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25X1A Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001003800057.1 CONFIDENTIAL and ISSUES INTERNAL USE ONLY This publication contains clippings from the domestic and foreign press for YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use of selected items would rarely be advisable. 31 OCTOBER 1975 NO. 22 GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS GENERAL WEST EUROPE NEAR EAST AFRICA EAST ASIA LATIN AMERICA PAGE 1 29 39 41 42 43 49 Destroy after backgrounder has served its purpose or within 60 days. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001-00380005-1 Washington Post 31 OCT 1975 Kissinger CM Group Didn't Meet By George Lardner.Jr. Washington Post Stet! Writer Nearly 40 covert Central -.Intelligence . Agency . operations were approved between 1972 and 1974 without a Single meeting of the Special While House group that was -ostensibly in charge of them, it was disclosed yesterday. Testifying before the House intelligence committee, a ' recently retired State. Department intelligence ' expert said the National Security Council's so-called Forty Committee did not have a single formal session bet?;. ? ween April. of 1972 and December of 1974. The witness, James R. Gardner, who served for nine years as the State Depart- ment's liaison officer with the Forty Committee, said the - committee's chairman, Henry A. Kissinger, apparently ? preferred to approve or at times _reject the secret :operations after "telephone votes,'" without face-to-face :'meetings at which their ?-merits could be debated and : discussed. ?: "Sometimes he felt he just didn't have the time for it and anyway, he knew what he wanted to be done," Gardner added later to reporters. He likened the Forty Committee under Kissinger to "Lincoln's Cabinet" ? with Kissinger's 'vote being the only one that s counts. ' Covert operations, which _Gardner said used to be far .more numerous than their re- cent 20-per-year average,have ranged all, the way from the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion to paying off politicians in Chile and raising a sunken Soviet submarine from the Pacific Ocean floor. The Forty Committee, which has existed under ? various names since the mid- ' 50s, has also been in charge of certain secret intelligence- gathering activities such as U- 2 spy flights. Kissinger is chairman by virtue of his post as special assistant to the President for national security affairs, a job he ;retained after his appointment in i973 as Secretary of State. ?' " Other members are CIA Director William E. Colby, Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements Jr., Gen. George S. Brown, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Air Under Secretary of State .for The Washington Star Thu.rdcy&io13;:?0, 197S Crosby S. Noyes Reverse Me in furor over intelligence artnyism i0Offlo These are hard times for the intelligence community. To judge from the expres- sions of horror and shock from our liberal legislators, we are back in the era of an intelligence-gathering which held that "gentlemen don't read other people's mail." Of course,-it's perfectly O.K. for private citizens to steal secret government documents and deliver them by the crateful to sympathetic newspapers. But let the government be accused of reading the mail or listening to the phone calls of a few people sus- pected of being security risks or involved in the international drug traffic, and the foundations of our fundamental civil liberties are held to be in deadly peril. It is very fashionable these days to be against any intelligence-gathering ac- tivity. It is even fashionable to be against national se- curity. Everything of this sort is automatically relat- ed to the excesses of the Nixon administration in,the Watergate affair. ? We are well on the way to a kind of reverse McCarthy- ism in which the most ele- mentary activities of the various security agencies are denounced as deep-dyed plots against individual freedom. Political Affairs Joseph J. Sisco. Gardner, an officer of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research who became liaison officer for secret CIA operations in 1966. said that the approximately 40 covert operations authorized between 1972 and 1974 were all subject to "telephone votes" by Forty Committee mem- bers, but that except for KiSsinger, committee members were often not given detailed explanations ? of why the programs had been ap- proved The official records of the Forty Committee, Gardner added, also became far less In this I suspect there is a large element of hypocrisy and political miscalcUla- tion. Americans may de- plore the need for govern- ment snooping on the activities of their fellow- citizens. But most would also recognize the legitima- cy of mail interception and phone taps in cases involv- ing national security, kid- naping or organized crime. It is hard to contend ? as some liberals do ? that se- curity of communications is a constitutional-right guar- anteed to all citizens. From its inception, the telephone has been the most insecure means of private communication., Almost everyone over the age of 30 has lived in a community of party lines where every conversation was assumed to be monitored and in which the telephone opera- tor was always the best-in- formed gal in town. In every foreign country, the tapping of resident foreign- ers is automatically expect- ed. A few years ago, I remember calling Lyndon Johnson's presidential as- sistant McGeorge Bundy at the White House with an indiscreet question, "Sure- ly," said Bundy, "You can't expect an answer to that ? especially over the tele- phone." Much the same goes for Although each department and agency represented on the Forty Committee submits the sanctity of the mails as an inviolable constitutional right of every American citizen. Many of those now leading the protest against the intelligence services spent plenty of disagreeable hours, as officers in the American Army in World War II, reading the letters of their own enlisted men ? a duty made the more dis- tasteful by the presumption that officers' mail was uncensored. True, we are not in a state of war today. But the principle that the privacy of communication is subordi- nate to the requirements of national security ? and presumably also the war against organized crime in this country ? would not be seriously disputed by a great majority of American citizens. The conflict between the rigIrts of the individual and the rights of society, repre- sented by a democratically elected government, is not exactly new. What is essen- tial today is that these dif- fering ? and not always easily compatible ? rights be redefined in a way which will protect honest citizens (by legal rather than politi- cal definition) without com- promising the right of the state to defend itself: It is one of the more ur- gent tasks ' of the post- Watergate period. 'memos detailing its views on Christian Science Monitor each proposed secret operation, Gardner said he had no way of telling how Carefully those views have been considered in recent years. By the time he retired, he said, the official minutes of the Forty Committee were "merely the statement of a decision" and plainly "inadequate." Kissinger is to testify before the committee today. Both Gardner and William Watts, a former staff secretary for the National Security Council, . handle intrigue than a politician who has made detailed under Kissinger than told the committee yesterdays it all the way to Washington? they had been in 1966. Also he that they felt Kissinger's I am appalled at the situation. told the Pike committee, the many roles have often Seal Beach, Calif. Joanne Sales number of covert operations inhibited serious con- qfiCO f . as '-lauen steauily, pp7gorle his32R.000100380005-1 1 l't6flefltdftijeu2011/6n8iffimen8ttiPietillIgltnarlYo even "radically," since 1966. own. 2, October 1975 Readers write In regard to your editorial concerning the CIA's spy files I should like to agree and add my response. Due to the bleatings of some of our legislators it looks like it may be no time until we have many vacant posts among the undercover operatives attempting to guard our national security. Perhaps it would be practical to ask those parties determined to disclose every facet of this program to fill those vacancies. After all who's more able to Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1 E IIIET?17 YORK TIMES, SATURDAY OCTOBER 18, 1975 U. S. Intelligence System: How Well Does it Do Ey JOHN M. CREWDSON SottO al to The New Ytfrit Times WASHINGTON, Oct. 17?As the House Select Committee on Irtelligence closes its doors to prepare the next phase of its investigation, it leaves behind what many see as a troubling answer to the question of how News well American in- Analysis telligence performs its principal task? predicting events of international significance in time to allow the makers of foreign policy to prepare or react. The conclusion that seems to emerge from public hearings over the last month is that the half-dozen or so Federal agen- des charged with gathering and evaluating foreign intelli- gence do not provide a reliable early-warning system where such things as wars, invasions and political upheavals are con- cerned. Representative Otis G. Pike, the Suffolk County Democrat who heads the 13-member se- lect committee, found the evi- dence so disturbing that he recently went so far as to ques- tion this country's ability to detect in advance a threat to its own shores. ? Form Crisea. Studied "If an attack were to be launched on America in the very near future," Mr. Pike declared, "it is my belief that America would not imow that the attack were about to be launched." The Central Intelligence Agency disputed that assertion, but so far no one has seriously challenged Mr. Pike's assess- ment that, in return for an in- telligence budget that approach- es $7-billion, the country does not seem to be getting its money's worth. In the public hearings, the committee chose to concentrate on four international crises in which the United States had a military or diplomatic interest, and by which it was to some extent caught off guard?the 1968 Tet offensive in Vietnam, the 1973 war in the Middle, East, the military coup in Por- tugal and the invasion of Cyprus by Turkey. Despite delays in obtaining documentary evidence, occa- sioned by dispute with Presi- dent Ford r the committee's !handling of secret materials, the panel was able to estab- lish that in each of the four .instances warnings of what :was to happen failed to reach :the top. Deliberate Effort Seen The committeehis also under- stood to have received docu- ments showing failures of intel- ligence in advance of other events, including the 1968 in- vasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union and its allies and] the detonation of a nuclear de- vice by India, but those mate-1 rials are still secret. The reasons for the intelli- gence failures are varied and complex. In some instances, raw intelligence collected was incomplete or simply in error. In others, good intelligence was misinterpreted by analysts. In the case of the 1968 Tet offensive; the committee heard assertions that American lead- ers, in deference to precon- ceived policies and for fear of: inflaming antiwar sentiment at home, had ignored 'indications that the Communists' forces might be twice as large as the official estimates. Samuel A. Adams, a former C.I.A. analyst who specialized in studying the Vietcong, re- counted his contention that this ? country's "astonishment" at the scope of the Tet offensive had resulted from a deliberate ef- fort within the intelligence community "to portray the Vietcong as weaker than they actually were." Mr. Adams quoted from pre- viously secret cablegrams be- tween Saigon and Washington that resulted in the unan- nounced dropping of two cate- gories of Vietcong forces from le official strength estimate to keep it at its previous level of 299,000. Mr. Adams's charges of corruption were not repeated by witnesses who testified on NEW YORK TIMES 17 October 1975 Human Experimentation A pending Senate bill to broaden the responsibilities of the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research offers a. simple but promising approach to a difficult and-Often painful problem. ? ? The commission was established by Congress last ? year to take a two-year look at the practices, ethics and1 values involved in using human beings as research - subjects. Formed after exposure of the infamous Iabama. syphilis experiments, the commission was em- powered to propose regulations for such experimen- tation to the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. Under the law, the Secretary is required, if he chooses -not to promulgate the proposed regulation, to give his reasons in writing. e The new bill would enlarge the commission's' juris- diction to include experimentation ' conducted by the Approved For Release 2001/08/08: Cyprus, Portugal and the Mid- dle East. But their accounts of failure to clearly see or cor- rectly interpret key signala were equally dismaying to most of the committee mem- bers. One subsequent assessment obtained by the committee said "there was an intelligence failure in the weeks preceding the outbreak of war in the Mid- dle East" in October, 1973. ? Analysts Are Blamed The fault, it said, lay not with the collectors of intelli- gence, who passed on "plenti- ful, ominous and often accu- rate" indications that the threat of war was serious, but rather with the analysts who were assuring officials that "neither side appears to be bent on initiating hostilities." Some of the best intelligence, the committee was told, was picked up by the National Security Agency, which moni- tors the military communica- tions of other countries. But some of this intelligence could not be passed on to the Watch Committee, set up to keep an eye out for trouble spots, because its members were not clear to receive such sensitive material. Ray Cline, the State Depart- ment's director of research and intelligence at the time of the' 1973 war, testified that he had concluded hours before the fighting began that hostilities probably were imminent and he had asked that the message be passed to Secretary of State Kissinger. Mr. Cline said he learned later that Mr. Kissin- ger never got the message be- cause his secretariat "did not want to trouble him at that late hour." Three intelligence officials told the committee that their agen- cies?the C.I.A, the State De- partment and the Defense In- telligence Agency?had been surprised by last year's over- throw of the Portuguese Gov- ernment by leftist military leaders. According to William G. Hy- land, the current State Depart- ment intelligence chief, no specific warning was provided Its lob by intelligence agencies despite indications in the months be- fore. Another witness, Keith Clark, an intelligence officer for West- ern Europe, said the intelligence community had failed to com- pile information about the dis- sident military officers who led the coup in Portugal. According to evidence and testimony assembled by the House committee, C.I.A. anal- ysts studying the Cyprus situ:- ation in July, 1974, tempered their previous warnings that the Government of Archbishop Makarios, the President of Cy- prus, was endangered by the military regime in Greece. That reversal, according to a second post-mortem report made available to the commit- tee, occurred a few days before President Makarios was un- seated and was founded on a single C.I.A. report from Athens suggesting that the Government there "had now decided not to move against Makarios, at least for the time being." Ability to Foresee The Cyprus post-mortem re- Port comments on an "inabil- ity to foresee critical events in the face of mounting evidence to the contrary." "Ultimately," the report con- tinues, "intelligence will be judged in the context of its .ability to provide the consumer with premonitory assessments. The ability of the community to provide its consumers with the news after a crisis has erupted is widely recognized." The House committee drew; no conclusions about what fac- tors might account for the in- telligence failures, but the C.I.A. officers who wrote the Cyprus post-mortem report offered one, possible explanation. Among analysts, they said, there exists "the perhaps sub- conscious conviction and hope that ultimately reason and ra- tionality will prevail, 'that ap- parently irrational moves will not be made by essentially rational men." military services, the C.I.A. and the Veterans' Adminis- tration. It would also make the body permanent and' add a number of officials including the director of Central Intelligence and the Secretaries of Defense and H.E.W. The revelations over recent months of the irresponsible manner in which the C.I.A. and -the Army experimented on people and the tragic results of some of ,those experiments constitute a powerful argument for introducing accountability into the process of secret experimentation. The legislation is imperiled by jurisdictional objections of the armed services and veterans' affairs committees on both sides of Capitol Hill. Such territorial 'imperatives should not be allowed to impede this legislation. The protesting committees have never bestirred themselves sufficiently to insure that these efforts to increase human knowledge are carried out with a decent regard for health and the lives of the people involved. The commission as strengthened ?by the new bill, would afford far greater assurance of responsibility in future experimentation than is e'er likely to come from the established committees. ? CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1 C. TheWAington Star Ftil Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432ROOM0038d005-1 Weezmity, ()deter 22, ?,975. Service C By Norman Kempster Washington Star Staff Writer A close and friendly relationship *with the CIA has become virtually "a prerequisite for promotion" to top posts in the State Department, a middle-level Foreign Service officer has told the House Intelligence Com- mittee staff. "You aren't going to have an ambassador anywhere in the world unless he has a record of working closely with the CIA," the officer said in a telephone interview after an hour-long unannounced talk with a committee lawyer. The olicer, who declined to be identified by name, said the exten- sive use of embassy posts to provide "official cover" for overseas CIA operatives produces a cooperative ? relationship between the agency and State Department management both in Washington and 'abroad. ? STATE DEPARTMENT personnel officers must be aware of undercover :CIA agents assigned to embassies, he said. And Foreign Service officers who buck the CIA just don't get pro- moted, he said. The officer said he had urged the Committee to continue its efforts to question junior and middle-level State Department officials as part of its investigation of the effectiveness of the nation's intelligence efforts. Secretary of State Henry A. Kiss- inger has refused to permit employes below the assistant secretary level to answer the committee's questions on matters of policy. THE PANEL VOTED yesterday to avoid an immediate showdown with Kissinger on the issue. The secretary was summoned to appear either Oct. 30 or Oct. 31 to defend his policy in :person at a public hearing. BALTIMORE SUN 22 Oct. 1975 CIA probes linked to aide's execution Boston (AP1?An official of an unspecified Middle Eastern country was executed for supplying information to the Central Intelligence Agency after the official's identify was determined through testimony in congressional probes of the CIA, the Boston Globe said yes- terday. The newspaper quoted a congressional source as saying the execution took place recent- ly. The Globe said its report was based on at least a score of interviews with intelligence sources inside and outside the CIA. The committee decided to call Kissinger as a witness after rejecting, 8-5, a proposal to launch con- tempt of Congress proceed- ings against him. The- middle-level officer who was interviewed by the committee staff said the lawmakers should insist on talking to working-level officers because they would be more willing than their superiors to discuss CIA "penetration and manipu- lation" of the State Depart- ment. THE CIA'S PENCHANT for secrecy makes it dif- ficult to trace the agency's influence. In many cases, he said, records do not exist. For instance, he said, as an acting counsel in South Africa in the 1950s, he was told to show a potential in- formant a fake letter plant- ed in the consulate's safe. After the informant left, he said, he was told to destroy the document. "There are no records of much of what they do," he said. "They burn the records " OTIS PIKE, D-N.Y., chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, and four other Democrats wanted to start action against Kissinger for refus- ing to comply with the com- mittee's subpoena for a rs memo that criticizes U.S. handling of last year's Cyprus crisis. But an im- promptu coalition of four Democrats and four Repub- licans decided to make one nitre try at a compromise. "It was my opinion that we should proceed against Dr. Kissinger as we would against an ordinary mor- tal," Pike said sardonical- ly. It was understood that State Department officials were working on possible compromise proposals to assuage the committee without violating Kissing- er's rule barring junior and middle-level employes from discussing policy matters. Pike objects to the order, which he said prohibits the committee from finding out the full details of the effec- tiveness of the CIA and other intelligence agencies. But he may be willing to compromise after he has a chance to confront Kissing- er face-to-face. THE COMMITTEE has subpoenaed a memo writ- ten by Thomas Boyatt, who was the department's top Cyprus expert at the time of the coup that ousted Arch- bishop IVIakarios from the presidency of the island na- tion. Boyatt has confirmed that -the memo was sharply criticial of U.S. policy? but he has declined to discuss POST?DISPATCH, St. Louis 25 Sept. 1975 ? A CIA Pretense 1. At a press briefing ?in' St. Louis birector William E. Colby of the'Central Intelligence Agency indicated that by such appearances he is trying to repair the damage to his agency done by adverSe"publicitY stemming from congressional investigations. If success de- pended only on a cool and urbane manner, Mr. Colby accomplished his purpose here. But the press has an obligation to look behind the friendly smile and the smooth answer. At one point Mr. Colby was asked to comment on testimony before the House intelligence committee by Samuel A. Adams, former principal CIA analyst of Viet Cong troop strength, to the effect that the agency; yielding to military and political pressure, had underrated the adversary's strength just be- fore the 1963 Tet offensive. Mr. Colby replied that-there had simply been a disagreement between Mr. Adams and others in the agency over categories of Viet Cone; forces and that there was no deception or chaoging of figures. - This answer just does not square wi:h the difference of opinion beloeeen Mr. Adams and Approvedvi*Mentilfitethk0108/4140MIAQROPTIZ-00432ROMMO(88000EMby is not helping the 3 House testimony and in a. detailed article in CIA's image. ? kanao the specifics. Kissinger has refused to give the committee the memo because it was sent through a special "dissent channel" intended to per- mit middle-level officials to object to policy without being publicly identified with their suggestions. The secretary contends his objective is to protect Foreign Service officers from the sort of public con- demnation they received during the era of the late Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy. But Pike argued that Congress is so weak "com- pared with the executive branch" that it can cause little trouble. He said gov- ernment employes have far more to fear from their own departments than from Congress. ? "GOOD, HONEST MEN who state their views are -punished within the: bu- reaucracy -while those that are gagged or go along, keeping silent, are pro- moted in the bureaucracy," ? Pike said. "To me, this is a far greater danger to our country than a charge of neo-McCarthyism." Pike was the only mem- ber of the committee who would discuss the issue with reporters following the ses- sion. The committee's rules make the chairman the official spokesman. the May issue of Harper's ma zinc. He ; reported that in 1966 he had found that the Pentagon was using an estimate 6f Viet Cong guerrilla strength (103,573) that had been thought up by the South Vietnamese and that . had remained unchanged for two years. After studying reports from the field, Mr. Adams ; estimated as early as 1966 that total Viet Cong troop strength was 600,000 rather than the 270,000 figure used by the American command. I ? Yet despite strenuous protests byg.Mr. Adams, the only CIA analyst on this assign- ment, the agency, under orders from Director Richard Helms, accepted the American com- mand's figure of 270,000 as late as 1968. The deceptive figure, put out in response to pressure from Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker and Gen. Creighton Abrams, was only changed after-the disastrous Tet offensive, which cost heavy U.S. casualties, made clear that the military estimates had been wrong. By pretending that the only issue here was a Approved liEti YORK TIMES 22 Oct. 1975 C.I.A. 'MAIL COVER' NIT Al 2.7 MILLION 215,820 of Letters Opened ?During a 20-Year Program, Senate Panel Is Told By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK ? . Special to The New York Times ? WASHINGTON, Oct. 21?The Central Intelligence Agency opened more than 215,000 pieces of mail in a New York operation that many senior agency officials knew to be illegal, it was disclosed today at a Senate committee hearing. ? Testimony and documents in traduced before the Senate Se- lect Committee on Intelligence sketched a program of intru- sion ' upon the United States! mails fa rmore extensive than was inaicated in the Rockefel- ler Commission report on the intelligence community last June or in previous Congres- sional testimony. 1. Figures made available to the committee by 'the C.I.A. !showed that it photographed. ;the exterior of 2,705,726 pieces :of mail to and from the Soviet Union in its New York pro- -gram between 1953 and 1973: This, testimony established, %vas' one in every 13 pieces of mail to and from the ? Soviet Union. The agency opened 215,820 individual letters. Similar operations were conducted' on the West Coast, in Hawaii and in New Orleans, but all were of shorter dura- tion. No figures were given for these operations. Two C.I.A. internal investiga- tions of the New York mail, project, one in 1960 and the other in 1969, found the opera- tion of little intelligence value,: ,the men who conducted the: reviews testified. ? Gordon Stewart, Inspector General of the C.I.A. in 1969,1 said that his office was "quite, surprised to find such an en- deavor going on" and that, 'after an internal investigation, :he recommended that the ,project be turned over to the Federal Bureau of Investiga- tion, which was receiving a large portion of the intelligence information. Mr. Stewart and John Glen- non, and Thomas Abernathy, -former staff members in the Inspector General's Office, said they believed the project was illegal. Moreover, Mr. Glennon testified, "obviously everyone involved in it at the C.I.A] realized it was illegal." gi As early as 1962, the C.I.A. !became concerned that the mail opening might inadvertently be gnade public and it devised cov- er stories for those involved, according to agency documents. For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1 ND' YORK TIMES 23 Oct. 1975 Hthns Says Search Of Mail Was Illega "As an example of additional safeguards to the project," one memorandum said, "high-level police contacts with the New York City Police Department are enjoyed, which would pre- !elude any uncontrolled inquiry in the event police action was ;indicated." A committee source said ,there was no evidence that the New York police knew 'about the illegal mail opening. The 20-year project appeared :to pick up speed in the late 'nineteen-fifties and again in .the early nineteen-seventies. ?During these periods, figures indicated, the C.I.A. was exam- ,ining peak numbers of mail items, and between 1970 and 1972 averaged about 2 million a year. According to C.I.A. memo- 'randums, the project was origi- nally proposed to postal offi- cials as one in which the C.I.A. would'only photograph the out- side of envelopes?in effect, a "mail cover." New York was selected because that was where mail to the Soviet Union was funneled. Subsequently, by the mid- nineteen-fifties, large numbers of letters were being opened, but it was unclear whether postal officials or Attorneys General were fully informed. According to testimony, members of the C.I.A.'s Office. of Security chose mail at ran- dom from the traffic between the United States and the So- viet Union, as well as looking for letters of certain persons. More than 25 million letters 'were, routed to the Soviet Union during the period. There was no direct testimo- ny on how the mail was opened, but intelligence sources said that the C.I.A. at first used a steam system, but later developed an oven, that "baked" the letters open. After the mail was opened, the con- tents were photographed and the letters were resealed and sent on their way. It was unclear whether the C.I.A. obtained approval over the years from Postmasters Ge- neral or Attorneys General. One memorandum made pub- lic today indicated that Richard M. Helms, former Director of Central ? Intelligence, had briefed Edward Day, Postmast- er General in 1961, and that Mr. Day permitted the project to continue but "he did not want to be informed in any greater detail on the handling." According to the Rockefeller Commission report. Mr. Helms briefed Attorney General John N. Mitchell and Postmaster General Winton Blount in 1971, and they fully "concurred." In its report, the Rockefeller Commission said at one point that "some 8,700 items were opened and the contents ana- lyzed"; at another point, it said the project had "expanded by 1959 to include the opening of over 13,000 letters a year." But at no point did the commis- sion make public the total num- bers of letters involved. Testimony before other Con- gressional committees and the select committee had estab- lished earlier that the mail pro- gram intruded upon the mail of',-- Senators, Representatives By LINDA CHARLTON special to The ls;evi York Times WASHINGTON, Oct. 22 ? 'Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence from 1966 to 1973; testified today that he !knew then that the agency's mail-opening program was il- legal. But he said he assumed that Allen W. Dulles, the intel- ligence agency's director who started the operation in 1953, had "made his legal peace with it." Mr. Helms, the only witness this afternoon before the Senate Select Committe on Intelli- gence, also conceded that , a 1970 report to President Nixon that he and others had signed, and that stated that the mail- opening - operation . had been discontinued? was untrue. But he added that there had been "no intention to mislead" the . President., He explained that he- had believed- that the statement had referred ?toy a similar operation of the Fed- eral Bureau of Investigation, which had. been discontinued. It was disclosed during testi- mony yesterday that the agen- cy had opened more than 215,- 000 pieces of mail in' New York from 1953 to 1973 and had photographed the exterior of 2,705,726 pieces of mail to and and other bublic -officials, in-I eluding Senator Frank, Church,I Democrat of Idaho. Mr. Churche Is chairman of the Senate selecti committee. . Suspension of Intercepts WASHINGTON, Oct. 21 (UPI) ? The State Dertment ap- parently asked the C.I.A. to suspend interception of mail to and from China in connec- tion with President Nixon's vi- sit in 1972, a-Senate investiga- tor indicated today. Questioning C.I.A. witnesses during a hearing of the Senate intelligence committee, Senator Walter Huddleston, Democrat of Kentucky, asked whether the witnesses knew about a stop order on aalL ihtercerts involving "an Asiatic country" in connection with the visit "of an eiecutive of this country to that country." THe witnesses said they were unaware of it, but it was clear from previous diclosures that Senator Huddleston referred to a C.I.A. operation in San Fran- cisco that sporadically inter- cepted amil to and from Com- munist nations in the Far East between 1969 and 1973. Senator Huddelston, glancing at documents, said the suspen- sion request was made by the Secretary of State?who, in 1972, was Willeam P. Rogers., Secretary of State Kissingere then Presidential assistant fort national security affairs, made the first secret trip to Peking in July, 1971, to arrange for Mr. Nixon's visit, which took place in February, 1972. 4 from the Soviet Union. Difference in Testimony Replying to questions about whether the agency had obtain- ed approval of its program from Postmaster-General, Mr. Helms was occasionally at vani-I ame.with two of the three wit-I nesses this morning; all former Postmasters General. They were J. Edward Day, Postmaster General trom 1961 to 1963, and Winton M. Blount, who held that position from 1969 ?to 1971. The third was John A. Gronouski, who headed the Post Office Department from 1963 to 1965; he said flatly and angrily that he knew noth- ing- of the program and would have opposed it if he had. This was confirmed both by Mr., Helms and -by an internal C.I.A. memorandum. Mr. Day, however, said that shortly after he took office in 1961, Mr. Helms, Mr.: Dulles (who died in 1969) and Kermit Roosevelt, then a C.I.A. offi- cial, visited him, saying they wanted to tell -him "something very secret." Mr. pay recalled that his reply was: "Do I have to know about it?" And was told he did not. He added that he was "sure that I wasn't told anything about opening mail." Told of Secret 'Project' Mr. Blount said be was told about a secret "project" in which the Post Office Depart- ment was cooperating .with the C.I.A., but not specifically the opening of mail. He asked if he should seek legal advice from the general counsel, he said, and was told that the mat- ter of legality had been dis- cussed- with the then Attorney General, John W. Mitchell. He did know, he said, that the mail of "avowed enemies of this country" was being "in- terrupted"?that is, taken out of the "main stream." and the front and back of the enevel, apes photocopied. The committee issued a subpoena today for Mr. Mitch- ell's appearance Friday, but his attorney, William G. Hundley, is expected to argue tomorrow to have the subpoena with- drawn on the ground that Mr. Mtichell's appearance might prejudice a pending appeal of his conviction in the Watergate cover-up case. Mr. Helms, in his testimony, said he believed that "we told him f.Mr. Day] the truth about' the project," but that he' could not be sure. A. C.I.A.. memo- randum referring to, the brief- ing with Day says merely that the .officials "withheld no rele- vant details." As for Mr. Blount. Mr. Helms said that he recollected taking with him to the Blount briefing "a couple of pieces of what we got out of the program"? typewritten . copies of material 't'hat would indicate that we had been reading the corre- spondence between certain in- dividuals in the United States and the Soviet Union." He appeared anxious to avoid contradicting Mr. Blount's testi- mony, and said that perhaps he had not been "specific enough" about the program. Mr. Helms said that Arthur E. Summerfield, Postmaster Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : etA=RDP77-00432R000100380005-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000190380005-1 'Cenzral frori:1953 to .1961, has been told only that the agency wanted to photograph enve- lopes, and that other Postmas- ters General during this period were not informed at all about the operation. ? 'No Written Record' He said that he could not recall if Mr. Dulles had told ?)resident Eisenhower or even Mr. Dulles's brother, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, about the program, nor whether President Kennedy had been in- formed. He said that he might have. told President Johnson during a discussion of C.I.A. matters in 1967, adding: "I -have :ter written record of what I told Johnson." TSimilarly, , he said he did not recall telling President Nixon. tater, talking to reporters in the. corrido outside the hearing thorn, he explained why he had no?record about what he might have told these Presidents: "You've got to protect the President from the dirty stuff.", ..:.!There's got to, be a break," he said. '"The President can't survive [if he is ;tied to this tort :of. activity]. But, some- boars got to take the heat. So. let old Helms take it, and I'm taking it. You can't ask' the President to sign off on illegal activity." As for his assumption ?that 'Mr.. Dulles bad resolved the legal question about the mail- opening, Mr. Helms said in his testimony that the former Di- rector of Central Intelligence was "a much respected figure" and "it would not have oc- curred to me to fault Min on a. Matter of law." ? ? 'He.?said that he could not. recall "ever having discussed" the. operation with any of the Congressional C.I.A. oversight committees. ? NEW YORK TIMES 18 October 1975 Ex-C.I.A. Agent Loses Suit Over Raid on His Arsenal' PHILADELPHIA, Oct. 17 (AP) ' ?Federal Judge Leon J. Hig- genbotham dismissed a lawsuit 'yesterday brought by a former agent of the Central Intelligence' Agency, George E. Fassnacht, against two police officers who raided his weapons arsenal in 1971, because the two-year statute of limitations had ex- pired. Policemen raided Mr. Fass- nacht's borne in the Fox Chase section June 20, 1971, and con- fiscated an arsenal of guns, explosives and ammunition from his basement, the suit said. The weapons were Sup- pressed as evidence Oct. 27, 1972, because the police had no search warrant. Mr. Fassnacht, a 42-year-old former city ballistics expert, was acquitted in December, 1973, of charges of illegal pos- session of an arsenal of ex- tiosives and dangerous weap- Vas. , 5Approved By. Norman Kempster and Orr Kelly From News Services Three former postmasters general today told a Senate committee they never knew the CIA was opening mail. Two of them conceded they really did not want to know anyway and the third said he couldn't find out. J. Edward Day, who headed the.' Post Office from the beginning of the Kennedy administration in January 1960 'until Aug. 9. 1963, said he was told the CIA was engaged in a secret project involving the mails but he said he shut off the conversation be- cause he did not want to know about it. Winton M. Blount, head of the de- partment during the first two years of the Nixon administration, said he was told that mail was being re- moved from the Post Office, given to the CIA and returned the next day. But he said, "I don't know what was being done with it." He said he never asked if it was being opened. In contrast, John A. Gronouski, ,Day's successor, said he was never told the CIA was opening mail al- though he tried repeatedly to find out about any cases in which mail was delayed or diverted. "I THINK IT is incredible that a person at a top position in govern- ment could have something like this going on in his organization and not know about it," Gronouski said. "It wasn't that I didn't try to know about it." ' A CIA memo dated April 23, 1965, indicated Gronouski was not told about the project because a Senate subcommittee was investigating privacy at that time and CIA officials decided that the postmaster general should not be put in a position where he could reveal the project to the committee. The CIA has confirmed that for about 20 years, from 1953 through 1973, it opened mail between the United States and Communist coun- tries. Of the seven postmasters general who served during that peri- od, the CIA has said that three were informed and four were not. Day and Blount are the only two still living whom the CIA has said were briefed on the project. FORMER CIA DIRECTOR Rich- ard Helms has testified that he per- sonally was involved in briefing both Day and Blount. He has said under oath that he told both of them mail was being opened. A CIA memo placed in the com- mittee record said Helms personally showed "a few selected examples" of the product of the mail opening operation to Blount. The June 3, 1971 memo said: "Mr. For Ritiligil2MbtlegeePrfatr 7t)i 0 the operation's product, including an item relating to Eldridge Cleaver which attracted the PMG's special interest." Blount testified that althoubh Cleaver's name was mentioned dur- ing the meeting' he can recall no evi- dence to show that the mail of the black revolutionary was being opened. Both Blount and Day told the com- mittee that they believed the CIA was protecting the national interest and should not be impeded. "I THOUGHT THEN and I think now that the CIA has certain powers that put them in a different class from other people . .The CIA is something different and very spe- cial," Day said. Sen. Walter F", Mondale. D-Minn., responded, "We are both lawyers. I don't recall seeing that in the Consti- tution." Blount said he supported any CIA project as long as it was legal. He said he assumed the mail opening was legal because Helms told him that then Atty. Gen. John N. Mitchell had been informed. The..CIA has since conceded the operation was illegal. "My understanding was that mail would be removed to the mail stream and given to the CIA and returned to the mail stream the next day," Blount said. "After being read?" Mondale asked. "I didn't know what was being done with it," Blount said. "Didn't you ask?" Mondale said. "I don't recall," Blount answered. The CIA memo said Helms briefed Mitchell the day before he saw Blount and that Mitchell "fully con- curred in the value of the operation and had no 'hangups' concerning it." Helms is scheduled to testify and is sure to be asked why he had person- ally supported the operation ? code- named HTLINGUAL ? even though other officials of the CIA had long felt it was clearly illegal and of dubi- ous value as a source of intelligence. Between 1953 and 1973, when the operation was stopped, the commit- tee was told, a CIA office in New York filmed the envelopes of 2,705,- 726 letters and opened 215,820 of them. The largest single recipient of information from the intercepted mail ? 57,846 items ? was the FBI. Howard Osborn, former director of security for the agency, told the' committee his office was responsible for running the New York operation, but he said he did it for another CIA division. "it was their Cadillac. They built it, they drove it. My job was to maintain it, to change the oil," he explained, and then added, a few minutes later:- 04NR0018i11001341038084 ve!"' good.. e product was worthless.' Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1 'TheWashingtonStai. NEW YORK TIMES, ? -October 23, 1975 ? Mail Spies Stopped By Fear By Norman Kempster Washington Star Staff Writer William Cotter, the for- mer chief postal inspector cast by the Rockefeller Commission in the role of hero for stopping the CIA's mail opening program, says he acted only out of. fear that the cover had al- ready blown off the opera- tion. Cotter told the Senate Intelligence Committee he became concerned that the project had been discovered after he received a letter from the Federation of American Scientists asking if the Post Office permits other agencies of govern- ment to open first-class mail. The question fit perfectly the 20-year operation in which postal employes turned their heads while the CIA rifled mail sacks look- ing for suspicious letters. "It appeared to me that the project was known," Cotter said. He noted that the federation's member- ship included one former CIA official and a number of scientists with high se- curity clearances. ? THE AUTHOR of the let- ter that worried Cotter, Jeremy J. Stone, director of the federation, said in a telephone interview that his question was just a shot in the dark. He said he was asking a number of agen- cies questions about priva- cy. ' Cotter ultimatly wrote a flat denial of any mail opening in a letter to Stone. He admitted to the sena- tors: "I knew it was false." But motivated by the let- ter from Stone, Cotter said he urged CIA Director Richard Helms to termi- nate the project. CIA docu- ments indicate that Helms briefed Atty. Gen. John N. Mitchell and Postmaster General Winton Blount on the project and decided to continue it when the two Nixon Cabinet members expressed no objections. After Mitchell and Blount left the government, Cotter said he renewed his request that the project be termi- nated. CIA Director Wil- liam E. Colby scrapped the operation shortly after he _succeeded Helms in 1973. . SATURDA:Y, OCTOBER 25, 1975 Mitchell Denies He Knew of Mail Opening By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK Special to The New York ThateS WASHINGTON, Oct. 24-7, Former Attorney General John N. Mitchell told a Senate com- mittee under oath today that officials of the Central Intelli- gence Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation had never told him that the agen- cies were secretly opening mail. His testimony before the Sen- ate Select Committee on Intel- ligence appeared to conflict with a statement made Wednes- day by Richard Helms, former director of the C.I.A., who COTTER, WHO became chief postal inspector in 1969, knew about the mail opening because of an 18- year career with the CIA. The CIA said earlier this week that 215,000 pieces of mail were opened in New York, the largest of four mail interceptions. Only mail between the United States and Communist countries was intercepted. The committee likened to testimony for about five hours yesterday in an effort to determine who knew about the mail opening ef- fort and who authorized it. The results were often con- tradictory. Helms, making his 19th trip to Washington since he was named ambassador to Iran in 1973, testified that he briefed both Mitchell and Blount on the mail opening program, showing them samples of material obtain- ed from reading the letters. Blount testified earlier in the day that, although Helms had discussed a se- cret CIA project that in- volved diverting mail, he was never told the letters were being opened. MITCHELL, whom the committee hopes to ques- tion in a public sesssion tomorrow, has told the .panel in executive sesssion that he remembers the Helms briefing, but he thought it referred to examination of the outside of envelopes without open- ing them. Examining the outside of envelopes is legal; opening them is a violation of the law. - Helms said he showed Blount typewritten copies of ' intercepted letters. He said he can't remember if he told Blount that letters were being opened, but he said he assumed that Blount would know there was no other way to copy the con- tents. "Perhaps I wasn't specif- ic enough." Helms- said. testified that he advised Mr. Mitchell of the mail-opening project in June, 1970. Mr. Helms said he had told the Attorney General about a "mail cover" and acknowledged that "in those times I'm not sure the Attorney General knew the difference" between "mail cover" and actual mail opening. A mail cover, Mr. Mitchell testified, meant to him that security agencies photographed the exteriors of the envelopes to obtain the names of the ad- dressors and addressees. Mr. Helms, however, said on Wed- nesday that he presumed from the context of the conversation that Mr. Mitchell knew the C.I.A. was opening mail. The committee chairman, Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, told reporters that while' there was an obvious conflicti in Mr. Mitchell's and Mr.' Helms's testimony, he was not prepared to accuse either man of lying. ? "there is no basis on which I could make such a charge in view of the possibility they might just have misunderstood each other," Mr. Church said. The committee also made public today documents that indicated that Nicholas de B. Katzenbach, Attorney General under President Johnson, may have known that the F.B.I. was opening mail. Committee sources said that Mr. Katzen- bach would be asked to testify publicly on the matter. In a memorandum written on ,,March 2, 1965, ?J. Edgar Hoover, then director of the F.B.I., said that Mr. Katzenbach had talked to Senator Edward V. Long, Democrat of Missouri, about keeping information on. mail openings out of hearings' Mr: Long was then conducting in the Senate. The Attorney General, ac- cording to the memo. said that Bernard Fensterwald, thea, counsel of Mr. Long's commit- tee, "had some possible wit- nesses who are former bureau agents and if they were asked if mail was opened, they would take the Fifth Amendment." "The Attorney General stated that before they are called, he would like to know .Nho they are and whether they were ever involved in any program touch- ing on national security and, if not, it is their own business. but if they were, he would want to know," Mr. Hoover's memo- randum said. . In a telephone interview late today, Mr. Katzenbach said he had "never heard" that either the C.I.A or the F.B.I. was open- ing the mail and he suspected he had not been told because the "process is illegal." He said he had believed the intrusion upon the mail system was only to conduct a "mail cover,' which he said was legal in both criminal and national security cases. Mr. Katzenbach said that had he known mail was being opened he would have ordered it halted. He said that he had already told the Senate com- mittee, under oath, in executive session that he did not know about F.B.I. mail openings. The committee in its hearings has established that both the C.I.A. and the F.B.I. conducted illegal mail-opening projects over long periods of time. Testimony by C.I.A. officials and C.I.A. documents have indi- and C.I.A. documents have indicated ? that agency officials throughout the years knew the process was illegal. Moreover, one C.I.A. document showed, they had serious doubt that in peacetime even the President had the power to authorize the activity. F.B.I. officials testified today that the bureau tended over a 26-year period to ignore the question of whether the open- ings were illegal. The question was discussed only once, in 1951, three former officials said. The F.B.I. conducted mail- 'opening projects in eight cities apparently without the approval of any Attorney General and without a warrant from a court. The F.B.I. legally opens mail in certain criminal cases after obtaining a court order. No figures for the amount of mail the F.B.I. opened were given. F.B.I. officials testified today that J. Edgar Hoover, while director of the bureau, halted the mail-opening project in 1966. W. Raymond Wannall, now chief of intelligence at the bureau, speculated that Mr. Hoover may have discontinued the top secret project because he had "a regard, for the cli- mate of the times." He implied that Mr. Hoover might have come to the conclusion that the political climate would not justify the illegal operation. Project Lasted Till '73 The C.I.A. did .not stop its mail opening until 1973. Mr. Helms testified on Wednesday that the only Attorney General he ever briefed about mail open- ings was Mr. Mitchell, in the session that Mr. Mitchell now disputes. Mr. Mitchell said that in June, 1970. he did have a 22. minute meeting with Mr. Helms on a subject he declined to re- veal for national security rea- sons. He has told the committee about it in executive session. Congressional sources indicated that Mr. Helms had been brief- ing Mr. Mitchell on aspects of electronic eavesdropping used by the National Security Agen- cy in tracking antiwar radicals. During this session, Mr. Mitchell said, Mr. Helms re- ferred to mail cover as an aside to the main purpose of the meeting. Mr. Helms said Wednesday that after he talked to Mr. Mitchell he had met with Winton M. Blount, then Post- master General, and told him; 6 Approved-For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1 that Mr. Mitchell had "no problem" with the project. He said he showed Mr. Blount some "samples" of what the C.I.A. was gleaning from open- ing mail. - Mr. Mitchell had sought to avoid testifying before the corn- Inittee in public session because his appeal of his Watergate conviction is still pending. He .was convicted of perjury.i conspiracy and "obstruction ofl justice in the Watergatel cover-up. _ NEW YORK TIMES 30 Oct. 1975 RSA. CHIEF TELLS OF BROAD SCOPE OF SURVEILLANCE By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK Spedal to The New York Times - WASHINGTON, Oct. 29?The National Security Agency secretly scanned international telephone and cable traffic to "intercept the messages of 1,680 'American citizens and groups and of 5,925 foreign nationals or organizations, its director testified today. ? The director, Lieut. Gen. Lew Allen 'Jr., told the Senate Se- lect. Committee on Intelligence that the seven-year program in behalf of six government agen- - ties, was halted in 1973. He said that N.S.A. had not ,ob- tained court orders to authorize the eleCtronic surveillance and had not received the specific approval of either Presidents Johnson or Nixon or of any Attorney General. ? This was the ?first time a director of the security agency had described one of. its opera- tions in public session. Under questioning, General Alien agreed that his public testi- niony might be in technical vi- ;OlatiOn of laws against ? dis- closure of communications in- telligence data. His description disclosed that the surveillance was far more , vast than hinted at in press accounts or in the report of the Rockefeller commission on the C.I.A. General Allen ?said the Na- tional Security Agency had sup- plied intelligence on Americans t to the Federal Bureau of In-1 vestigation, Central Intelligencel Agency, the old Bureau of Nar- cotics and Dangerous Drugs, the Secret Service and two De-. fense Department components,: Department of the Army and, Defense Intelligence Agency. Senator Frank Church, chair- man of the committee, de- scribed the so-called "Watch-i litical information along with list" operation as one of tAP ri3tmilikflorfileketts6a2001i08/08 - itspectS' of N.S.A,' s Activities1 that he regarded as "unlawful" and apparent violations of con- stitutional provriptions against invasion of privacy. The Idaho Democrat urged that the committee make pub- lic a report on the other aspect, described as "Operation Sham- rock," which Congressional sources later said was N.S.A.'s Arrangement with cable com- panies to obtain international traffic. ?. i Senator John G. Tower, A !Texas Republican and commit- tee vice chairman, opposed dis- closure of Operation Shamrock, :as he had opposed the public hearings held today. "I do believe the 'people's right to know should be sub- ordinated to the people's right do be secure," he said. , Senator Tower and Senator Barry Goldwater, Republican of Arizona, argued strongly that such disclosure would "adverse- ly affect Mir intelligence-gather- ing capability," as Senator! Tower put it. At a closed midafternoon meeting, the committee agreed, apparently without a vote, to submit the report on Operation Shamrock to General Allen for his comment on whether it en- dangered sources and methods of intelligence, before voting on whether to make it public. Even without the details of Shamrock, the scope of Gener- al Allen's testimony was un- expected. He said that as early as the first years of the nine- teen-sixties, N.S.A. had occa- sionally looked at communica- tions of Americans traveling to. Cuba. N.S.A. is part of the Defense 'Department and is charged with coordinating electronic intelli- gence gathering and with de- oielOping and break,ing codes. On Oct. 21, 1967, testimony and documents disclosed, the ADepartment of the Army form- ',ally asked N.S.A. to help in ,determining whether foreign ;governments were supporting .domestic disturbances. The following June, after 'Senator Robert F. Kennedy's .assassination, the Secret Ser- :vice submitted a list of persons ,,and groups that its officials be- lieved posed a threat to persons it was protecting. It also, Gen- leral Allen testified, submitted ; the names of the persons being 'protected. In the view of informed .Congressional staff members, Ist.his apparently permitted the - service to receive the over- 'seas communications of candi- 'dates for President, which it protects, as well as the corn- 'munications of the President himself, moreover. the N.S.A.'s computerized system, in addi- tion to selecting Shreating material, presumably would have selected innocuous over- seas messages about campaign activity. A spokesman for the Secret 'Service declined to comment on whether it had received po- sinatitin attempts. In 1969, theN.S.A. formalized its surveillance on domestic se- curity threats under an "Oper- ation Minaret." Internal docu- ments 7eleased today warned 'officials of the agency riot to disclose to other agencies that it was even collecting the in- formation. General Allen said he believed this concern was to Insure that the information was not used in criminal prose- cutions where its source would have to be made public to the courts. The data accumulated ? re- ports averaged two a day at one point, he said?were hand- carried to the agencies and marked "!): ckground use only." At the licietit of the various programs, Ile said, N.S.A. was scanning for information on, some 800 Americans at any one time. This included monitoring to discover narcotics traffickers, conducted from 1970 until 1973, as well as the programs aimed at political dissidents. In 1971eVice Adm. Noel Gay- ler, General Allen's predecessor at N.S.A.,. - briefed John N.- Mitche'l, then the An erney, General, and his deputy, Rich-{ ard G. Kleindienst, on the pro- gram. General Allen said that the group had agreed upon "procedures" and that this had implied some consent by the group. He said the agency, how- ever, had found no written au- thorization from Attorneys General for the activity. General Allen also said that the members of the United States Intelligence Board, made up of the intelligence agencies, knew of the intrusions because of the fact that the agencies individually submitted names for the "watchlist." He said the National Security Agency had not conducted sur- veillances on domestic United 'States communications and that all its intrusions had involved communications in which at least one "terminal" was in a foreign country. Benson Buffham, deputy di- rector of N.S.A., testified that no consideration had been giv- en to the legality of the pro- gram at any point. After a se- ries of questions on legal as- pects, Senator Walter F. Mon- dale, Democrat of Minnesota, said "what worries me" is that :N.S.A. officials still view the 'activity as legal.' - Mr. i'vto...:dale said that among the merrsage3 :hT:-.; A.. had inter- cepted waa a ieque3t tc a "peace-LI" antiwar activist to a foreign singer to participate in a concert to fund the antiwar movement or to make per- sonal contribution. The mes- sage was so innocuous, Mr. Mondale said, it "raises the very 'serious question about how to contain snooping." He said the effect of the snooping "discourages political dissent in this-country." General Allen said that the security agency had rejected some names for the watchlist, mainly from the F.B.I. and De- partment of Justice, as inap- propriate to its intelligence- gathering function mainly he- cause they appeared to be tar- gets of law enforcement. General Allen testified that N.S.A.'s, intelligence had helped the F.B.I. avert a major terror- ist plot in one city and had con- tributed to halting the smug- gling of several major ship- ments of narcotics. He declined to specify the inci2ents. In- formed law enforcement sources said that the terrorist plot was presumably one involving Pal- estinian terrorists in a plan aime dat American Jews. Concern about the legality of the operations emerged in 1273, at the height of criticism of Watergate matters, and shortly after General Allen became head of N.S.A. First he, testi- fied, the C.I.A. pulled out of the narcotics surveillance project on the ground that it appeared to violate the C.I.A.'s charter forbidding a domestic police role. Though N.S.A. has no such. charter, General Gaylor said, it followed suit. On Oct. 1, 1973, he said, then Attorney General Elliot L. Rich- ardson ordered N.S.A. sto. sup- plying the' F.B.I. and the Secret Service with material. "Until I am able more care- fully to assess the effect of Supreme Court decisions con- cerning electronic surveillance upon your current practice of disseminating to the F.B.I. and Secret Service information ae- quired by yo through electronic devices pursuant to requests from the F.B.I. and Secret Serv- ice," Mr. Richardson wrote, "it is requested that you immedi- ately curtail- the dis- semination of .such information to these agencies." LOS ANGELES T17.S 19 OCTOE3EFt 1975 ray A le.' ? :te s. eeeti ;N.; tiyi Lep - ? f.;:rWhil.g.the CIA needs a' tighter rein Ani.' :its activities and budget; thoses. i.seeking. to ;cripple its activities abroad should 'remember that Rus- :sia's equivalent of our CIA is working. .,.,4u.11-tirrie through numerous agents in': four country and elsewhere. Further' ,,anore... the present, action some' 'members' Of . Congress is to' give our adversaris whatever of -our 'secrets , they cannot otherwise learn... ? ? :?? . ARTHUR N. YOTTNO-. : CIA-RDP77-00462.R00010038000reinont' ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1 NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 29, :975 White House Pushes Effort to Keep Intelligence, By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK Special to The New York Times WASHINGTON, Oct. 28?The Ford Administration is increas- ing pressure to keep the hear- ings of the Senate Select Com- mittee on Intelligence behind closed doors, the . committee's chairman said today. The chairman, Senator Frank Church, Democrat- of Idaho, said "pressures are mouHting on a broadening front" that indicated the intelligence com- munity and the Ford Adminis- tration were "more and more opposed to public hearings on anything!" The senator made his comments after a two-hour closed briefing on covert activi- ty by the Central Intelligence Agency. Intelligence community offi- cials have said on several occa- sions that they are against dis- closure of details of present and past covert operations. "Just how do you have a public hearing on a covert oper- ation without endangering indi- viduals?" one official asked. THE WASHINGTON POST 4It . . The dispute now centers on; the issue of whether the com- mittee can hol a public session on the C.I.A.'s operations 1n1 Chile. Mr. Church and other) members of his committee havel said they believe a portion ofi th discussions can be held MI public without compromising; national security. Moreover,i they point out, much of the; activity has already been re-i ported in the press. Leaks Are Charged Senator Gary Hart, Democrat' of Colorado, charged in a; speech today that the Ford; Administration and the intel-i ligence community "were de- liberately leaking secret infor-I mad= about abuses under in- vestigation by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence." He cited a ?dozen news ar- ticles that had the effect, he said, of pre-empting the com- mittee hearings and putting Ad- !ministration explanations in a :favorable light. ? He said the cmmittee had made a major effort to remain "leak proof.", , There is no rcord that the] Wednesday, Oct. 29, 1975 oh? , er 7 Fregs.ure G Easy By George Lardner Jr. Washington Post Staff Writer plans to publish a com- prehensive report on its months-long assassination inquiry. The Idaho Democrat said he saw no reason to keep the Chile inquirysecret either, but the committee will first at- tempt to find out "how strongly the administration is prepared to resist" a public airing. Colby and William Nelson, the CIA's deputy director of covert operations, testified in closed session yesterday about the spy agency's work in Chile from 1964, when it spent some $3 million to oppose the. presidential candidacy of Marxist Salvador Allende, until 1973 when Allende was overthrown in a military coup. Two former ambassadors to Chile, Ralph Dungan, who served from 1964 to 1967, and Nathaniel Davis, from 1971 to 1973, appeared before the committee yesterday af-? 'ternoon. George Kennan, former ambassador to Moscow and author of the s6- called "containment policy," also testified about the value of covert operations generally,. The Senate intelligence committee has been running into mounting pressures front, the administration to suppress the results of its in- vestigations, Chairman Frank Church (D-Idaho) charged yesterday. ? ? Central Intelligence Agency Director William E. Colby urged the committee at a *closed meeting yesterday morning not to hold any public hearings on covert CIA operations in Chile. Church also told reporters at a mid-day briefing that the administration still opposes open hearings on improper activities of the National Security,Agency and that the White House recently objected to release of even a printed report on the CIA's in- volvement in foreign 'assassination plots. "The pressures are . mounting on a broadening front," Church said. But in spite of the com- plaints, he added, the com- mittee will go ahead today with a public .hearing. on the supersecret NSA. Church said the Senate panel also has no intention of abandoning its Administration has publicly charged the Senate committee. with leaks, but William E. Col- by, Director of Central Intel- ligence, has said that disclo- sures concommitant with the entire Congressional investiga- tion the intelligence community! had undermined the agencies': effectiveness. Senator Church said that af- ter today's meeting Mr. Colby! would seek guidance from the White House on whether he would be permitted to testify' before a public session. Mr.- Church also made public a let,, ter from Philip W. Buchen, counsel to President Ford, it was the "general view of thei executive branch" that if the; committee issued an "Official", report on plots to assassinate ; foreign leaders, it might da- mage United States foreign re- lations. . Senator John G. Tower, Re- :publican of Texas, 'who is vice [chairman of, the committee, I said he was also opposed to !public hearings on covert acti- ivities. . . Church said he felt disclosure "of the whole story fon Chile) is in the best in- terests of everyone" since it would give the CIA a chance to explain itself publicly. He said the episodes were all past 'history and would "not entail any threat to national 'security." . But he said no decision was reached because "it was not Clear if Mr, Colby and others " would be prohibited from testifying" in public. ? Turning to the committee's. nearly complete assassination- report, Church recalled how President Ford himself had encouraged a congressional investigation of CIA- sponsored plots after the Rockefeller commission had been unable to complete its own inquiry. "I can't imagine how now it could even be suggested that this report not be made, public:: Church said. He said the objection had been voiced in a letter to the committee from White House counsel Philip Buchen. The Oct. 9 note, made public later in the day, appeared to' ? be largely a complaint for the record. In it, Buchen said the "general view of the executive branch is that any report on political assassination allegations issued by the select committee as an official government document may seriously prejudice our national security through' damage to the foreign relations of the U.S. and to the position of the U.S. in the. world community." 8 Inquiry Secret Meanwhile, antiwar and reli- gious organizations filed a 8500,000 suit against the C.I.A., .the National Security Agency and four major cable communi- cation 'companies. The suit, filed in Washington's District Court, charged that the Govern- ment agencies had deprived some 8,200 persons of their constitutional rights. The plaintiffs sought $50,000 in damages for each of the 8,200 perso as. well as $100 for each hour they were sub-1 iected to illegal electronic cave- - sdropping. The suit is based on disclosures in a Rockefeller1 commission report of a domes- tic surveillance operation in 'which files were prepared on antiwar a radical leaders and in which th::: N.S.A. conducted cable and overseas telephone 'monitoring on some 1,000 per- 'sons. The suit was filed by the American Civil Liberties Union as a class action in behalf of those affected by the pro- gram. PUBLISHERS WEEKLY SEPTEMBER29, 1975 THE HOUR OF THE BLUE FOX. Hugh C. McDonald. Pyramid, $1.75 This long, walloping good espionage thriller has many ports of call, an ex- pertly devised plot and enough energetic spies to keep readers happily settled in for the run?that is, if they ignore the au- thor's obvious and overbearing political biases. The CIA, opposing d?nte, has lied to the president and aligned itself with an international organization of re- actionaries called the Blue Fox to infil- trate a Russian experimental germ war- fare facility in the Aral Sea. At stake is the antidote to a virile microbe the Rus- sians have successfully tested in three U.S. reservoirs. With super-security safe- guards easily penetrated on all sides, the action races around Hungary, Austria, Russia, San Francisco, Washington and New York. [November] Buchen added, however, that the White House realized the committee "intends to exercise its own judgment" and therefore would assign three officials, from the State Department, CIA and Pen-. tagon, to read over the draft report for any language that might cause "specific security problems." . Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1 NEW YORK TIMES Washington Post 22 Oct. 1975 29 Oct. 1975 INQUIRY !S VOTED 1502 MUlion FOR HARRINGTON Rs. k'clight in - U.S. Spying Ly RICHARD L. MADDEN Special to The Neer York Times WASHINGTON Oct. 21?The House Ethics Committee voted ..t .to 2 today to investigate formally charges that Repre- sentative Michael J. Harrington violated House rules by disciss- ing with unauthorized persons secret testimony on the Central Intelligence Agency's political activities in Chile. ? - If no inquiry is made, it would be the first time that the eight-year-old panel, which is.nfficially known at the Com- mittee on Standards of Official Conduct, has formally investi- gated a complaint against a *yew:her of the House. approving an inquiry, will begin with a public hearing Nov. 3, the committee's vote appeared to assure that whatever action it recommends ,will reach the full House for final action. Committee members said the panel could recommend that 'no disciplinary action be taken against Mr. Harringtcn, a Mas- sachusetts Democrat, or that be be censured or even expelled from the House. ? The last disciplinary action by the House against one of its members was the exclusion of' the late Representative Adam Clayton Powell Jr., De- mocrat of Manhattan, in 1967 for alleged misuse of funds and> for being in contempt of courtk in New York. Could Stir Fight ''The I-Parrington case could provoke a divisive fight within the intelligence operations are - already being investigated by House and Senate committees. .Mr. Harrington has acknow- ledged that he discussed with other members of Congress and a reporter for The Washington Post the substance of secret testimony on the C.I.A.'s efforts in 1973 to undermine the government of Salvador Al.. lende Gossens, Chile:s late President. The testimony had been given by William E. Colby, the Direce tor of Central Intelligence, to the House Armed Services Committee, and an account of It apperaared in The New York Times in September, 1974. t Representative Harrington, summoned before an Armed Services subcommittee two -weeks later, denied having been the source for The Times article but 'conceded he had? sought to bring the C.I.A. involvement to light. Representative Robin L liteeed Jr.. Republican of Ten- nee who is a member of tho Armed Services Committee, rift! a complaint with the Macs Committee charging that Mee Harrington had violated Keeese rules. retr. Harrington countered by Mug complaiits. against 17 members of the ArmeAfteetpf Caseunittee charging that they . - By Timothy S. Robinson Washington Post Staff Writer A lawsuit was filed in. federal court here yesterday charging the National Security Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency with conducting a massive, illegal spying campaign on antiwar activists in the late 1960s and early 1970s and seeking $500 million in damages. The suit was filed by the ,The Civil Liberties Union on behalf of 8,200 in- dividuals and groups on whom the CIA and NSA reporttedly maintained files, opened mail and intercepted messages and telephone calls. .The suit is based largely on information growing out of the Rockefeller ? commission's report in June on the U CIA's domestic surveillance ac- veelated Kouse rules hy voting beet June 16 to deny him access tee the panel's classified testi- rainy. The Ethics Committee is not yet acted on these arenpiaints. Mr. Karrington told reporters eterday that he was disappointed Lat not surprised by the Ethics Committee's action to investi- gate Mr. Beard's complaint. He said he hoped that the rearings would focus not on the narrow of whether Kouse rules may have been violated but on the broader question of what he described as "the use of the C.I.A. and govern- ment secrecy in general to short - circuit the democratic process and cover up illegal activity." He said his actions had been "responsible and proper under the circumstances," and added: "The implication of the Beard comrlaint and those behind it is that the rules of the House And the classification process itself can prevent the rtporting of a crime. I don't accept that, and Neither do the American people." ?? 3 on Other Panel ? He also noted that three of the seven votes in the Ethics committee to investigate Mr. Beard's complaint had been Cast by Representatives who were also members of the Armed Services Committee? Melvin Price, Democrat of Min- bis, F. Edward Hebert, Demo- crat of Louisiana, and Floyd Srence, Republican of South Carolina. The other four votes for the inquiry were cast by Represen- tatives John J. Flynt Jr., Demo- crat of Georgia who is chair- man of the committee; Olin E. Teagut, Democrat of Texas; James H. Qnillen. Republican FforRek1tite 261011/0/Offd Hutchinson, Repuencan of Michigan. deities. The report confirmed the existence of a program known as "Operation Chaos." The groups and individuals listed as plaintiffs in yesterday's suit reportedly were watched as a part of that program. Named as defendants are past directors and other top- ranking officials of both government spying agencies, as well as four international communications networks which supposedly aided in the illegal interception of messages being sent overseas by the plaintiffs. The suit claims the plaintiffs became the topics of "watch files" ce ''subject files" in the CIA because of their op- position to the war in Indochina in the late 1960s. The CIA then supplied a `.`watch list" to the NSA so the NSA could intercept in- ternational messages and telephone calls placed by persons on the list, the suit continued. t According to the Rockefeller commission report, the CIA began if Operation Chaos" to gather frlormation 'on* the "foreign contacts" of American eitizens here who were protesting the Vietearn war. As a part of that program, More than 40 undercover agents reportedly infiltrated plomestic antiwar - organizations. f The program also included illegal opening of first-class mail with the contents copied and placed in Chaos files, the Suit alleged. Reportedly aiding NSA in the interception- overseas messages were. Western Union,Telegraph Co.,. RCA Global Communications,. Inc., American Cable and Radio Corp., and ITT World' Communications, ? Inc., ac- ording to the suit. The four, 'coMPanies were named as, I:defendants. ? NSA turned over to the CIA more than 1,100 pages .of 'summarized conversations that had been illegally .overheard, the suit claimed. The suit seeks $50,000 in punitive.damages for each? 'plaintiff, as well as $100 a day 'for the duration of any illegal interceptions of wire or oral 'ommunications. Wednesday, October 22, 1975 The Washington Star Oliphant's seen \ aiding the KGB I am dismayed by the vileness of recent Oliphant cartoons, especial- ly, but not limited to, those concern- ing the CIA. Is he incapable of a humorous or positive or construc- tive portrayal of people, organiza- tions and events? , Years past, I had extensive ex- perience and involvement in propaganda activities. The most effective media instrument was the cartoon, since most people indulge visually and absorb the message, but rarely read written propagan- da. The KGB could never approach Oliphant's destructive cartoons, and they receive it for free; that is, the cartoons serve the KGB's objec- tives. Ed McGettigan CIA-R9PP-1604131214000100380005-1 THARimpe0gRogwag,2pfkii9AiozaatsiimeR-C)9f1532R000100380005-1 The Mail Cover Story When, Richard Helms became di- rector,. of the Central Intelligence Agency, in 1966, he knew that the agency's mail cover program was .would be unless, as Mr. Helms now says he assumed to be the case,, some form of legality had been :arranged by Allen Dulles, the director when the program was started in 1953. That may. have been a logical assumption, but the trouble was that Mr. Helms, did not bother to check its validity with Mr. Dulles?"it would not have occurred to me to fault him on a matter of law." Nor, apparently, did Mr. Helms check his assumption with _anyone else who might have knov4n he just let the mail cover pro- gram' go forward. That testimony and the rest of what the Senate Intelligence Committee has been, hearing about C.I.A. mail covers provide a sort of catalogue of the evils that allowed the agency to go its own way " fOr so long, to violate the law and its own charter with impunity, to become a sort of government within the Government.' . Mr. .Helms' "assumption," for ex- ample,, not only emphasizes the fact that .the C.I.A. was scarcely account- able ,to anyone, and that its power to operate in secrecy was, in fact, the power to do virtually anything it wanted to do. It also suggests the arrogant, expansive and dangerous habits of mind officials can develop when they can act in secret and with- out accounting for such acts. Mr. 'Helms further testified that when he signed a statement in 1970 informing Richard Nixon that the mail cover program had been ended, he had no intent to mislead Mr. Nixon? although the C.I.A. mail cover pro- gram -was continued until 1973. The 1970 report, he said, ?had referred to an F.B.J; mail cover program. Of 'all the devices of high-handed government, none is more insidious than this?the statement that is bound to mislead although it was "not in- tended" to mislead, that does not tell the truth although it does not tech- , By Torn Wicker nically tell a lie, that distorts or con- ceals or obscures facts while appearing to be a straightforward response. The C.I.A. may not have originated the technique, but its officials became master practitioners. The Helms testimony left the im- pression that at whatever political level?if any?the mail cover program might have been authorized in 1953 or afterward, it was not by a Presi- dent. He thought he recalled mention- ing the program to President Johnson, more than a decade after its incep- tion, although he could not\ be sure. But he could not remember if Presi- IN THE NATION 'No President has a right to be insulated from the knowledge that his own subordinates are deliberately breaking the law.' dents Eisenhower or Kennedy had been told about it by his predecessors, and he did not remember telling Mr. Nixon himself. "You've got to protect the President from the dirty stuff," Mr. Helms told reporters after testifying. It could as easily be said that a man-in his posi- tion, or Allen Dulles before him, had to keep the President from finding out what was going on, so that the illegal "dirty, stuff" .could, proceed. And even if the motive Was to "prd- NEW YORK TIMES, SATURDAY, OCTOBER 18, 1975 American Intelligence: 'A Page of Shame' To the Editor: Samuel A. Adams' effort to throw some light on corruption in the intelli- gence process before and after the 1968 Tet offensive reflects a personal integrity which, unfortunately, has been increasingly under fire within the C.I.A. and other precincts of the in- telligence community in recent years. As a C.I.A. analyst working on the Vietcong in Saigon and in the Pentagon from 1965 to 1970, I can confirm the entire thrust of Sam's charges. My only regret is that I did not have Sam's courage and foresight in saving relevant documents to prove the case. Some of Sam's critics attempt to represent him as an egomaniac on a crusade. Others portray the questions he raises as "arcane side issues" (R. W. Komer's Sept. 29 letter). These ,positions reflect either an appalling ignorance of the nature of a people's war or a self-serving but transparent effort at self-defense by the time- worn tactic of "plausible denial." The truth is that working-level analysts in the C.I.A. continually were diverted from following out leads on Vietcong strength; that ,they were as- signed to other areas of work when they attempted to do so; that they were ignored or suppressed, as Sam was, when they persisted, and that these efforts at distortion and sup- pression of the facts were common knowledge and were openly discussed at the working level. There was room for only one convenient "truth" in official estimates, as Sam has proved beyond any dispute. The choice was to compromise one's integrity or to resign, and too many chose the former. If the issues were fully studied, if special task .forces were appointed to study them and if the results were circulated in the intelligence corn- 10 tect" Presidents, why should ,they be protected? The highest duty of any President is to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and no Presi- dent has a right to be insulated from the knowledge that his own sub- ordinates are deliberately breaking the law. To whom should they justify do- ing so, if they can, except to the President? Mr. Helms said he never discussed the mail cover program with any of the Congressional oversight commit- tees to whom he supposedly reported. That can only mean that they didn't ask him anything, and he volunteered nothing, about such important inva- sions of the privacy and constitutional ? rights of Americans, and such viola- tions of the laws of the very Govern- ment the C.I.A. theoretically protects. So much for the supposed efficacy of Congressional oversight, and the will- ingness of the agency to cooperate with the overseers. ' Arthur Summerfield, Postmaster- General in the early years of the pro- gram was misled as to its extent, according to the Helms testimony, and his immediate successors were not informed of it at all?an early example of C.I.A. deception of its own Gov- ernment and subversion of official in- stitutions and processes. ? That neither Mr. Helms nor a later Postmaster-General, Winton M. Blount, could agree on exactly what the latter was told about mail covers suggests how ad hoc and inadequate were the sketchy procedures later followed to. inform the postal department of the perversions of law being practiced in its own house. And when Mr. Helms and other C.I.A. officials tried to tell Postmaster- General J. Edward bay "something very secret" (about the mail covers) in 1961, Mr. Day protested that he did not want to know, so that he could not be blamed for any possible leaks. Thus, he exemplified that' abdication of personal responsibility by Govern- ment officials that did so much to permit the vast growth of secret, un- lawful and imperial power in America.. munity as they became available, let the C.I.A.'s offices of Current Intelli- gence and National Estimates produce the published results for Congress. Let the Director of Central Intelligence release to Congress the detailed rec- ords and documents of the National Security Council's Watch Committee to prove that the matter was pursued vigorously and professionally. The facts will speak for themselves. The record is clear. It Speaks of misfeasance, nonfeasance and mal- feasance, of outright dishonesty and professional cowardice. It reflects an intelligence community captured by an aginc, bureaucricy which too often placed institutional self-interest or per- sonal advancement before the national interest. It is a page of shame in the history of American intelligence, and it de- serves to be aired as fully as possible beforc the public. JOHN T. Mooat, Selinsgrove, Pa., Oct. 10, 1975 ApproViesifFoiTRefeise-2001/08/08 :-CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000f00380005-1 BOSTON GLOBE 22 OCTOBER 1975 -11 o TAT 671, Etc It Beecher. The Cl?.,he's diPlontatic corresp,?Ident? in!iewed more than o score of prcscur and for- mer intelligence officigs to examine the in:tlications of recent exposes. In a ihrec-part series he discusses the impact on lorrign intelligence-gather- ing, adjustinents made to ride out the storm and future prospects ,for US ? intelligence capability. , By William Beecher -. Globe Washington Bureau WASHINGTON Within recent months, British and West. German intelligence services; which long had freely exchanged thie most sensitive information with their American counterparts, have become chary of providing such data. During the same period, a num- ber of major LIS corporations, which have provided cover abroad for Central Intelligence Agency opera- tives or insights on little-known eco- nomic and political trends overseas, also have become reluctant to cocas- orate as before. . ? And large numbers of foreign agents and contacts, always worried that an indiscretion could jeopardize .their jobs or* their lives, have be- come increasingly nervous about passing on documents or even ru- mors. Well-placed sources in or other-. wise familiar with the American in telligence community report - that such developments are a direct re- sult of congressional libarings and newspaper exposes of Certain ques- tionable activities on the part of the CIA and other intelligence agencies. Comments one top CIA official: "It would be overstating the situa- tion, to say our sources abroad have dried up. But 'there's no doubt we're hurting. People who used to give us whole reports now are giving us only summaries. People. who used to give us .summaties. are 'only giving us one or two facts. Other's who used to pass along an oceasional nugget at diplomatic party, are now not :willing to shake, hancis or even smile." ? The reasons for this ? sudden skittishness: fear that information o: turned .over to CIA. could coneeiV- fably ,he provided ? to Capitol Hill and thence ei- ther released wholesal Or -leakixf daniagtN roved 0 "'i (r"'"111.1 N 6 tl some cases?deacily, con-, sequences.. Indeed, a C:ongree.sional hsource -says certain, com- mittees have been advised that following a recent Congressional revelation a Middle East country put two and two together and executed one of its offi- cials believed to have been supplying 'reformation to CIA. The source declined .to be more specific. F. But while conceding at least temporary damage to iforeign intelligence g,ath- eging, several intelligence 'experts interviewed by The Globe. over recent ;weeks stressed that expo- esure of excesses and ille- e,oilities by American Intel- i :ligence was .direly needed order to force reforms ;chi' the system. Clark Clifford Is one l'suen person. Having .lielried draft the 1947. leg- islation which created the ..CIA and having served for ',seven .: years,' first as a ;member and later as hcnairman oto the Yresi- . dent's Foreign Intelligence -.Advisory BoardOhe 13 par- ticularly well qualified to assess the situation. ,He :says: ? ' " ? o "In the main, our intei'L ligence operation has set ved this country well, 1ircugh very troubled times, for nearly 33 years. Now the time has come to ? ? "Some of these engage-d- in intelligence deplore the investigation that's ? been gcing on. Tney take the position that there's some- thing . unpatriotic and naive and unsophisticated .aboot the whole thing.