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December 12, 1975
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-Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380002( CONFIDENTIAL INTERNAL USE ONLY This publication contains clippings from the domestic and foreign press for YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use of selected items would rarely be advisable. ;:0. 25 GOVEIu % iv'T AFFAIRS GENEPAL EAST EUROPE WEST EUROPE NEAR EAST AFRICA EAST ASIA LATIN AMERICA Destroy after back ro ndor has served its purpose or within 60 days. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380002-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380002-4 1JAS-ttINGTCN POST 12 DEC 1975 Stephen S. Rosenfeld pauses and Effects A refreshing question is coming to the fore in public debate over the. United, States' international embarrassments of recent years. Did what we did., besides drawing criticism and revealing one or another national character flaw, make a real difference? I don't mean a difference in the grand eternal scheme of things or a difference just in our image or self-esteem but a difference in the particular place, where, aid at the particular time when, the deed was actually done? Thus did the New York Times editorialize last Sunday about the Senate intelligence committee's staff report on Chile: "The central fact that emerges is that although the United States did, inexcusably interfere in the Chilean political process the United States still was not basically responsible for the overthrow of the Chilean government of President Salvador Allende." Thus does retired diplomat Lowell -Citron write in the last Foreign Policy. magazine that journalist Laurence Stern "-generally overestimates the centrality of American -actions and inactions as .decisive factors in the Cyprus imbroglio. Clearly, our diplomatic tactics throughout the crisis were ineffectual' in averting and/or amelioratng the disaster. But that disaster was created and worsened by the hubris, treachery, and sheer stupidity of the protagonists." For what it's worth, I agree with the Times that the United States; though it interfered inexcusably, was not "basically responsible" for the downfall of the inept, divided, minority Allende government, .and I disagree with diplomat Citron's contention that American actions and inactions were not "decisive factors" in the Cyprus tragedy. But these are clearly judgment calls. The encouraging thing is that people are arguing the point. Not only is it a service to truth to try to figure out the effect, as well as the motive and content, of our policies. It is a service to our un- derstanding of ourselves. In fact, a curious switch between left and right has. come about in our approach to this matter of effect. Previously, even historically, the left held history responsible for most of the good or ill in human affairs. Like Stalin, people of the left easily evoked history to justify arbitrary decisions of their own. The right, though not entirely lacking its own sources of determinism, tended to -hold that events could be shaped by men, particularly by leaders. In its disillusionment with the way the. world has been going, however,, broad sections of the American left-rejecting .determinism as a coward's copout-have, geles to - address the World Affairs Council and also a fund-raising din- her of the Anti-Defamation League of. B'nai B'rith, Church attended a. party for about 135 Democrats inter- ested in his prospective candidacy hosted by Louis and Irma Colen, close friends of Sen. Alan Cranston (D-Calif.). . , :.., Mrs., Co1en, commenting on thel Sunday `night affair for Church, told The Times that the 51-year-old, four- term senator had given the group "a very strong indication he was going to run" for the Democratic presiden- tial nomination. In interviews and the news confer ence here, all Church would say was that he is going to form an explorato- ry committee next week, when the investigatory work of his Intelligence Committee is complete, to "determine whether it's possible to put together an organization and gather sufficient money to make it possible for so late an entrant to launch a campaign for the Presidency." ' The senator, however, answered enthusiastically when }le.-was asked Monday about what he would do if he were President to exert a tighter, -more effective reigh over the CIA, FBI and other intelligence agencies. "0f course, I know a great deal .about that," he said. "I suppose I know the most about it and I think 'that unless a President Is fully pos. sewed of, that knowledge, it's. not Approved For Release 2001/08/08: C IA-R7P7I=00432R000100380002-4 come to impute great powers of decision to the institutions and leaders of states-the better to be able to blame them. My favorite example is "Inside the Company," ex-CIA agent Philip Agee's expose of his former employer. Relen- tlessly penitent, he cannot bear to com- template any misfortune unshaped by the CIA, even attributing to, "the Company" the downfall of an early-1960s Ecuadorean president whose alcoholism alone unquestionably provided adequate cause. So pronounced is the left's inclination to unforgivingly center responsibility on particular people that one conservative observer, Henry Fairlie, writing in ' the new Commentary, has called for a "Marxist correction"of the left's view-by which Fairlie means that history and the log Zngtleg trimei Tues., Dec. 9,1975. culture should share the rap. Meanwhile, back on the right, which is where I would put the center of gravity of American foreign policy these days, the tendency grows to explain defeats and frustrations by reference to the inherent intractability of reality, the cloying 'denseness of history, the determinative mortgage of the past. Fifteen years ago in Washington, people thought the. world was America's to run, and vast schemes to make men everywhere free and prosperous were launched almost as casually as paper airplanes. But now the thrust of policy is to seek out small limited openings in order to make what progress, or to deter what retrogression, one can. For myself, 1. would like to have the truths of both left and right: the left's demand for the accountability of power, the right's respect for the complexity of the medium through which power must move. And I would like to dispense with the defects of both left and right: the