount Weather computer system and the military's con- tingency plan for martial law. .,--Mr. Church warned that the nation's "very extensive capa- bility of intercepting mes- sages," which he said was es- sential in keeping track of for- eign enemies, '"at any time could be turned around on the American people." ..- He said that if the country. should - come under` tyranny, "tile most careful effort to corn- bine together in resistance to the Government, no matter how privately it was done, is in the reach of the Government to know, such is the capability of this technology. We must see tO it," he said, that the Central ,Intelligence Agency "and all agencies that possess this tech- nology, operate within the law and under proper supervi- sion so that we never cross that abyss." LOS ANGELES TIMES 8 August 1975 - :-..,---i CIA Malady Ernest Conine's (July 18), "Why the ?Big Flap Over CIA Contact Men?" .speitlights the paranoia that has seized so many of our political lead- ers and opinion formers. The CIA malady is not only vir- ulent, it is so contagious that the nor- mal good judgment of ordinary vot- ing citizens is being paralyzed. After these many weeks of increas- , ing hysteria, during which even the ?CIA executives have been badgered into apologies for just and proper ac- tions, how can we return to sanity before irreparable damage is done? ? Sen. Frank Church, the chairman . of one of the congressional commit- tees investigating the activities of the :Central Intelligence Agency recently compared that organization to---2 a - "rogue elephant charging out of- con- ; -trol." . More recently many responsible citizens have begun to compare the el investigation into the activities of the CIA, with Jhee witchhunts -the.. McCarthy era M the 1950s. Both .evaluationi have validity: :..each in its .own, context, each in its Own time period:' . ? 7 ' In some respects CIA has- behaved ? like 'a rogue elephant, although not of, recent date. 'In its heyday the Agency violated .its 'charier by spying on Americans within the United States of America. It succumbed to pres- sure from the White House to take parf in:improper activities. It un- doubtedly had a hand in more than a few revolution's here and there. And there were probably times when it even' diScussed the possible assassi- ? nation of foreign leaders. ? = : However, that is all in the past and, even at the- worst, its irresponsibili- ties and transgressions were accom- panied by skillful intelligence activi- ty if incalculable value-to the nation:. Today the CIA is prostrate. Its mo- : rale: is -sapped, its ability to recruit 'agents is damaged and, as Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger said over the. weekend, .the sources _ of information available to the CIA are drying up. In this context ? the continuing harassment of the Agency particu- larly in the limelight of congressional hearings, where immediate drama has more weight with the public than a voluminous report a year from now that few will bother to read ? is reMiniscent of the McCarthy era: What we are seeing is investigative overkill at its worst. The question nol,v,is not whether the CIA can be ? I wish it were possible to impose month of silence. We could then hope for a, rational action by Con- gress to correct the few defects in authorizing legislation and oversight procedures. During the silence those who have been hysterical would then be ready to praise the CIA for its ac- r rAl bridled and controlled by .Congess, but whether it can rise from the ashes And that brings the discussion to the: central point of whether we need a- CIA at all. We can't recall - that even the severest critic of the agency has said that we do not ? Whatever its failings, the functions of the. CIA are vital to our national -security. An ? agency of that sort is essential to provide the. President . .and the defense establishment the information: they need both to con- duct intelligent foreign' policy and to provid?' for the security. of the citi zens ()the United States of America. - I ? Mr. -Schlesinger, himself the head ? - - . of the. CIA:recently, reminded us that there'ils no other. way to obtain the intelligence we need; Satellites are inadequate because photograpIB do not think and, as Schlesinger !bated, they do not reveal intentions'. The message that he left with the CIA investigators merits the consid: eration of every American who be- lievg that he has been wronged by .the CIA, or that American institu- ' tioi4 have been subverted by CIA activities. ? We tend to forget, Mr. Schieskige said "that the most valuable of social welfare services that a society canTrovide for its citizens is to keep - thern alive and free." e Put -another ,way? we can and 'should insist that the CIA. not have ? the l willy-nilly right- to open our . mail?but we should also do nothing that sacrifices our right to have -private mail in the first place. We ? silo-1.11d also remember that ? while we must set the rulesby which the CIA operates, we will lose the game every" time if we insist upon using padded gloves while our oppo- nents are using brass knuckles. compliShments and urge its con- tinued operations as ar.i essential tool of our administrative process. Simmer down, America! Think quietly for 30 days; then act calmly. WILCOXPim Laguna Niguel 19 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-R0P77-00432R000100370003-4 NATIONAL OBSERVApproved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4 16 AUGUST 1975 finumunonitnitinuml This Week iiiWaShi7/010n iiiminlinuinimuniminimintuilitionnimminininionmotimmintutimtimmintuitui I!! E-: olby Gets Some Praise in Congress By sMark- R. Arnold ?,- ?? For much of the 27 months that he has headed the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), William E. Colby has suffered the fate of one of those mech- anical targets you see at amusement parks--the kind that gets shot down ?whenever it raises its head. ? Traditionally, directors of U.S. in- telligence have been able to keep their heads low and their agency's activities beyond the searchlight of public scru- tiny. But that has not been Colby's Revelations about CIA involvement in burglaries, buggings, drug tests, as- :sassination plots and its keeping of files on U.S. citizens have taken their 4011 on agency morale and threatened to wear out Director Colby's welcome at the White House. "They're taking a 'microscope to activities formerly viewed only through ? News Analysis a telescope, if at all," says one student *of the agency, referring to the recent spate of investigations?journalistic, Presidential, and congressional. But Colby, .to judge from: recent ? appearances, is accommodating him- :self well to- the demands? for: greater 'disclosure in post-Watergate Washingr. -ton, and is earning himself some ten- tative praise- on Capitol Hill for ;his: .co-operation. ?? Difficult to Judge Last :week,' he made two - appear-' ances before the House Select Com- mittee on Intelligence, his. 40th and .41st appearances before Government investigators this year. He began by saying, "It -would be disingenuous to -say that I welcome this process, but we will , work constructively with you both the good and the bath" How much of both good and bad ? Colby in fact disclosed is hard to judge because much of his testimony took place behind closed doors. In one executive session, he :satisfied a' key demand of the 13-member House panel by outlining the secret budget for U.S. foreign intelligence. This information the agency has previously shared with only a handful of lawmakers on the Senate and House Appropriations com- mittees. Chairman Otis G. Pike of New York said Colby's ? presentation had been "remarkably candid." But in sticking his head up before the Pike panel, Colby got knocked down once again. Rep. Les Aspin of Wisconsin drew from the intelligence chief the admission that the National Security Agency (NSA), which moni- tors foreign communications, some- times picks up conversations of U.S. ? :citizens while eavesdropping on over- seas telephone calls.. ? ' ? - Colby replied that intercepts involv:- ing citizens are "incidental" to agency monitoring of foreign communications. Aspin insisted, however, that the ac- tivity is not incidental but "random .? scanning." He also? argued that the practice is illegal -" under Supreme Court rulings limiting warrantless wire taps to national-security cases involv- ing foreign__ agents. ? The committee later took its inquiry behind closed doors after the White House warned' it was treading in an "extremely sensi- tive" area.' ? The House investigation and a com- panion inquiry by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, chaired by Idaho Democrat Frank Church, are run- ning on separate but complementary tracks. The Church group is exploring CIA operations, beginning with involve- ment in assassination plots against for- eign leaders. It has yet to hold an open session, though the panel has been tak- ing testimony since the spring. . .The Pike committee, seeking to avoid duplication of the Senate group's work, is zeroing in on the size and shape of the. intelligence establishment, its ,budget practices, and the degree of oversight, from the White House and Congress. ?? : . ? . ?:? Members of both panels are Imown to believe that intelligence operations should be subject to tighter congression- al supervision. In addition, there is some sentiment in Congress for elimina- tion of ,the CIA's responsibilities for cd- vert operations, which would leave the- agency as a purely intelligence-gather- ing organization. Such a step would be PRESS?HERALD, Port1and9 Me. 4 August 1975 bitterly resisted by the White Rouse and powerful congressional friends of the agency. - 'Thanks, Not Abuse' In his congressional appearances?. Colby conducts himself as a calm, sCr phisticated professional, seeking to co-operative while championing in low-key way the present prerogative of his agency. Occasionally, he becomei defensive, as when he said last week that CIA personnel "deserve the cowl- try's thanks rather than the' abuse they are receiving today." For the most part, though, he patient- ly fields inquiries about the mechanics of agency operations while requesting that questions about sensitive agency policies be handled behind closed doors. Pressed as to why the CIA should have greater flexibility in its transfer of funds than other agencies, Colby re- plied last week, "If we are offered a document of tremendous intelligence- value; we can not tell the seller to re- turn next year when we have had an opportunity to budget for it." His basic -message is that though there have been abuses in the past, the agency must be preserved. "The world has changed, the country has changed,' the intelligence business has changed,". he told the Pike committee. Replied freshman Rep. Philip H. Hayes of In- diana, "Congress has changed too." is healthy that the Central Intelligence Agencys:, illegal activities should be expOsed but the. excesses of congressional and' press-probing have damaged the ? agency and the country. ....The CIA's mission of providing authentleiiiformation about foreign; affairs to our government is vitally:. essential. .4k* sound foreign policy. is Impossible without.-this service. Judgments_ in the best, interest of the United States by:the Executive.branch,on.? overseas Matters. :depend reliable intelligence and analysis. But-there- isl reason to believe- that .the orgy of .attackson. the ? agency-by_some politicians -"and 'part -of the press-has reduced the CLk's effectiveness. Certainly our allies-are Wary about an intima relationship-.'"with the agency. Its :1- .wn their morale:shaken,. "are-',I.rii.nriing scared and :.such- timidity is bound tobereflected in the conduct' of covert.migsions, in the recommendations and 'action-:: whichTth&:record -will show: have., often helped to avert cnss abroad..-.7;, .z Worse, some of the revelations here at home have actually' lifted the lid from -,sCIA?-:':operations, ? enabling other' nations-:to take steps. to thwart our -information gathering: The-New:. York Times, for example, with' disgraceful irresponsibility;: actually disclosed that our. "specially- equipped'; submarines were- monitoring Soviet missile :.. ac- tivities: for- 15 years and .often . doing it inside Russian territorial waters- :The Times can be .proud ? that it led -the. 'Russians to: take 'countermeasure-s, including devices -around targets to nullify ? our electronic spying gear_ and underwater mines:- ? -"r - Siich" international spying; as unpleasant" as it may be, is routine :necessity with all nations and the keeping -an ,eye on Soviet missile activities was doing its job,;a job in the-interest of the American people. Because it went - astray in its domestic activities does not justify reckless exposure ?.of its:legitimate -performance on behalf of national security. 20 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4 NEW YORK TIMES 11 August 1975 rug rests a' 'Federal Project for Mind- By JOSEPH B. TREASTER American military and intelli- gence officials watched men with glazed eyes pouring out rambling confessions at the Communist purge trials in East. ern Europe after World War II, and for the first time they be- gan to worry about the threat of mind-bending drug ? as weapons. ' Then, a few years later, came the reports of American G.I.'s being brainwashed in Korean ,prison camps. "Here were people who had stood up against the Nazis, ,suddenly standing up and con- fessing everything to the Com- munists," one employe of the Central Intelligence Agency re- called the other day. "For the first time, our prisoners of war were denouncing their own county. What in the world was going on?" ?No one in the United States knew for certain. So, as the /story is now told, the C.I.A. began investigating a wide aPeiaty of then little-known, mind-altering 'drugs, including LSD, which is lysergic acid diethylamide, and trying hem out on human beings. So did the Army, the Navy and, event- ually, the Air Force. In the two months since the Rockefeller Commission first disclosed the C.I.A.'s experi- ments with LSD, there have been many fragmentary reports on drug testing in the military- intelligence community. From these reports, and new information turned up in inter- views and other research, there emerges the story of a vast government program ranging over nearly a quarter of a century, a program that, pri- marily in the name of national security, subjected more than 4,000 persons to such psycho- chemical drugsas LSD, marijua- na and a number of other chem- ical-compounds that could pro- duce hallucinations, euphoria and hysteria. ? Government in Vanguard The story is one of a Federal Government that played the role of foremost pioneer in research on a family of drugs that in the ninteen-sixties found their way into the streets of America as the seeds of a new counterculture. - It is a story, also, that makes! clear that the intent of the drug experiments went beyond the Government's contention that they were merely defen- sive in nature, aimed at learn- ing how or when an enemy was using the compounds and how to protect against them. In fact, there is ample evidence that military and intelligence planners hoped to add these drugs to the United States' arsenal of offensive weapons. The Rockefeller Commision reported, for example, that the C.I.A. considered several "op- erational uses outside the! United States." And in the late 'fifties there were a number of references in military publications to psy- ing agents" that could be used to knock out an enemy for a few hours or a few days with- out doing permanent -damage, a concept that one retired gen- eral the other day called, "winning without killing." Included in the commission's disclosure of the C.I.A.'s drug experiments earlier this sum- mer was an account of the ?death of a man who had jumped from a New .York City hotel window .after having been surreptitiously given LSD. As the identity of the victim, Frank R. Olson, became known, and as other details of the in- cident emerged, servicemen and civilian researchers who had participated in military drug experiments began telephoning newspapers and television sta:- tions. Several Projects Confirmed At first the armed forces re- fused to comment, but eventu- ally spokesmen confirmed.sev- eral drug projects. In the small- est, and apparently the only ef- fort not directly related to mili- tary activity, the Navy said it conducted a single study with 20 persons between 1950 and 1951 to evaluate the therapeutic value of LSD in treating severe depresSion. The C.I.A. and the Army, which was the principal re- searcher for the Department of Defense, say they discontinued their LSD experiments on hu, mans in 1967, but the Army says it went on with other drugs that could cause hallu- cinations until about two Weeks ago. In addition, the Air Force says it continued to sponsor university research in LSD through 1972. - Civilian scientists and medi- cal researchers generally agree that "there probably was good reason to test these drugs on humans?given the perceived threat and the fact that there existed no alternative means Qf determining, the impact of the psychochemicals on men. But they have been extremely cirit- ical of the procedures followed, by the C.I.A. and the Army. In most of the C.I.A.'s experi- ments with LSD, the Rockefel- ler Commission report said, the subjects were unaware that they were being administered the drug?a practice that Dr. Judd Marmor, president of the American Psychiatric Associa- tion, says he considers unethi- cal and dangerous. - The standard ethical ;proce- dure in human experimenta- tion in the United States is to obtain prior informed con- sent from subjects. There is a danger, especially with such a potent psychochemical as LSD, that an unsuspecting subject will suddenly feel he is losing mind and, in despair, at- tempt suicide, many research- ers believe. Despite the death of Frank Olson, which occurred in the fall of 1953, apparently not long after the C.I.A. began ex- perimenting on humans with LSD, the agency continued to administer the drug to ?unsus- imost 25 Years years, the Rockefeller Commis- sion reported. The agency's Inspector Gen- eral learned of the practice, questioned the propriety of it, ,and called a halt, the commis- sion said, but the C.I.A. did not finally abandon its test with these drugs for four more years. During that time, the subjects were allegedly in- formed volunteers at various correctional institutions. The Wife and. three adult children of Mr. Olson, who for 22 years had been in the dark about the apparent motivating factors in his death, have taken the first steps toward suing the C.I.A. for what they call the "wrongful death" of the head of their family. David Kairys, one of the law- yers for the Olsons, says his firm, Kairys & Rudovsky of Philadelphia, has also taken on the case of the survivors of a marine colonel who fatally shot himself nine years ago after a C.I.A. job interview in which he later said he believed he had been drugged. The Army says it admin- istered experimental drugs only to persons who had volunteered "without the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-reaching or other ulterior form of con- straint or coercion." The volun- teers, however, were rewarded with three-day passes ? every weekend and given an extra $45 a month in temporary duty pay. ? ? The volunteers were told, the' Army says, that they were be- ing given a "chemical compound which might influence their be- havior," but they were not told before or after the test the specific name of the drug, such as LSD, or that it might cause them to hallucinate or to feel panic or discomfort. Follow-up studies were done on only a handful of the mili- tary men tested, an inquiry over the last three weeks shows, and there was no indi- cation that the C.I.A. had con- ducted a followup on any of its subjects. Concerned Over Validity Dr. Marmor, the head of psychiatric asseciation, said: "One might argue as to whether [The Army] had obtained in- formed consent, but if you tell the subject everything you might well invalidate the experi- ment." Dr. Van M. Sim, who was di- rector of the Army's program of testing drugs on humans for 22 years, and is now being in- vestigated for alleged misuse of the pain ? killing drug Demerol before he came to the military, used the same ratio- nale in explaining his methods in a recent news conference, saying that to provide more in- formatiorr to subjects might prejudice the experiments. Dr. Marmor said that in the Army tests there apparently had been "some consent and edge. And that kind of pre- paration gives an individirat some kind of protection. What I'm concerned about is an in- dividual quite unsuspectingly( given a drug." Representative Thomas .1. Downey, a Long Island Demo-, crat who has called for a Con-, gressional inquiry into the sue, says he finds it "inexcus- able" that the Army did not tell its subjects what drug they had received after the experi- ments so that, in the event of aftereffects, they might have some sense of what was hap- pening.? He is disturbed, too, that there has been no substantive follow-up of' the Government test subjects. Dr. Sim said in an interview at his home in Bel 'Air, Md., near the Edgewood arsenal, that on its own initiative the Army had done a follow-up it 1971 on two men who had re- ceived LSD, and 38 who had received other drugs, and had not been able to distinguish between those subjects and a control group that had received no drugs. He said he had felt the sam- ple was too small, and that he was not entirely confident about the follow-up techniques employed, but he said he dklet have at his disposal emu& money or medical officers to expand and continue the follow- up "and nobody seemed par- ticularly interested in this." ' Dr: Situ said he and his staff had themselves taken all of the drugs being tested, and he said since neither he nor the others had experienced any trouble- some aftereffects, 'we didn't expect the other men to feel anything either." _ . In 1972, a retired Army lieu- tenant colonel, William Pa' Jordan, who said he had been. stricken with epilepsy a yeari after participating in an expezia` ment with psychochemicals, asked that the Army do a follow-up on his test group of 34 men. The Army initially turned the colonel down but later reversed itself after Senator Lawton Chiles of Florida wrote a letter in his behalf. In the ensuing followup the Army said it was ableto find only 27 of the 34 men. One had been killed in Vietnam, seven reportedly said they were not interested, and 19 were examined for two to five days each and finally given a clean bill of health. The Army now says it val. attempt to follow up on all of, the servicemen it has given the. drug, a total of 585 of the more than 3,000 men who parC.d- pated in the over-all drug pro- gram. Most of the others had re- ceived drugs that cm hallucinations, but tli:3Amy said it had no plans to follaw? up on these men. Even in defa., ing with only about 600 men,' ,chochemicals as "incapacrtat- peciting subjects for 10 more . e ? vo- Dr. Sim said he thought the' Approve For Release 2001/08/08 . 001415Pri-Obr4121460 1QQ370003-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-ERDM904M900100370003-4 effort would take years, and some Army doctors expressed skepticism that any meaning- ful results would be achieved. The Army said it had no in- tention of attempting to get in touch with the approximately 900 civilians who were given LSD in Army-sponsored experi- ments at the University of Maryland, the University of Washington and the New York Psychiatric Institute. The Air Force said it like- wise was not planning to re- view the health of the 102 ci- vilians who took LSD in stud- ies it paid for at New York University, Duke University, the University of' Minnesota, the Missouri Institute of Psy- chiatry at the University of Missouri in St. Louis, and the Baylor University College of Medicine at the Texas Medical Center in Houston. In addition to those given LSD by the military and intel- ligence organizations, the Na- tional Institute of Mental Health said that it had con- ducted tests on more than 3,000 volunteers?prisoners, mental patients and other civilans ? for 15 years ending in 1968 in an effort to determine the drug's medical value, particu- larly in treating psychiatric disorders and chronic alcohol- ism. The Food and Drug Adminis- tration said its records showed that 170 research projects with LSD had been approved over the last 10 years, but that only six were currently under way at five institutions, including the Veterans Administration Hospital in Topeka, Kan. The V.A. program, according to officials of the agency, in- volves an average of two care- fully selected mental patients a year, The Associated Press reported yesterday. The patients have been hospitalized for long periods and have not responded to other treatment, the V.A. said. Other Tests Listed The other research, a spokes- man said, is being done at the Vista Hilt Psychiatric Founda- tion in San Francisco, the Medi- cal College of Birmingham in Birmingham, Ala., the Langley Porter Neuropsychiatric Insti- tue in San Francisco and the Maryland Psychiatric Institute in Baltimore, which has two projects. Dr. Sim said he knew of no cases in which participants in the program he directed at the ,E,dgewood Arsenal in northeast Maryland had suffered serious consequences, nor had he heard of any adverse reports concern- ing the subjects in the experi- ments carried out for the mili- tary at universities and re- search centers. However, the Rockefeller Commission said that in a num- ber of instances, subjects in the C.I.A. experiments became ill for hours or days. after being given the drug and that one person had been hospitalized. The commission said the de- tails of the hospitalization and many other aspects of the C.I.A.'s drug testing could not be learned because all of the records concerning the program ?a total of 152 separate files ?had been ordered destroyed in 1973. Commission sources say that the chief of the C.I.A. drug testing program, Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, a 57-year-old biochem- ist who was personally in- volved in the fatal experiment in 1953, ordered the destruc- tion of the records in an appar- ent effort to conceal the details of possibly illegal action. Dr. Gottlieb is reportedly in India. Psychechemicals Defended Arguing in favor of using psychochemicals as offensive weapons in 1959, Maj. Gen. Marshall Stubbs, the then chief chemical officer of the Army, wrote in the October issue of The Army Navy Air Force Journal: "We know the concept is feasible because we have run tests using a psychochemical on squad-sized units of soldier volunteers. They became con- fused, irresponsible, and were unable to carry out their mis- sions. However, these were only temporary effects wtih complete recovery in all cases." The Army says it never pre- pared large quantities of LSD for offensive-use and that it discontinued experiments with the drug in 1967 because "all necessary work to define the chemical warfare threat from this compound" had been com- pleted. Several other military sources, however, said the Army stopped work with the drug because its effects were regarded as too unpredictable. A few years earlier, the Army adopted a psychochernical that it calls BZ as its standard in- capacitant, and a department spokesman said that bombs filled with the agent are now. stockpiled at the Pine Bluff ar- senal in Arkansas. So far, the Army says, BZ, whose chemical name is 3-quinuclidinyl benzi- late, has been used only in experiments. Like LSD, BZ is a derivative of lysergic acid. An Army training manual lists . the symptoms caused by BZ ,as dry, flushed s kin, uri- nary retention, constipation, headache, giddiness, hallucina- tion, drowsiness and, some- times, maniacal behavior. Also,' researchers say loss of balance and inability to stand or walk. are common. Dr. Sim said that most of the military drug testing took place at the Edgewood Arsenal in laboratory conditions, after the subjects?mostly soldiers, but also some airmen? had gone through a week of medi- cal, psychological and psychi- atric examinations. But he said that he and staff members had also done field testing with military volunteers at several installations in the .United States. i In the United States last week to attend a scientific meeting, Dr. Albert Hofmann, the Swiss chemist who acci- dently discovered the halluci- nogenic effects of LSD in 1943, said he had begun working with lysergic acid, in hopes of de- veloping a stimulant for circu- lation. He was unhappy, he said., that LSD had ever been considered as a tool of war. "I had intended to prepare a medicine," Dr. Hoffman said, "n)t a weapon." Disclosures of Colonel Michael Goleniewski Colonel Michael Goleniewski, a former director of the: Communist Polish Army counterintelligence, who wor'ked in close liaison with high level KGB officials and Soviet satellite intellieence officers while being in secret contazt with western intelligence, has now dramatically illustrated the warning issued by Sir Martin of MI-5. As a result of his defection to the West,, arranged primarily by the CIA, Colonel Goleniewski has become the' single most impor- tant foe of Soviet KGB espionage operations against the Free World.' Colonel Goleniewski brought to America numeroes Communist intelligence documents, including data on 240' intelligence agents working for the KGB in western Europe and .America. His 'disclosures have led to the arrest of many leading KGB agents and 'none of his in- formation has turned out to be untrue or inaccurate.. Consequently, what has turned out to be the most sensi- tive revelation by Goleniewski may have been a key spark for the purge of the .CIA Counterintelligence Staff and the frenzied 'left wing attacks to discredit and neutralize that vital agency, seriously weakened and penetrated as it k Intelligence Digest Weekly Review statement _ 'Colonel Goleniewski has established personal contact with your Intelligence Digest correspondent and his in- formation caused the following statement which appealed in the 21 May 1975 Intelligence Digest Weekly Review, "Brief intelligence items:" ? -* ? "There is yet another factor involved in the attacks on the CIA, especially its Counterintelligence Staff, which con-, -cerns allegations that a very prominent US official operatire at the highest echelon of government was formerly coot.