Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
June 25, 2001
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
June 22, 1975
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-0.pdf8.49 MB
3_ Approved For Release 2001/0M:FONM77-00432R0001003700074)---.? NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES INTERNAL USE ONLY This publication contains clippings from the domestic and foreign press for YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use of selected items would rarely be advisable. NO. 13 GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS 27 JUNE 1975 GENERAL 32 EASTERN EUROPE 34 WESTERN EUROPE NEAR EAST 4:1 AFRICA A '7. ? EAST ASIA 4E.) 25X1A Destroy after backgrounder has served its purpose or within 60 days. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-0 1,!ASHINGTON POST 22 June 1975 asas ? By George Lardner Jr. Wfisbington Post Stsff Writer s" The Central Intelligence AgencY. : conducted a hurried, cursory check oft .CIA misdeeds in the vvake of thei .Watergate scandal, failed to tell the _White House of its findings and de- stroyed some of the records of ita ,gal activities. CIA Director William E. Colby 'said': ehe ordered the destruction of various ". CIA files in 1973, but said he regarded ?it as a routine step at the time. . "Even before 1973, prior to that time," Colby said, "people had been tburning up collections -of files that we really had nu business oWning. This is a. natural process of any bureaucracy." Now, with the benefit of hindsight, Colby said he recognizes that he "should have reported the missteps to !the Justice Department, that the old standards which made the CIA virtu-. ally sacrosanct have slipped away.. ." '! e The CIA director discussed these.t, matters in an hour-long interview in his 7th-floor suite at the agency's head- : 'quarters Friday, coupling candid ad- . missions with repeated expressions of conceril about the hazards of unaccus-a iomed public exposure. r In. Colby's view, there? has been toot much publicity already. The agency,t he insisted, has served the country far, .better than it realizes., . at. But Colby acknowledged, too, that even he had no clear idea Of the abuses lurking in its past until the investiga- tion by the Rockefeller commission was completed this month. Even more sweeping congressional inquiries lie' ahead. - ' The seeds were planted on May 1973, when then-CIA Director James 11.. 'Schlesinger sent a memorandum to all,. 'employees calling- for immediate re- ports on any questionable activitiesa past or present, that they might know; about. ? , The impetus for.the directive cane- from the Watergate scandal. The 1971. tEllsbera case, burglary, which G. Gor- don LicrdY and E. Howard Hunt Jr. car- ried out with CIA technical assistance,. had just come to light,' and Schlesinger ,said he intended to do all he could "to econfine CIA activities to those which: *fall within a strict interpretation of its legislative charter." The result, Colby agreed, was a rush 'job that could not even be called a 'genuine. investigation. The CIA inspec- tor general's office, which handled the , *assignment, submitted a report just 11 days later, on May 21, 1973. . d "It was an accumulation rather .an Alum an investigation, if you get. the'. _distinction," Colby said. 'In other, words, the Schlesinger memo went to 'all employees. Well, the first employ- ees it went to, was the' roininftTvd And the command line basically ported what it heard down through the, regular hierarchy: what do you know, what do you know,? what do you , know. And that was gathered together and given to the inspector gAppxprA _ . "In addition," Colby said, "few em- - ployees went to the inspector general .with something they remembered. But . ... inspector general didn't go out and look through every, file drawer in the place or anything like that." The report included a. section on as- sassination plots and -schemes.. Other :portions were just. a rehash of "old ins' spector general reports that CIA offi- cials pulled .out of their desks, appar- ently including information on testing LSD on Unsuspecting subjects, part of .a controversial program . that lasted. :from 1953 to 19b3. The White House was not informed,. but not, by Colby's account, because of. any preoccupation with the Watergate :scandal. The day after Schlesinger wrote his May 9, 1973, memo, President Nixon nominated him to become Secre- tary of Defense, and Colby, who was ,then CIA deputy director for covert operations, was named to take over the. spy agency. "This one does embarrass me a bit," Colby said of the failure to notify the White House. "I think What happened, quite frankly, is that it fell between the t tools?of Schlesinger's leaving and my taking over. I imagine he ttisougat mayne i was g,omg to take care of the National Security Council [the White House agency which is sup- posed to supervise the CIA] and I lane _agine that I thought he was." . . The Justice Department also was ' kept in the dark by virtue of a long- , standing agreemerit, disclosed and dee' nounced by the Rockefeller commis- Sion, to let the CIA decide whether a , I crime had been committed by its em- ployees or agents and whether security considerations precluded prosecution even when a crime had taken place. es Organized in January with the in- spector general's 1973 report as one of . its basic primers, the commission con- -eluded this month that the CIA had ,engaged in "plainly unlawful" conduct ?from burglary through bugging to the LSD ,testing and other activities. But .Colby indicated that he never even contemplated going to the Justice Department at the time. ; "In retrospect, I would say yes, I should have," the 55-year-old Colby ac- knowledged. "No question about it, we 'Should have done it." ? Colby said he first reached that coo- ' elusion "sometime in December"? which was the month that The New. York Times disclosed some of the ac- etivities recounted in the 1973 report.. . The CIA director said he realized that 'month that "I do have an obligation to actually carry down to the Departmont 'of Justice and let them make the deci- sion as to whether anything should be , , prosecuted or not." .Afterconferring with Schlesingera ? . _ ? Capitol Hill, Colby said he briefed 'both Rep. Lucien Nedzi (D-Mich.) and Sen. John C. Stennis (D-Miss.), the ? chairmen of the Senate and House sub- committees in charge of CIA oversight, .in late May, 1973, on the agency's ime Proprieties. But clearly, Colby agrees .now, "that isn't enough." - ? ' Now chairman of the speCial House -committee investigating the CIA, Nedzi, who has recently tome under fire for taking no action two years ago, "asked a lot of additional questions," -Colby retailed, but was apparently sat- lafied with the answers he .got and did. not inform his colleagues. .not'? s Colby did no characterize Stennis' :reaction, but he has long been a stolid' i.defender of the CIA. Apparently both '-he and Nedzi accepted Colby's assur- arices that corrective action ? would be taken. No follow-up investigation was con-- tducted, including within the CIA, to whcthc: any cf thz-. ties warranted prosecution or to find :mit how extensive they actually were.: Repeatediy, Colby emphasized that his- 'mind was on the future, on making ..sure they didn't happen again. '`,;? He said he issued "specific instrucs -tions with respect to each of the catee -tgories of activities included in the in- ?spector general's report? on Aug. 29,. 4973, banning some, laying down strict -rules for others and declaring still oth- ers permissible. a Concerning the CIA's "following of !people around in America," Colby said, ?.tfor example, he "issued a directive say? ting 'you won't do that any more' la.... Ipoint'rfrankly didn't care at that point' whether it was 20 eases or' 40 cases. The fact was there weren't going to be any more." The Rockefeller commission found more instances of burglary, bugging, and other misdeeds than he was aware of, Colby indicated. Another reason for, the escalating statistics, he said, was the fact that he agreed with the com- mission at the outset that the CIA Would not interview former employees to avoid any suggestion that the agency .was trying to influence their testimony. t Consequently, Colby said, "the com- mission knows more than I do . . . There's a couple of cases, a couple of incidents mentioned [in the commission report] that I didn't know about. I don't. challenge the fact that they happened. Put they're not in our records.", '' The commission also said in its re ciAlt.leaSe 40011,0 rabet4R0 R77-000/14 6.9*-wlfivicowds had been r ere eVroYeenn 1973, including Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-0 -152 separate files on the drug-testing ? 4progretn. Colby said he had various documents destroyed, and indicated that the drug- testing records were among them. ? . "We had files around here we ehouldn't own, some of these surveil- .lance things and stuff like that," he. said, "and I had directed, `let's get rid of that stuff,' in 19'73." Colby recalled. that former CIA Director Richard M. Helms tack a. 'similar step with tapes. he had on leaving the agency in Janu- ary, 1973. ? . ? . .1 "He [Helms] said it didn't have any- thing to do with Watergate, (that] he was just getting rid of all this junk people collect, you know," Colby said. Asked whether he now felt that the documents he ordered destroyed should have been sent to the Justice p.De artment in 1973 along with the in- .spector ? ? general's findings, Colby paused and said softly, "I guess, ..maybe. I don't know." Then he added that not all should have gone to Jus- tice, since ? some of the incidents were rather flimsy, but other documents, he agreed, probably Should have been sent. over. . The Justice Department is studying the evidence compiled by the Rockefel- ler commission, concerning both do- mestic spying and CIA involvement in assassination plots, to determine whether any prosecutions ? should be undertaken. - Colby said he was confident that no CIA employees will be indicted be- cause, he said, he fells, they were act- ing under the belief that whatever they did, while perhaps ' "technically" illegal, was permissible "in the course of their dutieS." Among Colby's August, 1973, &raw tives was an order that the 'CIA will not engage in assassination nor induee, assist or suggest, to others that assas- sination be employed," but he said an earlier ban had been issued by Helms in March 1972, three months before the Watergate break-in. Asked what prompted the Helms edict, Colby said it was issued because of the heavy amount of publicity stem- ming from Colby's 1971 congressional testimony on Operation Phoenix in South Vietnam, which critic's chnrged relied -heavily on torture and assas- sination. The 1972 directive, ColbY said, was written "just to make clear what his [Helms] policy and my policy were ... to clarify the records so that it's clear what our policy was." The Helms order was not widely dis- seminated, however. Neither the White House nor congressional . overseers were told about it at the time, Colby said. Even the CIA's general counsel TI-IE VDT: TIMES, FRI.134 Y, ? .).?T '2;?, in 1972, Lawrence Houston, who is ilon! - retired, said he never heard of it until it .was publicly disclosed several dates ago.. Voicing high praise for the CIA aal` its employees de:mita the cureent furor, Colby said he has no Idea when tne investigations will end, but made plaid ? that he hopes they will close down as \quickly as possible. . "I think anyless dedicated group oZ people would have all flown away long ago, but this is an enormously ? highly Motivated, dedicated, talentad :group of people," Colby said. "Our in- telligence is the best in the world.". Unquestionably, Colby said, the CIA made mistakes, but he called this the result of an old tradition that its worir was not supposed to be talked about a climate that no longer exists. "If you let any large organization -operate without controls and without supervision, it will get in some trou- ble," Colby said, but even so, he said, "the country's been well served by this agency and I think it will be well served by it in the future, ? even. better." any case, Colby said with a grin, he plans to "tear up" a lot more files ? as soon as investigators are done with them. Have a bonfire? he was asked. "Damn right," the CIA director said, pointing out the windows to the closely guarded 219-acre site. "Right out .there." Colby Says WASHINGTON, June 19 (AP). ?William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, said to- day that over the years foreign- ?ers. had suggested assassina- tions-to him and United States Government employes had dis- cussed the possibility of assas- sinations with him, but that he had rejected the ideas every time. ' The 55-year-old head of the 'United States spy agency de- clined to name the suggested or potential targets or the per: sons who had-made the sugges- tions. Nor would he give the 'dates or locations of these con- versations. Mr. Colby said that he op- posed public disclosure of factsi behind th these or other alleged assassination schemes involv7 ing the C.I.A. because "I think there is positive harm to the reputation of the country to; go into great detail on these' things." ? 1 ' He said, "Our policies today' are clear . .? I am opposed to assassinations because think they're wrong and be- cause I think they frequentlyi bring about absolutely uncon-1 rolled and unforeseeable re-I suits .? usually worse re?sultsl than by continuing to suffer the problem that you're .fac- ing." ? Duling an intei.v?iew of inure than an hour in his seventh- floor office at C.I.A. headquar- ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-0 e Rejected All Suggestions for C.I.A. ssassinatians ters in suburban. Langley, Va., Mr. Colby discussed a wide range of issues raised during investigations of his agency by the news media, a Presidential commission and -several Con- gressional committees. Thesetwere among his major. 'points in the .first. interview ? he has given 'since the Rocke- feller 'CommissiOn last Week reported that it had found some "plainly unlawful" domestic ac- tivities by the agency. o He cannot. . enivsiorf that , agency employes would again -feel that the political climate in this country justified their ? violating the legal limits on .the agency's domestic activity. -he does not believe that any C.I.A. employes will be convicted of crimes or even prosecuted for illegal activities. He cannot be certain that all the agency's illegal or im- proper activities have come to light, but argues that no Feder- al agency could give such an assurance about its operations. ? It is up to the Congressional committees and the Justice De- partment to decide whether to make public the names of per- sons responsible for the agen- cy's illegal. activites. He cco;:i A-as that foreigneas aproached others in the agen- cy with a plot to. assassinate French President Charles de Gaulle, and that it was flatly ---- rejected. He does not know whether the French Govern-' ? went was advised of that plot, nor . can he say that in all instances he would advise a foreign government of a plot that came to his attention. . ClHe intends to implement the Rockefeller Commission's ?reCommendation that the agen- cy's inspector general's office be enlarged but hopes that ef- forts to police the agency will not impair its intelligence-gath- ering mission. glie has not been asked to resign and intends to stay at his -post so long as the Pres-- ident and he agree that he is useful. gale thinks that a career ih intelligence should be neither- a bar nor a requirement for the job of -director of Central Intelligence. Mr. Colby said that the Unit- ed States had the best intel- ligence service in the world and that he believed a major part of his role is to convince this country's citizens of that. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, June 30, 1975 * * * ? Troubles of the CIA have all but dried up an important source of the Agency's information?exchanges with intelli- gence services of U.S. allies. Word has been passed from abroad that there's little chance of renewal of a free-flow of information until vestigations of the completed. congressional in- CIA have been Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001008-70007-b THE WASHINGTON POST Sunday; June 22,1%1 By Arthur 31. Cox ? *,* Cox, a writer and lecturer on foreign affairs, is a former. official in the. State.: - Department and the CM. His next book, "Myths of. National Security," will be- 'published this summer. ? ' /TN AN ERA of budding detente the , 1.11 clandestine operations of the KGB.: iand CIA are an anachronism. Even so, both sides will continue to engage In y !secret political warfare and espionage .as long as the other side conducts such operations. But the decline of the Cold ..War and technological advances in in- vfonnation-gathering clearly challenge ethe validity of. these operations. The time has come to add this subject to the agenda of U.S.-Soviet negotiations toward the goal of phasing out the clandestine functions of both the KGB and CIA.. For years Washington and Moseow have used the clandestine operations of the other side as a sort of litmus paper to measure true- intentions. A U.S. President or a Soviet Communist ?Party secretary might talk of peace, 'but the knowledge of on-going clandes- tine operations is always hard evi- dence of the other side's continuing "ag.e4reneiva intentions. Tlus,tnt inAtee. (ties of the KGB and the CIA reinforce ithe continuity of each other. If the ?Soviets are going to conduct secret political action and espionage, then we 'should, too. - J Yet, General Secretary Leonid Xrezhney says time and again that "the :Process of detente is irreversible." De- .itente means a relaxation of tensions for the purpose of reducing the possi- bility of war. But the clandestine opera- tions of the CIA and KGB manifestly increase tensions. They are,a form of warfare. :KGB Blunders ? IF THESE CLANDESTINE programs were achieving important foreign policy gains for either the U.S.S.R. or ,the U.S., then their continuation, ;though debatable, would be under-. standable. But that is not the case. The KGB has had very few political warfare successes in recent years. The same is true of the CIA, unless the "destabilization" of the Chilean gov- ernment is considered a success. The U-2 incident, ,the Bay of Pigs and the CIA failure in Vietnam have been highly publicized, but less is known about some of the reversals for So- viet foreign policy, caused by the KGB. For example: ? In early 1969 there were a num- ber Of serious military incidents on the Sino-Soviet border. The S;2.fiets demanded that the Chinese sit down at the negotiating table to settle the matter, but the Chinese refused. In ? . Sino-Soviet affairs., Soon there was a. story in the American press indicating that the Soviets were considering a - pre-emptive nuclear strike against China. In September a story appeared in the London Evening News signed by Victor Louis, undoubtedly the most publicized of all KGB operatives,which -speculated about a Soviet strike to elim- inate Chinese nuclear bases.- These stories were followed by a flurry of news items, datelined from Hong Kong to Helsinki, about Soviet aggressive .intentions against China. In December, 1969, under a headline saying "Chinese Communists Appear to Expect a Russian Attack," Joseph Alsop reported that long-stalled talks dealing with border incidents were proceeding between the Soviets. and Chinese. "It is perfectly clear," he wrote, "that .the Chinese only con- serted to talk at all because of Soviet threats.._. . The language of the Chin- :Tx annnuneeinent -o.L' the talks quite openly implied that there had been Soviet threats of an extremely crude and brutal kind.' So the KGB operation succeeded in pressuring the Chinese to resume the talks, but it also alarmed the Chinese leaders so Much that they signaled in- terest in secret negotiations with the U.S. Soon there was ping-pong diplo- macy, and not long thereafter Henry Kissinger was on the way. to the break- through which led to President Nixon's visit to China, the beginning of more friendly U.S.-Chinese relations , and membership- for- China in _the United Nations. Surely, no development in recent history has been a greater set- back for Soviet foreign policy. In 1955 and '56 Secretary of State John Foster Dulles turned down the ? \ appeals of Egyptian President Abdel Nasser for U.S., arms aid and help in building the Aswan dam. So the So- viets filled the vacuum and. their re- lations with the Egyptians became very , close. '..11owever, things began to change when Nasser died in 1970 and was suc- ceeded by Anwar Sadat. Sadat was neither pro-Soviet nor anti-Western,. but he was very much of an Egyptian nationalist. He showed such independ- ence that the Soviets began to worry whether they_weuld have sufficient po- litical influence to protect their vast in-sestment in Egypt. By. the spring of 1971 the Soviets were so alarmed that they instructed the KGB to art;range a coup to eliminate Sadat from August Boris Dayid ov, a senior KGB povve officer in the Washington errtAiwol,*id For Rtiteasttt2001146408 toQJAA:47:7-004421*0049314837000A-Qo crucial Soviet lunch with an American sp"alEfist in s) foreign policy objectives, the KGB moved swiftly to arrest more than 90, ? r plotters. He was astounded to discover' that his trusted chief of intelligence, Sami Sharaf, was a KGB agent. The KGB had begun cultivating Sharaf in 1955, and by 1959 he had emerged as the de facto chief, of Egyptian intelli- gence. By 1967 he had become Nasser's closest adviser. Sharaf was the key. KGB agent in the plot against Sadat. ; After the failure of the attempted :coup it looked as though Soviet Middle East policy would collapse. The Soviets were so desperate that they presented ,Sadat with a 15-year Treaty of Friend- ship, pledging to stay -out of the in- ternal affairs of Egypt and agreeing to provide vast quantities of weapons. .Later, even after Sadat had expelled 110,000 Russian technicians, the So- viets continued to send planes, tanks and ground-to-air missiles. Sadat accepted anything he could !get until he had achieved his purpose ;in the 1973 Yom Kippur War with Is- rael. However, he has not forgotten how close the KGB came to ending his career. This explains, in part, the restoration of U.S.-Egyptian diplomatic relations and Sadat's extraordinarily ,friendly talks with Kissinger and now Mr. Ford. ' ; ? In the years after World War II the Soviets' greatest concern was that German rearmament might lead ,to a. Bonn attempt to take over East Germany and Berlin?and to war. But then Willy Brandt emerged as Chan- cellor of the Federal Republic with his Ostpolitik.. The most important step in the policy, designed to pro- mote relaxation of tensions with the Soviet bloc, was Bonn's recognition of Pankow as a separate, independent nation, - marking the abandonment once and-for all of the concept of a reunited Germany. General Secretary Brezhnev vigorously supported all elements of the Ostpolitik, but espe- cially Bonn's recognition of East Germany, , -Under the circumstances Brandt's sudden decision to resign must have come as a stunning blow to the Kremlin. And yet Brandt resigned be- cause of the discovery that one of his highest ranking assistants, Gunter Guillaume, was a Spy. What happened is now amply on the record: . In .1956 the East German intelli- gence service, which for years had been directed by the KGB, sent Gull- lauine to West Germany. Posing as an escapee from communism, he did re- markably well?for himselt and for his bosses. In 17 years he progressed from running a wurst and flower stand to the position of personal assistant to the federal chancellor. Despite Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-0 :toOk7-the incredible' risk of leaving: 'Guillaume in place. It is not difficult' to imagine what would have happen-' .ed had Brandt's successor rejected his Ostpo/itile, ? Electronic Intelligence TrillE EGYPTIAN AND German X. stories illustrate the fact of in- telligence life that spy operations can be conducted with remarkable success ? over aslong period of time?and yet end up having disastrous or potentially dis- astrous results for policy. It is ? clear that, in an era when negotiation is supposed to be replacing Cold War confrontation, the clandestine operations of' the KGB and CIA are archaic. They are hostile, provocative acts running' 'counter to the professed objectives of' the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. Of course, good intelligence will. continue to be important for both sides'-But intelligence data does not have to be obtained through espion- age. Strategic intelligence nf utmost int.: portance can now be obtained through' technological, rather than human, means; We are able to observe Soviet medium, intermediate and interconti- nental range ballistic missile tests . through the use of radar and .clecd tronic interception of telemetry sign nals. We- know what they have tested and what they have not tested. Through seismic and acoustic re- ceivers we know the size and location of all their nuclear tests. Through, the precision cameras of space recona. 'naissance we know the size and loca-i tion of their missile silos. For years We have known how big,' .and approximately how accurate, their missiles are?and how many they. have. We are able,- via sonar .and ?the, er sophisticated devices and tech- niques( to track ? their missile-firing submarines. The miracles of high-flying camerae, which can photOgraph the entire -U.S.S.R. in a few days, . combined . with the ?information obtained from electronic' interception, radar and. computers, provide us with much more accurate intelligence than we had. :available when espionage was ram- pant at the' height of the Cold War. In fact, in an era of strategic parity- or essential equivalence it is, impera: dive that both sides have excellent in- formation about the capabilities -of the other. That is the only way the bal- ance of deterrence can work. In , the interim SALT agreement signed i.n Moscow in 1972, both sides acknowledged the importance of space reconnaissance as an essential means of verifying that the terms of the agreement are fulfilled. If the Soviets - had not developed accurate space re- connaissance of their own, it would have been in our interest to make' - such facilities availalale to them. If , both sides intend to limit strategic arms, it will be essential that inform- -' lion about the systems of eaen be open, not secret. There remain, for example, problems about verifying the limit on the num- The high-flying cameras can locate the missile silos, .but if the silo is covered, the cameras cannot determine whether- the missile within it has multiple war- -heads. One solution is simply to as- .sume that all categories of missiles successfully tested with multiple war- heads will be so equipped when placed in the silo. Since the days of the McCarthy era and the national hysteria over corn-. inunist penetration and spies there has remained in this country- an ex- aggerated sense of the threat of the -KGB. Even if the FBI were not doing its job, there are very fear vital secrets for the KGB in the United States. We want the Soviets to have a very thor- ough understanding of our strategic strength. That is the point of deter-. -rence. Code machines and computers have made our codes and cryptographic systems virtually impenetrable. Our war plans are supposed to be secret, but a careful reading of the annual Defense Department posture state- ment, the congressional hearings and the technological journals 'gives any trained observer most of the essential data. There are diploMatic secrets, but those secrets -arc very short-lived,, usually valid only during the period of negotiation. Secrecy Hurts ACTUALLY, SECRECY. is often an' impediment to national security in a democracy. In 1970 the Pentagon asked. its Defense Science. Board to estab- . lisle a =tr. :tore& to study the effects of the secrecy system. The, board- concluded that as,much as 90 p,er cent of classified scientific and technical defense information should not be so designated. The board members es- timated that most secret information would become known within .a year. They noted that excessive' secrecy tended to stifle inventiveness and use- ful research in weapons systems. One member said, "If present trends continue for another decade our na- tional effort in weapons research will become little better than mediocre." Another member concluded that, ,"while secrecy is an effective instru- ment in a closed society,, it is -much. less effective in an open society in the long run; instead, the open society, , -should recognize that openness is eine *of its strongest weapons." The U. S. Moon program was open;' 'the Soviets' was secret. It was the U.S. 'which landed on the moon. As in the Past, most essential informa- tion will continue to come from open sources. The technological means for information-gathering will provide most of the additional required material. Of course, there will also be a continuing 'guest for information by diplomatic es- tablishments. Just as newspaper report.; ers have confidential sources, so dip- lemats will have confidential sources. -Whether the diplomat is called a KGB ,or CIA officer era fol:cigx-L'ervirr.: off i- cer makes little difference. If he is part of the diplomatic establishment he has ,the same privileges and the same risks . of being made persona non grata. , and the reerUitment of agent!! within' .the opposing government: The latter is a much more provocative -and hostile action. When discovered, stick ,acts sharply increase tensions. In a time :when both sides are advocating detente, ,the risks of developing a Penkovsky, .or Philby outweigh the benefits-. Now it will be said that the Soviets? 'because they have a. closed society, a police' state and an ideology which ad- vocates conspiracy?will never give up their clandestine operations. Perhaps .so, but if we intend to move ahead with a growing detente, now is the time to find out. It must be anticipated that there. will be vigorous opposition in the Kremlin, both bureaucratic and doctrinal. Never- theless, Brezhnev and his fellow polit- buro members have demonstrated that their advocacy of detente may be over- 'riding. In the struggle for power. in the Kremlin the politburo has ousted Shelest and Shelepin, both anti-detente hawks. It is worth noting that Shelepin was a former chief of the KGB. Brezh- nev and the others know that the KGB bee made serious blunders and has some- -times set back Soviet foreign policy. o Phasing Out Spying 'rliFIERE IS A LONG history of nego- Il. tiations between the US. and-So- Nies in the field of clandestine opera- tions, but never an attempt to negotiate a broad reduction. There have been many spy exchanges, some of them high- .iy publicized, such as the swap of -Col. Rudolf 4.--bel for IT-9 pilot :Ty There have been' deals about provocative' "black" radio broadcasts, and Soviet jamniing has been reduced as inflamma- tory political commentary has been phased out. Political warfare and espionage, like ..strategic missiles, form a eubject- for negotiation. One technique that has -worked before is to announce that we are unilaterally phasing out certain Op- erations and will be carefully watching to see whether the Soviets follow suit. This was the technique used by Preei- dent Kennedy which led to. the partial nuclear test-ban agreement. As the ,phase - out proceeded both sides would verify the implementation of the arrangements through the tech- 'niques of counter-espionage. The FBI .would have responsibility within' the U.S., while CIA counter-espionage and liaison with friendly foreign intelli- gence services would bear responsibil- ity abroad. The KGB counter-espio- nage system would obviously monitor. .whether the U.S. was carrying out its side of the bargain. . ' Once the dialogue begins, all sorts of possibilities will come into view. There will, as noted, be strong resist- ance by the hawks on both sides., If .the Soviets are unwilling to go along, it is important that we should know that, especially in these days of reVievi 'of the role of the CIA, But if we have sufficient self - confidence combined with the common sense to maintain. your guard while showing flexibility, there is now a prospect for persuading. the Soviets td join us in ending ?thei 'clandestine war. ? ber of missiles upgraded into MIRV's.. ? .by being fitted with mungtopracritegif orRelYkstptICl/Of,t- dfAIREPPV-00432R000100370007-0 -,rwe ip oma ic oniation gathering 4 ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007La0 NEWSDAY 13 Jun 1975 On the surface are charges of assassination plots and illegal deeds, 8ut -underneath, there is' an everyday human side.: Jane Morse Newsday S...te.ff Correspondent _ . ntil quite recently, one of the few prov- able facts known about the cloaked and. secretive Central Intelligence Agency is that its headquarters are in Langley, 1.7a., just outside WaShington. Current probes of the. organization suggest, however, that it may be a way out, and that anything at all could be going on there. Indeed it is. - . Although the knitting and crocheting club has actiourned for the est.n.---cea the 60-voice eherres ece-r- t.lnues to hold once-a-week practice sessions, the grand slam bridge club hairegular -duplicate games every Tuesday at 6:15 and .the Bible study deal gets together twice a week at midday. The fact is that behind the shadowy,. faceless say facade and in the midst of recent revelations and investigations, there exists a not-so-faceless bunch of individtsile linked by federal-style bu- reaucracy that's complete with a hyperactive em- ployee activities association, a private washroom for the director, a credit union and a ? car pool. It has, as well, carved-in-marble a testimonial to honor 31 of its people killed in the line of duty, a clinic set up with the specialized equipment needed for the prompt treatment of heart attack victims (some- thing that's required with startling regularity it is said),. and a "helping hand" fund that takes up voluntary, anonymous collections to help staff anent,- bars in need.. . Nonetheless, these . days, anyone who veers off the highway after the sign that says "CIA Next Right" is apt to cause Other drivers and passengers to risk dislocating their vertebrae twisting for a i look. It's hardly a Worider, of course. The place has! never been on the Gray Line tour and there are I relatively few peopie, outside the staff and its pro- fesiorial associates, who have . ever been inside. I . . The Tare visiting outsider would find that wInt's inside is a magnificently wooded, 213.1-acre campus; ?and campus is what its called. Like most cam- puses it's a little short on -clerking, but that's partly because Allen Dulles, who was the agency director when the new headquarters were built, had strong. feelings about frees. "He'd say, `Gee, tie something around it to mark it for saving, even if it had to be moved. I figure he cost us something like 250 parking spaces," an associate recalls.. Dulles hired the architectural firms of Harrison and Abramowitz and Frederic R. King, reportedly outmaneuvering the General Services. Administra- tion, which had some other ideas. The seven-story, off-white, reinforced-concrete birilding-thaf iestified, was completed in 1961?and promptly infiltrated.. Field mice moved in almost at once. _ ? 