left's perverseness in insisting that all problems will yield to the virtue and diligence of good men, the right's weakness for ex- pediency. A search for the actual effect produced by American policy seems to me an awfully good way to establish that vital balance. den. Church. Would Slash CIA Covert Wing by 90% Says If He Were President He would Transfer' Such Operations to State Department's, Control BY KENNETH REICH Times Political Writer 'Sen. Frank Church (D-Ida.), head :of the Senate Select Committee on -Intelligence, said here Monday that if. he were President, he would take the covert operations wing out of the -CIA, reduce its personnel by about ' 90% and put what remained under the State Department. Church, speaking at a news confer- ence before addressing a Los Angeles World Affairs Council luncheon at the Century Plaza, said he would not do away with covert operations en- tirely and he said that Portugal was ,one place where such operations. 'might be undertaken. But, he said, "If there's any kind of 'covert action that could be justified, ,it would be the kind that when our. hand is exposed, we could say, 'Yes, we are,damn proud of it.' 11 He said this would be the case if,, as in Portugal, the United States was truly enlisted in a struggle for free government rather than in the ser- 'vice of preserving corrupt, despotic right-wing regimes. He said the lat- ter had been the case for most of the last 25 years. Church's comments about what he: would do as President took on added' interest because the Idaho senator is openly expressing interest in running for President. . Approved For RBI 1975 likely that all of these abuses can be eliminated. r "For one thing, I would just take the whole covert operation wing and cut it out of the CIA entirely and di- minish it in size to about one-tenth of its present size and place it in the State Department, where it would be subject to the overall policy consider- ations of our government in connec- tion with the conduct of our foreign affairs. "As it is (now, in the CIA), it's a self-serving apparatus. It's a bureauc- racy which feeds on itself and those involved are constantly sitting around thinking up schemes (foreign) intervention which will win them promotions and justify further additions to the staff. "And thus it has grown and grown in the way that most bureaucracies do. And it self-generates interven- tions that otherwise never would be ,thought of, let alone authorized." . . Later, answering questions from the World Affairs Council luncheon audience of about 550 persons, Church elaborated on what he sug- gested were hundreds of covert oper- ations staff people in the CIA. "These are the types that you ac- tually would expect to find-the dare-doer types, the adventuresome types, the people that find their ex- pression in involvement in exciting activities of this kind and sometimes dangerous activities," he said. "And what are they doing? They .are sitting around -thinking up schemes for new interventions all .over the world and why are they doing it?- Keeping the CIA strong The United States intelligence and counter- intelligence apparatus has to remain strong. It will not be weakened through getting rid of abuses, which do not serve the cause of national security in whose name so many have been committed. It must not be weakened through the public ordeal of exposure and reform as the roles of the CIA and other agencies are clarified, their accountability ensured, and their misuse by the adminis- tration guarded against. _ The case of Chile, for example, shows the need to separate facts from suspicions. Though anti-Allende activities by the CIA have been confirmed, the Senate-intelligence committee has decisively denied the suspicion that the CIA played a part in the elected leader's fatal overthrow in 1973. If there were any doubt about the need for a strong CIA, the growth of the Soviet Union's massive KGB spy system should dispel it. As described in a recent Monitor article by Benjamin Welles, the expansion of the KGB to an estimated 300,000 at home and abroad has been accompanied by close cooperation with spy services it has trained in countries such as Cuba, Hungary, and Romania. And no representatives of the people are investigating the KBG in the Soviet Union. Christian Science Monitor 10 December 1975 Ford yields to House on secrets "Because they are professional in-. -tervenors. Now, this is how they get promoted. This is how they get de- corated ... And all kinds of plausi- ble schemes are brought to the Pres- ident. He is told, 'Don't worry about this or that, Mr. President, we can fix it.' "And its a very intoxicating thing if you are President of the United States to think you can fix it because you have the wherewithal, the ex- perts who know how to do the job. The trouble with that is that it ulti- mately reduces the President of the United States to a kind of a glorified Godfather." NEW YORK TIM 10 Dec. 1975 New Year's Resolution To the Editor: As we move once more into the sear, 'son of "Peace on Earth, Good Will .tg. Men." more and more revelations have, continued to be made about the, evil machinations and shenanigaps of the F.B.I. and the C.I.A. Would, not. oul7 best New Year's resolution for .1976E be to resolve to do away with a tional secret police and with this dreadful spying agency? HERBERT ELrot FREN~4 New York, Dec. 4, 10$ By Clayton Jones Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor But the threat of powerful rivals overseas is not the only reason for maintaining CIA effectiveness. It is also an essential source of advance warning to Washington about crucial events and developments abroad - a contin- uing flow of information which ideally is coldly analytical and free of political bias. The CIA's current defensive position - as an object of relentless investigation itself -is already said to have caused some impairment of its functioning. For example, it reportedly .has more difficulty gaining cooperation from some foreign intelligence agencies and from some U.S. companies that could provide "cover" for CIA agents. But according to Seymour Hersh of the New York Times - who called attention to CIA abuses before they were officially in- vestigated - CIA officials feel that all the furor over the agency has "failed to hamper seriously its main function - the collection of worthwhile intelligence." Such sustained