MODERN INTELLIGENCE: MYTH AND REALITY

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August 3, 1975
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NEW YORK TIMES 3 August 1975 Modern intelligence:. Myth and Reality By. William E. Colby . WASHINGTON-The Aztecs thought the Sun God had to he strengthened each day by the sacrifice of a young man or woman. Without the sacrifice the sun could not rise. . The myth of the Sun God's need drove the. nation through the daily, travail of the sacrifice. The reality of astronomy to explain the sunrise was unknown. Today we have myths about our Intelligence. They are expressed in. sensational catchwords: "dirty tricks," "invisible government," "terminate with extreme prejudice," "lie to any- one but the President," "infiltration of the White House," "destabilization," "secret war," "massive illegal." They come from old, outmoded ideas about intelligence: espionage, intrigue, derring-do. These myths achieve lives of their own. Formal denials, evidence to the contrary, and independent, serious, follow-up assessments of the true pro- portions of a catch phrase never over- take the original allegation. The myth becomes accepted as reality. In normal times, these myths are' but part of the life of an intelligence -professional, like the anonymity and the lonely challenges, intellectual as well as physical, of a demanding craft. Today, however, these individual myths are . gaining momentum and mass. They tend to portray intelligence as unconstitutional, improper, un- wanted by our citizens. They threaten American intelligence's ability to con- tribute to the political, economic and military safety and welfare of our nation. These myths threaten intelli- .gence's ability to help our country to negotiate with-not confront-oppo- nents in an unsettled world. If we believe 'these myths, we can make our own mistaken Aztec sacri- fice-American intelligence-in the be- lief that only thus can the democratic sun of our free society rise. - We must not sacrifice a virile, a necessary, contributor. to, the safety of our nation, the welfare of our citizens, and peacekeeping in the world of the future to a handful of myths. The reality of intelligence today is as dif- ferent from the myths about it as the reality of astronomy from the Aztec .myth of the sunrise. . Let's note some of the realities: Our careful centralization of foreign. information from open, public sources provides us with a compendium and. continuity of facts. America's technical genius has revo- lutionized intelligence. It has given us new views of distant objects, new abilities to analyze and absorb masses of data and detail, new e fJ i /For Release 200110810Et1w0F *-Rl !0 4a3Pft0ftY?r3iM004-3 complex world of today. ? -~ To these must still be added that information that we can only get from the resourceful, dedicated clandestine operator. He is the only one who can overcome the barriers of. the closed and hostile societies that share our planet. He can tell us of secret plans for tomorrow or the research ideas of today. He tells us of the human inter- action-something no technology can show--among groups and leaders of -closed societies. Experts of independence, talent. and intellectual integrity study this wealth of reporting. They write objective as- sessments of world affairs free from domestic political bias or Government departments' budget desires, Intelligence collection and analysis cover not only military threats but political problems and economic dan- gers as well. Intelligence forecasts of future trends abroad permit us to. -make national decisions, about future foreign threats in time to react. Intelligence permits us to negotiate international differences before they become disputes. And today the excel fence of our, information now con-. tributes to ,a new.role for intelligence: peacemaking and peacekeeping. With sure information about the plans, capabilities and dispositions of the political and military forces on both sides of foreign crises, we-can, clarify their misunderstandings of each other that might lead them to go to war; we can reassure both sides of getting from us early warning of hostile moves by the other side. . Perhaps the strongest myths relate to the Central Intelligence Agency's: mission of covert political . and para-. .military action. Today's reality is that' little of this nature is done. What is done is fully controlled by the policy levels of our Government -and is ' re- ported to committees of the Congress. This, then, is the reality of modern intelligence. We understand why the. myths arose, as we understand why the Aztec myth was born, but serious and scientific investigations by the Congressional committees examining intelligence will clarify the need of our free society for intelligence and, show the, excellence of the intelligence Adams, a descendant of John Adams and John Quincy Adams. entered the.CIA at a time when it seemed respectable. His LONDON TIMES 22 July 19?5 Union federation wins damages from Penguin Penguin Books yesterday apologized publicly in the High Court to the general secretary of an international labour federation for the suggestion in one of its books that his organization was under the control. of the Central Intelli- gence Agency. The company also agreed to pay unspecified damages to Mr Tom Sansby Bavin, general secretary of the International Federation of Plantation, Agri- cultural and Allied Workers in Geneva, who brought a libel action over the book,' Inside the Company : CIA Diary, by Philip Agee. Mr Marshall Andrews, for' Penguin, told Mr Justice. Eve- leigh that the libel would be. withdrawn from all future edi-. tions of the book. structure that serves it.. They should also show the true proportions of the: missteps of the past, and the national. atmosphere in which they occurred. With .this new perception of reality, should also come clear direction and effective supervision. This will insure' that the new reality remains, fully' compatible' with our free. society. For: this, too,, is ' a reality . of. American' intelligence, that it must conform to, the will of -the American public as well as our constitutional procedures. This need not. include some new ,myth that "the public has a right to know" everything. The citizen does have a right to expect that this new reality of intelligence will 'protect his country's essential secrets. We protect other American secrets: proceedings of grand juries, diplomacy,, .trade,.. income tax and - census data, although intelligence secrets are being exposed in unprecedented, and danger- ous, volume. Secrecy is not new in America.. In- telligence professionals accept, indeed seek, a better discipline to enforce ad- herence to the fundamental obligation' of intelligence, A hat it protect its? sources. With public understanding. of the realities of American intelligence, we, can avoid a useless Aztec sacrifice.' Nor need we believe that ultimate' myth: that America does'not have the responsibility and restraint necessary' to have the best intelligence' service! in the world. . William E. Colby is the Central Intelligence. - I LIS.R' S WEEKLY 21 JULY 1975 Norton nosed out the competition in an-auction for Sam Adams's "Fourteen Three" by slightly topping the next high- est offer of $50,000 and bettering the cus- tomary royalty rate and reprint split. book, still to be written, grows out of a A 7 Director of to keep up with the'fast-ntovtng and what the service has~ecome. Scott Mere- dith was the auctioneer. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 CIA-RDP77-00432R0 0100370004-3 advisers believe that the agency should be maintained in its present general form. and have the capability to mount covert operations. The Adrninistrntion is not likely to accept the advice of for- mer Defense Secretary Clark. Clifibrd and others who argue that the CIA should be split into two separate units: one for intelligence gathering and one for covert operations. White House officials believe that this could be inefficient, since the two functions often involve the same agents. In addition, there is the fear that putting operations under a separate and smaller agency might bring them too close to Pentagon influence. ? Public Budget. The goals of the White House are to restore public con- fidence in the functions of the intel- ligence agency and establish an effec- tive congressional watchdog organiza- tion. President Ford, say his top aides, now favors the creation of a special joint committee, drawing members from both the House and Senate, that would have the power-still not spelled out -to oversee the operations of the CIA. Such a step was recommended by both the Rockefeller ' Commission, which looked into the domestic transgressions of the CIA, and a blue-ribbon com- mission on foreign policy that was cre- ated by President Richard Nixon and headed by Robert D. Murphy, a for- mer Under Secretary of State. Also wider consideration by the White House is a Rockefeller suggestion that at least part of the CIA budget should be made public; it is now en- tirely hidden, in the nooks and cran- CHICPGO TRIBUNE 30 JULY 1S-75 Hies of other agencies' appropriations. Furthermore, the President is mulling over a recommendation made by both the Rockefeller and Murphy commis- sions that, as a general rule, the di- rector of the Clx should be chosen from outside the agency-a point that is agreed upon in principle by none oth- er than Director Colby, 55, the ar- chetypal insiderat the agency. Colby's experience has been almost entirely in the covert field from the time he parachuted into France in 1943. to lead an underground operation until he served as head of the CIA's plans, a job he left to become director in June 1973, just a year before the roof fell in. Since the beginning of 1975, Colby has had to spend most of his working hours coping with the criticisms of the or- ganization. He has testified 36 times this year before a variety of congressio- nal committees," maintaining his poise admirably and replying frankly to hos- tile questions. Indeed, Colby is being criticized privately at the highest levels of the Government for being needlessly apologetic. One senior official charac- terizes him as "the kind of guy who, when he is given a parking ticket, ad- mits to seven felonies." Sooner or later, quite possibly by the end of this year, Colby'seems certain to be asked to leave-a fate that he ac- cepts philosophically. Says one White House aide: "He inherited all the skel- etons in the closet and issued all the cor- rective memoranda, but that's not going to make him any less expendable. He should be allowed to see the investiga- tion through, then retire with honor." Tough Questions. The search for. Colby's successor as director is already quietly under way. One prime possibility is Elliot Richardson, now the U.S. Am- bassador to Great Britain, formcrly- Under Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense and Attorney General. Rich- ardson earned a national reputation for probity-when'he quit as Attorney Gen- eral during Richard Nixon's Saturday. Night Massacre rather than accede to demands to take the pressure off the Wa- tergate investigation. Other names being mentioned: former Treasury Secretary George Shultz, former Assistant Attor- ney General William Ruckeishaus and former Deputy Defense Secretary Cy- rus Vance. Whoever is chosen is like! to face tough questioning during his con- firmation hearings. "There will be one hell of a fight and an attempt to tie him down," predicts a senior policymaker. But finding the right man for the top job will be only part of the answer to the fundamental question of what kind of a clandestine operation the U.S. is prepared to conduct: How dirty should the dirty tricks be? The Hill and the White House will have to come to a.ba- sic accord on the matter, then work out a reasonable way for Congress to mon- itor the work of the agency. Until this happens, the CIA will continue to be a badly shaken organization working be- low its potential to serve.the nation. The agency is also defending itselfagainst 13 law- suits aimed at prying out information. In addi- tion, because of the new Freedom of lnformatian Act, it has had to answer nearly 4.500 requests from individuals and organizations demandins copies of any information about themselves in Cta files (in 90c of the cases, there is none). forinteiii' c~ e .. AL e n i llity. 't AWASHINGTON-There' is considerable`, irretrievably damaggedf its abii.y: ` . i. it-to.. ore, should in Cl`ford s view be re- talk here these days about. changing. the ..gather -Intelligence 'is, permanently - im-.. .moved from CIA to a separate agency Iaw governing. intelligence operations...; paired. ...Clifford, the . other- hand, reporting to the White House and over- Even ;if the. Rockefeller Commission, briefly concedes that we should have a = seen by a joint congressional committee: the. Murphy'; Commission, the Church CIA but.'insists that the old days` of spy- That committee, . Clifford believes, -Committee, and others produce little ac- . ing are'-gone, replaced by technological.'' ` must be small and well chosen to pre= tual result, they've declared open season -means. 'vent leaks, but it should control the en- on tee 1947.law-reason enough perhaps So what about a new law and budget and give `advance a uidelines:tire' CL = . g p , Jo consider some alternatives.' : for'!the' c o n d u c t'" of ' intelligence. grovel to foreign covert operations. It. is .::.Two of; the men most, qualified to.dis- operations? The key -- clause .,.most con- :the President Clifford believes; who 'cuss such. achange=-from opposite view . tested is the catch-all one. 'which says reeds oversight. He can't be expected to points-are least likely to engage in ac-.1..:'.- the CIA. shall perform' such other func= appoint his own overseers in the adv' tual'rewriting of the'law tho either nay Lions-as shall beassigned to it by the'-, isorv board and the CIA director.. ,have sorime infhuence.onitr`:., National Security Council. That was in Walters; with atrace- of -stoicism In i... Ore_ is; Clark CL'fiord, 'who as a young ciuded 30 . years ago, says Clifford, be i his otherwise folly manner, says the CIA :lawyer was asked ;ini194o by .President ;?cause without experience in the field it can operate under. any guidelines. the Truman` to `s t u d y `: unification of the `- ' .was impossible to foresee all continQen- Congress can write and adds that it has -jat:med:services. and 'establishment of a ties; it Holy should be dropped. Walters never in the past had trouble with leaks central.; repository of intelligence irfor-: -.:believes it's still impossible to.foresee, fro;a the oversight committee. This, of mation..'That was- the .beginning of an and thereby foreclose action to meet, all. course, begs the question. The commit- intimate acquaintance'. with intelligence.