- I disagree. If we find that -.under our democratic sys- Item we have created art operation which has gross- ly offended im.portant ten- lets 'adhere to, then it 'otteht to be changed. The iuost important job goy- 41- fro c-zt 0, CA), it C"`"'1,7 ,(7N Both critics and defend- ers of the CIA and its sis- ter agencies agree, howev- er, that never before has .the nation had greater need for clear, insightful iroelligence military, political and economic de- ve-erenents in the f3oelet Union and throughout ,much of the world. If detente with Russia is to continue, for example, it is vital that both sides have confidence they know to what extent agreements between them are being honored. And if detente should collapse, with a reversion to cold war attitudes, detailed knowledge of Soviet capa- bilities and probable in- tentions would obviously be of very 'great Impor- tance. The spotlight of recent revelations has focused on three 'broad categories of activity. ? On covert programs in places such as Chile and Laos, many observers feel it is unfair to pillory the CIA for operationa autho- rized and minutely hell-. rected from tha White House. . On domestic operation, which are. -precluded by CIA's charter, such as penetrating and spying on antiwar movements, even insiders concede the 'igen- ? cy should have strenuous- ly .resisted such assign- profit from lessons learned merits. ? and to overhaul this some- . On small - seals covert times free-wheeling ma- and clandestine opera.' chine. ? tions, ? informed sources . ernment has is to correct running amok and eu Foriksfealk92EH51/08/08 : CIA-Plaa-QW1i3gRiOW1 claim there has been a Ft-7cl rurner ey..ceedin3 authorized :actions. 'Very little has surfaced publicly on this. There was, however, the care of a middle level CIA official who took it upon himself to disobey an order .to destroy some 'deadly toxins developed for use in poisible assassi- nations. But of more than a tcore of epecialiees interviewed, none felt the "rogue ele- phant" concept of the CIA 11 fled. Ray S. Cline, who spent about 20 years in top ana- lytical and operational ag- sig-renents with CIA and four. years as director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, believes that while the intelligence structure requires. re.; ?. .vainping, an overdrawn picture of abuse of power has seriously damaged the 'ability of CIA to perform necessary work. . One of the major im- pacts of the bad publicity has been on the raoeala of .intelligence personnel, pri- marily 1st CIA, but also in other agencies. ? ? Notes one s?eitior cfll- ciol: "People in the overt. aids of CIA and TER (State Department intelli- ' ? gence) are. _:beginniri.g to r.fa-el a little. ashamed- to have been professional in intelligence .over the Years. ? When you tell someone you're in intelli-- pence, 'there's? a definite danger that you'll become. an outcast, both inside and outside government." ? Wives of CIA men report 'suddenly scornful. treat- Merit in social function's and even " by ..long-time neighbors. 7 About 2500 reportedly have resigned from the CIA over the last three years' and many are .en- countering 'difficulty ? in getting good jobs. "In they past, firms have been anx- ious to snap up our expe- rienced men," says one of- ficial. "Now they don't want to touch them with a 10-foot pole." ' William E. Colby. direc- tor of Central Intelligence, has said publicly there is no difficulty, getting re- cruits 'for the CIA. But others report the iluality of the new men generally is mit up to the level of the halcyon days .pf the ef agency. 000.05?Sleurces report that the National SPctiritv A isp.nev Approved ?c.NA) is wont ied that its worldwide electronic eavesdropping could be crippled for fear that -it wiil unwittingly pick up and transcribe f or eign - telephone conversations ? that. include US citizens, a matter that the Congress ? is very much upset -about. Sen. *Frank Church, Democrat from Idaho who is chairman of the Senate committee ? investigating the intelligence. communi- ty, has warned that the technology of exotic eavesdropping has become so pervasive and awesomei that Americans may soOrn be left with "no place to hide."? ? ? ? . ?- , But a senior intelligence official frets that while it would be important to learn what plan's a Euro- pean firm has to build pe- troleum pipelines in Rus- sia and China- over the next several years, the, ? NSA is nervous abouti going after telephone- in- tercepts of, that company for fear some . American may suddenly be heard in one of the conversations.. ? Attorney General Ed- ward H. Levi repqrtedly is k ta01.12.. Beecher; 'The Globe's diplomatic corre- sPondent, interviewed more than a score of present and former intelligence officials to examine the implications of recent exposes. , In a thrce-part. series he dis- cusses the impact on for- eign .intelligence-gathering, adjustments made to ride out the storm and future prospects for. US intelli- gence capability. (Second of a three- part series)' Be Wiliam Beecher Globe Washington Bureau ,.. WASHINGTON ? In order to convince British intelligence it. can hand over top-secret documents ;without fear of their be- coming public, the United States; now treats such material as "on loan." . :By that semantic sleight Of hand, such files would not be considered ? the "property" of the United States and therefore would not be subject to For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010038 trying to work out a sys- tem to safeguard Ameri- cans from unwarranted intrusions of their privacy While permitting NSA. to conduct electronic surveil-. ' However temporary this ? development may turn out to be, for the time being there appears to be a sig- nificant net reduction in so-called "humint," or lance that ii regarded as human intelligence. "The finest spy satellites in the world arc* great at count- ing missiles, but not- too good at providing .clues as to intentions; internal po- litical shifts, economic plans," says one expert. "For that we must. depend on people." ? . being in the national in- terest. ?Congressional sources say at after the Russians installed 'several facilities In the United States to in- tercept telephone conver- sations beamed by micro-. wave, 'they learned how valuable a n intelligence instrument that was and. proceeded to bury many of their key telephone lines in Moscow:.. ? Officials report that some foreign governments that used to pass secrets eagerly to the CIA,. on the. premise that a twe-way exchange would be mutu- ally beneficial, now are giving information instead to US military attaches abroad. Apparently they feel the ntilitary system is less likely to leak. But these officials say this switch is on a small scale and is not making up for a lot of material the United States used to get routine- ly.' . The negative climate within the .United States has cooled the. coopera- tiveness of American firms ,to the point where many are not willing to cooper- ate as before overseas. Also, in a recent CIA so- licitation of bids; on' a.. speoky piece of equip- ment, there were no tak- ers. The CIA says this is the first time in its history this has happened. The of- ficial ? who disclosed this was not willing to say. what the equipment was.. Perhaps as damaging as anything else of : disclo- sures from the Pentagon Papers to those more re- cently in the view of sev- eral officials, has been kbe? BOSTON GLOBE 23 OCTOBER 1 915 'It II -FLLi THE TROUBLED CIA 2 subeoena by Congress or the ceurts.- Also, while the Ford Administration ? wanted very' much to mount a major covert effort in sup- Port of political moderates in Portugal, because of widespread criticism over a similar effort in Chile no action was taken ? until very late in the game. What finally was done was not only very late, but very little. Contrary to published reports *pecu- lating about tens of mil- lions of dollars. of covert aid, the total effort to date, according to unim- peachable sources, has been just over $1 million. These two incidents are in one sense closely re- lated. For they represent ways the United States is trying to adjust, in the af- termath of months of rev- elations about the CIA on Capital' .Hill ?and:: in the press, try the new Yeality of nervous allies and a criti- ' cal Congress. For, whatever reforms may eventually be decided upon to restore confidence .in American intelligence, the United States cannot call "time" to minister to a key injured player. The US-British intelli- gence connection has been very close since the days of World War II when the OSS (Office of Strategic Services), the predecessor of CIA, was established in part . because of Britain's desire to ? have a single agency with which it cciuld share information and coordinate clandestine operations to mutual ad- vantage... . ? The relationship ? flow- ered as Cl.e. grew from a hand of a few hundred ex- OSS hands in le47 to a 15,000-man establishment, with access to information from the most sophisticat- ed apy satellites and other intelligence-gather- 0005-1 insight Soviet analysts have goLten into the inner workings both of American intelligence and or the de- cision-makeng process it- self. ? "Take the Pentagon Pa- pees." said one Defer:se of- ficial. "What the Soviets learned was not so much a few detailed recommenda- tions about Vietnaxn, but rather that . the. Joint Chie Is of Staff recom- mended to the. President a series of steps they felt he must. take toewin the wane: It was an interdependent! package deal ? with time ? being of the eieence. ."Other memos showedl the President agonizing ; endlessly - over seven '- months and then picking. out a few actions to try. This gave the-Soviets an imPortant insight into the. non.decision-making in -a democracy.. It cou3d tempt them to: act quichly in a crisis, _confident that be- 'fbre ii reazt'on is decided' .14pons..... ? in Washington. they'll -have achleie 7: ac-brazI? " ? ing equipment . In the :world. ? - ' But .the British, of late, have ? become ? quite alarmed. at the trend in the United States to shine a public spotlight into siime of the more shadowy cupboards of American in- telligence. In Britain that Could not occur because .of the Official Secrets Act. ? They were particularly concerned that their secret reports and analyses might be pried out of the files of the CIA by sub- poena from a congression- aI4cornrnittee or by court suit under the newly strengthened Freedom of Information Act. Highly sensitive sources and methods might he compro- mised: And so they held back a lot, and passed cer- tain information with so many restrictions as to make the information dif- ficult to disseminate to an- alysts, according to quali- fied US sources. Thus .American officials came u.p with theitnagina- 12 Approved For Release 2-001/08/08 : CIA:RDP7.7-00432R000100380005A Approved For Release 2001/08/08 !.CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1 - tive legalism of treating British intelligence - as property, not owned but merely on loan to the ?United States. But officials concede this has not totally ? over- come British apprehension ens: the earlier, close rela- tionship has not been fully restored. ? In the case of Portugal, -officiala say that Secretary of State Henry A. Kissin- ger was particularly wor- ried that unless Lisbon's drift toward including Communists in top gov- ernment posts could be re- versed, it might well give an aura of respectability to coalition governments with reeente?-zt members that might be repeated in Italy and elections in Western Europe. ? If euch a trend devel- oped, he felt, the very ex- istence of the North At- lantic Treaty Organization would be jeopardized. For NATO, ? art alliance de- signed to stand against So- viet political and military pressure, could not tune- tion without exchanging great quantities of .classi- fied facts and plans. And with Communists sitting in its inner councils, such information ? could not be kept from Moscow, in his view. Knowledgeable sources say William E. Colby, CIA director, in spring and early summer stoutly re- sisted pressures to mount a covert.- political-action program in. Portugal, ar- guing that word would get out and Congress and the Press would have a fit over interference in the internal affairs of another nation, similar to the reac- tion to revelations of CIA activities in. Chile. As late as July, a num- ber of other officials were backing Colby in the ar- gument that American handsewere tied in Portu- gal be... the hostile atmo- sphere in Congress. In- stead, they insisted the United States would have to sit back and depend on a number of West Euro- pean Socialist parties, led by those in West Germany and Sweden, to help their counterparts in Portugal. Meanwhile, while no one knew the hard num- cracy that . the Soviet Union was spending. about $50 mirion in Portugal. In early. August, Presi- dent Ford complained in an interview with U.S. News et: World Report of the vitual ittmos.sibilttes of CIA involvement in Por- tugal bee:et:se of the nega- tive climate on Capitol Hill. But a month later, itzt an interview with the. Chi- cago Sue-tiltnes, the Pres- ident :stinted of some in- volvement when he de- clared: "I dOn't think the situation" (in Portugal) re- quired us to have a major CIA involvement, which we have not had." .Sources say that be- tween those two state- ments by Ford, the Ad- ministration discussed the danger ef trendain Portu- gal with some key con- gressional., committees arid. a small-Scale CIA effort was approved and launched. Observers in and out of the intelligence conarnuni- ty believe the CIA has been given a bum rap over covert action in places like Chile and Laos. Aa in the case of Portugal, they point out, the decision to go in and the nature steel scope of the effort, were decided upon by the Presi- dent and supervised by his "advisers. Ray . Cline, who capped a 20-year 'career with CIA by servin'a.,? from 1962 to 1966, as iti deputy director for. intelligence and subsequently headed the State Department's irO- telli eence blanch from 1969 to 1973, raid in en - interview that the - Laos enparatiert started as a standard etandeettne intel- ligence mission to gather information on .. North ? Vietnamese -military movements- along the lia Chi Minh Trail. ? But a series of White House decisions; starting in the ? Kennedy ?Adminis- tration, turned the effort from that of a small num- ber of Meo tribesmen col- lecting tactical intelligence Into a covert, undeclared war, run in the field by a succession of American ambassadors in Vientiene. .A senior congressional source agrees. Both Nort Vietnam and the -United its pas ticipation in mili- tary activity in Laos. In the? case of the United States, he says; it might have been forced by the Laotian government to pull out if it admitted its role Publicly, thereby in- creasing the ? jeopardy to -American and Vietnamese 'troops in South Vietnam. "It grew to a $20 million , to $30 million a year .ope'r- ation, funded out of: the Defense Department's budget," the congressional source said. "But it was not an assignment the CIA. particularly relished, and it certainly cannot be blamed in that instance for running amok." In the case of Chile, Cline says, "Kissinger pushed .the CIA in, pre- sumably on ? behalf. of Nixon." The operation, he said, was run from. the White House. ? But he and others do blame the CIA for knuck- ling under to pressures from Presidents Johnson and Nixon to infiltraye and report on the activities of antiwar groups lit the Uriited,States. Clina makes this dis- tinction: if CIA had pene- trated domestic groups in order to provide a cover to send agents abroad on clandestine missions, that 'would have been permissi- ble,. in his view. But CIA provided extensive reports to the White House- and .the..F14 on the. plans and activitieseof such domestic groups, and that clearly was improper. "I can - only . blame Helms for not digging in his heels harder," Cline says, referring to Richard Zitelms, who at the time 'ambassador- to Iran. Many voters voiced. the same sentiment, saying that . Helms found it difficult to 'headed CIA and now is others voiced the same say no to the White House, -but suggesting that he saw that the agency "dragged . its heels" -and did the- least possible in questiona- ,- ble operations. . - . . A number of specialists. believe recent revelations may be useful in opening the way to needed reform of the intelligence commu- nity, but they argue that the focus on covert opera- intelligence activity, is. missing the forest for the trees. , ? In their -tier; the two most import2.M. are: I) a paucity of consir,- tently well thought-outs, well articulated and time- ly intelligence analysis, and 2) .a penchant for oversecrecy over the last six years which Withholds from top intelligence ana- lysts information, for in- stance, on negotiations with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic- of China. Such information would enable the analysts to hatter know what to look for in studying the roams cf data culled from recennaissance satellites, agent reports and transla- tions cf Soviet and Chi- nese broadcasts and news- papers. . Says one Official of the poor .qeality, overall, of analysis from CIA and DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency): "They know the single stones of the mo- saic. They know- the color and shape and' size of many of them. But they can't put the mosaic to- gether consistently." To improve the quality of analysis requires the recruitment of better ana- lysts, provision of well thought-out programs of specialized advanced edu- catiOn ? and training, and incentives to got out on -a limb an.d warn of impend- ing crises when facts and intuition warrant, the ex- perts agree. . ? s ? But they feel the pre- sent climate makes it es- pecially difficult .to recruit many of the kind of young people necessary for an upgrading effort t_ On .the matter of over- -secrecy,: Clint. recently told the Pike a-mmittee on intelligence: "In all . my years in the State Depart- ment as ? chief of. intelli- gence, I never saw any re- cord of any of .the many conversations between White House officials and senior Soviet officials. If these had been available for systematic study by Soviet experts, some of the rather naive steps taken in Presidential-level negotia-, tions with the Soviet. Union might have been avoided " reports were cireeu.- rcRiamttoeftsA113010(18/04171Alit;ittv-oraseittvoi 0 ?AN 0 - bers, ? ? lacing through the burea -PP whi neit er admitted ril wo percen o entagon - sources .13 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 .iythe decision to invade Cambodia in 1970 was so citnely held by the Nixon Administration that even the then DIA director, Lt. .Con. Donald Bennett, was f.e. the dark. According to '!1?:?e eccount, on the morn- THE BOSTON. GLOBE 24 October 1975 ing of the invasion Ben- nett was asked lions the Russians and Chinese were reacting? ? "If you'd hare -told me a few days ago. I would have gotten some special assets into place to be able : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1 to give you a decent an- swer," he is reported to have snapped. ? ? The point, of course, is that if a handful of top of- ficials are so worrhid about the possibility of Officials fear reform, admit ifs- riteeded William Beecher interviewed ',tore than a score of present and former intelligence officials to exantine the implications of recent exposes. In a three-part series he discusses the impac; on foreign intelligence-gather- ing, adjustments made .to ride out the ? storm and. future prospects for U.S. i4itelliL7enci capability. By William Beecher .Globe Diplomatic Correspondent V Anlilen_in. N ? The senior intelligence official official was trying to sum up his frustration and concern over sensation-packed Congressional hearings and newspaper exposes on the excesses of the intelligence com- munity. . . "The whole thing reminds me of the last scene of Oedipus Rex," he said. "The king, having seen some wickedness and learned some bitter truths', walked to center stage and tore his own eyes out. "If the current process continues; we're in danger of ending up with a blind government, trying to cope with foreign affairs and military policy in a very cruel, tough world." This sort of arpprehension, though not. so dramatically ,over- stated, was voiced in a series of in- ?terviews by a number of men, par- ticillariy those who currently lead the iritelligenee establishment. But they and others . generally agreed that out of the present trau- ma should come a 'Thoroughgoing analysis of what America wants and needs in. the way of an intelligence system, and reforms alined at achieving a better balance between ends and means. While experts in and out of gov- ernment have a variety of views on .what is needed, there are some com- mon strands in many of their pro- posed solutions. The common elements ? include: 1) A new look at intelli- gence priorities, with greater emphasis on de- veloping sophisticated eco- nomic intelligence and somewhat less on military fntelligence, especially if funds,are cut back, as ex- pected. 2)- A fundamental change in the present ar- 14 THE TROUBLED CIA -3 rangemertt in which the director of the intelligence community also heads one of -its components, the CIA. Most would separate the two functions and. up- grade the former. 3) Creation 'of a new loint Congressional over- tight committee, patterned on the Joint Committee on Atomic _Energy, to scruti- nize operations and con- sult with the Executive Department on long range policies and on proposed covert activities. 4) Some would take covert missions away from the CIA and establish a separate small agency, more closely, . supervised, for such activity. Others ivould leave the function at the CIA, but cut way back on such operations, per- mitting political interfer- ence in other countries only When a compelling case of American national interest could be made. Clark Clifford, Wash- ington lawyer, adviser to a succession of presidents, and former Secretary of Defense, has been in- volved in shaping Ameri- can intelligence since he helped draft the 1947 law which established the CIA... He was White House Coun- sel at the time. President Truman, he re- President Truman, he re- calls, wanted such an or- ganization because of his conviction . that the bu- reaucracy failed to fore- cast Pearl Harbor not be- cause there weren't solid signs and reports pointing in that direction, but be- cause no one central office was collating and evaluat- ing them. Following the Bay of Pigs fiasco in 1961, Clif- ford says, he was asked by President Kennedy to be- come a member of a new group, the Foreign Intelli- gence Advisory Board, to leaks ?that they don't even confide in the heads of State and Defense Depart- ment intelligence, this se- verely constrains the abili- ty of the intelligence corn- muhity to serve the policy mkirg precesr egeetively, improve US performance in this field._ "I made a tragic mis- take," Kennedy told him at the time; "The reason did was because my advice was wrong. My advice was wrong because it .was baSed- oh erroneous facts. And. the 'erroneous. facts were due to faulty intelli- gence. If we improve sub- stantially our intelligence, then my adVice will, be better and I will, hopeful- ly, not make another mis- take of this magnitude." . . Clifford served for seven years on The ?board, first as a-. member and later as. chairman. :From- this background, he has a- number of suggestions to improve the current Intel, ligence set up. He urges a new law 'which would take from the e National Security Council the primary re- sponsibility for making policy for the intelligence_ Community and vest it, in- stead, in a specialist at-the White House.. Any pro- posed covort actions, for example, would have to be cleared by him. He would consult, regu- larly and closely, with a new ? special oversight committee with a small number of senior members from, both houses of Con- gress. "This man would keep the President fully in- formed of all important developments in intelli- gence; if he needed a Presidential decision, he would get ? it, quickly," Clifford says. - He feels true oversight has not been performed in Congress for years. And he believes that the secre- taries of State and Defense are much too busy running their departments to give more than cursory atten- tion to overseeing the in- telligence community. Clifford says that at the Present time the director of Central Intelligence will come before the Na- tional Security Council, sketch out a problem and make a recommendation for perhaps a covert action /program. ? ? "The pushed, harried men at that meeting will say: 'It sounds O.K., pi tahead.' CIA will thus have a charter to go from point A to point B. But in the field it will appear to the operators the events ? are pushing' them to Point C, then to D and E. And then the roof falls in. In point of fact, they were only au- ? thorized a limited opera- tion from A to B." Clifford feels that with a small, new agency set up to handle only covert pro- grams, it would have to clear each and every stop directly with the new in- telligence czar. And he, in turn, would consult, as necessary, with the Presi- dent and the special Con- gressional group. He feels that very few covert programs would be authorized under this ap- proach, and that the effort in Chile would not have passed the test as being vital to US national inter- ests. . This raises a philosoph- ical question as to what sorts of activities the Unit- ed States should in fact get involved in. A senior intelligence of- ficial complains that under present circumstances the Soviet ? KGB could move into Bangledesh, build up the local Communist party, buy off some key people in the military, the government and the press, launch a black propaganda Cainpaign to mislead the populace on the true ac- tivities of the Uniteo ? States and others ? aL. without fear of any coun- - ter-effort by the- United States. "We - would say: ?A5prOVed-FOTRe1e-ate-2001/08/00 CIX-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1: ? V.- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000190380005-1 shouldn't ire counter it? Buy back some people? We need funds. But it wouldn't be authorized for of the activity leaking cnt; SO we'd drift along =tea' the. situation became so deenerate that we'd areve ne choice but to act. By then it, would lee too Tate to do anything effec- tive." . . :This reflects a coricern among a number of ective cfficialre but Clifford, Emong . others, would event.: . the United States should steer clear of such marginal situations. That is the kind': of question that doubtless Would :be 'debat- ed thoroughly.if aenewein-. telligence struc- ture is propoied either by. the White House or -Con- gress. A top- Congressional source says he would be apprehensive about creat- .ing a new intelligence czar ? on the President's . staff because such ? advisers at present may not be called before Congressional com- mittees. He would prefer having a Director of Cen- tral intelligence, confirm- ed by Congress, with over- nil responsibility for guid- ing' all the intelligence agencies, and a different man running the CIA. Currently both jobs are handled by one man, Wil- liam E. Colby. The Congressional source favors a new select committee of the Congress, NEW YORK TIMES 25 Oct. 1975 Former Intelligence Officer Sues for C.I.A. Files on Him but would limit it to over- all review of policy, with the Armed Services and Military Appropriations ? committees of both Houses centinuing to pass on the funding requests of differ- ent Lntelligence agencies, mostly hidden in the-De- fense budget. The new committee, however, would also be available for consultation on special, sensitive projects, such as proposed convert actions.. An official with eite-n- sive experience both in CIA and military intelli- gence points out that 80 percent of all intelligence resource's are under the control of the Defense De- partment. One result, he ? says, has been that the vast bulk of resources are targeted on' learning how many SS-19 missiles the Russians have deployed and how many mecha- nized divisions the Chinese have, but precious little on developing economic intel- ligence about plans of oil producing nations, for ex- ample. ? Other experienced intel- ligence officials, civilian and military, agree. One of them says: "Economic in- formation 13 booming, in- creasingly important to :the viability of this coun- try. We should be gearing up to a major capability here.. There ought to be some way we could obtain information from some of our major corporations, WASHINGTON. Oct. 24 (UPI) '?A former intelligence officer, John Marks, has tiled a free- dom of information suit against the Central Intelligence Agency seeking all files or other docu- ments the agency has compiled on him, the Center for National Security Studies announced.. The suit, filed this week for Mr. Marks by ? the American Civil Liberties Union, seeks "all files, dossiers, communications, computer printouts or other documents", the agency holals on the former State Depart- ment liaison official with the intelligence agency. - ? Mr. Marks is co-author with Victor Marchetti of the contro- versial book "The C.I.A. and the Cult of Intelligence," which, with court approval the agency partially censored. He is :now an associate at the center. without creating conflicts of interest or raising._ sto- ries about infiltration of US business by the CIA. "For example," he con- tinues, "Occidental Petro- leum knows more about what's going on in Libya than anyone in the US government. We ought to be able to go to them and _solicit information, prom- ising it won't go to ? com- petitors or anyone ,else. But Occidental doesn't want to be associated with CIA. Everyone is afraid to get involved .in internal collector, of information. But we should be gearing up more to ,understanding what's going to happen to oil, copper and other- com- modities. We know so much about strategic mis- siles, but very little about economic intelligence. It's a question of priorities." ? When will the priorities be addressed, the issues brought to ahead? ? A savvy Capitol Hill source says he thinks the issue will be kept gave through the election year. "There are some 'members who would rather .have the issue than the solu- tion.". But the Church com- mittee in the Senate and the Pike committee in the House should wrala up their investigations and render reports and recom- mendations within the next few months. Christian Science Monitor 22 October 1975 ' Presicicnt *ford is known to be unwillteg to let the matter rest with the re- port by the intelligence commission head?til 11,:r President Rockefeller. A team of White House ofil- dials is beginning to ac- tively dig into the situa- ation; que.Stioning officials at each of the intelligence agencies with an eye ton major Presidential initi- ative. ? . Clifford, for one, thinks it would be a mistake to think the community can be brought into line mere- ly by increasing the clout of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board as recom- mended by the Rockefeller Commission. The mem- bers of that board are much too busy in their own professions' to provide proper continuous over- view, he feels. One of the key officials in the community would Welcome the issue being aired in the Presidential campaign, so long as it is done conscientiously and 'constructively. "When the campaigs is over, the new President will have a mandate to reform the, system. The dust can set- tle, and we can stop' testi- fying ,and get back to our work sof gathering and in- terpreting the facts so necessary to effective pol- icy-making." 'Leave our spies alone' Commentary by Howard K. Smith on ? , ABC News. Chairman Pike [recently] praised our spies who gather information, but he said the CIA goes wrong among those who receive and interpret the information, and act on it. I don't know if he knew it, but scholars of the subject say he was stating the tradition of the dark game the world over. Espionage is eminently successful in all nations. There aren't many secrets that can't be found. But intelligence ? interpreting and acting on them ? are flawed most every- where. Because all the books on it are now open, World War II is an encyclopedia of cases. Hitler's planned attacks on the Netherlands and on Russia were known to the date in the victims' capitals, but they wouldn't believe it. ? Hitler had our detailed plans for D-Day, but we were smart enough to get a lot of phony ? plans to him too, so he never believed the real ones., ..;.? : , .? -; ? ?? . ??, ? . Books on 'cases since are not open. But we know that from Russia putting missiles in Cuba to the Yom Kippur war in the Sinai, we had. all the facts . we needed, but anis- - interpreted them. ". ? s. " " . Since CIA reform is now in order, the.. distinction is important: Leave our spies - alone. I am inclined to think the President ? right in denying Congress information that' would hint .at their identities, locations, or methods. : ? . .? ? a ea a a? - ? Go to* work on' the' superstructure of in- - telligence and dirty tricks. That's Where the .trouble lies and changes are needed.. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 jSIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1 New Statesman 17 octo4ppemed For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001h0q8K9A4 ion ta ISL garbage invariably con- Julian Barnes Under the CIA Cloak M.1:1Z1390, 411110NaliSONIMErtlffir Ac-cording to Walter Mondale, the Demo- cratic Senator from Minnesota, the present proceedings of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities are 'more import- ant than the Watergate hearings - possibly the most important hearings in the history of our country'. There have certainly been enough sensational revelations about illegal techniques and vicious hardware (dart-guns and shellfish poison) to disturb the glazed approval with which the American public traditionally regards the CIA and the FBI. The Committee itself is aiming somewhat deeper: at how the intelligence agencies are and can be made accountable to the Presi- dent and to Congress. Such a scrutiny is cer- tainly overdue, since congressional super- vision has long been weakly complaisant, and presidents have been more interested in hearing about results than methods. In addi- tion, presidential attitudes to the FBI were long conditioned by the secret files which J. Edgar Hoover built up on important public figures. Kennedy, asked why he re- appointed Hoover, replied: 'You don't fire God'; while Johnson, a rich source of coarse wit, commented: 'It's better to have him inside the 'tent pissing out than out- side the tent pissing in.' The Senate Committee is not a very wieldy institution, either for intensive cross- examination (each of the ten Senators has ten minutes with a witness), or for a serious exchange of ideas (three of the ten minutes are usually taken up with a harangue, sometimes patriotic, sometimes moral, sometimes folksy, sometimes, hideously, all three). Moreover, there are side-issues which often take over from the investigation. With election year coming up, and gavel-to-gavel television coverage available, the Senators are on good form: the younger DemOcrats are in feisty mood, throw moral fits towards the camera, and call for Nixon to be sub- poenaed; the Republicans soft-pedal the past, and take it out on the bureaucrat serv- ed up -as the day's victim. The chairman, Frank Church, neat and broad-jawed in the Kennedy mould, with a matching electric- guitar voice, is bucking discreetly for the Democratic nomination; and his recitation of the Presidential Oath (without notes), ostensibly to emphasise Richard Nixon's dereliction of duty, has an added resonance to it. Despite all this calculated theatricality, however, the plot-line remains vividly clear. The present hearings, part of the con- tinuing backwash from Watergate, develop- ed from the discovery of what was known as the 'Huston plan'. Named after a Nixon White House aide, this was a strategy de- signed in 1970 to counteract campus violence and the anti-war protest move- ment; it involved black-bag jobs (as break- ins are called in the sanitised vocabulary of intelligence work), mail-opening pro- grammes, and the vigorous harassment of . political activists. It also proposed domestic spying by the CIA, in direct violation of the agency's charter. President Islisoa gave official approval to the Huston plan on 23 July 1970; but five days later, after pres- sure from Hoover and Attorney-General John Mitchell, he revoked his approval. Both decisions were completely hollow: the first, since most of the illegal techniques suggested in the Huston plan had already been in use by the FBI and CIA for decades; the second, since both agencies went ahead and behaved as if the plan had been approved. It was a classic example of executive im- potence. The CIA, for example, immedi- ately began to expand the mail-opening programme which it had run on suspected dissidents since 1952 (its varied victims had included Senator Edward Kennedy, John Steinbeck, Martin Luther King, Richard Nixon himself, and, ironically, Frank Church). Meanwhile the FBI, which had had great difficulty in infiltrating student movements, had sought, and been refused, permission to recruit agents under the age of 21; it nevertheless went straight ahead with the proposal, and its teenaged inform- ants enabled thciusands of extra files to be opened on suspected dissidents. These files, illegally compiled, are presumably still held. Truly, as Frank Church put it, the intelli- gence agencies had begun to operate as 'independent fiefdoms', keeping the Presi- dent ignorant of everything which, in their judgment, he did not need to know. The reasons for acting unconstitutionally and illegally are easily explained: such methods are less trouble, they bring results, and anyway the other side is already using them. One of the few witnesses to approach candour on the subject was James Angleton, the former chief of CIA counter-intelli- gence. A gaunt, rather stylised patrician who cultivates orchids in his spare time, Angleton was reputedly the man who put the finger on Philby, and was forced into retirement last year because of his opposi- tion to d?nte. In an unguarded piece of testimony which he subsequently described as 'imprudent' but did not withdraw, he pronounced it 'inconceivable that a secret intelligence arm of the government has to comply with all the overt orders of the government'. It was a belief which followed ill on the assurance voiced earlier by ex- CIA Director. Richard Helms: 'The nation must to a degree take it on faith that we, too, are honourable men devoted to her service.' When Angleton was asked to evaluate the usefulness of the CIA's illegal activi- ties, he cited the case of Kathy Boudin, a member of a group of Weathermen who blew up the Manhattan house in which they were making bombs in 1970. The FBI's investigations produced virtually nothing on her; but the CIA's mail coverage pro- gramme turned up some 50 letters which related to her activities. Almost by arrangement it seemed, the next witness, Charles Brennan, a former assistant director of the FBI, emphasised the frustrations and failures of sticking to the law. A? chubby, nervous apparatchik, suspiciously eager to please, Brennan out- lined an FBI plan devised when informa- tion on foreign spies working in the United States was at a low ebb. This was a scheme of `trash coverage', and involved the bureau systematically sifting through the dustbins of suspected communist agents. The revela- 16 tamed nothing but garbage drew the loudest laughter of the hearings; but even this seemed to underline the stance which the intelligence services were taking before the committee. Either we stick to the letter of the law, they appeared to imply, in which case we remain empty-handed and ridicul- ous; or we use dubious methods, and get results. It is, of course, an illusory dilemma, since there are two more possibilities: legal com- petence, and illegal incompetence. Indeed, the latter may well turn out to characterise the recent activities of the CIA, since a concurrent House investigation under Con- gressman Otis Pike into the agency's actual efficiency has already revealed startling failures over the ret offensive and the Yom Kippur war. Even with an efficient intelli- gence service, however, the Executive must be able to control it. The Senate Committee returns restlessly to this question, with little enough help, not surprisingly, from its witnesses. Asked how he thought the agencies could be made to act within the law, Angleton brazenly suggested that the law should be adapted to the needs of the agencies; indeed, he even claimed (and in this was supported by Brennan) that if the agencies had gone astray it was partly through lack of guidelines from Congress. Disingenuous as this argument is, it con- tains some truth. Tougher congressional supervision is part of the answer (at the moment, for example, oversight of the CIA is split between ?four congressional units); choosing a president (and, through him, an attorney-general) of firm moral character is clearly another part. As far as the agencies themselves are concerned, it does appear that they are now less eager to en- gage in illegal activities: the FBI's black- bag jobs (of which, for example, there were 238 against 14 specific 'domestic subversive targets' between 1942 and 1968) were dis- continued on Hoover's orders in 1968; and the CIA ended its mail coverage in 1973 Of course this still leaves activities like the tapping of international phone calls (about which Senator Church has promised revela? tions), and the use of the Revenue Service to harass dissidents. But however much the structure of ac countability is tightened up, and howeve much agency operatives appear to change their spots, it remains extremely difficul if not impossible, to ensure the account ability of intelligence agencies whose pa terns of thought and modes of operatin., demand stealth, concealment and deceit Perhaps the most bizarre and disturbing dis covery made by the Church committee s far, and the one which is most indicativ of the thought processes of those under in vestigation, has been that of the existenc of the FBI's `Do Not File' file. This was system whereby the black-bag jobs which were done were recorded separately, an kept out of the regular bureau files. FE officials were thus able to submit affidavits and to swear in court, that their files con tamed no reference whatever to the break-i that was being investigated. 'It's really th perfect cover-up,' declared Senator Richa Schweiker. 'It would be technically telli the truth, yet it would be a total deception. Or, as Senator Howard H. Baker fro Mississippi, in his folksier way, put it: frightening.' - Washington Approved- o Release 2001108708 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380008-1 Th U.S . 