results under fire are a tribute to the basic professionalism on which the CIA has rightly prided itself. The task for the President and Congress is not to destroy but enhance this professionalism as they seek to ensure that it is used for the proper ends. A third subpoena, however, had not been complied with at this writing and a contempt citation still was possible against Dr. Kis- ,tger. That request was for all U.S. covert. -aerations abroad since 1961 that were re- uested by the State Department. But support 'r a contempt vote has weakened as Presi- lent. Ford appears to be compromising on the ;lE ase of such information. My . Ford offered to identify such operations it Y.ot by the name of the various intelligence ,ger:'ies. Executive privilege already had i=een claimed by the President over the iocu~rents but he wishes to head off a ,~;nt-.npt citation against the Secretary of ate. Such a compromise may be acceptable the House intelligence unit over the otests of its chairman, Rep. Otis G. Pike (D) r New York. The Pike panel heard legal scholars' opin- :ns Tuesday (Dec. 9) on the role of Congress . overseeing U.S. covert acts. Legal adviser for the CIA Mitchell Rogovin 'u the committee that no legal prohibition be found against the CIA participating in assinations abroad. .. nd, said Mr. Rogovin, certain congres- ,:n?nal committees have always been told, in Y;;-aural terms, of every U.S. covert act. Those -.embers, he indicated, are at fault for not :ring for specific details. hut; asked chairman Pike, "How can Con- 'ess ratify covert acts that it cannot be told i,,r:.rt?" He suggested new laws giving Con- _: a=s full access to such secret facts while " "ring the the Central Intelligence Agency .:c other spy agencies are working from set outlining their powers - rather than by 3? 'cedents of Presidents' actions. Washington Two House committees have successfully aimed the threat of contempt citations against two Ford Cabinet members to gain access to- U.S. foreign policy information. This new attempt by Congress to open up executive files and reveal decisions is consid- ered a foretaste of new laws and procedures designed to ensure legislative control over some U.S. overseas actions. The Ford administration has backed down an two requests for secret information: . ? Secretary of Commerce Rogers C. B. Morton agreed to turn over subpoenaed .information about U.S, corporation com- 3liance with the Arab boycott of Israel. A House subcommittee withdrew its contempt -iction against Mr. Morton and pledged to treat the controversial list "in consonance with heir asserted confidentiality." ? Two contempt citations were dropped against Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger when the White House allowed member of the House Select Committee on Intelligence to view top-secret documents of U.S. covert intelligence which the committee had subpoe- naed. Approved For- Release 2001/08/08 : CIA=RDP77-004-32R000100380002-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001003B0002-4 WASa NGTOPf STAR 9 DEC 1975 .How the CIA Grew Into a Monster By Frank Getlein Washington Star Staff Writer If -you are as confused as most people are about what the CIA has been doing, what it has been supposed to have been doing and for what pur- poses it has been doing both, you can do no better than to tune in tonight to a membership week special on WETA-26, The Rise and Fall of the CIA," a 90- minute show made origi- nally in three half-hour parts by the British com- mercial television produc- ers, Granada. , The program makes more sense of the perhaps TV Preview deliberately obscured facts about the agency than any attempt so far by our own television, public or commercial. The British interview- ers,who are never seen but are heard asking questions, rely on a large number of ex-agents, some disaffected and even authors of books exposing the agency, others retired but still loyal. Chief of I these, the head guide l.through Langley's laby- . rinthine ways, is Tom Braden, better known as a philoprogenitive news- paper columnist although, to tell the truth, by the end -of the show you wonder how thoroughly Braden .has severed his ancient connection. ' ACCORDING TO Braden and other agents, the CIA grew naturally out of the World War II Office of Strategic Serv- ices, changing direction from working against the defeated Germans to working against our part- ners in victory, the Sovi- ''ets, not. only a remarkable 'example of secretly turn- : ing against one's ally, but an equally remarkable fulfillment of the prophecy on the lips of every cap- tured German officer in the last days of the war. The agency's first sub- versive venture against a non-hostile country was a massive parachute drop :-into Albania to prevent that country from going Communist. It failed be- cause the Russians had ,Kim Philby working for `them in the British 'equivalent to the CIA and tipped off the, Albanians,? who not only went Communist but went vio= lently anti-Soviet Commu- nist, as their next door neighbor, Yugoslavia, al- ready. had. The obvious lesson there - that all Communists, Marxists or Socialists are not neces- sarily Soviet puppets was either lost on the CIA because its management was too dumb to get the point, or ignored by the CIA as being bad for busi- ness. MEANWHILE, the CIA was heavily into radio propaganda through two agencies widely accepted by Americans as being independent and support- ed by voluntary contribu- tions, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, per- haps the first systematic and for a long time suc- cessful effort by the agen- cy to lie to the American people. From there, the pro- gram lucidly lays out the whole history.of subvert- ing foreign governments that ? looked likely to put limits on the activities of American-based multi- national corporations, particularly in Iran and British Guyana. The over- throw of the government of Iran was instigated by the British, according to the program, with a view to saving British oil inter- ests from nationalization. With the rightwing Shah installed, 40 percent of the former British contracts went to American firms. The Bay of Pigs is thor- oughly examined and seen, astonishingly, as the springboard to the CIA's' protracted, secret and ex- tremely expensive war in Laos. Meanwhile, on the cultural front, the subver- sion of labor unions and intellectual