-, contingencies; the clause should stay. - tee, in the past, took the view that it ,that?incitided later pests as chairman of., The new law Clifford envisages shou''d didn't wart to know all those things that the President's Foreign"' Intelligence Ad- s' provide for a full-time White house offi were going or.. Arlsory Board and secretary.of defense:. .cial-pot the CIA;.du?ector as proposed' There is only one huge caveat in Wal- .The l -..The other, is Lt. Gen:.Vernon Walters,.. by the Murphy group ;or; the national .' ters' acceptance- of - guidelines.': If you director, of the Central Intel- security ? adviser as'. now :provided-to ' write them, ? he says, you. must also ligence--.A:gen_cy, who was beginning his acb as liaison between: the President and write in a mechanism for adapting them ;acti e; career.: ~n the field three the'inteliieence community. He would.be to changing public attitudes about intel- '.' ea-s before' Clif ford's' vrork started. ? a- htif fer between ~ President and CIA; . ligence. . '_ \o?.,' taeir vie;;s-overlap only at the:-.assuring trtat each- understood the othet?:- Operations that seemed appropriate in ',far:.:Qdge ,'walte-s ariefly .concedes trial completely.;_: ti a I950s.ate not accep!able. in the 19705, the.probes:may'oe_beneficial;,hut tier., `Coven :'operations, the._meddlitig `ut z ?he..s'lys and~he .doesn't:. yant.,jo:,.be emphasizes that tile. ' .0i i F tp~~{e 2p~jiF 8/OlgerM4OV7titi( 32OW001603y0a*-31990' standards' for ously threatened situuatWii ana may be . Clifford and Walters agree' must. be things done-or not done-iii 1975. NEW YORK TIME 31 July 1975 Books of The T.'he Times ThO? Unma 1h .Of a S.Q.Y. By RICHARD R. LINGEMAN INSIDE THE COMPANY. CIA Diary. By Philip Agee. B40 pages. ' Stonehill ? Publishing Company. $5.95.. Philip Agee's "Inside the Company" Is ,not a -diary of nearly '10 years with the Central Intelligence Agency, as the subtitle' ,might suggest. As he explains in the. foreword, the diary form. is a device to organize his material. What Mr. Agee has done is to reconstruct the events he experienced from memory and supple- mental research. Thus the book Is more history than diary, with large-chunks of material on the political, social and eco- nomic backgrounds for events be observed as an operations officer in Ecuador, Uru- guay and Mexico from 1960 through 1968. The book was first published in Britain to, avoid the kind' of C.I.A. censorship that shredded parts ',of Victor Marchetti and 'John D. Marks's-"The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence." Its, most valuable purpose is that of exposure, with Mr. Agee playing the "whist'_e-blower" who brings heretofore secret information into the light of public revelation. Although previous "outside" .reporting on the C.I.A. has given us a pretty good idea-.of how the agency plies its sub rosa trade, we have never before had such a detailed account of its opera- tions written by an insider, albeit a rela- tively low-level one whose service was limited to Latin America. Open Window on a Secret World Circumscribed as Mr. Agee's vantage point is, it nonetheless throws 'open a window on much of the C.LA.'s secret world, and it is doubtful that the agency's methods elsewhere differ much from-the ones Mr. Agee describes. In his eagerness Ito tell all, however, he almost swamps the reader at the outset while describing his preliminary training at the C.I.A. school at Camp Peary. Va. Here the "diary" uals or even a Soviet secret agency confer- (read, the left) was silenced, with C.I.A. tion. help, there was no incentive for reform. ~ It is when Mr. Agee moves on 'to his first assignmentin Ecuador that the story An Arguable Conclusion . loses its textbook quality - and,. gains. in it is here that the diary becomes a' authority. Here again, lie' leads off -vrith . political document. Mr. Agee's analysis what seems to be the. entire file drawer of South American conditions is informa- as he describes, the mission of the Quito tive; his conclusion that only. revolution "station,", the political situation in Ecua- (presumably of the Cuban type) can end dor, all the various. pending -cases and gross economic inequities is certainly ar- .? even the cryptonyms of various 'informers guable. --as well as their real names when he Yet as an account of Mr. Agee's conver- can remember them. This background is sion "Inside the Company" falls rather useful, though, because it sets the stage flat; deep introspection is lacking, and for Mr. Agee's description of what he the convert seems to have made a rather and his colleagues.did: In Ecuador-and abrupt flip-flop from amoral C.I.A. techni-the countries where Mr. Agee subsequently cian to knee-jerk Marxist-Leninist. 'So'. served-the C.I.A, mounted an aggressive, when he tries to assess the meaning of sometimes highly effective campaign of the C.I.A. in terms of- his newfound faith, countersubversion against leftist groups. Mr. Agee falls into a ritualistic denuncia-, If it did not control-the country's destiny, tion of it as the inevitable "secret police it certainly amended the political scenario of capitalism." The C.I.A. is a tcoi-and in significant ways. one that occasionally slips out of control ? 1' came a silent partner in the gov- ernments. Mexican authorities co- . operated with the CIA to such an extent that the Company could . tap 40 key telephone lines. Using agents to tap phones and pen- etrate the Ecuadorian Communist party, Agee & Co. worked out an elaborate ruse to discredit a leftist named Antonio Flo- res Benitez.. They concocted a report in the name of Flores, depicting him as a violent revolutionary. The paper was se- creted in a tube of toothpaste. One of the agents at the airport then concealed the tube up his sleeve and let it fall out while examining Flores' luggage. When the document was "discovered," the en- suing uproar in the press helped discred- it the government. Comely Agent. A military junta took over, much to Agee's satisfaction- Still he kept close tabs on the generals. The book reports wide penetration of -of American foreign policy and especla ry The mistress of one of his agents was Ecuadorian life-the Government, the po- the President and that is something else-. he official stenographer for Cabinet lice, labor, left wing, right wing--even the something more complicated and ambigu- . the eetin official A gee was privy P organization embracing, , among other controllable by public opinion in convinc- before the new governors. The CIA con- groups, the Boy Scouts and the 'Junior ing and distur?ing detail. centrated heavily on discovering the se- crets of Cubans, Soviets and satellites. Agents installed eavesdropping bugs in apartments. Lip readers studied films taken of Soviet officials strolling in their embassy gardens. If the subtle approach failed, the Company happily played the role of pimp for overamorous Soviet a- - Appro-VIe fi -For`RGtE'a e- 2001108108 "CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370004-3 b I UGUST 1975 Company Man INSIDE THE COMPANY: CIA DIARY by PHILIP AGEE 640 pages. Stonehiil. $9.95. The Rockefeller Commission report Red Cross. (One is touched to read that detailed its transgressions. Two congres- when the . station chief was transferred, : sional investigations are probing its a local civic group gave -rim a medal. . involvement in assassination plots and "in recognition of his work with youth domestic