'Present-day two-legged infiltrators might get by the guards at the toll-booth-like main entrance gate (they seem to be accustomed' to, unannounced visitors arriving to pick up and haul away passen- gers) butrto :park or to g'et---1-nore- than ? 20--Yards .4.... 16 1.1. ? ? ? 4 ? ?14,I ...a. Li. jL,ti. S C. expected, guards?behind signs warning that. such thin as' cameras, firearniS and, incendiary. devices are prohibited?will point Yeti toward -a-'reception room stOck'ed.". with magazines --and phones. There, .one.:?:of three receptionists will smilingly offer a visitor'slorm to-be filled-out in duplicate. Once you-receive the seal of approval (a clip-on cardsaying- "Visitor"); sit's entirely possible that you might even get inside someplace as -emetic as the self-service--: postal-, tenter_ . It will ?-? happen, though, bnly-if the_.perscn.,--avhom you're meeting or the escort wbo's assigned :10-you is agreeable. From the .reption roam on, you must -have corn- - 'The building is roughly- a quadrangle. In the center is an.enclosed patio that ycu'd pass if headed for the "open' cafeteria . or the Muzak-free but cocktail-lounge-like --Rendezvous :Room. ?Alcohol, .though,_ does not cross. the bbrder of any govern- ment . food" Serv-ice installation. 'The- Rendezvous Room-is, instead, noted for its- $2.20 daily. all-yoti-. .can-ea t 'criffeta "" ' ? :- When the- tvea- tiler permits, nuanbers::Cyf 7:6M- ployees opt for outside eating at rustic tables on the groundS?beind the building.. Still others-patron- -52e a second cafeteria that duplicates the first with the same vaulted ceiling and expanse of glass that, as interior decorators have- established, brings the outdoors in. The latter cafeteria, though, lets in only the outdoors and certain well-cleared CIA enTloyees, ? ? . ? S.orneeof the same employees were no doubt in- velved - succeeeful 1962 coup that ? resulted in the elimination of the building's there-tithe ?Iy" cepressmg -gr ng is?-egtiers-.7. were rushed in. arid fina/ly agreed -on:white wells intme- tuated by colored doors and panels, each: shaded to fellow the other likeaspokes in a color wheel. The new loolc? was a hit-with most employees, although one senior. official is suppoeed to have; itrkbilhaisfeittliagrAklettSe /08j08 PCIPPREfP571;11i9bilti'RIYINA6017300#7tili the .1t-erY! Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-0 of a visitor shown around the 'home of a newly! rich woman. "Madam," the visitor said, "111 pay! kr -the drinks but I won't go upsbirs." Ups'airs, one hears, there are still some proh-, leens? with perrs1 clutter. Personal clutter is "the enemy of good design," according to a 7-pege bock-! let, end employees are admonished that they may. he aiding the opposition when they tap-e cartoons to their ofilice.sales _or pile on top _of _them. - The -CL-C has won thedesign-c!Utter rin thel first floor, though, and in style. Bright cc-rite-Moor- ' ary paintings borrowed from Washington art col- lector VirioTnt 'Nlelzaz are pcxeitioned- eff.ectively on. various walls, and . an Exhibit niu in the soutle.est area is currently displaying near eastern ancl.Indo-Pakistani art objects from the private col- lections of CIA erneloye.s. The agency's own !in arts commission is at the moment being chewed out by in-house c-iitics for putting phony grass beneath the magnolia trees in a, small patio off the cafeteria area, but it has been lauded for other moves. It , gave its approval, for instan, to _"wrapping" th 1.four mein banks of elevators in floor-tc-ceiling blow- .ups of antique maps, one of Rome, one of Paris, one of London and one of St. Petersburg in Cznrist- : ? The- elevator interiors fell into waggish hands, and, although stand-rd "no smoking" sig,r.e are carefully posted, they're in such not-so-standard ! Languages as Japanese, Persian, Hindi and Hausa, ? as well as French and German: If a Chinese-speak- ing ePy ever penetrates the place, he-probably would: feel- encst at home using. the 'sta.irse w"..nce: floors are: numbered in various. Asian ?and. foreign.nornerals_?- ---, He -should net, however, bet any omeney, on. getting_ that far. -..- Anywhere on "Campus," you...n tell,' the regue. .iere free, the ernn.iii-trarlp at a giariep. Thp rprra:: lots have their pictures ? on thiere ID cards and' ? seem. to favor hanging them on chains around_ their necks. They're &sae-the-ones ?whoel-dpret sop fo- ! gawk- at- the :portraits- of_ former? CIA directors- ' that 'are-spaced out along one of. the firstrilcor. corridors: Or at the framed display of CIA medals., some' of. which have to be stashed-on the'prees/ until they're.nct too hot to be handled by?-re-cibi- ents whose- cover or operation. might bq blown if. NEW YORK TIMES 22 June 1975 rjVa SmEtates Co ledure CELL tinquirry - The Central Intelligence Agency obviously does a lot nobody else knows about; just as obviously it gets blamed for things it didn't do, because. what is known makes it a natural suspect. Unhappily for the beleaguered agency, mobster Sam Giancarlo was murdered last week, and an investiga- tor would have to be moribund himself if he didn't wonder about the C.I.A. Mr. Giancana was killed in his Chicago home. There were six bullets in and around his head, but no wit- nesses. There is no known evidence at? all that the C.I.A. had anything to do. with 'the murder. ? ? Mr. Giancana and aooth-; under- world figure, John Roselli. were re-, cently publicly linked with a C.I.A. assassination plot against Fidel Castro.. The plan was allegedly hatched in the ! they took delivery.: Or at the: copy :a George. Washington's- letter articulating his own sirbneo feelings of the necessity of intelligence.sgathering- arid the need to keep it secret.' . - '?It's hard, of .course, for- a? newcomer not- to st - .and stare. What the CIA may really be- running:- is a snelsri-xnusetun with research Even the librazy_ are more seetifacts and memorabilia. For one thing, there's the bigewooderr seal that identified the agency's. old headquarters in midtown Washingten It was-Seved in an in- formal.. Sunday' morning salv.age operation per- formed by a thoughtfol-his-torjemincleeestaff ,tnercie . , ? There's also the historical -intelligence collection ... ot some, _20,0W "tradecraft" books- frequently con- sulted by intellig---e-n-ae_offic-eis-- in -,e.arck ore.. Pit-eel dent.; The library'Oeemain collection'ie now pr'?=ar-et. ily a:body of abelit: 75,000 reference- books pluS ai worldwide selection of telephone directories and; enough newspapers 'to- provide the English with; a few centosiete worth of fish-and-chip wrappings.i ITo keep further abreast of current -events andl thinking, the CIA training _office--; from time toi Itime,' invites guests such as Missile-man - I'Vernheri i von Braun, authereeclitor-educator Irving F...ristol,; !Marquette University Journalism See'nool Dean; !George Reedy. and former Strategic Arens Limi.ta? ! tion Talks negotiator Paul ---lefitz.e-ito speak beforel ? employees in a bubble-domed 5C0-seat auditoriunoi ; , attached -to the main building. Keeping up also 1 ; means that ,the Northern Virginia. Community C01-1 1 sends over- instructors to hold regular after--i werk-hour classes in a variety of subjects. 1 - That last move, .though, seems like a Caels-to-; Newcastle waste of effort. As one of the rideriti intellectuals puts-it, .f.' the CIA closed down- teener- ! row as a spy operation, it ebold reopen the follow- ing day as one of ens- country's leading universities. i Enough academic .expertise could be rounded up, on the premises to set up shop immediately in; everything from "A" for anthropology to "Z" foe! zoology. For a language-studies department alone, ; the new university could call on people with i competence in 97 different tongues and dialects, ' not including the desk officer, who has achieved international recognition 'for .his hobby, ifyth- Century Latin. /1,1 ? - - Closing days of the Eisenhower Admi; nistration in 1960 and carried forward during the beginning of the Kennedy Administration. Mr. Giancana was supposed to testify soon before a Senate committee investigating intel- ligence activities. Mr. Giancana's business associates -presumably include a number capable of homicide and perhaps some with the motive; he had reportedly been testifying about underworld matters before a Federal grand jury. There has .been at least one other mob murder recently in Chicago. Yet in the current atmosphere espe- cially, the C.I.A. is not immune from suspicion; what, used to be considered the paranoia of the fc.?w is now the rational skepticism of many, including respected writers in respected jour- nals. There are constant reports to feed the skepticism: 0, Vice President Rockefeller said. the asSasalnatfon of Jolla an Robert Kennedy and. "a real problem of amnesia among those still around" made it impossible to determine conclusively the involvement of the Kennedy White House in Castro,' assassination plots. o President Ford indicated he will. turn over to the Senate committee minutes of National Security Council meetings at which assassination was' discussed. One source who had read the minutes said. "There were some pretty bizarre suggestions, as though a. group of guys were sitting around. and talking over a beer." ? . ?At the C.I.A., one spokesman (who asked to remain unidentified) said: "They're going ? to pin the crucifixion on us next." It was only gallows humor and may prove as' ineffective. as most in the genre. The Rockefeller Commission itself accused the agency of violating the rights of thousands of Americans. The Senate Committee is 'said to have enough evidence of the Castro affair so that it will not seriously miss Mr., Giancana's testimony. There are re- ports that Mr. Rockefeller and Henry Kissinger are seeking the resignation' of the C.I.A. director, William E ? Colby. It might be a while before any- one get around to the crucifixion. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RW77-00432R000100370007-0 TTIr'" 33 01121F.: 1975 TH2 CIA T' rar-. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001003470007-0 ssassindion Plot ThcLt Failed Of all the charges of wrongdoing by the Central intelligence Agency, the most disturbing arc those that implicate the agency in plots to assassinate foreign nil- ers who were deemed inimical to U.S. in- terests. Among the putative targets were Congolese Nationalist. Leader Patrice* Luntztrnba and Dominican Republic Dic- tator Rafael Trujillo, who were assassi- nated in 1961; South Viet Nam Presi- dent Ngo Dinh Diem, who Was murdered in 1963; and Cuban Premier Fidel Cas- tro. The allegations are being investigated by a Senate committee, which last week continued to question past and present CIA officers about the alleged plots. At TIME'S request, Charles J. V. Murphy, a former editor and Washington correspondent of FORTUNE, talked with his long-time sourc- es in the U.S. intelligence field about the charges and sent this report: The suspicion is that two Presidents?Dwight Eisen- hower and John Kennedy ?authorized or condoned foul plots by the CIA to do in sev- eral foreign leaders. Democrat- ic Senator Frank Church of Idaho, who heads the Senate investigating committee, has claimed to have "herd evi- dence.' of the agency's com- plicity but nothing that would implicate any President. Still, in the singular relationship of the agency to presidential au- thority, evidence of a CIA as- sassination plot would seem to implicate one President or the other, even both, unless, of course, the CIA had become a Jaw unto itself. What the Rockefeller commission report revealed was "in all likelihood just the tip of the iceberg." ac- cording to Church. The real likelihood is that so far as the actual assassinations are con- cerned, there was never much more to this floating body than a deceptively shimmering tip. Castro, however, was another matter. The n3ency version or the charges is this: TRUJILLo. Former senior officers of the CIA maintain that neither the agency nor Presidents Eisenhower or Kennedy had anything directly to do with the dictator's death. Officials in the. American embassy had tried to per- suade Trujillo to resign to end the do- mestic unrest that the U.S. feared might make the country ripe for Communism. They had also been gingerly in touch with leaders of the political opposition and as a token ofsthe American interest in seeing a change. had provided one faction with three rifles. A group of sev- en or eight men ambushed Trujillo on the road from' hiS honse to the presi- dential palace. Whether any of the U.S.- supplied rifles were used in the killing has never been determined to the se- nior CIA men's satisfaction. - LUMUMBA. The Soviet Union sup- W12 11 s I FP? IZ wOara4s4nn Approved For Klease ported him with money and arms in the contest to take the former Belgian Con- go out of the West's orbit. While the CIA supported President MoTse Tshombe of Katang,a against Lumumba, it had no part in Lumurriba's arrest and murder by Katanganese soldiers. He was a ca- sualty of African tribal politics. DIEM. The coup against Diem was planned with the knowledge of Dean -Rusk and Averell Harriman at the State Department, Robert S. McNamara and Roswell Gilpatric at the Defense De- partment and the late Edward R. Mar- row at the U.S. Information Agency. The U.S. hoped Diem's overthrow would halt the domestic turmoil that had weak- ened South Viet Narn. But the CIA's di- rector, john A. McCone. vigorously op- posed the overthrow of Diem on the reasoning that none of the generals en- listed in the coup would be half as ef- fective a leader as the man they wanted to bring down. After the coup, Diem was murdered. Former senior CIA officials insist that the slaying was the private work of the Vietnamese generals' junior officers and was done without the U.S. Government's foreknowledge. CASTRO. Though Castro is still alive, it is not because the CIA did not con- sider various ways of doing him' in. The det:an on the "maximum leader's" life burgeoned over a span ofsoase two years into a corpus of schemes. As best the principals remember, the idea first emerged in the late spring or early sum- mer of 1960 as a simple, even simple- minded plot to poison Castro's-food or slip him a poisoned cigar. By some ac- counts, the notion originated with a se- nior officer in the agency's Western Hemisphere division whose ideas inter- OS STOREY ested Colonel Sheffield Ed- wards, director of the agency's Office of Security. Edwards passed the idea on to Deputy Director for Plans Richard M. Bissell Jr. He instructed Edwards to explore the feasibility of the project. For help, Edwards turned to a former FBI agent and. later Howard Hughes as- sociate, Robert A. Maheu. ? Matieu, then a private consul- ? tant and investigator, was be- lieved to have a line to Mafia interests that, had operated gambling casinos in Havana. Through the connection, Ed- wards sought to find out whether the Mafia could pro- duce, if need be, a man in Ha- vana in a position to liquidate Castro. - Through Chicago Mafia Chieftain Sam Giancana, who was murdered last week in his suburban Chicago home, and his lieutenant. John Roselli, ?. the da recruited a gangster re- puted to be in Castro's eatou- rage of bullyboys. In late Sep- tember I3issell and Edwards informed Director Allen Dul- les of the results of their ten- with Dulles was in the most general terms: he was merely encouraged to test the ground . further. ? ? ; The medical section of the CIA produced some exotic pills and even "fixed" a box of fine Havana cigars. The cigars seem never to have left the lab- oratory, but the pills ware turned over to the Mafia. The would-be assassin was to have been paid S150,000 if he suc- ceeded; some earnest money, "a few thousand dollars," was turned over to him. Giancana and Roselli expected something more important than money: both were under investigation by the De- partment of justice and hoped to escape prosecution. In due course, the pills moved to Miami but no farther. No one seems to know why nothing happened. Perhaps the man in Havana got cold feet. Or he may have been eased out of his former close proximity to Cas- tro. By some accounts, Giancana and Roselli found a replacement for the orig- inal assassin and turned the pills over to him. The substitute later claimed to have put two separate three-man teams of infiltrators ashore in Cuba. If he did, nothing more was ever heard of them. There is. a further mystery as well. It would scarcely have been in charac- ter for Dulles to proceed in such a del- icate, potentially notorious enterprise without Eisenhower's sanction or at least the authorization of the National Security Council. But there is no record of such authority. Prebhetss of One of -Die- seas senior lieutenants in the Cuba busi- ness later stated he was advised by Bis- sell on two different occasions that the plan had White House authority. Bissell claims to have no memory of making such a statement. But he has also said he would not dispute his colleague's mem- ory. Vice President Nelson Rockefeller has described "a real problem of a .mne- sia" that 'pervadesthe recollection of the principals still alive. Bissell swore an oath to keep secret whatever they were called upon to do in the national inter- est. In their view, amnesia may well be another word for integrity in these times of damaged vocabularies. With the advent of the Kennedy Ad- ministration, the CIA plainly assumed that the new President would favor the enterprise against Castro. In February 1961 Bissell brought a new personality into the plan: a CIA officer. named Wil- liam K. Harvey. Long retired and liv- ing now in Indianapolis, Harvey was a pear-shaped . fellow with a. swinging stride. An intelligence officer of the di- rect-action school, he habitually carried a revolver in his belt. Bissell charged Harvey with the re- - sponsibility for preparing the ground for what in the jargon of the intelligence trade is called an "executive action." That is the term for an action calcu- lated to neutralize an adversary. The means may include defamation of char- acter by propaganda or luring a leader - out of his post of influence with the nromise of a fine villa on the Cote d'Azur and a bottomless Swiss bank account. The form, in theory, also includes as- sassination, though the CIA possessed no machinery for this kind of executive ac- tion. Harvey had no authority to act, 4821ROWD37tOOIRacid advise. In the wake of the failure at the Bay Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-0 of Pigs in April 1961 Dulles and Bissell both left the agency. They were succeed- ed by McCone as director and Richard M. Helms as deputy director for plans. ? Helms, who had known nothing about the schemes against Castro until he suc- ceeded Bissell, did not inform McCone about them until some months after Mc- Cone took charge. His reasoning: "Har- vey was merely looking into various pos- sibilities. If he came up with anything realistic, that would be the time to both- er John with the decision." By then, of course, the Mafia con- nection was dormant, but a blunder threatened to blow its cover a year later. because of an unrelated bit of skuldug- gery in October 1960. As TIME has re- ported, Giancana became upset because his girl. friend, Singer Phyllis McGuire, took up in Las Vegas with Comedian Dan Rowan. It was arranged to have Rowan's hotel room bugged. Through ill.chance, the snooper was caught in the act of planting his gear. The inves- tireai ion progressed slowly, but eventu- ally the Las. Vegas police insisted on put- ting the evidence before the FBI, and Maheu informed Colonel Edwards that Giancana and Roselli expected to be protected. By May 1962 the FBI got in touch with Edwards about the matter. With Edwards in tow, CIA General Counsel Lawrence Houston warned As- sistant Attorney General Herbert J. , ? Miller Jr. that the clis's connection with the Mafia faced exposure if the snoop- ers siere prosecuted. A day or so later, Houston and Edwards met with then Attorney General Robert Kenney. was upset but apparently not unduly alarmed. There would be no prosecu- tion. His parting words were: "If you people want to get involved again with Mafia types, I want you to consult me first." It was Houston's impression that Kennedy had not known of the oper- ation until that afternoon but had no ob- jection to its going forward. Special Meeting. In. August 1962 the assassination project came under ? discussion at the highest levels of the Government. McCone called a special meeting of officials?among them Rusk, McNamara and Murrow?to discuss the growing Soviet activities in Cuba. Mc- Cone and another man present remem- ber that McNamara raised the question of disposing of Castro. Murrow at once objected to any discussion on that point. McCone echoed the protest. Neverthe- less, a memorandum circulated two days later by Air Force Major General Ed- ward Lansdale. a counterinsurgency ex- pert attached to McNarnara's office, in- cluded a mention of a plan for "eliminating- or "liquidating" or other- wise doing Castro in?no one remem- bers the exact phrase. When the memo was hand-carried to McCone. he hit the roof. He tele- phoned the Pentagon and demanded that the memo be w ithdra wn at once. That was done, but a copy, with the ob- jectionable terms blanked out, somehow -survives, and was the object of much speculation among the Rockefeller and ;Senate panels. Two incw th.:i after the Au- gust meeting. the Soviet missiles were discovered in Cuba. In the turmoil, Har- vey's executive action and the Mafia connection all disappeared into the void, never to be revived. Approved For Re TIME 23 ;TUNE 7 I Lunch with the President. The Rockefeller commission's re- port on the Centre: Intelligence Agen- cy is something of a s indication for the New York Tmies, which bloke the sto- ry of CIA domestic spying in an article last Dec. 22 by Investigative Reporter Seymour Hersh. Yet for months the Times sat on an even juicier part of the CIA story?President Ford's concern :over the agenay's alleged role in foreign assassination plots?but chose not to print it. Times editors last week were standing by their decision, but the ep- isode underlined the hazards of giving and taking off-the-record information. Shortly after Hersh's. CIA story,. White House Press Secretary Ron Nes- sen called Clifton Daniel, the Times Washington bureau chief, and told him that invitations Were being sent for an "informal" lunch with the President. On Jan. 16, seven top Ttmesnien were ush- ered into a small dining room in the East Wing for lamb chops with Ford, Nes- sen, ? Chief of Staff Donald Rurnsfeld, Economic Adviser Alan Greenspan and Special Consultant Robert Goldwin. The gathering was cordial, though Ford occasionally interjected -Now this is off the record" and -This is not for pub- lic." Talk eventually turned to the Rockefeller commission. Ford ex- pressed concern that the inquiry could uncover embarrassing CIA activities not related to domestic spying. "Like what?" asked Managing Editor A.M. Rosen- thal, always the reporter. Replied the President: "Assassinations," Ford's Cormosr(!. e,LI- hors gathered in Daniel's office and agreed that since the lunch was off the record, the Times could not print the President's disclosure. When Daniel tried to get Nessen to relent and put the quote on the record, the press secretary stood firm. A day or two later, Daniel chatted with Reporter Hersh about the CIA's possible role in foreign assassina- tions, but Daniel says he did not reveal the President's mention of the subject; in any case, Hersh kept busy on the story's domestic angle. "Why didn't I tell him to drop everything and get on the foreign- assassination story?" asks Daniel. "Be- cause it Wasn't new. What was new was that Ford was concerned. We couldn't print that story. I don't take my word lightly. I don't think gentlemen and jour- nalists are mutually exclusive." Word of the lunch eventually got to CBS Newsman Daniel Schorr, who on Feb. 28 reported the President's concern about CIA assassinaticn plots. Schorr's report stirred a mild sensation, and for- mer CIA Director Richard Helms de- nounced the reporter as "Killer Schorr! Killer Schorr!" But by then the Rocke- feller commission was well into its in- vestigation, and its final 'report pleads ?not too convincingly?that there was ? not enough time to examine the subject fully. Schorr refuses to identify his source. Did the President deliberately make that off-the-record lunchtime disclosure in order to keep the paper?and the hard-charging Hersh?off the assassina- tion trail? Government and corporate Officials occasionally try to -lock up" news . organizations with strategically placed not-for-publication disclosures. In the President's case, it is unlikely that he spoke out of guile. "I don't know how devious the President is," answers Ron Nessen, "and I'm not going to ask him." Managing Editor Rosenthal sees no skulduggery in the President's remark. Says he: "How did he know that we would respect the off-the-record part?" Leaky Table. Net everyone at the Times is entirely pleased that the paper elected to be so trustworthy. "As far as I'm concerned, when you've got that many people around a table, nothing is off the record,- says Associate Editor Tom Wicker, who attended the lunch. "But I work here, so I accepted the de- cision." Says Hersh: "Things have a way of leaking?which is why it's ridiculous to make those agreements." Ridiculous it may be, but journalists often find it essential to let their sourc- es say things privately that they would never say otherwise. Some of these sources may try to entomb sensitive in- formation by using the off-the-record stratagem, but the presidential luncheon . episode seems to prove, as Seymour Hersh says, that such things do have a way of getting out. U. S NEVIS & WORLD REPORT 30 JUNE 1975 * - The operating budget of the Senate committee investigating the CIA has zoomed from the original $750,000 to nearly 1.2 million dollars. About 90 staff members are now at work, includ- ing a battery of experienced interroga- . tors, plus a number of specialists with CIA or FBI experience. lease 2001/08/0&: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-0 ars? TheWashingtonStar Garry Wills Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-0. Aboliih the CIA: it's the only cleansing The Rockefeller Commis- sion did not fulfill its pur- _pose. It did not because it could not. The purpose of an expert panel making a report to the President is to clear up public doubt about murky situations. The Warren Commission on the assassi- nation of John F. Kennedy, the Eisenhower Commis- sion on violence, the Kerner Commission on riots, the Walker Commission on the Chicago convention ? these and other reports were con- troversial. But their investigations were thorough and their re- sults were made public. The controversy arose from an irreducible minimum of confusion in events and of prejudice in hearers. law or the federal statutes. Assuring us of that was the job of the Rockefeller. Commission and, by the President's own statement, the commission failed. Why the failure? Was it the fault of Rockefeller, of Ford, of staff members; a goof in timing, publicity, or organization? None of these things. The fault is in the CIA. What was desired was a convincing assurance that the CIA has not been out of The contrast with the Rockefeller Commission is obvious. Even President rowel, whils tesestretulating Rockefeller and saying the report could restore CIA credibility, Went on to add that there can be no cover- up because other investigae tions will follow, or because Ed Levi is a fine man. " The President accepted the report while saying we should withhold judgment. Yet the report's job was to .facilitate judgment, and to convince the rest of us that its own norms of judgment were sound. Ford assured us he did not want to be a Monday, morning quarterback. But that is just the assignment given to investigators. . The reference to Attorney General Levi's integrity was beside the point. The report should have had its own credibility, entirely aside from criminal pro- ceedings. ? The attorney general, in this case, may not prose- cute individuals for any number of reasons ? am- biguity in the law, the stat- ute of limitations, the death of participants in illegal ac- tivities (which go back 20 years, the President tells us), the use of "executive privilege" to protect Na- tional Security Council ' members. The failure to prosecute now does not assure us that the CIA has stayed within the law ? either the moApprord WASHINGTON STAR 16 June 1975 control and engaged TnT shabby activities. That 'assurance will never be forthcoming, because it has been out of control and en- gaged in morally shabby operations for some time. t The CIA has inculcated in its members and leaders a feeling that they are above the law; that anything they do for what they conceive to be the national interest is justifiable; that all outsid- ers, even officials, must be died to and tricked; that any attempt to check their power is an attack on the country's security and must be foiled. ? Apologists for the CIA arc right in one respect: awn cannot neatly separate the CIA's foreign from its domestic activities. Not when the foreign activities are vast, secretly financed, \ and do not recognise for- eign or international laws: , Take just one problem: How do you prevent people from blowing the -CIA's Multiple covers? The agen- cy has thousands of present ? employes it must keep an eye on ? and growing num- bers of ex-employes who must be watched, silenced or intimidated. . To provide fronts, :the ;agency throws out ever .more corporations of its own, and plants men in other organizations ? and these, in turn, must be ,watched. Among other things, the CIA is a set of interlocking businesses that handle millions of dollars. ' Each cover must be covered. There is an end- less proliferation of spies to 4py on spies. If anything, the spinning-off of Hunt and McCord into careers of 'Crime may cause the CIA to increase efforts at watching kts own. And that means Watching them all, all the fest of their lives sa an end- Less, and endlessly expand- rite tes!:. Just look at the amount of tan-hours and money ex- pended to prevent one t t The name of the CIA is never going to be cleared The more v:e learn about it, the more despicable it ap- pears. Its directors have lied to Congress. Its mem- bers have routinely broken ,the law inside the agency, and some have felt commis- sioned to do so even after they leave the firm. Its de- fenders fall back on every sleazy argument available. The only cleansing thor- ough enough, the only one proportionate to the agers cy's offenses, is abolition. The CIA is a secret em- pire with more resources for protecting itself than for protecting the country Intelligence work goes on in many bureaus where it can still be controlled, They should be maintained and expanded. The CIA should be "terminated with ex- treme prejudice." to its instigators. Let a Mar- chetti, or a Philip Agee, make themselves wealthy and famous by spilling the beans, and what will fol- low? Howard Hunt has already demonstrated that an ex- CIA agent is not above trying to shake down the president of the United States for cash. The CIA has good reason to fear that men will start talking. The fear that men will talk is an unhealthy thing in a democracy. It gets more unhealthy as the number of men being gagged multi- plies, and the justification for their silence diminishes. What the CIA fears is the light of day. We taxpayers have, with billions of dollars, furnished' a thousand dank little cel- lars we know nothing about, and our own menet, will be. used in the future to make sure we learn-as little about them as possible. If you doubt this, look at the recommendations of the Rockefeller Cotrunission it- self. After criticizing the CIA, and saying it should stay, out of domestic spying, the report makes these four exceptions: I. When the agency is keeping a watch over its owe mambas:es, present or past ? a large domestic personnel. 2. When it is countering agent, Victor Marchetti, the actions of people outside ForkRedeasetED011.08/980bRAINArdom Crorn publi shine a book thanag,e.p ' teD7 the effort looks economical "facilities or personnel." at. 1:1.-^ ? ? ? The spies must spy not only' on their own spies, but on anyone who Might be spying on these spies. 3. When a domestic target is "suspected of espio- nage." In the past, receiv- ing mail from abroad was enough to qualify under this: proviso. 4. When ? information "incidental" to foreign ac- tivities has been uncovered and is referred to other agencies. in other words, even the commission, in trying to cut back on the CIA's home ac- tivity, specifies four powers by which it can police its: own, maintain its domestic fronts, use deceit about its - financing, and harass those who are suspected of for- eign activities or any illegal activities. We are asked to give the agency money for guarding its spies from exposure. We pay to insure our own deception. If the CIA is authorized to cover up, it is de facto authorized to avoid accountability. It makes no sense for the Rockefeller Commission to call for ac- countability. The CIA is already a cyst in our government, a can- cerous growth more loyal to itself than to any law, for- eign or domestic. It is an enemy of our enemies; but also an enemy to us. With such friends we 41x need enemies. One tliot "reform" a can- cer. One cuts is out. II:111 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-0 _ BALTIMORE SUN 23 June 1975 eairrv Wills C mmo s .? To criticize the CIA, one need not feel any animus to- ward it on ideological grounds. Even if one agreed entirely with the agency's goals, and had no objection to Its past record, there would still be two solid arguments against it. These arguments .are not political; they derive :from common sense, and can ? be stated simply: . ? ? Lit is hard to keep a se- - cret. - 2. The bureaucracy spends most, of its time servicing it- -self. Put these two insights to- : gaiter, and you- see that a : huge intelligence agency has the bureaucratic problem multiplied severalfold, since ? it is servicing a particularly vulnerable thing?its own se- . crecy. And all the servicing efforts in turn have their se- crecy protected. ? 