CAUSE AND EFFECTS

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 47
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 20, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 12, 1975
• Content Type: NSPR

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1JAS-ttINGTCN POST
12 DEC 1975
Stephen S. Rosenfeld
pauses and Effects
A refreshing question is coming to the
fore in public debate over the. United,
States' international embarrassments of
recent years. Did what we did., besides
drawing criticism and revealing one or
another national character flaw, make a
real difference? I don't mean a difference
in the grand eternal scheme of things or a
difference just in our image or self-esteem
but a difference in the particular place,
where, aid at the particular time when,
the deed was actually done?
Thus did the New York Times
editorialize last Sunday about the Senate
intelligence committee's staff report on
Chile: "The central fact that emerges is
that although the United States did,
inexcusably interfere in the Chilean
political process the United States still
was not basically responsible for the
overthrow of the Chilean government of
President Salvador Allende."
Thus does retired diplomat Lowell
-Citron write in the last Foreign Policy.
magazine that journalist Laurence Stern
"-generally overestimates the centrality of
American -actions and inactions as
.decisive factors in the Cyprus imbroglio.
Clearly, our diplomatic tactics throughout
the crisis were ineffectual' in averting
and/or amelioratng the disaster. But that
disaster was created and worsened by the
hubris, treachery, and sheer stupidity of
the protagonists."
For what it's worth, I agree with the
Times that the United States; though it
interfered inexcusably, was not "basically
responsible" for the downfall of the inept,
divided, minority Allende government,
.and I disagree with diplomat Citron's
contention that American actions and
inactions were not "decisive factors" in
the Cyprus tragedy.
But these are clearly judgment calls.
The encouraging thing is that people are
arguing the point. Not only is it a service
to truth to try to figure out the effect, as
well as the motive and content, of our
policies. It is a service to our un-
derstanding of ourselves.
In fact, a curious switch between left and
right has. come about in our approach to
this matter of effect.
Previously, even historically, the left
held history responsible for most of the
good or ill in human affairs. Like Stalin,
people of the left easily evoked history to
justify arbitrary decisions of their own.
The right, though not entirely lacking its
own sources of determinism, tended to
-hold that events could be shaped by men,
particularly by leaders.
In its disillusionment with the way the.
world has been going, however,, broad
sections of the American left-rejecting
.determinism as a coward's copout-have,
geles to - address the World Affairs
Council and also a fund-raising din-
her of the Anti-Defamation League
of. B'nai B'rith, Church attended a.
party for about 135 Democrats inter-
ested in his prospective candidacy
hosted by Louis and Irma Colen,
close friends of Sen. Alan Cranston
(D-Calif.). . , :..,
Mrs., Co1en, commenting on thel
Sunday `night affair for Church, told
The Times that the 51-year-old, four-
term senator had given the group "a
very strong indication he was going
to run" for the Democratic presiden-
tial nomination.
In interviews and the news confer
ence here, all Church would say was
that he is going to form an explorato-
ry committee next week, when the
investigatory work of his Intelligence
Committee is complete, to "determine
whether it's possible to put together
an organization and gather sufficient
money to make it possible for so late
an entrant to launch a campaign for
the Presidency." '
The senator, however, answered
enthusiastically when }le.-was asked
Monday about what he would do if
he were President to exert a tighter,
-more effective reigh over the CIA,
FBI and other intelligence agencies.
"0f course, I know a great deal
.about that," he said. "I suppose I
know the most about it and I think
'that unless a President Is fully pos.
sewed of, that knowledge, it's. not
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come to impute great powers of decision to
the institutions and leaders of states-the
better to be able to blame them.
My favorite example is "Inside the
Company," ex-CIA agent Philip Agee's
expose of his former employer. Relen-
tlessly penitent, he cannot bear to com-
template any misfortune unshaped by the
CIA, even attributing to, "the Company"
the downfall of an early-1960s Ecuadorean
president whose alcoholism alone
unquestionably provided adequate cause.
So pronounced is the left's inclination to
unforgivingly center responsibility on
particular people that one conservative
observer, Henry Fairlie, writing in ' the
new Commentary, has called for a
"Marxist correction"of the left's view-by
which Fairlie means that history and the
log Zngtleg trimei Tues., Dec. 9,1975.
culture should share the rap.
Meanwhile, back on the right, which is
where I would put the center of gravity of
American foreign policy these days, the
tendency grows to explain defeats and
frustrations by reference to the inherent
intractability of reality, the cloying
'denseness of history, the determinative
mortgage of the past.
Fifteen years ago in Washington, people
thought the. world was America's to run,
and vast schemes to make men
everywhere free and prosperous were
launched almost as casually as paper
airplanes. But now the thrust of policy is
to seek out small limited openings in order
to make what progress, or to deter what
retrogression, one can.
For myself, 1. would like to have the
truths of both left and right: the left's
demand for the accountability of power,
the right's respect for the complexity of
the medium through which power must
move. And I would like to dispense with
the defects of both left and right: the left's
perverseness in insisting that all problems
will yield to the virtue and diligence of
good men, the right's weakness for ex-
pediency.
A search for the actual effect produced
by American policy seems to me an
awfully good way to establish that vital
balance.
den. Church. Would Slash
CIA Covert Wing by 90%
Says If He Were President He would Transfer'
Such Operations to State Department's, Control
BY KENNETH REICH
Times Political Writer
'Sen. Frank Church (D-Ida.), head
:of the Senate Select Committee on
-Intelligence, said here Monday that if.
he were President, he would take the
covert operations wing out of the
-CIA, reduce its personnel by about
' 90% and put what remained under
the State Department.