spying. The press keeps pro- and sports groups in Quito.") The book. ducing fresh disclosures. With all this goes on: going on, the CIA looks less like a clan- Not content merely to inform the police destine fraternity and more like an open of the whereabouts of a guerrilla band,. society. New sensations would seem im- the Quito station also persuaded them possible to find, a ,d few, if any, are con. to exaggerate the number of guerrillas, taicred in the !at--St CIA expose by for- still operating when the arrests were an- men Agent Philip Agee. His book, Inside nounced to the press. Forged documents rre Company, is a sheaf of accusations were planted on leftists by compliant, police, who then leaked their "discovery" and recollections that can no longer as- to the newspapers. Numerous propaganda tonish a world grown familiar with the cgmpaigns were concocted and financed; vagaries of secret services. Nevertheless, militant-action groups were formed to pro- Agee's tales are worth attention, less for yoke anti-Communist crackdowns; an unre- their shock value than for the descrip- mitting campaign to force the Government Lions of a subterranean arena. to break off diplomatic relations with If ever the CLa recruited a candi- Cuba was carried out-all these in addition date of uncompromising devotion, Agee to "normal" intelligence gathering. There - seemed to be the man. When he joined were no coups or bought elections but "the Company" fresh out of No-, nonetheless Ecuador' was Chile written tre Dame in 1956, the graduate ex- small--or rather Chile on an annual budget, perienced an epiphany atop the of '$500,000, 'which was all the Quito, Washington Monument. In a so- station had to play with. liloquy straight out of a Loyalty - We tend to think overmuch of C.I.A. Day pageant, Agee claims too have bungles; what Mr. Agee's book shows sworn, "I'll be a warrior against is that, left to itself, the organization is Communist subversive erosion of;: frequently all too. effective. The trouble freedom and personal liberties is that the means determine the ends, around the world-a patriot ded- and 'the ends, in the sense of larger icated to the preservation of my moral and -policy consequences, are lost sight of. Mr. Agee's own disillusionment . country and our way of life." came when he began to assess these- Under the curious cover name larger implications. He concluded that the of Jeremy S. Hodapp, Agee was : agency was playing a powerful yet largely assigned to the U.S. embassy in. negative role as defender of a corrupt, Quito. Ecuador, and then in Mon- exploitative status quo. Not only the tevideo, Uruguay. Hodapp's good - C.I.A.'s activities in South America, but works later made him aide to the also other military and internal-security U.S. ambassador in Mexico. As aid programs, merely shored up the- described by Agee. the CIA's pen- : ruling minority-the 5 per cent con= etration of these South American trolling over one-third of the wealth-by nations was so thorough that it be- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370004-3 ficials. One was lured into bed by a comely agent, where his performance -said to be remarkable-was photo- graphed and recorded for possible fu- ture use. .In a scene reminiscent of the Wa- tergate bungle, Agee kept watch one night, walkie-talkie in hand, while two technicians and an engineer tried to bug the Czech legation in Ecuador. The agents were caught in the act by four guards. The fast-talking engineer saved the day by taking the guards aside to allay their curiosity while the techni- cians furiously ripped out installations. The encounter is one of the few memorable passages in a book stuffed with detail. Indeed, Agee includes so many facts and names that the book has two glossaries, one for. the cast of char- - acters, another for organizations-as if the reader were wading through War and Peace. Perhaps, in a sense, he is. The', events in Inside the Company are a mat-, ter of life and death; below their flat prose there moves a complex universe of national intrigue and human paradox. ; --The greatest paradox is Agee him- self; his conversion- is never fully ex- plained. The .superpatriot simply decides one day that he has been. on the wrong side all along: the good guys were the revolutionar- ies. "The CIA," he writes with pious hindsight, "is nothing more than the secret police of American capitalism, plugging up leaks in the political dam night and day so that shareholders of U.S. com- panies operating in poor coun- tries can continue enjoying their rip-off." With his new vision as a. Marxist socialist, Agee quit the CL4 in 1969 and wrote his book abroad while bugged and hound- ed, he claims, by Company agents. Agee profited from the experience of Victor Marchetti, another dis- illusioned CIA agent and co-author of The CIA and the Cult of Iri- telligence. When Marchetti set out to publish his exposd in the U.S.,. the CIA took him to court and scis- sored out 168 passages. To avoid this fate. Agee first published his Agee,' the Americans are always one- book to Britain. Once it was out, and a dimensional operatives, their indi ,,e- bestseller, the CIA decided to make no at-:. nous agents pliant and money-seeking: tem t at censorshi in the U S p p . . Although the CIA also refuses com- ment on the book's accuracy, indepen- dent intelligence experts, unable to The New York Times Book Review/August 3, 1 975 - Is there a sceret police of American capitalism? Inside the Company CIA Diary. By Philip. Agee. - 629 pp. New York: . Stonehill. $9.95. It almost takes the stamina and interest of a Soviet spy to get through Philip Agee's attempt to relate every- thing he knew and did during his 12 years as a Central Intelligence Agency operations officer-his selec- tion, training and assignments in Ecua- dor, Uruguay and Mexico in the 1960's, and his. final disillusionment and resig- nation at the end of 1969. Too bad "Inside. the Company" is such a task to read, because there is important information buried in its 600. or so pages that the general American public should understand, particularly with today's debate over the past and future roles of the C.I.A. Agee, however, wants his book to be more than just an expose for his readers. He wants to. convince them that -"the C.I.A;, after all, is nothing, more than ? the secret police of American capitalism, plugging up leaks in the political dam, night and day, so that shareholders of United States companies operating in poor countries can continue enjoying the rip-off.". To, support this thesis, the book is weighed down with polemics which Agee thinks of as "the more- difficult political and economic reali- ties that give the [covert C.I.A.] opera= tions meaning." To ' my way of thinking they don't. Instead they offer a distorted picture of many ugly .and often unnecessary attempts by United States agents to manipulate politically unstable Latin American countries. According to. no one on that side acts for noble or even patriotic reasons. The political and economc "realities" in Agee's vouch- for details, think most of it rings world also never seem -to include true-a fact that should shock only the disruptive acts by Cuban 'or Soviet naive. In a world full of other intelli- agents, though bombings, strikes and gence agencies and dirty tricks, a good deal of the CIA's work may be defended as useful and even necessary. The most volatile aspect of this an- gry volume remains