2ittar ? V./ASH NG.TON A PRIVATE WEEKLY REPORT AND FORECAST FROM U. S.NEWS & WORLD REPORT 2300 N Street N ? Washin5lon. DC 23037 Tel.: :202) 333-74j3 ? C:11)!ci Adrirsss. VOFEPO- October 10, 1975 .Quiet steps are being taken to reshape the Central Intelligence Agency.. One objective: To free the agency from "excessive" Pentagon pressures. Another, to lessen the influence the State Department wields over the CIA. And, at'the same time, a drive is on to find more spies who are willing to do the tedious undercover work that a successful intelligence operation requies. Little of this story has been told. Here is a bachgrounder for you: The Pentagon comes in for some severe criticism by CIA's civilian brass. In particular, scare-tactic lobbying by the military to boost CIA's budget -- the old routine of whispering to Congress that "Soviet subs are off the coast" at times when Congress just happens-to be considering appropriations requests from the Defense Department and the CIA. The growing view: No need for that. . Moreover, some CIA professionals resent what they regard as interference by the State Department -- "tailoring" CIA information to foreign-policy goals. (The charge that CIA figures on Viet Gong troop strength in the Tet offensive were doctored to match an Administration line is offered as an illustration.) ? . To correct the alleged abuses, the agency is doing some intense lobbying, asking Congress to amend the 1947 law which set up the CIA in the first place. Specifically, CIA seeks exclusion of military men from its two top posts. It's also asking Congress to block any Secretary of State from serving as head of the National Security Council, a position that Henry Kissinger holds today. CIA morale? Low. Investigations and adverse publicity haven't helped. Nor has this: The agency has became infected with. Washington bureaucracy-itis. Too many empire-builders, some offices overstaffed, some methods cry for change. Vietnam proved, for example, that the British Government could gather as many facts with 12 undercover agents as we could with 700 people in the same area. Then there's the problem of spies who don't want to stay out in the. cold. The CIA can hireplenty of people who like to work in the open, bat we're told there's a shortage of men and women willing to go overseas and underground to pose- as merchants, taxicab drivers and such while serving as CIA operatives. ? -These Missions can mean danger, hardship, facelessness sometimes for years. If you know anyone interested in working for CIA, suggest that they write CIA Personnel Director, Washington,- D.C. 20505. Or telephone 703/351-2028. NEW YORK 27 OCTOBER 1975 146 The Company Minds Its Manners The CIA is quietly launching a public-relations campaign to convince the establishment that its existence is worth preserving. So, the Harvard Business Club of Washington was recently invited over to CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, for cocktails and a little hard sell from Director William Colby. Equipped with charts and slides, Colby ! detailed the structure of the organization, discoursed on the necessity for some secret operations, and discussed the CIA's involvement in the six-day Arab-Israeli war. One of the agery's Middle East problems, said Colby, was that intelligence agents in the area had not anticipated an Arab attack. A more fundamental flaw in their operations, Colby explained, was that the agency had not "programed enough irrationality" into the Arab- Israeli situation. He promised that every effort wouAlifirol9dtltParRilea's re120.04406108 Meanwhile, over on Capitol Hill, the word is that Colby's courtship of the establishment may be a little "irrational" itself. A number of congressmen are saying that both the Church and Pike committees investigating U.S. intelligence activities have mishandled their hearings, and as a result, the CIA may get off the hook entirely. One embittered lib- eral congressman explained it this way: "Frank Church's Senate committee.lvent off into the clouds, playing to the press gallery with sensationarstuff about poison dart guns and shellfish toxin. It lost sight of the real purpose of the inquiry?not only what the CIA does, but why it does it. ...-Over in the House, Otis Pike is on an ego trip fighting the White House on a side issue of subpoena power, and it's caused a lot of dissension within the committee." The expected outcome: as the investigations drag on and on. Congress will lose interest in the whole subject and will 161AaREkR F3ROONMIRD MUSS WOO CIA. . alit)," in the future. ? 17 Approved For-Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1 FOREIGN SaRVICE JOURNAL October 1975 The nation must, to a degree, take it on faith that we, too, are honorable men devoted to her service.--:Richard M. Helms try^ yiqt? t? tinvesil adau_ THOMAS A. DONOVAN 1'1 IT SEEMS likely, when the Senate's. investigation of the Central In- telligence Agency .is finally behind us, that new and stronger barriers to Agency involvement in domestic affairs will have been erected. It is much less likely that any substan- tial:changes will have been imposed on the Agency's activities over- seas. Too many Senators have ex- plained that the investigation is not ? a threat to the Agency's continuing ability to carry out its "basic mis- sion" focl us to expect from the Congress any real change in CIA's mandate for clandestine in- telligence collection beyond our borders. This is a pity, for there is need for a careful Look at this "basic Mission." We should ask: Should we not, while retaining within the agency's sphere of operations all of its present open intelligence- collection activities, put an end to its present excessive preoccupation with the collection of information by the traditional methods of es- , pionage? We would still have our observa- tion satellites overhead. We would still tisten to (and if we are clever enough, even read) other people's radio traffic. We would continue, as in the past, to learn what we could from knowledgeable defec- tors and other walk-in document deliverers, such as Oleg Pen- kovsky. We would still take normal counter-intelligence precautions. Moreover, we would still have in an -above-board way, our batteries of intelligence analysts making their customarily careful analyses. We have been told by CIA spokesmen that the. overwhelming bulk of the information worked over by agency analysts emanates from more or less open sources, and only a tiny percentage conies from the packets of traditional spy Thomas A.-Donovan. FSO-retired. seri?ed at Prague. ilk IhtKitc. Fi.ankfort. Warsaw, Berlin, Khorramshahr and in the Depart- ment hefine his ,Virement vi the late 60s. Reprinted uldi permission _limn Com- monweal Publishing Co., Inc.. 232 Madison Are.. New l'grk, ew York 10016. work: - As for agency officers at CIA stations in embassies and ,consu- lates through the world, we could keep them on the. job, going to cocktail parties and-circulating as conventional diplorriats do. The unconventional but sophisticated political reporting talents of agency. personnel 'abroad already largely focused on and concerned with open available information, are an. asset that would not be diminished by depriving them of their authori- zation to act.,.fcr a feW-hours each week, like -"characters in a spy novel. All in all, then, an abrupt end to the shabby expedients now indulged in by our collectors of (or rather, lookers for) clandestine political intelligence would be a -long way indeed from total in- telligence disarmament. Certainly the record does not suggest that Russia's immense vestment of men and money in clandestine intelligence collection has been all that useful. The, Soviets have been taken by sur- prise quite as often as. perhaps of- tener than their Western rivals. They did not expect that Nkrumah would be overthrown in Ghana or that Sukarno would fall in In- donesia. They did not foresee that the United States would take pic- tures of the missiles in Cuba. or react to them as it did. They have been as often surprised by startling developments in East Europe as the rest. of us. Yet in all of these Ce'ri*rifries the Soviets have long possessed large clandestine intel- ligence-collection programs, and in some of them they have even con- trolled the local intelligence ap- paratuses. Is it, then, worth?'vhile for us as a nation to have on the .payroll at Langley a set of specialized civil servants to collect information for us by burglary, bribery and blackmail? For this is what we are really talking abOut in our sanitized language about the Agency's "basic mission" to collect clandes- tine intelligence.. My own experience, as an in- formation collector and intelligence processor of sorts in the Foreign Service and the State Department, 18 is that we could get along nicely without blackmail, bribery and burglary. No one who has not gone abroad on a diplomatic assignment .can appreciate how much our rep?i resentatives overseas are handi- capped by the reasonable suspicion that they have been sent to bribe or blackmail their way into possession of the classified internal trivia of another country's bureaucratic machinery of government. Cer- tainly, in my own tours of duty in Eastern Europe I have appreciated the legitimate anxiety of casual foreign acquaintances as .to whether I was other than I seemed to be. Was I. under diplomatic cover, Someone whose organiza- tional imperatives made it routine for him to be ready to ruin the lives of his foreign contacts?in the presumed "national interest" of the United States, but in practice mostly to win points for himself in his home organization? have firsthand knowledge of one such Agency effort. The victim was a young member of the Ciec'noslovak Mission in West Berlin who had the misfortune to meet, and subsequently to be prop- ositioned by, a free-lance An-ill-l- ean journalist whose acquaintance he made at a dinner in my home in West Berlin. My role in the matter seemed harmless. . I inferred correctly enough that the journalist whom I was asked (by an agency employee in the US Mission) to invite to my house was not, in fact, a legitimate American correspondent. I had never heard of the news agency listed on his &ailing card. Though I knew,' thei'efoie,' that I was being used by the Agendy to help bring these two men together (this is why I took up the agency man on his offer to pick up the tab on the cost of the dinner)--I rather simple- mindedly supposed that this was an inconsequential favor on my part. The Czech would be too wily to bite, I assumed, and if I 'didn't make the meeting possible some- one else would. Several years later in Washing- ton, a professor friend from MIT just back from a trip to Prague, told Approved For Release 2001/08/08': CIA-RDP77-00432R0001003800054? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1 me he had met somebody 1 knew. My ,young Czech diplomat had been assigned to escort him about Prague. Why was he no longer in the diplomatic service?, the profes- sor had asked. The young Czech had candidly replied that he had accepted an invitation to dinner at an American diplomat's house in West Berlin and there he met an American correspondent- who made him an offer to work for the American. intelligence service. He turned down the offer and informed his superiors. But they, in the way of intelligence organizations?and maybe this was what the agency had had in mind all along?called him home and cashiered him. After all, if the Americans could have had reason to suppose he might be a weak link in Czechoslovak secur- ity, then better to play it safe and put him on the shelf in Prague. An unimportant enough affair in the end, no doubt. Diplomats have to live with such hazards. But now it is no longer just the diplomats who come under a cloud from this sort of thing. Whole professions have been tainted by reasonable doubts as to:their bona fides. Can one wondeF, from the above in- stance, that stispicious security services in even the backwaters of the world now feel they cannot. af- ARGUS, St. Louis 2 October 1975 From The Publisher's Desk- ford to be indifferent to ,the com- ings and goings of US newsmen? The Senate inveMigators should ask, at long last, whether the na- tional interest is really servedby having this unWorthy and ulti- mately useless activity continue-to he tarried on by tare& civil ser- vants of the United States govern- ment. The Senators must go be- yond a limited effort to satisfy themselves that the clandestine arm of the agency henceforth oper- ates more clearly within the agen- cy's charter. They must redraw the agency's "basic mission" to ex- clude the kind of reliance on blackmail, bribery and burglary that has become such a characteris- tic feature ? of clandestine in- telligence collection. No amount of fussing with the agency's operating instructions?no new ordinances specifying, -? say, what kinds of newspapermen may or may not be used in what kind of operations? nothing of this kind will set things right. The Senators have, anyway, a unique opportunity to seek An an- swer to the question of whether our own record over the last 25 years shows clearly land decisively that slavish imitation - of the Soviet KGB has promoted our real na- tional interests in any significant way. Image Making. Eugene N. Mitchell, M.D. It would seem that in what is commonly considered the post Watergate era that Americans are in for an onslaught of redefinitions and new image making. Currently the media in most cities are about investigating government and its agencies. In a way, this is good in that many have needed a close perusal for sometime now. . , Abuses by physicians and other professionals are also popular topics, and most agree that certain types of exposes, while necessary, if not watched carefully can cause more harm 'than. good. Witness the ever increasing malpractice costs which, many- feel will seriously damage the practice of medicine in this ountry. Right now, alleged CIA and FBI abuses are the popular fodder for newspaper's powerful cannon, and sensational headlines concerning these co-called threats to our democracy are as common as raindrop's. ? That mistakes have been made is all to obvious, but if we're not careful the effectiveness of these badly They might try to balance the: Agency's inflated and thus far tm- I documented claims to occasional) modest successes against its all too t painful failures.. The committee should satisfy itself, for example, as to whether .the Agency has needed its license to practice blackmail, bribery and burglary beyond our borders in its much vaunted performance in gaining possession of the text of Khrushchev's secret speech of 1956 on the crimes of Stalin. In fact, several copies of the speech were simply passed to US officials abroad by foreign Communists who were anxious to get it into general circulation quickly and who were indifferent to the fact that a decision would be taken in Wash- ington to treat the windfall as a coup of CIA's clandestine in- telligence collectors. At any rate, my own exposure? in a Foreign Service career of 25 . years?to a representative cross- : section of the Top Secret output of the collectors of clandestine politi- cal intelligence convinced me that the game of authorized blackmail, bribery:, and burglary has been as .little abroad as at home. Thei'Sehators will conclude as much, 1 suspect, if they try to see for themselves- needed agencies will also be ,seriously hampered.. -This is not to say that the CIA, FBI, doctors, lawyers and politicians should not have checks and balances, but to totally tarnish their images or ignore their individual and collectiite good would be a horrendous mistake. All nations have a spy service and as CIA Director Colby pointed out recently in a St. Louis visit, this very delicate balance of power must be maintained to preserve peace. It would be nice if nations did not have to spy on other nations but it's naive to suspect this will ever be. Certain types of abuses simply can't be accepted especially if they infringe upon our individual rights. Would we, however prefer to allow groups like the SLA, the Weathermen: or Ku Klux Klan run rampant and unchecked? Remember the violence prior to J. Edgar Hoover's getting tough on the Klan. And don't forget that groups that advocate overthrotVing our form of government are also a threat. . It's obvious when all facts are considered, that the difference between totalitarianism and the effective safeguarding of American freedom is a thin line. The one area of concern that is -intolerable is the allowing of politics to influence, our powerful national agencies thrust. This, obviously, is_difficult to control, and in the end, after all the investigations are over, the main control will probably still be the integrity of the people involved. Laws, can be legislated, but honesty, and integrity can't. _ , _ ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1 19 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1 POST, New York 17 Oct? 1975 ax Lerner 14t _was still a blunder. Have othe.,_Cong,ressonal corruoittees be-come sensation-mongers, as is often charged? My answer is that the po- litical theater was inevitable. The _ strength- of Congressional investiga- ..,ar'''''''...-fv.r."71 WILL INTELLIGENCE SURVIVE? tions,- as witness the Ervin committee on Watergate, is that they are free of ? ? WASHaNGT.ON. ? It was part of the new "openness" of the CTA that a professor-columnist was invited to give a talk in an after- noon lecture series in the new dome- shaped auditorium. His theme being "Where Is America Gong?" he talked (among other -things) about open and covert societies, and about using social intelligence in intelligence operations. The policy of inviting some ideas from the outside into the sacred pre- cincts of the CIA predates the big public flap abOttf.'thea.gency. It was sta-rted when ? James-- Schlesinger was briefly director and has been contin- ued under William Colby. - ? Some might scorn such auspices for an arena of open discussion, but oth- ers have seen it as a change to infil- trate the hitherto rigid domain with oppositional ideas. In any event the CIA leadership publicly aired its con- viction that its sinners are not beyond salvation.. ....- 44.'.' My own view of the recent revela- tionS about the CIA' and its related agencies Is that it is never pleasant to watch a can of worms being opened, but that it is better to have the worst revealed than to continue the) conceal- ment. _- When director Colby ordered a set of intern al ,investigations into ,the agency's past several years ago, he must have had a strong hunch about what would -be discovered. Understand- ably he wishes that the cleansing proc- ess had stopped there. But no* one could have stopped it. Once the self-assess-. anent had begun it was bound to-spread. The 'Virginia Gazette ? ? -- ? Williamsburg, Va. October 17, 1975 Page 4 Colby's regret?if he hasany?is that he briefed only the- chairmen of the two Congressional oversight commit- tees or, the results -of the inner dig- ging. He should have- briefed the whole of the leadership of both houses, and arranged for 'an early'and orderly Con- gressional investigaton. By. not doing so, he let. the whole investigation game become a free-for-all.: SeymoUr Hersh of the New York Tithed got hold of a good part of the story, 'and then hell inevitably broke loose, :1 -, 1- ? -The Rockefeller commission worked hard, -but from its beginning it was bound to- be- tagged as -an- establish- ment inquiry. It did an honest, earnest job but the conclusions . 7Vould ,have lacked credibility, if they were not con- firmed by the independent work of the two Congressional committees.: Where -the aockefeller group made Its mistake was in deciding to separate the assassination material' from the rest of its report. The whole- thing was all of a piece in its methods and. in its moral roots, and should.. have been -treated as a. piece. -? 1.: ? The story one gets fir Washington Is that President Ford was responsible for .lopping off the assassination ma- terial. He felt it was bad enough for foreign "nations' to learn that their heads of 'government had been assas- sination targets, but if they had to know everything it was better for them to learn it from Congressional hearings and leakages than from a presidential commission which had been given the' President's brief and *hose report would get the President's approval. One can understand Ford's feeling, but Headlines- It was unfortunate that Vice Presiden. E-ROckefeller took the occasion Of the launching of the-,USS Dwight D. Eisenhower last. Saturday to' make some :gratuitous and misleading remarks-about news coverage.of the CIA._ Warning that U.S1 security is thrfeatened by a build-up of Soviet .naval forces and their existing intelligence system, Rockefeller said, "The Soviets-have, developed the most 'comprehensive intelligence complex the world 'has ever known,- while we run the risk of destroying our Own intelligence system with headlines.'.', This is analogous to the remarks of former President 1Slixon and his aides that "wallowing in Watergate" would ..aestroy the- presidency. Watergate destroyed Nixon but revitalized our trust in the presidency. -? 7'. Vice President Rockefeller did not tell the Newport 'News crowd that he was a member of the U.S. Foreign :intelligence Advisory Board during the same time that ?many alleged. CIA wrongdoings were permitted to occur, --executive' in'nibitions.---.--. Their weaknesses are that Congress- men have to play to the gallery of their constituencies, or. else they wouldn't be what they are. Curiously, none, of the Ervin committee :members who were touted for the presidency at the time have come through as real candidat. How about the question of legisla- tion? The best bet would he to strength- en the internal investigative controls within the CIA by giving the inspector' general stronger powers- to roam- through the 'agency. As for the Na- tional .Security Agency, its scanning of- global communications should get spe- cific assent from the Attorney General. The Congressional controls of the whole intelligenee setup should be in ,the hands of' a joint Congressional . committee of both houses, as is troe of the Joint Committee on Atomic En- ergy. But its members should be taken from the highest levels, and include the Congressional leaders of both parties. In that way there will be a. maximum, of intelligent control of intelligence. - -There remains the question of whether the Congressional investiga-1 tions have hurt the intelligence opera- tion., Temporarily they have, by putting the agency in a bad -light, but the in- telligence community will survive. .The valid functions of the operation will have to be separated from the abuses ? that have distorted them. What the world will in time see, 2$ It did with Watergate, is that 'a democ- racy can clean its house without de-. stroying the vital things that have to go on within it.. - ? j ;during 1969-1974: This board theoretically held super- :xisory authority , over the CIA and- other .intelligence :groups. ? . Rock efeller.,also-seemed to forget that it was his own .:Commission on CIA .Activities. Within :the=Uniteci States ::that just last June cOnfirmed the accuracy.of many news- about CIA- misdeeds.. in fact-, -the- Rockefeller 'Commission went beyond the news media, in several in- 'stances such as the discovery of Operation CHAOS, the 'domestic intelligence project_ 7- We have previously- maintained that an. official in- r'vestigation is warranted into possiblerConne.cdons bet- :ween alleged CIA assassination plots and the agency's ;Sprawling training base here- at Camp Peary. While it :'would be diplomatically damaging to expose the identities .:Of any targets, it would be helpful to know the sordid' "history of how these plots developed..Only in this way can 7-iwe learn froth our mistakes and hopefully punish any ::.perpetrators.. This,country has benefited far more. from ?:such exposure-to the-public eye than,,ite.bas from corn- '::parable cover-ups, as we so paintutiv -learned during ::i1Natergate. 20 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1 ? ? 61,?Ar? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1 NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, OCTOBER 19, 1975 AdministrationSaidtoMap 'Battlei 'aril' on Intelligence , By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK -'Special to Tito New York Times ? WASHINGTON, Oct. 18? in the preparation of Mr.: The Ford Administration will Ford's program for halting in- stanchly resist a Congressional telligence agency abuses. He effort to bar the United States and his advisers, senior sources Government from undertaking said, passed want to avoid legislation covert intelligence operations =, emotional present atmosphere" mlent's prerogative to order such operations, interviews with high Administration sources that would permanently crimp the Government's ability to maintain national security. disclosed. The Ford program, still far from finished, includes efforts This decision is one of sev- to "civilianize" intelligence and era' reached recently as the Ford 'Administration and the leaders' of the intelligence agencies drew up what one key official called the "order of battle" for an expected con- frontation with Congress on control of the intelligence com- munity. Administration sources said they fully expected, and many approved of, stronger Congres- sional oversight of intelligence gathering activities. But these sources agreed that President Ford would resist an attempt to bar the Government from engaging in covert foreign operations or an effort to re- quire him to get prior approval from Congress before such an operation might be started. The plan now under study Indeed, one top official was by Mr. Ford, drawn partly from even chary of proposals that a recommendation of the corn- the President should "consult" mission on the C.I.A. headed by Vice President Rockefeller. would require that a proposal for Covert activity be sent to the board and the board would give the President its recom- mendation on the 'plan. He would still have the final de- cision and his power is un- marred, most sources agreed. ? The board would be given an 'increased staff to permit it to examine the justification for agency proposals more fully. New appointments would also be made to give the board what one official called, "more Ford character." All current mem- bers of the board were ap- pointed before Mr. Ford took office and seven of the 10 members were appointed by ,President Nixon. "It's Mr. Kissinger's board," said one source, explaining that the appointments since 1969 had been recommended or ap- proved by Secretary of State arrange ways the agencies, can "police themselves," sources said. The keystone will be a rein- forced President's Foreign In- telligence Advisory Board, which would have the power to "look at" proposals for cov- ert activity. It would also, an- other source said, be a plate where complaints of abuse within the intelligence commu- nity could be carried. The board was created to be a place Presidents could obtain independent advice on intelli- gence matters. But, in fact, over the years its role has been min- imal in the President's decision- making on covert activities. with Congress on covert opera- tions before they are launched. "The problem with that is consultation implies approval which is a violation of the doc- trine of separation of powers and, we've been fighting this on separate fronts all along," he said. The move within the Admin- istration to solidify its positions on intelligence matters seemed to coincide with a sense of growing fatigue and irritation with the Congressional com- mittees and media disclosures on intelligence. "People are tired and tempers are flaring," one key sonrce said. ? A senior official said that he find the President belieVed that the two Congressional commit- tees did not need to "disclose everything in order to .get leg- islation" and suggested that the Congressional investigators may have passed from gather- Kissinger. ing evidence to prepare legis- lation to "mere curiosity." The White House, sources "I think they ought to get said, has rejected an early plan on with it," said another offi- that would have placed the cial. "Get the legislative pro- hoard's chairman over the in- posals together and stop all the telligence agencies in what one dramatics." He criticized partic- called a "czarlike" role. The ularly the upcoming hearings, post was offered to former See- of the Senate Select Comrlittee retary of the Treasury George on Intelligence, which will ex- P. Shultz, who is a member of amine mail openings this week, the board, but he declined it. M "We've been over and over and Mr. Shultz is employed by the over that." he said. Bechtel Corporation and is The Senate has already re- serving the Administration in -ceiged -testimony on how the several special capacities. Central Intelligence Agencyl There is also no immediate opened mail and the subject Plan to replace William E. Col- has been examined by several by, Director of Central Intelli- other Congressional commit- gence or Clarence E. Kelley, Di- tees. - !rector of the Federal Bureau of The pressure Of ace pears .have been one ffethe sbalfteffl/&,4?R Y-MOinMAPAUS Cotipp,ThinglItgot6g.tiitin. Acme pp_ h,hhint a a list of potential directors for 21 FEAT YORK Tr1ES 20 October 1975 11S1 PEFLD7E AIDE JLA FACES NEVI DELAY ? . By GEORGE VOLSKY Special to The New York TImes MIAMI, Oct. 19?The confir- mation of a Cuban-American' appointed last August as direc- tor of the Cuban Refugee Pro- gram faces a new delay follow- ing lengthy background investi- gations by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other agencies. A spokesman for F. David Mathews, the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, who is responsible for the Cu- ban program, said Friday that an-F.B.I. report en the appoin- tee?Ricardo Nunez, would be sent to the Civil Service Com- mission this week. "It's out of our hands," the spokesman said, adding that a 'decision might not be made: until December. Other Federal officials said they could not recall a "super-grade" appoint- ment for which confirmation by the commission had taken sO long. Mr. Nunez, a wealthy Miami builder, was a top executive 'of Gramco, a bankrupt invest- ment fund based in the Baha- mas that was owned by Robert Vesco, the financier who fled to the Caribbean after he was indicted on Federal char- ges of fraud and conspiracy. Between 1959 and 1968. when he joined Gramco, Mr. Nunez Was an employe of the Voice of America. During most of that time, he has said, he was also an undercover operative of the Central Intelligence Agency. His new $36,000 jab, although' subject to the confirmation by the Civil Service Commission, is a political appointment. It also requires a top security clearance. The refugee program he has the C.I.A.., but found no one with the qualities he felt the job called for who would _ac- cept the post. Mr. Colby has already in- creased the size of the C.I.A.'s inspector general's office and the inspector general is to be given new lines of command that will make it possible for. him to report to the advisory board, they said. Several officials were anx- ious about the concept that a director of the C.I.A. could complain to Congress, about Presidential orders or that Congress would be "ombuds- man" over the agencies. "I'm a little worried that oversight should not impair good' working management," said one senior official. He im- plied that making Congress a "court of appeals" for thei bureaucracy weakened disci- pline. ? Administration sources ap- peared to believe that how the !Senate select committee hen- Idled the hearings on the Na- tional Security Agency might #1,eAt;'nf gbeialoopsibility hfilFeis4 H0801.11 tionat security matters. beili named to head spends about S90-million a year. Its farmer director?like his prede- cessors. an expert social work- er?died in March, awl Case W. Weinberger, then the H.E.W. Secretary, named Mr. Nunez to the pest fillve months later. Before the appointment was Made known, some experts ad- vocated that the Position be abolished for the sake of econo- my_ They argued that since virtually no new Cuban re- fugees were coming to the United States, the program' should be phased out and its functions absorbed by other agencies. ! 'The app ointment of Mr. Nu- nez provoked strong criticism; particularly among Cubans who are Republicans and Americans! who have y had business deal- ings with him here. In Washington, Lilian C-iber- ga, a Cuban Adviser to the Republican National Commit- tee, s called Mr. Nunez, himself a Republican, "totally unquali- fied." She said that she had, written to resident Ford urg- ing that Mr. Nunez be asked to resign to "spare the Admi- nistration an embarrassment." In Miami, Rafael Villaverde, Republican who heads a so- ilaP agency for the aged. termed the process through which Mr. Nunez was appoint- ad'."our new Atergate." Supporters of Mr. Nuzez have isted, however, that his aide-ranging business and civic aetivities have qualified him 4r the job. In late .August, after The .tl'eW York Times learned that Nuzez was a defendant a dozen of civil lawsuits .ere, the F.B.I. reopened its inquiry into his 'background. According to court records in Dade and Broward Counties, about 30.companies:and indivi- odutis and several law firms are suing Mr. Nunez and N. B. S. Development Company, his land and contracting con- cern, alleging nonpayment of ,more than $300,000 in bills two other cases, the builder and his company ave been ordered to pay a number of plaintiffs. While not legally bankrupt, N. B. S. has no known assets. Mr. Nunez, who lives in Coral Gables, in a lavish home report- ed to be worth $500,000, was a modest wage earner in, 1968, when he left Miami to iive in Nassau. Four years later, following the bankruptcy of Gramco. he returned here a multimillionaire, according to former associates. One associate said that part of Mr. Nunez's job at Gramco had been to coordinate sales in Latin America. He added: "We all knew that it was illegal in every Latin country to sell Gramco bonds. At one time, our entire team of 10 salesmen in Peru was arrested, and it cost us a huge bribe to get them out of jail. After that our Latin operation went completely underground, with fictitious names, coded messa- ges and all that C.I.A. stuff.", When Gramco collapsed, thousands of Latin investors were reported to have lost more than $50-million. Some, of them are said to have ex- 380g?st to American diplomats 'dismay over Mr. Nunez's ;appointment. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1 PITTIADELPHIA NOJJIREH 17 OCTOBER 1975 ' __ - the:1 liberal reporters vFEe- :::eked off the CIA controversy inta 'last year are- now ready to settle .for the prosezution:and jailing of, one Or tY.-3. CIA agents?the higher,rank- log.- the.- better?forr.violations 'of law uneovered in the?cOurse of their hot-. .eyed investigations I hope profound- ,y that. no- such thing happens.. ? ,.; Tin whole flap over the alleged mis- eecds. -of the: CIA has: been-a phony- fron;._ t,he start?a painfully obvious attempt on the, part of the Washing. ton press corps to maintain the rma: mentcrn generated by Watergate and. .roll over, yet another pet liberal :tar- get- before the juggernaut slowed' -.7r5ra SeYinour Hersh's original story in the New York Times on Dec. 1974-,- to Sem-Frank E'nurch's most recent pirouettes, on the Sunday TV talk show, the entire affair has had the unmistakable flavor of a."happen- frig": , one of those . pseudo-eventS Staged-to aniaze and edify the ground- lings in the tedious gaps 'between real - -The 'test of the phoniness of the Ii'hole thing is the. disproportion tween the efforts exerted between the cooperating media and politicians the -amoant of authentic concern generated irr the public at large. T-leaven.knows_the effort has-'been. ? - .monumental: acre_s '.'of.. 'newsprint,' oceans of, ink, .hundreds of hours of prime time, a reveiarion a day for 300 days, a Presidential commission and three separate congressional investi- gations,?,-...: A ? ? Yet...just;hovii -concerned are the. 'misconduct' people -over.- the -:aileged of . the CIA? Have you. heard a single,- really tense. argument' on. the..subjeCt? -..Watergate caused' plenty of :them?and Vietnam- too; and .so.plid.the campus riots-and vari- ous aspects of the civil' rights contro- VerV: ?????? ; :.? `;.- ? . . ..?:?But if anybody outside' the original' elique:bas ever raised his voice in anger, one way 'or the other; on the subject; of-the CIA, it. has eluded me'. The reason for the public's indiffer- .ence .is not far to seek. Most. Ameri-i? cans. know:yery -well :.that... this, i5,4.? dirty 'and. are: entirely. in.' ac- ? . ? ? . "cOrd.with. the-idea* that it is necessary ? to have some- tough types on our side. ?. 'And ? if .Senator Church,. poking - around in .the .files, comes unexpect edly. Upon evidence that the Kennedy brothers -spent a lot of time trying to kill.-Castro,-- daresay that the domi-., nape. emotion Of a good many Amer-- tans :on the subject. is a. keen regret ? that they.didn't succeed. . . . To:be sure, it is the unwritten law' in such situations. that the did prin- ciple of "respondeat superior" doesn't .apply:?.?We all remember that . dry. voice on: the-, self-destructing tape .in WASHINGTON POST Tuesday, Oetober21.1975. turate ?By George Lardner Jr. Washington Post Staff Writer The Central Intelligence Agency built up such an un- dercover bureaucracy overseas that for a time it had almost as many employees abroad as the State Depart-, ment's Foreign Service, ac- cording to informed sources. Shortly after the advent of the Kennedy administration, sources said, the CIA had 3,700 employees operating under diplomatic or other official U.S. titles overseas while the State Department had 3,900 bona fide employees working abroad.. The CIA officials were known in U.S. "government circles as "CAS"?Controlled American Sources. Their proportions in U.S. embassies? abroad were sometimes startling. Some 15 years ago. One source said, for example. 16 out of 20 people in the political section of the embassy in Vienna really belonged to the CIA. En recent years, another source said, the CIA con- tingent abroad- has been. drastically reduced, partly because of the 1961 Bay of Pigs --? ? ? - : ? . ?: ? ?Inipossible" warning. 'Jim that if his .actions- unluckily came to 'light;. "the Secretary- will of course 'deny all -knowledge of them." ? Fair enough but it certainly that if Jim's illegal acts were -:exposed by .EsPine- nosey reporter, it would be the bounden duty of our own- :Depart-tent. of Justice to prosecute .? Jim and sendlhim up the river. ?? There is-such a thing as "prosecu-: ? torial discretion": ?the right of the ? prosecutor ? to decide, in the light .of all ',..ciretirnStances ? ;of ? the wheelie:- or not to seek an indictment, .?Just, at the moment that discretion is being exercised generously in favor :of. thousands. of draft-dodgers and de:- ,.serters, many of whom have recently ? compounded' their original. crime by failing to keep the promises (of alter-. native service) they made. to avoid 'prosecution in the first place: How much more 'deserving are, the men in the CIA'who may have yiolat-:. :ed lesser lawS'in the interests of this ? WielT.the:full knowledge and? ? the private behest, of the. Presi-; ::7denta- they sei-wd!' ?: To prosecute-such men now, for no: !letter; reason ? than ".to.- reassure moUr-Hersh that he hasn't been wast-; ,-ing,Our time and. his own, would be a. "deadlier'blow at the CIA' than any he ? and his -cronies have managed to. land' a. far .greater crime than anyi - , at tip. dc-Or of the . .. ? Em ssies In fiasco, but also because of the growing clout of the multi- billion-dollar National Security Agency, whose technological eyes and ears' are considered more reliable. -You'd be surprised at how few people the CIA has ; overseas these days," - this source said. Although the figure can sometimes jump dramatically with the in- ception of new covert operations, this source said the current total was "less than half" of the 3.700 officials: reported on the CIA's secret roster in mid-1961. Shortly alter the CIA was established in 1947, a special study group headed by then deputy CIA director Allen Dulles warned in a still secret report against using State Department cover as an answer to all its problems. The report, sources said., indicated that the CIA even then had been making what the State Department con- sidered excessive demands for official slots. The study group reportedly recom- mended that the C IA develop, more "outside cover" for its, personnel overseas, ,such as that which cquld be provided by private business. The CIA, however, steadily increased its requisitioning of official government positions, sources said, because it was easier, quicker, provided more security and offered more perquisites for its personnel. By 1961 as a consequence, according to sources, the spy agency had some 1,500 people abroad under State Depart- ment cover and another 2.200 under other official U.S. covers, such as Defense Department civilian per- sonnel. In some U.S. missions so- called "CAS" personnel outnumbered the regular State Department com- plements. At the embassy in Chile, for instance, 11 of 13 officials in the political section in 1961 were from the CIA. Almost half of the political officers in American em- bassies throughout the world were under cover for the CIA. The result, sources said, was often a seriousen- croachment on State Department policymaking. In some countries; CIA station chiefs were able to command more influence than the ambassadors and at times 22 pursued different policies. At the Paris embassy, where the CIA occupied the top floor and in 1961 had more than 125 people, the spy agency even took over much of the overt political reporting on French politics normally done by the "State Department. Although there are repor-. tedly far fewer CIA officials operating abroad today, there are indications that the agency still relies heavily on official U.S. cover for the overseas personnel that it does have. At the CIA's inception 28 years ago, according to one knowledgeable source, the use of State Department cover was supposed to be "strictly limited and temporary." But in an affidavit this month that was prompted by a freedom-of-information lawsuit in U.S. District Court here, officials of the National Security Council claimed that disclosure of initial 1948 plans for coordinating secret' operations with other U.S., agencies could, even today, "prompt attacks on our diplomatic personnel overseas as. being spies and covert' operators." 1 AP-P--rO-ved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-004321000100380005-1 ee. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1 -5or;: ? . ? BY THOMAS PEPPER BALTIMORE SUN 19 OCTOBER 1975 ? it; ; ? esie0 Washington. kleel' the leaves change color on the. treeee and time begins to run out on the tV:Congressional committes investigat- ing United States intelligence activities, it ;is :;becoming increasingly apparent if:Tar-normal standards of government tetgfiirmance are not going to bring gre,,itand meaningful change to the in-. telligence community. .- ...If-past precedent is any guide, it will t6,1;e-an extraordinary and concerted ef- fort.--:on the part of the White House, Congress, and the intelligence agencies themselves?to do anything more than, repeat the usual Washington cycle of disclosure, alarm, and inertia. . ..'