Church, speaking at a news confer-
ence before addressing a Los Angeles
World Affairs Council luncheon at
the Century Plaza, said he would not
do away with covert operations en-
tirely and he said that Portugal was
,one place where such operations.
'might be undertaken.
But, he said, "If there's any kind of
'covert action that could be justified,
,it would be the kind that when our.
hand is exposed, we could say, 'Yes,
we are,damn proud of it.' 11
He said this would be the case if,,
as in Portugal, the United States was
truly enlisted in a struggle for free
government rather than in the ser-
'vice of preserving corrupt, despotic
right-wing regimes. He said the lat-
ter had been the case for most of the
last 25 years.
Church's comments about what he:
would do as President took on added'
interest because the Idaho senator is
openly expressing interest in running
for President. .
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likely that all of these abuses can be
eliminated. r
"For one thing, I would just take
the whole covert operation wing and
cut it out of the CIA entirely and di-
minish it in size to about one-tenth of
its present size and place it in the
State Department, where it would be
subject to the overall policy consider-
ations of our government in connec-
tion with the conduct of our foreign
affairs.
"As it is (now, in the CIA), it's a
self-serving apparatus. It's a bureauc-
racy which feeds on itself and those
involved are constantly sitting
around thinking up schemes
(foreign) intervention which will win
them promotions and justify further
additions to the staff.
"And thus it has grown and grown
in the way that most bureaucracies
do. And it self-generates interven-
tions that otherwise never would be
,thought of, let alone authorized." . .
Later, answering questions from
the World Affairs Council luncheon
audience of about 550 persons,
Church elaborated on what he sug-
gested were hundreds of covert oper-
ations staff people in the CIA.
"These are the types that you ac-
tually would expect to find-the
dare-doer types, the adventuresome
types, the people that find their ex-
pression in involvement in exciting
activities of this kind and sometimes
dangerous activities," he said.
"And what are they doing? They
.are sitting around -thinking up
schemes for new interventions all
.over the world and why are they
doing it?-
Keeping the CIA strong
The United States intelligence and counter-
intelligence apparatus has to remain strong. It
will not be weakened through getting rid of
abuses, which do not serve the cause of
national security in whose name so many have
been committed. It must not be weakened
through the public ordeal of exposure and
reform as the roles of the CIA and other
agencies are clarified, their accountability
ensured, and their misuse by the adminis-
tration guarded against. _
The case of Chile, for example, shows the
need to separate facts from suspicions.
Though anti-Allende activities by the CIA
have been confirmed, the Senate-intelligence
committee has decisively denied the suspicion
that the CIA played a part in the elected
leader's fatal overthrow in 1973.
If there were any doubt about the need for a
strong CIA, the growth of the Soviet Union's
massive KGB spy system should dispel it. As
described in a recent Monitor article by
Benjamin Welles, the expansion of the KGB to
an estimated 300,000 at home and abroad has
been accompanied by close cooperation with
spy services it has trained in countries such as
Cuba, Hungary, and Romania.
And no representatives of the people are
investigating the KBG in the Soviet Union.
Christian Science Monitor
10 December 1975
Ford yields
to House
on secrets
"Because they are professional in-.
-tervenors. Now, this is how they get
promoted. This is how they get de-
corated ... And all kinds of plausi-
ble schemes are brought to the Pres-
ident. He is told, 'Don't worry about
this or that, Mr. President, we can fix
it.'
"And its a very intoxicating thing
if you are President of the United
States to think you can fix it because
you have the wherewithal, the ex-
perts who know how to do the job.
The trouble with that is that it ulti-
mately reduces the President of the
United States to a kind of a glorified
Godfather."
NEW YORK TIM
10 Dec. 1975
New Year's Resolution
To the Editor:
As we move once more into the sear,
'son of "Peace on Earth, Good Will .tg.
Men." more and more revelations have,
continued to be made about the,
evil machinations and shenanigaps of
the F.B.I. and the C.I.A. Would, not. oul7
best New Year's resolution for .1976E
be to resolve to do away with a
tional secret police and with this
dreadful spying agency?
HERBERT ELrot FREN~4
New York, Dec. 4, 10$
By Clayton Jones
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
But the threat of powerful rivals overseas is
not the only reason for maintaining CIA
effectiveness. It is also an essential source of
advance warning to Washington about crucial
events and developments abroad - a contin-
uing flow of information which ideally is
coldly analytical and free of political bias.
The CIA's current defensive position - as
an object of relentless investigation itself -is
already said to have caused some impairment
of its functioning. For example, it reportedly
.has more difficulty gaining cooperation from
some foreign intelligence agencies and from
some U.S. companies that could provide
"cover" for CIA agents.
But according to Seymour Hersh of the New
York Times - who called attention to CIA
abuses before they were officially in-
vestigated - CIA officials feel that all the
furor over the agency has "failed to hamper
seriously its main function - the collection of
worthwhile intelligence."
Such sustained results under fire are a
tribute to the basic professionalism on which
the CIA has rightly prided itself. The task for
the President and Congress is not to destroy
but enhance this professionalism as they seek
to ensure that it is used for the proper ends.
A third subpoena, however, had not been
complied with at this writing and a contempt
citation still was possible against Dr. Kis-
,tger. That request was for all U.S. covert.
-aerations abroad since 1961 that were re-
uested by the State Department. But support
'r a contempt vote has weakened as Presi-
lent. Ford appears to be compromising on the
;lE ase of such information.
My . Ford offered to identify such operations
it Y.ot by the name of the various intelligence
,ger:'ies. Executive privilege already had
i=een claimed by the President over the
iocu~rents but he wishes to head off a
,~;nt-.npt citation against the Secretary of
ate. Such a compromise may be acceptable
the House intelligence unit over the
otests of its chairman, Rep. Otis G. Pike (D)
r New York.