- nected with a Soviet-directed espionage network. It is reliably reported that the lack of response to these alley,: lions resulted in some ? resignations from the CIA Counter= intelligence Staff. All information on this factor has been 'blacked-out' by the left wing American press." CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 19 August 1975 'Ford and Olsons' Your editorial on "Ford and Olsons" is saccharine and shortsighted. It tells only a small part of the story, and fuzzes over the major problem of CIA. It is fine that President Ford apologized to the widow and family of Frank Olson for Olson's death a score of years ago after CIA 'gave him LSD without his knowledge. The action by CIA was treacherous and tragic. But the same President Ford believes that counterespionage and subversion in foreign countries is the natural order of things. The same Gerald Ford has played sleepy-dog on the charges that the CIA plotted the deaths of Diem, Lumumba, and Allende, that it tried many times to kill Castro. The same President played sleepy-dog concerning the infiltration of the American peace movement and the American liberal movement by CIA and other intelligence agencies. The serious problem of global CIA activity cannot be brushed aside with smiles, cosmet- ics, or image building. The real issue is subversion and killing in many parts of the world plus subversion at home by the intelligence community. South Dartmouth, Mass. T. Noel Stern e?et 22 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370001-4 NATIONAL GUARDIAN New Left Independent Weekly 20 August 1975 ci- ` ? The following "open letter to. the Portuguese people"' was written by Philip Agee, a former agent of the Central Intelligence Agency and author of the book, "CIA Diary: Inside the Company." Agee, who has recently visited Portugal. worked for the CIA for 12 years, engaging in counter-revolutionary activity in Ecuador, Uruguay and Mexico. His experiences, he sayS, led him to become a "revolutionary socialist" and his subsequent expose of the CIA. naming hundreds of undercover agents and operations, has seriously hurt the agency. The "letter" was distributed by Fifth Estate, an anti-CIA group. By PHILIP ...- ? , . ? _ . . The revolutionary process in Portugal is being attacked by the guardians of capitalist countries' interests, of which the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency is the most notorious: and powerful:: see the .1 signs daily, -These : -counterrevolutionary activities are'similar to what.! did the CIA for more :than 10 years' during the 1950s.::and 1960s. I send-this letter -as part af a continuing effort .by -many 'Americans to. end imperialist intervention ? and.i . support to repression by. the U.S. government:: In the Azores as well as in mainland Portugal; in thel Catholic Church,. in political parties and -even within the-! .;armed forces, the CIA and its allies are working to create' enough chaos to justify an attempt .by the so-called ,moderates to take over the revolutionary government: -1 the fall of fascism in Portugal,.!.have, tried to ? follow developments and have twice visited-your country. ? While my study of the visible signs of CIA intervention is still incomplete, there is good reason to alert You to what I have seen. Last week a :U.S. senator announced that the Communist Party of Portugal is receiving S10 million per month from the Soviet Union, a figure he attributed to the -CIA. Two days later Deputy CIA Director Gen. Vernon -Walters (who visited Lisbon to _survey . the political situation in August 1974) confirmed the senator's claim. :Secretary of State Kissinger, for his part. publicly warned The Soviet Union 'recently that assistance by them to the Portuguese revolutionary process was endangering detente.. These statements suggest .that. the American: "people are- being prepared for another secret foreign: adventure by the CIA .. ? , ? I will describe below:what I believe are CIA operations,. along With a list of names and residences in'Portugal of as: many of the CIA functionaries I can identify. ? The size of the. overall U.S, government mission-in Portugal is shocking, _especially its heavy dominance by military -personnel; The mission totals 280 persons of ?whom about 160 -are-Americans, with the rest being PortugUese employes. Of the Americans, 105 are military personnel assigned :mainly to the Military Assistance 'Advisory Group, the office of the Defense Attache, and the CQMIVERLANT command of NATO.,- - ,, ? - :??? ? ?:: ? ? *- HIDDEN AGENTS - ? . ? ? Of the approximately 50 American civilians in the mission, about 10, I believe; are employes of the CIA. No less than -10 additional CIA functionaries are probably working in Lisbon and other cities, having. been assigned ostenSibly for temporary duties so that their presence is . not included on embassy personnel lists, nor reported to the Portuguese foreign ministry. One must also assume that additional CIA operationS" officers have been placed under cover in American military units in Portugal,. where their_ experience in political: operations?far superior to that of their . military colleagues?will be most effective. While efforts to divert the 'revolution through Gen. Spinola have failed, new efforts are being made daily in the struggle to stop the revolution. - 131 - ,1 rA-1 11 '61 r.1 ? 6., ? ' ? - Y/ 1,11 s 11 a P 11 I4. : ? 4-? te7.1 .111 ? ? ? N.:ta csik, " -'? _Without, doubt, the CIA... officers .? other U.S.: embassies, most likely in Madrid, Paris and London, have. personnel ,assigned to Portuguese operations that. are 'undertaken .in those countries rather ? than . in Portugal 'proper. The most sensitive operations of the CIA probably ..are- occurring in other European cities2rather..than . . ..? Whospecifically are responsible for operation's against. Portugal? The CIA is only one of the various U.S'.'agencies- work-mg against the. revolution, under. the,' guidance' of' Ambassador Carlucd, Although .Carlucci is not -a.. CM agent,- he must carefully-direct:and coordinate all counterrevolutionary operations, including .those of the military services. His top-level team includes: Herbert Okun, his minister/counselor and deputy chief of missien; John Morgan, the chief .of the Adm.. Frank Corley, chief of the Military AssistanceAcivisory. .Group; Col_Peter Blackley, chief of the Defense:Attache Office; Charles Thomas,- counselot .for political affairst. and Navy Capt. James Lacey, senior U.S. inilitary representative on the COMIVERLANT NATO Command. .Each of the U.S. Military units;- along with CIA. and. State ? Department' personnel, areresponsible for one-.or more of the specific counten7evolutionary programs. ...?-... ? . In order to preserve imperialist interests in Portugal, the .revolution must be diverted from its current directions and. the U.S. governmentis not alone in its efforts. I strongly 'suspect that Kissinger many months agourged the leaders of-. Western 'European ? _governments: to..." intervene themselves directly ? to -reverse .the .Portuguese revolu- tionary process, arguing that the problem is essentially European -and that the CIA has; been limited in its capabilities, by recent ievelations. In 1948, ? when . the Communist Party of Italy was about to Win the elections, the U.S. government alone, threatened to halt aid for reconstruction and even to launch a military invasion. In recent days, the EEC presidents themselves have threatened. to withhold financial assistance from Portugal unless their style of democracy is established. Other similarities between postfascist Portugal and post-World War 2 Europe are striking. In Greece, France and Italy,.- the U.S. government established governments submissive to American economic interests while simultaneously providing alternatives to left-wing governments led by the same political forces that provided the backbone of the resistance. in World War 2. . The chosen- solution in that era was predominantly Chriszia.n Democracy or Social Democracy and the trade union movements corresponding to each. The promotion of t*.eest same forces in Portugal since April 1974 suggests to me that the CIA, -probably in coordination vith other- Western European intelligence services, is attempting the s2me. solutions that. were successful in other .countries following World War 2. What specifically is the CIA doing in Portugal? .The first priority is to penetrate the Armed Forces Movement in ,ordet-to collect information on its plans, its . we.aknesses and its-internal . struggles-,, to identify the so-called moderates and others who would be Western_ strategic- interests_ The-- CIA would use information colieed from within the AFM for propaganda inside.-and outside Portugal designed, to divide and weaken the AFM. Other CIA- tasks. include: .false documents and rumor_ campaigns, fomenting of .strife; encouraging conflict and. jealousy- Moderates. are being assisted. where possible in- their efforts. to restrain. ? the ?-? pace. of '.revolutionary Approved For Release 2001198/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4 development toward socialism_ .The final goal is for the- so-,called moderates to take: control of the AFM and all -Portuguese military institutions: , ? ? ?-? se- ' -The U.S. military.--schools have trained .over 3000 ? Psorteguese military personnel since 1950. Detailed files have- been accumulated on. every one of_theratheir personalities, politics,. likes - and dislikeS,... strengths, .weaknesses and vulnerabilities'. Many of these will have already been Selected as contacts to be developed within the Portuguese military establishment, with emphasis on developing close relations with as many AFM members as possioie. ' ? . ? ? .. ? ? SignifiCant efforts have already been made?and these, . zoo, have failed to date?to strengthen Social Democratic and Christian Democratic political parties. -The CIA's corroal procedure is to maintain friendly relations (and often ? .ro give financial support) with.. leaders of "moderate" opposition political parties who are forced to live in exile. The purpose is to reap large benefits when see! politicians re,turn home. Often paid agents are infiltrated into these exile groups in order to obtain additional information: The CIA may have intervened in nhe recent electoral campaign to assure that the-results ...would. "prove" that the majority. of Portuguese favor- a: more-"moderate" pace for the revolution. James Lawler,' ? the CIA deputy chief of station in Lisbon, engaged in just. such operations in Brazil (in 1962) and in Chile. (in 1964)1 ' many. millions of dollars were spent by- the CIA to! promote the election of .U.Snapproved "moderates." . s he trade unions. the CIA has also been unsuccessful sc., -far, but obvious efforts-continue. As in Italy and Francei after World War 2, the CIA is trying to split the trade: usilon movement by _ establishing an.. affiliate of the Internatioeal Confederation. of Free Trade Unions and by promoting ties between Portuguese industrial unions and - the International Trade Secretariats. Michael !loge's and Irving Brown, both officials of the AFL-CIO with notorious ties to the CIA, visited Portugal last year. Although the capitalist-controlled trade union...institutions failed to establish footholds when the trade union law was approved in January, !::the- ICFTU- is-, still trying,- through its representative in Portugal, Manuel Simon: - ? ? The CIA is also using the ROinan Catholic church for its ends. Recently a reliable source- in Washington told me that large amounts of money are. going frora- the United, States to the Catholic church for combating the revolution in Pertaigal. 'The- church's opposition . to the. W-arker'S control of .Radio Renascena should alert us-to the identity of interests-between the church and American economic - concerns. . - . ? . _ Propaganda carn,,a_ aigns are central for_all in-toot:tent CIA . political operations. These campaigns prepare ' public . opinion by creating fear, uncertainty, resentment, hostility, division and weakness.. Newspapers, radio, television, wall painting. postering, fly sheets and falsified' documents of all kinds?the CIA 'uses many different techniques.. In Portugal, these have had little success so far, mainly because workers have taken control of the public information media. But the CIA must continue to aid?in every-possible way?the efforts of "moderate" political forces to establish and maintain media cutlets that the CIA Can use for placing its materials. - ? - ? Outside. -Portugal -the campaign to discredit . the revolution is having success. In Europe and America we see the themes' clearly: "The AFM has failed to follow the. will of most Portuguese as reflected in the April elections t?-?.:'. .The Portuguese people have sadly 'lost' their freedom with the diminishing imporrance of the elected assembly The press has-tiost' its freedom . .?-". Portugal needs 'stability' to .Solve its social and economic probtatrna- . The revolutionary leadership is inept and unable to stop , the economic downturn . These propaganda themes ? are preparing the U.S. and Western public opinion for ?acceptance of intervention and a strong right-wing military! government. ?.These ? themes- present the usual, false dilemma: Portugal will have either capitalist democracy or cruel, heartless communist dictatorship, with attendant dull, austere livingeonditions. There has, of course, been little comparison of Portugal today with the cruelty and hardships of capitalist economics under the former fascist political system. ECONOMIC WARFARE 7 . - . _ As in the campaign against Chile, economic warfare is the- key for cutting away ? public ' support_ from the revolutionary leadership. By withholding credits and other assistance from bilateral- and multilateral commercial lending institutions, great hardships will befall the middle and working classes. Private investment credits can be frozen,- trading contracts- delayed and cancelled and unemployment increased,. while. imperialist propaganda will place the blame on _workers' demands and the government's Weaknes rather than on lending institutions . and their deliberate poiicies of credit retention. The effects1 of these programs in Chile during the . Allende . administration are known to all. .. ? -- . Propagaada exploitation of economic inedship. will thus! prepare at least a limited public acceptance of a strong military government that suddenly appears to "restore 'national dignity, -discipline, and purpoae." If there is a . .Portuguese Pinochet, he. ought to be .identified now. In coming months we Will probably see intensification of the CIA's operations to create Fear, uncertainty, economic. disruption, political division and the appearances of chaos. Political assassinations must be- expected.: :don with bombings that can be "attributed" to the, re.volittionary left. Morgan, the head of the CIA in Lisbon, learned the-Se kinds of operations when he served in Brazij (1966-1969) and in Uruguary (1970-1973). The "death squads" that were established in those countries during the last decade must be anticipated and stopped before they flourish in Portugal... . ? Greate,r militancy by reactionary elements in the Catholic church must also be. expected in their effort-to undermine ? the revolution. .As "moderate" electoral solutions become more and more remote, the CIA and its sister services ? will.. increasingly promote Chile-Style . "stability" as the only remaining way to "save" Portugal. ? , The separatist movement in the Azores; already gaining momentum among U.S. residents of Azores origin, may be promoted by the CIA. as a last. resort for.preserving U.S, :military bases there. In Angola, the CIA is not standing ?,Idly by, where exceptional natural resources must be kept in' capitalist hands. The FNLA is likely being supported by the CIA through Zaire in .divide the country .and .prevent MPLA hegemony... What can be done to defeat this intervention? Clearly the revolutionary process itself and the people's support and participation through organs of popular power is the strongest defense. Nevertheless, .imperialist agents ought to be identified and exposed by using many of the CIA's own- methods ? against them:- Careful control must ? be maintained of all entries and exits of:Portugal- by U.S. citizens, both through immigratiOn control and through the issuance of visas for diplomatic and-official passports by- Portuguese embassies and ?consulates. .!1n the CIA, 1-worked .to install in . Uruguay a system whereby all visitors' visas from socialist countries would require ,.? approval s of .. the . Uruguayaa 'director of immigration, with.... whom. 'I - worked closely, giving recommendations, _on- each visa_ request. Background investigations.* of the! employment!, histories of U.S.. government official's usually reveal which ones are:CIA officers posing as diplomats. Moreover, all "private" U.S.- citizens must bemonitored for possible CIA- connections: businesspeople, tourists, professors, students and retired people. .Once' these people have ? been. exposed, the Portuguese people themselves must be prepared to take the action needed to force the CIA people out of Portugal. The slogan ."CIA Out" must become a reality: ? . ? ??-?.- The. shocking U.S. military presence in Portugal could be ended altogether. The only -"advice". and "assistance" that a U.S. military group can now give in Portugal is how. to make a counterrevolution.. ?, . ?-? 24 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4 a Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003.-4 AD4 REPORT VOL. IV JULY 1975 rilNThLLENCE 1N. A ral DF1S"" r Lt. General Vernon Walters, Deputy Director of the CIA, says that the United States may be able to succeed in cirtying out intelligence operations in a goldfish bowl. But he adds that if we do it will be like going to the moon. We will be the only ones ever to have done it. General 1,1/alters-made this remark at the American Security Council luncheon .in Washington on. July 23, 1975. News media treatment of his candid remarks on the CIA and the dangers facing America today is symbolic of what is wrong with the approach of important elements of the news media's coverage of the CIA investigation. The Washington Star on the day following General \\tellers' talk carried three stories on the CIA, occupying 70 column inches of the paper (over half a page). The stories were headed: (1) "Did CIA Cause Colonel's Death?" (2) "CIA Panel Will Call Kissinger" (3) "Nixon Tied to CIA Effort in Chile." Not one word was said about General Walters' talk, even though The Star had a reporter present. The New York Times also ignored the story. The Washington Post devoted six inches to General Walters, burying the report in a story headed: "Clifford Urges Limit to CIA Activities." We were informed that both the AP and UPI carried stories on the Walters' talk on their wires, but no paper we ex-, arnined used their stories. The only respectable report we found was in he conse.rva- Live weekly, HUML711 Events, which led its August 2 "Inside Washington" report with a 375-word story on the Walters talk. The reporter who covered the talk for The Washington Star, Norman Kempster, told ALM that he did not do a story on it because Walters had not said anything new. It would appear that in the minds of some journalists the only thing that is newsworthy is material that is critical of the CIA. Statements that put our intelligence activities in proper per- spective, defending what has been done, are sinePy not deemed to be worth reporting_ On February 3, 1975, a top reporter for The New York Times, Peter Arnett, stated in a talk at the Air War College, "It seems to me that this is geing. to be the year that the 'spooks' (CIA) get theirs, or they have to start answering questions...Many reporters that I kri.,w are starting to go to Washington and are trying to find all the security people, all the discontented CIA officers and others who could feed the, grist for the mill to find the story of what went on. I think there are going to be some embarrassing stories-about this in the next few months and the next year." At that time, Reed J. Irvine, Chairman of the Board of AIM, made this rejoinder to Mr. Arnett: "I am afraid that the big story is one that the press is missing entirely. It may be that this is the year when we are going to destroy our internal security establishment,, when we are going to destroy or ,ge-atly weaken our defense establishment, and when, indeed, we are laying-the groundwork for.the demise of democracy, of the citadel of democracy, the United States, because of the intent of the press to bring about an immediate end without thinking of the ultimate conse- quences." In his American Security Council talk, General Walters voiced a similar warning. Solzhenitsyn has, of course, ad- vised us are faced with a very dangerous situation in the world, but this is not the -message that usually comes from high government officials in these days of detente. Despite what Norman Kempster of The Washington Star BOWL says, it should be news when the No. 2 man at the CU gives a Solzhenitsyn-like warning. General Walters told his audience that the country was in "a tougher power situation than it has been since Valky Forge." The reason for this, he said, was that for the first time a foreign country has the "power to destroy or seri- ously cripple the United States." General Walters pointed out that despite detente, the Soviets were deploying four new, different types of int continental missiles, with signs of a fifth on the horizon: They are building larger and more powerful submarines ant increasing the number and improving the quality of their tanks. He said: "We see in all areas a tremendous military effort being made to modernize and improve the Soviet forces beyond what seems to me to be necessary for eittrr deterrence or defense." The General noted that the Doolittle Report on the CM. twenty years ago had concluded that the U. S. was faced with a ruthless and implacable enerny who was determined to destroy us by any means in their power. Asked whether we faced that kind of enemy today, General Walters sail: "I think we are facing a very tough situation. I think the ? tactics may have changed, but I don't think the long-terra goal has changed very much." General Walters said that our position was especially dm- gerous because the people of the United States and mostof the Western World failed to perceive the great threat pod- by the growing military strength of the Soviet Union, givig it the superiority that might enable it to force its will eel the rest cif the world. Asked if the CIA had failed to convey its perception of the I. danger to higher officials on the National Security Council, General Walters said: "We have simply conveyed the infor- mation. They must draw their conclusions from it." . The Attack on the Intelligence Community' While welcoming a responsible, constructive investigatiore, General Walters suggested that the current assault on the. CIA is, in part, unfair and is also being promoted, in part,i by people with ulterior motives. He emphasized the point that activities that were accepted twenty years ago are! being condemned today. Standards would continue to change, and he feared that 15 or 20 years from now the: CIA might be condenmed for having failed to do things that; it could not-do given current attitudes. General Walters noted that many people now expect the intelligence services to operate with a degree of purity that will not be reciprocated by our enemies. He said you were. going to have a rotigh time if you fought by the Marquisof Queensbury rules when your opponent was using brass knuckles. The Doolittle Report had said that we would have to match the dedication and ruthlessness of our placable foe. That is not a popular idea today, but General Walters pointed out that even our revered Founding Fathers recognized, the need for covert operations. He said George 'Washington mounted three kidnap attempts on Benetl.t:t Arnold, and from 1772 to 1775, Benjamin Franklin ed'. his position as assistant postmaster to run a mail intercept! on the British. Personally he did not think it was a "dirty trick" to help democratic forces survive in a hostile .envintin-i Approved For Release 2001/08L08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4 ment. Walters stressed that there was a need for secrecy. Harry Truman had said that he did not believe the best interests of the country were served by going on the principle that everyone had a right to know everything. Truman had also' said that it did not matter to the United States whether its; secrets became known through publication in the media or through the activity of spies. The results were the same. General Walters said the CIA had been hurt and its ability i to carry out its mission had been impaired by the attacks upon it. He said: "People who used to give us whole reports are giving us summaries, and people who?used to give us summaries are shaking hands with us. People who used to i help us voluntarily are saying don't come near me. This must be a delight to the America-is-wrongers. For the people who believe that the U. S. represetits the best hope of mankind for freedom in the world, it is not an en-: couraging factor. The Big Story What is the big story today? Is it that a dozen years ago high officials, perhaps the President, plotted unsuccessfully to assassinate a foreign dictator? Is it that a decade ago the ! CIA accumulated information about Americans who were , THE WASHINGTON ST-AR 18 AUGUST 1975 Letters to theV editor\ leaders in the effort to frustrate our very -costly efforts to keep Southeast Asia from falling into the control of the communists? Is it that the CIA conducted 32 wiretaps m27 years? General Walters said: "We have spent an enormous amount of time rummaging through the garbage pails of histoxy, looking at the '50s and '60s, but the question of whether we are going to continue as a free and democratic nation is going to be decided in the late '70s and '80s, and I hopesve will spend an appropriate amount of time on that period, which is going to determine how we and our children live in the future." The news media are so absorbed in reporting the titillaling gossip, the tales of those disaffected employees that Per ? Arnett said his friends were hunting down, that they have no time or space to consider what they are doing to instikt- tions that are vital to our survival. The Washington Pest, which buried General Walters' talk, devoted 24 column, inches of text and 17 column inches of photos on July I2 to an unsubstantiated charge that Alexander Butterfield ; was a CIA "contact" in the White House. This was pada , the lead front page story of the day. Three days later Th : Post published Butterfield's categorical denial of the allest- tion in a 12 column-inch story on page A-3. It reminds one of a sheep dog chasing after hares while the coyotes devour the lambs. ?.?'i,-.4?;-?;?