.:"Indeed, without such an effort?of a edit-More systematic, for example, than thefeurrent attempts to change regulato- ry policy?one could hazard a guess that the. various intelligence agencies would rfde, :rent their current troubles, and be badt?:in business, roughly as before, by Mid4977. . te- -Between now and then, a certain ainOunt of day-to-day difficulty is inevit- ahleit Senate ? and House investigating cOnernittees will continue to demand an- ., , ewers to a host of questions, although the coMmittees will soon have to halt their inquiries and put together their reports; bath face deadlines of early next year. President Ford has indicated that he will-be instituting reorganization proce- dutese-presumably to check past abus- esebutealso to head off too much Con- gressional intervention later next year, when legislative changes arising out of the two investigative reports will be ready for passage. Meanwhile, the intel- likence agencies themselves can be ex- pected to do a certain amount of inter- nal?house-cleaning. - Thus, by spring various reorganiza- tion plans are likely to be in the works. And with an election campaign under- way, the country can expect?and de- serves?more debate than normal about the power and quality of its intelligence services. .. There will be charges and counter- charges, and bitter disagreements over who is protecting the nation more effec- tively: defenders of a relatively unfet- tered intelligence agencies, or critics of allegedly too powerful intelligence serv- ices. Then, no matter who wins the pres- idency?but particularly if a Democrat wins, and brings with him a wholesale change in executive branch appoint- ments?some further reAreanization is likely in early 1977. rprovea i-or 23 But what happens after that? Will the dust settle once again? What form will reorganization take? The answers to these questions would seem to depend, in the end, on the intel- ligence agencies themselves. A strength- ened system of oversight, though it is now the most obvious and most likely re- sult of the current congressional investi- gations, is not enough. The intelligence gathering process, if it is to work, must operate under condi- tions of greater secrecy than any other part of a democratic government. Un- like grand juries, or regulatory agencies and other quasi-judicial bodies that op- erate with a certain amount of secrecy, intelligence agencies collect much of their information without the knowledge of the people who first produce that in- formation. Any sharing of how this is done, even within an agency, is considered a risk perhaps greater than the original risk of seeking the information. The risk is evert greater when an intelligence agency en- gages in so-called "covert action," meaning an attempt not simply to col- lect information, but to change the courseOf events in a way that masks the cause of the change. Any oversight process, particularly' 'one that might involve public disclosure, increases the risk to intelligence opera- tions. Correspondingly, any requirement -for a secret oversight process weakens the independence of the oversight body. In extreme situations, something has to give?either the effectiveness of the in- telligence operations, or the ef fective-? ness of oversight. With mutual trust, there would be room for give-and-take; the. agencies could give up some of their secrecy, and the monitoring bodies could give up some of their need to know, tak- ing the rest on faith. I.? But that very trust is the missing in- gredient at the moment_ The succession of super-discreet ?congreesionai etibeoin- mittees that took care of intelligence oversight up till?now tilted heavily in the direction of intelligence activities. In practice, there was less oversight than this year's revelations would seem to have warranted. Now the atmosphere is different. Be- ginning with the Watergate revelations of 1973, and continuing into this year with the two congressional investiga- tions and one by an executive branch commission headed by Vice President Rockefeller, public perceptions of the in- telligence agencies have changed consi- derably. As a group, they stand accused of two severe failings: First, in their efforts to collect infor- mation, the agencies admittedly broke .; Agency aimed at letters to and from Communist nations, and an electronic eavesdropping program run by the Na- tional Security Agency on all interna- tional teiephone, telegraph, and telex traffic. Also, the Federal Bureau of In- vestigation has admitted that it conduct- ed illegal burglaries against U.S. citi- zens. In addition, the agencies often failed ?again, by their own admission?to meet standards of quality they them- selves had set for gathering accurate in- formation; standards they had told the rest of us to expect. Key examples here are the estimates by both the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency of the likelihood for unlikelihood) of a Middle East war in the fall of 1%7. As late as one hour after the Egyptiam;Syrian at-' tack had begun, these estimates were -still telling the President that no general offensive was in the works. Thus, judging by revelations so far, the major tasks ahead are: 1. On the input side, to curb abuses of the law. 2. On the output side, to force the sys- tem to produce higher quality, intelli- gence. ? Some would go still further and say that U.S.. intelligence agencies should not engage in "covert action." _ Any new congressional oversight body that might emerge from this year's investigations is bound to. have these matters very much in mind, and to shift away somewhat from the old system of, giving the intelligence agencies the ben- efit of the doubt' Just how far the balance will shift re- mains to be seen, however. A Democrat- ic administration could probably count , on greater latitude from a congressional committeehdominated by Democrats man the present Republican administra- tion could. - Furthermore, any new Congressional panel?say one patterned after the rela- tively successful Joint Committee on At- omic Energy?Would eventually en- counter the same obstacles that haunted its subcommittee predecessors. This conflict between secrecy and oversight would -also apply to any new White House monitoring group that Mr_ Ford might establish._ ' 9 7" "77 ;: ?- ' The. burden of change, then, is likely' to fall mainly on the agencies them-. selves. Each has a separate history, and a separate set of problems. But they. alone possess the necessary information to accomplish the two key tasks. Within the CIA, for example, there is a definite feeling of satisfaction about changes the agency introduced on its .. various laws and violated constitutional own in the period just before the con- rights of privacy. The primary examples gressional investigations begareeTheee both.= 'Lb- the problem of Relett14662NIMina"3114ilita"7-???NattWPIlfeuni-olf faulty Intel- gram run by the Central intelligence ? Approved For Releamds0SM/kNrW.TRP77=0042ERWRIQ weimoNnop ligence estimates of -the sort published just before the Middle East ware .. But again, if past precedent is any guide, further improvement will be needed. The next major phase in CIA history?following an inevitable period of caution during the current investiga- tions?will depend on how its next gen- eration of executive-3 is selected.---------. ? : The group that entered intelligence - work in World War II?when such work was an honor and a privilege?is now eerving out its last few years. Because the CIA was founded in large measure by these same people (and their like- minded, already-retired eiders), the agency has never really had a transfer of power from one generation to anoth- er. This-is why the nature of any reorg- anization that takes place over the next.: 18 months is so important. If all the dis- closures of the past two years lead only to a purge of a few top officials, and to the institution of a new but still politi- eized White House monitoring group and new but customary congressional over- sight, ? the intelligence agencies could .easily- revert to their old: habits?and .understandably so.. - " ? Are, pepper reports ? on congressional activities from The Sun's Washington . Bureau. ?? THE NEW YORK DAILY NEWS 111, October 1975 Surver.33 Agencies .SpentI63 fdr Cop. 's Washington, Oct. 13 (UPI) ? The first inventory ever conduct- ed of federal government police actitivites showed today that the government spent $2.6 billion last:year?to employ 169,$25 ner--' sons for police, investigative and intelligence-gathering activitieS in 33 agencies. The figures covered the fiscal year that ended June 30 and amounted to more than 0.8% of federal spending. ; The survey was, conducted by the General Accounting Office, an arm of Congress, and did not cover the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, of the Defense-Depart-: ment's - intelligence-gathering branches. No _ did the _survey._1 show how much' Is spent sepa- rately to contract for guards. The survey showed that the Capitol emploed 1,028 guards - more than two for every member of Congress ? at a cost of $12.2 million. The -survey raises -questions about "the sheer number of gov?- erriment units having some form Of law-enforcement responsibil- ity" as well as raising the possi- bility of duplication of efforts, according to Sen. Charles H. Percy AR-I11) w'no_requested the data.'- - Percy said, for example, that 23 departments and- agencies have 35 separate guard forces, with four alone in the Treasury Department. Percy questioned u4hy the Capitol, the Library of Congress and the Supreme Court each requires separate police forces totaling .1,214 officers to protect, a four-block area ,that also is patroled- by the District of Columbia police..? ..?, 24 4 ? By Benjamin Welles ? and even advertise in leading news- papers, including the New York Times. whose revelations of "massive, illegal" activities last December led to in- vestigations both by Vice-President Nelson A. Rockefeller's commission and by Senate. and House committees. ? Applicants were once interviewed on Campus, but anti-Vietnam war feeling ran so high in student circles in the late '60s and early '70s that the bulk of the inter- viewing process was quietly shifted to nearby federal office buildings. Applicants now must fill out a 17-page, personal-history form and if accepted must wait up to six months for the intense screening process. Most of those accepted then undergo a year's training (with certain exceptions such as engineers, ?e*. Washington e For the last 10 months the CIA has been e battered by more bad publicity than in all 28 previous years since its creation in 1947. Has this hurt recruiting? , ?-e ? . - No, say agency officials -- though they ' concede that the school year has only just begun and that recruiting trends may. not _ be clear until January. The CIA says-it hires "less than 500", ' young men and women officers a year (apart from clerical staff) of the 4,000 or so . who apply. assize and budget are officially secret, but a good guess would be 15,000 people and $600 million. ? Who, then, are the college and graduate students and the young men and women already in jobs who want to join the CIA? "There's been a Marked change down' ? the ye,ars," explained. ?enior.official. "In scientists, etc.). the '50s they came mostly, from the Eastern Not all the CIA's work is "spying." Of Seaboard and they were products of prep' the agency's four component directorates, one ? Operations (formerly Plans) trains and directs agents who collect clandestine intelligence overseas. Tradi- tionally the so-called clandestine services have had the lion's share of personnel (33 percent) and of funds (50 percent). But since Vietnam and the post-Watergate outcry about assassination plots and "de- stabilizing" hostile foreign governments much of its activities have been cut back. Of the other ? three directorates, In-. telligence analyzes the huge bulk of in- coming information ranging from pub- lished manuals on Soviet bee culture to secret-agent reports.. The work of the Science and Technology directorate and of the Support (administrative) directorate are self-evident. Virtually all new recruits have a PhD or at least an MA degree; only 5 percent hold only BA degrees, say the recruiters. As an equal-opportunity employer the CIA also has been seeking qualified women, blacks, plus Americans of Oriental and Hispanic origins. According to one official, "We've been delighted to find that we can hire from minorities without lowering our strict standards." Starting salaries ? depending on skills ? range from $10,000 to $20,000. _ _ schools and Ivy League colleges. Now they !come from all over the country." ? In the tOs when the cold war reduced .U.S.-U.S.S.1 . relations to black and white : many, recruits came from military ?backgrounds. Duty came before self-ques- 'tioning; patriotism before doubt. Now, since Vietnam and the Watergate scandal, :the CIA's recruits are more "intellectually ,challenging," says one agency official. "They ask tough questions: 'What do we *, why. do we do it?' They probe, they challenge us. We realize they face stiff peer pressures. So when they do decide to join ?7 they've weighed it -and thought it out. They're committed." Each year top CIA officials at headquar- ters near Washington list the special skills :e--engineers, chemists; economic geogra- , jphers, area specialists, linguists among others that they will need Over the coming year and in what numbers. The lists go out in autumn and spring to regional recruiting offices: Los Angeles; Portland, Oregon; Austin, Texas; Denver; Chicago; New York; and Philadelphia. 'Headquarters here handles recruiting for The South. , , CIA recruiters from the regional offides contact area university-placement offices WALL STREET JOURNAL 17 OCTOBER 1975 WasIfington Wire . CIA CLEANUP promises to fall short ot ;fundamental change. .Ford will order limited revisions soon. ;He will make the (MA inspector general. more autonomous. supposedly with power to I :halt dirty deeds. The White House plans to' give more authority to the Foreign Intelli-1 g6nce Advisory Board. install a new chair- man. Its legislative proposals may seek to bar assassinations. Skeptics claim the changes would be largely cosmetic., ? ' Congress will probably create *a, joint committee to oversee the agency. It will likely tighten legal language governing CIA operations, without banning all covert ac- tion. Some Capitol aides wonder if Senate in- vestigating chairman Church is more inter- ested in running for President than in re- forming the CIA. The House inquiry is far fvom reaching any conclusions.. Morale sags, meantime, among CIA , hands. They ?nuke reports increasingly , bland in efforts to avoid troubie: Some employes count the days till retirement. ? .1 ApprOVeCi-Fo-1---14-el;ase 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1 NElf YORK TIM ES 26 Oct. 1975 DRIVE FOR BLACKS I PRESSED BY RI,A, College Placement Officers Impressed by Parley on Minority Employment Ey JOSEPH LELYVELD Speclat to The New Yorks Tants WASHINGTON, Oct. 25? There were cocktails and an ample buffet, featuring South- ern fried chicken, in the execu- tive dining room of the Central Intelligence Agency list night fo a group of college place- ment officers As it happened, most of the guests were blacks. They had been invited into the sanctum on the seventh floor of the agency's McClean, Va., headquarters at the end of a two-day conference on "minority employment" de- signed to drive home the idea that the C.I.A. is an equal op- portunity employer. William E. Colby, the agen- cy's director, whose offices open on to the dining room through doors that have one- way locks, was on hand with other top officials for this rare display of C.I.A. hospitality. The guests were clearly im- pressed. Dr. Joseph M. Wright, direce tor of student affairs at the University of Michigan in Dear- born, said the very idea of coming to the conference had made him uneasy. Before this week the only C.I.A. man he had ever met was James W. McCord Jr., the convicted Watergate burglar, who had spoken on his campus. He would have been unlikely to mention the C.I.A. to a stu- dent job seeker, Dr. Wright said, because of his own doubts about its activities and anxiety about "how he might react to my suggestion." Now, he said, he is not only convinced that the agency is a "necessary evil" but that it ought to have more blacks. Drive on for Two Years . Long stereotyped as a bastion of the WASP Eastern establish- ment, the C.I.A. has been ac- tively recruiting black profes- sionals for two years now. It obviously did not have many blacks when the effort began, for only 1.5 per cent of its professional staff idc now black. (Of its total staff, including clerical workers, 6.4 er cent is black.) ? ? The agency divulge k only percentages, not absolute num- bers. According to the book by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, "The C.I.A. and the Cult of Intelligence," a 1967 -survey turned up fewer than 20 blacks on a nonclerical staff ' of 12,000. That works out to .0016 per cent. Yesterday, in one of the con- I ference's final sessions, the placement officers pressed F.W.M. Janney, the agency's personnel director, to say how many blacks were interviewed in recent years and how many were employed. When Mr. Jan- ney would not give the num- bers, suspicions were voice by the guests that the agency was more interested in image- building than black recruit- ment. These were answered by Mr. Colby, who followed Mr. Jan- ney to the rostrum. But, at the last session of the after- noon, Helen Kimball of the University of Kansas wanted to know "how much aware- ness" the C.I.A. had of the economic and social barriers the average black had to cross to become a college graduate. Her question raised the ques- tion of preferential hiring. It was answered by Dr. Ed- ward Proctor, deputy director of for intelligence, who said the agency would consider the obstacles an individual had to overcome but would not estab- lish special standards for blacks as a group."I'm looking for performance," he said. Orening Not Essential The one exception the C.I.A. would make, he said, was that it would hire a black who was "really first-rate in virtually any academic field that is per- tinent to our work" even if it had no immediate openfng for him. Moments later, Merritt Nor- veil, an assistant dean at the University of Wisconsin, said that blacks were not looking for preference. "The Russians don't care if I'm blue, yellow, or red," he said to a burst of arplause. According to C.I.A. personnel officials, the agency recruits about 1,100 new employes a year. Of these, only 2 to 3 per cent are taken into the elite career trainee program t at prepares future intelligence oeratives. In all, there are about 400 professional open- ings a year, mostly for econom- ists, linguists, scientists and others with special sLills. The recruiting is done from 10 regional offices across the country, which are said to be in contact with 400 campuses. Until the antiwar protests of the late nineteen-sixties, the -recruiters went on to the cam- puses to condnct their inter- views, the way corporate talent scouts do. Later they retreated to well- secured Federal buildings, bnt now, gradually, it is said, the climate is easing and the C.I.A. is cautiously starting to send its recruiters back to the cam- puses. In the last year, offcials say, the recruitment prospects for the agency have improved markedly, despite the revela- tions of the C.I.A.'s illegal domestic spying activities and the well-publicized investiga- tions these engendered. In fact, it is said, the publicity has helped, not hart. BALTIMORE SUN 30 Oct. 1975 Garry Wills FtI Motto Is to Save Its Face The revelation that the FBI destroyed a letter from Lee Harvey Oswald does not tell us anything new about the FBI?its highest imperative has always been "Don't em- barrass the bureau." What is more important, the letter tells us nothing new about Osivald's assassination of President John F. Kennedy. We are often told that new revelations make it desirable to reopen the Kennedy investi- gation. Most of these new rev- elations are repetitions of old stuff, like the fact that Jack Ruby was a mob groupie. But the letter of Oswald was a new bit of information, and it just tends to confirm the Warren report. Oswald wrote the letter because he was mad at an FBI agent for checking up on his wife, Mari- na, a routine the bureau fol- lows with immigrants from the Soviet Union. If Oswald had been work- ing for the FBI, as many con- spiratorialists have argued, he would not write the agent a letter telling him to stay away ?he would have talked to his "contact." In fact, he would probably have expected, and not resented, the agent's call on Marina. Then why did the FBI de- stroy the letter? Because it regularly tells lies to make it- self look like its TV image. Even without knowledge of the letter, some people find that the FBI had been remiss in not watching Oswald more closely. With the letter, things might have looked worse. So the FBI denied such prior knowledge of Oswald in his threatening mood. The letter gives us a glimpse of the reality that ex- ists behind conspiratorial theorizing. The theorists be- lieve that all people in power make up a clique of bad guys, whose interests are similar when not the same. They do not recognize that the bad guys spend a lot of their time fighting each other. The FBI swept much of the evidence in the Kennedy and Oswald killings off to its vaunted laboratories in Wash- -t ington. When the state prose- cutors needed rot';. of the ev- idence for the Ruby trial, they almost had to Lackrnail toe FBI to get it. The conspiratorial scena- rios depend very largely on meet-meshings between local police, the FBI, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Justice Department. But local police often resent the FBI ?especially Texas police, who still think of themselves as Rangers. The CIA and FBI have a long history of mutual distrust and bureaucratic non- co-operation. That is one rea- son J. Edgar Hoover shot down the Huston plan?he did not like to work with others, and especially with the CIA. In World War II, Hoover quickly expanded his anti- crime work to the hunt for do- mestic spies and saboteurs, and then expanded that hunt to foreign cities where he had FBI offices. So thoroughly did he take over the busy anti-es- pionage activities throughout South America that William Donovan, when he founded the Office of Strategic Services,- could not move in on Hoover's territory. Gen. Douglas MacArthur kept Donovan's boys out of the South Pacific, too; so the OSS had to settle for Europe and Africa. After the war, Hoover tried to supplant the OSS in Europe while retaining his sovereignty over South Amer- ica. But with the founding of the CIA, he had to relinquish even South America to' the President's new army of spies. He did this with a nota- ble lack of grace, and the bit- terness engendered then was kept alive, like most of Hoo- ver's resentments, through the rest of his career. As recently as 1971 he was again expand- ing overseas FBI offices, against the active resistance of the CIA. So those people who imag- ined Hoover's one-man band co-operating in a conspiracy to kill the President are mis- judging the actors in the plot. The FBI has always tended to be timorous with any people but the very helpless?fright- ened of embarrassing the bu- reau, and better at destroying letters than at pulling off co- operative ventures of high risk. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : gek-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1 wAsimuctifflgyedfuRaMjacazigli171/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1 Jack Anderson 'An Attack on America The Central Intelligence Agency's harassed director, William Colby, has written us a letter that deserves attention. "The successful conduct of both in- telligence and journalism," he contends, "depends upon the ability to protect sour- ces. We are deprived of intelligence today, which tve might have had but for sen- sational exposures of our activities, not our abuses. "The solution to the dilemma of how to conduct intelligence activities in our free society is to give our intelligence organizations clear guidelines and effec- tive supervision ? but through represen- tatives of our people, not through the powerful spotlight of total exposure." We agree that total exposure, like total secrecy, could be hazardous to our national health. But the greater danger, we believe, Is too much secrecy. For-too long, the CIA has operated in a. subterranean world of half light, a world of grotesque shadows and shapes. In this murky environment, the CIA plotted mur- ders, conducted burglaries and buggings, blackmailed diplomats, tailed _newsmen, 'spied on dissidents and engaged in dirty trickery. Often, the victims *ere not enemy agents but loyal Amerianans. We believe the press let the sunshine into this shadowy world just in time. Otherwise, a subterranean creature might have developed, which would have become a menace to the freedoms it was created to protect. The language of the Constitution ? 'justice, tranquility, welfare, liberty?was intended to protect the people from the government. The language of the CIA ? secrecy: surveillance, covert operation ? would protect the government from the people. Colby acknowledges "that the CIA must allow more light on its activities to regain the trust of the people. I believe we have been doing exactly that," he contends, "over the past two years Certainly, Colby has been more open and candid than any of his predecessors. But he has also a sought. to create it cozy . relationship between the CIA structure and the press apparatus. What he really wants are reporters who will act as explainers and apologists for the CIA. They would become lap dogs rather than watchaogs. The need for the press to occupy an ad- versary role was clear to America's founding fathers. That is why they made freedom of the press the first guarantee of the Bill of Rights. Without press freedom, they knew, the other freedoms would fall. Colby claims we misrepresented. his views on Senate Bill No. 1, a 750-page monstrosity disguised as a codification of existing law, which would strangle in the crib the system of free inquiry we have today. "You say that 1-want 'to make it a crime for newsmen to publish classified infor- mation.' This is not so. The legislation I have recommended," Colby claims, "would apply only to those who gain authorized access to classified intelligence information." He also states that his proposal "would require that any prosecution for un- authorized disclosure be subject to prior judicial review to ensure that classifica- tion of the information is not arbitrary or capricious." Behind almost every important revela- tion of government wrongdoing in our time has been three ingredients: (1) the honest public employee who reveals the hidden truth; (2) the newsman who verifies the story, fits it together with other informa- tion and publishes it; and (3) the official in- vestigation that is thereby forced into being. As we understand Senate One, it would nullify or impair each step in this process. First, it makes it a crime for public employees to reveal classifed information. Second, the bill in its present form would make it a crime for a reporter to receive or publish "national defense information." The government would have the power, with some limitation, to define national defense information. Thus, the govern- ment could attach this classification to OMAHA WORLD HERALD 5 OCTOBER 1975. erties' almost anything it didn:t want the people to ? know. Third, the bill provides a loophole for of- ficials who break the law in line of duty if they believe they were acting lawfully, thereby weakening the incentives for of- ficial probes. Our professional estimate is that this package would shut down the investigative press quite effectively. Remember how President Nixon tried to invoke the CIA and "natidnal security" to cover up the Watergate scandal? Under Senate One, he would have gotten away with it. The're are legitimate defense secrets, as Colby suggests, which the government ought to be able to protect. Codes, nuclear secrets,: plans for military operations, the identity of undercover agents, crucial data on weapons systems ? all have a just claim to secrecy if they are not already known to the enemy. I. But instead of defining narrowly the types of information that must not be revealed, instead of writing into Senate? One the standards set by the Supreme Court for justifying news suppression ? that the disclosure must pose "direct, immediate and irreparable arm to the security of the United States" ? the bill relies on a long- discredited classification system. . The decision as to which parts of the people's business could not be divulged would be left to the caprice of innumerable bureaucrats, such as a gentleman of our ac- ' quaintance who used to spend his days clipping articles out of newspapers and pasting them on stiff paper which he would Alien stamp with a secret classification. Millions of documents have been classifed, some legitimately, some willy nilly, some under criteria designed More for hiding mistakes than for protecting valid secrets. Senate One does not discriminate suf- ficiently between the yellowed newspaper clippings and the latest weapons designs. And so, instead of being a safeguard for national defense, it is an assault on American liberties. . (0:4975 by United Feature Syndicate Retired General: CIA Is Nearly Paralyzed By Michael Holmes the government) at the time much more secure." Congressional investigations of the American intelligence cOmmunIty "have practically paralyaxi the CIA," a former deputy director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, said Sat- urday. Retired It. Gen. Alva R. Exe/said: "Virtually no one in Weiligence does anything now because they don't know that tomorrow they might be ques- tioned about it," he said. Acknowledging that "the in- telligeoot community, like oth- er institutions, has some inter- nal problems and occasional policy errors," Fitch said the present investigations "are raising a moralistic fuss about things that were approved (by they occurred." He also lashed out at critics Partly because of the Water- who have accused the in. gate scandals, he said, "there's telligence agencies of formulat- e different morality now. But ing "assassination plots." the investigations have passed "I know thed I the point where they're doing good for the country. I think they're doing us .a great dis- service." Fitch said that certain prac- tices which have come under fire, such as monitoring phone calls, opening mail and keeping dossiers on U.S. citizens, are important. Fitch, who for 21/2 years di- rected Army intelligence activ- ities, said that when in- telligence agencies are denied the controversial methods, "if a man wants to sell out to a for- eign government, he feels know why they did things," he Said. "1 know of no single case where there was an assassina- -- tion plot. There's a great differ- ence between a plot and a con- tingency plan. "When you plan how to get students out of a high school in case of fire," he said, "that is a contingency plan ? it's not a plot to set the school on fire." .Fitch, in Kearney, Neb., for a 50-year high school reunion, told The world-Herald in a phone interview that the need for a strong intelligence oper- ation is "just as great as it eve, was." Fitch, a native of Arnhem. Neb., was held prisoner by the Japanese in World War 11. He began his career in Army in- telligence in 1947, retiring from the service in 1966. 26 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100386005-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1 FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL October 1975 BCOKSHaF - inside the Intelligence System THE CIA AND THE CULT OF IN- TELLIGENCE, by Victor !Marchetti and John D. Marks. Dell ( Knopf). 51.75. (S8.95). ISSIDE THC COMPANY: CIA Di A RV, by Philip Agee. Stonehill, 59.95.. IF THE CIA had been able to impose its will on, and enforce its employ- ment contract with, Marchetti and Agee, these books would not have been published. The Agency obvi- ously believes that parts of these books are injurious to intelligence and covert political operations. After a complex Federal Court battle, the CIA was able to enforce some censorship, and so "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence" contains sone .163 blank spaces representing material suppressed by the CIA. Other material has been printed in boldface type em- phasizing material that a 'Federal judge, over CIA objections, would not permit to be censored.. Mar- chetti worked for The CIA for 14 years.. serving in poSitions near the executive leadership. This gave him an overview of CIA ?aetivitie.s which few have had. Marks .was Foreign Service officer and former assistant to the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Re- search in the State Department and later a Senatorial aide on Capitol Hill. Their joint ? efforts expose a substantial amount of new informa- tion about the US intelligence sys- tem. Their book is strongest in muckraking details about the or- ganization, procedures and at- titudes of intelligence profession- als. It is weaker .as an analytic work; indeed rather thin when if comes to the tough problems of pol- icy, organization and control of se- cret services in a democracy. Much of the book is currently being up- staged by the various official inves-. tigations of the CIA problem. Agee's "Inside the Company" is a more radical and revealing book, if taken at face value. Its substance seems authentic, but who on the outside can say? Agee confesses a covert operator "you get so used to lying that after a while it's hard to remember what the truth is" (p. 9). Given Agee's cur- rent motives to further a world rev- olutionary, ? socialist cause, the reader is bound to be curious about how he was able to reconstruct - from memoty hundreds of pages of a "diary." And what, exactly, dogs Agee mean when he acAPFILlitOsF STAR, Indianapolis 25 Sept. 1975 ? TRANSATLANTIC' CIA Probe Boggles British BynthonyLeine IYILiiUS . Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, the leader of Brit- ain's conservative opposition, and her predeces- ser, Edward Heath, have both been visiting the United States during the past few days.- (Separ- ately, not together:? .there's ? an icy coolness between them.) Despite the European Common. Market, despite the' -resurgence of isolationist sen- timent in America, there has perhaps never been a ? time when the two nations had. more to learn from one?anoth- f er. Much of. what needs to be . learned fats - into the Awful - Warning category. NO ONE 'RETURNING "to the United States. after an absence of several years could fail to notice the strong. mirrent which has set in tdwards Federal, collective or, in plain Eng- li, eh Socialist solutions_to social and economic problems.. ? ? The sheer growth Of ,Washington, which means the growth of central- government and its attendant bureaucracy,, of politicians and their para,sites, proclaims what has been hap,- pening..And one 'has only to read the newspa- pers or watch television to meet a continual .sream of demands for government interven- tion; demands based on political assumptions which not long ago would have been consid- ered, at the very least,' highly Controversial.... ? Everything from Medical care to. car seat- belts, from housing to consumer' protection; is treated as ,a proper subject for the passing?of laws and the spending of taxpayers! money. Government and business are becoming more and Inore - intertwined, and a lot ,of business- men *.longer really . want to left alone, whatever 'they may say. ? ? ? The labor unions tea seek to gain what they want through government action, and are clambring for new welfare schemes and for ? more public expenditure in order to create , jobs.. The school system ha S become flagrantly a political- battleground. - that the Com-munist Party. of Cuba "gave the !important encourage- ment at a tithe when I doubted that I would be ab.le to find the addi- tional information I needed" (p. 639)? ? ? Agee's tedious book is unique in that it describes CIA covert opera-! tions in Ecuador. Uruguay and I Mexico in which the author was in- volved. Pointlessly, he cites the names of numerous agents, foreign and 'American; lists .secret organi- zations and Code names; and in general "blows the cover" from a THE COROLLARY of this process ? high. taxation, refueled inflation, a. jungle of con- trols and a habit of. mind which looks always to the government for help ? renders people le'ss able and less willing to look after them- ' selves, and therefore makes, the wellarists' predictions self-fulfilling. So the current flovAng towards Socialism ? b e c.6 m es. cumulatively. stronger. . All this will have seemed very' familiarto Mrs. Thatcher. It is exactly the road down which Britain ,has travelled since World War 11 ? with consequences which ? are. only- now 'be- coming unmistakably clear., On. the Other hand, any British ;visitor is likely to ,be startled by. certain attitudes toward government which are ouite unfamiliar. It is taken for granted in Europe that governments do not; and cannot, act only,in ways which would: satisfy the moral code of' Sunday Sunday School teacher. THE IN into the activities of the CLA are, from a British .or European point of view; truly mind-boggling ? not be- cause- of what they reveal but because the politicians involved, and indeed the press," seem to have no, qualms about revealing it. Britain's Secret Intelligence Service, on whica to a considerable 'extend, the CIA was original- ' ly modelled, has-endured seVeral major scan- dals since the wan' but they were not scandals of this kind. - . On the. contr.*, the whole sting of them. was that secrets had been penetrated or endan- gered, and that the 'efficiency of operations was therefore lessened and agents' lives put in pertl. -.Nobody in Britain doubts that a Secret In- telligence Service ought to be secret. Only- quite extreme left-wingers doubt the necessity or propriety of covert operations overseas scruples which seem not to worry theft unduly with regard to the. activities of the Soviete . - ? . 'Each day's news from-Washing,tOn Must setI- . the walls of the Kremlin racking with merry. laughter: America's allies find it less enjoyable and not at all reassuring. - t, (North -American Newspaper Alliance): ? - theme is that the CIA provides a, secret police for Americani capitalism-. His book. is substan- tially revealing; his theme is appall- ingly overstated and simplistic. Un- intentionally, parts of the .booki suggest a script fora Marx brothers: movie, which is to say that many US covert operations abroad were amateurish, outrageous and fool- ish. Smaller woridtr that the CIA would have suppressed this book, first published in Great Britain. had it been able to do so. -,? . ?HARRY HOWE RAN.SOM or PtieWttgeo 0111003150 it*A-Iftrin-00432R0001003694/054ilt Universify 27 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1 "TIMES OF 7.1iM131.1l." Lerseticn ?r, Septeember 11175 IIICTIMMISIEZeitteetetn NV- OVER the past couple ? Of - months, we have :Written considerably on the chronic shortages of essential commodities. We hope we are not boring our regulzir -.readers if we make :6ine"_ fresh . revelations ? on this -same topic. \krhiler: these snortages? have, not. brought a great deal. of joy in this country and . have been -a cause of severe inconveniences to the sort of life We were trying to get used to, they ha?ve brought a great deal of happineas to many parts of the world, particularly those near our borders where photos of our women queue- ing for essentials and fighting over them, have become a regular feature on the front pages of their national newspapers. Armchair economists are writing haughtly about what we should have done and where we went wrong. Zambia has suddenly be- come a household word in most parts of the world not because of our commendable efforts to sort out the mess In southern Africa, but be- cause of our failure to pro. vide the basic essentials to the common man. A couple of nights ago, I Was having i few t1uickoneg with my mentor tuld good friend Cortiracie Bonzo. I think it was during our second refills when Bonzo caught sight of the collars of my shirt and expressed ,grave indignation. He wori. .dered loudly if I had prob- lems in my household. . I assured him that all was well and that the lady of the house was given ample - housekeeping allowance bui there was just no soap powder to be had for love or money. I then complairo -ect t Bonzo and wondered if this country! was serious- ly tackling the supply dilU -distribution problem or essential commodities. in ciesperation anti mil u. emotion, charged ants blamed our shortages on congestion at ports and ex- pressed the hope that it they 'operated .. more efticientiy, we would get most of tne essential raw materials h. 'good time; "Nonsense," said Bonzo. "You have been reading too much of the 'Daily Noise' which is deluding the people about what is actually hap pentng to the economy of this - country.". ? -"But it's a fact, comrade," -1 exclaimed, . 'that .most of the essential raw materials have been -stuak at the ports tor years." "But it's a fact, comrade," Bora?. "that any Importer anc manufacturer who' has essential commodities stuck at the port of entry can get these moved in no time at all by approaching the right authority. What do you think is the reason for the establishment of the Direc- torate or Contingency Plan- ning?" "Then would you blame it on low productivity of the Zambian workers?" "That's another rubbish propagated by the 'Daily Noise'," retorted BortZo. "The Zambian worker works just as hard as any other worker anywheie where they have no shortages. In face we have had these shortages with us for the past thiee years only. You can't Con- vince me that the Zambian worker has suddenly become lazy and less productive. That's nonsenee, if anything, he has become a better anti etticient worker." "Would you blame the Ministry of Commerce then for not granting import licences tor essentials or that there le an absence or an effective supply, tied dis- tribution policy oz essential commodities?" "That again is not true. The Ministry of Commerce is very generous in its issue of import licences for essen- tial commodities and there I s in this country institu- tionalised machinery for the importation, supply and dis- tribution Of all essentials." Failed "Then, tell me comrade, what is the cause,, where have we failed, where have We gona wro'ng?".1;erlt "I win tell yew,. said Bonzte as- 'he ? reached. for his large glass of the fluid that Is never in short supply and drained it in one breath, "it's the CIA". "You don't mean the Can-, tral intelligence Agency?" "It's the one; comrade, at the root of all our current problems. I see a CIA touch on what is happening in CHICAGO TRIBUNE 23 October 1975 ? CIA- efficiency . this country. They' are very good at this sort of thing and no one else in the world could have convinced and effected It. Don't you ever under-estimate the CIA?" "Comrade you are not serious," I Said in disbelief. "Of course I ain, don't Imagine foe any moment that becaeme the CIA is under investigation and is having problems with the American Senate anti Congress it has been deter- red from exporting confu- sion, unrest, assassinations, anarchy, and coups to the Third World. The problems we are going through over supplies of es- sential commodities are not of bur own making, that is ? why we are unable to bring it under control." "Bet how do they do it?" '"That we shall never know. That's why they're an Intelligence organisation. I imagine they ? have in- filtrated the entire manu- facture, supply and distri- bution sector. "I certainly would like to know what they have done to these men involved ln this sector. "What other explanation could there be for failure to supply to the common man the basic essentials like salt, soap powder, cooking oil, beans etc unless he was being paid by someone like the CIA not 'to d-cr -job . properly otherwise you ex- pect him to discharee -his duties well, after all he gets paid for it." "But why should they employ this crude method of bringing frustration and un- rest to this country?" "Probably they realise that the people in this country are so politically united that we have to be tackled from a different angle." "What do they stand to gain out of all this?" ? asked. "Maybe: for the fun of it. There is usually no apparent reasons for most .things the "CHICAGO?The CIA should not' be criticized .for hiring gangsters as assas- sins. It should be complimented for try- ing to do a jell in a .more_ efficient. man- ner:. lzeee eel Forty'years ago,-far poseibly-lese-than? millicn dollars;: we could have ,hired'. the Mafia to bump off Hitler, , Goerieg,...? Goebbels, and a feev"- other key' Nazis ?Instead,e-,ve? permitted those dangerous' men to strut around while' shouting 'about oureideals-of morality,' assassinat- 28 CIA gets involved in." "But surely they shdtild have better teings tO do," I said. "1 don't know. Probably they don't like the Chinese." "What has their dislike of the Chinese got to do with us?" "They may think we are getting too much under the Chinese influence. They see a lot of Chinese goods in our shops, a Chinese built rail- way and we owe the Chinese a great deal of money. So I suspect they say to them- selves that if they can't have us under their sphere of influence, they damn well won't let the Chinese have us either." "What do you think is the cause of all this?" I de- manded to know. "Its simple really," said Bonzo,' "a great deal of American money was used to lay the economic founda- tion of this country." "I thought it was the British money," I reminded him. . . Unhappy "No, but American money using British personnel. The British have no money. Naturally, the Americans are not at all happy that their money will be used to finance the Chinese. Neither are they pleased that they are losing a potentially profitable market to the Chinese." "There may be something in what you have said com- rade, but I don't think .you will find many people accepting your explanation." "But the people have no choice but to believe the CIA theory. So far, every reason has been given as the cause of the shortages arid nothing has been done about it and nobody believes anything anymore on the supply situation. It is time, I think, we blamed it on the CIA, its the only thing, left ..." . -ed .htnadieds e of : thOusands, of' innocent. womeri and children. -In doing so: ? we' spent., billions _of-, dollars,- killed' and.. rippled 'vast :armieieof our own men, men, and devastated hundreds of cities: ;**' ee-13efore we get involved in another in-' -ternational'iconflict we, should: take--a 'long hard look at our -system 'of inorali: 'ty.?We might find that the most virtuous, :way of waging a war. would be to take .the- contract from.our star-spangled gen- 'erals andegiye, it to the Mafia_ ????,1 e-oe-e; ee. Otto Boutin Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1 THE NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY; OCTOBER 22;1975 Andrei rnalrik, on '-D?nte The writer of the following article, a 37-year-old historian and dissident, is best known in the West for his book "Will the U.S.S.R. Survive Until .1984?" in which he postulates that hostility among various ethnic groups an4 an eventual war with China could tear the Soviet Union apart. Last May, ? he returned to Moscow after five years' imprisonment and internal exile on charges arisieg from his writings. Barred from residence in Moscow last month, he now Lives in a nearby town and is permitted to visit the city two and three days at a time. This was translated from the Russian by The New York Times. ? MOSCOW?Assessing the advan- iages of d?nte over the cold war, We don't have the right, it seems, to 'say that detente is the alternative to ewer. The cold war, being a form of . sublimation of hot war, was not less effective than "d?nte" in averting a real war, because peace depended, and still depends, on the balance of -nuclear power. Therefore, _even a mutual 'reduction of weapons, should 'it' ever be achieved, would not reduce 'an'd. would not increase the risks of - ' The rise in armaments is ' a con- sequence of confrontation, not its cause, and to a certain degree is a . consequence of scientific-technical 'progress. Inasmuch as an accord about reductions in these or those areas will not end either confrontation or prog- ress, the arms race if suppressed in 'one area will merely emerge in another. A reduction in arms may be ,a result of d?nte but it is not its esole nor basic content. Therefore, it is 'better:to look upon d?nte as an in- strument not for the safeguarding of peace but rather for the improvement of the world. Otherwise, there would be no sense in, detente. - An impression is growing, however, that, the objective of the U.S. in detente is precisely the safeguarding of the existing situation. It seems to be striving to entangle the U.S.S.R. in a web of treaties and mutual coin- ..mitments, and thereby deprive it of .the ability to disrupt world stability without concern that these ties might be severed. . 