The Pike panel heard legal scholars' opin-
:ns Tuesday (Dec. 9) on the role of Congress
. overseeing U.S. covert acts.
Legal adviser for the CIA Mitchell Rogovin
'u the committee that no legal prohibition
be found against the CIA participating in
assinations abroad.
.. nd, said Mr. Rogovin, certain congres-
,:n?nal committees have always been told, in
Y;;-aural terms, of every U.S. covert act. Those
-.embers, he indicated, are at fault for not
:ring for specific details.
hut; asked chairman Pike, "How can Con-
'ess ratify covert acts that it cannot be told
i,,r:.rt?" He suggested new laws giving Con-
_: a=s full access to such secret facts while
" "ring the the Central Intelligence Agency
.:c other spy agencies are working from set
outlining their powers - rather than by
3? 'cedents of Presidents' actions.
Washington
Two House committees have successfully
aimed the threat of contempt citations against
two Ford Cabinet members to gain access to-
U.S. foreign policy information.
This new attempt by Congress to open up
executive files and reveal decisions is consid-
ered a foretaste of new laws and procedures
designed to ensure legislative control over
some U.S. overseas actions.
The Ford administration has backed down
an two requests for secret information: .
? Secretary of Commerce Rogers C. B.
Morton agreed to turn over subpoenaed
.information about U.S, corporation com-
3liance with the Arab boycott of Israel. A
House subcommittee withdrew its contempt
-iction against Mr. Morton and pledged to treat
the controversial list "in consonance with
heir asserted confidentiality."
? Two contempt citations were dropped
against Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
when the White House allowed member of the
House Select Committee on Intelligence to
view top-secret documents of U.S. covert
intelligence which the committee had subpoe-
naed.
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WASa NGTOPf STAR
9 DEC 1975
.How the CIA Grew
Into a Monster
By Frank Getlein
Washington Star Staff Writer
If -you are as confused
as most people are about
what the CIA has been
doing, what it has been
supposed to have been
doing and for what pur-
poses it has been doing
both, you can do no better
than to tune in tonight to a
membership week special
on WETA-26, The Rise
and Fall of the CIA," a 90-
minute show made origi-
nally in three half-hour
parts by the British com-
mercial television produc-
ers, Granada. ,
The program makes
more sense of the perhaps
TV Preview
deliberately obscured
facts about the agency
than any attempt so far by
our own television, public
or commercial.
The British interview-
ers,who are never seen
but are heard asking
questions, rely on a large
number of ex-agents,
some disaffected and even
authors of books exposing
the agency, others retired
but still loyal. Chief of
I these, the head guide
l.through Langley's laby-
. rinthine ways, is Tom
Braden, better known as a
philoprogenitive news-
paper columnist although,
to tell the truth, by the end
-of the show you wonder
how thoroughly Braden
.has severed his ancient
connection. '
ACCORDING TO
Braden and other agents,
the CIA grew naturally
out of the World War II
Office of Strategic Serv-
ices, changing direction
from working against the
defeated Germans to
working against our part-
ners in victory, the Sovi-
''ets, not. only a remarkable
'example of secretly turn-
: ing against one's ally, but
an equally remarkable
fulfillment of the prophecy
on the lips of every cap-
tured German officer in
the last days of the war.
The agency's first sub-
versive venture against a
non-hostile country was a
massive parachute drop
:-into Albania to prevent
that country from going
Communist. It failed be-
cause the Russians had
,Kim Philby working for
`them in the British
'equivalent to the CIA and
tipped off the, Albanians,?
who not only went
Communist but went vio=
lently anti-Soviet Commu-
nist, as their next door
neighbor, Yugoslavia, al-
ready. had. The obvious
lesson there - that all
Communists, Marxists or
Socialists are not neces-
sarily Soviet puppets
was either lost on the CIA
because its management
was too dumb to get the
point, or ignored by the
CIA as being bad for busi-
ness.
MEANWHILE, the CIA
was heavily into radio
propaganda through two
agencies widely accepted
by Americans as being
independent and support-
ed by voluntary contribu-
tions, Radio Free Europe
and Radio Liberty, per-
haps the first systematic
and for a long time suc-
cessful effort by the agen-
cy to lie to the American
people.
From there, the pro-
gram lucidly lays out the
whole history.of subvert-
ing foreign governments
that ? looked likely to put
limits on the activities of
American-based multi-
national corporations,
particularly in Iran and
British Guyana. The over-
throw of the government
of Iran was instigated by
the British, according to
the program, with a view
to saving British oil inter-
ests from nationalization.
With the rightwing Shah
installed, 40 percent of the
former British contracts
went to American firms.
The Bay of Pigs is thor-
oughly examined and
seen, astonishingly, as the
springboard to the CIA's'
protracted, secret and ex-
tremely expensive war in
Laos. Meanwhile, on the
cultural front, the subver-
sion of labor unions and
intellectual publications
and organizations grew
apace.
NEW YORK TINES
7 Dec. 1975
The C.I.A. in Chile
Revolutions and counter-revolutions inevitably produce
political myths. Like all myths that succeed in getting
hold of the popular imagination, these legends contain
an element-of truth; but they also contain large amounts
of exaggeration, invention, and imported emotion that
is derived from other situations or historical analogies.
The staff report of the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence has now placed the activities of the United
States Government in Chile in recent years in some
perspective The central fact that emerges is that
although the United States did inexcusably interfere in
the Chilean political process, the United States still was
not basically responsible for the overthrow of the Chilean
Government of President Salvador Allende. Despite the
left-wing myth that this country was the prime mover
in that event, the coup was actually conceived and
carried out by Chileans, acting for reasons ' of their own.