the author's indis- cretion: he has blown the cover of hun dreds of CIA men and Latin American agents. Agee took the step to discredit, and cripple the CIA, surely knowing he guerrilla warfare were being promoted by their Communist agents. I don't believe such actions justified the total C.I.A. interventionist response, but by leaving them out Agee defeats his- overall purposes. Agee also sees his book as a means to "neutralize the C.I.A.'s support to repression" in third world countries- an objective he hopes to accomplish and women. The ex-agent, who now: by exposing names of Agency "officers lives on the Cornish coast in England, so that their presence . . . becomes blandly claims that "as far as I know, no untenable." The close attachments de- one has been endangered as a result." veloped between C.I.A. and host coun- pened The CIA to the will not people reveal named by what its has hap- former try ry police and intelligence os coua- employee, but it is known that the Com- tions has always been a scandal; it pany has changed its operations in Latin is a United States national policy A A e hit h d h d followed just as conscientiously by e - ca abroad. If Agee limited his naming names to those in the police end of things it would be understandable. He does not. Page after page of C.I.A.' covert operations-intelligence gather- ing as well as political action-are listed along with the names of Americans directing them and the hun- dreds of Ecuadorian, Uruguayan, Mexi- can and other nationals who have served as-paid or unpaid C.I.A. agents. There are so many indiviuals named along with their cryptonyms and pseu-. donyms that two full appendices. are devoted to explaining them. When Agee was in agent-training he found the use of acronyms "rather complicat- ed" and "confusing." His own use of names and cryptonyms is no less confusing to readers who don't plan to become agents. _ This torrent of names, however, . raises a question about some of Agee's sources and the purpose of his book. In a recent Playboy interview, Agee said that '1 had no notes from my' C.I.A. days; I had to find contemporary sources to refresh my memory, so I could reconstruct events." In a 15- page section early in the .book, Agee lists some 24 covert C.I.A. operations which he said were under way in Ecua- dor in December,, 1960, when he was first assigned there. He not only lists the operations but also the real names and cryptonyms of. 34 Ecuadorians - whom he identifies as C.I.A. agents working on these operations. It is hard to believe. a man without notes could sit down- 12 years later : and fecall from, memory that many agents' names or reconstruct intel- ligence operations without any assist- ance from individuals who themselves had been collecting that very same information. Thus it seems likely that during Agee's 1971 trip to Havana for research, the "considerable mate- rial" he found there was of this intel- ligence variety: Both Agee and Cuban intelligence have, in a sense, an identi- cal goal-to disrupt C.I.A.. activities in Latin Amerca. Agee's book certain- ly ly has done that, though any major public response apparently will come only with a Spanish edition of the. book., Once the American reader gets over the twin hurdles of Marxian polemics and exposure for destruc- tion's sake, the book has real rewards. It describes how the C.I.A. functioned- in Ecuador and Uruguay between 1961 and 1966 far beyond any point of public or even Congressional under- standing of the. intelligence agency's mission. True, Presidents Kennedy and . g men me-an ar . Unite lit I up- volution to coun- With some justificatici pfRele e- tk-W !8bs432g4Jb4b %t rica. What each the Company now bite cal tin "our alter Pincus is a Washington jour- President did not say was that he first defector." 8 James Arwo!or ; nalist and consultant for NBC News. S 'had directed the C.I.A. to fight back, using covert methods. In short, the United States was exporting Counter- revolution. As Agee puts it, when he arrived in Quite in December, 1960, the Ecua- dor C.I.A. station's basic. campaign 'was "to promote a break in diplomatic relations between Ecuador and Cuba." To support that effort, according to Agee, the C.I.A. financed anti-Castro political candidates and even gave, money to those running for office in labor union and university student- government organizations if they were .anti-Castro. Through Equadorian po-' lice the Agency arranged for the bug- ging of pro-Castro leaders and even directed C.I.A.-paid surveillance teams- to follow specific individuals both in- side and outside leftist organizations. False documents were placed in news- papers through a respected newsman who Agee says was a paid C.I.A. agent. The agency also apparently con- trolled a hemisphere-wide news ser- vice and used it to circulate misinfor- mation to aid in the anti-Cuban pro- gram. At one point, Agee describes how one . pro-Castro individual was framed when a phony report was slipped Into a toothpaste tube and planted on him so that. it would,: be "discovered" when he returned to Quito from Cuba. Since there were no Soviets in Ecuador--.there were no diplomatic relations -between the two countries then-agency attention focused almost entirely on the Cubans and the inherent instability of the country's own politicians. Inevitably, American money and attention became a major factor in Ecuadorian politics. In Uruguay, Agee describes only a . slightly different atmosphere. There NFWS, Greenville, S. C. 10 July 1975 William Colby, of -tie CIA stand up-to Congressperson 'Bella Abzug and 'some of her left-wing associates at a 'hearing, the other. day. Bellowing Bella was com- plaining as usual because the CIA had kept files on some members of Congress, including her, in cases in- volving overseas connections. Bella thinks that-isn't crick- But Colby pill it in-th&i right perspective. Why, he wanted to know,'should Bella and other members of Con-! gress be. immune from. scru-1 tiny. in security and foreign operations instances when all .other. Americans are not immune? -In other words, does Rep.;; Abzug consider herself above,; V 'the urge p guayan or total ? ,olvement in Uru- ffairs 1Lhc rn n and student affairs airs al-k, the peasant urn contaminated by education, free press, politi: cal debate and other dangerous institutions. What Solzhenitsyn may lack in the way of democratic credentials, however, he more than compensates for in uncompromising zealotry. Not only does he believe we made a mistake in not pursuing to success our abor. tive invasion of Russia after the Bolshevik re? volution, and not only does he insist we should not have recognized the Soviet Union; in 1933, he also comes close to saying that we should have let the Germans win World Wat II-because he saw in them hope for elimin- ating the Soviet regime. Beyond that, little matters for Solzhenitsyn. . Now Solzhenitsyn is urging the Americar people, in effect, to rekindle the cold war and get ready to fight a hot one, no matter ho% much he denies it. In the meantime. he telh us to. make no agreements of any kind *i;t Moscow. If the world destroys itself in a nu. clear Armageddon, well, at least the hated Soviet Communists will be. destroyed, too.Sm Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370004-3 , Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370004-3 SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, London 20 July 1975 By ROBERT