'Soviet Union's Aims- :For the U.S.S.R. the side still on ':the offensive, the-objectives of d?nte are much broader. The U.S.S.R. is -Striving to emerge-from isolation for rat- -least three reasons.: first, to use detente with the West to manipulate :the Western countries one by one rather than in a group, and this is .already happening to a certain extent; :second, to assure itself of a secure rear. in view of the hostile relations ,with China; third, to overcome the economic backwardness deriving from the isolation. ? needs technological and organiza- tional .modernization, and this is im- possible without assistance from the West. In addition, the backward state of agriculture compels the U.S.S.R. to buy grain regularly in the West. Two ' .bad harvests in succession without such purchases could shake the Soviet economy and even provoke mass upheavals. Further, d?nte is explained, as I see it, by two not fully clear but real circumstances: first, by the fact that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. regard each other as the only equal partners; second, that they along with other developed countries are beginning to consider themselves not only rivals ,but also to a certain degree as allies ._?somewhat like a group of well-fed in a crowd of hungry. I speak of these tendencies recog- nizing that opposing tendencies are at work and that the U.S.S.R remains In the eyes of the U.S., as before, a destructive force. Whether or not the American leaders recognize it, a fun-? damental change in the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R. is impossible without a change in its internal situation. It is difficult to imagine- a state combining constant, suppression and violence internally with peaceful be- havior and accommodation externally. Such "peaceful behavior" could' only. 'be the consequence of military weak- ness or of deceptive camouflage. Therefore, any relaxation in .the in- ternal policies of the U.S.S.R. should be desirable to the Americans not only out of humanitarian considera- tions. It is also vitally important to them for reasons of their own secu- rity, and therefore can be regarded as one of the objectives of U.S. policy. Since the U.S., in working out its political strategy, chose cooperation with the U.S.S.R rather than its isola- tion, two tactical variations were possible: 1. To move toward rapprochement expecting that the cooperation of the U.S. and the West in general would gradually "soften" the U.S.S.R. 2. To tie every step toward the U.S.S.R. to a demand for a particular change in both internal and external policies, understanding their inter- dependency. An impression has been created that Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger chose the first path as the one seemingly requiring less effort and giving visible results promptly. Mr. Kissinger sought to resolve in -barely two years the challenge of rap- prochement with the U.S.S.R., a task -requiring, let us say, two. decades. Such haste possibly reflects not only the mentality of Mr. Kissinger him- self but also the features of American mentality in general-e-the mentality of businessmen who want to see at once the tangible results of their Despite important military-indust- efforts. to the hasty signing of a series of- agreements only for the purpose of presenting them to the citizens. on television and saying: "Look! We have done this and this and this!" But the U.S. is dealing with a partner with which it is dangerous to make haste. Even if the Soviet leaders no not possess the many brilliant qualities of Mr. Kissinger, they are able to a superlative degree to set themselves distant goals and also to wait patiently. American policy differs from Soviet policy in two other features. Foreign policy in a way is a pupil of internal policy. The mentality of government officials rising to foreign policy leader- ship has been shaped for years by dealing with internal political prob- lems, and all the methods they have mastered inside the country are ap- plied abroad. American domestic policies are based on a play of free farces, settled by compromise, while Soviet domestic policies are based- on a ncecompro- mise implementation of instructions. And while the U.S. may sit down at the negotiating table consciously or subconsciously thinking of compro- mise, the U.S.S:R. sits down with the. intention of achieving its objectives in full, agreeing only' to fictitious concessions. The other strange feature of Ameri- can policy, as with the policy of the West in general, is the treatment of the U.S.S.R. like a .small child who must be allowed everything and not be irritated because he might start screaming?all because, they say, when it grows up it will understand everything. .?Dr. Spook' Methods This prolonged "upbringing" Of the U.S.S.R. by the methods of Dr. Spock is reflected not only in an endless number of minor concessions by the U.S. but also in actions that are simply humiliating for its prestige as a big power:- This was most clearly illustrated by the reluctance of Presi- dent Ford to invite Aleksandr I. Solz- henitsyn to the White House because Mr. Kissinger feared this ? would in- furiate Leonid. I. Brezhnev. -Such behavior in general is very typical for representatives of the American Government. Thus, an American diplomat with whom I have been acquainted for more than 10 years and who recently returned' to Moscow declined for the same reasons to meet with me, although he did send expressions of his sympathy via an intermediary. Knowing the character of those whom the Americans are trying to play up to by such behavior, I believe that even though it wins approval . from their side it also arouses a degree of contempt. As I get older, it becomes Ale Pcf6'- inPflMease12100}M)81/08tmCiPIRrEfPrigtilM32fitiVi18112te0abvie best in rial achievementcp 29 . ever the Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1 world finds its expression in simple human relationships: the love of a husband for his wife and parents for their children, the comradeship Of men, compassion, patience and simple decency; while any ideology and doe-. trine, if not used with care as a work-- ? Ing hypothesis, may lead to the chop- ping off of heads or, in the best of cases, to the stuffing of money bags. The fact that two persons who were able to meet more than 10 years ago ? without any interference and now, in . the period of "d?nte," are unable to meet does not speak in favor of d?nte's humanitarian aspects. ! It does not seem to me correct, in light of the long-range problems of , the U.S. rather than the immediate ones, that there is a desire "not to'' overload" d?nte, as Mr. Kissinger has said, with humanitarian problems,'? and to yield on humanitarian issues as politically unimportant and annoy- ing to the U.S.S.R, all in order to pro- mote the sale of Pepsi-Cola. The Basis of Stability - - - If the U.S. sets itself the objective of establishing truly friendly relations with the U.S.S.R and wants to be as- sured of their durability, then it must, ? strive for the transformation of the closed Soviet system to an open one.' The awakening of the Soviet people-. , to human rights is a force working in this direction. ? Inasmuch as the movement? for 'human rights has no troops, the poli- tician-policemen and the politician- businessmen are inclined to slight it. But it seems to me that it is pre- cisely the world movement for human rights that will become a world-trans- forming force that will overcome both Inhumanity based on violence and in- humanity ?based on indifference. ? . Genuine stability comes only in a process of movement, only. in the ex- pansion of influence. The U.S. must strive for a transformation of the world if it wants it to be more stable. A .system that does not set expan? sionist goals for itself contracts and dies away. The world has experienced many forms of expansion?military, economic and cultural. If the U.S. can become the center of a .new expan- sion, a humanitarian expansion based on human rights throughout the world, its future 'would be assured for a long time. . . It is interesting that this idealistic element has already, to -a, lesser or greater degree, been felt in. American politics during the entire history of the U.S. The old-fashioned European political mentality?without an under- standing of historical perspective and without interest in higher. goals?is not., likely to long dominate the foreign policy of the U.S. No ?matter how much more Mr. Kissinger wants to cast aside humanitarian problems they come to the surface by one means or another. This is particularly evident in the differences between the Administration and the Congress over the question of trade and of emigre- . tion from the U.S.S.R. These differences, although' restrict- ing the Administration, also do give it certain benefits. The triangle of Mr. Kissinger, Mr. Brezhnev and Henry M. Jackson reminds me somewhat of the situation when a criminal is being induced to confess by two interroga- tors, one of whom?Senator Jackson ? ?shouts and beats his fist on the table, and the other?Secretary of State Kissinger?who smiles and gently promises leniency. So the heart of the criminal, faced with such con- trasts, opens up to the kind smile. The U.S. Govermitent evidently is feeling the pressure of business cir- cles. headed by makers of soft drinks, interested in cooperation with the U.S.S.R. because they consider it a gigantic potential market for their' products and a source of raw, materials and cheap labor. One can .only welcome economic cooperation if it is one of the elements of the policy of d?nte, but not a 'force shaping this policy. ? ? Without doubt, businessmen have made an enormous contribution to the ? creation of modern America, but when they became the, leading poli- tical force they led the U.S. to the, brink of disaster?to the Great De- pression of the 1930's. Americans are a people easily car- ried away. When they were carried away by the cold war, I don't know, whether there were sober voices pro- posing some kind of alternative. Now the Americans are carried away by "cleterfte," and it is good that warn- ing voices are being heard. The warn-, ing is that detente requires restraint and determination?not merely a will- ingness to compromise?and that meek concessions will only lead to demands for more concessions. Per- haps the voices will be heeded. " ? ? The alternative to d?nte, which its supporters have, demanded to hear from its critics, is detente carried out differently, d?nte in which long- range goals are not sacrificed to short- term goals; and- one must learn to wait for what is desired. Foreign policy does not exist by it- 'self'. It is an integral part of a coun- try's internal condition, which in turn . depends. upon external conditions. If ,one accepts the premise that without rpprochement with the U.S.S.R. the U.S. cannot exert influence on it, then one must say that if this influence is not in a constructive direction the rapprochement will be even danger- ous for the U.S. When the U.S.S.R. must pay for every bushel of grain and for every technological secret not so much with gold as with a step to- -ward democratization of its society, -,only then -will its foreign policy cease to ,present a. threat to the West. However, this exchange, this "gentle pressure" should not have the character of wounding the self-respect of theJU.S.S.R. tet it proceed under the banner of demanding fulfillment from the U.S.S.R. of the international declarations it has signed. And every concession should be looked upon not as a "victory for the West" but rather 30 ' as a step toward' common good. In the' emerging triangle of powers, the relationship of the U.S. toward , the U.S.S.R. , and China, amid some similarities, is very different. China ? has not developed yet to the level of true partnership with the U.S. eco- nomically, socially or politically; and militarily it presents much less of a . danger, , to the. U.S. than does the U.S.S.R. Further, the mainspring of - revolution still has not unwound in China. Any attempt to put pressure on China for the purpose of internal change most probably will yield no results. China is still so far from the West that everything that happens there is regarded almost like &time- ? -thing on the moon. China is still too ' "alien" for public opinion in the West to reach out a hand to those who are subjected to persecution. . Pressure From the West ? It is a different matter with the . 'From the circumstances' of its tragic. Eurasian "geographic situa- tion, _Russia has. always been both more sensitive to the West and more dangerous to the West than has China. The mainspring of the Russian Revolu- tion has completely unwound. And moving now only by the force of inertia, the U.S.S.R, will be highly. responsive to pressure from the West, all the more so because of a hostile.. ? China at its back. And it is fully clear that the more the relations of the: U.S.S.R.. with the West expand, the more it becomes "familiar" to the West, the more public opinion in the West will keep an alert watch on events in the U.S.S.R. If , the rivalry, of the U.S.S.R. and, China becomes ever sharper, and I , believe -that. it will. then the ties of ' the U.S. to the U.S.S.R. and China "will become like two sets of reins in the hands of ?the American leaders, , which they can use to ,guide the ' course of world history. But the question is, will they? Let us assume that a state or a group of states, working out long- range policies, should define the goals, strategy and tactics. As viewed from here in Russia, one might say that the political strategy of the U.S. is correct, but that its tactics in effect Pare ? undermining that strategy. But' what is more important, the policies - of the U.S.?and even more so of the in general?reveal very dim ob- . jectives or even the absence of ob- jeatives; the preservation of the status quo and, economic growth are not really objectives. Perhaps the dissent and lack of confidence that have seized the West and have found partial reflection in "d?nte" will open the way to a , perception of the- significant objec- tives?the objectives of reshaping the world, at the basis of which will be , the human personality, a personality - in its broad human, not egoistic, es- sence. Then the West, sure of itself, will begin to speak in a different voice. , Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001003801)05-1 CHR1S11AN SCiENCE MONITOR WedneSclai, -October 22, 1975 Schlesinger's risky 'empty strategy' - By Herbert Scoville Jr. When his "counterforce" strategic policy Furthermore, the military are strongly came under fire in the Congress, Secretary of opposed to placing any mechanism in the Defense James Schlesinger claimed the Rus- missile so that it can be destroyed or aborted sians had nothing to fear since they had "a in flight. They fear that this would make it capability to launch their strategic force on vulnerable to countermeasures and provide warning of an impending attack." the enemy a self-installed ABM (anti-ballistic This tactic, known as "launch on warning," missile) system. would place ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic Therefore to reduce the chance of calam- missiles) on a hair-trigger alert so that they itous accident, extraordinary measures are could be launched in the interval between the taken to ensure that no missile will be firing of a hostile counterforce attack (an inadvertently fired without authorization. The attack of one country's ICBMs against those of United States has adopted tight command and the other) and the arrival of the warhead at control procedures, which require author- the targeted silo. It takes 30 to 40 minutes for ization from the President, and positive action an ICBM to travel between Russian and by at least three independent persons to American sites, and radars or satellite in- launch any ICBM. Our deterrent forces are frared systems can provide at least 20 mm- designed to survive an attack so as not to have utes' warning that an attack is under way, to be fired hastily. Fail-safe mechanisms are With modern technology, defending missiles installed on all launch systems to ensure could easily be launched during that 20-minute against an accident which could unleash such period so that the attacking warheads would catastrophic destruction. only be destroying empty silos. A counter- force strike thus becomes an empty strategy. We have no specific knowledge of Russian "Launch on warning" would appear an ideal tactic were it not for other fatal flaws. Strategic missiles, unlike bombers, cannot be recalled or destroyed once they have been launched. Yet each packs the punch of many Hiroshima bombs?the Minuteman HI ICBM ? ens; in 1971 they negotiated several agree- carrying three warheads aimed at separate preordained targets and the Poseidon missile carrying ten warheads. Thus, a single missile is capable of destroying three to ten cities and ,of killing millions of people. procedures to prevent accidental launches, but there are strong indications of their understanding of the hazards involved and their interest in avoiding such an occurrence. They have exercised even greater control than we over people with access to nuclear weap- ments with the United States to provide safeguards against accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, all their land-based ICBMs have been deployed in costly, hardened silos to increase their probe- Tuesday,Ottober28.1975 N THE WASHINGTON POST bility of survival in the event 7t. an ettack: and avoid the need of rapid launch on warning. Apparently, Mr. Schlesinger feels that im- proving U.S. ability to knock out Soviet ICBM silos overrides the substantially increased chance that millions of Americans will be incinerated in an accidental nuclear strike. Actually, the Secretary was providing telling support for what critics of Ms counterforce policy have long been warning ? that we cannot risk the acquisition of a more effec- tive anti-silo capability, which meld push the Soviet Union-toward a "launch on warning" ' posture. Putting the Soviet ICBMs on hair- trigger alert is even more risky fcr us than for them. To make matters worse, Mr. Schlesinger has threatened to launch strategic nuclear weapons in a "selective" strike at military targets in the Soviet Union in response to aggression with conventional weapons in Europe. If the Russians follow Schlesinger's advice and "launch on warning," the selective strike will hit only empty silos while Soviet warheads may be killing millions of Amer- icans. It is time for the Secretary to con- template the implications of his own pro- grams, and recognize that they are seriously increasing the risk of a nuclear catastrophe. Mr. Scoville is former Assistant Direc- tor of the Arms Control and Disarmament _ Agency and Deputy Director of the CIA: ae By MichaelGetler ,- 1.1?itrostttriotOrt Post tiptcityriter ? ' Bt*W",?dat: Soviet. Union appears to ,heve. opt- smarted the.WeitemallieS on a key provision of the 35-- " nation. agreement ? on Etirepe.ari Security signed last au/Timer in Helsinki. , - ? T.!?!.c'prGvisionrqufte advance notice "major? .military. Maneuvers" by' Oitticipating.cottiitries when ihe maneuver! are within. a; ttrtain distance of another aluntry's border. I! p_Before the new agreement Ilas signed, the question of IlMat size maneuvers would require advance notice and t47 far away from borders Aley could be held without the notice was a major stumbling rock and the last issue to be ?Aresolved before the wide- ranging pact would be con- eluded. ? As matters turned out, the e numbers arrived at match the t: recent pattern of Soviet military maneuvers, in effect : allowing the Soviets to con- . Untie doing what they have been doing for the past few . years without giving prior eotice. Approve ; The provision, for prior' notification of tmajor military Maneuvers is included in a section of the 60-page agreement devoted to 'confidence-building measures." The idea was to ease fears that it country could launch a massive surprise attack ?against another country and.; use the .pretext of a big, military exercise to disguise the - massing of troops in border areas. Thus, the agreement, in rather vague language, requires that countries give notice three weeks in advance of military maneuvers in Europe involving more than 25.000 troops. However, a key provision is . that "in the case of a par- ticipating state whose territory extends beyond Europe, prior notification need be given only of maneuvers which take place in an area within 250 kilometers (153 miles) from its frontier facing or shared with any other European participating state." .Since the Soviet Union's territoey e.xtends beyond dg-1960.eierl?er?9A1/08/98 Soviets do not have to an- nounce large-scale maneuvers that are more than 153 miles inland from its European borders, . The agreement does limit the size of Soviet and Warsaw Pact exercises clese to Western European borders to the 25,000-troop level, but informed American and West German militaneofficials say that for the past few years at least the Soviets have been holding down their maneuvers 'in border areas to that size anyway. Since the signing of the Helsinki accords Aug. I, there have been a number of Western news reports that NATO governments had evidence of the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies "Circumventing a clause" in the Helsinki agreement by holding down the size of their maneuvers to escape the requirement to announce them in advance. In fact, Western intelligence officials say the Soviets ape patently knew that they could stay under the 25,000-man ceiling when they agreed to it in Helsinki. rqn PenrlinfitlIrt? 1 NATO- di i vance that while the Soviet general staff conceives of its military maneuvers on a very large scale, they generally have ? been carried out in the last -; year or two in concentrated: form near border areas, using perhaps two or three 8,000-toe 10.000-man divisions. The la rgersca le exercises,. in which perhaps 60,000 Soviet troops are airlifted aboard . planes of the Soviet airline Aeroflot, take place further inland, where ? no an- nouncement is required. The Western alliance generally does not have this/ luxury since the high {tensity.: urban part of central Europe' is not the best for military' maneuvers... Similarly, Western exer- cises in border areas: generally use bigger divisions; and several thousand extra: troops who serve as "referees and umpires." Virtually all NATO exercises exceed the tai lirnit and thus uarnbunced in ad- 3i v 5 ons. Sources say,, Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1 ?. One West German official likened the Soviet tactics at -Helsinki to the techniques used by the Soviets in the . Strategic Arms Limitation ...Talks with the United States. Moscow's representatives, in . this view, are not overt _cheaters but skillful negotiators who ignore vague unilateral statements by other countries that are ?not precisely spelled out in treaty form. Failure of the United States to insist on specific limits to size increases it atomic- warhead missiles in the first WASHINGTON POST Monday,October27;103 S viet uildup Dis uted Colby Sees No Massive Arms Increase By Laurence Stern , Washington Post Staff Writer 'Newly disclesed testimony by top in- telligence officials con- tradicts claims by Pen- tagon spokesmen that steady increases in Soviet military spending threaten to reduce the United States to subordinate power status. the current "Battle of the Pentagon Budget" there have been warnings from Defense Secretary James R. .-Schlesinger and other officials, of massive Soviet military buildups and "gaps" adverse ? to t he United States. . Centre! Intelligence Agency Director William E. ..Colby. in' testimony made SALT accord, for example, IS now producing problems in trying to get a second one. In the long bargaining at Helsinki over the maneuver ? limits, the United States wanted originally to require notification of exercises ex- ? ceeding 8,000 troops. . The Public yesterday by Sen. William Proxmire (D-Wis.), -said Soviet spending was increasing at a steady 3 per cent annual rate it has maintained over the past decade. colby also said that a substantial portion of Soviet defense costs was absorbed by defensive missions for which there was no comparable U.S. outlay?such as the 10,000 surface-to-air missiles deployed around Soviet borders as well as the positioning of forces along the Chinese-Soviet frontier. -. Summarizing the testimony by Colby and Lt. Gen. Daniel 0. Graham, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency; Proxmire said, "The U.S. leads the Soviet Union in 'virtually every area of ad? vanced military, technology." He acknowledged, however, that the dollar costs of Soviet military programs exceed those of the United States on the basis of estimating ivehniques used by the CIA. Colby and Graham testified June HI and July 21 before the Joint Economic Committee's Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government of which Proxmire is 'chair- man. The sanitized transeript, was issued yesterday. . A strong element in Soviet Military planning and ex- penditures, said Colby. was NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, OCTOBER 24, 1975 proposed " a 50,000.: troop limit. The 25,000 would, appear to be a compromise, but West German and. American sources point out. ' that the Soviets undoubtedly knew all along that they were: able to do what they wanted to with 25,000 men or fewer. defense against the pLoss- ibility of attack from aircraft deployed throughout the NATO countries. ? -They are very concerned about their vulnerability to aircraft. .The Soviets, of course, have a national historical fixation on the problem of invasion...," the CIA director observed. Aside from the deterrent capability arrayed against NATO forces the Soviet Union is deploying 40 divisions along its border with China together with some 1,000 tactical aircraft, half of them nuclear-armed, Colby said. . Colby and Graham agreed that the dollar basis of estimating Soviet military costs tended to inflate Russian expenditures because of noncomparable factors in the U.S. and Soviet economies. Nonetheless the estimated dollar costs of Soviet defense programs have exceeded U.S. expenditures every year since 1971, according to Colby. During 1964-1974 Soviet military costs, in dollar terms, were estimated to be 90 per cent of the U.S. level. ? In the course of the hearing Proxmire complained to Gen. Graham that threats of a new Soviet capability seem to blossom "just like the flowers Personal Diplomacy BY James Reston WASHINGTON, Oct. 23?Personal diplomacy is very fashionable these days. We have pictures of Henry Kis- singer shaking hands with Chairman Mao Tse-tung in Peking, of the Em- peror of Japan and President Ford on the White House lawn, and next week , it will be President Sadat of Egypt and his "dear friend" Henry dominat- ing the social and diplomatic news. Sometimes these personal contacts are vital to the relations between na- tions, and they have always fascinated Mr. Kissinger, who spent years at Har- vard studying and writing about the perscinal diplomacy of nineteenth-cen- tury Europe. But his own years in Washington illustrate the fragility of human life and power. He established a remarkable degree of respect with Chou En-lai, which helped to end the long break in Sine- American relations, but when he got to Peking this time, Chou En-lai was too ill to see him and it is doubtful that they will ever meet again. Likewise, it was thought here that negotiations with Spain for the use of military and naval facilities in that country ought to keep in mind the pride, and prejudices, of Generalissimo Francisco Franco; but before negotia- tions could be completed, Franco was stricken and the judgment here is that, his long domination of Spain is over. Mr. Kissinger counted on the philo- sophic and economic influence of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia to help mod- erate the demands of the Middle East- ern oil states, but Faisal was murdered in March of this year. The Secretary had hoped to get help in the Cyprus crisis from Bulent Ecevit, who had once been a Kissinger student at Harvard. but Mr. Ecevit was thrown out of office on Nov. 17, 1974. This is not to say that personal diplomacy does not have its uses or that Mr. Kissinger's own personality, 32 bloom in the spring" whenever the defense budget reaches the Appropriations Committee action stage. "During a debate over a U.S.. ABM we begin hearing about a Soviet MIRV or a Chinese ICBM," the senator observed. Proxmire asked Graham whether he agreed that the United States "leads the Russians in almost every high technology base in terms of bombers, submarines, computers, missiles and other categories." Graham answered: "I think ? that in almost all military technologies we lead them.' He added, without elaboration, "I am worried about several that are rather important, such as (deleted) the application of lasers." - Proxmire concluded that it would improve public un- derstanding of defense spending controversies if ? reports on Soviet military outlays were made at regular intervals by the "civilian side" of the intelligence community. "It would also help avoid confusion if Pentagon officials would refrain from using the estimates of the intelligence agencies prematurely, selectively, or out of context," he said. character and wide-ranging mind have not made great contributions to some of the more positive events of recent world history. It is doubtful, for ex- ample, that Egypt would have taken even its limited step toward an ac- commodation with Israel unless Mr. Kissinger had won the confidence of Mr. Sadat. In contrast, Mr. Kissinger also felt that he had established mutual trust with Le Duc Tho, the principal Hanoi negotiator at the Vietnamese peace talks, but the agreements arranged be- tween them fell apart when they no longer supported the interests of the parties concerned. Aside from the accidents of politics, the accidents and mortality of life make personal diplomacy a risky busi- ness. Since Mr. Kissinger came to Washington as the principal security adviser in the White House in January of 1969, President Nixon and Vice President Agnew have been forced out of office,, and his principal ally- in 2061706/08 :-CIA-RDP77-00432k0-80100380005-1 ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1 Cin*res-, Chairman William Fulbright of the Senate Foreign Relations Com- mittee, was defeated at the polls. ? Meanwhile, in these six and three- quarter years, the obituaries of world leaders have dotted the front pages. They include: Charles de Gaulle and . President Pompidou of France; Chiang Kai-shek of Nationalist China; Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt; Antonio Oh- ' veria Salazar of Portugal; Juan Peron of Argentina; Prime Minister Norman Kirk of New Zealand and Premier Car- rero Blanco of Spain. , And this does not take into account key political figures like Chancellor Willy Brandt of West Germany, who - left office at the height of his influ- ence in world politics. ? One does not dwell on the past to be morbid but to question the domina- Washington Post 26 OCT 1975 SALT Pact . May Slip to Early 1977 By Murrey Marder Washington Post Staff Writer ? The United States and the. Soviet Union soon must decide if they are prepared to risk a free in the nuclear arms talks that can extend to 1977, American strategists acknowledge privately. This is the most troublesome foreign policy ? issue inside the. Ford ad- ministration, insiders agree. -.The problem is compounded by continuing differences between the State Department and the Department of ' Defense over the price that should be paid for U.S.-Soviet detente. ? It is the Kremlin, however, rather than the-White House, ? U.S. sources say, which now News Analyses holds the controlling decision on whether any accord will emerge from the strategic arms limitation talks in 1976. The summit meeting bet- ween President Ford and Soviet leader Leonid I. Brezhnev, which has been delayed repeatedly, is tied to a SALT accord. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger's recurringly extended dates for producing a SALT agreement now have reached "early This is the Ford ad- ministration's actual deadline for any accord, it was learned. The United States has in- formed the Soviet Union privately that it will be politically impractical to pursue SALT negotiations _ beyond early 1976, to avoid the contentious atmosphere of the American p r e?kipttived election campaign. If this cutoff is adhered to, it WASHINGTON 'tion of personality in political affairs and to point to the instability of almost all the major political leaders at the present time. Mao Tse-tung is 81, Chou En-Iai is , 77, both in poor health, as is Leonid Brezhnev, the Communist party chief in Moscow. Also, President Ford's term of office is assured only until the end of next year, and Mr. Kis- singer will be leaving then, in any event, so that enduring agreements between nations must rest on national interests and not on personalities?a rule almost all world leaders accept in principle but defy in practice. Harold Nicolson, still perhaps the best student of diplomacy of this can- means that if SALT negotiations are inconclusive in the, next four months, they would go over to 1977. With this limitation on negotiations, administration sources concede, the prospects diminish for any SALT accord in 1976 without major Soviet or American concessions soon. As a political reality; the' pressures will grow inside the administration even during this period to resist com- promises that could expose President Ford to new attacks from the Republican right on his detente policy,- U.S. planners anticipate. Defense Department par- tisans initiated 'a flurry of attacks across the Potomac two weeks ago against Kissinger's SALT diplomacy, although Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger last week strongly disavowed any attempt to frustrate Kissinger's strategy.' Schlesinger personally shares some of Kissinger's concern about the need to "bind Brezhnev's successors" to agreed nuclear-force, ceilings. But Kissinger and Schlesinger* long have disagreed about the terms the United States should settle for in the projected 10-year SALT agreement. A failure to reach a SALT agreement in 1976, many Defense ? Department strategists and other specialists contend, still would leave in force the five-year limit on American and Soviet strategic weapons that runs to October, 1977. This would allow adequate time, these sources say, for resuming SALT negotiations after the presidential inauguration in January, 1977. Kissinger's associates label this an invitation for "panic negotiations," in contrast to chbeiRetteaset00114/08108 critics charge Kissinger with tury, went even further and argued , in "Peacemaking" that even when the great men are well and secure in office, the habit of personal diplomacy ' is dubious and maybe even dangerous. "Diplomacy," he said, "is the art of negotiating documents in a ratifiable and therefore dependable form. It is by no means the art of conversation. . . . Nothing could be more fatal than the habit of personal contact between statesmen of the world. It is argued in defense of this pastime that the foreign secretaries of nations `get to ? know each other.' "This is an extremely dangerous cognizance. Personal contact breeds, inevitably, personal acquaintance and ,that, in its turn, leads in many cases to friendliness. There is nothing more damaging to precision in international relations than friendliness between contracting parties. . . . Diplomacy, if . it is ever to be effective, should be a disagreeable business. And one . recorded in hard print." conducting. Beyond that hazard, such a delay runs the risk of a "totally uncontrolled nuclear arms race," Kissinger associates caution.. By 1977, these sources say there is almost certain to be a new leader in the Kremlin, even if President Ford remains in the White House. A change in either leadership, it is argued, could provide justification for cancelling the Ford-Brezhnev agreement made at Vladivostok last November, which is the basis for the present SALT negotiations. Kissinger, therefore, is described as being deter- mined to continue his drive for a SALT accord until the last possible moment, in the hope of inducing the Soviet Union to reach even a partial nuclear compromise. Time will run out, U.S. specialists now estimate, before the convening 'of the Soviet Communist Party's 25th congress, scheduled to open in Moscow Feb. 24. This is where Brezhnev planned on displaying a completed SALT agreement, capped at a Washington summit conference, as the climax of his detente strategy?and, it was speculated, perhaps his political career. The ailing Brezhnev, however, now may lack the power to produce any new concessions on SALT. In addition, the administration's political timetable for cutting off SALT negotiations may be construed as a deliberate pressure tactic, although U.S. officials have tried to eliminate that suspicion. The two most intractable obstacles in the path of a : tAllg-ROFTP00432ROOD1 be offsetting demands for 33 dealing with -two weapons not discussed at Vladivostok last year. One is the latest Soviet bomber, known in the West as the Backfire B; the ether is the. American-initiated long- range cruise missile, yet to be test-fired, but already regarded as a major. technological breakthrough to a new class of weapon!. Of the two, weapons American cruise missile is, overwhelmingly the most significant. The Defense Department is' pressing the Soviet Union to count Backfire bombers in its force level of 2,400 strategic , land, sea or air missiles or long-range bombers. The Soviet Union insists the plane is not an intercontinental bomber, but a medium-range bomber. The Soviet Union, in turn, demands that the United States count long-range cruise missiles in its total of 2.400' strategic weapons. The United States refuses on grounds that the cruise missile is the equivalent of a low-flying pilotless plane, not a ballistic missile. In the latest American counterproposal, submitted Sept. 21, which is now the critical offer in the negotiations, the United States proposed a trade-off formula for counting the Backfire and cruise missile in equal numbers. above the force levels set at Vladivostok. There is little, if any, ex- pectation on the U.S. side that this offer will be accepted as it stands. The question is, whether it will be rejected, deadlocking the negotiations long before February, or as 110384005-l1opes, it will stimulate an encouraging Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1 counterproposal.- strategists regard as Kissinger is prepared to A meriea n 'advantages bargain. Schlesinger repor- bargained away in earlier tedly is too, but to a lesser SALT agreements. extent. The Defense Depar- The ultimate test of whether tment has no intention of there win be any SALT abandoning what it sees as the agreement in ma, many U.S. .technological lead it now can experts believe, will turn less gain to offset what Pentagon on the. pursuit of detente than DAILY TELEGRAPH, London 9 October 1975 LIONEL BLOCH looks sadly at the Western nations' inadequacies in dealing with the Arabs _ . on the level of Soviet concern that American technology will end up with an uncontrolled advantage - in nuclear weapons. This was the decTsive factbr in the first, disputed, SALT accord .in 1972, which Kissinger justified primarily THE preparatory meeting far a world conference on energy and raw materials due to -open in Paris on Monday, is a icharacteristic tour de force of that great illusionist President Giscard d'Estaing. . His ambitious .project started in fact last April but promptly col- lapsed following the demand of the Third World's representatives to include the question of raw anaterials on the agenda?a thinly i veiled way of claiming that any- I thing OPEC could do with oil, they could do better with their own !commodities. For once, the advanced industrial Powers de- cided to draw the line there and Oen but, having made their gesture, they are now back at the bargaining table after receiving a prolonged kiss of life from the ' Elysee. This is no mean tribute even to a man with the President's , celebrated talents. - Since April, the plight of the poorer developing countries has grown more desperate, the budgets of the " older " consuming coun- tries have become even more un- balanced and OPEC has resent- fully settled for a " mere " 10 per cent.