publications and organizations grew apace. NEW YORK TINES 7 Dec. 1975 The C.I.A. in Chile Revolutions and counter-revolutions inevitably produce political myths. Like all myths that succeed in getting hold of the popular imagination, these legends contain an element-of truth; but they also contain large amounts of exaggeration, invention, and imported emotion that is derived from other situations or historical analogies. The staff report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has now placed the activities of the United States Government in Chile in recent years in some perspective The central fact that emerges is that although the United States did inexcusably interfere in the Chilean political process, the United States still was not basically responsible for the overthrow of the Chilean Government of President Salvador Allende. Despite the left-wing myth that this country was the prime mover in that event, the coup was actually conceived and carried out by Chileans, acting for reasons ' of their own. ? It. is true that the Central Intelligence Agency on orders from President Nixon became involved in out- rageous and futile schemes to block Mr. Allende's election by the Chilean Congress after he had failed to obtain a clear majority in the popular vote in 1970. But, contrary to the widely accepted myth, the C.I.A. did not finance the truckers' strike that preceded Mr. Allende's downfall in 1973. The $7 million that the C.I.A. spent in Chile from 1970 to 1973 is a derisory sum when, measured against the large effects ascribed to the agency by its critics. The C.I.A.'s interventions did not control events in Chile. In a country with a strong democratic tradition, Mr. Allende, who was elected with the support of only 36 percent of the electorate, did not have a popular mandate to carry out the far-reaching social revolution he envisaged. Ironically, the Moscow-oriented Communist Party recognized this fact and, until the very end, pressed Mr. Allende to reach an accommodation with his Christian Democratic rivals. But he was unable to control other far-left radical elements in his coalition, and at the time of his tragic overthrow, the country seemed to be sliding into civil war. The United States had no warrant whatsoever to meddle in the internal affairs of Chile. Such attempts to play the ideological and political policeman are usually Self-defeating and undermine the ideals of which the United States should be an exemplar. But neither is any good purpose served by exaggerating the importance of the C.I.A.'s bumbling interventions and ascribing to it the moral responsibility for the bloodshed, terror, and loss of freedom that the Chilean armed forces have since imposed on their own people. WITH ALL the harrow. ing record-of lies, perjury, murder, drug smuggling, burglary and the rest, the most intriguing single revelation is that for some taxpayers and keep those 'years the CIA subsidized tax dollars flowing to the the American Communist half-baked eternal school- Party publication, "The boys who ran the spook Daily Worker." Braden shop through all its years explains this plausibly as of glory. growing out of the desire ' The show is not to be to "keep your enemy in missed by any American i i " pos t on so that you know , with any hope of regaining what he's thinking. Anoth- popular, representative, er explanation is to keep elected control of the Approved For Release 2001/08/88 1 IY{o-Oi5P77-00432R000100380002-4 the enemy visible to the country and its doings in NEW YORK TIMES 7 Dec. 1975 Chile Paper Denies C.I.A. Support SANTIAGO, Chile, Dec. 6 (AP) - Chile's most important newspaper chain said today that it "energetically rejects" 'a United States Senate commit- tee report that the Central In- telligence Agency paid out $1.6 million fo keep it publishing during the era of the late presi- dent, Salvador Allende Gos- sens. , The chain's -Santiago news- paper, El Mercurio, said in a front-page editorial that the re- port a Senate special com- mittee investigating C.I.A. activities "ventures far beyond reality and is an incredible maneuver to damage the pres- tige of a news organ and those who direct it.,, Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380002-4 4 December 1975 e White H~'us~ Killers Y DAVID EISENHOWER off Castro." CIA aide Richard Bissell re- sponsibility (the Kennedy cases), even B - d Ordinarily, when you come up against the Kennedy Iegend and lose, you shrug it cff. It rarely occurs to anyone that in such a contest he might win. But when allega- tions of murder are thrown all over the po- litical lot except at the very people who are most likely to have been Implicated with it, it may be worth at least a try at over- coming the invincibility of that Kennedy ethos. was Wormed at least twice about i?~aria the Church committee's action is a deadly tro kill C t as o In real terms, this problem comes up as .-connections with attempts , a result of the recent report of Sen. Frank without disavowing either and, supposedly; combination of the two. Even when pro- Church's Intelligence Committee. To put without telling his brother, the President, tectirg the Kennedy,, it is not a laughing the matter as-starkly as possible; and also-about them. Robert Kennedy is, in fact, .matter to throw out infetences of murder as truthfully as possible, where there is the? frequently portrayed by the Church com- into a publicf where the distinctions best.. evidence that a President of the between "inferum erences" and .fact; get blurred. In other words, even to spare the United States might have known about and feelings of the Kennedy fans, you should sanctioned assassination, attempts, the - Even.--when protecting treat accusations of murder similarly in President In question is absolved. Where the evidence is weakest and most atten- - the Kennedy,, it is not a similar cases. lau~hinP matter to..throw:.