CONQUEST T WO rather different voyages are now in progress. In one of them, out in space, the Soviet rocket Soyuz has parted from :Apollo ` after the spectacular rendezvous. In the other Solzhenitsyn continues his tour of America and, after an initial docking failure, may yet meet President Ford. .1. feel, rather better qualified than most people to comment on these two events. I am an old rocket buff, a. member of the, British Interplanetary Society for' many years before the first arti-. ficial satellites. I lately had a long and most amicable morning with Solzhenitsyn. And I am just back from a tour of the United States where I met political and trade u; ion leaders, academics and res po nsib a journalists (while avoid- ing the irres},on';ihle, such as some sections of the British Press in ,Washington). The'roeket display, as is widely recognised, is of fairly marginal technical significance: its main., point is as a demonstration, a propaganda exercise, in favour of "detente." Solzhenitsyn, on the other hand, in the tradition of Russia's Holy Fools, has been blurt- ing out truths, has been the child pointing out that the glittering raiment of detente is largely imaginary. This has produced, in America, itself and in our own Press too, an enormous volume of abuse, mis- representation and denigration from owners of ideological shares in this phantom company. But let us note that even Soyuz contains striking confirmation of all that Solzhenitsyn stands for. The genius of the Soviet space apparently, runs the logic of Solzhenitsyn Many congressmen still' seem ready to do anything in the name of anticommunism, and so they cheered Solzhenitsyn when he ad- dressed them a few days ago. When President Ford declined to receive him at the White. House, there was -so much criticism the Ptes.' .ident backed down and issued an invitatiorl. One can only wonder about Kremlin's react; tion to all this. How would we react if the to-. bles were turned? Fortunately, the United' States does not have a prominent exile whc .might publicly call for our downfall. But if .there were, imagine what might happen if the Soviet government, while saying it was for detente, invited him to give an address in the Supreme Soviet. Solzhenitsyn does merit our respect as a'- great writer and a courageous man. As such; he deserved a hearing. Now that he has had it, I hope the American public will tune him out and consign him to his proper place as a literary giant and a political oddity. We can then get on with the business of working out ways to live peacefully in a dan-, gerous world--and in the bargain perhaps contribute to a climate which could breed more freedom in the U.S.S.R. and elsewheret programme was Sergei Koroiev. This was admitted only after he had died. Before that, the w h o l e thing was attributed to harmless academicians of the second and third rank who were allowed to meet foreigners, go abroad and behave in a manner appropriate to the New Soviet Man. Korolev could not be trusted to do this. He had started his contri- bution in a scientific prison, in` exactly the circumstances which Solzhenitsyn himself experienced and which formed the theme of 'the "First Circle." When released, and given com- fortable quarters and fine labora- tories, he remained totally cynical about the Soviet order. He used to say that even then (as with Sol- zhenitsyn's heroes), he remained` ready to move with the minimum, prison bundle, at the usual 3-noment's notice.. . And now, to put it crudely, -Korolev's product is generating fantasy in space, while his col- league is telling the truth on earth. He is pointing out, in fact, and in the bluntest and most tactless way, that, though there may be a peace in the sense of armed truce betwden the present-day Soviet Union and the countries of the West, the idea that the Kremlin's motivations have basically changed, or are likely to change, as the. result of trade, conferences, hand- shakes and mutual expressions of goodwill, is a false one. To do the Russian leaders justice they at least have always proclaimed that detente is " a method of struggle." For them " detente" is different. from " cold war " merely in the tactical sense which Aesop devel- `oped 2,000 years ago in that famous fable where the Wind and the Sun try in turn to remove a traveller's cloak, the first by cold blasts, which only make the man clutch A he garment more tightly about him, the second by increas- ing warmth. The sun, of course,, wins. - There are two types in America and Europe who do not wish these' facts to be made known. . First there are those'who, for whatever reason, are motivated by an anti- Western automatism. Secondly, there are " men of goodwill " who are so concerned with, or person-. ally committed to, the rosiest opinions about pseudo-detente that they cannot believe the truth to be otherwise. Both types have found Solzhen-. itsyn a nuisance. On the advice of the detente faction in the Ameri- can Administration, President Ford was originally unable to fit in a talk with him-being busy with such matters of state as a meeting with a basketball team. At a lower level (lower in, every sense) there has been vicious sniping at Solzhenitsyn. To under- mine his vast moral authority is not, indeed, an easy task. Nor can it be argued very convincingly by those in the trendy bars of the Washington Press corps that he does not understand Russia. Still, there are ways: he is a difficult customer from a cruder society, he does not understand how such bonds as trade and official visits will gradually erode Soviet hostility (even while free- dom of movement of 'people and ideas remains under total ban and while Soviet-ruled populations are subject to a vast campaign of anti- Western "vigilance," even when it is recalled that the highest points of German-Russian trade were in 1914 and 1940 respectively). But above all he can be got at i -as in a widely condemned and particularly nasty little piece in the Guardian the other day- through those in the West who agree with him. These are all " red-necks " or idiot trade ' union leaders, proponents-of course-of " cold wai." One would gather that none but Neanderthal patriots from the Ozarks hold the view of the Soviet leadership which Sol- zhenitsyn. puts forward, or have qualms about " detente." In fact, of course, it is common to almost all serious students of the Soviet Union and of foreign affairs in the ::United State's and 'here too: by everyone who writes and thinks of these affairs, in fact, except for appeasement-minded journalists and some circles in the American Administration. The phrase " cold war" is of course the litmus paper for the Guardian attitude. Cold war, bad; detente, good-these appear to be the furthest limits of political thought such minds can attain. But during the recent prevalence of detente we have seen Russian cannon blasting the way into Saigon, Russian tanks pouring to the edge of the Golan Heights; the Russian-sponsored C u n h a I h i d d i n g for dictatorship in Lisbon . , . For the more serious propon- ents of the American Administra- tion's current policy, the disadvant- age has always been that an atmosphere of the utmost cordiality towards a power that you admit- tedly do not trust enough to give it supremacy in armaments contri- butes to the psychological disarma- ment of the West. I would suspect that even while Soyuz and Apollo bombinate amicably in the vacuum overhead Dr. Kissinger