'Bernard Shaw puts the bu- reaucratic problem perfectly In: a brief parable. A wealthy Edwardian couple with one -servant got as much service ng annther Jamul; with nine servants. The house that gave -living space tollpersons (the -couple and their 9 servants) was of necessity larger than that accommodating 3 per. sons?and much of those 9 , servants' work must go to the ; upkeep of the larger mansion, seven though it was made large in the first place to house them. The cook can no longer cook for 3 (counting herself), sh3 must cook fort!. Nine ex- BALTIMORE SUN 17 June 1975 Sense Argues IPown CIA tra persons' clothes must be washed, beds made, hours ar- ranged, conflicts adjudicated; accounts watched, habits cor- rected, in order to get the 2 persons' needs looked after. Soon the employer must work harder to keep up this wasteful empire. Or, if he lives off others, they must be harder, worked, or a greater portion of their work must pay for the wasteful upkeep of the lord. You see the parallel?gov- ernment is the employer, and the taxpayers are being worked to keep up the canni- balizing efforts of the bu- reaucracy. As such, Shaw's ar- gument tells against all large bureaucratic agencies. But recast the fable to al- low for the secrecy factor. The nine original servants must conduct hidden Even the large house built to contain them is not enough. They must be maintained se- cretly elsewhere, .a new ex- pense; they must be brought to the house in secret?a five- fold eYpense, for the transpor- tation itself, for the secrecy measures around it, for trans- porters paid both to transport and to keep the secret, for the off-hours and double-time of the transporters' servants' employment, and for the peo- ple who have time to make all these quiet arrangements and keep them in operation. The housework must be done at night, or in odd hours, as if by magic. Scheduling presents great difficulties. So Kissinger says scrutiny of CIA hinders his job ' By DEAN MILLS ? Washington Bureau of The Sun - . Washington? Henry A. Kis- hope it will not be damaged by singer, Secretary of State, said these ... investigations." yesterday that the recent loves- He said it is "essential for' tigations into the activities of the United States to have a the Central Intelligence Agency first-rate intelligence organize- have hampered the conduct of tion under the strict control of American foreign policy but the political leadership." have not been "a major impedi- . Mr. Kissinger said he thinks ment." the revelations of the investiga- , Mr. Kissinger, answering tions have not disturbed foreign . questions in an appearance be- leeders as much as Americans, fore a conference- of the Public because the foreigners take for Broadcasting System here, said granted many of the intelli- the investigationS". have shown. gence activiae.s censured here. that there "obviously have been "There is no other country in some abuses" of power by the , the world where an intelligence CIA. agency could be subjected to "But," he added, "I consider i the public scrutiny that has the CIA essential. for thq, aon- ? been the case here," he said. duct of our foreign policyrattroved For Release 2001/08 08 does hiding the source of pay given to these servants. Be- sides, some servants' activi- ties must be hidden from their ' fellows. That involves still an- other house, another transpor- tation system; another fake conduit of pay, and another system to check up on what' these servants do that their. fellow servants cannot see. ? Beds are made in the sev- eral abodes, tunnels dug to connect them, and more peo- ple paid to keep the secret of hots, or whether, these things are being done. The main house is filled with secret pas- sages, so all the servants do not collide. Men must be hired for that carpentry, must therefore be checked, and . watched, and paid well to keep their secrets. When a 'servant leaves, he carries se- crets with him, and another servant must be hired to watch what he does outside the service. The bureaucratic problem, bad - enough, be- comes a 'nightmare in no time when multiplied by the secre- cy ,teeLor. That is what the current in- vestigations of the Central In- telligence Agency are all' about. And, naturally, we tax- payers are paying for the pea- ple to find all these secret tun- nets whose construction we al- so paid for. We pay the hunt- ers and the hunted, the hounds and the foxes, and both multi- . ply like rabbits. It is Alice time in this industriousWon- . derland. BALTIMORE SUN 23 June 1975 Proxmire raps calls to end CIA " Washington (AP)?Senator William Proxmire (D., Wis.), a leading critic of the Central In- telligence Agency, said yester-. day that calls for abolishing the agency are "foolish and danger- ous." "'re disband the CIA and give ? the military intelligence agencies free rein could result in a? new cycle of ominous- threat estimates followed by a dramatic increase in the de- fense budget,"- Senator Prox- mire said. "Talk of disbanding the CIA is unreasonable," Mr. Proxmire said in a speech prepared for delivery in the Senate today and released yesterday. "Strong measures must be taken to insure that future vio- lations,of the law or good sense cannot occur," Mr. Proxmire said. "Criminal penalties must be written into law. ' "But disbanding the CIA would shut our eyes and ears during a period nf tieneinn in ilia Middle East and elsewhere," he. ? said. "The CIA is the only organi- zation that can provide this da- ta without self-serving biases," he said. Senator Proxmire said mili- tary intelligence services are subject to a number of strong pressures including "the natu- ral tendency to inflate the for- eign military threat and get more money from Congress.' , CHICAGO TRIBUNE 21, JUNE 1975 L ETTERS TO THE EDITOR ? Raps CIA inquiries CHICAGO-.As a former staff officer of the Office of Strategic Services [the. predecessor of the CIA) I view the in- vestigations of the CIA as a product of the. "new 'morality" which now besets our politicians. ? With thousands of dedicated career people involved in gathering vital intel- ligence necessary ?for our nation's very ? existence, it seems picayune to submit this agency to the pick and shovel tech niques of 1976 candidates and the media, which now feel the need for a new road 'show. There is need, I admit, for new legis- lation which would compel the. CIA to be accountable for expended funds and for an overseer committee, but the 'com- mittee should be in the Senate, not the House. Lawrence L. Hollander : CIATRDP77-00432R000100370007-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001003/00074 WASHINGTON STAR 26 June 1975 .Letters to tho editor' 'Your columnist ?Garry Wills'' proposal that we abolish the CIA' provides us with a clear example of neo-Jeffersonian folly. To the liber- al mind, the solution to unchecked power is it abolition. Institutions are evil inasmuch as they restrain the creative and virtuous individu- al. Lurking in the background of liberal idealism is that nation of small farmers that would theoreti- cally allow maximum liberty for the, individual by severely limiting govm ernmental power over his life. But it is clear that our system is founded on the restraint of power, not its non-exercise. And, for the,i most part, our institutions have. 'exerted a force to expand individual - liberty, not to restrain it. The end. result of the abdication of power:. wielding in a society would be, in my opinion, not a Jeffersonian para- dise of free men tilling their own, part of the soil, but rather a Hobbe- sean purgatory of bellum omnia contra omnia (-the war of all .against all") The CIA is a necessary and vital' agency whose functions are indis- pensable in today's world. The solu- tion to its excesses lies in regula- tion. not abolition. Mr. Wills' proposal for its demise leads us no-, where but backwards into a never- never land of fantasy. R. Peyton Howard Washington, D.C. ' As a CIA retiree whb served 23 ' years with the agency, I resent deeply the implicit suggestion by Wills that all those who are serving and have given service with CIA ' should put on sackcloth and ashes and be stoned in the public square. During those 23 years, I suffered some fools in the organization and found it necessary to work with the , occasional bastard. (There must be .a few such folk in, say, the depart- ments of Agriculture, Commerce, or, perhaps, perish the thought, even in the journalistic profession.) Bastardly they may have been,' but, with a single exception, I had utmost respect for their capabil:,. Ities. I consider it a privilege to have been associated with the; organization. Not once did I lose the conviction that what I was doing was, at best, significant and impor- tant for America, and, at worst, simply dull, plodding work. Paul E. Carr 'McLean, Va. ? I realize the necessity for freeciom of the press, but Wills' opinions are verging on the brink of tyranny. His ? cute phrases such as cyst and "cancer" are irresponsible and sickenipg. If he's so smart,. whv ' Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA4bP77-00432R000100370007-0 ? ? alaaaaaa---?.a.a.-aa7a a wasps' nes doesn't he suggest some sort of a .solution other than elimination? I would like to know who he thinks ,would handle our foreign intelli- gence if the CIA were abolished. Albert E. Crandall Rockville, Md. ? : 'Ask Garry Wills who has been the imperialist al)(1 the confiscator of property and muntries in the past: '50 years ? the communist totalitar- ian socialists, the Nazi totalitarian, socialists, the Mao Tse-tung totali- tarian imperialist expansionist ' socialists, the Brezhnev totalitarian 'imperialist expansionist socialists (Soviet Union), the Pham Van Dong totalitarian socialists imperialists- , expansionists? Or the United States .and its CIA? Ask Garry Wills who are the ex-? ploiters and oppressors of peoples the United States and its CIA, or the Soviet Union and its KGB? The 'foremost authority on the Soviet Union's socialism is Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, who wrote "The, Gulag Archipelago." He says. "The Soviet Union lives under the rule of serfdom. Free citizens are not at all free. They are free neither to .choose their employment, nor to, fight for a fair wage for it, and even in their day-by-day lives, they are 'obliged to conform to the whims of, the petty local party bosses." . Solzhenitsyn says the petty local party bosses are generally KGB, and the KGB has infiltrated every. 'country in the world. They have. assassinated our agents and other' agents, universally. They have penetrated our schools and Con- gress. .- Anton B. Kamenev Washington, D.C. * t * Garry Wills doesn't want to cut out the cancer; he wants to kill the patient. ' ? H. Nelson Filton ;Alexandria, Va. In an 'article you published on' ? June 15, David Wise said; "There have, of course, been coups in. which CIA played a role and in !whieh, foreign leaders have been killed, notably Diem in South Viet- nam in. 1963 and Salvador Allende in ? ? Chile in 1973." a , Seymour Hersh of the New York; --Times invested a ?large aineunt- time and effort investigating the charge that the CIA was involved in -the .coup that overthrew Salvador Alende. I asked him about his find- ings a few weeks ago, and he said that he had been able to find no evi- dence cf any CIA involvement. Mr. Hersh, who was largely re- sponsible for the exposure in the press of the .My Lai massacre, is : .certainly not one who would conceal evidence of CIA involvement in any wrongdoing. If Mr. Wise has found evidence that neither Hersh nor.: anyone else has uncovered, he' should ? reveal it. Otherwise he should be asked to retract his "of course" assertion. . Reed J. Irvine, Chairman. Accuracy rri Inc Washington, D.C./. ? ? a Can honest and intelligent Ameri- cans really view it as wrong for local, county, state and federal po- lice organizations to work together for the common good of all? .Per-, haps some governmental big-wheels have' more to hide than us ordinary folk and; therefore, a greater fear of being exposed for what they are. A few years ago, when a woman was attacked and killed in New York City; neorhy riti7anc were condemned for not going to her aid ; or calling the authorities. According to the logic of CIA critics, if one of ? 'those citizens had been a CIA em- ploye and gone to her aid, he could -have been chastised for doing so be- ? cause it would not have been within the sphere of his agency's mission. Such rationale is most astounding. ' ? Many federal agencies adhere to the principle that their emplayes ? would be remiss in their duties if they did not report suspicious ac- tions, potentially detrimental to the U.S., to appropriate authorities.. With this tenet, a good cit4en must certainly. agree. Elmer Gettis :Falls Church, Va. What's source for the goose . I'm stumped. Would you please; tell me the difference between a 'a-'source" (identified as such a dozen times in a New York Times 'News Service story you ran under the headline, -Plot by CIA to Poison Cuba's Top Command Is closed") and a spy? Or do they both add up to hypocrisy? Maybe this is one of the reasons most Americans have a low opinion. ' of both the press and the govern- ment. Both of you could learn to be n lot more honest. ? Deriis M. WDonnell Forestville, Md. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001003-70007-0 RIGHT OF ALL CITIZENS SICURE THEIR HOUSFSi .ISVIOLATED: EVERY DAY THE STRANGE BUREAUCRATS. OF THE - INTEL. 14(";...ENCECOMMIINiTY-- _ .? ? :TAD .SZ_OL-C nierica.ns have; always, believed that' the ight to prisiaty is sacred. Vki&stwdder tofies tald by travelers to the Soviet Unian rid other dictatorehips who take for ranted that their hotel roorns and phones: re bugged and that tney are to/Amsted: But c.,..vawe. discover there is literally .no piece ?ithin the United States safe from the ii- egal snooping .of the CIA (which le re- tricted by law to foreign. operations) and he _many other government agerieies nOwn as the f`Intelligence CarzarininifY. a: One. extraordinary ..ekemr46 is ;tf-feArily aSe.r:bearn: tribsmittei.eiribedded in .the all of the Dial Office at thet-V,hite House's .? . . Ms transmitter' nicked up -and relayed tea, . . - , .. -?. . eTtiO , tti.: lorilbetliVeen..Richar'd M Nixon and his idee,-frierldSrancil visitors duting-larieaSt eveial months iri.19/0? the year the farm:ail sresidentl.fe-UnChecf.h is -Secret ddrneatidin-1 elligehbe program.:.Rres:fclentfartelepfjoi,i,e'l orversations 4ricLdtng those conducted: vet'. ;`SeOpre7- .scrarno1er I faiei'i:;ii6:1-6!:',)Ci.1 ick40-up-0:1:1.1.!te laser transmitter The:existeneein the 'p reside ntial offi-agf is highlY Sophisticated device, .knawrilayEl he code name. Easy Chair remains one I the most senSitioe -OtoSelsiguarded;'and.1 ntrigUing secrets of the Nixon peridd:qhis? nowledge is 'restricted to about a doze ey.pastand present officials of the inteltig'ill rice Canirnimitj:-.BLit the precise ptl,i*.a.s4i ttiqoPeratiOn,_the eZeOt:i0eritity Of tfloSe*4 theeinetellatiOn. Of the lesti-4; . _ _ . eVice? under. a, coat of fresh paint on the 'sal pffice. Wall, and the 'ultimate disoo- ition of the insirtiment remain unclear or we kno?ii: if Tapes were made of hese transmissions?which is, perhaps, he most crucial question. It is also not known if Nixon himself was Ware of and consented to the installation. If e did, the laser system complemented his idden recording devices that produced the arnous White House tapes. (In any event, he laser device picked up with infinitely ore clarity every word uttered in the Oval fice, eliminating the "unintelligible" gaps hat affected the tapes. In addition, the laser ystem permits, unlike a tape recnrder, the dentification of every individual voice in a ooin and the separation of sevensl simul- aneous conversations.) It is not known where the laser beam signal was received, ut technical experts believe that such a his Is the:third article in a Monthly se.des ? - _ _?? - n America's Intelligence APPVA141141:11yrAT, !ding the 12 device has a transmission range of under a half mile along a clear line of sight. The laser beam must be aimed out a window?it would be deflected by a wall. In the case of the Oval Office it had to go through the panes of the French doors leading to the Rose Garden. Highly reliable sources told Penthouse that one or more senior officials of the Secret Service and the Central Intelligence Agency are familiar with the "Easy Chair" situation in the White House, although they could not say whether they learned of it only when the laser device was discovered and removed early in August 1970, or whether they knew at some earlier date. The sources would not rule out that the late J. Edgar Hoover, then director of the Federal Bureau of Investiga- tion, was also privy to "Easy Chair." In any event, this super-bugging of the presidential office looms as one of the most bizarre episodes in the still unfolding story of domestic spying carried out by six suc- cessive administrations, but climaxing most spectacularly during Nixon's tenure. Penthouse learned of this bugging of the Oval Office as a result of a lengthy investi- gation. According to highly authoritative sources, the person who installed the laser transmitter, possibly on a second attempt when an original device did not function properly, is a foreign-born individual em- ployed as a painter by the government and apparently controlled by one of the intelli- gence agencies. His name as well as a number of other relevant details are with- held from publication to avoid causing suf- fering and embarrassment to persons inno- cently involved in this operation. Investigations by Penthouse have also produced the significant fact that officials of the General Services Administration, which is responsible for the maintenance of gov- ernment buildings, have been under strict orders from the Secret Service since 1970 not to discuss with outsiders anything per- taining to the painting of the interior of the White House. The Secret Service also is- sued orders that all inquiries on the subject be immediately reported to it. These orders tants, dissidents in general, and real or sus- pected radicals. e Court records, disclosed in April of this year (months after Ford ordered the inves- tigation of the Intelligence Community), show that at least twenty federal agencies still maintain electronic surveillance of Americans at home and abroad. Overseas, particularly in Germany, the targets are U.S. military personnel. This surveillance in- cludes telephone tapping and the secret recording of face-to-face conversations either through hidden devices or informers secretly wired for sound. (It is unclear. how- ever, whether all this surveillance is based on court orders or is conducted illegally.) The immense scope of this activity Can be appreciated from this list of .agencie-en- gaging in domestic and foreign electronic surveillance of Americans: the FBI; the CIA; the National Security Agency; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the Department of the Air Force; the Postal Inspection Service: the IRS Intelligence Division; the IRS Inspection Service's Internal Security Division: the Drug Enforcement Administration; the Treasury's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco. and Firearms; the Naval Investigative Service; the Administrative Services Section of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Defense Mapping Agency; the Defense Nuclear Agency; the Defense Security Assistance Agency; the Defense Supply Agency: the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency; the Defense Ad- vanced Projects Agency; the Defense Communications Agency; the Defense Con- necting Audit Agency; the 502nd Army Se- curity Agency Group: the Office of the Depu- ty Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the U.S. Army in Europe; the Investigation and Police Information Division of the U.S. Army in Eu- rope; the Army Criminal Investigation Command; and the Defense Investigative Service. It must be kept in mind that all this spying is outside normal criminal surveillance by law enforcement agencies. In addition, acting on requests from nineteen federal agencies and scores of local law enforce- reenS units. the U.S. Postal Service (which ha 's an intelligence unit) is currently tracing apply to painting foremen and their crews as and recording the origins of mail delivered well as to other GSA employees. Penthouse to thousands of American citizens. Our gov- sources were unable to say, however, wheth- ernrnent. from the federal down to the state Cr these orders are exclusively related to and municipal levels, appears to have em- the "Easy Chair" incident, barked on a veritable snooping binge( It Beyond the new disclosures of White should be recorded, however, that tile Pen- House bugging, recent investigations, in- tagen makes a point that only five of its eluding those by Penthouse, also strongly agencies are authorized to conduct elec- suggest that the cover-up of secret domes- tronic surveillance.) tic spying activities by U.S. intelligence ? CIA director William E. Colby informed agencies has continued in 1975, despite President Ford of possible illegal activities President Ford's instructions that all rete- by his agency, including domestic spying vant information be supplied to the investi- ? and conspiracies to carry out assassina- gating panels: the Rockefeller Commission tions of foreign leaders. only after a part of and the two special congressional commit- the veiI of secrecy ,.vas lifted in press reports tees. But the White House has excluded cer- last December. This information had been tam n top-secret material from information withheld for nearly two years even though given to the Senate and House panels. These former CIA director James R. Schlesinger, are the facts: now secretary of defense. ordered CIA em- ? Civilian and ' military intelligence ployees as far back as 1973 to report to him agencies maintain political files on tens of activities exceeding or violating the CIA thousands of American citizens, ostensibly charter. He received a number of seen re- for reasons or4national ecurity" and crimi-' ports. Colby inherited this material in 1973 nal investigations, but just as often to satisfy and secretly requested the Justice Depart. the political curiosity of overzealous gov- meat to investigate illegal CIA actions? ernment sleuths. There are _files on sexual, raising the possibility of criminal prosecu- drinking, and ?the? personal habits and tions Toje4t,..e.g4aki CIA officials?but he Raligii@e120:01008008gICIPPROPM1100143213APYN4A1Weildtliform Ford of it until the cials, artists and writers, civil rights miii- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001003700070 seasentation of hie fifty-paee written rep:tr.! eel Dece.rnber and his supplemental "oral" apart on assassinations. The CIA maintains its awn secret list of known as the BIGOT file, in ed- ition to 10,000 name files of Americans ospected in some manner of foreign intel- .gence connections or some vague form bf '.:bvE.,rsion. The latter list includes antiwar rtd civil rights activists. Penthouse report- et. in its June issue that the CIA maintained ince the 1950s separate dossiers On the at senators Joseph McCarthy and.Roberl t;err. as well as on Senator Hubert H. Hum- hrey?in addition to New York congress- .'oman Be.ila Abzug. the only member of that the CIA has publicly admitted eeping a mean. The BIGOT file is made up f persons who are regarded as "bigoted" gaisist the agency. Besides keeping dossiers on thousands ;Americans, the CIA is also known to have aintainsti surve.siilance on Supreme Court ustice William 0. Douglas; Representative lande Pepper. Florida Democrat; former epresentative Cornelius Gallagher, New Repub!ican; and the !ate senator e.tteset loano. a Missoeri Democrat. The interest in Douglas and Gallagher was pperently based on their contacts in the aminican Republic: Douglas visited th6re 1952 and had close ties to former presi- en; Juan Bosch. one of whose advisers .ad CIA links of his own. (And allegations ase been made that the CIA played a-rote e he 1981 assassination of the Dominican :tato. Rafael L. Trutillo.) Pepper was re- tertedly a because of his ties to Cu- ... _feet-nee F:3ristse a meter a:ea of C!A ;aerations. Long. according to sources. rcesed the agency's interest ,because of ns to foreign corporations operating in he United States. ? CIA sources say that many "enemies" on he BIGOT list have been targets of agency. ugging by "Easy Chair" laser devices. The dvantage of such devices is that they are sually untraceable and do not constitute ctual Wiretapping for which, at least in the-) ry, either a 'court order or a "national secu- ay' clearance by the attorney general is equired. The government secretly condoned the roduction of awesome antipersonnel ex- losive devices, such as flashlights and elephone receivers loaded with explo- ryes, by the B. R. Fox Company; a private ompany in Alexandria, Virginia. Some of he officials of this company are believed o have had past ties with the CIA's pare- ilitary operations branch. There is no evi- ence that B. R. -Fox, which mysteriously ent out of business last November, was ctually owned by the CIA. But Fairfax Coun- eauthorities reported upon inquiry that the ornpany never requested nor received the acessary permit for the manufacture of ex- losiVe devices in the Fairfax jurisdiction. telligence sources indicatethat other such Ompanies are presently operating else- here in the United States. The CIA obtained from the Civil Aero- a.utics Board and the-Federal Aviation Ad- inistration a special certification for one fits "proprietary" airlines. Southern Air ransport Inc.. ea.errpting it from the require- ent of flying approved charter routes. uthern-staircraft are thus able to be used nywhere in the world witbout Mina ro.ute e eports with the CAB. Approv -dt or ft to deal with nre.seurs fierii.current in-' Hareem Os-Am:Id Vii-:Z; the on as.sessin. vestigations. the CIA established at its Ford. who was a member of the Warren headquarters last February a secret "CON- ? Commission, said that "so far" he has seen FOUND Task Force." designed to counter no evidence to dispute the original concke charges against the agency. CONFOUND is sicns. David W. Belin. executive director of supported by ORA, the Central Intelligence the Rockefeller Commisnion and formed Retired Association, formed last March-20. counsel to the Warren Commission. totektIsa C1RA's board of governors includes some of same view. (But George taToole's reccetty the best-known former senior agency off i- published book . The Assassination cials. The CIA, according to informants, also which was excerpted in the Apri; Penthouse, sought to plant at least two of sits former presents what may be called the first snien- officials on the staff of the Senate committee tific evidence that Oswald was innoce-stE) investigating the Intelligence Community. Meanwhile. the Rockefeller Commission 0 Its naval operations ranging from the has received allegations in form of testimony sublime to the ridiculous. the CIA has been from private groups E. Howard Hun involved with billionaire Howard Hughes in the ex-CIA official and convicted Watergate various ventures, including the ship de- burglar, had been arrested in Dallas signed to retrieve a sunken Soviet subma- utes after Kennedy's shooting. I hint heeds,- rine, and it continues to operate?from a flied this charge az., wE.,11 as pub!ished re;mIts room in a small York hotel and from a the: he was in Mexico City in August 193. postal box in Par.arna?the Apollo. a myste- at the. same time as Oswald (see Hunt litter- rious motor yacht loaded with electronic view. Penthouse 1\.tay 1975,) and communications equipment. The There are also new doubts surrouncralg 3000-ton Apollo. which is almost 500 feet the murder of i?obert F. Kennedy in Los long, usually operates in southern European Angeles in June 1953. and the special 76 - waters. vestigating bodies may took into it. tu This article will examine in some detail Charges of CIA and FBI involvement in the domestic activities of the U.S. Intelli- gence Community?many of them clearly il- legal and a clear and present danger to the democratic process. For over twenty-five years these activities have often been in direct violation of U.S. laws. (The CIA. for example, is barred by federal law from domestic intelligence op- 1968 assassination of King in Memphis were made early in April by the Rev. Jesse. Jackson, who succeeded King in the lead-7' ership of the civil rights movement. This; accusation coincided with recent asser- tions by James Earl Ray. the convicted sassin, that he did rot act alone and with his request for a new trial. Acting on Hoover'erations and from domestic police func- orders, the FBI had been wiretapping Ki tions.) In addition. this domestic espionage during the years preceding his death. has violated the civil rights of Americans on Hoover memorandum, disclosed severat, whom SeCrCt fi'es ha.ia bee6 agQ. the. sitior! *mai, whose phones have been tapped with or- disrupt, discredit. or otherwise neutrali without court orders, and whose mail has the civil rights movement." been opened or. at least, monitored through: Political power struggles may have &sat Postal Service "mail. covers" on behalf of been behind the installation of the "Easy! various intelligence agencies. And there Chair" laser device in Nixon's office in 197ittn have been many unexplained accidents. This secret transmitter is similar to the one deaths, and "suicides" in the U.S. involving accidentally discovered many years ago in- persons who had connections with intelli- side the Great Seal of the United States in. gence work, the office of the American ambassador in Moreover, the intelligence agencies. Moscow. Such devices, unlike standard' using their immense manpower. and finan- hidden microphones and transmitters, can- cial and technolooical resources, have nOt be located by electronic sweeps. The, been part of great political power struggles instrument in the Oval Office was appare,n in this country going back at least ten years. discovered by a Secret Service agent who "Keeping files on citizens may be the least noticed an extra dab of paint covering thei some of these agencies have been doing." spot on the wall where the device was irn-i an intelligence expert with long experience planted. The paint caught his eye because in Washington remarked recently. of the way in which the light was being re: Some major American political assassi- fleeted by it at that particular moment. nations, on which official files have been It is possible that Nixon had personal closed, may become the subject of new ordered the implanting of the laser device scrutiny by Rockefeller and the special con- obtain a more accurate secret record of a gressicnal committees. If nothing else, a conversations in the Oval Office and chose psychological climate has developed faeot_ to keep the Secret Service in the dark about ing the reopening of investigations of the it. But it is also possible that, because of the murders of the Kennedy brothers and the extraordinary importance of policy deci- . Rev. Martin Luther King. sions made in the Oval Office, one of the This climate, in which the CIA and the FBI intelligence services may have installed the are being publicly linked to these and other device. (There is at least one other case of political assassinations, evidently led Presi_ such spying in the White House: during dent Ford to remark at his news conference 1971, a navy yeoman attached to a Pen- on April 3 that "it is my understanding that tagon liaison office in the National Security, the Rockefeller Commission may. if the facts Council regularly supplied the Joint Chiefs seem to justify, take a look" at the charg_ of Staff with the most top-secret materials es that the CIA was involved in the 1963 from NSC meetings as Well as the most sen- murder of President Kennedy aid ftia i ,.sitive foreign,polioy ddcirnents handlodt, was a conspiracy involving more than one Henry A. Kissinger, who then served as gunman. This would be the first fresh official special assistant to tile president for natio* look at the Dallas assassination since the at security affairs.) Warren Comrnissicn issued its report more The Oval Office transmissions could be RtiLitagwooyftwolvpciwkijimititiolist RtriiciroilAt feywhere in the White House or i4tAgackutive Office Building 13 They could also be picked up, technicians Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-0 say, in the Treasury Building a block away considered a federal rather than a state of- evities of CIA-connected Cubans: many e ie Secret Service is part of the Treasury tense becaose such murders would most L-ern arrr.d. i(: iocal crime. There ,s talk a: a Departnent) or in the Commerce Depart_ likely be planned in a federal office) and -Cuban Mafia" using CIA Cuoans, and there raent building three blocks away. But, be_ current investigations by the Justice De- have been numerous instances of terror cause laser beams can travel only along a Penment could lead to indictments of CIA . tcnsbings and assassinations. But the Iced line of sight free of any obstructions, it would Personnel. ' police and even the FBI often find that some be necessary to have "repeaters" located If this happens, one may well ask why somewhere on the White House grounds to "higher-ups" in the government, including redirect the beam emanating from the Oval members of the White House "Forty Commit- Office windows to reception points. If, in- tee." which must authorize foreign assassi- deed, the president was spied on by one of nations by American agents, would not be his intelligence agencies, the American liable to prosecution. The Forty Committee government was in a greater state of disin- is presently headed by Henry Kissinger and tegration than we ever realized, a case of legal accountability may develop Policy power struggles likewise seeMed against him and his predecessors. It may to loom behind the CIA's own violent reor- even be argued that presidents of the United gc.nization in the wake of the disclosures States can be named as co-conspirators in last December that the agency had en- foreign assassinations, inasmuch as they gaged in :massive" spying on Americans. supposedly must clear such acts when CIA director Colby, anxious for a scapegoat. Americans are used. But traditionally presi- apparently chose the chief of the Counterin_ dents haVe been protected by the so-called te.11igence Staff, James Angleton, as the doctrine of "plausible denial," under which public culprit, although knewlecigeable they are able to officially ignore this type of agency officials believe that Angleton had activity. Moreover, the Fcrty Committee relatively little to do with it. The belief in the keeps virtually no records. thus depriving intellinance. Community is that the spying courts of needed evidence. And no official scandal gave Colby the long-awaited op_ is likely to incriminate himself in court?. portunity to dismiss Angleton. a powerful should it ever come to that. . operator who had carved out his private It is obviously impossible to separate empire in the CIA. Angleton had become a completely the CIA's domestin and foreign thorn in the side of Secretary of State Kis_ activities. The agency, after- aila has its singer because of his control over the flovv of headquarters in the United States and all its secret intelligence between the U.S. and operations are planned and coordinated at srael. Kissinger, it is said. felt that Angleton its sprawling building at Langley, Va., just was interfering with his intricate Middle outside Washington. Because of all the Eastern policies and persuaded Colby to support requirements at home. the CIA's remove him as soon as possible. operations inevitably spill over to American Angleton was quietly replaced by George cities. It is this spill-over factorthat has often Constantinides, a fifty-three-year-old Mid- led tn the abuses and violations. aicik.3t n.,1-.0 has ei:.s.,atad ts The CIA r"!nrrle that it ?e't,c? !Cbg,,fly ,n1 CIA's Near Eastern Affairs Office since American territory when it engages in train- 1972, and is unlikely to create problerris for ing. and recruitment, the contacting of Kissinger. But nothing was said about Americans and foreigners who may possess Richard Ober. the official who ran the CIA's useful intelligence information, and the in- Domestic Operations Division (renamed the vestigation of potential agents or informers Foreign Resources Division in 1972) during it may wish to hire (as distinct from campus the period when the agency was engaged in recruitment for CIA careers). Few CIA critics spying on antiwar militants. Ober Currently would dispute this claim. Likewise, there is assigned to the National Security Council appears to be nothing wrong with the work staff where, presumably, he enjoys Kissin- here of the agency's Technical Services Di- ger's protection. Angleton, who stayed on vision, which concentrates on intelligence for three months to assist Constantinides technology and the equipping of agents for during the transition, was awarded on April? foreign missions, or the Office of Security, 7, 1975, the CIA's Distinguished Intelli- which supposedly does what its name sug- gence Medal in a surge of bureaucratic iro- gests. In fact, "overt- CIA offices in dozens fly. Colby managed to be in New Orleans on of American cities are listed in local phone the day of the award and Angleton received directories. it from Colby's deputy, Lieutenant General The trouble, however, is that the CIA also Vernon A. Walters. Another power struggle runs "covert" offices and operations had run its course. throughout the United States?the ones Col- As we've noted. the CIA is forbidden by by does not mention in his increasingly fre- federal law to operate in the United States quent public appearances in defense of the except for managerial, policy. training. and agency. Here are five examples: support functions related to its foreign oper- 1. The Miami area is the center of major ations. But this prohibition has been vio- covert CIA operations. The principal opera- rated to a steadily increasing degree since tion is Support Station East, headed by a the CIA was founded twenty-eight years senior CIA official named Paul Holle,vell, in sssrepte of the agency's domestic activities ago. The violations range from supporting charge of all the activities in Florida. A spe- te s: often verae on the illecial. _ local police departments and spying on cial section deals with anti-Castro Cuban _ _ American citizens to managing a huge cor- refugees, many of them veteran ? of the Bay This story is further complicated by Gio- oorate empire. shielding mysterious private of Pigs invasion and other CIA adventures in bal Marine Inc.. a publicly held company which de- companies producing lethal devices for use Cuba. The Cubans are used as intelligence (unlike the Summa Corporation) . k at home and abroad, supplying tax covers sources and as infiltrators into Cuba (al- signed and operated the Glomar.yr:Aye for such companiesnas Howard Hughes's though this activity has been considerably for Summa and the CIA. Under Securities' Surnma Corporation, which built the subma- curtailed over the years). r eugenio Martinez. Commission ruIss. public . and Exchange companies must provide "full disclosure" o rine-recovery ship G/pmar ExPIdrer (it saved one of the Wateroate burglars, was still on a their activities: Global Marina calked up Hughes over 59 million), and conspiring on Set CO-a-month CIA retainer when he joined profits from the Glomar Explorer operations. United States soil to commit foreign asses- En Howard Husit's Cuban-American team for sinations. Conspiracy to commit murder is a Sieverly Hills and Washington break-in but, according to an SEC staff study. its pub- lic reports were "inaccurate and incomplete major criminal offense under the United lee other Hunt accomplices were ex-CIA due to the classified aspects." Thus far the States Penal Code (it probably would be --s, n1nkgil Approve For tAl.iWrg.atiMrraegdiirfceporfeegs- VacrurrhWP a broad ruling on 14 ' ? - :-. Global Marine's pubic reporting. If one is Cubans with criminal records are "uctcuch- able" because of CIA protecticn and invoca- tirsen cf "national security." "Sa/pport East" uses the facilities of Mial7li Internastional University for operations i Latin America and provides technical and fasancial support for far-flung CIA missions_ But. most important' of an.. it contscts a v,crldwide network of double agents uncles Os.'eration SEEBOLT, one of the most sensi- ti-ve CIA missions. A special staff known as thae "Green Light Group- runs SEEBOLT le..etati of the agency's Clandestine Services chiefs in Washington. It is in close touch. with the inter-Agency Defectors' Committee (IDA), a major source of double agents. De- spite many valid objecticns to turning an Arrerican city into a major espionage center. CIA cfficials insist privately that this activity is all really part of foreign. cperations. ? The Miami group has its counterpart. Sup- :sort Station West, in Burlingame, California. This station. near San Francisco, concen- trates on Asian operations in roughly the cense manner in which the Miami station vearks on Latin America and Eurcpe. There is also a large covert CIA station in Denver. and there is one in Las Vegas. vinare the Mafia provides a fertile field for foreign and domestic intelligence. ? 