- That's- what the law is supposed to be bated that Presidents--were involved, the. a a ` -about-treating similarly situated people Church committee uses the strongest lan- Out' Inferences of Murder similarly. And respect for the law and for" gunge with the-most sinister implications. -:' into- a public: 'forum forum where American ideals is supposed to be the rea- It ids unmistakably obvious that the former the. distinctions between "in son why the Church committee is washing President is Bohn F..Iietmedy and the lot- t, , so much dirty laundry in public. We have ter are Dwight Eisenhower and Richard. ferences and facts get.: to have an open society, reasons Sen. Nixon. blurred. Church, so let it all out, no matter how bad :..... `Straightforward Actl it looks. To take the cases in chronological or- mitiee as misled by the nature-and extent Less Than :Meets the Eye' der, President amver is accused of in- of CIA activities, a proposition which Tom "There are a couple of problems with this, volvement in plans ns t to assassinate Patrice Braden, a: Washington coluninist'With close _ " posture. One is that we may be letting stuff I Congo' ba;' --a pro-Sortl leader in the Kennedy. associations and a. former.Office out that .is worse than what really happens. i Congo' before and shortly after its inde- of Strategic Services man himself, thinks Ia':-other words, in the cases of all three ! going '? pendence from Thee tof.the is "impossible,toamagirie.'.' Presidents, there is apparently less at at a a meeting of of the-Na- tional Security Council, "President Eisen All of this activity, the- Church. commit.. on than meets an eye scanning the Church howerris `said to have expressed the wish: tee concludes, shows-only ,that-President report..A report from an American Senate: for "straightforward activity" against Lu- : Kennedy was interested: in. some kind. of committee accusing Americans of plotting. mamba. This" recollection comes from one "broad strategy."_ to. bring, about t Cuban, de murder is one thing if .it. is solidly based- It mocracy becomes quite another thing, somet:: uncorroborated witness: At least three- more.' like the most irresponsible kind.of other witnesses of the same meeting did Moving right, along despite .a mountairr. - ip v if it is a device aimed at one y evidence. of Kennedy,, displeasure with p are like only not recall an such order.... of the most A day later, Director of the CIA Allen the Ngo Dinh Dient-regime and undoubted Ply .byevidence.: another, using Dulles" is reported to have authorized an at- U.S. involvement in the coup against him flimsy evidence: what good will the- ro? e. W tempt on Lumumba, resulting in"the trans- and his brother Nhu, 'the- Church commit:, it has. demoralized the report or What we CIA. mission of various guns and poisons to the tee finds the Kennedy,, absolved because cannoi know is how foreigners will react to Congo. Six months later, Lumumba died-in the murders of Diem and Nhu were our self-flagellation. Senator Church tt the hands of his Congolese. captors-his spontaneous acts. The assassination. of_ ? will respect our candor. I urch t inks death unrelated to a CIA plot, according to General Trujillo of the-Dominican. Repute they but think that this is akin to thinking a rap- the Senate committee itself. On the basis of lie, though' plotted with the-knowledge of the one "straightforward activity" remark,--American ,"personnel".., (read._"the."Press-;',_istBell beas mired for r c f ssisaabout not the committee draws the "inference" that dent, John F.. Kennedy') is construed by assassinating people, hedged with more President Eisenhower authorized an assas- Church's group as defiance of Kennedy's vague words about not barring covert ac- sination. ? written ? statement that assassination is es wo d Church report ongr ve t ae- wrong (though .not so wrong as to prevent tiviti, the On the other hand, the Kennedy broth- U.S. recognition of Trujillo's assassins ance about how the CIA should be conduct- ers are held by the committee to have = itself, which, after all. Is supposed to should they succeed.) been unaware of the repeated murder ef- be the main product of the Church commit- forts in. the -Caribbean on the following ?evi-.' -When -the report: comes to Richard tee.- Perhaps that will come with the com- dence: There were repeated presidential- Nixon,' .Sens-'Church's committee finds tee Perhaps final report in a few months. In level discussions'of the Kennedys' displeas- - "inferences"-. that. President Nixon gave the meantime, is any broader purpose than ure with Castro: As in the Eisenhower-Lu- carte blanche to the CIA to kill whoever publicity for politicians being served? It's mumba case, Sen..Church found references necessary to keep Allende from power in -hard to see what that might be. ,to suggestions for- "straightforward act- Chile'- and therefore Mr. Nixon should be Assassination. Just the sound of the ivity" against Castro. responsible for the death of General Rene word makes one's skin crawl. The commit- Schneider. General Schneider had been a However, in what seems to some ears to tee report calls it a coawlded, targeted tfor CIA' Iddna ping; but died- in a- be stronger language,. those discussions target P. tntentionali;illing of apolitical leader." also included references to' "disposing of non MA, connected: kidnapping: Don't we need far more tangible, convinc- Castro." CIA director John McCone re- - The Church committee is thus giving us in.-- proof before we even begin to make calls. that. discussions with the Kennedy, more than a double standard. It Is saying, such grave charges against . Presidents were' even -drawn In terms- of "knocking that. where there. is clear evidence of re Kennedy or Nixon or my grandfather? pproved-For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RPP -00432R000100380002-4 e calls that President Kennedy ordered the clearer evidence of responstb[lcly is nee CIA to "get off its ass" against Castro. - to establish an "inference." WVhere there is Further, within three weeks of JFK's in- extremely vague evidence of responsibil- auguration, his national security adviser, ity (the Eisenhower and Nixon cases), no McGeorge Bundy, was briefed on the de- more than vague hints are needed. velopment of an "assassination capability" As I said at the outset, people are used i within the CIA. Mr. bru'ndy -supposedly did. to less than equity when dealing with the" not order it stopped nor, supposedly, did Kennedy legend. And, in recent years; poll- he tell President Kennedy. Robert Kennedy- ticians have gotten used to throwing Wrathy case lly. r tut ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380002-4 i LONDON TD4ES 20 Nov. 1975 John Ehrlichman, one of former President'Nix'on's closest advisers, tantalizes Washington with a semi-autobiographical novel Fiction that tries to be- stranger, than