? It. is true that the Central Intelligence Agency on
orders from President Nixon became involved in out-
rageous and futile schemes to block Mr. Allende's
election by the Chilean Congress after he had failed to
obtain a clear majority in the popular vote in 1970.
But, contrary to the widely accepted myth, the C.I.A.
did not finance the truckers' strike that preceded Mr.
Allende's downfall in 1973. The $7 million that the C.I.A.
spent in Chile from 1970 to 1973 is a derisory sum when,
measured against the large effects ascribed to the
agency by its critics.
The C.I.A.'s interventions did not control events in
Chile. In a country with a strong democratic tradition,
Mr. Allende, who was elected with the support of only
36 percent of the electorate, did not have a popular
mandate to carry out the far-reaching social revolution
he envisaged. Ironically, the Moscow-oriented Communist
Party recognized this fact and, until the very end,
pressed Mr. Allende to reach an accommodation with
his Christian Democratic rivals. But he was unable to
control other far-left radical elements in his coalition,
and at the time of his tragic overthrow, the country
seemed to be sliding into civil war.
The United States had no warrant whatsoever to
meddle in the internal affairs of Chile. Such attempts to
play the ideological and political policeman are usually
Self-defeating and undermine the ideals of which the
United States should be an exemplar. But neither is any
good purpose served by exaggerating the importance of
the C.I.A.'s bumbling interventions and ascribing to it
the moral responsibility for the bloodshed, terror, and
loss of freedom that the Chilean armed forces have
since imposed on their own people.
WITH ALL the harrow.
ing record-of lies, perjury,
murder, drug smuggling,
burglary and the rest, the
most intriguing single
revelation is that for some taxpayers and keep those
'years the CIA subsidized tax dollars flowing to the
the American Communist half-baked eternal school-
Party publication, "The boys who ran the spook
Daily Worker." Braden shop through all its years
explains this plausibly as of glory.
growing out of the desire ' The show is not to be
to "keep your enemy in missed by any American
i
i
"
pos
t
on
so that you know , with any hope of regaining
what he's thinking. Anoth- popular, representative,
er explanation is to keep elected control of the
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the enemy visible to the country and its doings in
NEW YORK TIMES
7 Dec. 1975
Chile Paper Denies
C.I.A. Support
SANTIAGO, Chile, Dec. 6
(AP) - Chile's most important
newspaper chain said today
that it "energetically rejects"
'a United States Senate commit-
tee report that the Central In-
telligence Agency paid out $1.6
million fo keep it publishing
during the era of the late presi-
dent, Salvador Allende Gos-
sens. ,
The chain's -Santiago news-
paper, El Mercurio, said in a
front-page editorial that the re-
port a Senate special com-
mittee investigating C.I.A.
activities "ventures far beyond
reality and is an incredible
maneuver to damage the pres-
tige of a news organ and those
who direct it.,,
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4 December 1975
e White H~'us~ Killers
Y DAVID EISENHOWER off Castro." CIA aide Richard Bissell re- sponsibility (the Kennedy cases), even
B
-
d
Ordinarily, when you come up against
the Kennedy Iegend and lose, you shrug it
cff. It rarely occurs to anyone that in such
a contest he might win. But when allega-
tions of murder are thrown all over the po-
litical lot except at the very people who are
most likely to have been Implicated with
it, it may be worth at least a try at over-
coming the invincibility of that Kennedy
ethos. was Wormed at least twice about i?~aria
the Church committee's action is a deadly
tro
kill C
t
as
o
In real terms, this problem comes up as .-connections with attempts
, a result of the recent report of Sen. Frank without disavowing either and, supposedly; combination of the two. Even when pro-
Church's Intelligence Committee. To put without telling his brother, the President, tectirg the Kennedy,, it is not a laughing
the matter as-starkly as possible; and also-about them. Robert Kennedy is, in fact, .matter to throw out infetences of murder
as truthfully as possible, where there is the? frequently portrayed by the Church com- into a publicf where the distinctions
best.. evidence that a President of the between "inferum erences" and .fact; get
blurred. In other words, even to spare the
United States might have known about and feelings of the Kennedy fans, you should
sanctioned assassination, attempts, the - Even.--when protecting treat accusations of murder similarly in
President In question is absolved. Where
the evidence is weakest and most atten- - the Kennedy,, it is not a similar cases.
lau~hinP matter to..throw:.- That's- what the law is supposed to be
bated that Presidents--were involved, the. a a ` -about-treating similarly situated people
Church committee uses the strongest lan- Out' Inferences of Murder similarly. And respect for the law and for"
gunge with the-most sinister implications. -:' into- a public: 'forum forum where American ideals is supposed to be the rea-
It ids unmistakably obvious that the former the. distinctions between "in son why the Church committee is washing
President is Bohn F..Iietmedy and the lot- t, , so much dirty laundry in public. We have
ter are Dwight Eisenhower and Richard. ferences and facts get.: to have an open society, reasons Sen.
Nixon. blurred. Church, so let it all out, no matter how bad
:.....
`Straightforward Actl it looks.