2. in the overlapping of the CIA's Id-reign and domestic functions, the agency's rep- resentatives in Los Angeles first persuaded Pcssa--rd Heehee'e, Seremo: Cceccrc,tion te beild the S350 million (in taxpayers' money), deep-sea mining ship, the Glomar Ex- p:cier. and then went to the Los Angeles County tax assessor to inform him in secrec that the vessel belonged to the Unite Steste.s government. The Summa Corpora- t:crl thus was not subject to local taxes ia excess of 59 million. But this is where the CIA got caught in its own game of secrecy: :he ship's license, filed under oath with the Coast Guard, states that the Glomar Explor- er belongs to the Hughes interests. Los County was thus cheated .out taxes. Inasmuch as the CIA did the lying, seay well become the target of tax frau peesecution. The same may happen with festerai taxes, although the IRS has not yet teen heard from, and we may face the ex- naardinary situation of a federal agency. YS) suing another federal agency (CIA) for tax fraud. And there is the additional fact teat the CIA representatives were intro- deed to the tax assessor by an FBI agent. secgesting further intra-governmental col- It.sicn. The CIA's request that the tax asses- see. cooperate in the secret cover is another Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007:0 made, however, it would affect other public companies with secret CIA contracts, pos- sibly blowing their covers. 3. In the CiA's operation of its vast corpo- rate activities?the so-called "proprietary" Companies?the agency has always badly needed the secretive cooperation of federal and state authorities. It is, of course. a matter If subsequent legal determinaticn whether the incorporation of the proprietaries and their operations have been in violation of laws. The existence of the CIA corporate empire, estimated at some 5200 million an- nually in sales and services, has long been a secret and there have been no court tests of the legality of these proprietary come panies. Since none of these companies has: - publicly owned stock, problems with the: SEC are unlikely to arise. The CIA began putting together its pro-' prietary corporate network in the early. 1950s in order to acquire dornsetic and foreign covers for secret operatiorit and to Oar:inert' funds discreetly to its overseas operatives. Only top CIA officials know how smarty of these companies are or have been in existence?what is known of the opera- tion suggests that the agency has been clos- ing down some of them and creating others, according to need?but the system is being used to this day. Colby, in fact. confirmed it earlier this year when he denied a charge that profits generated by the proprietaries an be uSed for covert foreign operations, thus bypassing restrictions written into law by Congress late in 1974. Most of the proprietaries were incorpo- rated fe Delaware, a state that does not levy local corporate taxes, and there are reasons to believe that the CIA even has its own incorporating company in Dover to handle the business away from prying eyes. CIA officials say, however, that in some in- stances officials in the office of the Dela- ware secretary of state had to be informed of, the true nature of the proprietaries to avoid: blowing the CIA covers. Probably the oldest major proprietary is the Pacific Corporation, with headquarters in a third-floor suite in an office building at 1725 K Street in Washington. Incorporated in 1950. Pacific is one of the principal CIA holoing companies because it provides fi- nancial and management controls for other irrportant proprietaries. Pacific's president is Hegh L. Grundy, believed to be a long- time CIA official, who actually lives just a few blocks away from the agency's Langley be.adquarters. Operating directly under Pacific are Air Arre.rica. Inc.. the "private" CIA airline thee has operated planes and helicopters for yeao:-.. throughout Indochina in support of the ageocys "clandestine army" in Laos and eerier paramilitary activities. Air America is fuected by the Agency for International De- ve:opment (AID), which has often served as a cover for the. CIA's operations in Asia and eee.ahere. The CIA refunds AID through a complex bookkeeping system involving the, corceatrnent of CIA appropriations through- o: ;he federal budget. ? Pacific also owns Civil Air Transport Co. Ltd.: a Taiwan-based scheduled airline arcein as CAT. CAT. in turn, owns majee aircraft repair and overhaul facilities on Teewan. The third known CIA ,airline is Se.n.r.rn Air Transport Inc.. which is also the with a number of unusually large antennas for interviews and the CIA has refused c Ine roof). has. interlocking directorships Ments on its links with the company. wen Air America. Between 1966 and 1972 it As a rule. CIA proprietaries pay taxes !eased aircraft from Air America as well as meet other official requirements, but from-Air Asia Co. Ltd.: another proprietary director Colby had to arrange for a specie controlled by Pacific. According to Federal dispensation from the now defunct Pri Aviation Administration records, the present Commission so that Pacific Corporation'. ownership of at least four jet transports books would not have to he opened tort :eased from Air America and subsequently commission's inspection. -eturned toil is "unknowe." These planes. in' In addition to proprietaries, the CIA tact, are not even registered anymore with "fronts" and "conduits" through compani the FAA. At present. Southern 'o,.vrts three. it does not run outright but supports finesi transport planes, one of them a DC-6 clay. The fronts and the conduits provid (bought from Air Asia). A DC-68 was sold to covers for CIA operations at home an, Ethiopian Airlines in 1972. .1 abroad. The best known of the fronts was (Southern's attorney is James H. Bastian.! now disbanded Robert R. Mullen public re who is vice-president and secretary of the i lations company that employed E. Howe; Pacific Corporation. Bastian. inCidentally, is, Hunt after his resignation from the CIA the registered owner of several apparently 1971 until his involvement in the Waterg- uninhabited townhouses in Washington.) break-in. Interestingly the Mullen cornea Most of Southern's operations have been; also handled a public relations account f in Latin America. including eight flights to. the Howard Hughes interests. The cow Chile in 1971 (on earthquake relief missions pany, as it developed in 1974, was c for LAN, the Chilean national airline, ac 7: trolled bye full-time CiA case officer. Th cording to a CAB certification) when thelate are many other such fronts. president Salvador Allende was still in'. Some of the most interesting CIA c power, but very little is known of the current duits?channels for transmission of fu use of its planes. Its operational hc.',adquar-* and other materials?were the Germa ters are in Miami. but at one point Southern' companies broken up after the war by the was leasing one of its aircraft to a U.S. oil!, Allied military authorities. These cornoani company working in the Niger in Africa and: .included such giants as the Farbenindustrie another to a company in Alaska. 1 A.G., the huge Nazi conglomerate, and, Late in 1973. Southern was officially for there are indieations that the CIA planted its sale and it filed a petition with the CAB for i agents in new firms resulting from postwar "cancellation of certificates" for charter, decentralization, including their United. routes. But the airline then changed its. States subsidiaries. These and other mind, and on December 31. 1973, became a , companies?some of them famous Amen- "commercial operator" under FAA Requla- can business institutions?serve the Clf. s ?pee through the supply of invoices for materiat tion 121. No longer under the CAB' ating authority, Southern has greatly in- a.edsery!cez., that were never rendercc aea creased its anonymity?it no longer has to that money can be easily shifted abroad far file documents showing aircraft purchased the agency's operations. It was through the or sold, detailed financial statements, and a branch offices of a large New York-base log of all civil operations listing the number banking and currency firm that the CIA so of hours flown by aircraft types, tonnage car_ dollars for piastres in the back market in ried on each route, intermediate stops. and Vietnam. the number of trips made over each route. 4. The case of the B.R. Fox Company. As a "121" contract operator, Southern has According to its letterhead this company s no restrictions on where it may fly?except specialized in "custom designed electronic those by foreign governments. Under the specialties," but in reality it manufactured new status, Southern cannot advertise for lethal explosive devices. As noted earlier. commercial work. but this seems to be the there is no direct evidence to connect Fox least of its worries. 'the CIA. However, one of its directors, Mi- Other Pacific subsidiaries include the chael Morrissey. had past links with the Pacific Engineering Co. and the Thai Pacific CIA's Paramilitary Operations Branch, ac- Services Co. Ltd. The nature of their ac_ cording to agency officials. It is also known tivities is unknown. Foreign Air Transport that Morrissey. according to memoranda Development Inc.. another proprietary, has written by him, had been in contact with Lieu.tenant Colonel Lucien Conein. a former gone out of business. And over the years the CIA and its subsidiaries have dealt with senior CIA official currently serving with t. Drug . Enforcement Administration (DEA). such companies as Lao Air Development Inc.. operating in Laos under Air America. Conein admitted to newsmen teat he had _ been approached by Morrissey. but insisted and Birdair, the company that flew the Cam bodian airlift for the U.S. air force in 1974 he never became involved in any dealing and 1975 with him. Acting through other channels, the CIA Fox, which operated from a watehouse a had been funding since 1965 a Washington 2701 Fairview Drive in Alexandria. Virgini firm named Psychological Assessments (it also had an office at 15 Abingdon Square Associates. Inc.. whose function was to in New York City), produced a fire of "Astro- conduct psychological assessments of horror items. These lethal devices included American citizens hired for foreign em- explosive-filled telephone handse:s. bcoby ployrnent and to study brainwashing tech- trapped magazine clips for the M-16 rifle: niques of foreign intelligence agencies flashlights and cigarette peeks full of ex- PAA was organized by two former CIA offi- plosives, a "fragmentation halt and an dials. Samuel B. Lyerly and Robert E. Good- exploding camera. now. (Goodnow has since cone to live in Fox's ce.tatoguenotes ',See "The intoana- Australia for unexplained reasons.) PAA tion contained herein is CLASSIFIED by the operates in complete secrecy. Admission manufacturer for U.S. Government use only. to the office. in a residential uptown section The handling and storage cf this material rncst. mysterious. Southern (not to be con- of Washington, is obtained by pushing a should be done so mindful of its sensitive fused with Southern A i rwRytts1,.120teghe 6101w/telt srpmi td.tip,piag h5Ftdmil.nnTiemobt the exolosive hone 1625 K Street in WashingtMlh'av5UirdYrIgiNTAAYptegtiftneffldtbrglArrivighdr-e harileiellf-eVi-c-e-iS described: "Size 113.25" . . is Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-0 75" x 0.5. Use the inside telephone hand- et. Automatic charge fired at (blank) sec- ads following lifting of instrument hand- iece. Easy and quick installation to under- ide of mouthpiece. Any red time delay n be preset. No switches. presetting, or atteries. Simply install 4-wire module.... niature unit... rugged and durable. All and wired. Unlimited lifetime with proper' ndling," The exploding cigarette pack,. described s an "anti-disturbance explosive.- func- ons as follows: "Electronics and explosive. odule packed inside cigarette pack.. hen the pack is lifted or moved in any anner. the explosive is set off. Simple op- ration. Only one switch. . . . A built-in elec. onic counter is factory set for 90 seconds to flow time for evacuation of the area.... The ircuit will stay armed for a period of 21/2 to 3 ears.... Explosives are not included and the cnly thing to be added." In the flash- Vit. the catalogue explains. the "normal n'Off switch on the side activates the op- ration.- Then the catalogue adds: "This is n example of an explosive anti-distur- ance dummy unit. Anyother items desired be so modified may be submitted for such valuation." That the CIA may have been the intended, (not actual. client for the Astro line is sug- ested in Fox's classified catalogue. which ays that the explosive devices "have been. esigned and manufactured for sale to au- crized agencies of the United States gov- rnment, specifically intended for applica- ron outside of this country." A well-informed overnrnent official remarked in an inter- iew that "t can't think of anybody outside he CIA who would want to buy this kind of tuff?and I'm not even sure the CIA would:: ut the mystery remains: if the CIA was not: he client, for whom was Fox working? oreover. as we've said earlier. Fox never- equested or obtained the required license or manufacturing explosives in Fairfax ounty. Hew did Fox get around it? Nobody seems to know what has hap- ened with these assassination devices fter Fox Company suddenly went out of usiness. It may be something the Rocke- eller Commission and the congressional ommittees will wish to explore as they look into charges that the CIA has been involved in foreign assassination plots. 5. The CIA is explicitly forbidden by law to xercise domestic police functions. But it has Secretly collaboratea with numerous police departments throughout the U.S. in support of their political intelligence func- tions. One of the most notable examples was the agency's "formal liaison" with the Metropolitan Police Department in Wash- ington, D.C.. going back to the late 1940s. Maurice J. Cullinane. the new MPD chief, acknowledged in a report last March that the Washington police borrowed agents, au- tomobiles, and electronic surveillance equipment from the CIA to help them spy on political activists in the capital. This "Cul- linane Report" was one of the most detailed admissions by any .U.S. police department on its political intelligenee work. The department's intelligence division spent $1.7 million since 1958 on political surveil- lance. The refatiOn4hip beideen tilt:. CIA and the Washington police became particularly active in 1959. when the agency trained at feast seventeen MPD officers. twelve of cations." Even the department's moral general William B. Saxbe.. about the-i) squad received wiretap devices from the Under a secret program known as COlel- CIA. Between 1958 and December 1974, the TELPRO, initiated by Hoover in 1956. the Washington police had also been training FBI ran for years a counterintelligence cp- "selected CIA employees" in interrogation eration aimed at domestic dissenters. Al- techniques. Police departments in the though the program was formally terrealated Washington area have also provided CIA in April 1971. these activities. includirg the cficial s with local police credentials to fa- harassment of radic-als. we.nton at leas:until . cilitate domestic undercover work. 1973. Among COINTELFROas targets were Former CIA director James Schlesinger the Socialist Workers' Party. the Young So- suspected the CIA may have been engag- cialist Alliance. the "New Left." American ing in illegal activities shortly after he re- Communists."black extremiSts." and -white placed Richard M. Helms. now U.S. ambas- !hate groups." COINTELPRO was oricinalfy sador to Iran. In an internal memorandum to ?aimed at foreign intelligence agents in the "all CIA employees" sent out on May 9. United States, a proper FBI functica. but 1973. Schlesinger said: Hoover. without clearance from successive ? "I shall do everything in my power to con- :attorneys general, applied it to doseestic fine CIA activities to those which fall within a groups as well. strict interpretation of its legislative charter. In 1969, for example. the FBI sent a fake I take this position because I am determined ;threatening letter to a black Baptist minister. that the law shall be respected and because !Donald W. Jackson. to force him to abandon this is the test way to foster the legitimate his civil rights work at Tougaloo College in and necessary contributions we in the CIA Mississippi. The letter was sent in the name can make to the national security cf the of a nonexjstent "Tougalco College De'ense United States. I am taking several actions to -Committee," whose members were said to implement this objective: I have ordered all be armed. And in 1972. a Florida resident the senior operating officials of this Agency was recruited by the FBI to infiltrate and to recort to ma immediately on any activities disrupt radical groups in. the United States now going on. or that have gooe on in the and Canada. The informant. Joseph A. Bur- pas?, which might be construed to be out- ton, told newspaper interviewers that as late side the legislative charter of this Agency. I as 1974 he was told by the FBI of its efforts hereby direct every person presently em- to put the Vietnam Veterans Against tee.. ;ler ployad by CIA to report to me on any such out of business in Florida. actesities of which he has knowledge. I invite One of the FBI's most astonishing unau- all ex-employees to do the same. Anyone thorized efforts was against the srrieai So- who has such information should call. my cialist Workers' Party and its affiliate. the secretary (extension 6353) and say that he Young Socialist Alliance. The party had not wisa es to talk to me abouractivities outside.: been prosecuted since 1945. but the FBI ClA's charter.' . . Any CIA employe:E.. who files on the disruption program runs to an believes that he has received instructions amazing 573 pages. the bureau's harass. which in any way appear inconsistent with .ment of the party reached the point where. the CIA legislative charter shall inform the last December, a federal judge in New York Director... immediately." ordered the FBI to desist from conducting Schlesinger evidently received substare surveillance on a national convention of the tial response to his request because Colby. Young Socialist Alliance. Another instance when he succeeded him later in 1973. be- of unauthorized FBI activity came to light den turning evidence over to the Justice when it was learned that the security chae.1 of Department for investigation and possible the American Indian Movement durindthe prosecution. However, for reasons that re- Wounded Knee takeover ia 1973 had beena main unclear. Colby apparently failed to paid FBI informer. Evidently. neither Heceees notify the president of his move. Ford be- death nor Watergate has taught the FBI any- came aware of it only after the domestic thing about the need to observe the consti- spying.scandal broke cut late in 1974. tutional rights of Americans. Subsequently. David Blee, deputy direcz It seems as if every government agency for of the CIA's Directorate of Operations has been involved in SOM. e form of spa:noon (Clandestine Services). advised CIA em- Americans. Thus the CIA, with the cc:s.a.e.:a- ployees by memorandum that they should tion of postal officials has been intercept- retean private coonse: in the event of legal ing. reading, and copying since 1953 un- proceedings against them in connection counted thousands of first-class lettere writ- with the: Justice Department's investigation. ten by Americans to addresses in tha Soviet But the CIA is not alone when it comes to Union. Former CIA director Richard Helms :Ilene! domestic political operations aimed: refused to stop the interception in 1959. but at American citizens. The FBI, as we now are, Colby testified that the. aaency suast and-ed beeinning to discover, was among the tee operation in February 1973. He eon- etess: culprits. The new attorney general. Edward the orograrn was "illegal."' So frantic H. Levi. told a congressional subcommittee this mail reading by the government that zee eselie.r this year that J. Edgar Hoover had CIA developed, at great cost. a special Ira- amassed at least 164 files containing fold-' cnina to unseal and reseal envelopes of a;- r with informatioe. some of it derogatory. ery conceivable size in a matter of S"COO?3 on "presidents. executive branch employ- During 1974 the U.S. Postai Service ser- ass. and seventeen individuals who were \:eilled.and recorded the origins of all mail members of Congress." The files, were received by nearly 4.500 Americans. Th.n marked "OC.- meaning "Official aro Conti-, CIA was no longer requesting such re-et ! dential.- Levi added that the existeece of covers last year. but the Postal Service was these files was not made known by the FRI to acting on the behalf of t h 5, Naval. trues;i- i the Justice Department. of which the FBI is a gence Service: the Army Intelligence Com- part. until early 1973 In other words. thc mend: the Air Force Special Command: in= ' Hoover files were a secret from dozens of Air Force Spacial Investigations Office: tea them in "intelligence activity, The CIA gave ; attorneys general over the years. (The ores- Interstate Commerce Commission: he " the department what was dAlocisi rtdis.FiligiAVOctWe:ricieAt'ibikeY-WAVVskoolitlii 91 E-front: the Health. Educe- lamps ca1sable of interceptirKoral commu- I 4wssb'oral.ri b.7-YYftet. tion anort are Department; the Agricta- r11 16 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-0 ure, Department: the IRS: the FBI: the Postal nspection Service: .the Drug Enforcement drninistration: the Secret Service: the Coast uard: the Interior Department: the Labor apartment: the Justice Department: the mmiere.tion and Naturalizaticn Service: ustorns: the Royal Canadian Mounted Po- ice: and a vast number of local police de- artments and tax offices. The Internal Revenue Service. throuch its pedal service staff, was also involved in omestic espionage. A congressional in- estigaticn established that the IRS had 1.458 files. on individuals and organize- 'ons (including 706 persons from Nixon's enemies list") for reasons that clearly rad othing to do with tax collection.. In Miami: he IRS cranked up its "Operation Lep- rechaun- designed to assemble data on :he sex and drinking habits of prominent reSi- dents. including the state's attorney. The National Security Agency. a superse.- cret outfit dealing with code breaking and electronic intelligence, is currently continu- ing to monitor all overseas telephone calls and cables. During the Nixon period. the NSA.was an enthusiastic supporter of Nix- on's domestic intelligence program. par- ticularly when it came to breaking into foreign embassies. Admiral Noel Gaylen then the NSA director, has been rewarded with the post of commander-in-chief of all U.S. forces in the Pacific (CINCPAC). - There could be an endless list of the intru- sions of our government into our private lives. Let us conclude with three of the more EDITOR & PUBLISITK 14 JUNE 1975 investigative stories As a result of a New York Times_ investigation first published on Decem- ber 22, 1974, the Rockefeller Commis- sion this week (June 10) released a re- port that substantially confirms alle- gations that the Central Intelligence Agency has conducted unlawful and uncontrolled domestic operations. On the release date, the commission also recommended tightened controls on the agency and criticized the Justicc Department for abdicating "its statu- tory duties" for more than 20 years in a secret agreement with the CIA. The events of the week substantiated stories that both plagued President Ford's administration in its early days and shocked Washingtonians from the highest levels down. Although hardly as shattering as the Watergate revelations, the CIA investi- gation revealed a number of suspect operations conducted by the agency long before the commission report. Among early allegations by Times reporter Seymour M. Hersh and others were: ?charges that the CIA had estab- ished files on at least 10,000 American citizens as part of a special agency unit. This now has been confirmed by the commission which said that a unit called Operation CHAOS had main- tained 13,000 files on individuals as well as 11,000 FBI memoranda and 3,500 internal memoranda. A computer system, it was revealed, has indexed over 300,000 names and organizations that apparently are not connected with espionage. An additional 800 files were created on dissenting organizations with some 12,000 to 16,000 names in- dexed in them. ?charges that the CIA had used il- legal methods for their operations in- cluding break-ins, wiretaps, and mail inspection that began as early as the 1950s. The commission found that the CIA had logged-32 wiretaps, 32 bug- gings, 12 break-Ins. None were con- ducted under auclicial :?arar.ill.t and only one was with the approval of the Attorney General. Further, mail open- ings in New York City alone accounted for more than 4,350,000 incidents. ?charges that the CIA,. had followej anti-war and other cauliPPAQVArk.Or tors. This was confirmed. ?charges that the CIA had set up a network of informants in anti-war groups. This too was confirmed al- though the commission reported that CIA actions went far beyond just moni- toring such organizations. ?charges that the CIA had placed members of Congress under surveil- lance. This too was confirmed. ?ell^ -gee the t the agecy 1rd - stroyed many of the filesn proving its guilt just prior to the CIA investiga- tion. In this instance, the commission found that some files on a test of LSD on persons who were unaware they were being tested were destroyed. In one instance, a person died (1953). ?charges that the CIA had estab- lished a secretive unit for domestic in- telligence operations. The report con- firmed that Operation CHAOS was in- deed this unit and that in some in- stances had overstepped its legal authority. Further in the report, it was revealed that among those individuals kept un- der surveillance by the CIA were news- men who were watched in five different investigations in an effort to determine their sources who leaked classified in- formation. The report's section on reported plots to assassinate foreign leaders has been withheld although the commission has collected information on the subject. The one allegation that the report pointedly did not confirm was the use ? OARADE ? JUNE 15, 19,5 'striking examples: in 1969 Henry Kissinger recommended names of his closest aides land several newsmen to be bugged by the FBI for "national security" reasons: the CIA investigated the personal life of a Nixon carnpaien adviser in 1968: and a deputy attorney general proposed in 1975 that "internal passports- be issued to aliens in the United States, a step that could -have led to a national identification system en the Soviet model. However Attorney General Levi vetoed the scheme. Spying and covert activity is now an cfli- cial government pastime in the United States. Can the president or Congress arrest this trend toward an American police state? The answer is vital in determining the kind of society in which we will live. 9-i-a Of the word "massive" in conjunction with CIA operations. According to ' Times associate editor, Clifton Daniel, the commission report avoided the word and used in its place terms such as "considerable," "large scale" and "sub- stantial." The commission report served a dual purpose in the eyes of many reporters. ? The first was ita confirmation of re- ports by Hersh as well as some allega- tions made by a former CIA Inspector General. This confirmation, many feel, was necessary since the running of stories on the highly secretive CIA was considered both daring and, at times perhaps, speculative. The second' purpose was to clear the Rockefeller commission of any charges of a possible whitewash of the entire subject, although.e.vEal Ll(ings includ- ing the assassination attempts were withheld from the public. Daniels' article in the June 11 edi- tion of the Times traced the history of the story from its appearance to Wil- liam E. Colby, director of the CIA, who denied the allegations. Daniel reported that on January 16-, Times publisher Arthur Ochs Sulz- berger and principal editors had met with President Ford for a luncheon at the White House. During this occasion, Daniel reported, ". . the President, under questioning, used the word 'as- sassinations' in a discussion of the activities of' the CIA." His conversation was off-the-record, however. As well .as tighter restrictions through a Congressional committee, the commission also suggested that the 'President tighten executive control by making the Foreign Intelligence Ad- visory Board an effective watch-dog agency, open the CIA director's job to people outside the government and put a 10-year limit on the director's term of .service. Q. I understand that Columbia Pictures is secretly negotiating with Victor Marchetti, author of The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, to write a film called The Director. It would be based on the clandestine activities in Italy of William Colby, director of the CIA. In this film Colby would be depicted as having fallen in love with Clare Boothe Luce, who was U.S: Ambassador to Rome when Colby' was CIA chief. there. Is any of this so??L.G., McLean, Va. A. Marchetti and a Hollywood studio have been cussing a screenplay to be entitled The Director. Releall 2001/08/08 : CiA-RDP77-0042R000100370007-0 .. ? , ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-0 THE DUAMI HERALD 12 JUNE 1975 Otert o counter etion Cal4d- tance the ,Soviets By MIKE ACKERMAN With WILLIAM MONTALBANO (o) 1913, Miami Herald Publiehine Co. Intelligence is like an air condi- tioner in the summertime. It is nice to have. But it is no good unless you use it. The Soviet KGB and the Cuban DGI are experts in translating intel- ligence into effective covert action.i. They use a worldwide network of' allied Communist parties to help. The CIA must be able to counter- balance these activities. That, pure and simple, is the 'case for covert action. However great the uproar in the United States over its propriety, covert action is g necessary tool of the CIA. ? AN EXAMPLE: , One steamy morning in aa Latin American?country a few years ago, a source tipped me that a Commu- nist group was secretly plotting takeover of the port workers' union. They planned to sow discord among the workers by spreading rumors of corruption, by disrupting meetings, and by stealing an up- coming election through a secret sympathizer on the election corn- mittee. ? That was intelligence. The Com- munist takeover could have mortal- ly wounded a new, weak and unsta- ble democratic government._ _ . My CIA station chief directed me to act on the intelligence. I sought out the incumbent union leader, a tough, basically honest but un- lettered former stevedore. I told him what the Communists were planning, and I offered to help him. FOR TWO WEEKS, I lived with the man in a safe house- outside the -Capital-- City. By the time he went back to his union, he knew