Watergate fact From Fred Emery Washington, Nov 19 Did a former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, who became an ambassador, blackmail a former President over Watergate-type actions and a Caribbean-linked assassi- nation ? Indeed so, at. least in a novel that is the talk of Washington before it has even accounts " there has been nothing like it since the play Macbird made President John- son responsible for .the murder of John Kennedy. With his appeals against con- victions pending, Mr Ehrlich- man is now . in New Mexico, bearded, and reported to. be separated from his wife Jeanne, who .. unflaggingly been published. , . ' attended every.;,-,day of his The reason is that the novel trials.' . ?' ' - is not by the likes of ? Mr E. The novel was first reported Howard Hunt of " plumbers": with fascination by Mr William ' notoriety. It is by Mr John Ehrlichman, twice convicted of Watergate crimes perpetrated while he was one of the most powerful men in the land, as President Nixon's adviser on domestic affairs. That he should write with such verisimilitude of recent events, veiling against libel, but giving a yet more shocking and perhaps, more plausible twist, makes the iretter all the more intriguing. Mr Ehrlich- man insists that it is all just a novel, assured, of course, of best-seller status. By initial LONDON TIMES 2c; Nov. 1975 Safire, the ' former Nixon speechwriter who continues his occasional apologia for the deposed President in his col- umn in The New York Times. He is perplexed by the close- to-the-bone questions the novel asks, and confesses that there is no knowing how much truth there is in it... Mr Safire relates that the CIA chief in the book -actually carried out in the early sixties an assassination in the Carib- bean at the order of a Presi- dent now dead. Later a Presi- dent whom the CIA maze; fears conies to power, but the - CIA man cultivates "a national security adviser with a German accent" who helps to protect the dread secret. Where Mr Safire is shy of giving away the whole plot, Mr Daniel Schorr of the Columbia. Broadcasting System has plunged ahead. The same day as Mr Safire's column appeared, he broadcast. on national television a picture' of the novel's flyleaf. (The Company it is due to be titled) and brazened ahead with the identities of all those we have come to know from the recent power structure. Mr Schorr also had this vicious scenario: the President wants to use the old assassi- nation report against the dead President's political allies. The CIA man realizes this will drag him down, too. He confronts the President at a dramatic Camp David meeting. His blackmail: the CIA knows all about the plan for raiding and bugging the opposition political party headquarters, LICENSED TO KILL 'Throughout its history the United States has been father to some of the best and the worst in human behaviour. Its leaders :and its ordinary citizens have :shown themselves capable of the highest idealism and the lowest gangsterism. The Senate report on the CIA displays both elements in 'a mixture that is uniquely American. On the one hand it presents an extremely disturbing picture of criminal, immoral and inefficient be- haviour by agents and institu- tions of the United States Government. On the other hand it shows another branch of the same government exposing this behaviour, albeit very late in the day, and rendering it much less likely to be repeated in the future. Friends of America can only hope that the benefits deriving from this demonstration of the system's ability to correct its own abuses will outweigh the damage done by the revelation of the abuses themselves. There is no doubt that the revelations are damaging. The squalid and often laughable antics. of some of the crackpots and gangsters who were drawn into the service of American foreign policy (a saddening pic. ture in itself) should not obscure the serious implications of the evidence that earlier American administrations thought. they were justified in trying to engineer the assassination of foreign politicians. Counsel for .the defence. would presumably say that the United States was engaged in a struggle equivalent to a war with a ruthless com- munist power which would use any met ods in u s~hiiit world dominat pP"v l~cl" !fg P it would be naive and unrealistic to be too scrupulous about methods. Nice guys finish last, as the Amercans say. What are the lives of a few unlamented and often fairly villainous foreign .leaders in comparison to the free world's interest in . preserving and the telephone tapping of 1 reporters and staff. He will trade this for the destruction of the CIA Assassination report. The President complies. The questions being asked in the Washington political arm- munity are obvious. Why would-Mr Ehrlichman suggest the President had prior know- ledge of a bugging break-in? What' else did the CIA man have "on" the president, and perhaps others of his staff, that he was so powerful to succeed in this blackmail ? One thing seems clear, at least to Mr Safire. Mr Ehrlich- man, who with Mr H. R. Hal- deman sought and failed to gain a last-minute pardon from the resigning Mr Nixon, seeks to get his own back on those he might feel abandoned him. Mr Safire writes : -The author spares nobody . least of all the President. Ehr- lichman's `President Richard Monckton' reflects only the dark side of the leader he fol- lowed all his life. more efficient and had not been brought to light. A more substantial argument is that by using such methods the United States damaged and diminished itself at home and abroad. International as well as American influence around the domestic politics must be subject world ? to some legal and moral order Counsel for the prosecution _ if they are not to degenerate into could reply roughly as follows. anarchy. Once a government, It is true that the deaths of starts using the methods of the Lumumba and Trujillo evoke gangster its entire mentality is few tears and were probably broadly in the American interest. But the death of President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam solved nothing. If Dr Castro had been assassinated it is far from certain that the United States would have been better off, and the threat which he was thought to pose has since proved much milder than expected, partly because the Russians did some- thing to restrain his attempts to