- increase in oil prices. ? Against this sombre background, the basic aim of the oil-consuming countries is to eliminate or limit attempts to wreck their economies by the ruthless manipulation of fuel supplies and to ensure that normal market mechanisms func- tion ? free from cartel . pressures. These objectives are common to both the developed and undeve- loped consumer nations, but can - they be attained by rational argu- ment, diplomatic skill or appeals to the 0 P E C's , enlightened self- interest? There are many reasons for doubt. - - Firstly, the oil-consuming coun- tries do not pursue a common policy. The Ford Administration is divided. An influential section , of its economic establishment ? favours high prices which benefit America's own oil producers and stimulate the massive investments in alternative sources of energy. Not so long ago, at the time when Dr Kissinger uttered pious hopes ; that oil prices would come down , a little, the Assistant Secretary in charge of energy problems, Thomas Enders, argued publicly in favour of a high floor price for oil. This conflict is not merely one of emphasis?it is similar to the ,current divergences between the Secretary of State and the Pen-, tagon on supplying Israel with Pershing missiles and undermines 34 Approved1ForRe1ease2001/08/08 : CIALIRDP77=00432R000100380005-1 oil ad arty racewar-1, America's credibility and standing in international negotiations. When we turn to Britain's posi- tion, we note that her will to resist the crippling effects of high oil prices has been paralysed by -three trends.' There is in the air a general feeling that financial expediency is all that matters. OPEC in gen- eral and its Arab members in particular must not be upset if we want to have their business and keep their sterling balances. ' Beyond this' crude 'and short- sighted opportunism, there- are other forces at work. The rot has spread into the Conservative party, whose experts on energy can now only think of how best to recycle the excess oil profits of OPEC without even considering ways and means of reducing them. Given this sort of defeatism, who can blame the coal miners doing their own "recycling "? After all, they, too, could argue that any increases in wages paid to them are put back into our economy. Even the ,Economist (Sept. 20) discerned something humiliating but " healthy" in seeing "the West so busy today appealing to OPEC, please not to put prices up too much" and shows sympathy for OPEC's use of oil power for dent- ing "the arrogance of the West." With such friendly support, who needs enemies? Of course, there -remains the question of our vested interest in high oil prices for the sake of our North Sea bonanza. The most obvious criticism of this point of view is that this country's invest- ment in the new oil fields should net have to depend on artificially. high OPEC prices that, for a variety of reasons, could be brought down as arbitrarily as they were put up.. Pulling out As to whether all our efforts -to placate OPEC are useful, the answer is not reassuring. In 1974 OPEC invested ?3,700 million in Britain. In the first six months of 1975, . these investments dropped to ?370 million. Having on grounds that it Checked a more dynamic Soviet missile- building program. .41-1,NY attees shattered our precarious economic balance, OPEC is now letting us down because our economy no longer inspires confidence ! Is France faring differently? After all, with her well-established tradition of renversement des alli- ances, she has been leading - -Europe in cultivating 0.P E C's benevolence to the extent of turn- ing some of her leading statesmen into commercial travellers. On the face of it, charm and servility have paid. In the first six months , of this year French exports to the Middle East have increased by 76 per cent. But, for all this, France still pays for her oil as much as anybody else and her export re- cords are a shade less gratifying when it is remembered that ,to a large extent they are paid for by- , her own money. To put-it differ- ently,- the amount of oil that France could purchase in 1973 by exporting one tank to Libya could be bought a year later only by exporting five tanks. The price of French tanks and other exports Were- duly marked 11D, but not by 500 per cent, and the remaining gap still hurts: thus in her current Budget there are provisions for a "little deficit" of ?4,500 million,-. and it is likely to be higher?as ? Germany is clamping down on Common Market agricultural sub- sidies. Even when France's hell-bent export drive achieved records, its very success created new prob- lems, as in the case of Algeria where?after a French trading surplus of $650 million in the first six months of this year?a budding "special relationship" turned into acrimonious controversy culminat- ing with the Algerian regime buy- ing space in the French Press to berate the economic policy of Paris. The weaknesses underlying all these strains and stresses among and inside the leading industrial countries do not escape ? 0 P E C's leaders, and inevitably they con- clude that the consumer's goose can be made to lay many more golden eggs before the game is over. The case of Patricia Hearst has prompted some general discussion on whether a kidnapping victim Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1 can really make common cause with his tormentors. If one con- templates great Powers doing pre- cisely that, why wonder when a helpless individual succumbs under pressure? The true meaning of 0 P E C's frenzied overdevelopment is still only dimly perceived. It is a pro- cess generating its own uncontrol- lable momentum to such an extent that, against its better judgment, OPEC may be forced to press on and on for higher prices, even if this means growing inter-depen- dence with the West, stimulating the West's reserve stocks and its drive for alternative sources of - energy, crushing the poorer nations and going against the weight of market forma. It is this last factor that worries the oil producers. To counter it, they encourage the notion of inter- national economic egalitarianism which offers the richer countries of the world an opportunity to expiate the sins of past im- perialism and present affluence. The modus operandi of this new ideology is the transfer of wealth to the underprivileged countries of the Third World by paying the earth for their produce and raw materials. Possibly, this new egalitarian concept is an adaptation of the old Cargo Cult of the Pacific?a belief among some of its islanders that a large ship full with everything NElek YORK TIMES, MONDAY, OCTOBER 20, 1975 ? With Fertilizer Shortage Past, Poor Countries Are S till Hungry BY ANN C The worldwide fertilizer shortage of last year is now past. But left in the wake is a dectine in fertilizer usage?and therefoT in pro- duction?in the world's poorest countries. Furthermore, fertil- izer manufacturers, who in- creased prices during the short-. age far above production costs, are expecting huge profits. . These price increases ? as much as 1,000 per cent be- tween 1972-and 1974.for some of the most commonly used fertilizers ? had a particularly severe impact on the less de- veloped countries, which de- pend on expensive fertilizer im- ports for most of their needs. RITTENDEN to pay their iScalating fertilizer t? The impact of the shortage :h been been broad: girt some of the poorest na- tions, such as India and the Philippines, fertilizer consump- tion has fallen as much as 30 or 40 per cent, according to the International Fertilizer Devel- opment Cerrter, a private, non- profit organization that was established in Muscle Shoals, Ala. ? ? ? - 9The world's major donor of fertilizer aid, the United States, reduced its aid from 631,000 tons in 1973-74 to 487,000 tons in 1974-75, and had to spend more than' twice as much for the lower amount. igAs a result of these devel- opments, some observers- fear that food production has not been so high as it might have been in the hungriest areas. The Food and Agriculture Or- ganization or the United Na-i tions has calculated that the 1 current shortfall of fertilizer in; 43 of the world's poorest coun-i tries is equivalent to the loss' of about 2.7 million tons of grain--enough to spell the dif-I ference between subsistence! and starvation for millions ofj people. (iThe steep price increases have also meant, that poor countries have hadApiagoweed) much scarce foreign exchange d they ever dreamt of and more would appear one day on the coral reef, wrecked and abandoned, its contents available to enable them to live forever after in lilssfel opulence. For all their weaknesses, contradictions and generosity, the time is nearing when the advanced industrial coun.tries will have to inform OPEC and Co that, although during the post-1973 storms some cargo had to he thrown into the sea?at least ?for the time being?they are neither shipwrecked nor willing to aban- don their cargoes. Alas, such candour is not the stuff of international conferences. Nevertheless:- the poor ria- 1"but we're .also generating tions will still need to import funds to build the additionat some 3 million tons of fertil- capacity that will be needed in izers in the 1975-76 growing the next five or 10 years. season, by F.A.O. calculations. "The poor do a pretty 'good They will probably be unable to job of exploiting us when the finance more than two-thirdsj shoe is on the other foot," he added. "Look at oil." Or one might look at fertil- izer, for now that prices are tumbling, it is the international trients?nitrogen, phosphorus I customers turn -to break con- and potash?the most common- tracts. ly used fertilizers in the third India has renegotiated sev- world are those based on nitro-. eral major contracts with gen. The world's major food American producers, and Indo- grains heavily depend on an- nesia has recently cancelled nual doses of artificial nitrogen outright huge purchases of fer- fertilizer, which is largely based tilizer made when the price was on ammonia, derived from oat- over $300 a ton. It is now near- ural gas. naphtha or coal. er half that. Anhydrous ammonia can be "The sanctity of contracts anplied directly to crops. but doesn't exist in this business. its derivatives are more signif- because of the wild price flue- icant in world trade, and one. tuations," said Emil S. Finley, urea. is the most widely used president of a fertilizer-expori:- fertilizer in the developing ing firm. the International world. Commodities Export Company of New York. Part of the instability might also result from 'much of the export trades being handled by brokers, who frequently split their sizable sales commissions with key purchasing agents in less developed countries, ac- cording to widespread trade reports. as potash. began to soar. From Referring to this practice, the (depressed levels of 1971-72 Mr. Finley said, "Our company could have made twice as much money last year if we had been greedy and willing to ,in the bills that "they were forced to of these requirements, leaving defer expenditures in other vi- a shortfall equivalent to about tal sectors, thereby slowing 10 million tons of grain. their already sluggish economic Of the three basic plant nu- growth rates," according to Martin M. McLaughlin of the Overseas Development Council, a research organization in , Washington. I Although there were many reasons for the sharp price in- creases of the last two years (primarily a real fertilizer shortage in the face of explod- ing demand) aggressive profit- maximizing on the part of the producers played a significant part, according tb a number of industry analysts. These analysts point out that although the juin!) in energy prices in 1973-74 did increase fertilizer-productio costs, fer- Next in imnortance are the n Ph tilizer price movements in most phosphate fertilizers, such as cases far exceeded cost in- triple sunerphosnhate and the ammonium phosphates. based creases. As a result. fertilizer- nroducing companies enjoyed on phosphoric acid, and normal superphosphate produced from unprecedented earnings last , year. ? phosphate rock. When the fertilizer shortage e ' "There was a big rin-off last merged in late 1973. prices for 'ear." said Robert? T Eastman all of these Products. as well Af RlYth EastmPri ninon & Co.. a brokerage fi-n. "The retail dealers and distribotors took advantage of the shortage to rin-off the farmers in this cram- try. and the prodiicers sold to sop to Loon Per cent, and dirty busOess." countries like todia and Brazil I nhosphate rock jumped 470 per. t This chaotic situation in the at inflated prices."cent. fertilizer trade has worked far Buyers Show Resistance In the process. producers and l more to the advantage of the This process ended a few suppliers scrambled to renego-i producers; however, than to months ago, as the ? inflated tiate contracts signed at lower the purchasing countries. world prices ran into buyer re-' prices. . ccot. g j ? Last year the largest Ameri- sistance and as purchasers: Roher, an industry analys,t, with: can companies that primarily many of whom panicked and Goldman Sachs SE Co., Com- produced fertilizer?the Inter- overbought last year, pulled out panics would call, their cus- national Minerals and Chemical of the market to work off their tomers and say, Because of Corporation. Reker Industries. Corpora- excess inventories. the shortage, we can, guaran- the First Mississippi Corpora- fertilizer. We tion and the Williams Compa- For these and other reasons.. tee any _more ,the fertilizer shortage turned don't want to break this con- nies?enjoyed an average re- :around to a glut, and the prices. tract, but if you want any of I turn ort equity of 31.6 per cent, iof many commonly used fertil- the product after this shipment. I in contrast to 14.6 ner cent for izer products have tumbled to you'll have to pay more for it Standard & Poor's index. the 425 companies listed in the i one-half to one-fourt of ii,.e w to the neak earlier this year. urea went up Loon per cent, nhosnhate chemicals were un thy are still well above the tries of Greenwich, Conn. .. of tWo .?rs g ? broke the same contract withlow I The major producers are India twice, although the corn- culp.tions for the 425, according to cal-. holding large inventories, and I nanY says that after India made by Investors ? ? threatened legal action. Bakerl 1?1Pnagement Sciences. !peak levels of -1974-2althotia,h One company,. Baker Indus- they The fertilizer industry's pre- tax profit was 18.3 per cent. compared with 11.15 per cent according to orld BanK o cials many governments in de.: agreed to sell at the original veloping countries have huge! price. ? stockpiles, which they are und "You might say we're goug- es/plielIllftV9.".?8166?:ubi0EtarPOW 35 ka a* The leading producer, I.M.C., which sells one-third of its product internationally, had a 182 ner rent increase in profits 80006-liscal year ended June - ? ? ? - ? or -e -ase is I: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1 PO. following a 123 per. cent( iumn in net income for the t' previous year. Commenting on the prices{ that made such gains possible,1 I.M.C.'s president and chief ex- ' ecutive officer, Richard A. Len- on, said, "We were meeting a market opportunity?that was what the buyers were willing to pay. It follows," he contin- ued, "that to avoid a repetition .of the shortage periods, prices Will have to move forward. Au .ctirrent prices you could not build a plant from scratch to- day." The most dramatic enrich- melt was reflected in the in- come statement of Beker In dustries. In the first six months of 1975, the company, which has $157-million in sales, had a sales increase of 118 per cent and in increase in pretax income of 160 per cent, follow- ing a jump in income of 249 per cent last year. To a large extent the numbers reflect prof- its earned abroad, for foreign sales accounted for 55 per cent of Beker's total tonnage in 1974. Ultimately, however, the farmers in the third world re- fused to pay the higher prices NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, OCTOBER 19, 1975 U.S. Arms-Sale Rise Stirs Capital Concern .Greater Control Is Sought by Congress As Nation Takes Lead in Munitions Sal By. RICHARD D. LYONS ? . Special to The New York Time' VVASHINGTON, Oct: 18?The' two areas, which account for emergence of the United States more than half of American as munitions king of the world arms sales overseas, there have 'and almost daily reports of new arms deals with foreign Governments are generating a fresh sense of uneasiness among policy makers and Congress- men over the impact of the weapons on global affairs. Sales of American-made weapons have risen from about $2-billion a year in 1967 to about $11-billion in the last fiscal year, abetted by Federal policies of liberal credit, a be- nign attitude toward the ship- ping of arms overseas, the pre- eminent state of American military technology, the rapid obsolescence of weapons and an almost limitless world-wide demand for more guns. Congress has become in- creasingly embroiled in the specifics of such arms deals as tanks for Turkey, missiles for Jordan, rockets for Israel and jet fighters for Egypt; at the same time Congress is con- sidering the general idea that the Senate and the House of Representatives should have greater control over interna- tional shipments. of munitions made in this country. During the last decade there has been a complete reversal of United States arms policy from one of giving the weapons away to one of selling them, either for spot cash or on lib- eral credit supplied by the Fed- eral Government. The demand for American Weapons has been spurred by arms races in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf because of the quadrupling of the price of oil and the desire of the petroleum producing nations to defend their enormouslyi amplified wealth with steel. _In recent months, in these been reports of Pershing mis-' siles to Israel, radars to Egypt, fighters to Saudi Arabia, Hawk missiles to Jordan, destroyers to Iran, antitank missiles to Oman, bombers to Kuwait and tanks to Yemen. While orders for American- made arms appeared to have peaked last year, the probable effect of Congressional ap- proval of the Sinai accords, which would provide arms to both Egypt and Israel, would be to push still higher the sales of American arms, spare parts and training services. Increasingly vocal critics of American arms policy, which some complain is a lack of policy, note that this country seems only too willing to sell to all sides. Over the last generation a dozen nations in conflict have battled one another in Central -American jungles, Middle East- ern deserts, East Indian islands and Asian 'plateaus in wars having one common denomi- -nator?they were fought with arms made in America. Guerrilla Actions In thousands of guerrilla ac- tions spanning four continents :from Northern Ireland to the :Philippines, hordes of people 'have been killed and maimed :by weapons whose production translated to salaries for Amer-- -can workmen and profits for .American corporations. In Asia, Africa and Latin .rAmerica,' military dictatorships. :have power and keep power 'with munitions sold, lent and f.given away with the endorse- vent?indeed even the enthusi- ?astic approval?of the last six .Presidents and 16 Congresses. .Since the end of World War II 'the United States has shipped 8100-billion worth of weapons :to 136 nations, making this *country the munitions king of The globe with arms sales equal, to those of all the rest of thel jwas clear. price do partly explain lagging and the impact on consumption !ever, that factors other than I Consumption Declines fertilizer usage in developing ,countries. These include.- low usage dropped 40 per cent in In the Philippines, fertilizer pgralaninting, and prices which discourage the first six months of 1974. In the lack of ade- Indonesia, normally a growth quate marketing storage and credit facilities in many coun- market of 10 to 12 per cent a triMesoreover. India in particular inant last Year and in India it year, consumption was stag- wa ' w.ould be completely self-suffi- "It was pure and simply her , s down 25 to 30 per cent. cient in fertilizer if her own ted inability to protect herself from plants opera lv, international more efficient- world price increases," Dr. Paul J. Ste u because of power failures Stengel of the International and inadequate maintenance, iFertilizer Development Center Sid of India. Indian factories operate at only Observers do point out, how 60 or 70 - Per cent of capac ty .7 t quarter-century' :the United States has trans- ferred to foreign Governments 166 Phantom jets, 2,375 vopters, 185 destroyers and de- stroyer escorts, 1,500 landing craft, 5,000 Hawk anti-aircraft missiles, 25,000 Sidewinder air-j tto-air missiles, 28,000 antitanki Missiles, 16,000 armored per-I 'sonnet carriers, 25,000 pieces; :Of artillery and 28,000 tanks,c plus enormous stocks of other' Weapons, spare parts and 'services. f' Virtually no public debate -has accompanied the increasing :flow of American-made arma- .'ments throughout the world, ,and only in the last year have ,members of Congress begun to express concern over the poten- -tial danger lurking in overseas 'arms sales, even to friendly 'nations. 'A Real Tragedy' . "I think it's a real tragedy! ?:for us to end up being the arms1 :Merchants of the world," Sena- tor Edward M. Kennedy told a 'Congressional hearing on arms ''sales a few months ago. Senator Hubert H. Humphrey. -has likened the American mu- -initions industry to "a kind of ''.arms supermarket into which Any consumer can walk and. laick up whatever he wants." , Defenders of overseas arms, t'sales say, however, that theyj :are necessary to counter Corn-j munist threats: that if thej :United States did not provide' uthe weapons, other cottntries1 :would, and that weapons pro- eduction translates not only into! 'national security but also prof, Its and jobs. In Congress, members of lioth houses are increasingly questioning what the arms Sales policy of the Ford Admin- istration is, if' indeed there is. :one, and whether the nation :should adopt a different course.1 Among the questions they have raised about arms sales are these: Are they moral? Will the arms sold trigger wars? Could the arms eventually be ,used against the United States? Should the United States seek a treaty with the Soviet Union limiting the supply of conven- tional arms? Would other na- tions increase munitions sales if the United States chose to curtail shipments? What would be the impact on the American. economy if the United States drastically reduced foreign arms sales? _... 36 "Merchant of Death" . In discussing such issues be- fore a Congressional commit- tee, Thomas Stern, deputy di- rector of the State Depart- ment's Bureau of Politico--Mili- tary Affairs, said: "These are valid questions for Americans, who are troubled at seeing their country in the arms sup- ply business. The image of, 'Merchant of Death' dies hard.") Arms experts here are also. expressing doubt that it would even be politically possible to curtail the production of weapons for sales overseas be- cause of the increasing strength: of the loosely allied arms lobbyt in the United States. "The economy now is sad- dled with a self-perpetuating munitions industry that is bad for long-term economic policy," said one knowledgeable Senate staff aide. In addition to the increase in sheer volume of arms being produced for other countries, the United States in recent years has radically changed its policy on the method of trans- fer. Until a decade ago most of the arms were given away.' Now they are sold for cash, generating fat profits. " Financing Methods Most arms transfers are' fi-1 nanced in the following ways: Wirect give-aways of mate.; riel and services to foreign Gov- ernments under the military assistance program. About $500- million was earmarked in 1975. firoreign military sales in ;which contracts for the arms are arranged by the Defense Department, with credit terms secured through the Treasury Department's Federal Financing Bank. Current rates of interest and terms of repayment, about 8.7 per cent over six years, are slightly below the going mar- ket rate for international loans. In the fiscal year 1975 about 89.5-billion in orders were placed in this manner. qCommercial cash sales with , the foreign Government dealing directly with the American Imanufacturer. Export licenses for the material, about 81-bil- lion of which was sold in the fiscal year 1975, must he issued by the State Department. One of the very reasons used recently by White House lobby- ists in imploring Congress to lift the ban on arms shipments j to Turkey was that the Turks thad already paid 8184-million Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1 In cash for the undelivered weapons. Boon to Grumman The sale of 80 F-14 jet fight- ers to Iran has shored up the troubled Grumman Aerospace Corporation and helped to brake the unemployment rate on Long Island. Throughout the world, Amer- ican munitions agents are hus- tling for new contracts with the covert, if not total, approval of the Federal Government. Military assistance advisory groups, composed of 2,000 American military personnel, are stationed in more than 40 ed th served n e advisory groups overseas say that the units have and are working intimately with the sales representatives ot American companies. One fot? mer Army colonel, who now it a staff aide on Capitol Hill, said the groups "do their best to convince foreign Govern- ments to buy American weap- ons." ? While serving in such a group in Europe, he said, the over- seas agents of American arms companies "attended all the so- cial events at the American Embassy." He added that even the air, naval and military at. countries aiding in the purchase tach?,ave them aid by such and maintenance of American- things as setting up interviews made weapons, as well as the with high-ranking officers of training of those who man other Governments. them. "Munitions sales is the big- gest floating crap game in the world," said one arms specialist in the State Department. "The amount of money involved is enormous and everyone is try- ing to get a piece of the ac- In addition to pushing the hon. The United States and the sale of arms through the De- Soviet Union are the world's fense Department, American biggest arms dealers, with the weapons makers are also con- former outselling the latter by fronted by other Governments a margin of 2 to 1. But France, whose agents "walk in the front Britain, China, Italy, Sweden door demanding to be sold the and Canada also make major stuff," as one State Department overseas arms sales. !official put it. During' a Senate subcommit- He cited the almost un- tee hearing in ?June, Senator noticed arms race now going Humphrey, a Minnesota Dem-: 'on in South America in which ocrat, asked Lieut. Gen. H. MJ Ithe Peruvians bought tanks and Fish, director of the Defense! ijet fighters, prompting demands Assistance Agency, if the De-. from Chile, Argentina and Bra- fense Department was ?hus- zil that they be sold similar tling" overseas sales. equipment. 'No Huckstering' For over a decade the State' General Fish replied that Department had a tacit policy there was "no hustling, no' of forbidding the sale of huckstering. Sales will be made, sophisticated weapons to Latin- only if it serves our national, American countries- on the interests and meets a valid mil-, ground thatey were not itary requirement." ,needed there since there was This prompted S ena tot ' no outside threat to the security, Humphrey to ask, "What kind ,of the area. of security do you get out of "It's hard to say no to the' giving something to Haiti, or to requests," said Representative Paraguay?"Lee H. Hamilton, Democrat of I Indiana, who is chairman of a, Yet former officers who havei subcommittee of the House In. "I thought some of the rela- tionships were clearly unethi- cal," he added of the links be- tween the agents for American arms and United States military officers stationed overseas. ? Buyers 'Walk In' NEW YORK TIMES 29 Oct. 1975 French Nuclear Spread = By deCiding to sell South Korea equipment and tech-' nology to produce weapons-grade plutonium;.the explo- sive material. for . atomic. bombs, France has taken man- kind a: long step toward, worldwide spread ..of . nuclear weapons?and ultimate disaster. ? , - For thirty years,. the United States: and other advanced " nuclear countries have refused to .sell, such.:.eqUipment.. ? Then West Germany broke ranks in June by. agreeing to sell Brazil a similar pilot reprocessing plant. - ? Apart from the threat to non-proliferation "palici?and violation ? of the spirit of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation.. Treaty, which 'both West Germany and France have pledged to honor ? the Koreati deal' poses special ? dangers.- Divided Korea is the??tinder box of Asia, with Massive artnies of the Communist North and e? American-backed South facing' each 'other across the .38th Parallel.. North.. Korean ambitions to reunify the country- by :force; as ? was attempted in the . 1950-53 - war,. have been' -re- awakened by AnAiSiSilaaja*oraw South Korean. nucidar move co-in from Indochina; The PAW*: ternational Relations Commit- I lattempt to reach a joint mora- tee that is investigating over-i'torium on arms shipments to ;seas sales. I "I don't take the position "We are told that if we do I 1 the area. . ! that we ought not to have armst_ sales," he added, "but there has not sell arms other nations will I been a disproportionate atten- no so, yet we have never tried to get common agreement, on pad to arms and not to t i " . the economic and political Mr. Kennedy said. "We have s Can the never asked the British, French, aspects of the ales. countries 'afford them? Will the the Scandinavian countries, as sales only spur new demands well s the Soviet Unon for more weapons?" whether they are interested in any kind of moratorium. Better Mousetrap'" One arms expert here said the military cliques "are always looking for a better mousetrap. The Senator said he was par- ticularly irked by the fact that shipments of American-made arms to the Middle East are If one country gets a new being paid for in part by the weapon its neighbor wants it higher prices Americans are too. In t'..e Middle East it 'nay paying for oil, so that "We are be a question of national sur? in effect funding the whole vival, but in Latin America it's arms race in that part of the more a matter of national pride. world." ' There's a macho attitude to- The intent of the Kennedy ward weapons too." emendment would be to force An American representative the Administration to explain for a European munitions corn- what its arms sales policy is, pany, who is based here, said not only in the Middle East hut also elsewhere in the world.' This is basically the aim of a bill introduced by Senator Gay- be buying new weapons. lord Nelson, Democrat of Wis-' "Is it really up to the United' consin, to force the Adminis- States to tell other sovereign' tration to disclose target fig- nations what they may or may' ures on arms sales at the be- not be allowed to buy?" he; ginning of each year. asked. "This is the sort of At present Congress may patronizing that third world na-1 overrule the Administration and tions detest. They want to make: deny the right to export arms their own decisions, and in a: costing over $25-million to a laissez-faire market how can toreign country, but ;t has sel- we say, 'No'?" dom done so. 'Have Never Asked' But the arms lobby both in Congress and the rest of the nation is bound to attacks both measures: A warning about the power lof this group was sounded 14 !years ago by President Eisen- hower during a farewell speech in which ' he offered parting words of advice to the nation. sored by eight other Senators, He spoke of the "grave impli- to suspend arms sales to the cations" of weapons making' Middle East, which is the major that posed a threat to "the very: 'American market. F.tructure of our society." Yet' i Senator Kennedy originally, his warning of the dangers of1 ;had sought to gdad the Ford, rhe "military-industrial.. corn- !Administration into approach- plex" has been all but forgotten ling the Soviet Union in an in the intervening years. the best incentive to the sale of arms is the knowledge that a rival nation is also known to But one attempt is being made to curtail overseas sales. In taking up the foreign as- sistance bill later this month. the Senate will have to consid- er an amendment put forth by Senator Kennedy, Democrat of Massachusetts and co-spon- a Northern attack?or lead to theeven morp nuclear arming of North Korea, stimulating dormant: pressure for nuclear weapons in Japan. The prolonged efforts of American officials to dis- courage France' and West Germany from their nuclear deals undoubtedly would have had a far better chance of success if ? Secretary Kissinger and President Ford, had not over-peisimistically refused to engage their own' personal prestige, and the full influence of the United States, for fear of a profitless crisis with major allies. . After an overly cautious approach to the issue, Secretary of State Kissinger has belatedly underscored the awesome risks, involved, when he told the United Nations General Assembly last month: "The greatest .. single danger of unrestrained nuclear proliferation resides in the spread under national control of reprocessing facilities for .the atomic materials in nuclear- power _ plants." .? ."..? ? ??* ? ?.? ? One urgent need is so step up American efforts to establish multi-national regional nuclear fuel centers. COP-41;01b1717.4614321ftitptyph30ritl_s1 could thus be 37 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1 securely stored for possible future use, if reprocessing' ever becomes safe and commercially feasible. More important Would be:a genuine effort to provide the world with-an assured-..supply_enriched uranium, a far cheaper fuel than plutonium would be. even if the ' breeder reactor proved safe and commercially feasible by the 1990's. Neither this country nor the world can afford further delays in expanding uranium enrichment capacity. : Finally, it is essential that? the United States hold firm in its thirty-year policy of refusing to spread nuclear weapons capability around the world, whatever the French and Germans do now. The pressures undoubtedly will be intense. A. $7.-billion reactor order from Iran- is hung up right now on. Washington's insistenee.-that the. ? site and form -of plutOnium reprocessing, if 'eVer eco-"- ? nomic, be subject to joint agreement. To hold. firm. on. this position and the American refusal to, sell power. reactors to Egypt?unless there is a guarantee that the spent fuel rods will be processed abroad?will be diffi- cult unless a? more vigorous effort is made .to reverse French and West?German policy or, at the very least, to obtain 'assurances that no further such, sales will' be, made. The alternativeis a world of a croieii or More states brandishing their nuclear arsenals within the next . decade; in such a circumstance, .the' threat, of .nuclear holocaust would be.' immeasurable. ? THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, OCTOBER'17, 1975 U.S. Confirms '66 Diego Garcia Deal By JOHN W. FINNEY Spedal to The New York Than WASHINGTON, Oct. 16?The State Department said today that the United States had en- tered into a secret agreement in \ 1966 under which it reduced the cost of the Polaris missile to Britain in return for British establishment of a military base on the island of Diego Carcia in the Indian Ocean. In a report to the Senate, the State Department said the United States had agreed to share the cost of establishing ?the BritishIndian Ocean Terri- tory on a group of islands with the understanding that the territory would be used to meet future defense needs of the two nations. - As its contribution, the Unit-1 NW YORK TIMES 28 Oct. 1975 ed States, according to the re-' military construction bill call- - mg for a complete report by port, agreed to waive some $14-million in research costs that had been charged to Bri- tain in the purchase of the Polaris missile for her nuclear. powered submarines. The agreement also specified that Britain would assume re- sponsibility for removing some of contract laborers with ties 1,000 residents of the Chagos in the Seychelles or Mauritius, Archipelago, of which Diego .and totally dependent on the Garcia is a part. .. ;coconut plantations for their There have been published ,Iiveliho0d. reports in the past that awl "It appeared that most of United States and Brtiain had the inhabitants would accept made such an agreement. The work elsewhere if given the A U.S. Study Finds Mexico the Source For Most of Heroin WASHINGTON, Oct. 27 (UPI) ,?Mexico has replaced Europe as the major source of heroin that is smuggled into the Unit- ed States, according to a Feder- al study released today. During the first six months of this year, 90 per cent of the samples of confiscated her- oin in 13 cities were Mexican. processed, according to an an- alysis of the Drug Enforcement Administration that was re- leased today by Senator Charles H. Percy, Republican of Illinois. In 1972, only 40 per cent of heroin sold on the street was the "Mexican brown" va- riety, so-called because of its impurities. Fort 1973 and 1974. the figures Were 63 and 76 percent. Senator Percy said that the report, which he had requested from the agency "confirms the virtual severing of the 'French connection." Only 2 per cent of confiscated' heroin that was analyzed between January. and June came from Europe or the Middle East, compared with the Administration on steps ta- ken to estabish a military base on Diego Garcia. The report said that the pop- ulation of the Chagos Archipe- lago was "essentially migrato- ry, almost entirely comprised report made public today by Senators John C. Culver, Demo- crat 'of Iowa, and Edward M. t Kennedy, Democrat of Massa- chusetts, was the first official confirmation. Senator Kennedy is the spon- sor of an amendment to ai sible, providing adequate reset- opportunity," the report said. "Thus, the removal of the workers and their families from the Chagos Archpelago?for reasons taat were considered compelling ? seemed at that time both reasonable and fea- 44 per cent in 1972. The film "French Connection" popularized the description of the movement of heroin from poppy fields overseas to Amen- can streets. "In many ways the current situation is more difficult to control than in the days of the now-dormant 'French Con- nection,'" Senator Percy wrote in letters to Secretary of State Kissinger and Attorney General Edward H. Levi. The Senator urged them to take immediate diplomatic action "to dam u this international stream pollut- ed with deadly granules. of brown heroin." Among the 13 cities in which illegal heroin was analyzed by narcotics agents, nine had a greater percentage that came from Mexico in the first six months of this year. three had slightly less and in Chicago all the heroin during both pe- riods came from Mexico. Boston Percentage Greatest In Boston, 100 per cent of the confiscated samples came from Mexico?up from 50 per cent in 1974. In New York,, 83 per cent of the samples were Mexican-processed and 10 per cent were European- processed in the first half of 1975. Last year, 21 per cent of the samples were Mexican and 67 per cent, European. ? 