To take the cases in chronological or- mitiee as misled by the nature-and extent Less Than :Meets the Eye'
der, President amver is accused of in- of CIA activities, a proposition which Tom "There are a couple of problems with this,
volvement in plans ns t to assassinate Patrice Braden, a: Washington coluninist'With close _ " posture. One is that we may be letting stuff I
Congo' ba;' --a pro-Sortl leader in the Kennedy. associations and a. former.Office out that .is worse than what really happens. i
Congo' before and shortly after its inde- of Strategic Services man himself, thinks Ia':-other words, in the cases of all three !
going '?
pendence from Thee tof.the is "impossible,toamagirie.'.' Presidents, there is apparently less
involvement.is?thatat at at a a meeting of of the-Na-
tional Security Council, "President Eisen All of this activity, the- Church. commit.. on than meets an eye scanning the Church
howerris `said to have expressed the wish: tee concludes, shows-only ,that-President report..A report from an American Senate:
for "straightforward activity" against Lu- : Kennedy was interested: in. some kind. of committee accusing Americans of plotting.
mamba. This" recollection comes from one "broad strategy."_ to. bring, about t Cuban, de murder is one thing if .it. is solidly based- It
mocracy becomes quite another thing, somet::
uncorroborated witness: At least three- more.' like the most irresponsible kind.of
other witnesses of the same meeting did Moving right, along despite .a mountairr. - ip v if it is a device aimed at one
y evidence. of Kennedy,, displeasure with p are like only
not recall an such order.... of
the most
A day later, Director of the CIA Allen the Ngo Dinh Dient-regime and undoubted Ply .byevidence.:
another, using Dulles" is reported to have authorized an at- U.S. involvement in the coup against him flimsy evidence:
what good will the- ro? e. W tempt on Lumumba, resulting in"the trans- and his brother Nhu, 'the- Church commit:, it has. demoralized the report or What we CIA.
mission of various guns and poisons to the tee finds the Kennedy,, absolved because cannoi know is how foreigners will react to
Congo. Six months later, Lumumba died-in the murders of Diem and Nhu were our self-flagellation. Senator Church tt
the hands of his Congolese. captors-his spontaneous acts. The assassination. of_ ? will respect our candor. I urch t inks
death unrelated to a CIA plot, according to General Trujillo of the-Dominican. Repute they but think that this is akin to thinking a rap-
the Senate committee itself. On the basis of lie, though' plotted with the-knowledge of
the one "straightforward activity" remark,--American ,"personnel".., (read._"the."Press-;',_istBell beas mired for r c f ssisaabout not
the committee draws the "inference" that dent, John F.. Kennedy') is construed by assassinating people, hedged with more
President Eisenhower authorized an assas- Church's group as defiance of Kennedy's vague words about not barring covert ac-
sination. ? written ? statement that assassination is es wo d Church report ongr ve t ae-
wrong (though .not so wrong as to prevent tiviti, the On the other hand, the Kennedy broth- U.S. recognition of Trujillo's assassins ance about how the CIA should be conduct-
ers are held by the committee to have = itself, which, after all. Is supposed to
should they succeed.)
been unaware of the repeated murder ef- be the main product of the Church commit-
forts in. the -Caribbean on the following ?evi-.' -When -the report: comes to Richard tee.- Perhaps that will come with the com-
dence: There were repeated presidential- Nixon,' .Sens-'Church's committee finds tee Perhaps
final report in a few months. In
level discussions'of the Kennedys' displeas- - "inferences"-. that. President Nixon gave the meantime, is any broader purpose than
ure with Castro: As in the Eisenhower-Lu- carte blanche to the CIA to kill whoever publicity for politicians being served? It's
mumba case, Sen..Church found references necessary to keep Allende from power in -hard to see what that might be.
,to suggestions for- "straightforward act- Chile'- and therefore Mr. Nixon should be Assassination. Just the sound of the
ivity" against Castro. responsible for the death of General Rene word makes one's skin crawl. The commit-
Schneider. General Schneider had been a
However, in what seems to some ears to tee report calls it a coawlded, targeted
tfor CIA' Iddna ping; but died- in a-
be stronger language,. those discussions target P. tntentionali;illing of apolitical leader."
also included references to' "disposing of non MA, connected: kidnapping: Don't we need far more tangible, convinc-
Castro." CIA director John McCone re- - The Church committee is thus giving us in.-- proof before we even begin to make
calls. that. discussions with the Kennedy, more than a double standard. It Is saying, such grave charges against . Presidents
were' even -drawn In terms- of "knocking that. where there. is clear evidence of re Kennedy or Nixon or my grandfather?
pproved-For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RPP -00432R000100380002-4
e
calls that President Kennedy ordered the clearer evidence of responstb[lcly is nee
CIA to "get off its ass" against Castro. - to establish an "inference." WVhere there is
Further, within three weeks of JFK's in- extremely vague evidence of responsibil-
auguration, his national security adviser, ity (the Eisenhower and Nixon cases), no
McGeorge Bundy, was briefed on the de- more than vague hints are needed.
velopment of an "assassination capability" As I said at the outset, people are used i
within the CIA. Mr. bru'ndy -supposedly did. to less than equity when dealing with the"
not order it stopped nor, supposedly, did Kennedy legend. And, in recent years; poll-
he tell President Kennedy. Robert Kennedy- ticians have gotten used to throwing
Wrathy case lly. r tut
?
 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380002-4 i
LONDON TD4ES
20 Nov. 1975
John Ehrlichman, one of former President'Nix'on's closest advisers,
tantalizes Washington with a semi-autobiographical novel
Fiction that tries to be- stranger, than Watergate fact
From Fred Emery
Washington, Nov 19
Did a former director of the
Central Intelligence Agency,
who became an ambassador,
blackmail a former President
over Watergate-type actions
and a Caribbean-linked assassi-
nation ? Indeed so, at. least in
a novel that is the talk of
Washington before it has even
accounts " there has been
nothing like it since the play
Macbird made President John-
son responsible for .the murder
of John Kennedy.