propa- ganda theory; he knew how to counter Communist attempts at dis- ruption; he knew how to guard against election-rigging. He was his country's foremost authority on parliamentary procedure. He also had a modest sum of money to start a health insurance plan among his workers. He won the election. The new government still had its problems, hut at least it did not also have a Communist . union threatening to close down the country's ports. That was covert action. Most of the operations I ran between 1965 and 1970 as a CIA street man were in this field. I worked in Latin America and in Africa. _ Covert action is an attempt to - clandestinely influence the politics of another country without showing your own hand. Like it or not, it is a major part of the intelligence business. ? ? ? Approved Fi&r. To those who insist we have no business interfering in the affairs of other countries, I say, "Fine, if no one -else will interfere either." - EVERY MAJOR intelligence agency in the world has covert ac- tion specialists. It is true of the British MI-6, the French SDT, the Israeli'Moisad, and it is even more emphatically true of the . Soviets, the Cubans, the Chinese and the East European satellites. All use co- vert action as an adjunct-to' diplo- macy. Once, the CIA leaned heavily on covert action as a clandestine means of furthering the objectives of U.S. foreign policy, as a halfway house between diplomatic gumbeat- ing and military intervention. Today, if the CIA again needed to help, the Latin American union leader, it would legally have to ad- vise between 50 and 150 members of the House end Senate. In those circumstances, it might as well take an ad in The New York Times. In countries where covert action used to be the CIA's bread and but- ter program, the term isn't even heard anymore. I know that first- hand. About five years ago, the CIA ? rightfully ? began cutting back its covert-action operations. The agen- cy recognized that it didn't need co- vert operations in every banana re- public. NOW, THE 'PENDULUM has swung too far the other way. We are out of the business altogether. The Soviet KGB admits to no re- straint. Cuba's DGI encounters no public pressure to curtail its wide- spread international activities: We have dropped our guard, but they keep punching. Covert action can follow many paths, and the Soviets and the Cu- bans have been down all of them. In the mid-1960s, local terrorists allied with the DGI firebombed the ! offices of a moderate newspaper in one Latin American. -country. I I passed funds to the publisher to get the newspaper back on the street. In another country, Communist infiltrators secretly engineered the takeover of a Muslim religious or- ganization, intending to use it as a platform for anti-government and anti-American propaganda. I FORMED a counter organiza- tions that was more rigorously or- thodox. It was nonpolitical. Given ? an alternative, the country's serious Muslims opted for what some of my .. CIA friends. teasirtgly called ? the "Abdul Ibn Ackerman Benevolent Society."' In another country, Communist agents were successful in placing one of the ix _ syfeepatletzere_eo Rely*KG29911031/914 party. In a prolonged and often angry dialogue with a young moderate who was a natural antagonist of the sympathizer., I persuaded him to enter public life. He did, and came to be a vital counterweight to Com- munist influence. He may one day be his country's president. On other occasions, I worked ? with another union leader to break. a general strike called by the Corn; . .munists to upset an elected Latin- American government. Once, I pro- vided advice and ? financial aid to. African politicians locked in an!. election battle with Communist and! Communist-leaning parties. Although covert action is usually ? directed against a clear Corrimunist _threat, theee are exceptions. Once in Latin America I worked covertly with other case officers to help cool both sides in a Latin American border dispute that came .perilously close to bloodshed. ? THE MOST EFFECTIVE covert operations are pot the ones that make '.eadlines. In Moscow, the Ic.C.31.; never -makes headlines. It Ls well-trained, well-financed and historically com- mitted to the art of covert action. It is the pride of a society. which has elevated conspiracy tca life- style. ???? Americans take for granted that back-room maneuvering plays a role in their own domestic po- litical flux. Why do they then recoil with horror at the reality of clan- destine political intrigue at the in- ternational level? International politics is not a po- lite bridge. game. There are no Mar- quis of Queensbury rules. The choice between black hats and white hats is not always clear. ? Often, the CIA is critized for backing right-wing dictatorships as an alternative to Communism. But if you ask me whether the United States is better ?off with a friendly military junta than with a hostile Communist government, my answer is "Yes." ? MILITARY JUNTAS do not last forever. They allow for the possibil- ity of eventual change toward more democratic forms. " Perhaps Communist dictatorships don't last forever either. But the fact is that no institutionalized Communist government has ever been overthrown. Even in countries where they do not hold power. Communist parties pose a clear and present danger of irreversible dictatorial change. They are organized conspiratori- ally. They play the game of covert action to the hilt. -Often, they have r00432ROM1r000000711(Pd in the mili- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010037000720 NEW YORK TIMES 24 June 1975 * OvIet Intelligen.ce ,T By JOHN M. CREWDSON . The New Yotic Times ' WASHINGTON, June 23?The Soviet intelligence service has been able for at least a .year.i to intercept and record tele. phone conversations within the United States between Govern- ment officials, military leaders and private citizens, according to informed Federal intelligence officials. One official said today that the National Security Agency, which has the responsibility of; . insuring the security Of domestic communications, had been aware of the practice "for some time," but that there was ,..'nothing that can . be done 'about, it, absolutely nothing `nothing." . The reason, he said, was that the interceptions were made: at the point that the conversa- ttions, chiefly ? long - distance ,ones but including scme cross- -town calls, entered the extem, sive microwave relay network that passed them through the air to satellites or between the radio relay stations that stretch acroosss the United States.. ? Sensitive Channels Separated ? The Russians, the official said, had developed the ability to reparate certain sensitive rehannels?fi6in: the yyriRcl. .64 ;Teo:lucre:las that make up -these traHsmissions, allowing them to ?? monitor calls' to and from "the military, Congress, anybo- dy?you name ? it, they can chi it." A White House official fami- liar with the Soviet operation, which until two, weeks ago was among the American Government's best-kept secrets, said that telephone calls placed and received by members of Congress "undoubtedly must be among those that were over- heard." An spokesman for Senator Frank Church, the Idaho Demo, crat who heads the Senate corn-- mittee inveatigating intel- ligence activities, .said today that the panel's staff had been. instructed to find out how long, Such external eavesdropping had been going on and what ihad been overheard. ? ents Rep' oriedly Intercept and ecord Phone Conversations in rir.8 r'rhe 'first- hint that foreign - operatives might be eavesdrop- ping on domestic telephone 'communications inside this, 'country was a brief allusion to that possibility in the recent- ly released report of Presiden Ford's commission that investi- gated the activities of the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency. The Chicago Tribune reported today that a six-page section' 'of the report containing the reference, prepared by Vice President Rockefeller, who headed the commission, had been "censored" for security reasons-by White House, State Department 'and N.S.A. offi- cials. Censoring Denied .,, A _spokesman _for the, Vice tary, the press,' the police. When the right moment comes, they can act with terrifying speed.. That is what happened in Portu- gal. The speed of the Communist --rise to power there did not surprise me. The tactics the Conimunists used there are not new. . But they have seldom been as successful as they were in Lisbon. Perhaps there is a reason why not. My conviction is that commu nism has not prospered more be- -cause the CIA's Clandestine Servic- es, through covert action, has served as a powerful check on Communist aspirations. President said today. howeveral that the 'report "was not cen- sored by anyone," although the commission had sought "the advice of experts on classifica- tion as to certain sensitive mat- ters," and that as a result a 'few passages nave been "re- ! phrased." ' The' interception of electronic intelligence, or `Vint," as it is' known, has become within the last two decades an increaa singly costly and time-consum- ing undertaking of both the 5oviet and American intel- ligence communities, and to a lesser degree of the other technologically advanced na- tions as well. 1. 'The United States- for 'axe! ample, reportedly deVelored the ability some years ago to THE GUARDIAN MANCHESTER 2 June 1975 'listen in, via a satellite p-oised over Moscow, to the conversa- tions of Soviet leaders oVer radio-telephones installed in their limousines. ? One former intelligence offi- 1. cial described today the collec-i tion of such intelligence aS. "very expensive" because of; the resources required to moni- tor and cull it, and of "veryl marginal value" because of its, sheer bulk and the fact that: much of it was case in indecip- herable codes. Officials said today that the; Soviet interception of microw-; ave . telephone transmissions was believed to have been ac- omplished with fixed anten- nas,, such as .those on the roofl of the Soviet- Embassy here," S. S seer s ? - ? :From SIMON WINCHESTER, Washington, June 1, , 1 .A.. Secret, deal betWeen ? the Persian Government and a. big American defence ? contractor,. . . .w.luch.. leaked into 'the ?press here?today, would not only have further strengthened Iran's domination of the Middle East oil regions but have . com- promised some of America's most - sensitive intelligence secrets. . ? . ? The project was the building of an intelligence . communica- tions system, at a price which could be. as high as $500,000, in the ? heart of the Shah's increasingly powerful- empire. The corporation involved ? is Rockwell ? International, which is based in California,: , ? The' . story began with. a series of ostensibly unremarka- ble asa.dvertisernents which, started'. appearing in news: pa-oars"across this country last 'November includingone on the sports page of a. Washington paper, and which _ called for "engineers, operators and ana- lysts" who had a keen interest in " communications analysis, voice processing, and intelli- gence operations." . These ads, it has now been disclosed, were the initial phase of the big deal, which is now being regarded with ;Amite con- cern here. , .The leav about the- loss of US secrets has arisen because, - as part of the? deal Iran has won the right to recruit former members of two of America's most clandestine intelligence agencies, to help to build . the new message-intercepting and code-breaking centre. ? The contract with Rockwell, made ,it- is understood at the Shah's personal request and signed with the blessing of a little .known. State Department office. calls for the recruiting of former officers of the, National Security Agency and its Air Force subsidiary, the Air Force Security Service. Both of, these agencies, which make it their business to collect radio,- cable-and ? diplomatic traffic intelligece from alt over the world a?nd subject it to the most sophisticated kind of code-breaking, operate with . a degree of secrecy that makes CIA sound like the local public library. The new Persian agreement ? which goes under the code name "ibex" is uniuue in that it is the first time Ameri- can military aid has been pro- vided without any kind of con- Until- ? suaervision ny the. US Government. - It is assumed that the Shah's immense and growing influence in ? Waehinetem and his- close personal ties- to the- 135 Ambas- Sador in Tehran, the former CIA chief, Riehard Helms, -led to the writing of this: extraor- dinary contract. ? ,? The 'contract document, believed to have been :signed. in February or March, called- for Rockwell ,to start a ? pro- gramme, to take between five and 10 years; to build the- Intel- ligence .systeni. apd an initial payment of $50 millions; was demanded ? . The proposed facility will. make use?in much the same. way as the NSA headquarters, at Fort ? Mead, Mainland ? a battery of expensive and sophisticated- radio monitoring, apparatus, with a number of electronic monitors carried in ? C130 aircraft on constant intele ligence-gathering patrols. Ibex. it is thought likely, will be of special use against Soviet-, forces and diplomats based in neighbouring Iraq. But the Americans concede that Many more producers of radio and cable traffic in the Persian Gulf region could, in theory, be monitored by the. Shah's new. facility ? and American military groups them- selves could have their ladle). messages so listened to. . There is concern that inter- nal security work may be per- formed by the radio monitors ; the Persian secret ? police for example, could use them to. Locate dissident- .groups in the; remoter parts of rural Iran. That check, that vital Apiaretioetl For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDFW-00432R000100370007-0 at-ice, no longer exists, Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-0 LE MONDE Paris, 12 June 1975 CONTROL TO BE RESTORED It would be easy to write that the Rockefeller report on the CIA contains no new elements for action concerning the abuse of power which, since the end of last year, some American opinion had been looking forward to. It confirms at least three-fourths of the accusations made against the Agency (more precisely, the Central Intelligence Agency) last December by our colleague of the New York Times, Seymour Hirsh. In the wake of his investigations, "revelations", "leaks", calculated indiscretions, etc. have abundantly nourished the curiosity of the public, which saw for the first time a little opening of the cover of the sanct- uary of the American state. Two points need to be made at the very outset. The first is the very fact ? that there is a commission of inquiry appointed by the President, which today has submitted the result of its investigations. It should also be noted that the task of Mr. Rockefeller and his associates was precisely circumscribed, namely to focus on "counter-espionage" operations conducted domestically by the CIA. This concerns legal matters with diverse, complex aspects which are secondary when compared with the wide range of external actions based on the large technical capabilities for intercepting and decoding signals in the atmosphere which the "place" ("maison") in Langley, outside Washington, has become known for in our time. The three hundred pages of the Rockefeller report contain a documentation which one may still judge to be inadequate but one could not imagine the issu- ance of a similar report in any Western democracy. The second point is that it is disastrous that an organization with the great mission that the CIA has, frequently became involved in actions beyond its assigned mission: it matters little that it occurred most often at the instigation of the White Hese that the CIA compromised itself on affairs which were not within its 1-0M,TY'tianf'". And jnef an off-hand remark about the neglig- ence of Congress which over a twenty-year period has not shown the slightest sign of taking a close look as to what was going on and was carried out under the name of the three famous initials. As a matter of fact, the responsibility of the Congress is perhaps a heavier one than that of the Executive. For, it is the legislator who is concerned here: it is he who defines the prerogatives of the important services of the nation. All irregularities revealed and condemned in the Rockefeller report are deemed to be "against the law": for sure, they are not compatible with good sense and good taste. Legally, things are little bit more delicate. The act by which the CIA came into existence, the "charter" invoqued to prevent its involvement in domestic police functions, dates back to 1947 and is not marked by clear logic. It has, among other things, been erased and over- loaded with and superceded by hundreds of "directives" from the White House, some general in nature others more specific; they constitute what is called - officially! - the "secret charter" of the CIA. It seems that the White House has decided to refer the integration of this confusing matter to Senator Frank Church, who heads a CUWASSiOn of inquiry of the Senate on the conduct attrib- uted to the CIA. He firmly intends not only to change the practices but also the statutes of the obscure institution. The CIA has shown by its cooperation with the Rockefeller inquiry as well as with the two special Congressional commissions which were created for the same reason and in the same spirit, that it is vitally interested not to come out of the shadow but out of the semi-darkness into which certain of its marginal activ- ities had spread, to devote itself in good conscience to that which will always be its untouchable and hence irreproachable domaine: espionage abroad, world- wide by a super-power. 20 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-0 .50 Approved For Release 2001108/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-6 ,cone -da restaurer . , 1.1 Serait facile 'd'ecrire que le rapport Rockefeller sur In C.I.A. n'apporte pas d'elements nou- veaux sur le -proces en abus de peuvoir que, derails le debut de. l'annee, !al intente une partie de l'opinion americaine. H continue au moms aux trois quarts les accusations portees en decembre dernier contre 1' e agence (puis- s'agit, pour etre pr?s, de la Central Intelligence ? Agenc y) par n.otre confrere dn e New-York Times a, M. Seymour Hersh.' Dans' le sillage de son enquete, lations e fuites *, indiscretions dirigees, o n t surabondamment nourri In curiosite du' public. qui voyait pour In premiere fois s'ens . trouvrir le -voile de ce sanctuaire ; de In raison d'Etat americaine. Deux remarques s'imposent d'emblee. La premiere .est le fait meme y ait Cu commission presidentielle d'enquete et clue celleci livre aujourd'hui le resula tat de ses investigations. Encere. faut-il noter que .1a ache de M. Rockefeller et de ses assistants atait etroitement eirconscrite aux aspects des operations de ? contre- espionnage interieur menees par la?C.I.A. II s'agit l?'aspects liti- ? gieux a de nombreux points de vue, mais plus tine secondaire? en, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE. _.1\4,9NTiroli 19 June 1975 - - Jos ph Hrsch comparaisOnf?dur aon illaetfon'" ex riear tie l'inanense labora- toire a. licher et a decoder l'uni- vcrssaue la e malson A de Langley, aux environs de Washington, est fievenue de nos jours. , Les trois cents pages du rapport Rockefeller contiennent tine do- cumentation qu'en pourra tou- jours juger iusuffisante, mais dont on n'imagine pas l'equiva-: lent dans line autre democratie occidentaIe. Seconde remarque : s'il est fatal qu'une organisation de l'ampleur de la soit frequemment tentee d'outrepasser le cadre des missions qui lui sont assignees, il n'en reste pas moms que c'est le plus souvent it l'instigation de,Ia Maison Blanche que la. C.I.A. S'est compromise dans des affaires qui n'etaient pas de sa competence. Et ne parlons tale pour memcire de l'incurie du Congres qui, vingt aus durant, n'a pas montre in moindre velleite de regarder de pres ce qui se passait et se per- petrait it l'enseigne 'des famenses trois initiales. i , ? ? En In matiere, sa responsabillte -est pent-etre encore plus lourde que celle de l'executif. Car c'est hil, le legislateur, s'il s'en soucie, qu'il revient de definir les attri- butions des grands services de In nation. Toutes les irregularites relevees et denoneees pat: le rap- port Rockefeller sont censees etre o contraire.s ,ii, In loi, : it coup elles sent contraires an bon sens et an bon gout. En droit. les choses sont beaucoup plus Hones. L'acte de naissance de In la e charte inVoquet pour condamner son ingerence dans Ia police interieure, date de 1947, et n'est pas d'une logique limpid?. II a ete, en mitre. rature et sur- charge par les centaines do e di- rectives a 'emanant' de In Nielson Blanche, tantet de style general, tantot d'usage particuller, qui constituent ce qu'on appelle ? officiellernent ! ? ? la e -c'aarte secrete de la C.I.A. Il ? semble (Luc la Nelson Blanche alt pris In decision de transmettre Nate- gralite de ce fatras an s.enateur Frank,. Church, qui dirige une commission d'enquete senatoriale sur les agissements prites it la CIA., et quo soutient le forme propos de reformer nen seulement les pratiques, mais les statuts de cette tenebreuse institution. La C.I.A. a montre par sa cooperation it l'enquete Rocke- feller commie, aux travaux des deux commissions speciales du Congres creees dans le meme esprit, qu'elle etait la premiere interessee ii sortir non pas de l'ombre, mais de In penombre oC certaines de ses activites margi- nales se deroulaient, pour se consacrer en paix a ce qui de- meurera toujours sen domaine intouchable et d'ailleurs inatta- lane : l'espionnage du reste du monde par une superpuissance. r' Afterthoughts" ? _ _ I Afterthoughts on me CA The Rockefeller Commission report on withholding of information damaging to the mistakes committed by the U.S. Central In- CIA. ?A telligence Agency in the past was not a A A whitewash. On the contrary, it uncovered and Not all, but most of the abuses confirmed or reported to the public several highly improper actions which had not been sniffed out previously by any investigating news re- porter. The worst examples of such newly disclosed impropriety included giving LSD to an unwit- ting person who subsequently jumped out of a 10th-story room to his death. Others included keeping a defector in solitary confinement for three years and "in one other case a defector was physically abused." The major published allegations against the CIA were confirmed. There was widespread abuse of the rights of American citizens. The CIA did exceed its charter on a very broad scale. It did allow itself to be used improperly for political purposes. This confirmation of published charges and disclosure of more that had not been suspected by reporters can, and should, be the beginning of the restoration of public confidence in the integrity of government processes in Washing- ton. It is noteworthy that many newspapers both in the United States and abroad assumed that the Rockefeller Commission report would be a whitewash, and some rushed to a whitewash conclusion on the first day after publication. Only after reading the text was it generally realized that this was a remarkably honest job. ? :lee principal subsequent criticisms were hat the report had not expressed sufficient outrage over the mistakes it had uncovered or cenfirmed. Another was that it had not gone beyond its mandate which was limited to should be pet-Sons of "stature, independence, disclosed in the report occurred after 1961 when the CIA moved from various antiquated and obscure buildings scattered around Wash- ington into its superpalace at Langley, Vir- ginia. This was in the middle of one of the most expensive and exclusive suburban residential districts around Washington. The building looks like a junior Pentagon, and not all that junior. It is highly visible from the air and scarcely concealed from -heavily traveled highways. It lost its anonymity when the move was made. No one Could weigh the extent to which life in a supersplendid building contributed to what can be called delusions of grandeur. The ill-starred Bay of Pigs affair was conceived before the move was made, but during the construction process. The widespread surveil- lance of American citizens by the agency, in confirmed violation of its charter, was trig- gered by the radical movements of the '60s which grew out of black unrest and antiwar protests. But it remains a fact that the CIA was largely anonymous and largely non- controversial while it was living in humble quarters. Did it share in the "arrogance of power" which marked the Johnson-Nixon era? A A A Remedies proposed by the Rockefeller Commission largely deal with way a ad na'eaes of improving supervision over CIA activities. Particularly interesting is the recommenda- tion that in the future directors of the CIA - that this does not necessarily exclude perso from within the service. But it says "consid eration should be given to individuals fr outside the service" and it adds that "manag ment and administrative skills are at least important as the technical expertise whi can always be found in an able deputy." All CIA directors up to 1956 were recruit from outside the CIA. They came either fro. private life (John McCone, Allen Dulles) from the military services (Gen. Wal Bedell Smith, Admiral Hilenkotter). In 1 Richard Helms became the first CIA three promoted from the ranks of the servic William E. Colby, the present director, is al. from the career CIA service. The above should be read against the fa that the report finds that Presidents Johns and Nixon used improper pressure on the?C to do things which it ought not to have don The implication is that Mr. Helms, a car service officer, was less able to resist t pressure than a person from outside service who because of personal position personal wealth would have had enoug "independence" to resist presidential pr sure. A A .1- The Rockefeller Commission consider but discarded a recommendation to separa the CIA's open appraisals of information fro its clandestine overseas' operations. Congr should consider this idea further. It is difficu to see how ,Clandestine operations can conducted from such ?A ":",-sert" buildiag the palace at Langley. If the covert work we separated and moved into physical obscurit the overt and vital work of intelligen evaluation could go on at Langley with less improper activities inside AM:44W~ Relt*egfitiCAY68/ WPA-qi30011 4 661 1 2R0 )1 derdo paraphernalia of fenc Perhaps. But there was no whitewash, and no needs underlining. Tfie repo goes on o say guar s, Aria passes. 21 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-0 CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION 19 MAY 1975 7.1 4_4 el ) 4. 0 "4 - .J1 i4-.411 .1 t:/ 1 ttisciosure Drarlir.)ts .2.. 0 Innrry Van Dye* ST. LOuta A dir4l.t.sttre that a Wa.shienton University oublic re:nip:is man had been :amyl:U=3 the Ottnial Letel- ngencee Agency with infer-neat:on oo *lee foreign travel ?pleces of faculty members over the past few years has pr .,ted the university to begin drafting formal guidelines to govern itS cone, with eoverament jowled- :ors. The grio'elines, which will be pre- ;axed by a ur_iversity-wide commit- et-o' that is now being formed, ep- arently will be one of the first acknowle.dged attempts by -v Arnericen university to spell out early its etc il members' rinlen; and pom!biit:ee inthis tielelish area. At issue is .eleether, and nr.der what eircumsternes, information sieculd giver. to the whose -eterest in netiocal eecerity and in- -motional politics might sometimes an counter to the rights of individ- al professors and the desi-e for a ll'omeete cf tmet among scholars rom eiff=zent conntriee. The *:'iashinoton University case e.s implications for other American iversities. Many of their imerni- onally knowa scholars regularly ttend foreign conferences at which ev have access to sensitive infor- nion end ars in contact with sci- atists, ;lectors, teed scholars from rnmuais: countries. The disclosure that prornptcl the uldeline writing at Washington rtiversirj involved the activities of an Gaehler, former director of the ..ews bureau in the university's rr.ed- 1 s-chool. Mr. Gashler, who be- erne director in 1966, says it -ented to him from the oeteet to be rfectly reeeonable to cooperate 1:11 the one... He understood, he recalls, that bureau hen given gents access to faculty tavel. plans or several years before he arrived. Every year the hterean circulated memorandum to factity tat=bers as'..ting them to detail their travel ptans. presumably for use in pub- licity releases. Mr. Cashier's under- standing was that CIA. agents from the agency's St. Louis off= had come around resularly and had been given access to the information the faculty Members supplied. Mr. Cashier also was, by tarn- perament, a good source for the C.I.A. A politleally conetrvative mart who .b...ts seen active for raw years as an ofelen: in the Naval Reserve, he says he .1-el:eyed it was the duty cf any petriotic American to beLo the C.I.A. when he could. He remembers, for instance, a lecture at a Navy training session that made preciaely that point. "It was pointed out," he says, "that a lot more communists are involved in [intelligence work] than our peo- ple, so the thought occurred to me that whatever I could do toward getting us some information woeld be a.patriotie gesture." ? BriteFnao Saught So Mr. Cashier cooperated. Acting at !east in part on his information, c.t.A.. agents would telephene pro- feszors who treveltecl to overseas conferences and reottest a meeting. Sometimes the agents would seek such meetings before the trips so they could outline v.hat information they wanted the peolessors to. look for and identify the foreign scholars in whom, they were interested. At ? other times they would esle for a leriefaeg only after a .peee:eseor e?- .tterreed Lomee.... ? .In acy. case, the connection the news -.bore-en:se h-treoal solicit:16ml of travel plans and the calls from the c.i.A. eventually prompted eon:tone to bring the mat- ter* to the attention of William H. Danforth, then vice-chancellor for the medical school and new chan- cellor of the entire university. Mr. Dar.fortla told Mr.. Cashier to cad his relationship with the cane, and the annual solicitation of travel plans was suspended. Sensa ol Patriotic Duty For a while, the Gashier-tter-i. connection was interrupted. But as protests against the war in Indo- china escalated in the late 136C's, Mr. Cashier's sense of patriotic duty drew him back into contact with the agency. "One thing really sticks in ray mind," be recalls. building was burned [in 19703, and the students were: really getthri'g away with a lot of things I consid- ered really unpatriotic. I guess the nest time I got a call from :herr: [the C.I.A. agents) asking if I could help, I felt that I. could." Thus Mr. Cashier's ofice again became a conduit for information, although evidently on a less com- prehensive basis than in the days af the annual memorandum. ? Late in 1973, however, his activ- ities again came to the attention of the medical-school administration, and he was again told to end his C.t.A. contacts. Tne oreler came this time from Saralee! 13. Gum, ee?ho :end enre-ed .Dani".oreh vice-char.cellor. That might have been the quiet end to the matter. Instead,? the story turned up last January on the front page of the Si. Louis Gro?lee-Derno- eratozbout the time that iaterest in the eerie's -dcraestic zetivijes had been. heightened by. laoionurrs in the. r.etional press. Faced with the p...n'elleity, the versini. reeporided .i-Ippeintieg a committee, of. faculty eteeentems to invest p-as. Not ban ago com! eeittee, heeded by John W. Olney, faculty. issued a short report that * corroborated the f,...cts in. the newspaper story, "Faculty members or their car:e- t:ries assume, end are correct to assume, that when the news bureau contact.; theta for faculty informa- tion. it is the bureau's intent to dis- seminate that ir,frh-mation for pur- poses strictly, ber.eflcial to the farl...i- ty and medical rzhool," the commit- tee said. "Relaying such information on to the C.I.A. wouit: cer.ainly ree. interpreted some faculty members. "M.r. Cathie: meicreewledges re- questing faculty ieformation from the secretaries of feculty for the sole purpose of relaying it to the cetet. . . The commit:: iee.'hoid.s that the news* bureau has eeiicited its- formation under an inappreneelate guize." ? ? Guicleilnos *Pnreptersael The Olney committee also pointed directly at the broad issues involved: "To many facylty. C.I.A. interest in their activities can seriovly com- promise their standing in their pro- ' fessional cernmunizies, can bring into question their independence and bona fides in their contacts with forei;r: colleagues and ,-an inhibit titern in the parratii of their legiti- mate academic iaterests... ;2=2 LISZ such impormnt issues were involved, the committee said, clear guidelines for 1-12..11irtz; rela- tions with.the C.I.A. Soc a r.ecessity. The committee to develop the guide- lines :s in the process of being appointed by Mr. Dar.forth. Mr. Gas%ler, in the meantime continuing to serve as directc.-..- alumni affairs but. h...s Ivett rvd . of his th..-! news 1;urreau. The univel-,..ity says his re-- :novel from the nee.; job had t.eer. plartaded before the or his ca.), i,:volvicytent- and occurred for a p.onthiatriet all the me:lit:al-school rsaaas u elo,d to it. WASHINGTON POST (POTOMAC). 15 JUNE.1975 By Rudy Maxa * One of the CIA's least favorite former em- ployes, writer Victor Marchetti, is at his Virginia home working on a spy novel that is an "interpre- tive history of the CIA in fictional form, a CIA God- father." The courts are still considering whether the CIA can censor all of Marchetti's writing as the agency did in the case of The CIA and The Cult of ? Intelligence, the best-seller he wrote with John i Marks. Approved For Release 2001/08/Qt: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-0 WASHINGTON POST 15 June 1975 r:Rowland Evans an iriXe'7;:i rriro;viit 577 ebuke to Harrington 12 after the CIA's activities in Chile were exposed by The New York Times: He was called on the carpet by then. committee chairman, Rep. Edward Hebert of Louisiana, who suspected Harrington himself as the leak for The Times expose. Denying he was the leak, Harrington was excused by the Armed Services s Committee after his Sept. 12 interroga- tion and the matter appeared closed. But on May 25, Harrington read former CIA Latin America chief David A. Phillips' defense of the agency in a signed an Sete in the New York Times. Phillips wrote that it was a "myth" that the CIA "encouraged the Chilean plotters who toppled President Salva- dor Allende-Gessens and funded the strikeei leading to the coup" against Marxist Allende. Angered once again, Harrington wrote a circular letter to House col- leagues suggesting that they do what he did last June: obtain access to Col- by's still-secret testimony to the Armed Services C/A oversight committee. He also asked, for access himself to other classified committee documents. That letter triggered the disciplinary action by the committee. It voted unan- imously on Tuesday (with 13 of 40 members present) to deny Harrington access to any more classified material at least until the House Ethics Corn- niittee (officially the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct) exam- ines the whole question of access to a committee's secret testimony by non- committee members?a direct rebuke ? to Harrington. ,e? ' Despite private advice from the parliamentarian's office that the House .Ethics Committee lacks jurisdiction in -a case looking toward a possible re- 'bnke of Massachusetts Rep. Michael Harrington, a liberal Democrat who has led attacks on the Central Intelli- gence Agency, the Ethics Committee expected to meet next week to cons .aider the case. .