-.7.'::::Sa;;;.:-.:.7.E.?-..":7.7.;.!..'?L77:".2:-.. ? .. -:"- .te 74: For some months I have shared the concern of many others about the reported lack of internal securi- ty among some of our congressional committees. While quite in sympa- thy with the need for the legislative side of our government to- have more knowledge of the workings of such important agencies as the FBI :and CIA, it is with great apprehen- -sion that I view disclosures which have to be made by the agencies, supposedly in seorecy, but appar-. ently subject to public disclosure. - '? -Having worked under a variety Of Security conditions, necessitating various clearances, I have, been presumably investigated frequently and in depth. It is my understanding that no congressman or senator is WASHINGTON POST 16 August 1975 CI , _ -- required to have such clearance investigations to allow him access to classified material. The reason . for this is understandable ? up to a - point. But it gives no assurance that they understand even the rudiments of security practices. V? -- papers nomer _ The recent situation brought - about through the ransacking of Sen. Howard H. Baker's home exemplifies the situation. Judging from the reports from his staff, as well as himself, it would appear that from time to time he would take classified documents home . with him to work on, even though it was contended that no such docu- ments were in the house at the time Of the break-in. Whether there were Gets Dng C se Extension The Central Intelligence, ency has asked for and re-I Ived an extension of the! g. 15 deadline for deliver-I g secret documents to a , use Government operations! beommittee investigating! e dropping of drug charges! ainst a former CIA agent.' A staff member of the Guy- 'uncut Information and Emil- dual Rights Subcommitteel id yesterday the CIA ap? peat-ed to be- "cooperating" and the threat of a subpoena to CIA Director William E. Colby would not be used un- less it became evident the doc- uments would not be pro- duced. ? The .CIA was given an ex- tension until early next week to hand over documents con- cerning the CIA activities of Puttaporn .K.hrainkhrtran, 31, a former CIA operative in Thai- 'land, indicted in 1973 for !smuggling about 60 pounds of 1rai,v opium into Chicago. T h e Justice Department later dropped the charges when the CIA refused to turn over documents which he said would aid his defense. The pre- siding judge had told federal prosecutors he would dismiss the case unless the documents were produced, the prosecu- tors said. _ such documents or not is scarcely the point. The very fact of taking classified documents home is re- garded as one of the prime and cardinal sins by security officials.. - - lam certain that if, as a pverri- ment employe, I had been Emmet to have taken classified papers to my home, I would not only have been severely chastised, but probably fired.: AndI certainly-would have _ lost my security clearance.. - , What line 'of reasoning makes a senator without background investi- gation less of a security ri..4t than any of the hundreds of other people who work for the government, or ' government contractors, and who are investigated to high heaven be- fore being alIowed-to handle dassi- s fied papers? The scary thing about the How- ard Baker affair is that it discloses the practice: of congressmm and senators presumably to take classi- fied papers to their homes or else- where for convenience. With this , knowledge in the open, all of their ; homes should be regarded as fair an&profitable game for agents-to ' break through our security__ - . - ? ? ? ?? ? ? ,3?.116- ; .;71,,,auris ton S. Taylor; - Neoie;.*1 4,4,40 a. ZAdletine ? holectiow and Atemazazwrots Washington, D.C. ' ? ? 26. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100470003-.4 Washington ? ?,.???43F1 -4 1_, ? .4 - - The last secret ac-'4 n -a tropical summer's night, with the dogwood wilting outside and the vena gnats dropping like flies, a number of us are bask- ing in the chill of a centrally air- conditioned neo-Federal house, guests at a quintessential intimate Georgetown dinner party. The lineup is not half bad. The host advised two Presidents. The guest of honor is the nation's hottest young movie- direc- tor. -Assembled for his edification are: one Senator; one former Sena- tor who tried for the White House and missed; and one of the two re- porters who retired Richard Nixon. , Yet the star of the evening turns out to .be a merely successful Washing-. ton attorney .who advised only one -President. ? ? ? .Just as the rent-a-butler is clear- ing away the spinach souffl?the at, torney is called to the telephone. By the time he returns, the rest of the guests are well into the boeuf Boor- guignon. Pale, Sweating, his collar loosened to facilitate breathing, the lawyer -explains that a reporter had called that afternoon with a story suggesting that several Of the law- yer's former White House colleagues ? were in on a :plot to assassinate Fidel ? Castro. The reporter had asked if ? such a thing could be true. "I don't know," the lawyer had replied. ? Now one of. the former White House colleagues had got wind of the lawyer's "I don't know" and had tracked him down to the dinner par- ty. The colleague, seemed to feel that the lawyer had damned him with faint comment, He was, one gath- ered, hysterical, going so far as to suggest that the .lawyer had ruined his life. These days, the lawyer says, he is no longer very sure of anything. Maybe these guys tried to assassi- nate Castro and .maybe they didn't. He really doesn't know. "Ninety per- cent of us went along playing it straight," says the lawyer, "but God only knows what the other ten per- cent were doing. I'm beginning to suspect that there may have been a second, underground government un- der Kennedy and Johnson." Something is happening and you don't know what it is, do you, Mr. Jones? Out of a clear blue sky, Nem- esis has descended on Washington and is having a field day. The last three years have yielded more ca- sualties than the three decades that preceded them. The Best and the ? Brightest may be next on the list. Or ESQUIRE SEPTEMBER 1975 where people believe hardly anything that anybody says, there is only one test for truth which is widely ac- cepted as foolproof: whatever is se- cret must be true. To possess secrets is to know -what is really going on. To have secret information on some- one is to be in the catbird seat: Once you become known as an owner of secrets, you are Well on your way to becoming powerful. (This is why the Pentagon, the C.I.A., the F.B.I. and certain congressional committees classify everything in sight?instant secrets.) Any Secret-holder with the slight- est amount of brains or ambition goes out and puts his secrets to work in the market. There are three ways of doing this: 1. You can hold_ on to your secret and -collect modest dividends in .the form of favors from people who have heart attacks every time you remind them of what you have on them. 2. You can trade your secrets for other secrets.' 3. You .can risk cashing in your secret in return ?for a spectacular gain. That is, you can leak your se-- cret to the press, thereby precipitat- ing a scandal that will topple your enemies. For years, the Washington secrets market was a pitiful thing. . Most politicians fancied themselves to be gentlemen, a conceit which is fatal to active trading. The prime example was Harry Truman. who could have made an easy killing in the market with one quick phone call to Drew Pearson. "Say, Drew,. do you have any idea- what was going .on in the back seat of Ike's jeep? . Well, maybe you ought to look into it. . .?. Sure, I'll have my secretary .send out the ftle?this afternoon." Harry could have spared us the Eisenhower era, but instead he sat on his secret for twenty-five years and ended up actu- ally giving it away to Merle Miller, who turned it into a small fortune. But then Harry was the kind of hopeless straight arrow who called a son of a bitch a son of a bitch and kept his secrets secret. ??What could you expect of a town where the main outlet for secrets was called Washington Merry-Go- Round? Pissant stuff, that's what. The casualties could be counted on the, fingers of a lobster. Sherman Adams, Bobby Baker, Tom Dodd. The only bright spot was Joe Mc- Carthy, an inspired gambler who cashed in everything he had and went for a real ride. McCarthy might have cleaned up in- the secrets mar- ket, except that he was twenty years ahead of his time..?? Probably the most successful se- cret-trader in town was Lyndon John- maybe the whole damn C.I.A. son. He was no- gentleman and he ? The Washington secrets market is had an excellent nose for garbage, clearly out of control: In a town two attributes that stood him well in the little secrets crap game that some of the boys were running upon Capitol Hill. Lyndon didn't get tube ? majority leader without having the 'goods on at least half the members of the U.S. Senate, but his technhaties , in those days were instinctive and ' ? crude. It wasn't until he reached the; White House that lie acquired the-so- phisticated apparatus. of which he! had always dreamed: F.B.I. files and ' Pentagon briefings for source mate- rial, and national TV for exposure.1 i Unfortunately, this windfall went to 1Johnson's head, and he ended up: floating a mammoth issue of phony stock, which is to say that he as- sured the American people that he was in possession of secrets that kis-- tified waging a war in Southeast? ; Asia. When his secrets turned est to . be nothing- more than a bund e of 1 -worthless, trumped-up statist-its,. .I01.1nao? took the bath he deaervel ? Johnson's demise gave the serrets :market at much-needed lift, because lit started off a large-scale ems:inn of the credibility of politicians every,- ' where, thus making them more vul- . net-able to secrets. Even a few ?mein- }pars of the traditionally reverential -.national press corps began to see ? that they could publish secrets 'With - o u t getting hanged for treason. But it took Watergate to turn the secrets .market into the crazy, go-go exFaav-? aganza that it is today. The big pan- ic that began on June 17, 19'12, brought into the secrets market a lot , of people who wouldn't have been: there otherwise?people like John Dean. and James McCord, who could hardly wait to dump their secrets into the maws of the Ervin commit- tee, The. Washington Post, and any- one else who put in a decent bid. Most of these people had no Choice in: the matter, but that is oft the case with pioneers. The important thing is that they established the trend of going for broke in the se- crets market and made it pewtible for every American to blow the whistle on his fellow citizens -with- out fear of being branded a stool. pigeon or fink. The first genius of this exciting; revitalized market?its Bernie Corn-. feld, in fact?is Seymour Hersh of The New York Time.. Nobody Imowa, how much Hersh is worth, and he is too crafty to let on. One moment he talks as if he has at least twa hun- dred thousand major secrets locked - up in his desk drawer, and the next moment he has you thinking that he couldn't find the Washington Monu- ment. When Hersh is talking his best game; yea can almost believe, that he has enough secrets to explain every sinister turn in American his- tory over the last ten years. If he wanted to, Hersh could put .41 his secrets -together and drop them with Approved For.tielease 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4 one great thud. But he is too smart to blow all of his capital at once. In- stead, he drops them slowly, one by one, and watches as ripples of panic spread all over Washington. Then he *sits back and waits for terror-strick- en secret-holders to come running to his door, begging to sell him what they have for practically- nothing. With the market as volatile as it seems to be right now, the danger is that Hersh may precipitate a crash. The scenario, as I imagine it, goes like this:. After a lengthy investigation, the Church committee issues a report which rashly claims to expose "every last secret of the C.I.A." Forced to defend his honor, Hersh unloads the Big One on the C.I..A.?a billion- dollar secret iIn-is been saving for just such a rainy day. Stirred up by Hersh's twenty- thousand-word tale of murder, rape and plunder, public protest reaches such a strident pitch that Gerald Ford announces 'his decision to shut down the C.I.A. and turn the Agen- cy's. Langley headquarters into a cancer research center. In retalia- GAZETTE, Beaufort, S.C. 6 August 1975 tion, high- officials of the J.A. leak their Ford dossier, which :.includes, among other bombs, photocopies of the President's high-school I.Q tests. Public outrage over the Ford revela- tions leaves the House of Represent- atives no choice but to vote a unani- mous bill of impeachment. When that happens, Ford, who was not for noth- ing the minority leader, lets out ev- erY secret he ever collected on his old buddies in the House. Then he puts in a phone call to San Clemente. "Dick,- old pal, remember the 'par- don? Hell, you don't have to thank me agaire-just give me a little dirt-on Rooky?there ?must be some- thing on the tapes." Ford hangs up. and immediately persuades the Vice- President to invest three and a half 'million dollars in buying off. the Sen- ate, thereby insuring a verdict of not guilty in the ?impeachment tr:al. House members, quick to notice the sudden increase of Bentleys in the Senate parking lot, launch a full- .scale investigation. In the course of it, various cOngressmen unload all the secrets they have compiled on their Senate colleagues, against whom they were one day planning to run. Finally, Warren Burger steps . in, declares both the executir and legislative branches unconstittibnaL and sets up the Court as a "n-man ? judiciary junta?until new ?elmticras- ' can be held." ? All of this happens with thespee& of a Rube Goldberg contraption be- ing sprung, and it makes thegeil-,t.t. of Terror look like a Boy Saga jam- horee. Within weeks, the federatigov- , ernment is totally decimated,mmt re- ports of tarrings and featheriegs are so widespread that not asi?gI Washington official dares to geliwhi face in the continental UnitedStat Those unable to i;i:_fn on as adaches? in the.Singapore reftert and have their feature. : altered 1:47-ph..-- tie stirgery,like Hoffman_ , The crash lue4 rned ouL Ike se- crets market. to such a total vster.t. that there is not even one inendelp, left in all of Washington. At Sefoot of the Washington Monume4,,htut- dled in a-ragged overcoat, Sepaotur- Hersh sits with a -sign that rzachtz "Used Secrets Five Cents." Mere- ' are no buyers. -R. - - ? - Iare??:,'', sign ' in- . . vestigations7 :Ofi'-the. Central Intelligence- -? Agency could create ; an atmosphere in Washington similar to .:that, which prevailed during the Watergate affair. While there is a world of difference between the Watergate scandal and the :problems .of monitoring in; telligence activities, the CIA affair *s is 'heading down:the- liVatergate path of reckless rumor and speculation. - The. facts. about Watergate eventually came out?facts shocking enough- virtually to bring an administration. to a - halt . and :to -force the resignation Of a president. The CIA investigation is no threat to .the present administration, but " an orgy of suspicion 'and in-* nuendo. about CIA activities in the past could have as 'un- settling an effect on our foreign relations as did the long agony of Watergate.' " cts_aboat__ theClk ? oyerstoppin;?its-; bounds in American.? Citizens haVe;ifeen' laid 'oil rby the Rockefeller':-Commission,' *putting most of the speculation on that subject. to rest. It is the commission's - n inconclusive; ,report o, . alleged CIA in--/ volVerrient : foreign', assassination plot's.': that has* opened -the: dopr.--for the .now-- familiar process. of. leaks of confidential information about' investigations in progress. To begin with there is a limit to the facts that can be obtained about discussions that took place among government of- ficials a decade or more ago. Vice President Rockefeller was perhaps too candid, in his remarks. before a television audience about . the in- conclusive nature 'of in- formation on the chain of responsibility for CIA activities during the Kennedy years. As, he has learned, to Say that a story cannot be proved false is interpreted as saying it might be true. .; When President Ford turned over Material on alleged assassination plots - to Congressional committees. and the Justice Department,'ne urged that it be handled with "utmost prudence" in view of its extraordinary sensitivity. It is nott Surprising that he is already dismayed with the leaks and speculation that have ensued. While a. House com- mittee acted properly, in denying access to CIA material 28 to a congressman who leaked secret testimony -onte before, there are still many holes in the sieve. It:would be most ngrettable if responsible congressional leaders and JuStice.i:Depart- ment attorneys who, by their oath of office are obliged to exhibit sensitive prudence in handling information, are accused of a "cover-up"? another term familiar from Watergate days. The fact is that there are aspects of CIA operations that need to remain secret?not by any _means to protect any rindividual but to: protect.' the United :-States of -America. ' -? Members of the nel,vs need :.? to - balance that,-. con-- sideration with their dedication to the public's right to know, and there is the additional point that the CIA investigation may involve people who: are not alive to defend themselves.: Above . all, neither national security nor the reputation of people living or dead should be subject to speculative charges by politicians looking for a cause celebre to make namey ? for. themselves. . Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4 z Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RD.P77-00432R000100370003:4 THE GUARDIAN MANCHESTER 2 August 1975 efore the ink is For. thirty years .the peoples of Europe have lived in- peace because of two unused words, one Russian and the? other American. The balance of nuclear fear .has kept the cOntinent ,peaceful. The Helsinki agreement now offers Europe the opportunity to make- cooperation instead of terror the basic reason for not getting killed by your neighbour. The chief merit of Helsinki's 300,000 words is that they set standards of international behaviour and of behaviour stowards individuals which are higher than those which much of Europe has so far experienced. Frontiers are not to he changed except by agree- ment; and high time too as the Greek Cypriots are no doubt saying to themselves this morning. No state shall interfere with the government of another; and high time too as the Hungarians ? (1956) and .the 'Czechs (1968) must also- reflect today.? . ? . Does all this mean what it says ? :Yes, said Mr Brezhnev on Thursday, though will they .believe him in Prague? Yes, said Mr Ford yesterday, though Will they believe him in Chile? t:It remains to ? be seen. And what is seen will . depend more on the, governments of the super- 'Powers than on the other 33 Helsinki participants ;put together. For Helsinki has not abolished the iron curtain?which is the super-Powers' basic ? territorial bargain or changed its location. Thirty years ago yesterday Truman, Stalin, and Attlee agreed at Potsdam that a. line running from the Baltic to ? the Adriatic 'S would divide a -Soviet sphere of influence from a Western one. Helsinki did not alter this line (the only man who beat. it was Tito in 1948) and the states on one side of it still have different forms of government to those on the other. For all its fine words the Helsinki agreement does not say ? that these forms of government are open to .change. A western-style democracy in Czecho- slovakia would be no more acceptable to the .Soviet Union now than it was before, or than a Communist dictatorship in Italy would be to the. ?- United States. . ? To change these: attitudes would have been ?RASHINGTON POST 17 August 1975 Rowland Evans and Robert Novak ry impossible. The merit of Helsinki is that it covers? as much common ground as could be found and that much of it may be. fruitful. For example, there ought to be no real obstacle now to pro- gress towards a Mutual Balanced Force Reduction in Europe. The MBFR conference in Vienna has been wasting its time since the spring when the Soviet delegation, presumably with the possible cancellation of Helsinki in mind, began to drag its feet. MBFR is a worthy cause and ought. to be the object of the next big European diplomatic effort. Fewer men-at-arms mean more money for other, more benevolent things, and if both sides reduce their forces fairly security is not endangered. Another piece of business which Helsinki did - not?and could not?finish is the dispute over Cyprus. This is a clear case of one country (Turkey) altering a frontier, or establishing a ,new one, by force at the expense of another country. Which makes nonsense of the hallowed Helsinki principle that frontiers are unchangeable except by agreement?a principle to, which Turkey yesterday ceremoniously subscribed. -Archbishop Makarios was justified in wondering . aloud about the sincereity of the Helsinki pro- ceedings as a whole. - Helsinki coincides with one other develop,' ment which is out a tune with the fine words pronounced in Finland. If it is true that the Soviet Communist Party is suhsidising the Portuguese one then this marks a quite serious departure from established postwar Soviet policy. Ever since. the Second World War the Soviets have refrained . from fostering revolutionary - communism in countries west of the iron curtain to which they, agreed at Potsdam. They have maintained correct diplomatic relations with. 