himself, if not his lesser followers, welcomes. the strengthening of the West's resolve which arises from such bluntness as Solzhenitsyn's. - Meanwhile., one could hardly express the issue more clearly than one of the major bugbears of the "liberals," George Meaney, did a year or two ago: Approved For Release 2001/08/08 CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370004-3 3 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370004-3 WASHINGTON STAR 1 Augus t 19 75 Wfflkn mn F. Buckley Jr. A- A_ The _ The gradual re7iection of Solzhenitsyn by the Ameri- can intellectual establish- ment was predictable. For one thing he is entirely independent, moving through the cosmopolitan scene without tripping over any of the lilliputian nets that ensnare most of us. Now Newsweek magazine has come up with the killer designation: "The exile found himself ignored by` some influential liberals and embraced - apparent- ly to his discomfort - by the conservative right." If only they can thus taxono- mize him - a member of the conservative right - they can pin him ? up in a showcase along with the rare and grotesque butter- flies, let him go on there with his writhings and - forget about him. The extensive story in Newsweek does not tell us just how Solzhenitsyn is' embarrassed by the support given to him by the conserv- ative right. When he insist- ed that Senator James. Buckley of New York be invited to hear his speech in Manhattan, he was hardly shrinking from an associa- tion with the right. On the other hand, his principal sponsors were the trade unions, the organized voices of the working man - and they gave him a tumultuous reception. Unremarked in Newsweek. "His writings. glorify the wisdom of the simple peas- ant and the righteousness of the most rural communi- -ties," wrote the editors. So did Thomas Jefferson's, the founder of the Democratic party. He speaks of the "deca- dence of Western society.". So does the New York Re- view of Books, Noam Chomsky, and Herbert Mar- "He hates cars and cities." So does Ralph Nader. "He was shocked to find, that interest in Soviet af- fairs seemed to be limited to the far right." Well,'if that is so, I too am shocked. Interest in Soviet affairs was very great among the far left during a period when much of it was servile to the Soviet state. New- sweek seems to be suggest- ing, though I doubt it was. intentional, that American liberals have lost interest in the Soviet Union now that they acknowledge it as a slave state bent on main- taining the captive nations in captivity, and manufac- turing more and better hydrogen bombs with which. to threaten us. If Solzhenitsyn is a far rightist who appeals to the far right, he goes at it in a most unorthodox way. Hav- i g declared that the Rus sian people are the natural allies of the American workers, he commented in .one of his recent speeches about "another alliance at first glance a strange' one, a surprising one - but if you think about it, in fact one which is well-grounded and easy to understand: this is the.alliance between our Communist leaders and your capitalists." "This alliance is not new," Solzhenitsyn remind- ed his audience. "The very famous Armand Hammer, who is flourishing here today, laid the basis for this when he made the first ex- ploratory trip into Russia,' still in Lenin's time,' in the -very first years of the Revo- lution. He was extremely successful in this intelli- gence mission and since that time for all these 50 " - . with regard to Moscow's present line, we are told that we must' accept the politics of reality.' That means the Berlin Wall, mine- fields along the frontier, ransom for Soviet Jews, and acceptance of, say, the persecution of Lithuanian Catholcs as an 'internal Soviet affair."' " Well, we don't see it that way. We don't want to start any : wars, but. we insist on something. that seems to disturb a lot of so-called intellectuals-we insist on emphasising the difference between democracy and dictatorship." And so says Solzhenitsyn. And stigmatize 001zhenitsyn ous and steady support by the businessmen of the West of the Soviet Communist leaders." Doesn't sound to me like a typical far right talk. . . . Solzhenitsyn went on 'to, discuss a recent exhibit of United States anticriminal technology which the Rus- sians bought up with fasci- nation. The difference being that we were selling our scientific paraphernalia not to the law-abiding for use against criminals, but to criminals for use against the law-abiding: rather like inventing a guillotine for the. purpose of chopping meat, and then selling it to Rosespierre for other uses "This is something which is almost incomprehensible to the human mind: that burning greed for profit which goes beyond all rea- son, all self control, all con- science, only to get money." Far right talk, .to NEW YORK 4 August the editors of Newsweek. As- a veteran of a number of .right-wing rallies, I take leave to pronounce this as an unorthodox way to ce- ment relations with the. capitalist class. What Solzhenitsyn is of course proving is that the deep resources of humanity lie for the most part in the conservative community. This is despicable. Because conservatives, by and large, do not believe in the- shifting standards of right and wrong which, for in- stance, can bring a Barbara Tuchman, a James Reston, or a John Kenneth Gal braith to travel to mainland China and report back their boundless enthusiasm for the work of Mao Tse-tung. If his tormentors truly suc- ceed in identifying Solz- henitsyn as a member of the far right, they will succeed in identifying themselves as the heartless, mindless robots they, in f?et, so often are. TIMES 1975 let O t reams By Anthony Lewis In his speech to the Helsinki Con- ference, President Ford emphasized its pledges of freer movement for people and ideas. "It is important," he told the leaders of thirty-four other coun- tries there, "that you recognize the deep devotion of the American people and their Government to human rights, and fundamental freedom." How embarrassingly hollow those' words must have sounded. For Mr.: Ford had just had a chance to demon-' strate his devotion to human rights in the simplest way-by meeting a man who symbolizes the struggle for them -and he failed the test. The decision not to invite Aleksandr' Solzhenitsyn to the White House has' been deplored by now from all points of the ideological compass. For sheer political inepitude it was in a special class. But beyond that, the episode teaches us some things about the na- ture of political life. CIA-RDP;,7-P0432RP0Q100370004-3 g po iticcans and commen- so say all of us. Approved For Release 20018/08 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370004-3 tatdrs in the United States seized on Soizhenitsyn's presence here as a way to dramatize their argument that detente is a mistake because the Soviet Union can never be trusted. The, only way to deal with Communism, they say, is to oppose it everywhere by military strength-and increase the already enormous burden of the arms budget. President Ford and Secretary of. State Kissinger allowed that view,to. occupy the field by their foolishness. But the special importance of Sal- zhenitsyn -does not lie in any par- ticular political stance, or in his own Christian-Slav mysticism. It lies in his person, his witness, his words. 