- The move against Harrington, an out- spoken CIA critic particularly in the ;Chile affair, has been hatching for almost a year, the result of smoldering :resentment over what some Armed Services Committee members say psi- . vately was Harrington's violation of a -signed secrecy pledge. e-? -Harrington signed the pledge on -June 4, 1974, as a condition for obtain- 'Ing access to secret testimony given ? to the Armed Services subcommittee on CIA oversight by CIA director William Colby on the agency's activi- ties in domestic Chilean politics be- fore and during the Allende regime. ? The secrecy pledge signed by Har- rington was as follows: "The contents of such classified information (Colby's testimony) will not be divulged to any unauthoriged person in any way, form, 'shape or manner." ., Angered over what he regarded as 'eongressional apathy in the CIA-Chile , %affair, Harrington subsequently in- :formed the chairman of the Senate rorcign Relations arid House Foreign ? Affairs Committees, as well as other congressmen, members of his own staff and one highly reputable report- !en that Colby's teStimony contained 'political dynamite. The general trust of Colby's testimony was given by Har- rington at least to the two committee , chairmen, and possibly others. . Harrington admitted as much to the Armed Services Committee last Sept. THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE 21 JUNE 1975 President Ford's as-yet unannounced presidential campaign committee in the home state of former Gov. Ronald Reagan will include at least two of Reagan's long-time aides and political Mr. Nedzi unresigned The House of Representatives has. overwhelmingly rejected the resigna- tion of Chairman Lucien N. Nedzi of the Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, and ' whatever its motives its decision was a wise one. The select committee was appointed by Speaker Albert,in February, mainly to investigate charges against the CIA. It consists 'of three Republicans and seven Democrats, S01116 of whom---not- ably Michael Harrington of Massachu- setts and Ronald Dellurns of California ?are inveterate liberals and bitter critics of the CIA. When it was. learned earlier this rrionth that as chairman of an Armed Forces subcommittee Mr. Nedzi had been briefed by the CIA on some of ' 14e very activities to be investigated, I 1 se the seect committee Is D etnoc ra demanded his resignation. He appeased them by agreeing to turn the CIA in- vestigetion over to a su tta hcommi e. Approvg ror Release 2001/084i : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-0 which he would noti be a member. But In the interest of objectivity he also re- fused to name Messrs. Harrington and Deilums to the subcommitte, which so inflamed them that the compromise fell apart and Mr:. Nedzi submitted his resigna tion. Anti;CIA elements whipped up senti- ment in favor of accepting Mr. Nedzi's. resignation, pointing out that it would be almost unprecedented to reject it (but neglecting to say that it would be just as unusual to accept the resigna- tion of a committee chairman over in- ternal commmittee bickering]. Fortunately the House rejected the resignation on Monday by the sur- prising vote of 290 to 64. A majority of both parties supported the phairraan... For the most part, the vote was taxen advisers, including state Republican Chairman Paul Haerle. Hearle and state Attorney General Evelio Younger, the state's top Re- publican officeholder, will be co-chair- men of the Ford campaign committee, with Anita Wentner Asheraft, vice chairman of Reagan's 1970 re-election finance comma' tee, to take over as active head of the Ford California campaign later this year. For Mr. Ford, the quiet acquisition of Haerle and Anita Ashcraft is a major coup, establishing his political clout and proving that Reagan, a pcs- sible contender against the President for the 1976 nomination, does not own his own state. Haerle was an all-out conservative backer of Sen. Barry Goldwater's pres- idental nomination in 1.9(54. Northern California chairman for Reagan's first gubernatorial campaign in 1960, Haerle became hie personal appointments sec- retary for the next three years. More recently, Haerle has been out of tho inner Reagan circle?but all his past Republican credentials are with the former governor. ? With David Packard, board chairman of Hewlitt-Packard, as national finance chairman for the Ford campaign, White House operatives feel the Presi- dent has made more solid progress In California than any other state. Top r0Ordinatnr fnr the cast- is Mr. Ford's close personal friend, Leon Parma, ivice president of an Diego-based Teledyne Corp. and one-time adminis- trative assistant of conservative Rep. Bob Wilson of California. A footnote: Haerle has been criti- cized for his imminent move to the Ford camp on grounds that the Repub- lican state chairman should be neutral. But Haerle won't change his mind, A 1975. Meld Enterprisers. Ina as a demonstration of confidence in Mr. Nedzi personally and in committee chairmen in general. But to some de- gree it also reflected a feeling that the investigation of the CIA should not be turned over to a bloodthirsty clique whose clear purpose is to emasculate it. In either event, we're better off as a result Either the select committee will be immoblized or more likely it will be abolished and the investigation turned over to a more objective group. An investigation is needed, and very likely there should be some congres- sional action along the lines recom- mended by the Rockefeller Commis- sion. We're enW.lez.1 to some assurance that the CIA will never again venture as far beyond its authority as it did in the decade before 1973. But the Iasi thing we need is a destructive witch hunt carried out by fanatics and based on excesses which almost certainly no longer exist. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-0 WASHINGTON. STAR 17 June 1975 House Has a Cloak for CIA's Dagger ? ' In the morning, Rep. Michael Har- rington, D-Mass., was cashiered, 1S- 13, by the House Armed Services Committee amid high talk of treason,: anarchy and the decline of the West. ? In the afternoon, Rep. Lucien Nedzi, D-Mich., by a vote of 290 to 64, was handed back his crown as chair-- man cf the Select Committee on Intel-1. ligence Activities to a chorus of "For he's a jolly good fellow." ? It seemed an appropriate double. 'observance on the eve of the third anniversary of the Watergate break-, in, which precipitated the country's , greatest cover-up to date, and it put the House of Representatives on, record as being a safe house for the : CIA.? ? Nothing the agency did, the House was saying, was so reprehensible as . talking about it. HARRINGTON'S crime was that./ he tried to bring to the attention of Congress allegations from CIA Direc- tor William E. Colby that the CIA spent $8 million dollars bribing Chi- lean officeholders, and labor officials' and in creating economic chaos for.. the Marxist government of Salvador:. Allende. . Nedzi knew all about this and moni" ? but he understood that the House didn't want to know, and so he never ? told. He also found out about murder, but he kept that under his hat, too. He offered to resign in the face of out-: rage from several members of his4 WASHINGTON POST 19 June 1975 VI. Foreign Policy Faults Control's 'committee,,' but the }toys e 'Wouldn't-1 have it. Nedzi is perhaps the chicken in the chicken coop, but the House .wants it that way. The members have heard just; )enough about poisoned cigars (for Castro), a poisoned ring (for De; Gaulle) to realize that they do not want to bite into the poisoned apple of more information. If they do they might have to do something about it. Besides they want to teach their dissidents and upstarts a lesson. It is the revenge of the Cavemen. Harrington, yellow-haired and pumpkin-faced, has an "up-the- rebels" air that enrages them. Be- cause he did laugh at the classifica- tion system, and did talk about ne- ? - MaatonallSerwEINIZrz=21 Poime off View -,1:5621sessoaan61111 farious deeds to unauthorized periorts, he offers the perfect battering-ram for the demolition of the Select Com-, .rnittee. ' IF HE CAN BE denied access to classified -information, he obviously, will be disqualified for service on the CIA panel, and the group can be solved without further fuss. Dangerous people like Rep. Jarnes Stanton, D-Ohio, who marked his ;deabtless fleeting chairmanship of the special subcommittee by announcirm that he knew of successful assassina- tions, can be evicted from the. premises, and the inquiry can be turned over to "national security" freaks, who can be trusted to endorse the "no name, no blame" report of the Rockefeller Commission. 7 Everybbdy will be happy, except those souls in the country who object to political assassination in peace- time and who would rather know if it's been tried1 even if it turns out to be at the direction of John F. Kenne- dy, and his brother Robert. 'Vice President Nelson A. RockefelT Associated Press .i.'A presidential-Congressional' 1port says. commission studying U.S. for. , ' The current process for Bp- ; ;proval of covert actions in- eign policy says in a draft re- i volves the submission of pro. port there Is inadequate eon. Iposals to the so-called "40 Vol over covert operations 'Committee" beaded by Henry launched by the Central In-, A. Kissinger in his post as the telligenee Ogency :against fr.c.' President's national security : eign countries. : . ... ',: -adviser. . . In recent years, the .pro, , , 1 The draft report sa,,,S that --14,-.'d"rPs for - airrovin::', cc'Yert? 1.,-,!_atise 'of Kissinger's other, operations "have become quite! -duties as secretary of state, ; informal" and at titres the 1 ',the 40 Committee "has rarely: 'President has or de red the l met" and consultation is fre- 'normal review pro e es s by- I quently done o v e r the tele- passed altogether, a draft of phore the, AlurphY C9111111issicHAISfi 6 vett FliSrffe &a iV-12e0 Veleri0 8 ler has stepped forward' as the hie': ;nan against the Kennedys. He said' On "Meet the Press" that the "White 'House knew" about such activities." He was preceded, of course, by for- mer CIA Director John McCone, who went before the cameras and invited the country to believe that an at- tempt had been made on Fidel Castro in the Kennedy years and even trans- posed the date of the installation of missiles -on the sacred soil of Cuba", to make the point. . , ADAM WALINSKY, former aide to Robert Kennedy, told of a CIA-Mafia collaboration on Castro which was foiled by Robert Kennedy; Some Democrats are nervous, however, that the Kennedys may have had a hand in doing in Ngo Dinh Diem of. South Vietnam. But the evidence against that is that Richard Nixon illicitly re- quested all CIA files on Vietnam and ?found so little dirt that Charles W. :Colson had to call in E. Howard Hunt :to fabricate the "smoking pistol". cable implicating the Kennedys. ? But the peoples' representatives 'cannot be expected to assume the 'burden of these troublesome and , squalid matters. They are not self- conscious on such occasions, as wit- ness their 10-year flight from the Vietnam War' . The Republicans are showing Ger- aid Ford they understand his tender-' -I-IC=3S fc.;r thc The, 'cmccrats protecting can ,claim that they are the Kennedys and sparing the country much woe. ' The tides of freedom and openness4 that ran strong in the House for three giddy months early this year have been turned back. F. Edward Hebert, deposed as Armed Services chairman by the freshmen, resumed his old seat for the Harrington auto-da-fe. The House ahd the CIA now are, working hand in glove. CIA has the .',dagger; the House is providing the cloak: - IniSsion executive 'director, :acknowledged the existence 'of. the draft report but said has been changed and prob- ably will be changed again" .by commission members who include Vice President Rock- efeller. The draft version ? tecom- fliends that the President's na- tional, security adviser be prevented from holding' -other -other Cabinet position. It also ? recommends that all covert activities be made known to Congress but says the Presi- dent should not have to .give his personal' endorsement of such operations in order to avoid harmful effects, , Headed by retired Ambassa- dor Robert Murphy of New York, the 12-member Commis- sion for Reorganization of the Covermnent's Foreign Policy was created in 1972 by Presi- dent Nixon and Congress. The commission is scheduled to hAi4R01371X-0 043 woppl ? NEW YORK TIMES 14 June 1975 A highly .placed Iranian, moved by the latest news about operations of the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency, told ,a story this week to an American correspondent. When Richard M. Helms, former head of the CIA!, was named Ambassador to ,Iran in . 1973, ViaclUnLr Y. Yerofeyev, the Soviet Ambas- sador, went to the Iranian Premier,' Amir Abbas Hoy- eyda, and inquired sneering- ly, "Why did the Americans send their No.. I spy as Am- bassador to Iran?"- Itemier Hoveyda looked the Soviet Ambassador up and down and, replied, "The :-nztkcans' are our friends ? at4least, they don't send us their No. 10 spy.'!,- * 00370007-0 24 NEW REPUBLIC 28 June 1975 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-0 ? Playing Fast and Loose With Truth Led Astra by Morton H Halperin One technique of the Central Intelligence Agency, discussed only in passing in the Rockefeller Commis- sion report released two weeks ago, is dis-information. As Philip Agee discusses in his book Inside the Company, the agency has expensive facilities for producing fake documents and other means for misleading foreigners. As with other CIA methods, dis-information has been turned against the American people. The clearest and most important domestic dis-in forma tion project of the agency Was the effort, still going on, to discredit the Seymour Hersh story on the CIA's "massive, illegal domestic intelligence operations" and to conceal the scope of CIA domestic activities. From 1953, when a program to open first-class mail began, CIA officials had no doubt that they were engaging in illegal activities. By May of 1973, if not long before, they knew that they had engaged in extensive violations of the legislated mandate to avoid internal security matters. Yet every effort was made to conceal this knowledge. In May 1973 jarnes Schlesinger, then director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and now f.::.cretary of Derpn,:r., C Prj pracr.rit anri frIrrnor emplr,veoc of the CIA to bring to his attention any activities that they believed to be illegal or in violation of the CIA charter. This memorandum produced some hundreds of responses and an inspector general's report laying out many, but apparently not all, of the activities described in the report of the presidential commission. Schlesinger's response was to order an end to some of the activities. He made no report to the oversight committees of the Congress or to the public. Soon thereafter he or his successor, William Colby, reduced the inspector general's staff and ordered him not to conduct any investigations of agency operations. As the full extent of the Nixon adrninistration's paranoia about domestic dissidents became public, questions began to be raised in the Congress about whether the CIA had been drawn into any ,of these activities. It had, of course, in the -massive way discussed below, but CIA officials at first saw no need to inform Congress at all. Richard Helms, Schlesinger's predecessor as director of Central Intelligence, and.a man ubiquitous in the Rockefeller Commission's account of CIA misdeeds, was probed on the question by Sen. Clifford Case. Helms had been nominated to be ambassador to Iran and the Foreign Relations Commit- tee took the opportunity to ask him about reports of CIA domestic activities. In light of the Rockefeller .Commission's descriptionof operation CHAOS, direct- ed at domestic dissidents, and Helms' role in it, one has difficulty deciding which is .inc.-)re astonishing?his answer or that Helms remains ambassador to Iran. Here is the text.: Senator Case: If has been called to my attention that in 1969 or 1970 the WikprikikiedsiR'deiRegliS02,061108108 : OPAIRi3R774)3242R1101340037NRicti..,enee operation" by the CIA agencies pin in the effort to learn as n: tick as they could-about the antiwiir 'movement, and during this period US Army Intelligenee became involved and kepi files on US citizens. Do you brow anything about any activity on the part of the CIA in .that connection? Was it asked to be invc-!ved? Mr. Helms : I don't recall whether we were as;:ed, but we were not involved because it seemed to me that was a clear violation ofWhat our charter was. Senator Case. IV:rit do you do in a case like that? Mr. Heins. I would iimply go to explain to thc President this didn't seen: to me to be advisable. The Rockefeller Commission apparently considered deception of the American public and possible perjury as .beyond the scope of its inquiry into CIA domestic . activities. Thus it neither reports nor comments cm this testimony. Statements of current Director William Colby are treated, in the i same way. One needs, therefore, to refer to the published hearings of the Senate Armed Services Committee preceding Colby's confirmation. to learn that he saw no reason to report to that committee, even in closed session, on the results of the investigation launched just a few months before as a result of the Schlesinger memorandum. Indeed, in July 1973, Mr. Colby had this exchange with Sen. Senator Symington. As I understand it, you do not intend to participate in any way in any domestic intelligence. Mr. Colby: I do not, Mr. Chairman. Senator Symington. Would this prevent you front helping to make policy regarding the collection-of inielligence on domestic groups? Mr. Colby. I believe it would; yes, Mr. Chairman. I--do no! see thofas within my responsibilities at all. Senator Symington. Would the 1947 act prohibit the OA from collecting, or providing the support necessary for collecting, intelligence within the US on domestic groups? Mr_ Colby. I believe that is the same question, essentially. Senator Symington. Yes.? Mr. Colby. And it would prohibit me fro:n doing.that. Sometime after, Mr. Colby. decided to give the sub- committee to which he 'reports some account of the illegal and inappropriate activities uncovered in the . Schlesinger investigation. This testimony, which has still not been made public, produced no congressional action. In desperation one or more middle level officials . of the CIA gave Hersh the bare outlines of the story. Before publishing his article, Hersh, faithful to New York Time; tradition, conferred with Colby. The DO, by his account, attempted to convince Hersh, and no doubt. , Times executives, that the stcfry was 'fundamentally wrong and misleading. The Times was in this caSe not persuaded and on December 22, .1974 published Hersh's account under A four column headline reading "Huge CIA Operation Reported in US Against Antiwar Forces, Other Dissidents in Nixon Years." The opening sentence reported that the CIA had conducted a 25 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-0 against the antiwar movement and other dissidents. ?That phrase?"massive illegal domestic" was to become the focus of a massive illegal domestic CIA campaign to discredit the Hersh story. As will be shown, every fact save one in the Times story is confirmed by the commission. The agency pulled out all the stops in the effort to divert attention from its activities to a discussion of how Sy and the Times could have gone so wrong; suggestions were put about that both were eager for a Pulitzer Prize to get even for The Washington Post's Watergate coverage; hence the need to rush into print before the end of the year. Reporters with little or no prodding came to talk of Sy's carelessness and bias. Although neither Hersh nor anyone else could get additional detail or further confirmation of the story, it would not die and Colby was forced to confront the Congress. He picked his target carefully, a closed session of the ultra-friendly subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee. His opening state- ment was released to the press and billed as a complete description of the agency's domestic activities. This January 15, 1975, statement has to be read carefully, along with a correction sheet issued quietly a month later, and compared to the Rockefeller Commission report in order to appreciate the subtleties of dis- information as practiced by the company. The DCI in this statement denies the Hersh story fully and frontally. A month later testifying before the House Appropriations Committee he characterized his earlier testimony as a flat denial of the Times allegations, stating that "this operation was neither massive, illegal, nor domestic, as alleged." The operation he was referring to was CHAOS. That is as good a place as any to begin a comparison of the Hersh story,,the Colby statement, and the report of the commission appointed by President Ford. In the process we can review the facts brought about by the official panel while examining the agency dis-information campaign. We will then be in a position to consider the tone of the Rockefeller report and its recommendations. peration Chaos. As Hersh acknowledges, he was not able to get many details about the special unit set up to investigate domestic dissidents. Even its "Get Smart" name had not been revealed to him. These are the facts he reported: O Files were compiled on 10,000 American citizens. O Specific individuals were targeted, including one antiwar member of Congress. ? Information on the targeted individuals was collect- ed from a variety of sources including informants who penetrated antiwar groups. . O There were names of others in the files, including other members of Congress. 5 The activities were conducted by a special Unit, reporting directly to DCI, set up initially to look for evidence of .foreign involvement in the -antiwar movement but growing into a domestic intelligence op' r. IOU . t> The group produced a antiwar movement, one of Kissinger. While claiming to deny the entire story as it related to the special unit, Colby in his sta ternen t con fi rinecl.rna n y of the facts. However he carefully lAft the in-lose-do creafed sonic 7000 ietei fn American citizens that the unit neverALIIMMdbFe9t501PRE"A ssio/i9 t.CY8 : CAIRRIV07N4-MOR: ,drga/,',Oz. its. The computer series of reports on the which was sent to Henry exploring the links domestic dissidents might have had to foreign grot.ips.? . Colby conc'eded. that there were files on 10,000 Americans. He acirnitted that agents had infiltrated the 'antiwar movernerit as part of operation CHAOS. He said that the) had limited to gathering informa- :tion abroad, although he admitted that some reports were submitted On the activities of American dissi- dents. He denied:that surveillance had been conducted on antiwar Congressmen and, after an initial denial, 'confirmed that there were files on four members of ,Congress. In five.pages of testimony, Colby failed to . touch on the other specific facts in the Hersh story. !The basic ployWas to divert attention away from the 'details,of what the special unit had done and focus it instead on the disputed accuracy of the Times story. Until the Rockefeller report was published, this ploy had largely succeeded. The Times had pulled Hersh off the investigation claiming that he was part of the story and could not cover it objectively. Many reporters and observers were convinced that there had in fact been no massive effort and nothing very illegal, only as Colby had put it, a few occasional missteps brought about by intense presidential pressure. . The writers of the Rockefeller report were well 'aware of the controversy over "massive illegal domes- tic" and they were not about to explicitly confirm the characterization that had been made the touchstone of the accuracy of the. Times story. However they leave the reader in little doubt. The operation, the eight conservative commissioners concluded, "unlawfully exceeded the CIA's statutory authority." Sc much for -illegal." As to "domestic," they write unanimously that the operation became a "repository for large quantities of information on the domestic activities of American citizens" and that "much .of the information was not directly related to the question of the existence of foreign connections with domestic dissidence." Notice the use of the adjective "large." The commis- sion staff must have wan ted to avoid "massive.- Earlier, they had referred to a "veritable mountain of material," and a paragraph summing up the activities of this unit, which at its peak had more than 50 employees, reads as. follows: ; By August 1973, when the foregoing Colby memoran- dum was written, the paper trail left by Operation CHAOS included somewhere in the area of 13,000 files on subjects and individual.; (including approximately 7,200 personality or files); orer 71.000 men:ay-an:1.a. re;-ort5 and ILIteri; Iron the t-"SI: oL'er the FBI; l almost 3,500 memoranda for internal use by the operation. In addition, the CHAOS group hact generated, or caused the generation of, over 12,000 cables of various types, as well as: a handful of memoranda to high-level government officials. On lop of this veritable mountain of material was a computer system containing an index cliver 300,000 names.; and organizations which, with few exceptions, were of United Shitfs titizens and otganizntions apparently ant ant:tried f?wit.I.: espionage. 13y any standard other than-that of directors of the this. was :a ?1112.SSIVe 017141-+Ati011: The commission, in the process of describing and deploring the CHAOS operation, confirms all the Harsh fact::: with one possible exception. There were- 26 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-0' system of CHAOS had indexed some 300,000 names of citizens and domestic organizations. Specific individu- als, those with -201 files," were the targets of information gathering from many sources including the penetration of antiwar groups. While the commis- sion found no evidence that a congressman was specifically targeted, the "inaccuracy" in the Hersh story is simple to explain. An agent of the CHAOS operation "became involved as an adviser in a United States congressional campaign and, for a limited period, furnished reports to CHAOS of behind-the-scenes activities inthe campaign." The activities were,. as Hersh reported, conducted by a special 'unit reporting directly to the DCI. This unit Was, as he explained, originally set up to gather evidence of foreign connections and grew into a domestic intelligence operation. Finally, a series of reports was produced and at least one forwarded to Kissinger. In describing these reports, the commission blows the agency cover that, as Colby put it, this was a "counterintelligence operation directed at possible ? foreign links to American dissidents," and that it was a proper activity observing the limits on CIA domestic activity. The commission report describes some eight studies prepared by the CIA on the antiwar movement in the. United States in the period between November 1967 and January 1971 and forwarded outside the agency. These studies reached the same conclusion: there was no evidence that foreign governments or agencies ? controlled or directed domestic dissident movements or provided financial assistance to them. The agency didn't have any doubt about this, nor does the commission report on any evidence to the contialy. If the agency knew that its efforts were not directed at studying what it kneia, to be a nonexistent connection, neither did it have any doubts about the impropriety of what it was doing. In sending one study, "Restless Youth," to Walt Rostow in the Johnson White House, Helms wrote that "You will, of course, be aware of the peculiar sensitiVity which attaches to the fact that CIA has prepared .a report on student activities both here and abroad.' In forwarding a second copy of the report to Henry Kissinger in February of 1969, Helms was even more explicit: lit an effort to r,12o:d-out our discaion of this subject: ;nwe included a :?ecm on A mcrican 51ndents. This iz:an area not within the if b.:r ThAgettry, so not emphasize t. remely tl:is the paper. Shaul,' 'earn of its exist, P:ce? it would proc.? ina:g embarraS5itiS. . . . In addition to confirming all of the facts. of the Hersh story regarding the CHAOS unit, the presidential commission provided considerably more detail of its operations. Several items are worthy of note in light of the CIA effort to paint the unit's activities as proper. On three occasions, the commission notes, ac.:?nts who had infiltrated the antiwar movement were sent on specific assignments wholly concerned with domes- tic activities. One of these assignments yielded 47 separate disseminations to the FBI with such titles as "Plans for Future Anti-War Activities on the West Coast." As the commissionexplains, the bulk of these 'reiated soleVio aomestic activities. _ . Another agent reported on the high-level leadership' activities of a?clissident group, and a third infiltrated the group planning May Day demonstrations. 'Approved For Release 20011cwo aa. he CHAOS unit had a watch list of some 1000 organizations and thousands of individuals. Forty-one names from this list were sent to the unit opening mail in New York; it sent back a two-file-drawer load of material obtained from the illegal opening of mail. Names from the list were also supplied to tl?n National Security Agency, identified .by the commis- sion delicately only as "another agency." NSA rnoni- toted the overseas phone calls of those on the list, in .violation of their Fourth Amendment rights, and provided some 1100 pages to the CHAOS -unit. Other. Domestic Surveillance Programs. Thus far I have discussed all of the facts in the original Hersh story related to surveillance of domestic dissidents except .one. This is the assertion that CIA agents followed and photographed participants in antiwar demonstrations_ Not so, said Mr. Colby in his January statement to the Congress. He went on to detail several instances of surveillance of American citizens but said that they related to leaks of information or assassination plots. According to the Rockefeller Commission report that statement to the Senate committee was simply false. Participants in antiwar rallies were followed by CIA agents as part of a totally different program that is not mentioned at all in the original Hersh story. Colby touched briefly on these activities in his statement, telling the Senate committee that beginning in 1967 the CIA office of security, acting out of fear of the safety of its installations in the Washington area, has inserted 10 agents into dissident organizations to ;.-Ither information "relating to plans for dernor.stra- t;:r.,n:.:, Or IOCCI1r.:-.1715." The presidential commission tells a different story The program, which ran froin February 1967 to December 1968, involved many different agents, although no more than 12 at any one time. These agents penetrated a number of different organizations including the Women's Strike for Peace, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, the National Mobilization Committee to End the War, and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. The infiltrators sought to learn whatever they could about the organizations, including their domestic sources of funds and the names of those who attended meetings. To learn their identities, some of the participants in these meetings were followed home. In the words of the report, "the Agency's .infiltration of dissident groups in the Washington area went far beyond steps necessary to protect the Agency's own facilities, personnel and operations." The DCI made no mention in his.statement. to the congressional committees of yet a third CIA operation directed at domestic dissidents. This entirely separate project, run by the Office of Security, maintained more than 5000 files on dissident organizations and individu- als including some 12,000 names, and published weekly from 1968 to 1972 "Situation Information Reports" dealing with dissident activity in the US. titer illegal activities. The Hersh story reported that in addition to the activities directed at domestic dissidents, the CIA had also engaged in dozens of other illegal activities, including "break-ins, wiretapping, and the surreptitious opening of mail." These, Hersh reported, were a "different category of domestic activities carried 8 (;) telAsRDPV7430.32ROM100-878QCVA spec t ed foreign Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-0 intelligence." These facts too were fully confirmed in the Rockefeller report. The commission provided the. details Hersh could not get and it yields insight into the agency's view of its relation to the laws of the land. The commission report devotes considerable atten- tion to the agency's programs to open first-class mail. These operations, running from 1953 to 1973, were the largest, clearly illegal and unconstitutional programs discovered by the commission. Colby in his statement to the Senate committee dealt with these allegations in deadpan fashion in .a single page. He asserted that the primary purpose was to identify individuals in active correspondence with Cornmunist countries for "coun- terintelligence purposes, the results being shared with the FBI.? That sentence would not enable one to infer that the CIA did not even inform the FBI that it was operating the program. It was only when the bureau approached .the postal authorities to propose a similar scheme of mail covers that the agency told the bureau what it was.up to and agreed to share the fruits. Colby's .statement does not acknowledge that the roerarn was ille;a1 end smconstitut it is from the commission report that Ive learn that the agency was aware from the beginning that the operation was illegal and that CIA officials, including Richard Helms, deliberately deceived postal authorities into thinking that the operation was limited to mail covers, Le., to the copying of information off envelopes. The details .of how the agency deceived postal -authorities provides an interesting study of CIA dis- information techniques as applied to other government agencies. The discussion of."crwer stories" to use with the public should the operations' existence leak. provides evidence of the conscious nature of the CIA's use of false information to mislead the public. A 'careful reading of the Colby statement gives no hint as to the scope or dimensions of the program. The DCI lists each of the operations reported by the commission with the significant exception of 12 separate operations to open the mail of American citizens who had no connection with the agency. But there is no suggestion of the magnitude revealed by the commission report: Seiti.;!iCs g;% by the CIA show that in the last full year of its operation, the New York mail intercept handled approximItely 4,350,000 items of mail and examined the outside c,:er 2,300,000 of those items. Photographs were taken of the exteriors of approximately 33,000 items. Some 8,700 items were opened and the contents analyze.d. Selections for opening were made on the basis.of a watch list given to the crew and upon various other intelligence factors. During the last year, approximately 5,000 of the selections were on the basis of the watch list. In the l:ist year, the program made over 3,800 separate disserni!!ati,,ns of information deriped from the project within the Agencv and sent some 1,400 separate items of .inform:7tion to the FBI. At the end of 1972, the active watch list of ncores totaled approximately 600. The number of nam es :cat: varied from month to month as they were supplied by CIA components and the FBI. Although only mail ioming into the United Slates was intercepted inlhe early yeiirs of I he proient, both outgoing and incoming mail were involved during most of the project's operation. CIA personnel estimate that, overall, approxi- mately 30 percent of the mail intercepted was outgoing. The project nol only disseminatedjurrengn formally Iot t r elease 0 18/08 provided file data backegaPrPY.f., FP-arlomparrtn n?t d /0 , 28 computerized machine record system containing almost 2.000.000 entries. Institutional and organizational files were also maintained for reference and analytical purposes. One minor CIA ploy not cleared up by the commis- sion report concerns the opening of mail to and from non-Communist countries. The original Colby state- ment talked of opening mail to and front "two Communist countries." In a correction sheet released a month later that phrase was changed to "countries, mostly Communist." The commission does not com- ment on change (as noted it refers not at all to these Coiby -,t.i.e.