'established and elected governments. West of ? the iron curtain (though not to the east of it)' they they have refrained from encouraging Commu- nists to overthrow those governments, in France, Italy, Denmark or anywhere else except, ? apparently, in Portugal. If this is what they are doing now they are flouting the spirit of-Helsinkii. and doing so before the ink is dry. Moynihan's Undelivered Speech The State Department bureaucracy 4ast week killed a blunt speech drafted oy ambassador Daniel Patrick Moyni- Ian and aimed at Third World mem- )ers of the United Nations, showing ..:hat the reality of U.S. isolation in the U.N. is not yet accepted at Foggy Bot- Even Dr. Moyniblin's veto of U.N. nembership for Communist North and South Vietnam was a surprisingly :lose call, Despite some opposition adthin the State Department, he got le green light to veto the two Viet- :anis in response to the U.N. Secur- .ty Council's refusal to even consider membership for South Korea: ? Moynihan had planned to accom- pany the Vietnam vetoes with tough , talk relating them to the Korean exclu- sion. He drafted a speech noting that votes over the years on South Korea's . membership in the U.N. had ,been sup- ported by countries with multi-party systems and opposed by countries with one-party systems. ? .Moynihan's draft speech then deliv- ered this message to the Communist and Third World One-party nations: You cannot turn the U.N. into a one- party system by excluding the South Koreas and including the Vietnams. Such realism is not objected to. by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. But with Kissinger in Montreal for a speech on veto day, Aug. 11, the State Department bureaucracy succeede,1 ash-canning the speech. Instead, Moy- nihan made a brief 'statement barely suggesting the outlines of the full speech. Approved For Release 2001/08/0P29CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4 The State Department's attitude re- flects its congenital insistence on maintaining Warm bilateral relations , with individual countries no matter ? how roughly they treat this country in. multilateral organizations. Moreover, in handling Third World countries ? with kid gloves, Foggy Bottom seems to be living in a past world when U.S. strategy at the U.N. was aimed at maintaining. majority support on key. . DAILY TELEGRAPH, London 6 August 1975 votes. The harsh inevitability ? that the United States Will be .badly outnum- bered on future U,N, votes means Moynihan may well resurrect his one- party speech. Beyond speeches, how- ever, the United States may have to start pressuring individual nations to convince them that consistent anti- Amercan votes could be costly for them. , POLAND SELLS BO 1ES WILSON, summing up the Helsinki conference in arliament yesterday, spoke of "a new spirit of co-opera- on" which should provide the basis for more fruitful relationships." He dwelt particularly on the articles relating o freedom of movement and the rights of individuals. A sobering, indeed sickening, example of the chasm between uch expectations and the hard realities of dealing with the ron . Curtain countries, is provided by an agreement etween West Germany and Poland actually concluded at elsinki. Under it 125,000 people of German origin in he former German territories awarded to Poland in 1945 ill be allowed by the Polish Government to go to Germany. In return Bonn will grant Poland a credit of 180 million which in effect amounts to a gift, plus a lump sum of ?236 million on other accounts. Poland has already bilked Germany on this issue. The Bonn-Warsaw treaty of 1970 provided for the release f the Germans, but only a relatively small number have eeri allowed to go. ?This; may be why the present cash WASHINGTON POST 14 August 1975 Roioland Evans and Robert Novak Probable Israeli-Egyptian agreement ' in the Sinai will prevent a showdown of Thi,rd-World efforts to expel Israel from the U.N. But Ambassador Moyni- han and the United States will face a tough test when the regular general assembly session next month votes on a Communist-Third World resolution calling for removal of U.S. troops from Korea./ prices are bele* current rates. East Germa-ny has sold West Germany thousands of "political prisoners" much dearer., These auctions have become a major source of income' for the East German Government, which can always round up a batch when the balance of payments needs a fillip. In addition, as part of the 1970 agreement under- which the East Germans reduced their interference with West Berlin traffic and allowed more visitors in, Bonn has paid hundreds of millions of pounds under various headings such as road repairs. Further" easements" have been offered for ?545 millions. This obnoxious trade in human beings, in. its various aspects, is the basis of the Helsinki bargain. The West has paid a huge price in irrevocable diplomatic concessions_ In -return the Communist Governments give vague and suspect undertakings to allow a few of their own people, and also to a tiny number of foreigners, isolated glimpses of those, freedoms of movement and action,to which they already have multiple international, and constitutional commitments. At least the West should have insisted on something tangible as an earnest of a -change- of spots-- the dismantling of the illegal Berlin Wall for instance. Why had Mr WILSON nothing to say about that? ? . tst'I issinger, Schlesinger and SALT Although the Pentagon now has been brought into the heart of policy-. making on Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT), there is widespread sus- picion that Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger will abandon the mili- tary's position if necessary to avoid. stalemate with the Soviets. The, fact that Kissinger finessed the Defense Department out of a seat at recent SALT conversations in Hel- sinki, while not inherently important, demonstrates he is not fully sharing the stage. There is, moreover, in- formed opinion .high in the govern- ment that Kissinger will not endanger a SALT agreement by sticking to the Pentagon position on critical ques- tions affecting long-range security of the United States and short-range po- litical success for Gerald R. Fordk If Kissinger seeks new compromises, the final decision will be President Ford's. He maintains total confidence in Kissinger, and some high-ranking officials cannot imagine him breaking with his Secretary of State if that would prevent 1975 agreement with the Soviets. Other officials, however, believe the President's interests are not identical to Dr. Kissinger's and that he must be prepared to support the harder-line Pentagon position. Actually, preparations for U.S.-Soviet SALT sessions at Helsinki were far less of a one-man show than in the past. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, Kissinger's arch-rival in. side the 'administration, attended two top-level planning sessions. .Schles- inger and Gen. George Brown, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, met with the' President' at a third meeting, 'which did not include Kissinger. The result: a unified U.S. position at Helsinki, including Kissinger's accept- ance of the Pentagon's tough standard for counting Soviet MIRVs (multiple independent re-entry vehicles). That turned into a vindication of Schles- inger's arguments for hard bargaining when Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev agreed in Helsinki to MIRV verifi- cation. But picayune maneuverings over whether the Pentagon would have its own man in Helsinki undercut this unity. As we reported earlier, Schles- inger requested that a high level Pentagon representative attend the Helsinki bilateral negotiations about SALT. Acting on Kissinger's recom- mendation, Mr. Ford replied the So- viets wanted'. only four persons per side?definitely excluding the military of both nations. Schlesinger, therefore, sent nobody. But at Helsinki, the cozy four-man game suddenly doubled, with eight Americans and eight Russians sitting in?including. unexpectedly, Gen. Mik- hail Kozlov, deputy chief of the Soviet general staff. Pentagon officials concluded Henry had tricked them again. Elsewhere in the bureaucracy, the interpretation was that Kissinger was determined not to let his Kremlin counterparts think he was being outflanked by Schlesinger. Nothing occurred at fiel- 30 sinki to alarm the Pentagon. But Kis- singer's maneuverings raised doubt about how long he?and the President ?will stick to these hard bargaining points: The Soviet Backfire bomber: The Kremlin contends it is only a local weapon and is not to be counted among strategic weapons according to the SALT agreement reached in Vladi- vostok last November. But the Back- fire can easily reach the continental " United States on a one-way flight and, by refueling in Cuba, could make a round trip. Therefore, the U.S. insists the Backfire must be counted among strategic weapons. Cruise missiles: The Soviets claim the Vladivostok agreement counts as strategic weapons subsonic cruise mis- siles, fired from bombers, with a range over 600 kilometers. But the U.S. mili- tary contends that this conveniently discriminates against U.S. cruise mis- siles which could reach the Russian heartland. Missile size: The Pentagon, backed by U.S. disarmament director Fred Ikle, considers it vital to negotiate reductions in the huge Soviet ad- vantage of larger missiles and believes Brezhnev is now ready to negotiate. The question a U.S. survival may depend more on missile size than on any other issue. But in the short run, the Backfire bomber is most politi- cally combustible. Should the U.S. per- mit this menace to the U.S. heartland to be omitted from strategic weapons, Mr. Ford would be open for intense Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4 pprove . political assault. When Kissinger first returned from Helsinki, colleagues found him pessi- mistic about prospects for a SALT agreement this year and wedded to a tough bargaining position. But more recently, the officials describe him as reverting to his old theme of this NEW YORK TIMES 11 August 1975 COMMANDOS TRAIN FOR EMBASSY DUTY Navy. farce Would Protect U.S. 'Lives and Help Curb , ? ? Terrorism Abroad By EVERETT R. 14LLES Special to The Nel? York Times t. SAN DIEGO, Aug. 10?Navy Seal comihandos have received special training for possible as- signment to -American embas- sies in countries plagued by ,gtierrilla terrorism, according to Navy soirees here. The Seals?the name is de- rived from sea-air-land, denot- ing the scope of their opera- tions?would monitor guerrilla and revolutionary activity and give counsel to the foreign gov- ernments on counterinsurgency tactics;?while at the same time reinforcing security for the lives and property of Americans. ' Assignment of these special- ists?trained in such _counter- insurgency tactics as hit-and- run abductions of enemy mili- tary and political leaders?to embassies in perhaps a dozen countries was said by a Navy informant to have been under consideration. at the Pentagon and State Department for some, time. . ? Discussion of the proposal, has been accelerated,vhe said, by the recent deterioration of the American military position in the Mediterranean, rising ' or e ease being the last chance for agreement that would avoid additional multi-bil- lion-dollar defense requirements. If he follows that through by recommend- ing key concessions, Mr. Ford will face the most difficult and most fateful choice of his presidency. 6 1975, Fled 1tatergrises, anti-Americanism in some Afri- can countries and anxiety over events in Korea, the Philippines and other Asian areas. Seizure by Japanese terror- ists last week of a part of the American Embassy in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, along with a number of hostages, was be- lieved likely to spur the dis- cussions. Navy sources 'stressed that the Seals, some 2,500 of whom have been trained here and at Little Creek, Va., over the last 13 years, would be assigned only to embassies in "friendly countries?' Most Are Vietnam Veterans The countries under consider,' ation were not identified here, but one informed source said they included capitals in Eur- ope, the Middle East, Africa, the western Pacific and, pose sibly, South America. Selected groups of the Navy commandos, totaling 75 or 80 men out of a current force of about 300, were said to have' been given the special training' to equip them for possible em- bassy duty, including language and political courses. They would be accredited as embassy naval attaches and assistants. Almost all are veterans of Viet- nam combat. Seal units of two to six men each are .alreacly stationed at American military bases over- seas, in both jthe Pacific and Atlantic, and ,1 others are at- tached to military assistance Missions in countries that have defense alliances with the United. States. ? An officer of the specialized warfare command in charge of Seal training at theNavy's Coronado amphibious base here said .that if the commandos were attached to embassy staffs their role would be largely ad- NEW YORK TIMES 10 August 1975 U.S. ARMS SALES HIT NEW RECORD, 72 Nations Bought $9-Billion Worth in fisGal '75 By JOHN W. FINNEY ? Special to The York Times WASHINGTON, Aug. 9 ? Foreign military sales by the United States in the fiscal year ending June 30 reached a record $9-billion, with nearly half going to three Persian Gulf , states. Defense Department figures show sales to 72 countries, the bulk In Europe and the 'Persian Gulf. , The total was not expected, the Defense Department says, After a new high of $7-billion was reached in fiscal 1974, largely because of substantial orders from Iran and Israel, the Pentagon had foreseen sales leveling off or even decreasing. The situation changed with a dc,cision last spring by Bel- gium, Denmark, the Nether- lands and Norway to purchase the F-16 fighter developed for the Air Force by General Dy- namics. The cost will exceed . . ..Congressional.Criticism While no firm orders for the F-16's have been placed the Defense Department decid- ed to include agreements on them in its sales total for the 1975 fiscal year. -00432R000100370003-4 visary. But he added that "ac- tual field operations using the skills they ,employed so suc- cestfully in Vietnam could not be ruled out, should emergen- cids arise' A former officer of the Coro- nado specialized warfare com- mand said, it was "reasonable to assume" that any Seal units as-Signed to American embas- sies would work closely with agents of the Central Intelli- gency Agency, who are listed by many embassies as cultural and commercial attacMs. Used in Phnom Penh ? ? A Navy spokesman in Wash- ington acknowledged that in one instance, Navy Seals had been assigned to embassy, duty. After the withdrawal of Ameri- can troops from Cambodia and until shortly before the Com- munist takeover of the country, he .said, Seals were assigned-to the American embassy in Phnom Penh as Navy attaches and assistant attaches. Five Seal officers served there be- tween 1973 and 1975. "At the present time no Seals are assigned to American em- bassies overseas," the spokes- man said. "Except for the Kh- mer Republic [Cambodia] there have been no Seal assignments to other United States embas- sies." Military sources acquainted with the Seal program here said that preparations for ultimately sending the counterinsurgency specialists to American embas- sies began in January, 1972. That was a month after the last Seal units were Withdrawn from Vietnam, leaving behind a few advisers to the Vietnamese Navy's Seal-type force they had trained, the Lieu Doi Nguoi Ngay, or "underwater soldiers." Comdr. Deniel Hendrickson, commander of Seal Team 1 for At the samelime the depart- ment, in the face of Congres- sional Criticism that it was in- discriminately ? pushing sales abroad, provided a breakdown designed to show that not all involved arms' and ammunition. Of the firm orders placed, the breakdown showed, 44,4 per cent were for weapons and ammunition. Spare parts,. large- ly for weapons, accounted for 23.2 per cent, while 12.4 per cent was for such support equipment as cargo aircraft, barges, trucks and communica- tions equipment and 20 per cent was was for such support services as construction, supply and technical training. The breakdown is part of a new case 'being advanced by Defense Department offi- cials in support of military 18 ,months until March, 19724 when he moved up to the nado training base's operatio command, said that after Vi nam, the Seal training shifted "from unconventio warfare techniques, largely Jungle environments to worldwide capability on stand-by basis." Commander Hendrickson s the Navy foresaw a need for Seal force that could handle variety of unconventional wn.-e fare missions in other countries, helping foreign governmeift detect potential guerrilla activ- ities without upsetting sensrei rive diplomatic balances." Describing the shift in traink ing, Commander Hendrickson' said it was anticipated that Seals would ultimately be se ing abroad on embassy attache duty or with military adviso groups. "Then we will be in a bet position, to provide expert cou set to our Government, to picks danger spots and prevent const flicts wherever possible," hq, said. "We can advise the h country and, if necessary, p vide assistance before it is tata late and help the armed forcesf of those countries to coun guerrilla efforts." Although the Seal teams we set up in 1962?on order fronts President Kennedy at the time of the Cuban missile crisis?it. was not until late in 1966 that, the Navy acknowledged theie existence. Their exploits in,7 Vietnam were not disclosed of finally until Seal Team I frormt Coronado received a Presiden- tial eitatien in November, 1968, for "extraordinary heroism in action" between July, 1966, and August 1967. Seal Team 1 here and Seal Team 2 at Little Creek are each reported to have about 122 men on a stand-by basis at present, sales. Their contention is anti while all are ostensibly for nn7,-I tary purposes some can haeei, an indirect economic benefit' by promoting development. The Largest Orders Large orders were placedlyi Iran, with $2.5-billion; Saul Arabia $1.4-billion, and Keil wait, $366-million, all cge Persian Gulf. Other big buyem! were Australia, with $157-re1 lion, Canada, $101-million; Tfei wan, $104-million', West Ger--1 many, $283-million; Gree.cel $195-million; Israel, $83S-m1-1 lion, and South Korea, $21:.el All the rest were considerah2e) lower than 8100-million. ? t The breakdown showed Ileee of the $1.4-billion in sales Saudi Arabia, $318-rodlion weet_ 31 ' Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4 for weapons and ammunition, ?$212-miilion for spare parts. $63-million for support equip- ment and $596-million for sup- port services. For Iran the ?figures were $1.5-billion, $353- WASHINGTON POST 15 August 1975 Claytoit Friwhey si i.; Ti million, $170-million and $259- million. Miscellaneous items made up the balance in both cases. With the easing of Congres- sional restrictions on the sale of sophisticated weapons to Latin-American countries, the United States has been return- ing to its role as the major supplier. The Defense Depart- ment listed $137-million in sales to 18 Latin-American countries in the last fiscal year. e Voice of the Pentagon ? ,James Schlesinger is usually referred to as the Secretary of Defense, but In practice his principal role seems to be director of public relations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and their principal propagandist and lobbyist. He's one of the best front men the Pentagon has ever had. What Secre- tary of State Henry Kissinger used to do so masterfully for Richard Nixon '?articulate and sell his master's policy L?Schlesinger does almost equally well for the chiefs. In the process, he is also being useful, in a special political way, to the commander-in-chief, Gerald Ford, for Schlesinger's tough talk and in- creasingly belligerent stands give the President some protection from the right wing of his own party. The defense secretary's recent gratuitous references to "first strikes," resort to nuclear weapons, armed intervention in Korea and other pro- vocative statements have prompted Moscow to charge him with playing "dangerous games," but this response has only ' enhanced Schlesinger's standing with the President's cold warrior critics. While differences between Schle- clinger and Mr. Ford, as well as bet- ween Schlesinger and Kissinger, are attributed more to nuance and style than substance, there is no denying that' the Pentagon spokesman sounds far more belligerent, and intention- ally so. 'Since Schlesinger has not been con- tradicted, reprimanded or told, dir- ectly or indirectly, to pipe down, it is obvious that the course he is pursu- ing has the passive, if not active, ap- proval of the White House. And it is NEW YORK not hard to see why. Mr. Ford inherited a detente with Russia. - It is the centerpiece of the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger foreign policy. Without it, there is no recognizable policy. At this point, Mr. Ford has little choice but to sink or swim with it, but more and more it is playing into the hands of his conservative critics, a distressing development for a President soon to face election. In the last few weeks, Mr. Ford has been under heavy attack for various efforts he has made in behalf of detente, such as going to Helsinki for the signing of the new European Security Pact, allowing the sale of millions of tons of U.S. wheat to Russia and refusing to see Moscow's implacable critic, Alexander Solzhen- itsyn. So it is not strange that Mr. Ford would permit, even welcome, the off- setting hard line of his defense secretary, which is such music to the enemies of detente. As the presidential election year approaches, Schlesinger may be allowed, indeed encouraged, , to go further, for there are signs that Mr. Ford may himself be getting a little skittish about detente, or at least' its political value in an election year. It Is difficult to see how, at this late date, the President could dump detente and its architect, Dr. Kis- singer, but in the coming months it would not be surprising if the Secretary of Defense began to rival the Secretary of State as the key adviser on national security affairs. Everything that Schlesinger has said and done lately has helped the -President with the critics he fears TIMES, MONDAY, AUGUST II, 1973' most ?. the Reagap-Goldwater-Thws mond-Helms Republicans?while it is just the opposite with Kissinger. It was Kissinger who advised Mr. Ford not to see Solzhenitsyn, and it was Kissinger who paved the way for the President's controversial trip to .Around the White House they agree that Kissinger for the time being is indispensable, blit it is also recognized that there is a more natural bond between Mr. Ford and Schlesinger_ The President has always instinctively been a hawk, a cold warrior and an unlimited military spender. In his two years at the Pentagon, Schlesinger, with the enthusiastic ap- proval of the President, has increased the military budget by $20 billion annually, and he frankly projects adding on another $40 billion to $50 billion in a few years. While Kissinger's has lately been counseling patience in dealing with Portugal's left-wing military govern- ment, the President and Schlesinger continue to talk as if a Marxist take- over would be intolerable for the United States. The defense secretary's argument is that our Mediterranean Sixth Fleet would be seriously en- 'clangered. George McGhee, former U.S. Under Secretary of State and former ambas- sador to Germany, notes, however, that "despite the fact that our air'-,, craft carriers, submarines, cruisers and destroyers have steamed up and , down the Mediterranean shores since 1946, we lost our dominant influence in the Middle East even before the introduction of the Soviet fleet.' 49 1975. Los Angeles Times Soviet Warship esign Emphasizes First Strike Rolq By JOHN W. FINNEY Special to The New York Times WASHINGTON, Aug. 10?A Navy study has concluded that superiority of Soviet warships in firepower has been achieved by sacrificing the endurance, electronic sophistication and crew comforts emphasized in American ships. The study by the Naval Ship Engineering Center Hyatts- ville, Md., helps provide an answer to a question that has been troubling officers and members of Congress as they have watched the Soviet fleet expand with new classes of heavily armed warships. Increasingly over the last few years, the question has been raised as to why the So- viet Union is able to build war- ships that appear to be smaller, faster and more heavily armed than those in the United States Navy. The question, in turn, has been used in reverse by such officials as Secretary of the Navy J. William Midden- dorf to emphasize a threat posed by the Soviet Navy. Priorities of Fleets Differ The answer supplied by the study was that the Soviet Union' has not achieved any breakthrough or significant ad- vance in naval ship design. Rather, it finds that the Soviet Union is building large num- bers of relatvely small, fast warships with impressive fire- power "to satisfy misson re- quirements and design priorities different. from those" of the United States Navy. The study is summarized in an article in the August issue of the Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute by Capt. James W. Kehoe, who is assigned to the Naval Ship Engineering Center. In effect, the study finds the United States Navy could build warships like those of the Soviet Union if it wanted to change its priorities and mis- sions for the fleet. The characteristics of the Soviet warships, according to the study, are dictated by the mission for the Soviet fleet of "sea denial"----or denying other nations, in particular the United States, certain uses of the sea. The sea-denial mission, it points out, ,requires a design emphassis on heavy firepower, a first-strike capability.against enemy shipping and high speed? and good sea-keeping capability rather than endurance. In contrast, the mission ern-, phasis in the United States Navy has been upon sustained control over the sea lanes and projection of striking power by means of aircraft carriers. Such missions have established ship design requirements in the United States Navy for en- durance so the ships can op- erate or extended deployments without dependence on land bases and for electronic so- phistication so escort ships can provide antiaircraft and anti- submarine protection for the carriers. The contrasting missions, the study finds, have led to differ- ent priorities in design o warships. 32 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4 The design priorities, in de- scending order, in Soviet war- ships, have been on weapons, propulsion; electronics, endur- ance and crew comfort. In con- trast, the study finds that the priority order in the United States Navy is electronics, crew comfort, endurance, weapons, and propulsion. Less Space for Weapons I The emphasis on electronics and crew comfort means less space for weapons and ammu- nition. This helps explain, the study finds, why Soviet ships in general carry about twice as many weapons as American ships. ini the study points out that the Soviet ships, in their emphasis upon higher firepower, have little or no NEW YORK TIMES 10 August 1975 . . capability for reloading their major missile and torpedo weapOns systems mounted on the decks. "This design philosophy," it observes, "suggests that these ships are being configured for a pre-emptive first strike in a short, intense conflict." A question being raised in Defense Department circles is whether the Navy, caught in a budget squeeze by the high cost of its nuclear-powered warships and envious and turbed by the firepower of. Soviet warships, will not be' driven toward the same design- philosophy if it wants to ex-, pand the present fleet of 500 ships. he Ford Trip Riskei Little And Accomplishes Little By LESLIE H. GELB , ' WASHINGTON?Some scenes of recent weeks go right to one of the questions that is beginning to consume Presi- ? dential election-minded Washington: How much detente is ? enough, or, put another way, how much d?nte is good pol- itics? . * There is Aleksandr Solzhenitzyn, the Russian Nobel ? laureate, regaling a Washington audience on the perils of detente, a process, so he says, of aiding Soviet leaders in cementing their ,control over Russian society and Eastern Europe. Listening and applauding in seats of honor are none other than President George Meany, of the A.F.L.