'Solzhenitsyn has shown the world that one human being, through his courage and his. art, can inflict moral defeat on the most powerful of tyran- nies. He has reminded us of the poten- tialities of the human spirit. And of course that achievement transcends any narrow politics. , The United States cannot ordinarily help the victims of tyranny by means of bombs or missiles. We do not live in that kind of world. Our recourse has to be to other ways of pressure:. political and economic and. psycho- AT HOME ABROAD logical. One of the most important things we can do is simply to make JAPAN TIMES 25 July 1975 ra 5 ante Hero By Max Lerner clear that we have a commitment to human rights-a commitment going` beyond immediate political considera- tions. For those who live under oppression, it can make all the difference to know that somewhere outside others care about them and share their views of humanity. That is why those who suffer discrimination in South Africa .give such an emotional welcome to visitors from abroad. And it is exactly the same for dissenters in the Soviet Union.' It would have been a restoring symbol of hope, for them, if an American President had shaken the hand of Solzhenitsyn. A second lesson of the episode, a sad one, is that we suffer these days from political leaders without ideals, without dreams. Their interest is limited to the immediate, their vision to- power. Consider the reason finally given for the decision of state to keep away from 5olzhenitsyn,. After v.irio::s pa- thetic excuses from the WLte- House, Mr. Kissinger gave this explanation: Solzhenitsyn's "views," if they be- came our "national policy," would threaten "military conflict." ilow happen to think that that stated reason had nothing to do with the case. I think Henry Kissinger just cares much less about human rights and decency than he does about power' and short-term political objectives. He Watching Alexander Solzhenitsyn on TV, on the Meet -the Press program, one saw a transplanted hero, with a Dostoevs- ' kian growth of beard and fierceness of eye, coming on with the intensity of a major prophet. Because the setting was the fa- miliar American one of electronic journalism the torrential flow of his talk had to be, sliced up into question-and-answer segments. When the'Apocalypse comes it will be measured out in two-minute driblets, with time out for a commercial. Solzhenitsyn's American tour is not just a 'case of another visit by another famous foreigner. It is a historic test of what ' happens to a hero when he gets ripped up from his native soil .and transplanted to a foreign one. Does the magic of heroism get muted, the halo tarnished? Does the sense of the extraor- dinary dissolve when dipped into the everyday? The Soviet leaders, when they packed Solzhenitsyn off on a' 'plane to Switzerland, may have gambled on this happening. They hoped that with the transplanting to Western. Europe and America the bloom would wear off the rose. Will it? The danger of its happening is clear enough. As long . as. Solzhenitsyn spoke and wrote from within the belly of the monster itself, putting his life on the line, courting peril, dar- ing the Soviet masters to stop him, the rest of the world -- . including his critics on the left - watched in awe. They didn't dare speak out against him. But now that he is out of extreme danger, appearing securely before American audiences, vis- iting with 'a delegation of American senators, his .critics no :longer are inhibited. The whispers get louder. Isn't he a cold warrior, as witness his quoting Melvin Laird on SALT I? Isn't he old hat, hobnobb- ing with George Meany and the other old men of American conservative labor? Is-Ti't he a fanatical anti-Communist, who sustains the right-wing governments of such countries as Chile and South .Korea, despite their brutal character, because he thinks them helpful to his policy. And he does not want to let anything get in the way of his doing business with Leonid Brezhnev. But in a way it would be worse if Mr. Kissinger really meant what he' said. For the suggestion is that an American President dare not meet a person with bad ideas, however great a ;human being, lest the President be infected with his views and make them "national policy." Try to imag- ine Jefferson or Lincoln or Roosevelt -afraid of ideas. We ask our politicians to do the' work of the day, and we should not expect them to show the same concern as artists for eternal truths. But we may begin to. wonder, in this age, whether something has happened to make political leaders everywhere-- not only in the United States-such narrow, humorless, insensitive crea- tures. It is our own fault, as citizens, if we begin to see life in the politicians' limited terms. There is more in- the stars than that. Generations thrill to' Mozart that do not know the poli- . ticians of his age. Men will remember and read Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn when Gerald Ford is a footnote to history: ' name of a President who pardoned ' is criminal predecessor. will get the United States into trouble with the. Soviet Union?. Isn't it dangerous to talk of the Russian people being buried by their rulers? Isn't he just a Catholic writer carrying the same old anti-Communist message that other exiles have carried the Poles, Lithuanians, Latvians and the .rest? Isn't he a stick-in-the-niud conservative, and a mystical one, too, with all his , talk about religion and love of the Russian earth and the soul of the people? Isn't he enveloping the. -American people of the Heartland with the same mystique?. The answer ,is, of course, that one can disagree with particu-' lar views of Solzhenitsyn and still see his continuing heroic quality. He could have made an easy adjustment to his exile.' He could now be mouthing all the fancy rhetoric that would go down beautifully with the -intellectual elites of. New York, Washington, Paris, London, and they would be carrying him on their shoulders,- before they dumped him in time: But that isn't his style. He is in dead earnest, he is consumed with an inner. fire, and he won't let anyone near him get out of reach of the flames. On the question of President' Ford's failure to see him, Sol- zhenitsyn's answer - that he didn't come as a guest of the American Government and didn't expect to be received by Mr. Ford - is good enough in its own way. Yet something must be added. As long as the rulers of one great power would deem it an unfriendly act for the head of another great power to talk with a major intellectual' figure from either country, there is no common climate between the two, and as yet no world in- tellectual community. Solzhenitsyn is especially good on the question of commu- nication between peoples.. The experience of one people, he says, is communicated back to another by its great writers. He adds that the burden of experience borne by the Russian people has been tragic. This is true of the American people, too, if our. writers and thinkers could only express it. Asked whether he regards the West as in decline, Sol. zhcnitsyn answers no; that it is only the will' of its ruling groups which is weak. He might have added that the pe_- ceptions of its intellectual communities are also confused. I Solzhenitsyn can act as a seer, and invoke the experience of the Russian people to make the people of the West see more. clearly, he will play a great historic role outside Russia, as be did within Russia. ' C. pyr'ight 1975, Los' Angeles Times ,42 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370004-3'