With his appeals against con-
victions pending, Mr Ehrlich-
man is now . in New Mexico,
bearded, and reported to. be
separated from his wife
Jeanne, who .. unflaggingly
been published. , . ' attended every.;,-,day of his
The reason is that the novel trials.' . ?' ' -
is not by the likes of ? Mr E. The novel was first reported
Howard Hunt of " plumbers": with fascination by Mr William
'
notoriety. It is by Mr John
Ehrlichman, twice convicted of
Watergate crimes perpetrated
while he was one of the most
powerful men in the land, as
President Nixon's adviser on
domestic affairs.
That he should write with
such verisimilitude of recent
events, veiling against libel,
but giving a yet more shocking
and perhaps, more plausible
twist, makes the iretter all the
more intriguing. Mr Ehrlich-
man insists that it is all just a
novel, assured, of course, of
best-seller status. By initial
LONDON TIMES
2c; Nov. 1975
Safire,
the ' former Nixon
speechwriter who continues his
occasional apologia for the
deposed President in his col-
umn in The New York Times.
He is perplexed by the close-
to-the-bone questions the novel
asks, and confesses that there
is no knowing how much truth
there is in it...
Mr Safire relates that the
CIA chief in the book -actually
carried out in the early sixties
an assassination in the Carib-
bean at the order of a Presi-
dent now dead. Later a Presi-
dent whom the CIA maze; fears
conies to power, but the - CIA
man cultivates "a national
security adviser with a German
accent" who helps to protect
the dread secret.
Where Mr Safire is shy of
giving away the whole plot, Mr
Daniel Schorr of the Columbia.
Broadcasting System has
plunged ahead.
The same day as Mr Safire's
column appeared, he broadcast.
on national television a picture'
of the novel's flyleaf. (The
Company it is due to be titled)
and brazened ahead with the
identities of all those we have
come to know from the recent
power structure.
Mr Schorr also had this
vicious scenario: the President
wants to use the old assassi-
nation report against the dead
President's political allies.
The CIA man realizes this
will drag him down, too. He
confronts the President at a
dramatic Camp David meeting.
His blackmail: the CIA knows
all about the plan for raiding
and bugging the opposition
political party headquarters,
LICENSED TO KILL
'Throughout its history the
United States has been father to
some of the best and the worst
in human behaviour. Its leaders
:and its ordinary citizens have
:shown themselves capable of the
highest idealism and the lowest
gangsterism. The Senate report
on the CIA displays both
elements in 'a mixture that is
uniquely American. On the one
hand it presents an extremely
disturbing picture of criminal,
immoral and inefficient be-
haviour by agents and institu-
tions of the United States
Government. On the other hand
it shows another branch of the
same government exposing this
behaviour, albeit very late in
the day, and rendering it much
less likely to be repeated in the
future. Friends of America can
only hope that the benefits
deriving from this demonstration
of the system's ability to correct
its own abuses will outweigh the
damage done by the revelation
of the abuses themselves.
There is no doubt that the
revelations are damaging. The
squalid and often laughable
antics. of some of the crackpots
and gangsters who were drawn
into the service of American
foreign policy (a saddening pic.
ture in itself) should not obscure
the serious implications of the
evidence that earlier American
administrations thought. they
were justified in trying to
engineer the assassination of
foreign politicians. Counsel for
.the defence. would presumably
say that the United States was
engaged in a struggle equivalent
to a war with a ruthless com-
munist power which would use
any met ods in u s~hiiit world
dominat pP"v l~cl" !fg P
it would be naive and unrealistic
to be too scrupulous about
methods. Nice guys finish last, as
the Amercans say. What are the
lives of a few unlamented and
often fairly villainous foreign
.leaders in comparison to the free
world's interest in . preserving
and the telephone tapping of 1
reporters and staff. He will
trade this for the destruction
of the CIA Assassination
report. The President complies.
The questions being asked in
the Washington political arm-
munity are obvious. Why
would-Mr Ehrlichman suggest
the President had prior know-
ledge of a bugging break-in?
What' else did the CIA man
have "on" the president, and
perhaps others of his staff,
that he was so powerful to
succeed in this blackmail ?
One thing seems clear, at
least to Mr Safire. Mr Ehrlich-
man, who with Mr H. R. Hal-
deman sought and failed to
gain a last-minute pardon from
the resigning Mr Nixon, seeks
to get his own back on those
he might feel abandoned him.
Mr Safire writes : -The
author spares nobody .
least of all the President. Ehr-
lichman's `President Richard
Monckton' reflects only the
dark side of the leader he fol-
lowed all his life.
more efficient and had not been
brought to light.
A more substantial argument
is that by using such methods the
United States damaged and
diminished itself at home and
abroad. International as well as
American influence around the domestic politics must be subject
world ? to some legal and moral order
Counsel for the prosecution _ if they are not to degenerate into
could reply roughly as follows. anarchy. Once a government,
It is true that the deaths of starts using the methods of the
Lumumba and Trujillo evoke gangster its entire mentality is
few tears and were probably
broadly in the American interest.
But the death of President Ngo
Dinh Diem of South Vietnam
solved nothing. If Dr Castro had
been assassinated it is far from
certain that the United States
would have been better off, and
the threat which he was thought
to pose has since proved much
milder than expected, partly
because the Russians did some-
thing to restrain his attempts to
promote revolution in Latin
America. As for the death of
Dr Allende, which he himself
did much to bring about, it has
produced a situation which could
yet rebound against the United
States and has already done its
reputation some damage.
In other words, even on the
coolest calculation of national
interest, and leaving morals
aside, assassination is an impre-
cise weapon which is liable to
have unpredictable results, such
as the martyrdom of the victim
or his. replacement by somebody
worse.. Granting that extreme
situations can sometimes demand
extreme actions, and that moral
absolutes may conflict with poli-
tical needs, it is highly doubtful
q
are defending ~vit140-AM ~hulClt~~`dt' fen as much
azfending as of
united States even it it, hid.been . the means of defence.