- C.I.O., Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, former'. Secretary of Defense Melviri Laird, and Senator Henry M: ? ,Jackson. About' the only thing this group has in common ' its lack of admiration for Secretary of State Kissinger, , who 'hasrjust advised President Ford not to see Mr. Sol- , zhenitzyn. '- ? There are the millions of tons of grain destined for - Russia piling up on the docks while the longshoremen , Wonder whether loading the ships will drive up the price of , bread to the American consumer. Meanwhile, the farmers' and. traders are getting ready to sell more grain to Moscow. ? Then, there, is Mr. Ford in Helsinki (Mr. Kissinger standing obligingly in the background) signing the Euro- pean security agreement so desired by Moscow, followed by e? head-to-head talks with the Soviet Communist party lead- er, -Leonid I. Brezhnev, on another strategic nuclear arms ? Finally, to counteract the charge that the document ,Mr. Ford just signed in Helsinki forever doomed the nations ? of Eastern Europe to Soviet bondage, Mr. Ford flies off to demonstrations with the leaders of Poland, Rumania and Yugoslavia. .. D?nte is obviously a very 'tricky business. To be sure, each United States President wants to do those thing t he pees as right, that is, to insure that Washington is getting as much peace as it is giving to Moscow. But it is difficult to "do what is right" or, indeed, to do anything or nothing, . without landing in a political minefield. Every United States President who has gone to a meeting with, his opposite Soviet number learned., quite quickly, ? that the, American people like detente and want peaceful ' relations with Moscow. But each had to puzzle a great , deal about public support for particular agreements with ? the Russians. Nuclear arms control agreements go over well with the political center and with some liberals, only to be attacked by other liberals and most conservatives. Grain sales are applauded by grain farmers and damned by consumer groups. Sales of manufactured goods are hailed by big busi- ness and condemned by labor. Human rights issues such as tying nondiscriminatory trade status for Moscow to the freer emigration of Soviet Jews, causes schizophrenia all over the politicallancls6ape. Mr. Ford is tip-toeing through this in the traditional man- 'ner. He is flying to foreign countries which,, ipso facto; makes him a world leader. Administration officials acknowl; ? '4 4 4 . _ edge that Mr. Ford's trip to Europe would have meant something only if it' had not occurred. In foreign policy terms, nothing much was either risked or gained. He is trying to occupy the political center: signing the European security agreement and. saying it doesn't mean much, aP:: proving a big grain sale for Russia but warning that het watch the next one carefully. . But try as he might, the one, big new Soviet-America' deal that Mr. Ford will not be able to side-step is on stra,- tegic nuclear arms. By most accounts, this agreement Will be signed this fall or it probably will not be signed at all: And by the lay of the politics, there is practically no accord that he can cut with Moscow that will not be cut tip by the conservatives in his own party and by Mr. Jackson. - a-' A Case of Oversell ? ? Strategic nuclear arms have a symbolic importance in world politics and United States politics that often trail; ?scends their military significance and far surpasses public understanding. There is no doubting that each side has the capability to destroy the other under any circumstances. And yet the very unspeakability of nuclear war fires th imagination in a way that has led leaders and public opinion in most countries to gauge relative Soviet ana. American strengths by the nuclear forces that each pos`-, sesses and the mutual agreements that they reach- in this area. Thus, by the fall at the latest,' Mr. Ford will have to choose between the pluses of another nuclear pact with Moscow and the minuses of losing conservative support. - Mr. Ford will probably have the support of most liberals whatever agreement on nuclear arms he reaches with Mos.-' cow. This is not because liberals believe?he is negotiating the best or the most comprehensive nuclear arms deal (in fact, many think it is too little, too late), but because they feel trapped. In their eyes, to- oppose the deal and join forces with the conservatives to defeat it, would be to destroy detente?and that they do not want to do. State Department officials express unusual concern about the political fate of "their d?nte policy. They know that their boss, along with former President Nixon, oversold the benefits of detente, in part to sell it in the first place and in part for political reasons. Along' with Mr. Kissinger now, they have been moving to readjust public expectation about detente, but they realize as well that the damage has already been done. Some speculate that a hardened publid attitude might cause the Russians to make some additional 'concessions to save d?nte.' But most seem to feel that if Moscow and Washington are to reach any new sig:: nificant accords, they had better be consummated soon.; before election year. Election year is already rushing in on sun-baked Wash:. ington. The surest sign is the increasing number of con- versations where only high principle is attributed to one, self and only base cynicism to one's opponents. In the proc; ess, the question of how much d?nte is good for peace .is being submicrged by the question of how much detente is good politics. ? Leslie H. Gelb s a New York Times Washington diploi matic correspondent. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : ai-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4 DAILY TELEGRAPH, London 7 August 1975 HUNGRY RUSSIA RUSSIA CANNOT FEED HERSELF. Before the 1917 revolution she was one of the world's major grain export- ers. The family-run farms produced enough for the population and a hefty surplus. The Communists " collecti- vised " agriculture, since when the country has been in permanent food deficit. STALIN let the peasants starve. 1(HRUSCITEV began buying grain abroad. BREzHNEV, with increased resources to hand from higher prices for Russian-exported raw materials like oil and gold, has greatly extended Russian buying of foreign grain: ? ' . Quite regularly, ?the anyway - inadequate 'Russian harvest "fails," due to climatic conditions. Nature comes in to reinforce the endemic: inefficiency of the collective farm system. When this happens, as it did in ,1972, Russian purchases abroad can have a disruptive and diS- tiorting effect on economy. In that year, Russia --SUNDAY TIMES, London 3 August 1975- THE "Krushchey Spring!' was a reversal of the 30-year-despotism of Stalin.' It was both defensive reaction against the monstrous power of the security organs which had been nurtured by the ruling elite and also a reaction to the impossibility of economic development in a closed society Which retained strong elements Of slavery and feudalism in an age of scientific and technological revolution, When the Stalinist myth was exposed from the pulpit of the General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party?the spiritual and worldly overlord of the Country?social thought began gradually to " unfreeze " and values to be feappraised. Soon the' elite noticed first timid and then increasingly assured mani- festations of a resurrection of the intelligentsia, the truly, inde- pendent thinkers who vanished Shortly after the Revolution. And neither the end of the Krushchev Spring nor the large-scale repres- sions practised by his successors could put a stop to the process. 'On the other hand the rapid erosion lin people's Minds of the quasi-religious status of Marxism- Leninism, and a certain 'improve- ment hi living standards, gave rise to a Soviet version of the consumer society in which the old fanaticism of the masses was replaced by a spiritual vacuum, filled with alcohol. Having lost its ideological basis the regime became entangled in : the snares of insoluble contradic- tions arising from the incompati- bility between the problems posed by the new epoch and the primi- tive, bureaucratic structure of the regime. The only way for it to Lend off the inevitable fiasco was to :emerge from economic and Scientific isolation and expand its contacts with the West. Yet at the same time unanimity of bought just under 20 million tons of grain, from America alone. By clever, super-capitalist-style operations on the market, Russian buyers organised what 'is now referred to in America as "the- great grain robbery." To the subsequent, embarrassment and anger of Washington,- a good part .of 'their purchases; was actually subsidised by .,., the American Government under the then existing rules. ; 'Now there are well-fourided-reportS -tha-t this -Year's . 'harvest in Russia will, again be bad, necessitating the purchase abroad of up to perhaps 30 million tons. i Purchases already made in America ? amount to: about 10 million tons. Mr Buzz. the Agriculture . Secretary, has placed a " hold " on further sales until the next American crop report, due on Monday, -As well as the economic effects of Russian purchases (highly inflationary-for food , prices in 1972), there is a strong political' background to this whole 'question. Should' the West continue to bia RussIa ouryearly,as part of a sham "d?nte S llET 1)LEIVPA Detente plus extermination VICTOR FAINBERG thought had to be preserved as the basis of society--" granite unity of party and people." Dis- sent 'must be exterminated.. Dissent is that part of the newly reborn intelligentsia which not only is not afraid to think, but does not hide its opinions. The dissidents demand that the authorities take the window- dressing of the Soviet political myth seriously. In his final plea at his trial, playwright and essayist Andrei Amalrik said: "We demand that you act in conformity with your own constitution, your own laws, and the United Nations Declara- tion of Human Rights. But we know that you cannot act in con- formity with these laws (ie grant freedom of speech, of the Press, of assembly, etc) because if you don't jail ten men who come out and demonstrate there will be hundreds the next time, and then thousands." This paradoxical situ- ation in which the man who defends the constitution of his country is considered a dissident, is resolved by means of concen? tration camps, prisons and lunatic 'asylums. One has to give the Soviet authorities -their due: they know the worth of words. For a five- minute demonstration of protest against the occupation of Czecho- slovakia my friends Larisa Bogoraz and Pavel Litvinov were each given five years' exile, and myself five years' imprisonment. For his appeal to Western psy- chiatrists about the Misuse of psychiatry in the 'Soviet Union Vladimir Bukovsky was sentenced to 12 years Imprisonment, camps, and. exile. Ukrainian. historian Valentin Moroz gat 14 years for writing a book on the political camps. For publishing art under- ground literary-political journal, Ukrainian poet Zinovy Krasivsky got 12 years. But the dry figures of ? these sentences are no true reflection 0 Victor Fainberg, who spent five years in Soviet menial hospitals and lwisons, was allowed to emigrate last year. He .now eampaiyns from .London for Soviet human riglds, of their; real significance. People like Bukovsky cannot be silenced even in the camps. And they are killing them. Not 'with bullets, as they did under Stalin, but by starvation, cold, the damp of prison cells and the lack of medical treatment. To this end they have carefully devised a system of punishments: strict regime, special regime, isolation cell, and so on. When I 'read speeches or articles on the subject of detente I feel like asking: what sort of d?nte have you in mind? It is unrealistic to seek rapprochement with a great nation which is , thoroughly fenced off from you by a wall of ideological and political isolation. The so-called rapprochement can only be the Soviet leaders?for whom -this I isolation, which they maintain by ; such shameful means, is a sine qua non of their political being. ' Do you not think that detente ? in such a form with one side flouting all the standards set by international law and its own is tantamount to letting a Trojan horse into a commonwealth of nations? , The paragraph in the Helsinki agreement concerning non-inter- ference in the internal affairs of the countries which are its signatories has aroused a great deal of argument. A broader interpretation of this paragraph suggests that it excludes even petitions and 'other diplomatic measures which have always been used to alleviate the fate of the innocent who have been con- victed. I believe that measures, , of this kind are first and foremost acts of humanity, not politics. Outsiders should not refrain from protest on the grounds that such actions are " political." The Soviet system makes this unavoid- able, it 'is maintained by the destruction of dissidents. 34 Approved-ForRelease-200-11081O8 ?-? CIA-RDP77-00432R0001003700034-- . Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4 BALTIMORE SUN 8 August 1975 George F. Will U.S. Brea Washington.. Speaking with rare conci- sion and customary inaccura- cy, Vladimir I. Lenin declared that the 1917 revolution would produce "bread and freedom." Freedom has not arrived, because the Soviet Union has not yet passed through the "glorious transition period" between the dictatorship of the proletariat and the wither- ing away of the state. But bread will , be along any day now?when U.S. grain sales compensate for the Soviet Un- ion's reactionary weather. For about the 58th time since 1917, an unusually dry winter or wet summer, or vice versa, or both, has prevented the Soviet Union's collectiv- ized agriculture from fulfill- ing the promise of scientific .socialism. So the Kremlin has ear- marked some money (perhaps diverted from the fund for the subversion of Portugal) for the purchase of huge amounts of the United States grain that ,.are produced in suchinexplic- ,ably large quantities in spite of the internal contradictions and imminent collapse . of American capitalism. _ Actually, if the collapse. -comes in the next few months, the Russians will be peeved. They have contracted for ap- proximately 10 million metric tons of our grain, and proba- bly least 5 mil- lion more tons. ? The ? Soviet Union has Ig- nored its formal promise, , made at the 1973 summit con- - ference, to provide projec- tions of their agricultrual needs (just as they will ignore 'all significant promises made At. Helsinki, , including . the , and N Freedo'm in Soviet Union promise to publish adequate "economic and commercial information"). So we are un- sure about the exact size of the Soviet appetite for our grain. *We will know that size only when it is to late to do any- thing about it?after Soviet purchases- have driven U.S. grain prices far above the prices they paid when they en- tered the market. But Ameri- can policy holds that detente is a bargain at any price. Anyway, it would violate the "spirit of Helsinki" to wonder aloud if more grain might spring from the Eura- sian earth if that earth were hoed vigorously by the Soviet soldiers who are tied down at the task of nailing govern- ments in place with bayonets in Prague and elsewhere. Be- sides, if we don't sell the Sovi- et Union at least 15 million tons of grain?an amount ap- proaching the 19 million tons of the memorable 1972 grain sale?the Kremlin will face the soct of internal unpleas- antness that one detente.part- . WASHINGTON POST 13 August 1975 ner should spare the other. The Kremlin needs grain primarily for livestock feed. Soviet leaders rashly prom- ised to increasetheir subjects' protein consumption. For that purpose the leaders will spend money not required for re- pairing the Berlin Wall or for cheating on the 1972 strategic arms agreement. World grain markets can- not-supply the 40 million tons of grain the Soviet Union probably will need to make up its shortfall. Even if they buy 15 million tons of U.S. grain, the Soviet people will have to slaughter a lot of livestock prematurely. ? But without that U.S. grain, the Kremlin would be severely embarrassed, and there might even be social un- rest in the workers' paradise. Of course, there may be some unrest in the U.S. when the prices of our beef, bread and other foods begin to reflect the price of what is left of our grain. There is a first time for 'ev- OV1 olz ies enitsyn erything, so conceivably the U.S. Department of Agricul- ture is correct in saying that we are not in for a repeat of the 1972 "great grain rob- bery." According to a govern- ment study. that transaction earned $700 million, but cost consumers $1 billion in higher,. - food costs. Unfortunately, we could " have more confidence in - USDA assurances if the de- partment were not guessing about the size of ?oviet de- mand and U.S..suppl Fortunately, U.S. supply may be even better than ex- pected if there is a lot of rain, soon, in the Midwest. So to cope with the myriad prob- lems caused by Soviet pur- chases, a former USDA of fi- cial recently suggested a pos. - sible policy: "We can only hope the rains fall." ' Even a policy of dynamic- - hoping has shortcomings. It does nothing to get grain to some of the hundreds of mil- lions of people who need it - even more than do the Soviet ? people. By Carroll Kilpatrick washincton Post Staff Writer VAIL; Colo., Aug. 12?Sec- retary of State Henry A. Kis- singer tonight denied a report that he had made a "deal" with the Soviet Union which led to President Ford's ini- tial refusal to meet with Rus- isian author Alexander Sol- zhenitsyn. ? However, Kissinger said in a telephone interview with a reporter here that he had urged the Soviet governmentI to permit the Nobel-prize-win-I ming author, to emigrate. about! a month before he was al- lowed to do so in February, 1974. Mr. Ford became Presi- dent in August, 1974. The new development in the Ford-Solzhenitsyn meet- ing controversy came after , the Associated Press, in a dis- patch from Scottsdale, Ariz., Approved For Release 2001/08/08: ;quoted Warren Rustand ap- pointments secretary to the !President, as saying the Pres- !ident's refusal to see the fa- !mous author was the result of an agreement between the United States and the Soviet !Union at the time Solzhenit- syn went into exile. The AP report produced a Ifrenzy of activity here, with , White House press secretary Ron Nessen telephoning Rus- tand and Kissinger to try to find out what had happened. Nessen told reporters that Rustand denied Saying what the AP quoted him as saying., Rather, said Nessen, I-Zustand Insisted he reported he had heard "rumors" about the ar- rangement in Washington. Nessen then quoted Kissin- ger as saying that the initial CIA313DP77-00432R00010 decision by the President not to meet with Solzhenitsyn when he was in Washington. "was not based on any ar- rangement made with the So- viets at the time Solzhenitsyn left the Soviet Union." Nevertheless. Nessen ton: ceded that Kissinger 'tad . some informal conversatans 'with the Soviet government at the time of Solzhenitsyn's de- parture" from the Soviet Union. That comment led reporters to the conclusion that Kis- singer .at least had entered into an informal agreement that the United State's gov- ernment would not use the Solzhenitsyn case to enilar- rass the Soviet Union. When Nessen said he had ? no information to support that conclusion reporters ask- ed him to telephone Kissk....-;er again to clarify the When he refused, a reporter asked to use Nessen's tele- phone to reach Kissinger. The Secretary of State took the call immediately .and de- nied "absolutely" that isrel was any agreement heieu the United States and the U.S.S.R. with respea to the writer. Kissinger said he had urged the Kremlin to let: Sol- zhenitsyn leave the county,. 3iord6T4waS no deal of znY Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4 !kind as to how Solzhenitsyn was to be treated in the Test," Kissinger said. ? . Expressing annoyance at the questioning,, the secretary said, "this thing has become an absurdity" and flatly, de- nied that there was any con- nection between his earlier conversations and Mr. Ford's , initial refusal to receive Sol- zhenitsyn when he . was in !Washington this summer. Kissinger would -not .say what Soviet officials he talked! with about release of the well-! known author and critic of communism, . Following criticism of the President for not seeing the writer. Mr. Ford issued an invitation- and Nessen said to- night that Solzhenitsyn con- tinues to have an "open invi- tation" to visit the White House and meet with the President. NEW YORK TIMES 12 August 1975 'Normalized' Prague? Of all the Soviet satellite states in Eastern Europe, Czechoslovakia undoubtedly imposes the most repressive conditions on its people. The secret police keep the populace under intensive scrutiny. The worst blows are aimed at Czechoslovakia's foremost writers, some of whom have even seen their children denied the right to enter high school because they will not conform slavishly to Prague's demands. Czechoslovak press and radio routinely turn out the most heavy-handed anti-American propaganda in Europe. They portray the United States as a partner of Nazi Germany at the end of World War II, with General Eisenhower a collabora:tor of Hitler. The role of the American Army in helping liberate Czechoslovakia in 1945?a liberation in which 1,500 Americans died?is never mentioned, while there is unceasing and nauseating tribute to the Soviet Army as the sole instrument of Czech liberation from the Nazis. The present rulers of Czechoslovakia, led by the Soviet gauleiter, Gustav Husak, are propped up by the bayonets and tanks of tens of thousands of Soviet soldiers who continue to occupy Czechoslovakia and make it for all practical purposes the sixteenth constituent "republic" of the Soviet Union. None of this is likely to be changed by the ritualistic Husak-Brezhnev pledge last weekend to observe the. Helsinki declaration. Under the Ford Administration's flabby interpretation of detente, all the many unsavory aspects of Czecho- slovakia must be ignored in the interest of full normal- ization of relations with Prague. T.he sole barrier to an immediate move by Washington to give Prague eighteen tons of Czechoslovak gold held since World War II, along with access to American credits and the like, is the refusal of some American businessmen to accept as part of the projected deal only a fraction of the value of assets which were confiscated in that .country a generation ago. All this, we would suggest, is a 'gross misreading of the requirements of, detente and a memory lapse about the need for d?nte to be? a two-way street. There is no need to hurry about full normalization while "Hate America" propaganda is routine in Czechoslovakia and a Stalinist-type tyranny oppresses Czechs and Slovaks alike. When there are serious signs of real normalization in Czechoslovakia, then Washington can give serious thought to normalized relations. The economic issues involved here are insignificant ? from the national point of view. The central questions are of decency and morality, and the lack of need, to say the least, for unseemly haste in fully accepting the most repulsive regime among the Soviet satellites. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 1 August 1975 Another Soviet grain drain Are American consumers about to be bamboozled again because of U.S. grain sales to the Russians? So far the Soviet Union has purchased just under 10 million tons of grain and the administration insists the impact on American food prices will be marginal. It is not yet clear, however, how much the Russians will buy this year If their faltering grain crop ' turns out even worse than expected, addi- tional purchases could be heavy. If Arthur Burns of the Federal Reserve is right and domestic prices shoot up as a result, President Ford will confront an irate public. Americans remember only too well the 1972 Soviet grain deal, which caused food prices to soar for the next two years. The picture is different today. There are no more price supports to grain exporters which enable the Russians to pay a low price. Moreover, the purchases are smaller and the ? U.S. harvest is larger. The administration is in fact happy about these sales. Food has long been an important component of American exports that earn money to pay for imports of oil and other commodities. Proponents of free trade argue that export controls, while they may keep prices down for some goods, simply increase the cost to Americans of other items imported from abroad. - ? Furthermore, it is argued that American farmers have to be able to export their grain if they are to keep expanded acreage in produc- tion. Now that soil-bank subsidies are lifted, the farmers are out on a limb. If they cannot sell the grain, they will not plant it in the future. That would be self-defeating at a time when the world demand for food grows. Yet consumers are understandably sus- picious that they are always the victim of manipulation and end up paying the price for Soviet inefficiencies in farming. Part of the problem arises from the secrecy that attends so much of the grain dealing, which is carried on by private American companies in Moscow and does not become known until it is over. The Russians, for their part, are equally secretive. Under an agreement with the United States they are supposed to provide periodic reports on crop production, con- sumption, foreign trade, and so on. But they withhold crucial data, such as forecasts of their import requirements. Somehow a means ought to be found of bringing Soviet-American grain negotiations into the public domain ? and of making the Russians rather than the Americans pay the price of Soviet failures in agriculture. The administration should be alert to the political liabilities it faces if the American consumer finds the price of bread and flour climbing (as it already is) and concludes that he has been had. 36 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100-37000314 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003,74 NEW YORK TIMES 19 August 1975 nited State s Qre: ni. the West Europ ; DAVIS, Calif.?In the aftermath of .America's Indochina debacle, it has By Robert J. Lieber become fashionable to view the future with- concern and trepidation or to find that "we are close to a national nervous breakdown," as Secretary of ,State Kissinger has said. As applied 'specifically to Western Europe, such fears and their concomitant -mood of .Spenglerian gloom are clearly exag- gerated. - In Europe, there has been a resur- gence of left-wing strength within ?some of the prinicipal Socialist parties, ,but both left and right within these Parties remain strongly wedded to democratic values. ? ; This commitment profoundly divides them from the Communists and is evi- dent, for example, in the character of Frangdis Mitterrand. and the French Socialist party. Mr. Mitterrand's electoral and pro; grammatic alliance with the Commu- nists has been a striking success for the Socialists. By creating an attractive rejuve- nated party, not least\ by his willing- ness to propose substantial and occa- sionally radical measures of domestic , reform, Mr. Mitterrand has succeeded .in making the Socialists the senior partner.. ? Clearly, it is Mr. Mitterrand who has exploited the Communists,. thereby- contradicting the conventional wisdom 7?borrowed from the Eastern European context of 1944-47?that if you sit down to dine with the Communists it is they who will devour you rather than vice v,ersa. As for Britain, the United States press and television commentators have?in a tone of prophecy?told us of the smell of "Weimar" or of "Ar- gentina" in the air. - Britain's troubles are significant, but the assessment of these has been my- opic and, at times, hysterical. Con- sider Britain's past economic and political disarray: major labor strife and the specter of civil war over Ire- land on the eve of World War I, griev- ous losses in the 1914-1918 war, the General Strike of 1926, economic crisis in 1931, 22 per cent unemployment in 1932, economic and political misman- ? agement throughout the 1920's and 1930's, appeasement, Dunkirk and the . costly victory in World War H, eco- nomic crisis in