-n.ent-;) and seetns to suggest that only nail to and prom Communist states was opened. Colby told the Senate that the last of the ,mail surveillance program ended in 1973. He neglected to mention that this was only.because a postal inspector, who had been a CIA official, ordered the agency to end the program_ The Rockefeller Commission report deals with the charges of illegal wiretaps and burglaries in a single section in which it discusses agency "special coverage" of American citizens. As usual we find Colby with his numbers too low and with no hint of illegality_ The DCI's statement reports four break-ins; the commis- sion found 12. Colby admits to 27 wiretaps; the , commission found 32 and 32 bugs in addition. It also found J. illegal examinations of tax returns ancithe 12 individual mail openings described above. The commis- sion reports more than 100 cases of "special coverage" involving one or more of these techniques. Despite the alleged comprehensive nature of his description of CIA domestic activities, Colby did not report on other illegal or unauthorized activities noted by the commission in its report. Among these are: O giving LSD to unsuspecting Americans, one of whom killed himself as a result O holding a defector in solitary confinement in the United States for three years 0 aiding the Bureau of Narcotics in violation of the CIA charter e giving gratuities to local police forces e securing telephone records for the National Security Agency. ,In many of these and other cases the Commission reaches the conclusion that the agency clearly violated its charter, the laws of the land, and the Constitution. ^ he Report. When the Rockefeller panel was appointed by the President, many critics predicted that this panel :of eight establishment figures, including, besides the Vice President, Ronald Reagan, Lyman Lemnitzer and C. Douglas Dillon, would produce a whitewash. First , reactions to the report reflected pleasant the detail provided. However a closer look makes plain why the commission reveals what it did. The tone and recommendations of the report reveal the next line of defense to which supporters of the CIA are retreating. Early in its deliberations the Rockefeller Commission must have become aware of the Schlesinger study and ? the inspector general's report covering most, if not all,. of the episodes in the commission report.. The .commission members knew that the Church commit- tee investigating this matter for the Senat:, had this material and would eventually make it public. To fail to provide the information ,now would be to discredit the entire commission and its recommendations when the SCIIALREWThile2itmonitosylc**oba te on what to do got underway. A report issued nowwithout detailed Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-6 facts wouid have been branded as a whitewash. The candid tone of the report has earned it a respectful hearing. Many editorial writers and com- mentators have adopted the tone and approach of the report. The abuses are to be deplored but we need a secret intelligence agency to counter the Communists. The commission's style is reflected in the second chapter of the report titled the "Need for Intelligence," which notes that the "United States remains the .e.. principal intelligence target of the Communist bloc." The chapter closes with this curious sentence: Americans halie a right to be uneasy if not seriously disturbed at the real possibility that their personal and business activities which they discuss freely over the telephone could be recorded and analyzed by agents of foreign powers. One would suppose that this is intended in some %Ar ay to justify the same intrusions on our privacy by the CIA. Having set the tone in the, opening section, the .commission remains consistent. Flagrant abuses of the Constitution are described with no sense of outrage. Agency explanations of the need to take the illegal actions in order to perform its assigned missions are accepted in general without question. The commission members evidently believe that the agency has the right to investigate what it calls "dissident" organiza- tions and individuals even if they have broken no laws and show every intention of remaining law abiding. The commission knows a "dissident" when it sees one. Thus it reports without comment that such peaceful and nonviolent groups as the Women's Strike for Peace and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, among others, are dissident groups but reports that a few non-dissidents such as Father Hesburgh somehow crept into the files. When it turns to recommendations, the commission lays out the approach likely to be adopted by the Ford administration, the agency and its supporters. First the report notes that many of the activities discussed in the report were terminated in 1973. It presents a total of 29 recommendations of various kinds. On the whole they add up to saying that the President and the. director should issue instructions that the agency roust obey the law. Various internal monitoring mechanisms are to be 'beefed up and a joint congressional oversight commit- tee is to be created. The budget of the agency might, the commission suggests, be made public at least in part and other material should be declassified. At the same time the commission endorses a law making it a crime for present or former employees to divulge classified information learned in the course of their employment. The commission doesn't even comment on the fact that such a law would have made criminal the.leaks that forced the information in the report to surface. Most important, are the commission's recommenda- tions on what domestic security functions the agency should have. The basic commission approach is to avoid the problem of the agency violating its charter in the future by authorizing it to do the things it has done in the past in violation of its charter. lithe recommenda- tions of the commission ere accepted, the .--,gcncy would be able to resume most .of the . progiattri4 it 1973 subject only to whatever deference it chooses to give to the Constitution' and the general laws of the land. These startling suggestions are stated so matter of factly as recommendations (1) and (2) that they have occasioned little comment. In recommendation (1), the commission proposes that the agency be permitted to approach willing sources in the United States openly ? and be prohibited from efforts directed at unknowing American citizens. It would thereby sanction covert operations aimed at gathering intelligence from foreigners in the United States. Then, in recommenda- tion (2), the commission would authorize the agency to engage in collection of information about American citizens in the following circumstances: a/ Persons presently or formerly affiliated, or being considered for affiliation, with the CIA, directly or indirectly, or others who require clearance by Me CIA to receive classified information; b) Persons or activities that pose a clear threat to CIA facilities or personnel, provided that proper coordination with the FBI is accomplished: cl Persons suspected of espionage or other illegal octioities relating to foreign intelligence, provided that proper coordination with the FBI is accomplished_ Thus, the agency would have authority for most of its domestic programs. These proposals would, of course, give the agency the domestic police and internal security functions that Congress explicitly denied to the CIA when it set up the agency in 1947. It would ignore the warnings issued then about the dangers of a super secret agency coming to operate at home and infringe on the liberties of American citizens. And it would do so in the face of 200 pages of its own evidence that those fears were well founded. The legislative history of the creation of the CIA is very clear. Congress intended that the agency do nothing in the US but maintain a headquarters and train its personnel. That there was to be only one exception to this rule?the overt collection of informa- tion about foreign activities from willing sources in the US?is made explicit in an exchange between a congressman and Alien Dulles in a House hearing on the bill creating the agency. In light of the evidence presented by the commission, it would be foolhardy to do anything but return to this original understanding. The CIA must be told by the Congress that it may not operate at home. Congress must spell out in explicit detail all of the things that cannot be done. It must then make the violations of this law and failure to report the violations to the Attorney General criminal offenses. The right to sue for civil damages should also be made available to those whose rights are violated by the agency. Nothing short of this will be sufficient to create even the 'possibility that the agency will not in the future succumb to external or internal pressures and resume its massive illegal domestic surveillance' . In the domestic field what must be done is clear. The connni,aiion has givriea all the fai. ',a 51-1,,Aln-2ed to conclude that a secret spy agency cannot be permitted - to operate at home. We can expect a new dis- information campaign to assure os that all is well and that ive need only to adopt the commission proposal, lf the Congress and the public fall for that line they will get the government they deserve. Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-0 29 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-0 Arbeiderbladet, Oslo, 12 June 1975 (Norwegian Labor Party) INVESTIGAIION OF CIA - Paranoia is Greek and is used as an indication of illness characterized by systematic, firmly-anchored delusions. There are a number of variations. One of them is inventor-paranoia. , It was the latter Variety that during the course of the Vietnam decade insinuated itself in the office of the American president. In the Width House in Washington enemies of society were discovered all over the. American society. Active and passive critics of USA's war in Vietnam were shadowed and photographed. Demonstrators' mail was opened, their telephones were tapped. Dissenters were duly recorded in files by the tens of thousands. This began seriously under President Lyndon B. Johnson and was developed further quickly under President Richard Nixon. Nixon was not only convinced - that the Americans who openly declared disagreement with the Vietnam policy, .in reality all those who were a danger to the country's morale (he often' used those words), but also he went a step further: Nixon critics were suspected of belonging to a network centered iniXoscaw. Ultra red and contagious. TheWatergate'hearings disclosed that it was during Nixon's presidency-- at the president's order--that the American intelligence organization CIA systematically began to overstep the statutes Congress had passed for the organization's activities. When CIA was set up in 1947, Congress had established by law that CIA should limit its activities to other lands. The Federal police, FBI, would be responsible for domestic security. In 1970 Richard Nixon had reached the point where he had convinced himself that J. Edgar Hoover, FBI chief, no longer had the necessary fervor and the right drive for hunting down comnunista and foreigh agents. Monday evening the so-called Rockefeller Commission publicized its 300-page report on CIA's activity. For the first time the legal infringe- ments we have cited were officially confirmed. The report also describes other excesses and infringement of internationally-recognized human rights. CIA agents, for example, experimented with the drug LSD on people who were unaware of this. One defector was held in solitary confinement for three years because CIA had suspicions that the man was actually a planted spy. What makes the Rockefeller fommission: report especially. effective is the composition of. the commission. None of the eight members can be described as a dissenter. Vice President Nelson Rockefeller has long been a member of the Foreign intelligence Board;vhich is charged among other things with keeping an overview of CIA but which has never followed up reports of excesses. Five of the members have had in one way or another contact with the intelligence organization. The Commission correctly places emphasis on the fact an effective intelligence organization isof decisive importance for national security and often also a medium to serve in the relaxation of tensions. The Commission has found it to be necessary to recommend that a permanent control mechanism be set up, a control commission under the President's authority and a control committee consisting of members of Congress. , CIA's budget in part ought to be made public, according to the Commission. President Ford has decided to classify the Rockefeller Commissien report on CIA's assassination plans ?against foreign politicians and chiefs of state. . We underttand that this sensitive matter is so delicate that the President sooner or later will be compelled the make public what the Commission has learned. And some hope that the leaderg'in t6Li KrcAtan WILL follow the lead of the American example and set up an investigating commission to find out if the KGB has committed excesses and infringed on human rights1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-WF77-00432R000100370007-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-0' Gransking av CIA Paranoia er gresk, og bru-' -kes som betegnelse pa en' sykdom .som er preget av systematiserte, fast forank- iede vrangforestillingere Den fins i en tekke varianter. En av dem er oppfinner-para- _, :neje. Det var den siste avarten soul i? 'pipet av Vietnam-ti- ret snek seg inn i ameri- : kanske presidentkontorer. I Det ?hvite bus i Washington -ble det oppfunnet sarnfunnS- 'lender overalt i det ameri- kanske samfunn. Aktive?og 'passive kritikere av USAs ? krig i Vietnam ble skygget ? .og fotografert Demonstran- -tenes post ble apnet, deres lelefoner avlyttet. ? Dissenter- ne ble behOrig arkivert til sammen titusener av navn. Det begynte for alvor. un- der president Lyndon B. John. an, og det titviklet seg resift videre ? under president 'Richard . Nixon. Nixon i-ar ?ileke? bare overbevist cm' at de amerikanere som hadde seg uenige i . den 'amerikanskel Vietnam-poli- tikken,... i virkeligheten elle; som en var farlige for same! funnsmoralen (hart brukte; ofte det ordet), men han gikk et skritt videre: tikere-ble mistenkt? for a til-; hplre det'nettverk som hadde' sitt sentrum I Moskva. Ultras'' :'rfacit og smittsOmt. Watergate-hOringene .av- slOrte at det var i NisrOns. .presidenttid pa presiden. tens befaling at den ame- rikanske etterretningsorgani- saojonen CIA systematisk be- gynte a krenke de ? statutter Kongressen hadde vedtatt for ? organisasjonens virksomhet. Da CIA hie opprettet 1 1947, hadde nemlig Kongressen ved lov' fa-stslatt at CIA skulle .begrense' Sin virksomhet til andieslan? Det lelderale p0- litiet, FBI, skulle feresta den indre overvalingen. ? I 1970 var Richard 'Nixon nadd? det' Stadium home han ? klarte overbevise seg om at FBI-sjefen J. Edgar Hoover ikke leriger hadde den neldvendie-e elorl ne (let rette pagangsmot i jakten pa kommunister og fremmede agenter. Mandag kvelcl offentlig- CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 16 June 1975 By James Nelson Goodsell Latin America correspondent of . The Christian Science Monitor It was just before midnight. Moonlight glinted off the waters of the Caribbean. The lone car on the coastal highway, a chauffeur- driven limousine, sped westward toward the Dominican city of San Cristobal. The limousine's two occupants, chauffeur and passenger, at first failed to notice the green Chevrolet that followed them ? and by the time they became aware of the vehicle, it was too late. . The Chevrolet pulled alongside, spraying' ;teei limousine with rifle and carbine bullets, Both cars came to a halt. The chauffeur, ? . ?-gjorde han den sakalte Roc- 'kefeller-kommisjonen sin 300 alder lenge rapport om CIAs - vLrksomhet.. For fOrste gang :Ufr. de lovbrudd vi her har ? nevnt, off isielt ? bekreftet.. Rapporten forteller ogsa om andre overtramp og brudd pa internasjonalt anerkjente menneskerettigheter. CIA-* agenter eksperimenterte for' eksempel med rusgiften LSD, og lot intetanende mennesker bruke, den. En overlOper ble holdt i enecelle i tre an fordi CIA , hadde mi. stanke om at mannen egentlig var en plan-. tet spion. ? Det som gjgir Rockefeller- kommisjonens rapport smrlig virleningsfull, er den sam- mensetning kommisjon-en har hatt. Ingen av ' de Atte medlemmene kan betegnes som dissentere. Visepresi- dent igelson Rockefeller har lenge s-rt medlem av ethe Foreign Intelligence Board* ? som blant annet er palagt overoppsynet med CIA, men som tidligere aldri har fulgt oem meldineer om overtramp. Fern av' de andre medlem- mene har i hvert fall pa ett eller annet stadium hatt riser kontakt Med etterretnings- escaped, but the passenger was killed. The scenario marked the end of the 30-year dictatorship of Gen. Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina. The whole incident, which took place May 30, 1961, was long thought to have been solely the work of Dominican patriots, including Antonio Imbert Barreras, the driver of the Chevrolet, who himself became a general in the years after the assassination of General Trujillo. But this weekend, there is mounting evi- dence? that the United States Central In- telligence Agency (CIA) had a hand in the affair. ? In fact, Washington sources say that the U.S. contributed "significant material sup- port" to the Trujillo assassination. Efforts this weekend to reach General Imbert, the lone survivor of the team of assassins, failed, but other Dominican sources say that "there were lots of CIA agents in Santo Domingo,' in the weeks before the: Trujillo assassination." If all this information proves true, it will be the first specific instance in which there is proof the CIA successfully participated in the, .organisasjonen. Kommisjonen legger m ,rette vekt pa 'at en effekti etterretningsorg anisasj on er ?av r avgjdrende betydrling fo len nasjonale sikkerhet, o ofte ogsa et middel I avspen- ningens tjeneste. Kommisjo- nen har funnet det riktig a anbefale at det na opprefl_. permanente kontrollmeka- nismer, en kontAillkomrni- sj on under presidentens. .mynelighet og et kontiollut- ; valg bestaende av kongreess- medlemmer. CIAs budsje bOr bli delvis offentliggjort, mener konunisjonen. ?President Ford har beslut- i tet A hemmeligholde Rocke- feLler-kommisjonens rapport om CIAs attentatplaner ma titenlandske politikere og regjerings:sjefer. Vi forstar at dette er Omtalelige sake; ja sA delitkate at presidentm fOreeller siden blir ric6dt til A offentliggjOre det kommisjo- pen kan fortelle om dem. Og sa haper vi at Kreml- 1s.oretar t ampriknndr. c e'npel nedseen tindersaelses-1 pa.mang.,...4..."m"?*4",monsaftsmativ,. kommisjon ior a iirme ut om IThairsp ofs TITTITZFIVeiuert assassination of a foreign leader. . Speculation that the CIA had a hand in a number of such assassinations has been growing since the first of the year. Just what the motive was for participating in the Trujillo assassination is not clear, nor is it clear at what level in the administrations of either President Kennedy or President Eisen- hower it might have been ordered. T assassination took place four months after John F. Kennedy became President and only weeks after the unsuccessful Bay of Pip invasion of Cuba, which had been organiz under President Eisenhower although carried out under President Kennedy. The Trujillo assassination sparked a mas- sive roundup of anti-Trujillo Dominicans. Accordir.g to a Dominican government source, one of those picked up, who had been involv in the acutal assassination, said after having been tortured, that the arms used in the incident had been supplied by the CIA. It seems that no CIA agent was direct involved in the Trujillo assassination. But apparently quite a few gave material and perhaps physical help iri'settirp. up the etent. Approved For Release 2001/08/0a3: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-0 BALTIMORE SUN 17 June 1975 Will West's broadcasts to East die? - cis1s-at to .roe Ey GENE OISH1 5s; Sun Staff Corresprndent ' Munith?Radio Free Eu- rope is undergoing a crisis of confidence and morale after a being hit by a budgetary Squeeze and another wave of " layoffs. ? Some see it as the begin- ning of the end for the radio station, which broadcasts dai- ly to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bul- garia to inform the people there about the events in the West as well is developments in their own countries. - While not all see the future so darkly, there is general agreement that the budgetary difficulties .faced by the or- ganization - will reduce the ? effectiveness and quality of aot only its broadcasting but also of its highly regarded re.; search 'operation.. The same could be true for'' Radio Liberty, also based here and which broadcasts in- to the Soviet Union. But the next round of staff reductions of about 150 apparently will - fall most heavily within Radio Free Europe: The mood at Radio Liber- ty, therefore, while not bright, is not quite as pessimistic. ? At Radio ? Free Europe I: some see the present situation as a crisis comparable to the ? early 1970's when both Radio ? 'Free Europe and Radio Liber- ty were cut off from the funds from the Central Intelligence a Agency. At that time, there was op- position in Congress "against continuing the two operations out of regularly budgeted :funds. Senator William Ful- bright (D., Ark.), then chair- man of the Senate Foreign ;Relations Committee, in par- ticular, questioned the'pro- priety of continuing- the two stations during a period of East-West detente. - - ; Since then, both organiza- tions have gained respectabil- ity with the creation of the ?Board for International Broadcasting in Washington to oversee their operations. The ' board is criticized here, however, for not being 'vigorous enough in looking after the interest of ? its charges. Under its steward- ship, the two stations have had to cut their staffs by a third because of insufficient funds. . ? , - ? David Abshire, the chair- man of the board, told con- gressional budget commit- tees, for example,' that be- cause of the devaluation of the dollar and inflation an op- eration that cost $30 million in 1968 would cost more than $80 rnMicn for fiscol Asi V. Nevertheless, the board asked for only $65.6 million ? for fiscal 1976, and only be- cause of one-time needs to. make up for overdue pension fund contributions, renovation of the building and replace- ment of old equipment. For fiscal 1977, he prom- ised to reduce the budget re- quest to $57 million, which is the reason for the reduction in staff which already is begin- ning. Radio Free Europe sources Said the board made the com- mitment without studying the inevitable consequences. One source called it a "verdict of slow death," adding, "in two or three years we will be ex- tinct." One department head said the cutbacks mean the loss of some of his top talent, with no possibility of replacing them. Because of the German labor laws, he said, the cutbacks cannot be made selectively to weed out the least effective personnel. Many of those being laid S create uro e ? .7 off, he said il are the Ounger members of the staff, "our. fresh blood, the people Who represent our future." Others noted that, even if ' funds were available, it is dif- ficult to find qualified persons willing to come to what could become a moribund organiza- tion. The cutbacks, according to Radio Free Europe sources, will mean cuts in programing, which currently ranges from 19 hours a day for Czechoslo- vakia to 8 hours a day for Bul- garia, to an estimated total audience of about 30 million. Perhaps of More general concern is the likelihood of cutbacks in research. Radio a Free Europe subscribes to more than 600 East European newspapers and periodicals, zdcI it! rdri tr.! transcribing radio reports from the various. East-bloc countries Its publications, including special reports based on this information as well as sur- veys of the East-bloc press, are sent out to more than 1,- 100 subscribers, who include universities and other aca- demic institutions, individual scholars, journalists, Western foreign ministries as well as the United States State De- partment. . While the research section at Radio Liberty is not quite I as extensive, it keeps tabs ow more than 500 newspapers and journals, most of them from the Soviet Union, but al- so publications that deal with the problems of the country published in the West. . Both organizations receive a constant stream of scholars and journalists who make use of their archives, which gen- erally are acknowledged to be the best of their kind in the world, ' Radio Liberty, moreover, - has a growing collection of the so-called samizdat docu- ments?underground publica- ? tions of Soviet dissident groups?which Albert Boiter, its chief of research, says is more complete than what the KGB, the Soviet secret police, has. While both organizations Are products of the cold war, advocates insist that the oper- ations are even more essential - during a period of detente. The two stations, for ex- ample, intend to broadcast de- tails of the declarations on freer human contacts to which the Soviet bloc will agree at the European Securi- ty Conference but is not likely to publicize. Others say that the two ta4,1.4.1V?AAN ?0?11C au,4-? 111? creased because the Voice of America, a State Department operation, has softened ? its broadcasts and reduced its commentaries in the interest of detente. ? It is also noted that the Voice, the BBC and other Western broadcasts heard in the East report mainly on events around the world and do not deal as much as Radio Free Europe and Radio Liber- ty with internal developments of the countries to which they broadcast. Alexander I. Solzhenitsyn, the Russian novelist expelled from the Soviet Union, for ex- ample, said after his exile that his main source of infor- mation on what was happen- ing in his country was Radio Liberty. One broadcaster noted that Moscow was increasing its foreign language propaganda broadcasts and to cut back on U.S. broadcasts to the East would be a "one-sided conces- sion to the Soviet Union." Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : ClAsIFP77-00432R000100370007-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-0' BALTIMORE SUN 15 June 1975 es t really 41 f ?:By DEAN MILLS ? ' Washington. ; The United States has long regarded C the United Nations as an unpromising child, but one which?thank God?at least had the admirable habit of obedi- ence. Now that even that virtue has dis- solved in a fiery show of independence, What's a parent to do? Spank, prescribes Daniel Patrick' , Moynihan, who has been picked to be the . next U.S. ambassador to the U.N. be- cause his ideas on the organization ap- peal to President Ford. In a well-publi- cized article in the March issue of Corn- montrim and a 02in in rarant tactirrinny before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Mr. Moynihan laid out his formula for whipping the U.N. back into ? ? shape. ? The problem, as Mr. Moynihan sees it, lies largely in the Fabian socialism which many Third-World U.N. members absorbed, while still colonies, from a dying British Empire. The solution, he argued, is to. prove the advantages of American (or Japenese) capitalism over these unhealthy socialist transplants, V and to expose the hypocrisies of Third- World officials who see political injus: tice everywhere but at home or .in the Soviet Union. In his testimony Mr. Moynihan also endorsed the suggestion of Arthur Gold- berg, a former U.N. ambassador, that S. the United States withdraw from the or- e gahization if Israel is expelled. ? Mr. Moynihan's get-tough attitude seems to be in tune with public, as well . as presidential sentiments. Mail to the - U.S. Mission to the U.N. and public opin- ion polls show disillusionment and anger with the behavior of a General Assembly . dominated by the Third-World bloc. ? But there is another view. It holds that the United Nations, despite faults, has accomplished immeasurable?and generally unremarked?good , for the world; and that American delegations; far from being too passive in the defense of U.S. interests, have been too stubborn in demanding their way. And although ' the United Nations seems to have be- come a populai? target among liberals as well as conservatives, it was this view which predominated among Mr. Moyni- han's less publicized isUnsNePor Former Senator Wilrfam u rign , 1 , serv exchanging weather information, for al- locating radio frenuencies. Bad as our -situation now is, it would have been im- measurably worse?quite .possibly be- ? :..yond repair." . ? ? ? : .? ? , And even most critics of the. U.N. would not dispute its usefulness as a sup-. plier of policemen and observers in crime es?from the first' Middle East war:inee 1948 to the most recent Middle EtaStn. War.. Mr. Gardner divides the U.M.'e funtese, tions into two systems, the rhetorieaL; and the active. The latter does mostenfe the work and the former?the debatezeof ? the General Assembly and other vorgOtir' --:-gets all the attention. e ? _I I 11,1 It was three General Assembly vcifee--7 in the last session that crystalized the growing American anger with the: "tyranny of the majority." The: Assem- bly expelled South Africa, accorded ser Arafat, the Palestinian leader, thee' honors of a head of state, and adoptet the "Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States." ..:aLsee The Ford administration's critic:3.4;4; not, on the whole, blame the administek tion ?or the American public?for being- ' angry over these actions. Indeed, eneleya of them share the annoyance. But moat , of them differ radically from the .admineit,tien diagneisin: the hind those unpleasant symptoms antilite prescribing a treatment that might help.6 , The General Assembly, they argue, Was', only registering, not generating, thee anger felt in the Third World toward dig ? United States. Any treatment milk' ? therefore deal with the reasons .for-tha--; anger, not with the General Assembly; Mr. Gardner agrees that the assets:1-e; bly's double standard on the Middle Eist. and on economic and human rights tions "is often deplorable" But, he said in his testimony, "It is an unhappy fa that United States leadership has been' badly damaged by Vietnam, Watergate,, economic mismanagement and neglect of Third-World interests. So if that UeVII, reflection is ugly, it's not the: mirrom ee? that's to blame." As treatment, these administration , ? critics propose co-option and co-opera-- tion rather than confrontation. The ling ed States would, for example, conce,- . that Third-World producers of raw ma- terials have gotten bad deals in the past, ?.. and it would work to set up a .system to: protect both consumers and producers from wild price fluctuations. It would., work to ensure that Multinational cor- porations do not exploit weak govern- ? rnents. It would work to draw develop- ing countries into wider participation in , the financial agencies that affect them: so critically. Above all, the critics would have the united States make a bigger effort to" get the United Nations to work: to beef up its detegations?quantitatively ana4 qualitatively; to make the U.N.-a central" part of its diplomacy, rather than a for-- - a former chairman of the Foreign Rela; tions. Committee, said the United States, accustomed to getting its way in the early years of the U.N., has turned into a poor loser. "It seems to me that the great-power role has gone to our head . and 'we have not learned to take the brickbats and setbacks philosophically _ and the tail-tweaking with good humor. ? When opposed, we pick up our marbles and go off to play by ourselves, making , the situation only worse." . The witnesses for the defense in the U.N. hearings had little trouble making a case for the organization's utility in the nuts-and-bolts business of running a planet. Indeed, even most of the U.N.'s severest Critics concede that if it were abolished overnight, something would have to be invented to take the place of the two dozen specialized agencies it op- erates To the extent that some aeencies touch on areas with political as well as practical content?the International Atomic Energy Agency, for example --their effectiveness may be diluted by national jealousies. But in less ideologie cal areas, the international bureaucracy can have decisive clout. U.N. agencies have all but 'wiped out smallpox, have made English the universal language of international traffic, and have made na- tional stamps valid for the international mails. . ? The various international financial, economic, and trade agencies that oper- ate:under the U.N. or in close co-opera- tion with it have been essential in pro- viding the ground rules for international barter and the funding for economic de- velopment in poorer countries. While the General Assembly and the Security Council dominate the decreasing amount of news space devoted to the U.N. these ,days, it is these agencies of economic co- operation that do the most work. They use 90 per cent of the U.N. system's an- ual budget of ;1.5 billion. . . Richard N. Gardner, a former deputy assistant secretary of state who is now the U.S. member and the rapporteur of a committee appointed by the Secretary General to propose changes in the U.N.'s system of economic agencies, told the Foreign Relations Committee: "It is a useful 'exercise to ask where ? we would be today had we had no United Nations economie system-no institu- tions for trade and monetary co-opera- tion, for economic development aid, for agriculture, population and environ- ment, for the establishn olAy 1121Avi opsehrited.ake'its' ReigtagapippmgAg4e.e g Es 7.004 grace u y w en it oses. ? I 4 ? 