promote revolution in Latin America. As for the death of Dr Allende, which he himself did much to bring about, it has produced a situation which could yet rebound against the United States and has already done its reputation some damage. In other words, even on the coolest calculation of national interest, and leaving morals aside, assassination is an impre- cise weapon which is liable to have unpredictable results, such as the martyrdom of the victim or his. replacement by somebody worse.. Granting that extreme situations can sometimes demand extreme actions, and that moral absolutes may conflict with poli- tical needs, it is highly doubtful q are defending ~vit140-AM ~hulClt~~`dt' fen as much azfending as of united States even it it, hid.been . the means of defence. Watergate affair was a symptom ' of corruption deriving from the belief that any methods were justified in what was assumed to be the defence of the American presidency. The activities of the CIA were the result of a belief that any methods were justified in the defence of what were assumed to be American interests abroad. They went longer uncorrected because the checks and balances* of the American system are less effec- tive in foreign policy than in domestic affairs. But American interests'do-not. depend only on nuclear weapons and friendly governments or client states. They depend also on the ability of the United States to convince people that-it represents certain values and principles and ways of life that are worth defending. If it uses the same methods as the KGB it will come to be regarded in the same light. Obviously it cannot always appear as a knight in shining armour, and moral pos- turing in the wrong context can Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380002-4 Nrg YORK TIMES WASHINGTON POST 6OEC1975 7DEC1975 TS ASSAIL I ~M. Korry, and 1967; Edward concoction of a simplistic and M. Korry, Ambassador between monstrous black and white Intelligence 1967 and 1971, and Charles A. mythology-a legend in which LGOVERTACT!ON WASHINGTON, Dec. 5 (AP) I --Covert action aimed against foreign governments has dam- ,aged the reputation of the. tUnited States and should be (severely curbed; four authori-! ' ties on issues of national se- curity said today. "Many of the problems !which beset the intelligence 1community result from histori- ;cal slips on the banana peel of covert action," said David A. hillips, a former Central In- lIigence Agency official who was involved in undercover operations. "Our reputation has been, damaged and our capacity for ethical and moral world lead- ership has been: impaired," said Clark M. Clifford, former Sec-retary of Defense. Mr. Clifford told the Senate ;'ntelligence Committee it was clear that covert operations .aavo gotten out of hand. Knowledge about such oper- ntions has become so wide- pread," he said, "that our country has been accused of ',sing responsible for practical- _y every internal difficulty that as occurred in every country :z. the world." Security Need Stressed Cyrus R. Vance, former Deputy Secretary of Defense, -aid he believed it should be 'U nnited States policy to engage .in covert actions only when. it I was "absolutely essential" to the security of the nation. By covert operations, the ;witnesses were referring to seo: et actions taken to 'influ= fence another country's atti- f tudes and public opinion, in- cluding attempts to change the government or course of events.mMost of the witnesses 161d not oppose other intelli- (gence-gathering operations. However, Morton Halperin, :'ormer Assistant Secretary of Defense for National Security Affairs, said all or most of the United States clandestine in- telligence-gathering operatives !should be called home. The other witnesses said the capability for such action should be retained. Mr. Phillips said that ending covert opera- tions entirely would be like (disbanding the Army in .peace !time or "abolishing the office of the President because it has been once abused." Mr. Clifford and Mr. Vance [proposed a complete overhaul. lcf the 1947 National Security Act to make certain that all,. covert action proposals are con- sidered and approved only at the, _cc level of the executive- I ,ranch and reviewed in advance :)P their implementation by a Congressional committee. sZ4Ambassadors' Testimony Special to The New York Times WASHINGTON, Dec. 5-The Senate committee's hearing yes- terday was largely devoted to statements and testimony from Three former United States dip- omats involved with Chile:, lnlnh A. Dungan, . Ambassador. Meyer, who was. Assistant Sec- the American bullyboys kicked retary of State for Inter-Amen- , and cuffed small and innocent can Affairs from 1969 to 1973. Social. Democrats because they Mr. Dungan urged in a state- only wanted control of their. ment that the C.I.A.'s clandes- resources, and because they tine operations apparatus be only wished to implement some sharply reduced in size and progressive socio - economic that its functions be centered -programs, and besides, weren't more on intelligence gathering. they democratically elected?" Mr. Meyer confirmed in brief While the committee staff testimony statements in the re- reported that it could establish port that he was uncomfortable no direct operational involve- about intervention .in Chile's ment by the C.I.A. or United internal affairs. States Embassy in the 1973 Mr. Korry angrily charged coup, the members agreed dur- that Senator Frank Church, ing a press briefing today that chairman of the select commit- the United States policy had tee, and committee staff mem- "created the atmosphere" in bers had tried to keep him Chile for Dr. Allende's removal. from testifying. He charged 1964 Election Influenced that the committee report painted Dr. Allende and the According to the committee Marxists in Chile in an entirely staff, the attempts to manipu- favorable light, while making !late the Chilean Government the United States representa- ;were most intense in 1963 and tives appear to be "goons." '1964 and from 1970 to 1973. He said that this was. an The staff reported that the inaccurate "rewriting of histo-' United States supplied $3.4 mil- ry." Mr. Korry said he neither lion to help bring about the approved nor knew of plans -election of Eduardo Frei Mon- to cause a military coup in talva, a Christian Democrat, 1970 and had argued against, as President in 