the late 1940's, "stop- ? and-go" economics in the 1950's and 1960's, and the frequent perils of sterling. In this perspective, the present crisis recedes in both gravity and unique- ness4What is more, fundamental polit- ical questions go begging. Britain's high inflation and wage settlements involve a definite pattern of income redistribution and class-based politics. The Heath Government of 1970-74 enacted whopping tax advantages for business and for upper- and upper- middle-income families. More recently, the Labor Govern- ment and the trade unions have exact- ed an even more marked redistribution Of income in favor of their own con- stituencies. In any case, the Labor Government has begun to deal with hyperinflation; the Common Market referendum has ?predictably?provided a resounding endorsement of Britain's continued membership; oil has begun flowing from the North Sea, and?above all? Britain remains a rational, viable and civilized society and polity. n P lic an Left To the extent that the Western European democratic left successfully addresses itself to pressing social and economic problems it strengthens the fabric of the societies and makes them less susceptible to the kind of turmoil that fosters the growth of Communist movements. Indeed, I would\juxtapose to Secre- tary Kissinger's penchant for quoting Spengler the view that in order to preserve it is necessary to change. In this sense, the domestic difficulties faced by Eastern Europe and the -Soviet Union may prove more intrac- table than those in Western Europe. As for the question of a viable bal- ance of power in Europe, the situation is less grim than it has been painted. There is no valid presumption that governing parties of the democratic left will neglect security factors. Note that Sweden (Social Democrat- ic) spends the same proportion of her gross national product on defense ,as does France (Conservative-Gaul- - list), that Britain and West Germany under Labor and Social Democratic party Governments respectively, main- tain adequate defense establishments and close Atlantic ties, and that a French Socialist Government would be Ii1-.ely to continue Gaullist policies in- volving a strong national (and nuclear): defense. ? ? ' The future alignment' of Western Europe will also be shaped by Amer- ican policies whose ingredient of real- politilt has often ? Snd ironically ? proved evanescent. Before 1973, by treating the Greek and Portuguese ? authoritarian regimes as favored allies we over-identified ourselves with these ill-fated and unpopular Governments;' In the case of Greece, this 'policy (as well as Secretary Kissinger's inept actions involving Cyprus) has led the present moderate Government of- Greece to call into question the Amer- ? ican military presence there. In Portu- gal, United States policy may have played into the hands of Communist elements in the Armed Forces Move- ment. Similarly, President Ford's recent visit to Spain can be seen as an en- dorsement of the tottering dictatorship. - of Adolph Hitler's erstwhile and aging ally, Generalissimo Francisco Franco. In Spain, as recently in Greece and Portugal, change will come, but when it does the legacy of United States policies is likely to have earned the' enmity of moderate and democratic. elements. The societies of Western Europe are ? complex and pluralistic. Visions of a Communist coup like that of Prague, 1948, or of Finlandization?enforced, neutralization?do not correspond to existing realities. Except for Portugal these countries, are not in imminent danger of capture, or even major influence by Cornmu-, nists or pro-Soviet elements. Even in Italy the Communist party .is in no position to assume political domina- ? tion for the foreseeable future. To the extent that dangers might arise they are likely to owe as much to American mistakes as to .indige- nous factors. . Without the albatross of Indochina around our necks, perhaps we will now be able, to address the area with a sense of proportion and sophistication; and without becoming frozen into pa- ? sition by nostalgia for old patterns and relationships. . Robert J. Lieber, associate professor of political science at the University of California, Davis, is author of "British , Politics and European Unity" and "Theory and World Politics." a a Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CN-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4 LONDON TIMES 6 August 1975 Will d?nte force Italy behind the- Iron Curtain? Clare Boothe Luce, who was American ambassador to Italy from 1953 to 1957, contributes this 'week's ?Coltifnri. in our. International -Womed.s', As the. accepted leader of the free world, the United States creates, to a large extent, the political climate in it. The effect of US political and cultural - d?nte with Soviet Russia has been to create a world climate in which com- munism has become politically and culturally respectable. D?nte has strengthened communist parties?and weakened democratic parties in the western democracies. Because of d?nte, many democratic parties have begun to suffer defections both from the left and the right. Oppor- tunists on the left hasten to join forces with the upcoming Marxist socialists. situation is dangerous, precisely Those on the right, who refuse to ? because d?nte has now made, the accept political detente with their communist alternative to democratic domestic communists, have no choice government, much more acceptable but to join hands with the hard-core' ,than it -was in the Cold War era. anti-communist elements, whose Italians.- no longer fear that the US programmes are all too often neo- would not recognize a communist Italy,. fascist" or "militaristic ": extend aid, or -refuse to trade with it. heat. .deaL with Russia, and the extension In the new climate of d?nte, hich The US w . of credits are ample tends to make the anti-communist right proof that a communist Italy would not almost as -disreputable as it was in- the- fascist era, the weakened centre i be cut off from US commerce, support: s ? forced to weaken itself even more by and friendship. joining the communists in attacking its ? Despite the efforts of the communists right-wing defectors.. Thus, there is a? to hasten the collapse of the Christian gradual erosion of .the centre towards Democratic government by endlessly the left. Sooner or later. the point iS agitating - the most unreasonable reached where the centre can no longer, economic demands of the electorate, if govern, because it can no longer form it were not for d?nte, there would be a parliamentary majority. And in order t no reason to fear the entrance of the to avoid civil strife, and maintain the communists into the government. But facade of democracy, it must bring the detente has maximized not only the communists into government. gains of communist political penetra- ? non of .Italy, but also the gains of The great gains seored by the' Com': ? munist. Party in the recent Italian communist cultural penetration. elections are among the first?but nor In their struggle tO create a corn- the last?sour fruits of detente. ' munist world, the men of Moscow are f American liberals, whose passionate long-range- totalitarian planners and belief in economic determinism might campaigners. They have neglected no astound Marx himself, have attributed field of human thought or endeavour. the communist, gains in Italy entirely For three decades now, seemingly a- to the adverse economic conditions political communists have been 'care- prevailing there, and have failed to see fully woven into the fabric of Italian culture. Twenty-five years ago, the their connexion with political and cul- tural d?nte. ? . American Embassy was aware of a corn- It is true that there is consider munist directive instructing every economic Italian communist to concentrate on economic discontent in Italy. Like all converting the youngest male member the democracies, Italy is plagued by of non-communist families. Today, inflation and Unemployment, and has been hard hit by the ?rising costs of fuel. But even when the Italian recession is taken into account, the fact remains that the majority of, the people are better off today than'they have been in their entire history. Moreover, "economic discontent " is par for any .democratic course. As Tacitus once observed about the human appetite for the goods of this world, "There is no such thing as enough ". And the desire of a democratic electorate for more---and more-L-iS increased, rather than satisfied by the progress it has previously made. In the past 25 years, no country in Europe has, made relatively more progress than Italy, and no electorate is demanding more of its government. ? . All political scientists seem agreed that the hour when a democracy begins to collapse is when the people's demands,, exceed ? the country's resources, and refusing to face this fact, they begin to raid their own Treasury. . . ? ? ? The resources of Italy today are. simply not adequate to meet the excessive demands that the people are 'making of '_ their Government. This 38 these cultural' ConVerts, now matured; are present in large numbers, not only in the party,' but also in the Italian educational system, the arts, the profes- sions, the media, the military, and even in the church. . r! In the Cold War days, this process of cultural Penetration was called "subversion ", and was stoutly resisted, , especially by the church. In the climate of " peaceful coexistence ", resistance ?even by the Vatican?is viewed as "religious intolerance ", or an undemo- cratic, even " fascist " attitude. The political and cultural coup de grace to anti-communism was recently delivered by President Ford himself. when he refused to receive Nobel Prize winner Alexander Solzhenitsyn in the White House. When the world's most famous anti-communist, and political exile, who has won his credentials as a " freedom-fighter " in Russian labour camps, is persona non grata to the leader of the free world?how can anyone in Italy, or anywhere else, fail to get the message that communism is " in " and anti-communism is out " ? The President later changed his -mind, but by then it was too late and Mr Solzhenitsyn declined the invitation. So long as the United States fails to realize that the struggle against Soviet world expansionism is being lost in the cultural and political field, it will be impossible for democratic governments to devise effective strategies, no less find convincing arguments for keeping their domestic communist parties from increasing participation in 'govern- ment. It is predictable that once the communists enter . the Italian govern. ' ment, the pattern, with variations dic- tated by local considerations, will eventually follow that of Czechoslo- vakia. ? . . The Mediterranean, once the Mare Nostrum of the Romans, is still a wes- tern. sea. But if Italy slips behind the. Iron Curtain, nothing short of the Third World War will -keep it from becoming a Russian lake. When this . happens, the US defence of Europe will become impossible. And the USA will be isolated. Altogether a ? pretty heavy price to pay, when one conies to think of it, for a d?nte that has produced nothing for the West but a very slight increase in' trade, and a series of nuclear disarma- ment deals that have, on balance, favoured the Russians. 4) Times Newspapers Lid, 1975 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003=4 ? CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 21 August 1975 Joseph C. HaFet',1 Communist [oss hi It wasi a very good thing indeed, and imelhing which should be more widely noted an it has, that communism in Portugal is I ing pushed back by the Portuguese people emselves without any appreciable outside elp and certainly without the intervention of the American Central Intelligence Agency Jr by any other form of American inter- ention. There has been encouragement to the . ? ialists in Portugal from outside. It has been mostly in the form of advice and encour- ? gement, supplemented with some funds, torn socialist parties on the outside ? rimarily from the socialist parties of France ? d West Germany. But the American role (largely for accidental or mistaken reasons) I as been nonexistent. The Communist failure in Portugal ( which it already is) can never be pinned on American intervention no matter what the Communists themselves may claim in their propaganda. ' American nonintervention has been due in part to the immobilization of the operations side of the CIA. Current investigations and disclosures of past CIA mistakes and the generally bad reaction to the last CIA inter- vention in a similar situation (Chile) have for the time being taken the CIA out of play. Its intelligence appraisal work goes on unchecked and undamaged, but its clandestine side is simply not operational under present circum- NEW YORK TIMES 17 August 1975 Portugd stances. Add that pessimism prevailed at the top levels in Washington when the Communists in Portugal opened up their bid for control. The tendency was to assume that since the CIA was immobilized all was lost and Portugal would be the next victim to communism. There was a defeatist attitude based on the fallacy that communism wins wherever American resis- lance is absent. - Happily the pessimism was unjustified. The Portuguese people themselves have exhibited a vigorous reluctance to hand over their country to a minority capable of gaining only some 12 percent of the vote in a free election. It is healthy indeed for everyone, perhaps especially for Americans, to learn that anti- communism exists all by itself in a sturdy and vigorous native form. Americans are not the only people who know that Stalinist-style communism is a tyrannical condition unsuit- able for free men. Americans have no monopoly on awareness of the dangers or of willingness to take firm action to resist it in its aggressive forms.' There is also a reminder in recent events in Portugal that Communists are neither all- powerful nor all-wise. They have generated almost no real power in Portugal. And they have done some exceedingly stupid things. , ? Support for Portug 1... After long assuming that a Communist takeover was almost inevitable in Portugal, Secretary of State Kissin- ger has finally set United States policy?in its public ? ,expressions, at least?onto a more constructive tack. - His Birmingham speech offered just the kind of psycho- logical support that Portugal's embattled democratic ' forces have been needing as they press their resistance ? to Communist-backed Premier Gongalves and the radical left-wing minorities of the Armed Forces Movement. ? Much of the credit, for this belated show .of encourage- ment must go to the energetic United States Ambassador in Lisbon, Frank Carlucci, who made a flying trip to. Washington last weekend for urgent consultations. Dis- patched to Lisbon just seven months ago, Ambassador' Carlucci from the start sent back reports and reconi- ,mendations that shook up Washington's fatalistic, prede- termined notions. Last April's election,' in, which the non-Communist They have probably set their cause back by another decade. For example, the Communist parties of both France and Italy have long been cultivating a "law-abiding" profile. They have claimed that they seek power only through the ballot box. They have purported to have become domes- ticated and law-abiding. And this new image was helping them greatly throughout Western Europe ? particularly in Italy. The Portuguese experience has exploded the theory of a benign form of communism in Western Europe. The Portuguese COITIMU- nists refused to accept the verdict of the ballot box. They reached for decisive power after being defeated overwhelmingly. They an- nounced they were not impressed or in- fluenced by such expressions of popular preference. The arrogance and the baldness of their behavior in Portugal can now be added to the list-of events which cause men to resist them wherever they can. The suppression of popu- lar will in Hungary and Czechoslovakia took care of a lot of earlier illusions. The CIA intervened in Chile on the astunp- tion that otherwise Chile would be captured by the Communists. Would it? We can never know. There was a counterrevolution ? and a brutal one at that. If Portugal comes out of its ordeal by its own efforts ? everyone will be better off. And we will know the answers. parties scored such a resounding triumph, added weight to his cautiously sanguine assessments; the past week or so of popular resistance to Communist authoritarian- ism confirmed that forces of democracy and moderation need not be written off in Portugal. This resistande is all the more impressive for having so clearly lacked the same sort of tangible support from abroad that the Soviet Union is providing the locaf, Communists?and which, in an earlier era, the Central, Intelligence Agency might have been tempted to'con- tribute through a variety of covert actions. There is a world of difference between undercover'. manipulation of another country's political affairs and, open expressions of sympathy from an allied govern- ment for the majority will against 4 ruthlesssminority's power play. The United States and the allies of Western ? , Europe are now approaching a common position toward ,the Portuguese struggle; both are holding out the prom- ise of economic aid and support?without which.P,ortu- gal cannot begin to restore its threatened social fabric ?once it is clear that the country's political develop- ment can proceed along democratic lines. , Approved For Release 2001/08/08 :19A-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4 BALTIMORE SUN 28 July 1975 Where the Powers Converge .41?IMMISMOIM ?1?1?11???????? Korea: the Enduring Test of U.S. Asian Policy Washington. Many problems face the Unit- ed States as its thirty years of he- gemony over what we used to call "free Asia" are ending. But the severest tests could come in Ko- rea where Americans already have fought one war and there is concern lest it stumble into anoth- er great tragedy. After all, it was the Korean War in 1950, as?Yale University's diplomatic historian, Gaddis Smith, recalled in a recent New York Times Magazine article, that "inaugurated a generation of American warfare in Asia, froze relations with China in a hostile mold for two decades and led to the debacle in Vietnam." Another Korean war would be infinitely more dangerous and disastrous than Vietnam because Northeast Asia is the geographical meeting point of China, Russia and Japan. And the United States meets all of them there by virtue of its mili- tary presence in South Korea. ? ? ? Unfortunately, a lot of thoughtless, hard-line talk pre- vails which only intensifies a complex, tense situation. In South Korea, the harsh, repressive re- gime of our ally, President Park Chung Hee, almost daily justifies its totalitarian policies at home by predicting an imminent new attack by North Korea. It de- mands that the United States "demonstrate by' deeds its firm determination not to commit the same failure on the Korean penin- sula as it did on the Indochinese peninsula." This is a form of dip- lomatic blackmail, challenging the United States to "prove," in . the wake of Vietnam, that it is not a "pitiful, helpless giant." In Washington, the Ford ad- ministration tries to bolster U.S. "prestige" by proclaiming?also almost daily?its determination to stand by its treaty commit- ments. It even encourages hints that if there is another Korean war the use of "tactical" nuclear weapons against North Korea By R. H. SHACKFORD cannot be ruled out. That is sup- posed to keep North Korea guess- ing, even though we would call it nuclear blackmail if another country were doing it to us. Meanwhile, North Korea keeps repeating what it has claimed for 25 years?that unification of Ko- rea is essential and inevitable, 'while it maneuvers diplomatical- ly for victory at this fall's United Nations Assembly to remove the U.N. flag?merely a symbol ?from South. Korea and to get majority support for American troop withdrawal. ? . ? All this, and more, coincided with the 25th anniversary of the start of the Korean War on June 25, 1950. But another, equally im- portant anniversary, although ig- nored, occured last Saturday?the 22d anniversary of the armistice which ended three years of terri- ble fighting in Korea. That armis- tice still prevails. But no genuine effort by either side has been made since then to take the nor- mal next step?to negotiate a peace settlement. The question of reunification of Korea, an enduring notion, is unrealistic today short of a total military victory by one side or the other. But that does not mean that there is no opportunity for diplo- macy on the Korean problem to- day. It is essential. If detente has any fundamental meaning at all, it is to prevent controversies in small countries leading to conflict between large ones. There are six countries with direct and vital interests in what happens in Korea. Most immedi- ate, of course, are the two Koreas which, a couple of years ago, had talks for a short time on ways to resume contacts and live-and-let- live. There are the three major countries who are Korea's neigh- bors?Japan, not much farther away (125 miles) from Korea, across the Korea Strait, then Cu- ba is from Florida; Russia, whose major Pacific city and naval base, Vladivostok, is only 75 miles from the Korean. border, China, which shares a border of more than 400 miles with North Korea. Then there is the United States which converted South Korea aft- er the Korean War for all practi- cal purposes into a colony, even though in 1947 it had been ready to get out of that country "with the minimum of bad effects." The stakes and the rivalries in the area are tremendous, and some of them date back long be- fore Marxism, Leninism or Maoism became household words. But it should not be beyond the ability of rational men in these six countries to find a formula for preventing a war that no one wants. The formula appears to be so obvious as to be too simple. Reunification of Korea, long ago relegated to the propagand- ists, must be abandoned as a fea- sible objective for the forseeable future. It must be left to time, and more importantly, to the Koreans themselves eventually to decide. ? ? ? The status quo?two Koreas ?is the basic formula for avoid- ing another war. And the surest way to avoid such a war would be agreement among the large pow- ers?the U.S., Russia, China and Japan?to persuade the two Ko- reas that the status quo is in their vital interests, too. Even that idea is Korean. It has been suggested by the leading critic of South Ko- rea's dictator Park, Kim Young Sam, who leads the New Demo- cratic Party. He proposed that the six nations primarily involved meet to find a way to guarantee peace in the Korean peninsula. There is no longer any chance in South Korea for such dissent from the regime's policies?virtually all dissent having been banned in May by President Park. ? Unhappily, most of the talk about Korea, even in Washington, is about another war. At a recent 40 Ford press conference there vias talk (in response to questions) about whether the President would use nuclear weapons if North Korea attacks South Korea.. The President wouldn't say yes? but he didn't say no?only that nu- clear weapons would "be used in our national interest as t should be." There were no ques- tions?and, therefore no answers ?about any diplomatic initia- tives ? .. In his recent Speech to the Ja- pan Society, trying to woo Japan into a new partnership after y. of ignoring that country, Sec ? tary of State Kissinger vowed "to maintain the peace and security of the Korean peninsula . We will assist South Korea...But we shall also seek all honorable ways to reduce tensions and confronta- tions." He made no specific suggestions. . What more honorable way is there?not forgetting the skepti- cism that greets any claim abont, "peace with honor"?than an ef- fort to get the six nations most, crucially involved to seek an agreement to maintain the status quo in Korea and to stop S-211c about "going north" or "going south" or using nuclear weapons? What more honorable way is there?not forgetting the skepti cism that greets any claim about "peace with honor"?than an ef- fort to get the six nations most crucially involved to seek an agreement to maintain the status quo in Korea and to stop talk about "going north" or "going south' or using nuclear weapons? Winston Churchill used to say. "better to jaw, jaw, than to war. war." Now that we have "cele- brated" the 25th anniversary of the start of the Korean War with talk about another war, what more honorable way to "cele- brate" the 22d anniversary of the end of that war by trying a lita, "jaw, jaw" to prevent another. Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R-000100-376003-4- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4 The Washington Star Monday, August 11, 1975 18 Moe. to Prepare Pus As! By Fred S. Hoffman Associated Press U.S. intelligence analysts, believe Thailand and Malay- sia have about 18 months to prepare for major Commu- nist insurgencies. Reports indicate that infiltration into Thailand already has increased since the Communists won in neighboring Indochina this spring. ? Malaysia is less vulner- able than Thailand to large-scale overland infil- tration because it does not border on any Communist- run country. But intelligence sources say Malaysian insurgents have become more aggres- sive in recent months and have sent emissaries to try and obtain U.S. small arms captured by Communist forces in Indochina. INFORMATION collect- ed by U.S. intelligence in Southeast Asia indicates that massive infiltration into northeast Thailand is likely to begin in early 1977 with the objective of "liber- ating" 16 provinces, sources say. By that time, intelligence specialists believe, the Communists will have ce- mented their control throughout Vietnam and Laos and will be ready for a major effort to promote insurgency in neighborning Southeast Asia countries. Worried Thai leaders al- ready are embarked on diplomacy aimed at achiev- ing a live-and-let-live ar- rangement with the Communist Vietnamese, considered the principal threat. The Thais also have been courting support from Communist China in hopes of countering the Viet- namese. MALAYSIAN officials are said to anticipate one or two years of grace before facing serious insurgency troubles. To get ready, they are reported expanding their army, police and vil- lage guard forces. Last week, Thai. Defense Minister Pramarn Adirek- sarn said in Bangkok that "thousands of insurgents" have been receiving war equipment from foreign na- tions which he did not BALTIMORE SUN 13 August 1975 Air ree confirms dru ging. of 13 Ir(ietnamese refu ees Washington (AP)?The Air Force confirmed yesterday that it drugged 13 Vietnamese refu- gees and put them on the last plane from Thailand to Guam while they demanded to be re- turned to Vietnam. ? The Air Force issued a state- ment after Representative ?Joshua Eilberg (D., Pa.), chair- man of the House immigration subcommittee, said he had talked to 12 of the refugees and was told they had been drugged, beaten and taken to Guam against their will. The Air Force, however, had no comment on the alleged beatings and on Mr. Eilberg's statement that the Vietnamese had told him they were threat- ened with jail and then death if they refused to go to Guam. "Near hysteria, they [the refugees] demanded to be re- turned to Vietnam and threat- ened suicide if they were not re- turned immediately," the Air Force said. It said the Vietnamese were sedated with sodium pentathol and also given the tranquilizer thorazine. The Vietnamese had been flown from Vietnam to Thai- land, and Thai officials ada- mantly refused to let them stay, so a decision was made by U.S. and Thai officials "to se- date the Vietnamese and take them to Guam," the Air Force said. The 13 Vietnamese said that when they boarded the plane in Vietnam, they had been told it was flying to the delta region, not out of the country, the Air Force said. "Hours of discussion failed to persuade them that there were no means to take them back," the Air Force said. "The Thai officials were adamant that they leave Thailand imme- diately." - The Air Force said the Viet- namese were sedated with medicines regularly given in evacuation situations "for the patients' comfort or where be- cause of Mental or emotional disturbance they may pose a threat to themselves or others." An Air Force nurse accom- panied the 13 Vietnamese on the flight and "no ill effects were noted," the Air Force said. "Although they were helped aboard the aircraft, all 13 were ambulatory during the flight," the Air Force said. "And all ex- cept one, who insisted on being carried off, left the aircraft at Guam without assistance." The decision to sedate the Vietnamese and take them to Guam with other refugees, the Air Force said, was made with the hope that they could be re- patriated expeditiously. The Air Force said the inci- dent occurred May 1 after South Vietnam had fallen and the drugs were administered by U.S. medical personnel at Uta- pao Air Force Base in Thailand. Mr. Eilberg had said he would conduct a formal slab-- committee inquiry into the in dent if the Air Force did mg give him a full explanation. Mr. Eilberg, who is at GUM with subcommittee membeza on an inspection trip, sag through his Washington office that he did not know why tbe refugees were beaten sad drugged. He said the 13 Vietnams were among 65 people who hat fled to Thailand at the timed the fall of Saigon but changed their minds and asked to retain to Vietnam. "After being threatened by Air Force officers, 52 of the Va-, etnamese agreed to go Guam. The 13 who did not were then threatened first with jab and then death if they did rot go to Guam," Mr. Eilberg's as- nouncement Said. Mr. Eilberg said he was tog during the interviews "that ffe 13 were then beaten and tbes each person was carried kr four Americans into a roam where they were given injections in their arms and bat' in their legs." The Vietnamese said 11- reported the incident to as "American doctor captain" wily told them he believed their story, Mr. Eilberg said. The chairman said he dna not know the identity of the LT- Force officers allegedly respza-? sible for the drugging or the tie- my captain who examined the Vietnamese. name.. About the same time Gen. Kriengsak Chama- nand, chief of the Thai joint military staff, spoke of "preparing our defense strategy and reviewing the military situation daily" in light of increasing internal insurgency and uncertain relations with Thailand's Communist neighbors. But U.S. officials long have been critical of Thai- land's armed forces. Those forces have received more than $600 million in U.S Approved For Release 200148/ equipment but were unable to suppress even a relative- ly low-level insurgency while the North Vietnamese were concentrating on gaining Communist victory in Indochina. AMERICAN officials also have been unhappy over what they consider Thai failure to act effectively in recent years to improve economic and other condi- Although the Thai northeast seems the pre objective, U.S. intellig=e specialists say the VII- namese Communists pan to expand subversion in, other areas of Thailand as well. The Communists are re:- ported to have agents in 42 of Thailand's 71 provinces. They are said to have a goal of training in Nara tions in Thailand's impov- Vietnam some 500 Ti s erished northeast prov- Communist and 500 Vi namese living in northm 089'61A-RK77-00432R00011)0217a01003-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4 NEW YORK TIMES 18 August 1975 Indochina in Flux The Communist bloc's own power struggle for pre- eminence in Indochina shows signs of, intensifying, just three months after the United States abandoned the :? region in defeat. A complex tangle of ideological and his- torical rivalries is provoking friction, not only between ; China, and the Soviet Union but between Vietnamese and Cambodians, and among differing factions in their revo- -lutionary regimes. Long-standing strains between Hanoi and Peking ' showed up openly in the correct but low-key treatment : accorded a North Vietnamese delegation visiting Peking last week. Their rivalry is also evident in the maneuver- .. ing of both sides' partisans in the shadowy. .leadership , of Cambodia. When Phnom Penh recently announced the appointment as new Deputy Premiers of two politicians linked to Hanoi's Vietminh movement, Peking raaio ? hastened to reveal that a top-level Cambodian delegation was about to visit the Chinese capital?the first foreign trip by any of the Cambodian leadership since the Khmer Rouge took control last April. On arrival in Peking, the Cambodians were received with warmth and fanfare. Especially baffling, is the status of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, former Cambodian head of state. who lived in exile in Peking for five years. Though the rebel forces ;vvho.nominally recognizrd his leadership have assumed WASHINGTON STAR 30 July 1975 _ 7-2 to power, the Prince made no apparent effort , to return' : to his capital; indeed, he even left Peking for a long sojourn in North Korea. The United States is hardly in position to influence these obscure maneuvers. even if it had an interest in doing so. But increased flexibility in Washington's ap- proach to the new Communist regimes could help them maintain their independence of both Moscow and Peking. . There is no visible logic, for example, in the Ford Administration's attitude toward private economic iniatives that could lessen Vietnamese dependence on Communist aid. A prominent American banker is per- mitted to visit Hanoi on an exploratory mission, yet American voluntary organizations are explicitly barred from sending economic and development aid to affiliated institutions in Vietnam?aid that they were permitted to supply even while the war was raging! President Ford himself imposed this ban, reportedly against? the recommendation of Secretary of State Kis- singer. -At least one affected organization, the American Friends Service Committee, intends to keep fighting the decision. Fishnets and tractors donated by private Americans are not going to change the course of Indochina's Com- munist politics. But they are symbolic of the change in , official American attitudes which will have to occur if - the United States ever expects to play a more construc- tive role in Vietnam's peace than it did in Vietnain's war. " By Denis D. Gray Associated Press BANGKOK ? The fate of tens of thousands of Indo- chinese refugees still in Thailand hangs in the bal- ance: the United States is not prepared to take the ? bulk of them; the Thai government says it cannot keep them, and the United Nations is only starting to tackle the problem. Thai and American officials estimate there are 90,- ' 000 to 50,000 Cambodians, Laotians and Vietnamese in Thailand. And while the influx of Vietnamese has stop- ped, Cambodians and Laotians continue to come in. Cambodia fell to the Communist-dominated Khmer Rouge in mid-April, South Vietnam fell on April 30 and Laos since has come gradually under the dominant influence of the pro-Communist Pathet Lao. Judging from the latest instructions from Washing- ton, U.S. officials say, at best one-third of the estima0 ed 7,000 Cambodians in Thailand might be allowed into ' the United States. BUT NO MENTION is made of the largest refugee group, the Meo hill tribes people of Laos, who were considered among the best and most loyal fighters the U.S. government supported in Indochina. The United States has to date taken in about 80 per- cent of the Indochinese refugees that have already been resettled outside of Thailand, according to United Nations and U.S. Embassy statistics. Thailand has been saddled with the problem of car- ing for the refugees mostly because of 1,700 miles of border with Laos and Cambodia and proximitY to Viet- nam. It faces the refugee problem with considerable po- litical embarrassment -since the Thai government- is anxious for peaceful coexistence with its new , Communist-dominated neighbors. "Our standing policy toward the refugees is to send all of them back to their homelands while helping them the best we can for humanitarian reasons," Premier Kukrit Pramoj told newsmen recently. "We don't want the refugees to create misunderstandings with our Indochinese neighbors." ' MOST WESTERN observers, however, do not fore- see the Thais actually forcing refugees back across the frontiers and predict that some at least 'may quiet- ly be allowed to settle in the country. But largely, Thai policy has been one of "wait and see," hoping the United States and other countries will take the refu- gees off their hands. Several reliable U.S. diplomatic sources and Amez:i- ban refugee relief workers here say high-ranking Thai officials have told them privately that the lives of the refugees are not being made too comfortable so as to' dampen any desires for staying in Thailand perma- nently. U.S. Embassy officials in the refugee program say many of the remaining 2,000 Vietnamese refugees in Thailand meet the two criteria for admittance to the United States ? employment by the U.S. government at the time of the American evacuation of South Viet- nam or having a relative in the United States. VERY FEW OF the Cambodians meet such requirements for entry and almost all the 2,400 "spaces" set aside by Washington for Cambodians coming from Thailand have now been filled and the refugees flown out of the country, the officials say. These "spaces" were not subject to the normal crite- ria. A State Department cable earlier this month: said Cambodian and Laotian "leaders" and "high-risk personnel" ? those whose lives might be in serious danger if they returned to their homelands ? would be granted entry, the officials said. It is difficult to esti- mate how many refugees could fit into these two cate- gories, but a diplomat charged with the Cambodian refugee problem said between 2,000 and 3,000 might qualify. The estimated 4,000 ethnic Lao and 34,000 Meo- tribesmen have not been designated as "refugees" by Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010070003!4 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003t4 the American government ani consequently none has to date been admitted to the United States, the officials say. U.T. KADRY, the regional director of the U.N. High Commission for Refugees, said in an interview that his agency has not yet provided aid to the camps but has helped several hundred "legal entrants" from Indo- chinese nations, including payment for their air fares out of Thailand. ? "Legal entrants" are people with proper exit docu- ments and identification papers and they form a minor fraction of the total refugee population in Thailand. , Kadry said he hoped a recent meeting between Thai Foreign Minister Chatichai Choonhavan and U.N. offi- dals in Geneva would produce some concrete steps 'toward "a permanent solution" to the refugee prob- ? lem. The foreign minister told newsmen that the International Red Cross and the U.N. High Commis- sion would send representatives to see what could be done to help the Thai government in dealing with the refugee problem. Chatichai said Prince Sadruddin Agha Khan, the head of the commission, told him his ,agency would try to allocate some funds for the refu- gees. ? . ? THOUSANDS of the refugees live under conditions which a U.S. diplomat charged with the Cambodians described as "generally poor." He said that during his recent visit to one of the largest refugee camps, about 1,000 Cambodians had no meat, vegetables or fruit to eat and that only a small bag of rice and some dried fish were provided daily to each family. He added that BALTIMORE SUN 13 August 1975 Mary McCrory he detected signs of malnutrition and fever, especially among the children, and said medical care was sub- standard. "They get just enough to keep them alive," he said of conditions at the Aranyaprathet border camp. "The people are literally packed together like in a concen- tration camp. They don't want these people comfortable, they want them out." ? Least is known by Thai and American officials about the Laotians, the most recent of the refugee groups. , One embassy official said about half of the estimated 4,000 ethnic Lao might qualify for entry to the United? States. HE SAID THE United States would probably not permit the Moo hill tribes people to go, especially since they would probably want to emigrate en masse. To control the refugee population, Thailand has an- nounced that all who fail to register and obtain proper identification papers by Sunday will be arrested and charged with illegal entry. Statistics compiled by the U.S. Embassy and the United Natons give the following breakdown of Cambodian and Vietnamese refugees in Thailand who were accepted by foreign nations as of early July: United States 6,500, Malaysia 700, France 600, Canada. -300, Norway 83, Austria 29, Italy 8, New Zealand 1 and, Belgium I. One refugee official at the American Embassy said' representatives of other nations occasionally stop by to enquire about procedures for accepting refugees but to date have taken no action. ? ? Reprisal Guides U.S. and Vietnam Washington. - As usual, the reflex for re- 'prisal is guiding our relations with Vietnam. Upon the Security Conn- :nirs rejection of South Korea ,for membership in the United :Nations, the United States -promptly threatened to veto -the applications of North and South Vietnam. The principle evoked was _resistance to what the State ? Department terms "a selec- .tive program of universality." ? Said a representative of -the- American Friends Service 'committee, whose application .forlicenses to ship machinery to Vietnam was turned down recently by the State Depart- ment, "It seems as though some people in this govern- ment are still fighting the var." 7.- The reason given, by the .way, was that while private agencies like the Quakers can .send food and medicine to the war-ravaged country, "devel- opmental items" cannot be li- censed. The machinery was destined for a small workshop for the handicapped. The UN action is explained by Philip M. Habib, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, as meaning that "the other side can't decide who is eligible." "We don't want to exclude anyone," he says, "but how can anyone argue that South Vietnam belongs, when no- -body even knows who their thenAppro around and say South Korea Thieu regime. doesn't belong?" If what are called "normal , The UN explanation is that relations" were resumed, it is customary when only one those people could communi- half of a divided country ap- cate with their friends and plies to turn it down. North families. Korea has evinced no interest. What the episode illus- trates, beyond what some call "sandbox diplomacy," is that it may be a long time before the Ford administration can bring itself to acknowledge that the Viet Cong won the war and to sit down as equals with Madame Binh of the Provisional Revolutionary Government. The secretary of state keeps saying we have to see how the South Vietnam gov- ernment "behaves," as if it were a newly released felon. Mr. Habib concedes that there is "no evidence of a ma- jor bloodbath," but tells of re- ports of "massive repressive- ness and brutal re-education." If and when the Saigon government changes from military to civilian?a move promised vaguely for later this month?the pressure for recognition from U.S. busi- nessmen, private voluntary agencies, Americans with relatives in Vietnam and those people in Congress who regard the present policy as vindictive would increase. The people most affected by diplomatic recognition, of course, would be those refu- gees who dramatically fled the country, with our help, long our disastrous and futile The administration last month decided to offer "vol- untary repatriation" as an op- tion to the refugees?some of whom were admittedly scooped up willy-nilly?and turned the whole matter over to the UN high commissioner on refugees. Since that time, a UN spokesman said, the office has received and processed 3,000 applications. The Saigon gov- ernment required each appli- cant to fill out a question- naire. Most put down "reunion with family" as their reason for seeking re-entry. The UN has opened an of- fice in Hanoi and made a writ- ten promise of another in Sai- gon. The new regime is so far, however, not holding out open arms. "It has other priorities," says a UN refugee commis- sioner representative. It would seem that self-in- terest as well as humanitari- anism?not to mention the oft-voiced concern for the MIA's?might dictate a change from the present isola- tionism. After all, it was to avoid that sin, we were told, that we had to maintain for so 15 August 19 75 NEW YORK TIMES Zaotiani Charge Two U.S. Diplomats With Spy Activities ? BANGKOK, Thailand, Aug. ,114 (UPJ)?The Laotian Govern- . inent has accused United States i Embassy officials in a diploma tic protest of "spy and sabotage activities" in photographing a government compound. The note was delivered yes- terday by the Foreign Minis- try's chief political officer to the chargd d'affaires, Thomas, orcoran. - Embassy officials said there would be no answer. The substance of the protest Was broadcast by the Vientiane `radio and printed in Laotian newspapers. It said that two embassy Officials had taken photographs 'onkthree occasions at Kik:meter, 94 the former compound of 'the. Agency- for International Pe2elopment. '.f.The aforesaid acts of the two Americans are acts violat- inc.: Laotian law as well as international law, in particular thd Vienna Treaty of April 18, 1961 on diplomatic relations ris.1 privileges," the note said. It said the picture-taking constituted "spy and, sabotage activities in Laos." ? "The Laotian Foreign Minis- try hereby demands that the: I:Ttited States Embassy be re.? spbrisible for any consequences that might arise from the af;,.:-e-1 'said acts," it added. "The tian Foreign Ministry 'yarns) the United States Embassy for; the first and the last time to' prevent the recurrence of such; illegal acts." government is, and 4ViifIF6VeNelbains 2410t#08/08MOIPARDP717300432R1000 100370003-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4 LOS ANGELES TIMES 27 July 1975 AS. THETWO VIETNAMS ,ADJUST i BY GARETH rOlaTER . , ? The future relationship ? between North' - and South Vietnam .remains Unclear to :- outsiders. There have, been indications in 'hoth public and private Vietnamese state- dnents that formal reunification will not ;take place for years. Nevertheless, there . ?Ilas been much speculation that the North iast,al ready moved to take over the istration of the South, in the ;form of the' Saigon Military Management Committee.: ,(MMC). : ???; The assumption underlying this specilla;. ..- .tion is that the present adthinistrative ?the revolutionary army in ?South Vide ..)iam constitutes North Vietnamese hegee *ony. This widely, accepted assumption is measure of the ga0 between Vietnamese. ? e'.ealities and the language which has. koverned American thinking about Viet- ., ,? ealam for the past decade.? ? .; ,c U.S. officials first convinCed, thernielveS hnd; then convinced the American public': that it was; essentially a war between ;; North Vietnam and ,South ;Vietnam. The''..e uttonfusion? of the; leadership of the. Lao Tong Party as well, as the revolutionary rhrmed "forces in the South with North Vietnam continues to confound 'American 4.inderstanding of the nature of the new re- Igirrie in Saigon. ' ?-? . ? . 7 The misconception begiifg, With 4trUtht the basic line of the Vietnamese revolue - _lion on problems of strategic importance is sion of 'our cotintryno longer exists." , But the Vietnamese leaders have rong distinguished between- their dernand'. for . the removal of external constraints on the:, e two zones created by the Geneva accord Of 1.1954 and the question of how formal reun- ification, would come about: On external constraints, they have been inflexible and unyielding in diplomatic contacts; on reun- ification, they have been willing to corn- promise from the beginning of the Conflict. The political unity which, ? has 'now, been ' achieved by the Victory of the revolutiona- ; ry forces in the South does not mean,- therefore, that the South will new be sub- sumed into ? a unitary adininistration, or. subordinate to the North. ? ? . The Military Management Cominittee for , Saigon and surrounding Gia Dinh province. ? has often been 'identified as -belonging; to the "North Vietnainese "NVA';" as officials 'and journalists called it during' the war. -.'e; , But the "NVA".? was always a? figment ;of the American iMagination, necessary. to 'the official position that the boundary line ? between, the ; -ionee 1.corresponded somehow to the fundamental political cite- ''age in the'CountrY; No such .term existed?.in the 1.evolutIoeary vocabulary on either side. of ;the line.. The relationship betw-een 'ethe CoMinimist military structure and the geographical division of the country re- quires a brief histerical resume for proper ; ; ; ; ' ; ? ?-e - ective :? ' etermined it has been today. as as since the Pers P eginning of the revolution ; by the Lao The Vietnam .Peoples Army (Quan Doi ,Pong Party Central .Coinmittee.'? Most of e; .'leThan Dan Vietnam); which was thetriilita;-? -etli?embers of the Central Committee?, e. arm of the Viet Mirth movernent during ;ithough *by no means all of them?have . e its resistance against' the French, Was 4 national army with units in-every area . of ? :." the-country: Only because,' Geneva. Jjagreement called-for a temporary regroup,' merit ? of .the :Viet" Minh and; the French fortes: *?'-the;:entire Vietharn People's ? ArmY -(VPA)' physically concentrated in ; ?? the northern zone after May, 1955. The importance of its southern com- ponent is indicated by the fact that, by 1959, five full VPA divisions out of a total of 20 were made up entire- ly of southern regroupees. . When the struggle resumed in 1960 in South Vietnam, southern cadres who had regrouped to the North be- gan to return to the South to help lead the military forces of the Na- tional Liberation Front. But instead of leading the struggle in the name of the Vietnam People's Army, which was clearly an all-Vietnamese institu- tion, the party set up a "People's Liberation Armed Forces" command in the South in 1961, which was os- tensibly independent of the VPA. The PLAF claim to separateness from the North was to become a ma- jor target: of American propaganda, given the fact that many of the PLAF's officers and troops would: come from the VPA. 44? Why did the party attempt to; }Seen :physically located in Hanoi foi.' the . . past two decades, for obvious reasons. But that does not, make it a "North Vietnam- ese". leadership or a "North Vietnamese" Communist Party in' any meaningful politi- cal sense. For ?the Central committee in- cledes representatives of the party., from all, three 'traditional regions of Vietnam? north, center and south. It is' the political leadership of the pear tentral Committee over a nationwide. or- tanization whieh insures' that, beneath the. ; .:present formal division of the country, the ;'.two zones Cannot drift apart or be posed in . ; ? '.:4 former correspondent in Saigon, .and formerly a 'research associate ? at Cornell, Gareth .Parler- is director. of the Indochina ? . ? ? Resource Center, in Washington. He spent,. .18 days id Hanoi last December and fan-, nary. Ills book. on the Paris. agreement, "A..;.: . Peace Denied,' is to 1?e published in Scptern- ber. ? ? ? A, ?. , ? - :?1 '! opposition to each 'other. And now that the demarcation line at the 17th parallel is no 'longer an international boundary forced', 'on the Vietnamese by an outside power -but merely an administrative convenience,' 'Col: Gen.' Tran Van Tra,.chairman of the '.Military Management Committee in 'Sai- gon, could declare on May '15,' "The diVie maintain an exclusively "southern military command in the form of the PLAF? Central Committee member Hoang Tung, who participated in the decision, explained to me last Jan- uary in Hanoi that they feared a di rect American military intervention in the conflict in the South if there was any provocation. If the North, was directly, involved, he 'said, the United States probably would attack North Vietnam, which was then in the midst of an ambitious five-year development plan. ; Nevertheless, the entire military' leadership from South and South Central Vietnam from the first resis- tance war were all still in the North. They would be needed as the milita- ry conflict in the South steadily esca-. lated. Gen. Tran Van Tra, a native?of - South Vietnam's Quang Ngai pro- vince who had been secretary of the party committee for the South as well as commander of the entire in- terzone of Eastern Cochin Chine, or Nam 130 (roughly the southern half of South Vietnam) from 1950 to 1954, returned to the South in 1963 to be- come commander in, chief of all armed forces in the South and secre- tary. of the party military committee once more. Some zone commanders also were southerners. ; There was thus a high degree of continuity in the PLAF command and staff with the military leadership of the caner Viet Minh resistance in Nam Bo. But while it favored officers' who were natives of the South, the VPA Command did not hesitate ,to send northerners to the battlefront when their experience was needed. As larger numbers of northern troops moved into the South, the United States portrayed their pre- sence as an. instrument of northern domination of the South. What few Americans knew but most Vietnam- ese remembered vividly was that northerners had come to the South to fight in the anti-French resistance as well. In December, 1945, when the resistance had just begun in the South but there was no French pre- sence in the North, the Ho Chi Minh government had sent 10,000 northern volunteers to the South 'in what was proudly called the "Nam Tien" (March South). In the Vietnamese historical context, therefore, the arri- val of northern troops after 1965 had a precedent as an act of solidarity rather than of domination. In the last stage of the war, U.S. _officials carried the argument of northern hegemony over the South to its ultimate conclusion, claiming that southerners no longer played a significant role in the Communist military forces in the South. Lt. Gen. Daniel 0. Graham, director of the De- fense Intelligence Agency, testified last January that southerners had 6. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010637000i-4 constituted 'Only 20% of the Commu- nist forces in the South after the Tet offensive and that by 1975 the num-' ber of southerners in the PLAF was But this testimony is contradicted by National Security Memorandum No. 1, compiled in January, 1969, which revealed that the CIA official- , ly estimated at the end of 1968 that there were somewhere between 145,- 000 and 210,000 southern Communist , /troops, including the support troops and guerrillas, normally included in " the order of battle, or about 60%. , ? The number of indigenous southern' . troops fell sharply from 1968 to 1972. because of the hundreds of thousands , of casualties from U.S. firepower, the , depopulation :of the South Vietnam- ese countryside, and the decision by ? the ,Lao Dong Party leadership against continuing to throw its main force units against the Americans . while U.S. troop withdrawal proceed- ed. But the role played by souther- ', ners in the PLAF was still vital. ? s Official Administration estimates of Communist troop strength included 80,000 southern main-force troops and another 50,000 guerrillas by the .beginning of 1975, or about 40% of the total estimated Communist force ? in the South. . Once Saigon surrendered on April '30, moreover, northern troops essen- tially faded into the background. Ac- cording to an eye-witness account, in s.' the first days after the takeover by the Provisional Revolutionary Government, the North Vietnamese; ? soldiers were ordered to turn in their weapons and wandered around the: city as civilians. It was the southern' - guerrillas and cadres who came into,, the city to reestablish and maintain, , order. It was southerners who went into the neighborhoods to talk with- - the people and acquaint them with., the new regime, according to ?,,, - eye-witness. - The members of the Military. Man- agement Committee, are certainly no -strangers to the Saigon area. Chair- man Tran Van Tra has spent-nearly.: two decades commanding troops in, the region. And while the MMC's spe.... cialized sections in the various minis- , tries, include a number of northern officers as well as northern techni- cians brought in to assist in postwar ? tasks, they are supplementing rather, than replacing southern officers and, technicians. The MMC is only a tem? porary body Whose mandate is estab? lishment of the social, econemic and' administrative basis for the work of,: the PRG. The rumors that the PRG will no' longer have a political or administra,7 tive role are premature. While the., PRG has stayed in the background , since the April takeover, it has not: been idle. According to the well-in,f formed correspondent for the Far Eastern Economic Review,. Nayane Chanda, PRG officials have been stu-: dying long-term problems, making, observation trips to the countryside' and planning policy guidelines. Sai-.: gon radio broadcasts on a June 4 ses- sion of the PRG cabinet in Saigon'. make it clear that the MMC is re- sponsible to the PRG. s ? * The ? prospect for the next few, months, therefore, is not for a sudden. ?move to reunite the two zones under-. Hanoi's administration, but for a) southern government which would; begin the slow evolution toward a sct ciety more compatible with the, northern zone. The party leadership-, has no desire to impose a Socialist-: system on the South while there is substantial opposition to it. "We are, ? in no s'hurry to establish socialism-, there," said Hoang Tung in a conver-- ?sation with American visitors in. 1973, noting "the reality in the South. that a large part of the population still doesn't approve of socialism." For the foreseeable future, South Vietnam will have a mixed economy in which those industries already in government hands under the old re- gime or which do not have sufficient private investment will be nationa- lized, while small industry and agri- culture 'will remain in private hands. ? This mixed economy in the South ? will remain for a "relatively long per- iod," Hoang Tung told recent visitors to Hanoi, even after reunification. On the political plane, the revolu- tionary government will also try to accommodate non-Communist politi- cal groups and personalities which were not connected directly with the United States and the former Saigon regime. Like the Union government after the American civil war, it will prevent those who were active sup- porters of the Saigon government from immediately reentering political life. But some of those who were op- posed to American intervention will be able to form parties, publish news- papers and run for office. What was formerly called the "third force's can be expected to be represented in a reorganized PRG when it assumes full responsibilities, as well as in a new assembly when it. is elected. PRG officials in Canada re- cently confirmed that the PRG would "broaden the basis of government itiZ the future," by adding those who had, been anti-United States, during the, war. Gen. Tra has reaffirmed the PRG's intention of holding an elec.? tion for a new government at an un?Li specified time in the future, afterl Which the PRG, could remove thee, "provisional" from its name. The Vietnamese revolutionaries" feel strongly about reunification of" their country, believing, with Ho Chi Minh, that "Vietnam is one country,. the Vietnamese people is one people.' Rivers may dry up, mountains mar, erode, but this truth will not change."s But. after 80 years of French cola-) nialism and 20 years of American dbminance in the South, they are: prepared to move with deliberation': and patience on the problem or bringing the two zone's under a single' administration, avoiding policies, which would suggest the imposition,. of the system in the North on the:, South. The result, they hope, will be the development of a consensus in i the South on the terms under which the two zones would once more be) Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIAL4DP77-00432R000100370003-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4 WASHINGTON POS 10 August 1975 The President's Turni n Panama rrIlE PRESIDENT'S delay in moving to consummate ? -11-:? negotiations for a new Panama Canal treaty threatens to produce at least three kinds of damage. First,- despite the Panamanian government's efforts to ? maintain control, it may be impossible to prevent riots or Sabotage that would deny the United States and ... other nations the continued, efficient use of this . major .international waterway. Second, failure to negoti- ate- a treaty Would inflame American relations not only With Panama but also with all other Latin American nation's that are united on this issue as on no other? in r.bbt1Vphilosophy_a1id diplomatic position.. American failure to set aside the "big stick" with which Teddy Robseyelt acquired the Canal Zone, and to move . into new-? association respecting Panama's sovereignty, would -be condemned everywhere. Finally, My. Ford, by having created a messy and unnecessary crisis on the U.S doorstep, would project the image of a Presi- dent unable to handle foreign affairs?an image that can- only lihrt his, prospects for re-election next .year. :With these negative prospects so unmistakable, why then -is Mr. Ford dragging his feet on a new treaty? It has been 18 months, after all, since his Secretary of State. promised, in Panama.: "In the President's name, I Ifettby commit the United States. to complete this negotiation successfully and as quickly as possible." And-it. has ?been more than: four months since negotia- tions th Panama were effectively suspended. The reason for the suspension was a disagreement between the Defense Department and the. State Department over how the U.S. relationship with Panama ought to be changed. - . The pentagon's attitude is perhaps best conveyed by the---fact that, though. seaplanes went out of use years ago; the Navy has wished to retain a seaplane ramp site in Panama for "contingency planning." With just such inflated " and over-anxious conceptions of its own de- fense.,reSponsibilities, the, Pentagon has resisted efforts to :return' control of the Canal Zone and canal to. Pan- ama. The period 4of return .contemplated in a- new treat, .by the way?a period in which the United States would retain major rights?stretches out over ? several .decades. It is not as though the American flag were .to be hauled down tomorrow. And it is not as though, once the Panamanian flag alone were flying in the Zone, that -the United States would allow itself to be shut out of- the canal. On that point surely the Panamanians have no illusiOns: Unrestricted transit will- remain a vital interest that the United States can be expected, at almost any cost, and by almost any means, to protect. ' , NEW YORK TIMES' 17 August 1975 TI.e 'Forgotte Americans By James Reston ? s The State. Department, on the other hand, has argued* -7-persuasively, in our view?that the best way to en- . sure continued American .use of the canal is to make a new treaty that will drain off the nationalist bitter- ness that the Panamanians feel about the old one. Teddy Roosevelt's Secretary of State conceded, at the time, that the 1903 treaty was "vastly advantageous to the United States, and we must confess, not so acWantageous to Panama." What hurt the Panamanians most was :the treaty provision granting the United States control. Over its most vital resource?a swath . cutting the: country in half?"in perpetuity." No modern nation . can be 'expected to tolerate such a legacy of imperialism. ! And since riots or sabotage ire-the only likely ,threat 4 to the canal, it makes all the more sense to take a -! diplomatic step?a n:ew treaty?that will at least re.- duce if not eliminate the possibility that the threat. will become a reality. Not making the new treaty, in our, - "view, very nearly 'guarantees that this threat will in fact . Materialize, and under conditions that promise i no sympathy for the United States, from the rest of J. the hemisphere. ? ? Mr. Ford, however,? so far has not chosen ?to break the bureaucratic impasse that preparation of an Ameri- can negotiating position has reached. The apparent, reason is that he fears a political backlash from the rightWing conservative elements that are tightly organ- ized to maintain the status quo. Some of his political advisers have been telling him that it would be ".politi- ' cal suicide" on .the eve of an election year to hand to ? the likes of Ronald Reagan the ammunition that- an enlightened treaty stance might provide. We submit, however, .that Mr. Ford ought not to allow himself to be intimidated by the specter`of a backlash/ on this issue. Just before Congress went on .holiday, for in- stance, more than 60 senators agreed to oppose an anti- treaty resolutien being prepared by Sen. Harry Byrd (I-Va.)?an impressive display of pro-treaty strength. If the Joint Chiefs of Staff were to swing publicly be- .hind a reasonable negotiating position, then the op- position in Congress and the eountrY wotild surely be 'reduced to a manageable hard core. . President Ford L then, has no good reason that we ,can see for allowing ;questionable political and bureau- cratic considerations to stand in the path of. an _action that the national -interest plainly requires. He ihntild stop following course?delay?that could provoke canal-closing riots and that could cost the United States . heavily in its international relations, especially in Latin America. He should move promptly to complete negor Hations on a new treaty, with Panama. ' MEXICO CITY, Aug. 16?In the last few days, the Foreign Secretary of Mexico, Emilio 0. Rabasa, has been in Moscow signing air economic, sci- entific and technological agreement With the Soviet Union and the other members of. the Communist economic bloc. At the same time, President Eche- verria of Mexico, whose term of office ends next year, and who is building support as a "third. world" candidate 146 to succeed Kurt Waldheim as Secre- tary General of the United Nations, was completing a three-week trip across the world from India, the Mid- dle East, and Northern-Africa to Cuba., These widely ignored events are re- minders of two significant facts: First, that while the United States has been preoccupied with other parts or the world, our neighbors in the Western Hemisphere have been strengthening their ties with Europe, Japan and the Soviet Union; and second, that while Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4 . - ? "Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010037006-4 the Soviet Union - has been' steadily building- its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, and China has been attempting the same in Southeast Asia, the United States "special relation- ship" with. Latin America has been ?steadily declining. Ten years ago, when the cold war was in full swing and the Cuban crises were bitter memories, Latin America acquiesced, though grudgingly, in the economic and political dominance of the United States and tended to fol- ? low Washington's lead in the United Nations. The Situation is quite different now. Politically, the cold war has abated. Cuba is less of a public issue, while'. the 'U.S. domination of Panama and the Canal has become the most alarm- ing and diyisive issue since the Bay of Pigs?and is now regarded here and elsewhere in Latin America as a major threat to Henry Kissinger's Latin American _policy. . . Economically, with the increase of industrialization of the major Latin American states, the direction, volume, and terms of trade in the hemisphere are changing dramatically. Latin America seeks more access to the United States markets ? the United States trade surplus last year was $1.2- billion ? and Latin America's markets are becoming more important to the big multinational U.S. 'corporations, the control of which is causing new problems and tensions in thig part of the world. The Linowitz "Commission on U.S.- Latin American Relations," headed by Sol Linowitz', former United States ? NEW YORK TIMES 11 August 1975 Hopes of Nicaraguan Opposition Rise th S t of t e . nvoy Ambassador to the Organization 'of' American States, summed up the prob- lem as follows: In the last decade, "Latin America has changed; the rela- tions between Latin America and the U.S. have changed; the role of the U.S. in world affairs has changed. . . . "Lack of sustained official and gen- eral public interest in Latin America by the U.S. makes it hard to impress on our country's citizens, or even on its officials, how much has been- hap- pening in the Americas. But unchang- . ing. policies in the face of rapidly changing conditions is a sure recipe for trouble." Secretary of State Kissinger and , William D. Rogers, his intelligent and well-informed Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, are aware of all this, but Mr. Kissinger is preoccu-- pied with other problems: of arms con- trol with the Soviet Union, the price , of oil, the--problems of peace in the Middle East, and the latest crisis in Portugal. In the short run he is probably right. He is dealing with the immediate tur- moil of world affairs and this requires 48 hours every day. But in the long run, the security of the United States and even its relations with the rest of the world, may very well depend on the stability of the Americas as a whole?perhaps even more than al- most anything else. Ideology is a mat- ter of transitory opinion, but geog- raphy is an enduring fact, and this is, an immediate problem in our relations with the rest of the hemisphere. For there is much criticism in this Part of the world about Washington's excessive rhetoric. Presidents Roose- velt, Kennedy, Johnson and Secretary Kissinger, in his offer of a "new dia- logue," have all recognized the impor- tance of a new deal for the new world, but it has been, a long time coming, and the problem remains and deepens. It is immensely complicated, for ? most of these countries are producing more people than food or goods, and they are at different stages of develop- ment, with alarming gaps between the very rich and the very poor. . The danger of a guerrilla war against,United States control of Pan- ama is very real and a threat to our entire hemisphere policy. The danger of illegal Mexican immigration into the ' United States ? 710,000 illegal Me7r- ? jeans were arrested in the United States last year?is even more of a , menace for the future, with Mexico's population expetted to go from sixty. million at the present time to 125 mu- lion by the end of the century. So one fact is fairly obvious. The hemisphere is not getting the atten- tion and priority it deserves from. the ? United States. This may be ore redson why Panama is bringing the Canal tq, the point of crisis, and why the Mexicans are male- ing agreements with the Communist economic bloc and identifying them- selves with the organization of the-un- derdeveloped "third world." They are in trouble at home, in Latin America and the Caribbean, and they are trying by new alignments and sharper con- frontations to gerinir attention:. . By. ALAN RIDING Special to The New York Times International Studies. Normalr diplomatic practice is for one, or two months to pass between the departure of an ambassa-! dor and the .arrival of his suc-' cesmr. piplomatic sources said that 'General Somoza, who t was 'trained at West Point and whose family has ruled this Central American republic for the last 40 years, has also tried MANAGUA, Nicaragua I?The imminent replacement of thej controversial United States Ambassador to Managua, who over five years has become a friend and adviser of the long- time dictator, Gen. Anastasio Somoza Debayle, is both rais- ing hopes and causing concern ? here. Opposition groups are hoping that the withdrawal of Ambas- sador Turner B. Shelton will mark the end of the total iden- tification of the United States 'with the regime and perhaps lead Washington to press Gen- era! Somoza to liberalize his Government. President Somoza, on the . other hand, is , reportedly so worried that the change of am- .bassadors could affect his re- lationship with Washington that he campaigned to have Mr. Shelton's assignment extended. When this failed, according to :diplomats here, he arranged for the Ambassador to remain in Managua until the last possible moment. As a result,- Mr. Shelton will leave Nicaragua on the morning of Aug.' I), several weeks behind schedule and just hours, .before the arrival of his succes-' sor, James D. Theberge, former; director of Latin-American! 'studies at Georgetown Univer- sity's, Center for StrategiA00- ? flection of the United States' immense political influence over Nicaragua. The United States occupied and governed the country between 1912 and 1925 and again between 1927 and 1933, and since then Washington's backing has been a key factor .in enabling the Somoza family to perpetuate it-' self in power. "American ambassadors have to influence Washington to of- always been seen here as sort, fer Ambassador Shelton a pres_ of viceroys or proconsuls," at tigious new assignment on the foreign official explained, "and! !ground that his abrupt demo_ both the Government and the tion or dismissal would imply opposition have always tried censure of his close ties with to win their support." the Nicaraguan President. But well-placed sources said the State Department had no intention of offering the 59- year-old Mr. Shelton, 'a former movie industry executive, an- other diplomatic post and that his only hope for a government job lay with the White House. They added that Mr. Shelton's relations with the State De- partment had long been strained and that he had taken to sending his reports to Secre- tary of State Kissinger in his capacity as head of the White House's National Security, Council. What His Critics Charge ' The main criticism of Ambas- sador Shelton has been that he has ? cultivated his relations with General Somoza to the exclu- sion of all other political fig- ures, particularly well-known opponents of the regime. The fact that he speaks no Spanish has also helped isolate him from many Nicaraguan sectors. "Shelton's biggest hero is Somoza," a diplomat said, "and Somoza obviously trusts Shel- ton completely. Shelton is prob- ably more exposed to the local president that any other United' States ambassador in the; world. He spends at ,least 101 hours a week with Somoza and half the time they re alone and; The controversy that has conal no one knows what they dis-.! stantly surrounded Ambassador ciNttIPFciteRe1eartEP2001,1913 Oakt 61A143413F127e#3043aRd 147 ever, it was no secret that Gen eral Somoza relied heavily on lAmbassador Shelton's advice. !After the earthquake in Decem- ber, 1972, that destroyed down- 'town Managua and took over 10,000 lives, Mr. Shelton not only arranged for 500 Amen- can soldiers to be flown from; the Panama Canal Zone to help!, ;in the emtrgency and symtio1-1 !ize United States support; but Ihe also spent long hours help- ling General Somoza re-estab- lish a semblance of government. In December last year, after 12 prominent Nicaraguans were kidnapped by leftist guerrillas,: the Ambassador again acted as! President Somoza's closest con-1 fidant and was constantly by his side. General Somoza's apprecia- tion of Mr.. Shelton has been 'demonstrated bY the large num- ber of official going-away par- ties arranged in his honor, in- cluding one given by the Presi- dent himself in the National Palace. The Ambassador's final days here are also being covered in the official news- paper Novedades with the solemnity of a space-mission countdown. Opponents of the regime are not alone in being upset by the Ambassador's partiality.. Sharp disagreements between itailuisWoltn,d ,several senior YR.r'United States Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4 Embassy became common l knowledge in local political cir- cles. Sitting in his office besidet signed photographs of ? Presi- dents Nixon and Ford, the Am- bassador defended himself against his critics. "It's the job of an ambassador to establish the best possible relationship with the president of a friendly country," he said in an inter- view. 'I don't think of it in terms of a personal relation- ship, but I think President So- moza is a very nice man. He is lfriendly to the United States,1 the does a good job and he's al hard-working leader who hasj done a lot to improve things in this country. I'm sure if there were elections supervised by the United Nations, General Somoza would win." The announcement of Mr.' Shelton's withdrawal sparked rumors in opposition circles that his successor would be more liberal, but embassy per- sonnel have hastened to ex- plain that Ambassador The- berge "may have a different personal style but will proba- bly have the same politics." They point out that Mr. The- berge's recent publications in- CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 4 August 1975 Details conflict Q.11..e... leftist - By James Nelson Goodsell , Latin America correspondent of ,The Christian Science Monitor,,, , . - - BuenOs Aires Some ?sort of collusion between Chilean securiti:offciers and groups in Argentina is thought to lie behind the mysterious deaths in Argentina of 119 Chilean leftists, who were known to have been under arrest in Chile... The , ? ? _ - _The bizarre and complex details of the case; which could mushroom into a trans-Andean ? scandal.-are coming to light here and in :Santiago, the 'Chilean capital. ? ? ? The case may well have been a factor in the decision last month of the Chilean military government to bar the planned visit to Chile of:. a United Nations human rights committee.? ... In the Past months articles have appeared in Chile's controlled press indicating that the 119 were killed in guerrilla skirmishes in Ar- gentina. But there is no word in these reports on how, the Chileans got to Argentina while supposedly under arrest in Chile. , The information for these articles was said to come from two sources: an Argentine magazine, Lea, which put out its first and only issue on July 15 and a Brazilian newspaper that sources in Rio de Janeiro indicate does not even exist.? The same Chilean newspapers also reported ? dude books entitled "The So- viet Presence in Latin America" and "Russia in the Caribbean." Nicaragua's main opposition leader, Dr. Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, publisher of the newspaper La Prensa and presi- dent of the Democratic Libera- tion Union, expressed the hope in an interview that Ambassa- dor Shelton's successor "is a correct person who does not in- terfere in the struggle of Nicaraguans to obtain their liberation and Who discontinues the ,policy of supporting cor- rupt dictatorships like that of the Somozas." . those on the list had turned up in Buenos Aires: But when family members of the two came to Buenos Aires to check the stories, they discovered that the bodies were not those of their loved ones. Further investigations dis- closed that the identity cards with the bodies were not those of the missing Chileans and. : probably were fabrications, ? _ "- The 119 were, in the Main, One-time mem- bers of the now outlawed extremist Mov- imiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR).? They were arrested at various times in 1974. Most were under 30, and at least one-fourth of them were women. Once arrested, the majority simply dropped out of sight despite strenuous efforts by their families, human rights organizations, and others to get information on their, where- abouts. In a few cases, information did come from specific sources ? the International Red Cross, released prisoners, and, in at least one instance, from the Chilean Foreign Ministry_ U.S. Reassures Nicaragua Special to The New York Times WASHINGTON, Aug. 10 ? State Department officials said the Ford Administration had re- cently assured Nicaragua thatl the replacement of Ambassador, Shelton was "not to be taken, as representing any change inl United States policy" toward' that country. The officials said that Nica- ragua had been told that Amer- ican foreign policy was con- ducted "with countries, not with persons," and that a normal ambassadorial term was two years. The Foreign Ministry last year wrote the British Embassy in Santiago confirming that Christian von Yurick was being held under "preventive arrest" and that he was in "normal" health. But it made no mention of Mr. von Yurick's son, Edwin, and the son's wife, Barbara, who also were missing. All three now appear on the lists of those killed in Argentina. The British Embassy had inquired ' about the von Yuricks at the request -of relatives in England. The newspaper accounts of the Argentine deaths suggest that the Chileans in question were killed fighting with guerrillas in north- western Argentina. but the battle is said by Argentine military sources never to have taken place: Yet Chilean authorities continue to talk of the guerrilla skirmish as a major one. Chilean newspapers quote the Curitiba, Brazil, news- paper 0 Dia, as mentioning a battle near the . Argentine city of Salta. But sources in Rio de Janeiro say there is no newspaper 0 Dia in in late July that the bodies of at least two of Curitiba. 48 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001003700-03:4-- -,