33 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-0 ,THE NEW YORK?TIMES, MONDAY, JUNE 2, 1975- -Detente Is Said to Give the KG.B. By DAVID BINDER Special tome Nevi 'York Times ' ? WASHINGTON, June 1?The K.G.B., the Soviet Union's se- - curity and intelligence organi- zation, has. taken on some new foreign assignments and a big- ger' work load at home as a -result of East-West detente, -Western espionage specialists say. , While detente has increased the ability of the K.G.B.?the - initials stand for the Russian words for Committee of State Security?to infiltrate Western countries, it has also given it more work at home keeping surveillance over the larger number of foreigners moving around the Soviet Union. For the United States, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation are similarly oc- cupied. ' The Soviet Union, the espion- ?age specialists said, has 1.083 'nationals working in the United country, and supervision of the ligence role, they tend to be States as diplomats and trade 175,000 border guards assigned maVericks, according to a representatives, whereas 10 to protect the frontiers. No tWestern expert. /They have . 'years ago, there were 4561 Western intelligence agency-is ? ? ..... more defectors than we do," Soviet citizens in such roles, known to have such pervasive he added. .: It .k in the Ls:reign field where mlre".ends of oeviet an', rest, eeeecre. . , inee are also reared at. vs e. ,... ? ? European trade representatives i Outside the Soviet IJnion, Ithroughout the Soviet Union, in the past, despite the large somewhat less effective than are visiting the United: States,! the K.G.B. _operates much as although not as much as during and the number of East Eu- do other espionage' organiza- the rule of Stalin. But ordinary ropean student visitors and tions, although it has greater, Soviet people would no more - East European seamen here is, manpower. and more sophisti- ;think of talking critically in Up. , 1 cated technology than most, public about the K.G.B. than Counterintelligence officials Of its estimated total of 420,-, they would' of disrobing in assume that 40 per cent of 000 employes, the K.G.B. has, front- of Lenin's mausoleum. the Soviet diplomats in the about 10,000 officers assigned! . One reason for continued fear United States are full-time in- to foreign operations, of whom of the K.G.B. is its large and telligence officers. It is as- 2,500 are abroad. Between 50,- still active "wanted list" of sumed that this may rise as 000 and 80,000 officers are Soviet political enemies. A 460- high as 75 per cent in other assigned to internal security page document contains ab- countries. - - work, Western specialists be- streets on 1,132 Soviet citizens, 'Broadening of the Base' lieve. is stamped "sovershenno sek- By contrast, the Central In- retno." cir "top secret." - , "It means a broadening of telligence Agency, which focu- . Nureyev on the List 4he base," a counterintelligence ses on foreign activities, has *official here remarked. It makes the totality of the United States a target. Their opera- tions are alwayS damned good and their technology is first- of whom 8,600 are listed as family particulars, the dossier in Middle East posts. rate?very good trade-craft." ? Mr. Sakharov told the C.I.A. special agents. entry says: ? . But there is no comparison In the judgement of K.G.B.'s "While on tour in France officers who dealt with him between the situation of the Western counterparts; its on June 16, 1961, he betrayed that once, when he had written Committee of State Security _ an objective analysis of the officers are much more securi- his country. In 1962, the Lenin- an political scene that did not correspond in all details with the official Soviet view, 15 K.G.G. officers who have de-' Another entry lists Nina V. thilysuopuerhiaovreeeambarriklleida brilliant career. fected to the West in the last' Paranyuk, a ship stewardess i 20 years the following picture who fled at Melbourne, Austra- Take that back and write it a igger Work Load! defector" appeared in February; agency in foreign work. cow. There must be receipts , "They provide the cement at each end. This creates a that holds the whole thing virtually unbreakable security together," an analyst re- system. marked of 'the K.G.B. With a K.G.B. , ,personnel ? at home dence doesn't exist," he said. degree of professional admira- tend to ?keep to themselves. i This is explained in part by Among the uses that Leonid, tion, he added: "If I had their, Western specialists as a result I. Brezhnev the party chief, system, then it is the. only has for the K.G.B. is its daily way I would do it?to have of the hierarchical system of the summary of "vital events" in a K.G.B. I see it as part of K.G.B. Officers have military-; technology, science, economics, the main show, an integral and style rank? from lieutenant defense and political affairs. well-integrated part of Soviet to general?but are paid five, !Once a. week, the K.G.B. secrer society. They are not a freak to six times more than the Once also provides the leader- show." , Iship with: a "broader view" 3 Instruments of Power lof domestic and international In. 'the Soviet Union the affairs. , K.G.B. has three main in- The K.G.B. has an elabor- struments of power, as far as ate apparatus for dealing with the Western analysts can deter- civilian dissidents, the so-called mine. Fifth Chief Directorate, with the Communist 'party's Polit- subsections assigned to Jews, the Communist party is politba- young people, intellectuals and ro by the K.G.B. chairman, Yuri religious figures. V. Andropov; control. of all Intimidation of the political Effectiveness Abroad Declines essential communications net- works and code used in the dissidents over the last four years has , largely eliminated the problem for the time being, in the view of Western speci- alists. . . 1974, was a captain of military counterintelligence assigned to the Sixth Armored Guards Divi- sion in East Germany, "Dissi- (equivalent rank in the armed forces. But the rank system, a spe- :cialist said, creates "a lot of lincest and infighting?back- stabbing because of rank." I The K.G.B. is also "extremely compartmentalized," he added, ,even in comparison with West- ern intelligence organizations. Although K.G.B. officers per- meate Soviet society, including the armed forces, in which they play the sole counterintel- number of agents it has in the field and the high' quality of many of them. "The great successes of the K.G.B. were in the nineteen- thirties and nineteen-forties, when they had ideological re- cruits," a Western analyst comemnted. -"Now revolution- ary ?n is dead and Soviet life is marked ? by increased bureaucracy." This, too, is seen as a reason for the relatively high number of K.G.B. defectors. Man example, Western spe- about 16,000 employes, of: It ' lists such seeming in cialists quote Vladimir N. Sak- whom'4,000 work abroad. The nocents as Rudolf Nureyev, the harov, a.K.G.B. agent who de- F.B.I., dealing with internal se- dancer,' who defected to the fected to the West in 1971 curity, has 19,500 employes, West in 1961.?After noting his after having served four years and that o e en ty- conscious than Western grad City Court sentenced him ligence Agency in terms of the agencies. . to seven year's deprivation of United States agency's ordeal As gleaned from some of the, freedom. He lives in London." of Congressional and executive investigations, according to an informed Administration offi- cial. ? emerged. ha, in 1956. Tne entry says so that ties can undeestand The K.G.B.,. he said, has "no less forces and no less budget." Only One Notebook . that she was "sentance-d to it at home." . I "I don't want to paint it 12 death T ')R los7 The Soviet intelligence offi- " u ---?." in the powerful Western in- feet high," he added, "but it cers keep almost no files in is still alive and well and plays the field. They destroy ,copies a very major role." of telegrams received at the "The K.G.B. is praised, not "residence?a legal cover sta- attacked in Moscow," he said. Around Washington these days, such statements are not made about the C.I.A. Broadly, the K.G.B. combines the domestic work of the F.B.I. and the foreign intelligence- gathering of the C.I.A. It is the secret police in the Soviet Union and .the hiligrence Austria; countries?chiefly the Security System Effective . lUnited States and Vest Ger. In the prevailing Western Imany-e-K.G.B. officers are also view, the K.G.B. has proved lunder instruction to 'wield highly effective in maintaining ("political influence" wherever tson such as an embassy?with- security in the Soviet Union-- they can. in 24 hours. . to the degiee, as a specialist '. A correspondent Of The New Only the "rezident" (chief said, that Western intelligence York Times in - Bonn . ronorts or a statjon) may keep a Str-'2li agencies ha.. e 'never perietrat- that the'agents woek uneer the notebook. The sheets are ed the Politburo" and have guise of diplomats, trade offi- cials or journalists to cultivate private relationships with poli- ticians and businessmen?the numbered and the notes are only "gotten closc to the Cen- handwritten: When he is send- .tral Committee" of the Commu- ing a report it is photographed nist patty and the film it placed in a It has also kept dissidence purpose being, to "convey Soi- boobvtrapped casktte.1 p gy dfairpReiliiias904MVI a .V#-Wgrolit3gRiptctr03700307- d warnings" on . st ece ? critical issues. . ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-0' _ .? . Posed as 'a Journalist ? . An official of the Krupp con- 'tern, which has millions of dollars in trade with the Soviet Union, spoke of one such intel- ligence officer posing as a jour- nalist: "I like- to talk to him because he makes no secret at all of whom he really works for. You know that anything you tell him goes straight to the ? Lubyenka [K.G.B. head- quarters]. - -, It is telling, perhaps, that few of the. K.G.B. men who have come over to the West manage to make headway - in the new lives arranged for them, despite their abilities as espionage agents. , . "We set them up in business and' they go bankrupt," a West- tern anaiyst remarked. "Most Iof them can't handle being alone 'and on their own." 1! In K.G.B. usage', the United !States remains the "main ad- yersary"?as it has been -since the collapse of Nazi Germany. This is 'reflected in such sta- tistics as 800 attempts to re- cruit American citizens for espionage purposes over the last 10 years?most of them outside the United States. It is also evident in the tremen- dous amount !of attention paid by 'the K.G.B. to acquisition of military, industrial and scien- tific secrets, the analysts said. , , ' 'The K.G.B. formed a scientif-' ic-technical directorate in 1962 and recruited science and en- gineering graduates to staff it. It employs 500 to e;OU ofticers abroad, many of them in the, United States. . 4i, Concerning the more James1 NEW YORK TIMES 8 June 1975 Many of Soviet Emigrants Reported Asking to Return MOSCOW, June 7 (Reuters) ?The Communist party news- paper Pravda says that the Soviet Embassy in Washington has received "hundreds of ap- plications" from recent ,emi- grants who want to return to the Soviet Union. The report was in an article yesterday by Ytiliyan Sem- yonov, who has been touring the United States as a special correspondent for Pravda. "There are hundreds of ap- plications lying in our consu- late, and many of them are tragic," he wrote. - Mr. Semyonov quoted from one of the letters: "I came here with my two children, and I know there can be no forgiveness for me. But I beg you to allow my children, who have not yet come of age, to return to the motherland." The Soviet Union normally ,refuses to allow the permanent return of emigrants, who usual- ly have to renounce their citizenship to gain an exit visa. ,Bondish asPeeti?of eapionagel work, the Soviet secret service has been credited with perfect- :inggenious coding systems, tiny lass assination weapons and un- !telling devices to promote co- vert operations. But Western specialists believe the KBG is still basically agent-oriented and remains far behind ,the C.I.A. in technology. There is no evidence that it has displayed any of the scien- tific daring, technical know how or financial risk compara- ble to the successful C.I.A. ef- fort-to recover part of a sunken Soviet submarine last summer in the Pacific northwest of Ha- waii. That venture, involving a salvage vessel specially built by Howard Hughes enterprises, is said to have cost more than $350-million. Nor is there anything in the ambitious Soviet submarine-de- velopment program comparable to- the electronic surveillance missions of United States Navy submarines, which are said to have tapped Soviet coastal com- munications cables, monitoring on;shcre missile firings !and! identified individual Soviet sub-: marines by their sound pat- terns. As ,for covert operations abroad, the K.G.B. maintains a strong capability, in the estimate of Western analysts. Aimeng the most recent K.G.B. involvements in insur- gencies weie in Portugal's African territories in Cambo- dia and Laos and in the Dhofar region of Oman. Po- tential guerrilas are recruited by the .K.G.B. and then' passed on to the G.R.U.?the Soviet military intelligence service? for training. The K.G.B. maintains a very large operation in Thailand, a New York Times correspondent reports, presumably to control operations throughout Indo- china., - ?? ' Must Wait on the Porch Visitors to the Soviet Embas- sy, where the K.G.B. has ,its offices, are asked to wait , on the front porch and staff mem- bers come out to meet them. Western intelligence operatives assume the 15-member Soviet trade delegation in Bangkok consists primarily of K.G.B. of- ficers since Thai-Soviet trade amounted to $6-million last year. The rent and services for the trade delegation are estimated at $500,000 annually. Since 1958, the Thai Govern- ment has expelled nine Soviet officials after they had been identified by Western intel- ligence agencies as K.G.B. offi- cers. Western analysts believe the K.G.B. has abandoned its prac- tice of, "wet affairs"?the So- viet euphemism for covert ac- tions like assassinations. ' According to Oleg A. Lyalin, a"wet\affairs" specialist who defected in Britain in 1971 causing the expulsion of 105 Soviet spies, the K.G.B. halted its political assassination! pro- gram in 1959. But Mr. Lyalin said that the K.G.B. retained !plans for assination and cab I !otage of vital installations in the event of a war threat. 1 In the opinion of Western 'specialists, the K.G.B. has re-i ceived orders from Mr. Brezh- nev not to undertake any operations that would com- promise or undermine his poll- ee/ ? of relaging tensions with the. United States and other Western countries. Close to '10,000 Soviet and Eastern European trade repre- sentatives visited the U.S. last year, as against 1,249 in 1964. There are 45 Soviet students here, and 50 other scholars are engaged on research projects. The number-of Soviet-bloc sea- men arriving in American ports has risen from 1.300 to 13,000 since 1964. An area in which the K.G.B. continues to excel, especially in less developed countries, in- volves "disinformation," the practice of misleading people with forged documents and the planting of distorted informa- tion in the press. ? ! For a dozen years, it is said, Ithe K.G.B has financed a political' weekly in India called 'Blitz, which disseminates, propaganda damiging to the United States. Another fairly recent change in K.G.B. priorities nbted here is increased emphasis on China- watching. It formed a special China department about 1970. The K.G.B. has a network of ."old China hands," and is sending young recruits to An- Yang University in Singapine to iearn Chitee,i-, but it, is evidently weak on reliable In- telligence about China, the ana- lysts said. " ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : RA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-0 TE O-CRISTtAN SCENCE MONITOR Monday, June 16, 1975 . Over the years the Communist Party has made littie headway with British voters. But today Communists hold key posts in zonio of the country's most .117erful trade unions, a cause for growing c ncern in an economy where the uni*ns call the tune. rinufri Abe Staff correspondent of ? The Christian Science Monitor London Just a carrot's throw from the boarded-up remains of 'Covent Garden's former fruit and vegetable market stands a grimy office building, fronted with thick t. frosted glass and crumbling stone and marked with a barely visible, small brass plate. Inside, light bulbs hang unshaded from their wires. The walls of the . waiting room are bare and dingy. It is the headquarters of the British Communist Party. * Despite the seedy anonymity of their King Street ;? offices, Britiain's Communists are today the focus of an unaccustomed glare of public comment and concern. Columns about their activities, known and guessed at, appear frequently in the national dailies. Politicians of various persuasions speak out against the Communist threat. And ordinary Britons tend to answer questions s about Communist influence with faintly embarrassed phrases such as, "I've never been a 'Reds under the beds' person myself, but. . . ." ? The reason does not lie in any sudden electoral success. The Communists' parliamentary performance 'remains as dismal as their headquarters. ? Rather, the reason lies in the current power struggle between Parliament (regardless of which party is in r power) and militant trade-union leaders. . Ills widely accepted here that some union leaders are using vast wage demands and inflation as, blunt instruments to push a, virtual economic revolution past a feebly protesting Parliament. And since Communist power, overt and covert, i3 concentrated in the unions, . there are fears here that: 1. The Communists are actively fomenting industrial strife andee,' nion-Pai-liamert cenflict los their own ends. . 2. Their allies have infiltrated the Labour Party's parliamentary ranks to weaken that party's tradition- ally strong democratic ideals and to undermine its leaders' ability to resist union demands. 3' The C"Pgii9M4adikk514tVloirestfiriffelds if they could, use the present turmoil as a stepping- * stone to something nearer real, preferably irreversible- political revolution. 'A faithful Moscow satellite' All this sounds far out in a country so solidly democratic, so skeptical of wordy ideelogies, so firmly attached to that curiously British mixture of common sense and self-deprecating humor. What are the facts? . The British Communist Party, with a membership of about 29,000, ranks as one of Moscow's faithful ' satellites. But there is no solid evidence that Commu- nist officials in British unions respond to strings pulled from Moscow. On the visible parliamentary level the Communist Party is a complete failure. The party has no seats in the House of Commons', nor has it even come near ? winning any over the past couple of decades. ? Out of a total vote in last October's general election of just over 29 million, the Communists managed to gather - in a paltry 17,426 votes. ' On the less-visible parliamentary level, however, a rather different picture emerges. Some of the Labour , Party's "social democrats," who comprise the bulk of the party and almost all the present Cabinet, appear as ? anxious as their Conservative colleagues about the motives and loyalties of some extreme left-wingers in Labour's ranks. ? How much influence? ? ? Lord Chalfont, a former Labour minister who is now an independent peer, put the point discreetly to the ? House of Lords earlier this year: `!. . in what I have to say I shall suggest that the governing [Labour] Party provides, in one way or another, shelter for a number of people who are almost certainly committed to undermining the existing political system in Britain." How much such back-benchers can influence Labour Party and government policy is an open question. Assessments vary greatly according to the political viewpoint of the speaker. But with Prime Minister Harold Wilson holding only a very narrow majority in .. the Commons, the votes of the extreme leftists in his own party can on occasion be of immenseimPortance to him. On the trade-union level, the Communists have a . much more obvious foothold. Indeed they have clearly put most of their intellectual and ideological eggs into this basket, under the watchful eye of their tireless industrial expert Bert Ramelson. : C - RE41.07-43 abIR.G13464 OiNtitigt7 1 percent of 36 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-0 ' Britain's trade unionists are Communist Party mem- bers, the party has managed to get itself into a position of influence out of all proportion to its numbers. ' More than 10 percent of union executives now are card-carrying members of the Communist Party. Many other union officials are active sympathizers or follow the Communist Party line. In total, some industrial- relations specialists reckon, from 30 to 40 percent of , union officials are probably Marxist in their outlook. - In addition, the Communist Party succeeded last September in getting one of its members (Ken Gill) on to the general council of the Trade Union Congress (TUC), the central body of British unionism. Methods, worker apathy blamed The outdated operating methods of British trade unions, and widespread worker apathy, are most usually blamed for this formidable Communist-cum- leftist foothold in the union movement. Postal ballots, for instance, are few and far between. 'Hence, a well-organized, vigorous minority is often able to get its candidates into office because of minuscule turnout (sometimes as low as 5 percent or less) or occasionally by straightforward manipulation of the ballot. Of course, it is perfectly legal for anyone to run for union office. The current spate of concern arises over how elected officials may use or abuse their influence. According to one leading trade unionist, the Commu- nists "never cease working in their cells, magnifying every grievance into _major proportions, and struggling to get into positions of influence." In the words of Lord Shawcross, a former attorney general in Clement Attlee's postwar Labour govern- ment, "There are forces now actively and openly at work whose object it is to bring our existing society and : estahliahment tn rent I apse" (May is sneer+ tn the Wirlpr Share Ownership Council in London). Similarly, as Lord Chalfont pointed out in his speech to his fellow peers, the Communists use all the leverage they can muster to sway the Labour Party. According to Lord Chalfont, Mr. Ramelson claimed last year that "the Communist Party can float an idea early in the ? year, and it can become official Labour Party policy by the autumn. . . . We have More influence now on the .Labour' movement than at any time in the life of our ? party." ' - Anti-Communists rallied The Communists have burrowed their way into the union movement in classic fashion ? via the formation --of small, highly active, cells. The second most powerful union in Britain, the Amalgamated Union of Engineer- . ing Workers (AUEW), provides a vivid example of the party's mode of operation and its results. , The AUEW is a prime Communist target Its 11/4 WASHINGTON POST 15 June 1975 1 Radio hey Cha E 01 ?? By Richard M. Weintraub Washingtor Post Staff Writer , Free Europe has gi- meat, Capt. Tomaz Rosa, said million members include only about 2,500 registered Communists. Yet of the 52 men on the AUEW's National Committee, 16 are card-carrying members of the Communist Party, according to Lord Chalfont. About half the National Committee are either party members or sympathizers. Until five years ago the mighty AUEW appeared to be slipping inexorably toward total Communist control. With union election turnouts sometimes as low as 21/2 percent, the Communists were able to tuck their men or tacit supporters into more and more union offices. "A majority of such a small percentage are always Communists with chips on their shoulde:'s," explained John Boyd, the union's newly elected and fervent anti-_. Communist general secretary, in an interview. 1 Hence, in 1969 Mr. Boyd rallied the anti-Communists and managed by one vote on the National Committee (meeting as a rules committee) to switch the union to a' postal ballot. The result was a dramatic increase in participation, often rising well above 30 percent, and the defeat of many Communist candidates. However, the Communist's counterattacked last month. The National Committee (meeting again as a rules committee as it does every five years) narrowly. voted to retain the postal ballot. But, taking advantage of a mixup in committee members' credentials, the leftists managed to reduce this majority to a tie. Union president Hugh Scanlon (a former Communist Party member) later used his vote on the seven-member National Executive to throw the postal ballot out. ? Such tactics, repeated throughout the union move- ment, give the Communists and fellow travelers ' national scope. "There are very few unions in Britain which don't have a Co-nmunist cell," says Mr. Boyd. "Fundamentally the Communists look upon their aim nrd aject life as being to undermine what they , consider is the capitalist society." Under normal conditions Britain's mixed economy - and open society muddle along sufficiently well to make the Communists' real national impact of little impor- tance. But today's conditions are far from normal. Weak governments and successive economic crises have undermined the authority of Parliament. Militant trade-union leaders have taken advantage of the situation, defying attempts at wage control and even flouting laws enacted by Parliament. If is a moot point how much the Communists are responsible for today's highly charged climate of anxiety and confrontation. What is certain is that it is an ideal atmosphere for them to exploit. Their motives and methods, along with those of the rest of the extreme left, have therefore become the focus of far greater than usual concern. This is especially so since - grave economic and political challenges still lie-ahead. - 'Ven no guarantee to Portugal in an interview with:, Wash- 'about limitations on its broad- ington Post Correspondent casts and has made no chances Patirok Chanipman that ..RPF in its programing as a result had given "assurances" that -of discussions with the Por- it would broadcast nothing to ftugtiese, RIPE officials said. harm "the Portuguese revolu- .... A member of the Porte- tion" or "the politics and di. Suese 'Armed For p?iiVe'd;IfttftilzIkItifage$213011106/1091, 37 ?1co-untries." Rosa .said he had- noted "small, changes" in RFE programing. With over 80 per cent of ;As programs transmitted from its facilities in Portugal, RFE- '.officials have been highly con- cerned over 'what orie of them has called a "live-or-die" sit- uation. While contingency plans are ,heing drawn up in case the contra(t for the facilities is 'not renewed or is abruptly canceled, officials in Wash- . 4ligion admit thai it would be :difficult if not impossible to :replace the Portuguese facil-1 which could harm the move-I 2nent in Portugal," Ralph Wal-; ;tor, head of RFE's ? Munichi :operations, said in a telephone interview. "I have described to Capt. Rosa our policy about broad- casting on Portugal, which is ;a reportorial policy," Walter Walter, who has handled. ?most of the contacts with they 'Portuguese, said that the Por- tuguese are sent summaries of ;TiFE's daily broadcasts . -that tapes. of all broadcasts', :7are available to Lisbon author- ities as they are to German., ?iues. "The Portuguese have been ;concerned 72446tAgagti Q1101430137: lgovernment officials. He. ',added that there had been no AMA:Vs-gy the Portuguese for Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-0 tat The Board for International Broadcasting, which was cre- ated to take over responsibil- ity for both Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty after Cen- tral Intelligence Agency ties were severed in 1971, has re- quested funds from Congress to update transmitter facilities ?in Germany. elladio Free Europe broad- t: ? easts to Poland. Hungary, r Czechoslovakia, Romania and Bulgaria. Radio Liberty governments. William P. Durkee, retiring president of Radio Free Eu- rope Inc., said in a telephone broadcasts to the Soviet interview from New York that Capt. Rosa had been fully briefed about the nature of RFE programming both in New York and in Munich and that he believed that the "as- surances" about which Rosa spoke stemmed from his bet- der understanding about RFE broadcasts. Union. Total budget requests for the two radios this year amount to over $65 million, a large portion of which is ;for pensions and related items !stemming from staff cutbacks. The radios often have been I sharply criticized by the So- viets and Eastern European WALL STREET JOURNAL , I 3 Juno 1975 Portugal. By ARTHUR ScHausINcan an. . The hints and whispers and mumbles from Washington are that Portugal is about to go Communist. that it will consti- tute a fifth column within NATO, that it will give the P.ussians an opening to the Atlantic; and oh if the CIA were only alive and well in .Lisbon. ? ? Poltugal going Communist is not a happy prospect. It is also a considerable exaggeration. The Immediate prospect, if - the democratic forces' fail to sustain them- ? selves, is not a Communist takeover. It is rather the establishment of a military re- gime, Nasscrite in its model and 'neutralist in its foreign policy, using the Portuguese . Communist Party for counsel and support. I Such a regime might well deny military ? bases to the United States, but. there Is no ? reesen io suppose that, any more than Egypt or Peru, it would turn overnight into a Soviet satellite. ' Moreover, if such a regime comes to power, it would be against the wishes of the Portuguese people as expressed in the ; recent election?and this is why the pessi- mism spilling out of Washington is so de- pressing. President Ford and Secretary Kissinger appear to have given up the bat- . tie for Portugal; the Portuguese people have not. In the election, the Socialists ? took 38% of the vote, the Popular Demo- : crats, a center party, 26% and the Commu- !.nists a wretched 12.5%. But, where the Communists are giving the dominant !Armed Forces Movement unconditional support, the Socialists, under the leader- , ? ship of Mario Soares, have irritated the military by their demands for democratic liberties. So, when Communist printers shut doWn the respected Socialist newspa- per Republica, the military, despite mass ? Socialist protests, decided to go along with ? the Communists. The question now is what the Western democracies can do to help the Socialists In their struggle to keep Portugal in the democratic world. On this question there are two divergent approaches: the Ameri- can strategy and the Western European strategy. ? ? ? Our strategy derives from the fact that we (Le., our masters lit Washington) really preferred the old regime in Portugal?the .rightwing dictatorships of Selazar and Caetano. We found it convenient to deal with them, and we supposed that Portu- guese authoritarianism had: unlimited life expectancy. Our policies both toward Por- -tugucse *Africa lint; Portugeil itself were based on this supposition. Our intelligence Was gravely mistaken. The Portuguese army was a good deal less sanguine than .we were about the Portuguese capacity to hold on to its African colonies, and Portu- guese generals eventuA S elf Fu1f him 13phivtild PopiRel tion against the regime we had so stoutly ' supported. Taken by SurInise? When the revolution occurred, we were evidently taken by surprise. The Common Market countries of Western Europe promptly welcomed the emergence of "a democratic Portugal." The United States maintained a sullen silence for three weeks until our ambassador was finally in- structed to. deliver a god-will alma-age to the new government. That was a year ago; and since then we have been acting as if we thought a Communist Portugal to be in- evitable. Our first ambassador after the revolu- tion, Stuart Nash Scott, was quickly re- cailed because he rejected State Depart- ment defeatism and wanted to work with democratic elements in the new. regime. His successor, Frank Carlucci, has report- edly had difficulties because he also sees possibilities for positive action. But the Secretary of State has taken a sour line al- most from the start, expressing a concern for democratic processes in Portugal that he had ably concealed during the Salazar- Caetano years. In April he told a group of West European journalists, according to The New York Times, that "he believes that by next year Portugal will be a Com- munist nation or a neutralist nation under heavy Communist influence." On May 23 President Ford himself threatened the Portuguese governmeet (in a statement that lir. Rissing,er felt obliged to qua/ay the next day) with excommunication from NATO if it does not shape up and ship out Its Communists. The argument for this, I imagine, is that lectures from such exalted personages will shock the Portuguese military into good behavior. This notion displays our usual gross misunderstanding of the psy- chology of small revolutionary states. Lit- tle is better designed to strengthen the Board of Contributors The Ford administration seems determined to con-- sign Portugal to Commu- nism and thereby assure the fulfillment of its own proph- ecy, Alan Hovey, RPE vice president, said that "the only guarantee we give to any- body is that we will continue to adhere to the internal policy 'guidelines which re- quire us to report the news of that area [Eastern Europe] and the rest of the world objectively, comprehensively and accurately." Hovey, Durkee and Walter all said that there had been no change in RFE program- ming. Prophecy? II" and calls for appropriate action. One hopes that the Ford administration, after proving to the world that the United States is stronger militarily than Cambodia, will not be rendered dizzy with- success and I send the Marines on to Portugal. The Western European strategy is very I different. It deserves a hearing if only be- cause it is Western Europe after all that would be most immediately threatened by ' untoward developments in Portugal. The ; delusion that Washiagton, thousands of miles away, knows better than the people L's the. neighhorhood got us into enough teuble in Vietnam. There seems no great need to carry it forward into Portugal. . The Western European view is that the struggle for Portugal is far from over. Many West Europeans see the events in Lisaasn ;as a zalutary remindsr ea! the- ?:.,,;., of detente. The fact that, for diverse good reasons, the United States and the Soviet Union have a stake in avoiding nuclear war does not mean that communism has. become a benign and ? ennobling, faith. In- deed, the big losers in the short run have been the Communist parties of Italy and France. These parties have recently pres- ented themselves as national and parlia- mentary parties which, if trusted with porker, would devoutly respect the rules of the democratic game. Such claims look a little tattered note. The ambition of the Italian Communists to join the government has been very considerably set back; and, while the French Socialist leader Francois Mitterand will certainly continue the So- cialist-Communist electoral coalition, this Is only because he feels, perhaps rightly, that he is wilier than his Communist allies and will use them more than they can use Within Portugal the West Europeans re- ject the American idea of giving up the fight and arc trying instead to stay in close and to help the Socialists. Two days after Mr. Ford's statement, tho Comm-,n Market countries agreed to offer Portmeal better trading opportunities, financial aid and in- dustrial cooperation so long as such help might encourage the maintenance of