Watergate affair was a symptom '
of corruption deriving from the
belief that any methods were
justified in what was assumed
to be the defence of the American
presidency. The activities of the
CIA were the result of a belief
that any methods were justified
in the defence of what were
assumed to be American
interests abroad. They went
longer uncorrected because the
checks and balances* of the
American system are less effec-
tive in foreign policy than in
domestic affairs.
But American interests'do-not.
depend only on nuclear weapons
and friendly governments or
client states. They depend also
on the ability of the United
States to convince people that-it
represents certain values and
principles and ways of life that
are worth defending. If it uses
the same methods as the KGB it
will come to be regarded in the
same light. Obviously it cannot
always appear as a knight in
shining armour, and moral pos-
turing in the wrong context can
 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380002-4
Nrg YORK TIMES WASHINGTON POST
6OEC1975 7DEC1975
TS ASSAIL I ~M. Korry, and 1967; Edward concoction of a simplistic and
M. Korry, Ambassador between monstrous black and white Intelligence
1967 and 1971, and Charles A. mythology-a legend in which
LGOVERTACT!ON
WASHINGTON, Dec. 5 (AP) I
--Covert action aimed against
foreign governments has dam-
,aged the reputation of the.
tUnited States and should be
(severely curbed; four authori-!
' ties on issues of national se-
curity said today.
"Many of the problems
!which beset the intelligence
1community result from histori-
;cal slips on the banana peel of
covert action," said David A.
hillips, a former Central In-
lIigence Agency official who
was involved in undercover
operations.
"Our reputation has been,
damaged and our capacity for
ethical and moral world lead-
ership has been: impaired," said
Clark M. Clifford, former
Sec-retary of Defense.
Mr. Clifford told the Senate
;'ntelligence Committee it was
clear that covert operations
.aavo gotten out of hand.
Knowledge about such oper-
ntions has become so wide-
pread," he said, "that our
country has been accused of
',sing responsible for practical-
_y every internal difficulty that
as occurred in every country
:z. the world."
Security Need Stressed
Cyrus R. Vance, former
Deputy Secretary of Defense,
-aid he believed it should be
'U nnited States policy to engage
.in covert actions only when. it
I was "absolutely essential" to
the security of the nation.
By covert operations, the
;witnesses were referring to
seo: et actions taken to 'influ=
fence another country's atti-
f tudes and public opinion, in-
cluding attempts to change the
government or course of
events.mMost of the witnesses
161d not oppose other intelli-
(gence-gathering operations.
However, Morton Halperin,
:'ormer Assistant Secretary of
Defense for National Security
Affairs, said all or most of the
United States clandestine in-
telligence-gathering operatives
!should be called home.
The other witnesses said the
capability for such action
should be retained. Mr. Phillips
said that ending covert opera-
tions entirely would be like
(disbanding the Army in .peace
!time or "abolishing the office
of the President because it has
been once abused."
Mr. Clifford and Mr. Vance
[proposed a complete overhaul.
lcf the 1947 National Security
Act to make certain that all,.
covert action proposals are con-
sidered and approved only at the,
_cc level of the executive-
I ,ranch and reviewed in advance
:)P their implementation by a
Congressional committee.
sZ4Ambassadors' Testimony
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, Dec. 5-The
Senate committee's hearing yes-
terday was largely devoted to
statements and testimony from
Three former United States dip-
omats involved with Chile:,
lnlnh A. Dungan, . Ambassador.
Meyer, who was. Assistant Sec- the American bullyboys kicked
retary of State for Inter-Amen- , and cuffed small and innocent
can Affairs from 1969 to 1973. Social. Democrats because they
Mr. Dungan urged in a state- only wanted control of their.
ment that the C.I.A.'s clandes- resources, and because they
tine operations apparatus be only wished to implement some
sharply reduced in size and progressive socio - economic
that its functions be centered -programs, and besides, weren't
more on intelligence gathering. they democratically elected?"
Mr. Meyer confirmed in brief While the committee staff
testimony statements in the re- reported that it could establish
port that he was uncomfortable no direct operational involve-
about intervention .in Chile's ment by the C.I.A. or United
internal affairs. States Embassy in the 1973
Mr. Korry angrily charged coup, the members agreed dur-
that Senator Frank Church, ing a press briefing today that
chairman of the select commit- the United States policy had
tee, and committee staff mem- "created the atmosphere" in
bers had tried to keep him Chile for Dr. Allende's removal.
from testifying. He charged
1964 Election Influenced
that the committee report painted Dr. Allende and the According to the committee
Marxists in Chile in an entirely staff, the attempts to manipu-
favorable light, while making !late the Chilean Government
the United States representa- ;were most intense in 1963 and
tives appear to be "goons." '1964 and from 1970 to 1973.
He said that this was. an The staff reported that the
inaccurate "rewriting of histo-' United States supplied $3.4 mil-
ry." Mr. Korry said he neither lion to help bring about the
approved nor knew of plans -election of Eduardo Frei Mon-
to cause a military coup in talva, a Christian Democrat,
1970 and had argued against, as President in 1964, defeating
such an approach. ( a coalition of Marxist parties.