1964, defeating such an approach. ( a coalition of Marxist parties. In a 28-page letter to Senator Mr. Frei's party also won con- Church, given to reporters at trol of the Chamber of Depu- the. hearing, Mr. Korry charged ties. - that an article in the Sept. At the briefing session with 8 issue of The New York Times reporters today, committee had been leaked by a counsel staff members asserted that on another subcommittee head- Mr. Kissinger was the central' ed by Senator Church._ figure designing United States The article, the Korry state- policy in Chile during the Nixon ment said contained, material years. They said that as nation- critical of him.: ? ? al security adviser and, chair- Mr. Korry's statement con- man of the 40 Committee, tinued: :which authorizes covert opera- "Do you not find, these accu- tioris, he was constantly'being sations by your staff, leaked pressed by President Nixon to sneaky anonymity without any get things done. prior notification, without any The report said the effort communication to me, of- any to stop Dr. Allende's election kind, without any opportunity began in the spring of 1970.1 to this date to examine charges It said that Mr. Korry, who or to rebut them, a callous, was then Ambassador, submit- even criminal abuse of the U.S. ted a plan to spend $500,000 judicial process?" 'to affect the Congressional vote ? f th a noff aru Also during his appearance, a -brief one devoted mainly to reading parts of his letter, Mr. Korry described the ' C.I.A. as "amoral." It was authorized by Con- gress to be so," he added. "It, was paid to be." . His letter said the agency could "operate behind my back, not merely with the President of the United States, but with Chileans and private Ameri- cans, because the whole proc- ess of espionage and Intel-j ligence, like knowledge, confers immense power, and because the C.I.A. was the one per- manent institution to tie. the past to'the present in the in- fluential ? and persuasive arena of clandestine political activi- ty.,. Nevertheless, -Mr. Korry strongly defended the actions) of C.I.A. representatives ini Chile during his, tenure. He, said they were fulfilling their, "rightful responsibilities and by, precedents legitimized by sue-, cessive. Presidents . and Con- gresses:" . Mr. Korry charged that Sena- tor Church had covered up real. events in Chile. Was not the cover-up, he asked, "indispensable to your i erew s This was rejected on June `27, the committee said, but it added that the 40 Committee, .an arm of the National Security Council that is supposed to review all clandestine opera- tions, voted $300,000 to be used as a "spoiling" operation in the election. The State Depart- ment, the report said, opposed this. The report recalled that after the Allende inauguration, Pres- ident Nixon said in his 1971 State of the World Message: "We are prepared to have the kind of relationship with the .Chilean Government that it is prepared to have with us." The report then said: "Yet, public pronouncements 'notwithstanding, after Al- lende's inauguration the 40 .Committee approved a total of over $7 million in covert support to opposition groups in Chile." It said the money also funded an extensive anti-Allende prop- aganda campaign. ','The C.I.A. rebuht its new network of contacts," the re- port asserted "and remained Close to Chilean military offi- cers in order to monitor devel- opments within the armed .forces." 'Deputy Set At Pentagon The White House has decided to create a new. Defense Department post of second deputy defense secretary that will be largely concerned at least initially with intelligence problems, according to informed government officials. The officials, who asked not to be identified, said the new Defense Secretary, Donald H. Rumsfeld, has decided to promote Robert Ellsworth, the present assistant defense secretary for international security affairs, to the post. Ellsworth, a former U.S. ambassador to NATO, will report directly to the Defense Secretary and will be on the same level as the present deputy defense secretary, William P. Clements Jr. The officials also said Rumsfeld has decided to bring in deputy White House press secretary William Greener as the new assistant secretary for publi affairs to replace Joseph Laitin, a close associate of former Defense Secretary James R. NEW YORK TIMES 2 4 NOV 1975 C.I.A. Said to Have Links With Azores Secessionists The Central Intelligencef Agency has developed exten- sive contacts with a group fav- oring secession for the Portu- guese Azores and State Depart- . ment ' officials have received representatives of the group, Time magazine has reported in its issue that goes on sale to- day. Time said the contacts were set up with the Azorian Libera- tion Front, which advocates in- dependence for the island group in the Atlantic, despite United States Government claims of "strict noninvolve- ment" with the separatists. The C.I.A. purpose, the maga- zine said, was "occasionally to provide some guidance and share information about devel- opments on the mainland." "The C.I.A. also wanted to be in a position to help push for secession if Lisbon went Communist," It added. Time said that representa- tives were of the Azorian Front had been received by middle level State Department officials in Washington, although it did not, say when. Approved for Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001Q0380002-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380002-4 PENTHOUSE December 1975 BY:JOSEPH4 B:TREASTER ?.THE DIRECT Back in;tho'se difficult . days' in the'White= r: House when the war in Vietnam was get r tingebigger. and:; seeming,. more unwinTM nabte;every day, it'must.have looked like' such a beautiful. plan: get the. CIA to _pull together: all..the, intelligence'' people one! four..'side-.the South Vietnamese police' the}military;-everyone, who; knew 'any- thing about the,VietGong; pinpoint;the enemy'spolitical. leaders, the; men who': called the shots; then; send-in`comman; [onto neatly,surgically:take them out of; the picture Yoil rlsked.;only.a.few men:; Yift~ ripped:; out': the heart of `the'hated Iron Within ?rr t. t ,, r ~fo~ ED" - as simplicity itself But`what be. ?ame known'as 'the Phoenix. Pro gram" was,.one,of. thoseconcepts.that, did not Irmove gracefully. from the drawing board: fo..real life-at least not in the hands bf y h .YV y the' ClA :r ; ayr { t' s ~ ~ ? i32