In a 28-page letter to Senator Mr. Frei's party also won con-
Church, given to reporters at trol of the Chamber of Depu-
the. hearing, Mr. Korry charged ties. -
that an article in the Sept. At the briefing session with
8 issue of The New York Times reporters today, committee
had been leaked by a counsel staff members asserted that
on another subcommittee head- Mr. Kissinger was the central'
ed by Senator Church._ figure designing United States
The article, the Korry state- policy in Chile during the Nixon
ment said contained, material years. They said that as nation-
critical of him.: ? ? al security adviser and, chair-
Mr. Korry's statement con- man of the 40 Committee,
tinued: :which authorizes covert opera-
"Do you not find, these accu- tioris, he was constantly'being
sations by your staff, leaked pressed by President Nixon to
sneaky anonymity without any get things done.
prior notification, without any The report said the effort
communication to me, of- any to stop Dr. Allende's election
kind, without any opportunity began in the spring of 1970.1
to this date to examine charges It said that Mr. Korry, who
or to rebut them, a callous, was then Ambassador, submit-
even criminal abuse of the U.S. ted a plan to spend $500,000
judicial process?" 'to affect the Congressional vote
? f th a noff
aru
Also during his appearance,
a -brief one devoted mainly to
reading parts of his letter, Mr.
Korry described the ' C.I.A. as
"amoral."
It was authorized by Con-
gress to be so," he added. "It,
was paid to be."
. His letter said the agency
could "operate behind my back,
not merely with the President
of the United States, but with
Chileans and private Ameri-
cans, because the whole proc-
ess of espionage and Intel-j
ligence, like knowledge, confers
immense power, and because
the C.I.A. was the one per-
manent institution to tie. the
past to'the present in the in-
fluential ? and persuasive arena
of clandestine political activi-
ty.,.
Nevertheless, -Mr. Korry
strongly defended the actions)
of C.I.A. representatives ini
Chile during his, tenure. He,
said they were fulfilling their,
"rightful responsibilities and by,
precedents legitimized by sue-,
cessive. Presidents . and Con-
gresses:" .
Mr. Korry charged that Sena-
tor Church had covered up real.
events in Chile.
Was not the cover-up, he
asked, "indispensable to your
i erew s
This was rejected on June
`27, the committee said, but it
added that the 40 Committee,
.an arm of the National Security
Council that is supposed to
review all clandestine opera-
tions, voted $300,000 to be used
as a "spoiling" operation in
the election. The State Depart-
ment, the report said, opposed
this.
The report recalled that after
the Allende inauguration, Pres-
ident Nixon said in his 1971
State of the World Message:
"We are prepared to have
the kind of relationship with
the .Chilean Government that
it is prepared to have with
us."
The report then said:
"Yet, public pronouncements
'notwithstanding, after Al-
lende's inauguration the 40
.Committee approved a total
of over $7 million in covert
support to opposition groups
in Chile."
It said the money also funded
an extensive anti-Allende prop-
aganda campaign.
','The C.I.A. rebuht its new
network of contacts," the re-
port asserted "and remained
Close to Chilean military offi-
cers in order to monitor devel-
opments within the armed
.forces."
'Deputy Set
At Pentagon
The White House has
decided to create a new.
Defense Department post of
second deputy defense
secretary that will be largely
concerned at least initially
with intelligence problems,
according to informed
government officials.
The officials, who asked not
to be identified, said the new
Defense Secretary, Donald H.
Rumsfeld, has decided to
promote Robert Ellsworth,
the present assistant defense
secretary for international
security affairs, to the post.
Ellsworth, a former U.S.
ambassador to NATO, will
report directly to the Defense
Secretary and will be on the
same level as the present
deputy defense secretary,
William P. Clements Jr.
The officials also said
Rumsfeld has decided to bring
in deputy White House press
secretary William Greener as
the new assistant secretary
for publi affairs to replace
Joseph Laitin, a close
associate of former Defense
Secretary James R.
NEW YORK TIMES
2 4 NOV 1975
C.I.A. Said to Have Links
With Azores Secessionists
The Central Intelligencef
Agency has developed exten-
sive contacts with a group fav-
oring secession for the Portu-
guese Azores and State Depart-
. ment ' officials have received
representatives of the group,
Time magazine has reported in
its issue that goes on sale to-
day.
Time said the contacts were
set up with the Azorian Libera-
tion Front, which advocates in-
dependence for the island
group in the Atlantic, despite
United States Government
claims of "strict noninvolve-
ment" with the separatists.
The C.I.A. purpose, the maga-
zine said, was "occasionally to
provide some guidance and
share information about devel-
opments on the mainland."
"The C.I.A. also wanted to
be in a position to help push
for secession if Lisbon went
Communist," It added.
Time said that representa-
tives were of the Azorian Front
had been received by middle
level State Department officials
in Washington, although it did
not, say when.
Approved for Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001Q0380002-4
 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380002-4
PENTHOUSE
December 1975
BY:JOSEPH4 B:TREASTER
?.THE DIRECT
Back in;tho'se difficult . days' in the'White=
r: House when the war in Vietnam was get r
tingebigger. and:; seeming,. more unwinTM
nabte;every day, it'must.have looked like'
such a beautiful. plan: get the. CIA to _pull
together: all..the, intelligence'' people one!
four..'side-.the South Vietnamese police'
the}military;-everyone, who; knew 'any-
thing about the,VietGong; pinpoint;the
enemy'spolitical. leaders, the; men who':
called the shots; then; send-in`comman;
[onto neatly,surgically:take them out of;
the picture Yoil rlsked.;only.a.few men:;
Yift~ ripped:; out': the heart of `the'hated
Iron Within ?rr t. t ,, r ~fo~
ED" - as simplicity itself But`what be.
?ame known'as 'the Phoenix. Pro gram"
was,.one,of. thoseconcepts.that, did not
Irmove gracefully. from the drawing board:
fo..real life-at least not in the hands bf
y h .YV y
the' ClA :r ; ayr { t' s ~ ~ ? i32