38 tIement funds were made avai;: lable." The British Government in 1973 paid Mauritius $1.4-mil- lion for relief and relocation of the persons removed from the Chagos Archipelago. The report acknowledged that thus far most of the resettlement funds had not been spent by the Mauritius Government. . In separate statements, the two Senators said the report made clear that Defense De- partment officials were dissem- bling when they told Congress earlier this year that Diego Garcia was an unpopulated is- land with no indigenous popu- lation. What Congress was not told, they said, was that the island was unpopulated because the United States had secretly. colluded with Britain to remove the inhabitants. "It is one more classic ex- ample of military objectives; riding roughshod over basic humanitarian consideration,'_1 Senator Culver said. , , Approved I- orReiease200;140g/08-:;GIA-4RDP77;00432R13001003800054 Approved For Release 2001/08108 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010038000-1 Sunday, October 26, 197S THE V/ASPILNGTON POST nc Exec S fry Says nit lotted Murders By Bernard Kaplan seed& to The Washington Post PARIS, Oct. ?During the 1960s the French government eperated a high-level "assassination" committee whose task was to pinpoint enemies of the regime for termination, according_ to a newly published book by a former senior French secret agent.. In ? his book "The Com- mittee," ex-agent Philippe Thiraud De Vosjoii also claims that the De Gaulle government systematically opened foreign embassies' diplomatic mail, including that of the United States. On one occasion during an in- ternational conference in Cannes in 1961, according to De Vosjoli, a French agent entered the hotel room of U.S. Under Secretary of State George Ball in the middle of the night and rifled it for secret documents. Although De Vosjoli's book contains many alleged revelations about the inner workings of France's in- telligence U services, it is principally a defense of a former colleague, Marcel Leroy-Finville, who was cashiered and imprisoned for his supposed involvement in the kidnap-slaying here of a leftist Moroccan politician, -Mehdi Ben Barka, in 1965. The Ben Barka affair erupted into .a major scandal of the De Gaulle regime and led to a diplomatic crisis between France and Morocco. ' THE ECONOMIST OCTOBER 11, 1975 De Vosjoli insists that Leroy-Finville. considered one of the top agents of the French intelligence agency' was actually framed by his own government. ? The real reason for his official disgrace, he says, was his refusal to obey or- ders?emanating from the "Committee" ?to kill a number of French Algerian -dissidents living in exile in Portugal and Spain just after the Algerian war. Leroy-Finville, now in retirement in southern France, backed up De Vosjoli's allegations in a telephone conversation. "Nothing has escaped him," Leroy-Finville said. "He followed my personal tragedy closely." According to the book, the committee consisted of senior intelligence officials and civil servants and was sometimes presided over by the then- prime minister, Georges Pompidou. De Vosjoli im- plicates Pompidou, later president of France, in the Leroy-Finville case, claiming that the orders to kill the French Algerian exiles came from a senior official in the prime minister's office. ? The Committee kept no notes or records, De Vosjoli says. It had a "permanent" list of assassination "os jectives," among them Presidents Sekou Toure of Guinea and Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia, both at the time considered antagonists of Charles De Gaulle. Spanish guide rouge FROM OUR SPAIN CORRESPONDENT Reading his censored newspaper and watching his government-operated box the average Spaniard is left with the impression that Spain's terrorist foes are a hydra-headed lot. In reality only two -serious terrorist groups?Eta and Fran? are now active in Spain. and more than half of their active militants are either in prison or on the safe side of the French or Portuguese frontier. Eta is the Basque separatist organisa- tion which assassinated Admiral Carrero Blanco, General Franco's first prime minister, a little under two years ago. Its name is an acronym standing for Basque Country and Freedom. It began life in 1959 as a mainly C ataqiipmeemp:14 Olt If *De Vosjoli Is to be believed, one successful target of the committee was the Italian state oil tycoon Enrico Mattei. French agents were responsible for sabotaging Mattel's airplane in 1963 because, according to him, France believed he was seeking to oust French oil interests in Algeria. The book offers an ex- ,planation of why Leroy- Finville was abruptly released from prison after four months and never tried. According to De Vosjoli's account, a group of the accused man's former associates, including himself, sent a warning to De Gaulle and .PomPidou that unless he was freed, they would reveal the existence of the special committee. He was released less than a, week later. Ironically, in view of the recent allegations of CIA involvement in foreign assassination plots, De Vosjoli in the mid-1950s was the French intelligence service's liaison man with the American agency. He was fired by De Gaulle for becoming too closely iden- tified with the CIA. Some time afterward, he asserted that the French leader's entourage had been infiltrated by a Soviet agent?an allegation that served as the basis for the plot of the bestselling novel "Topaz" by Leon Uris. While De Gaulle was in power, the novel was banned in France. In the more relaxed at- mosphere under President Valery Giscard d'Estaing, a rejected the moderation of the traditional "bourgeois" Basque nationalist move- ment. In the 1960s Eta drifted to the left, though since its fifth assembly in December, 1968, its doctrinaire marxists have flaked away, in successive schisms, to join ? non-activist trotskyite groups such as the Revolutionary Communist League. Today its most able leaders are dead or in prison, and fewer than 100 experienced militants are still at liberty. The - Revolutionary Anti-Fascist Patriotic Front, or Frap, was founded in the spring of 1973. It is a mainly maoist group, though it is aot thought to be backed by the Chinese embassy in Madrid, whose officials have been at pains to eletilieit2GtOckia81iQliwts Gat- ROB/3134W 39 French edition of "The Committee" is expected to he published here shortly. Meanwhile, a French- language version has ap- peared in Montreal. De Vosjoli says that the diplomatic pouches of vir- tually all foreign embassies in Paris were regularly opened by French agents in the Gaullist era. Agents operated from a specially equipped van at Orly Airport, where the incoming and outgoing diplomatic mail was in- tercepted. They even had the chemistry equipment to reconstitute the fibers of paper that might be inad- vertently torn in the process. American diplomatic mail could not be intercepted in this way because it was invariably carried by State Department couriers. But, says De Vosjoli, French intelligence discovered that copies of most U.S. documents usually were sent to the American em- bassies in neighboring countries under less stringent security. So, according to De Vosjoli, Leroy-Finville set up an organization in Morocco to open U.S. dipliomatic mail there. The burglarizing of Ball's hotel room was ordered after a bugging device failed to pick up enough information, ac- cording to De Vosjoli. That 'operation was, also conducted under Leroy-Finville. He stood poised as at the hotel's fuse box,. ready to plunge it into darkness in case the agent was discovered. He was not, De Vosjoli says, but was able to photograph the contents of ? Ball's briefcase and replace them while the under secretary slept. ? authorities. Frap may, like Eta, have received a little Cuban advice and assistance. It operates mainly in Madrid. Its honorary president was the former Republican foreign minister, Sr Alvarez del Vayo, who died in Geneva last May aged 84. Most of its militants, like Eta's, are students and semi-skilled workers. In July a secret meeting of representatives of Eta, two anarchist groups and some IRA Provisional visitors criticised Frap's "half- hearted attitude to direct action". This may have goaded it into the operations that have recently enabled the police to capture some of its leading militants. Frap has safe houses in Portugal that correspond to Eta's bases in France; but even in Madrid, Barcelona and Valencia, OtOltg. ? ? Osaknow best, it lacks ? vTfill Eta can count on Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1 1 - in the Basque country, and will find it harder than the Basque group to re- organise and resume co-ordinated opera- tions. But even scattered groups of determined terrorists can find sufficient targets to maintain political tension. Other potential activist groups exist but, by comparison with Eta and Frap, their immediate significance is slight. Some belong more to folklore than to politics. In General Franco's native Galicia, whose language is similar to Portuguese, Eta has found an occasional ally in Upga, the small but growing pro- Portuguese and pro-marxist Union of the ' Gallego People. In Catalonia, whose nationalism is at the moment more cul- tural than political, Eta has some admirers but few imitators: the Front for the Liberation of Catalonia is alleged to have carried out a few dozen guerrilla-style actions, including the murder of a civil guard, in the early 1970s, but it now contents itself with issuing leaflets. Spanish anarchists occasionally sur- face violently in groups such as Mil (Iberian Libertarian Movement), Gari (International Revolutionary Action Groups) and 011a (Organisation for the NW YORK TIMES 28 Oct. 1975 Armed Struggle). Some of them have links with the big Spanish libertarian community in and around Toulouse? although, as anarchists dislike organisa- tion, there is little serious co-ordination between them. One unpublicised attempt on General Franco's life, by means of radio-detonated explosives, was prepared and carefully rehearsed by an anarchist cell near Toulouse. Gari, said to consist of five "commando groups", was alleged last year to have tried to kidnap Don Juan de Borbon. the liberal father of General Franco's named successor, Prince Juan Carlos, but has not been heard of lately. Ten Catalans alleged to be members of 011a will soon go on trial in Barcelona: the prosecutor is asking for prison sentences totalling 500 years. The only guerrilla-minded trotskyite group appears to be the ineffective Revolu- tionary Communist party. Most of these groups, and others, are well known to the police. The Spanish security police are the most experienced in western Europe in dealing with political subversion and their reports on opposi- tion movements contain detailed accounts of the opinions and personal habits of -DISSIDENTS ACTIVE with us," one illiSPAttISHFORCES is ? Clandestine Group Warns of ; CMI War if Fascism .Survives 'Franco 4 By MALCOLM W. BROWNE Soerial to The NfVt York Times .a MADRID, Oct. 25?A clan- destine association of Spanish Military officers believes that givil war could follow the Fran- co era "if it becomes apparent that the only alternative is 40 More years of fascism." This view was expressed in :a. meeting arranged outside Madrid by two repesentatives of the underground group known as the Democratic Mill- lary Union. The interview, in Spanish, was understood to be the first the group had ever permitted in Spain proper with /a representative of any foreign .news organization. Extreme precautions were observed in :its arrangements. The two representatives, whose identity was not dis- 'clbsed are both captains in active command of troops. rhey said that the DemoCratic ,Military Union had 900 mem- ber's or supporters in the armed ibrces and was counting on at ?least the sympathy of thou- sands of others. -4 :Me personally know a num- bet of colonels who will be of the captains Active Commands Involved ? ' Although in numbers the group constitutes a small mi- nority of the armed forces, the ?fact .that many of its members are understood to hold active commands?some of them re- portedly sensitive?lends, it im- portance.. "We are all moderates in our goal," one captain said. "Our group does not believe the army should initiate politi- cal change in Spain, or in any, way influence the future demo- cratic political life of the coun- try. Furthermore, we believe in peaceful change and seek ;no confrontations with anyone. ? "But if, after Franco is gone, some new fascist seizes power, someone like Angel Campana, whom Franco appointed as ? commander of the civil guard a few weeks ago, then it would be different. . "In that case, armed confron- tation between various army factions would be likely, if it becomes apparent that the only alternative is 40 more years of fascism." He said that most of Spain's generals would probably op- pose liberal change, adding that "they all owe their careers?in corruptsome cases very careers?to the . present sys- tem." , But younger officers are rap- idly spreading the doctrine of change in their contacts with; fellow officers, he added. Both of the officers spokei contemptuously of Generalissi- mo Francisco Franco and as- serted that "our People will political militants and their families. Even Eta's internal discussions are reported, though with some delay, in detail. Some of this material is supplied by informers, some is obtained by the intimidation and torture of detainees. A source who was recently in contact with an imprisoned Eta militant who goes by the name of "Wilson" (Pedro Perez Beotegui), and was able to observe him during confrontations with other suspects, reports that he appeared crushed and said whatever the police required of him. There are grounds for believing that pseudo-leftist grouplets have on occasion been sponsored by the police?for politi- cal reasons and in order to infiltrate a more important organisation?and that one such grouplet, having obtained advice from Eta and arms from a Mafia supplier, went into business on its own account and carried out an embarrassing opera- tion. As any security man knows, in cir- cumstances like those prevailing in Spain, subversive activities proliferate in direct proportion to the number of manhours devoted to keeping tabs on them. be bathing in Champagne" on hearing of his death. Elections a Goal The two captains interviewed said they were acting as spokesmen for the Democratic Military Union with the knowl- edge of the group's leaders. They said the constitutional succession of Juan Carlos as Chief of State would be suc- cessful only if he quickly brought democracy to the coun- try with the assistance of quali- fied civilian political figures. The dissident group calls for the convocation of a constit- uent assembly to write a new national constitution, which would guarantee a referendumF to determine the future form' of government and subsequent free elections. The group's manifesto has' also demanded immediate re- lease of all political prisoners, "redistribution of wealth," the right of workers to organize' and strike, and other social changes. "We are in contact with every political party in Spain," one of the officers said, "in- cluding the Communist party. But I can tell you that we are not Communists, and we neither advocate nor imagine possible the kind of situation that has developed In Portugal. We also insist that in the fu-1 ture, the army be controlled completely by a democratically elected civilian government." He added: "Every possible political tendency from conserv- ative to far left is represented among us, but we ail agree, on the basic aims." The two army career men, 40 said that in recent years young- er men, "mainly from the new Spanish industrial bourgeoisie like ourselves, were coning out of the military academies, 400 of them a year." "Most of us," he said. "fit into the age bracket of 30 to 45 years old. Instead of wasting all our spare time we have been studying, studying everything, not only military subjects. "The effect was to open our doors to new ideas, and those ideas are antifascist in es- sence." Arrests Last Year ? The first of the dissident officers got into trouble and were arrested in September last year, they said. Since, others have been arrested, and many reecived such "nonjudicial" pun- ishment as pay reductions. One of the dissidents sharply criticized the United States for its friendly relations with the Franco regime. He said the officers realized that Washington had a vested interest in Spain because of its need for military bases. "But there were thousands of ways Washington could have brought pressure on Franco to liberalize the government, with- out actually breaking with him," he said. "Washington never seemed willing to capital- ize on the fact that Franco needed American aid and friendship at least is much as Washington needed those bases." "We hOpe America will change its policy in the critical time ahead, and choose the? right side in Spain while there is still a choice open to Wash- ington." Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000106380005-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1 "THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY ,.00TOBER 24, 1975. Egypt's Top Editor Attacks Sinai Pact And Says a War Is 'Highly Probable' By BERNARD GWERTZMAN ' Special to pie New yorii: Times WASHINGTON, Oct. 23? Egypt's best-known journalist has come to Washington to make clear his view that ? President Anwar el-Sadat's agrement with Israel were "a tragic mistake" and that a new Middle East war was ? highly probably. Mohammed Hassanein Hey- kal, sitting in his room at the Madison Hotel this morn.- mg, was his usual provoca- tive, garrulous self, seemingly unconcerned about the effect his jabs at Mr. Sadat's policies might have only three days before the Egyptian President arrives for a 10-day visit. ? Once regarded as , the spokesman for the Egyptian Government, Mr. Haykal in the last two years has be- come a sharp critic of Mr. Sadat's policies, although he .has been permitted to travel widely and publish his views outside Egypt. Mr. Haykal . has been in this country for 10 days. He said his visit was not connected with Mr. Sadat's trip. ? Discusing the Sinai agree- ments, Mr. Heykal said they were "nothing, worse than nothing." He said they "divided the Arab world, which is a horrible thing" and made the Soviet Union' more mischievous. New Class Emerging - Even mere damaging to Mr. Sadat's image on the eve of his visit here was Mr. Heykal'S description of Egyp- tian society today. He said: "You have seen how many new cars there are in Cairo; a new class is emerging." "Some people from the West and from here think this is a healthy sign," he said, gesturing with his ex- pensive Corona. "This is not a middle class emerging, un- fortunately. This is a pare- site class emerging." These, he said. are "para- sitical elements, who are liv- ing on parasitic activities, black-marketeering, illegal trade, commissions, bribery sometimes, and it is creating a very high . pattern of con- sumption, vulgar consump- tion, and a very difficult strain economically and so- cially." "Where is the ordinary man?" he asked. "What is he getting in all this he asked, "in the form of services, pro- duction, wages?" The implied answer was very little. Confident of Nasser The 52-year-old' Mr. Heykal has been Egypt's best-known journalist for two decades. He was a close political con- fidant of the late Gamal Ab- del Nasser, who made him head' of Al Abram, Cairo's leading morning paper and publishing house. He wrote a weekly column, "Speaking Frankly." that was widely read throughout the Arab world and in foreign capitals as an authoritative insight into Mr. Nasser's thinking. Mr, Nasser also ap- pointed him as Minister for National Guidance, in effect the official Government spokesman. After Mr. Nasser's death on Sept. 28, 1970, Mr. Heykal remained at his journalistic posts under Mr. Sadat. But his criticism of Mr. Sadat's interim accord with Israel .ii January, 1974, led to his de- parture from Al Abram, al- though he continued to draw his $500-a-month salary until last week when, in another rift with Mr. Sadat, he was dismissed altogether. Explaining the reasons for his break with Mr. Sadat in 1974. Mr. Heykal said this morning that he thought in the aftermath of the October, 1973, war, that "we had the historical moment for a real agreement." 'A Moment in History' "Why?" he asked himself aloud. "For one simple pys- choloaical ' reason. After October. T thought there is a moment in history when the psychology of all parties was reedy. I thought simply that the Arabs to a certain extent were cured, not corn- pletely cured, cured from their inferiority complex and the Israelis were more or less cured from their super- iority complex and the American element was there. The Agreement of the super-. powers was there for the first time and there was a certain sort of Arab unity. These elements are very necessary for an agreement." But, he said, by going for a limited Israeli-Egyptian . accord, "I think we destroyed most of the 'chances; instead e of pushing to a real settle- ment. we left all the real is- sues aside." "I expressed these views strongly and the President thought they were embar- rassing to him," Mr. Heykal said. . As a result, he was forced to give up his editorship and - column in Al Ahram. Mr: Sadat, he said, "asked me to be his press adviser, . and I apologized; he asked 'me to be his political adviser, . and I apologized; and lately, he asked me to, be deputy , prime minister for informa- tion and then director of his. office for political affairs. And I said 'No.' :This is not my job." "I told the President I want to be a friend and help as much as I can but I don't Want to accept a governmen- -tal post and I prefer to keep my freedom as a writer," Mr. Heykal said. Mr. Heykal said that Mr. ? Sadat was coming here in part to seek a vast amount of arms from the United States, but he said he doubted that,the United States would give- the President anything substantial. When asked for, an alter- native to the current step- by-Step diplomatic approach ' on the Middle East, Mr. Hey-! kal had no easy solution. At one point he said that such accords were a mistake, but then he said the Syrians and Palestinians had 'to get "something." "We are moving, but sub- stituting motion for pro- gress," he said. Asked whether this didn't mean the prospects were very grim, he said he saw "no other probability" but war. Noteonly was the chance of war great, he said, but the Arab world, including Egypt, was liable to a social, class explosion similar to what he ? Lebanon. The conflict there, he said, the result of differ- ences between Christians and Moslems bet but between the rich and the poor. At. the moment Mr. Haykal writes a column from Cairo thas is syndicated in Beirut, But most of the money that allows him to wear expen- sive suits and smoke expen- sive cigaes ecenes from royal- ties from his books and. art- icles published in the West. On the coffee table was his latest book, "Road to Ramadan," about the October war, being published in this country by Quadrangle Books. Mr. Heykal said he had been invited to adress the. - annual meeting of Arab grad- uates of American universi- ties last 'week, in Chicago and was just passing through Wahington. but while here - he was seeing many impor- tant people. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-9P77-00432R000100380005-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1 NEll YORK TIMES 26 Oct. 1975 U.S. Turns Cheek and ? Checkbook To Zaire By COLIN LEGUM United States policy is once again focusing more sharply on Zaire, the former Belgian Congo, which became synonymous with chaos after its ill-prepared independence irt 1960. Secretary of State Kissinger is urging on a reluctant Congress the importance of voting $60-million of emergency aid to the regime of President Sese Seko Mobutu, who was helped to power by United States policy but who nevertheless expelled the United States Ambassador last June after alleging that the Central Intelligence Agency was behind an attempted military coup. General Mobutu would appear to be an unthankful and unpredictable ally; why is Mr. Kissinger, who has shown so little interest in African affairs, trying to persuade Congress to enlarge the United States role in Zaire? The answer is that more than 15 years after the United States- first began to assert a major role in the Congo region of Equatorial Africa, Washington's evaluation of its interests in' Africa has not changed very much. In the late fifties and early sixties, Washington decided that the precipitate withdrawal of Belgian / colonial rule from the Congo threatened to open the immensely rich heart of Africa to the Communist powers. The United States saw the first Prime Min- ister of the Congo, Patrice Lumumba, as a possible vehicle for the Russians. Washington intervened to help the President, Joseph Kasavubu, and, later, the young army leader, Colonel Mobutu, to oust Mr. Lumumba. Recently, a former top scientist for the Central Intelligence Agency, -Sidney Gottlieb, told a Senate committee that a dose of lethal poison was shipped 'to the Congo intended for the assassination of Mr. . Lumumba, who was killed by his enemies before the agency's agents could put their plan into effect. Mr. Mobutu's control over his army was finally established through the joint support of the Ameri- cans, the Belgians and the Israelis. Through his dynamic, and authoritarian, rule he brought the country back from economic ruin and anarchy. The country's enormous wealth, which had previously ? been monopolized by the Belgians, was thrown open to other foreign investors as well. By the end of ' 1973 United States private investment had reached $100-million, with a further $100-million in the pipe- ? line. Bilateral aid totaled $500-million between 1960 and 1973, second only to Belgian official aid. However, as his power increased, Mr. Mobutu began to chafe at his reputation of being so closely tied to Washington. His natural xenophobic tendencies. assumed strong nationalistic overtones at home. In ? his foreign relations he decided to repair his broken- bridges with Moscow and, especialy, with .Peking. This realignment demanded that he should also , 1 1. i? V. adopt a more critical attitude toward United States policies in Africa. When Mr. Kissinger earlier this year replaced Donald Easum as Assistant Secretary of State in the Africa Bureau with the former Chilean Ambassador, Nathaniel Davies, President Mobutu took the lead in criticizing the change. Mr. Davies recently resigned the Africa post, largely because Mr. Mobutu refused to admit him into Zaire. ? These developments occurred at a time when the emergence to independence of Zaire's neighbor, the. Portuguese colony of Angola, again threatens the peace. Washington decision-makers see in Angola a close. parallel to.`the earlier situation in the Congo at the end of Belgian rule. . In Angola, too; three rival movements were vying for power. One of the groups, the Movement for Popular Liberation of Angola, led by Agostinho Neto, has many similarities to the Lumumba movement.. As was true of the Congo, Angola is a desirable and wealthy trading ally; and, strategically, its govern- ment can expect to wield considerable influence in the area. ? ? The interests of the United States and Mr. Mobutu appear once again to coincide, since the Zaire leader is also bitterly opposed to the Neto organization, and to a possible Russian-influenced neighbor. ; Mr. ?Mobutu has backed the rival Front for the National Liberation of Angola and, to a lesser de- gree, the Union for the Total National Independence of Angola. Zaire also hopes to get control over the !oil-rich enclave of Cabinda, whose fields Are worked plainly by United States multinationals. The Threat of Civil War However, the Neto movement has successfully en- trenched itself in the capital of Luanda and the rival. movements have promised to fight back. The pros- pects are that when independence comes on Nov. 11 there will be a civil war. Zaire needs United States military aid to back up the national front, and the United States needs Zaire as a channel for its sub rosa support for the anti-Soviet movement. '?? 'However, the fall in the price' of copper' has plunged Mr. Mobutu's economy into deep trouble. To survive politically he needs Washington's help: thus Mr. Kissinger's request to Congress for emergency *id. The American identification with , Mr. Mobutu means the United States can expect to find itself in conflict with the Organization for African Unity and with many influential African leaders who back the pro-Soviet movement: There are at least two lessons in this history of U.S.-Zaire relations: . ? So long as Washington believes it has an interest in blocking what it sees as Russian-backed govern- ments from coming to power in strategic areas like Aifgola or Zaire, the United States is bound to be- come a party to escalating foreign entanglements. ? While leaders of developing countries welcome the aid of the major foreign powers while such leaders are engaged in a struggle for power, they always end up deeply resentful of a too-heavy de- pendence on their supporters once the leaders have power. A key, and unanswerable, question is whether the big powers serve their own best interests by deep involvement in such struggles. As long as any one of the super-powers elects to play a leading role in such situations, the others, under present condi- tions, are almost certain to react. Colin Legum is associate editor of The Observer of London and editor of The Africa Contemporary Record. ? 1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1 Monday,October20,1975 N THE WASHINGTON POST Tribesmen Still Fight Pathet ao By Lewis M. Simons Washington Post Foreign Service VIENTIANE, Oct:- 19?Thousands of Laotian tribal guerrillas, many of whom fought for years as U.S. Central Intelligence Agency mercenaries, are staging an intensive armed struggle against the Communist Pathet Lao. Confirmed by a ranking: Pathet Lao government of-, ficial here, the fighting is- going on northeast of Vien- tiane in the Long Tieng Valley, until just six months ago the stronghold of Brig. Gen. Vang' Pao, the CIA-backed Mei), leader. The struggle, described as a "sizable insurrection" by Western military sources and "scattered fighting" by a Foreign Ministry official, is the only known serious resistance to the gentle Pathet Lao revolution that has swept the Communists into power since last spring. The guerrillas are members of the Meo _tribe, a fiercely independent people spread ? across the mountainous regions of Laos, North Viet- nam, -Thailand and southern, China. ` 'Growers and heavy users of opium, the Meo are most easily 'recognized by the distinctive, colorfully em- broidered black dresses and pendulous silver jewelry of their women. The name "Meo," applied to them by the 'Chinese centuries ago, is despised by the tribesmen, who refer to themselves as Sunday, October 19, 1975 Hmong. There are some 200,000 Meo among Laos' three million people. Armed by the CIA, the Meo reportedly have salted away huge stocks of arms and ammunition. According, to one informed Western source, "They've got enough to let them carry on the fight at this rate for a least a few years." - There have been no claims by the Pathet Lao that the CIA is continuing to support the, Meo. However, Meo sources hint that ,they are receiving food and medical supplies from neighboring Thailand. These sources suggest that Thai air force pilots, possibly acting on their own without the knowledge of their com- manders in Bangkok, are making air drops to them. Asked about this, a senior Pathet ,Lao government of- ficial said he knew nothing of such supply drops. If the Meo claims were substantiated, they could seriously aggravate the already strained relations between the new Pathet Lao leadership and the government of Thai Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj. Kukrit, whose multi-faceted coalition government is none too steady, is striving to im- prove relations with his Communist neighbors in Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. He admitted recently that he was limiting Meo refugees in Thailand to meager rations in an effort to drive them back to Laos. The Meo, -some 35,000 of whom have taken refuge in Thailand, openly express their hopes that Kukrit will be overthrown by a military coup. A Thai military -government, the tribesmen believe, would come to their assistance against the Pathet Lao. With travel by journalists and non-communist TheWashiiigton Star -diplomatie observers sharply restricted, there is little first- hand information available on the extent of the Meo in- surrection. According to a top Pathet Lao official, the fighting is "small-scale." The official, respected by Western diplomats as one of the most powerful Pathet Lao figures in Vientiane, said a number of former followers of yang Pao were "attempting to subvert" the Pathet Lao revolution by "stealing from villages" in scattered areas of the territory known as Military Region II. "Villagers and soldiers of .the Lao People's Liberation Army are collaborating to smash these small, scattered :groups," the official said. Western military -sources claim that the insurrection is far more widespread and serious. "Not a night goes by without a major firefight between the Meo and the Pathet Lao," said one source, who based his information on reports from Meo tribesmen who recently traveled from Long Tieng to Vientiane. This source claimed that some 5,000 Meo are engaged in the struggle. They are said to be armed with CIA-supplied M-16 rifles and M-79 grenade launchers as well as Chinese- and Soviet-built AK-47 assault rifles captured over the years from Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese troops. The Meo are reportedly operating in small raiding parties, striking at Pathet Lao units only at night, and claiming heavy casualties among the Communist troops. A number of Western sources claim that the Pethet Lao are receiving armed support from elements of North Vietnamese army units that have remained in Laos since the end of the fighting in Indochina. Pathet Lao officials deny the specific claim of North Vietnamese assistance against the Meo as well as the widely held general allegation that some 40,000 North- Vietnamese army regulars are spread throughout Laos. According to Western sources who had been in the Long Tieng Valley area when the Pathet Lao took control of the country away from the right-wing elements of the Laotian coalition government, the Pathet Lao are unable to guarantee security in the region. The insurrection flared up - soon after the Pathet Lao revolution took root throughout the country, these sources said: According to one Westerner who lived among the Meo for' several years, the trouble is directly traceable to yang Pao. This source noted that the Meo have been split into pro- and anti-Communist elements since the French Indochina war in the 1940s and 1950s. Following the Vientiane peace agreement of 1973, mixed teams of Pathet Lao and rightist government census takers began a survey of displaced persons throughout Laos. In most parts of the country, the census had the side effect of showing villagers that Pathet Lao and rightists could work together in peace. "But Vang ,Pao sealed off the second military region from the census," the source said, "and the effect was that the rightist Meo continued to live in fear of the Pathet Lao and the pro-Communist Meo. Those who didn't follow yang Pao to Thailand felt they had no choice but to fight for their lives." By Henry S. Bradsher Washington Star Staff Writer . The U. S. Embassy in Saigon chose to believe Communist assurances that a truce would be arranged last April, rather than its own intelli- gence reports that the North Viet- namese intended to capture the city, according to official sources. This acceptance of what appears to have been a deliberate Communist deception was a major element in the embassy's failure to make adequate preparations for the evacuation. Thousands of Vietnamese who had been promised that they would be taken out, as well as dozens of Ameri- cans, were left behind. 432R000400080008e1. which seemed to originate in Hanoi. said that the '143 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1 United States would be' 'giVen a chance for an orderly withdrawal from Vietnam during a halt in fight- ing. THE MESSAGE came through the Hungarian and Polish delegations, to the International Commission of Con- trol and Supervision (ICCS), which '._was created by the ineffective 1973 Vietnam cease-fire agreement. At- tempts to confirm it through the Sovi- et Union yielded ambiguous answers that were taken by many officials as confirmation. Officials in Washington made final preparations for a helicopter evacua- tion of Saigon on the basis of the intelligence reports. But they also gave some credence to the assur- ances, if not so much as Ambassador Graham A. Martin in Saigon did. . Secretary of State Henry A. Kiss- - inger said when the evacuation ended that until 24 hours before it started, "We thought there was some consid- erable hope that the North Vietnamese would not seek a solution by purely military means . . .We thought a negotiated solution in the next few days was highly probable." But then, "The North Vietnamese ..'obviously changed signals," Kissing- er said. Intelligence reports showed, how- ever,*that there was no change of sig- nals. The Communists never intended to make any kind of deal. Those re- ports were substantiated by independent means more than a week before the final attack on Saigon and have since been verified by Commu- nist statements. THE PICTURE which emerges from a lengthy investigation of the last days of an American presence in -South Vietnam is one of confusion compounded by wishful thinking. Martin in Saigon as well as officials in Washington wanted to believe that the assurances of a dignified, arrang- ed ending were true. Martin was so convinced that right up to the final air raid and rocket at- - tacks on Saigon, he was operating as if the war was about to halt. . Even after the 4-am. bombard- ment of Tan Son Nhut air base on the outskirts of Saigon which triggered the evacuation order from Washing- ton, Martin told members of his staff that he could not understand what went wrong. ?" But all along, reports from intelli- gence agents of proven veracity had . said the Communist high command intended to smash Saigon militarily. It planned to destroy any vestige of the Nguyen Van Thieu regime, rather . than making any sort of deal with it or with the Americans whom the ? Communists linked with Thieu in undifferentiated hatred. The confusion which surrounded the last American days was the kind of failure of intelligence evaluation ? not collection, because the .raw material was there ? which had occurred many .times earlier in the Vietnam and Cambodian wars. This time it had the excuse of the Communist deception about intentions. 44 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380095-1 THE ROLE of the Hun- garians and Poles is un- clear. It is impossible to learn whether they were de- ceived themselves by the Vietnamese Communists into thinking a deal might be arranged, or were in- formed parties to a plan to throw U. S. officials off bal- ance by putting out a false story. Some Americans who were involved in the high- level exchanges during the last few weeks of April be- lieve the- two Communist delegations were in on the plan. They also believe that the Soviet Union was a Party to deceit, although several senior officials re- fuse to accept this. ? Despite the initial furor in this country after the Sai- gon evacuation left many persons behind, there has been little public discussion of what happened. This suits the Ford administra- tion. There. has been a strong official desire just to forget about the whole mess. . President Ford set the tone at a news conference May 6, a week after the evacuation of Saigon ended. He was asked if he would welcome "a congressional inquiry into how we got in and how we got out of Viet- nam." "It would be unfortunate for us to rehash" what hap- pened, Ford replied. "I think a congressional in- quiry at this time would only be divisive and not helpful . . .The lessons of the past in Vietnam have al- ready been learned.., and we should have our focus on the future." - THERE HAVE BEEN half-hearted congressional attempts to probe the last days. Up to now they have been fended off by the una- vailability of Martin, who has been ill, but now he has recovered and is on leave while the administration tries to figure out what to do with him. Other officials who were in Saigon at the end have been dispersed to other jobs. The State Department and the Agency for Interna- tional Development say they wanted to get them set- tled in new jobs, but there is a strong suspicion among many officials that Kissing- er wanted to separate them in order to prevent too much comparing of recol- lections and mutterings about the way things were handled. The sequence of events which led to the American retreat from Saigon has no clear starting point. The 1968 Tet offensive might be one point, since it caused the halt of continuing U.S. escalation of the war. But the final phase started last ?January in Phuoc Long Province along the Cambo- dian border north of Saigon. What the Communists called "the People's Libera- tion Armed Forces" (PLAF), and were in fact North Vietnamese Army (NVA) units with some sup- port from troops raised in- side South Vietnam, launch- ed an offensive in Phuoc Long about New Year's Day. They encountered lit- tle resistance. Martin had been arguing that the reduction of U. S. military aid for South Viet- nam had so weakened the southern army that it was unable to hold outlying areas. Ford asked Congress in January for a $300 mil- lion supplement to the $700 million already appropriat- ed for military aid in the fis- cal year ending last June 30. WHATEVER THE rea- son for the loss of Phuoc Long ? and some observers have argued that it was cor- ruption and a lack of will, rather than a shortage of American aid, which caus- ed the Vietnamese army to fight poorly ? the Commu- nists drew important con- clusions. They stepped up the flow of troops and supplies southward, adding to a fighting strength and logis- tical base that had been built up as part of both sides' violations of the 1973 Paris Agreement. Hanoi de- cided that it would strike at other provinces on the bor- der of Cambodia, where adjacent regions were being used as NVA staging areas. An offensive began March 5 in the Central Highlands, which run along the western side of central South Vietnam. Ban Me Thuot fell five days later. In a panicky decision made without considering all its ramifications or 'consulting the United States, President Thieu decided to shorten his logistical lines and reduce his battlefront by withdraw- ing troops from the high- lands. Inadequately prepared and incompletely executed, that withdrawal touched off a general collapse in the northern and central re- gions. On March 26 the psychologically important old imperial capital of Hue fell to the NVA almost with- out a fight, and on March 29 Communists took over South Vietnam's second- largest city, Danang. The Communists then de- cided to finish the war by capturing Saigon, not by ne- gotiating from their new , position of strength. fense minister, Vo Nguyen Giap, and its army chief of staff, Van Tien Dung, pub- . lished an article jointly in the four main Hanoi publi- cations on June 30 recount- ing how the final victory was achieved. They made it clear that the Communists had never had any intention of making a deal. After the collapse in the highlands and the Hue-Da nang area, they wrote, "the time was ripe for our armed forces and people.. .striking directly at the enemy's last lair in Saigon, completely annihilating the puppet army, totally overthrowing the puppet administration and achie,-iag complete victory "By late March, when the Huabattle was going to end in victory, we had already officially taken the decision to launch a historic cam- paign of decisive significance . . .bearing the name of the great Presi- dent Ho Chi Minh." This article in effect con- firmed that the leadership in Hanoi had always consid- ered Vietnam as one entity, despite the 1954 division of the country, and was in command of both parts while using the PLAF as a fiction to obscure its con- trol. Western analysts have generally felt that the Viet Cong's National' Liberation Front (NLF) had a signifi- cant southern appeal but was ultimately a creation of the unified leadership of northerners and southern- ers in Hanoi. The Far Eastern Eco- nomic Review, a weekly news magazine published in Hong Kong, carried on Aug. 8 an interview with the chairman of the NLF's cen- tral committee presidium, Nguyen Huu Tho. Although he was a figurehead whose insignificance has been emphasized by his invisibil- ity since the fall of Saigon, Tho's account added de- tails. "BY ABOUT THE begin- ning of the last week of March, the determination to launch the historic campaign . . .was official- ly laid down," Tho said. He did not mention who laid it down, since that would have exposed Hanoi's control. "At that time, we defi- nitely reaffirmed that the total collapse of the puppet army and administration was unavoidable: the United States was com- pletely incapable of rescu- ing their agents in Saigon," Tho said. American analysts noted Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001'00380005-1 that in early -April the NLF's Liberation Radio stopped referring to the Paris Agreement's provi- sion for the establishment of a three-part National Council of National Recon- ciliation and Concord of Thieu representatives, Communists and so-called neutralists as a transition away from the Thieu re- gime. The radio had been using Thieu's reluctance to agree to this as a propagan- da weapon, but the signifi- cance of its being dropped was not appreciated at the time. In fact, the Communists had decided to abandon a negotiated settlement as an unnecessary encumbrance now that total victory was in sight. The Paris Agree-: ment, which was nibbled to death by both Hanoi and Saigon, had been ignored on one more section. Within two weeks'of the Communist decision, word on it had filtered through to the Central Intelligence Ag- ency's offices on the sixth floor of the U. S. Embassy in Saigon. ? THE INFORMATION came from what Americans called the Communists' -Central Office for South -Vietnam, or COSVN. This was the elusively mobile military and political head- quarters for the war in the southern part of South Viet- nam which U S. troops had tried unsuccessfully to cap- ture in the May 1970 invasion of Cambodia. COSVN was directed by Pham Hung, a member of the politburo of the Lao Dong Party the Commu- nist organization based in Hanoi that rules Vietnam? who outranked even Gen. Giap. Since the fall of Sai- gon, Pham Hung has emerged as the man in charge of South Vietnam, taking precedence in offi- cial lists over Tho and lead- ers of the apparently powerless Provisional Revolutionary Government ' (PRG). - Contrary to recent con- gressional testimony about a lack of American intelli- gence agents inside the Viet Cong apparatus, the CIA re- ceived occasional reports from within COSVN. Over the years, these reports had repeatedly been proven accurate. The first report on the ate-March decision to smash over Saigon was brief. Coming at a time of rapid developments and numerous intelligence re- ports of varying degrees of reliability, it seems not to have gotten much attention in either the Saigo*PPTAY-ed sy or in Washington. ? A FACTOR contributing to this neglect was the mes- sage which the Hungarians and Poles were beginning to whisper in American ears. When the ICCS was set up in 1973 supposedly to insure respect for the ceasefire agreement, it was generally assumed by Westerners that delegates from the two East European countries would be sympathetic to the Vietnamese Communists while the other two ele- ments, Canadians and In- donesians, would be more neutral or even sympathetic to Saigon's problems. Cana- da quit the commission when it became impossible to overcome Communist ob- struction and do a meaning- ful supervision job, being replaced by Iran. With the ICCS moribund, the Hungarians and Poles took on a new role of inter- mediaries, passing mes- sages between the Commu- nists and Americans. The Hungarians in particular came to be briefed regular- ly on April's rapid develop- ments by the CIA station chief, Thomas Polgar, who is of Hungarian origin. This relationship seemed to have developed because of Washington's desire to get word through to the Vietnamese Communists that would avoid any misun- derstanding of U. S. inten- tions. The Far Eastern Eco- nomic Review quoted an official in Hanoi in another Aug. 8 article as saying, "The question we had to deal with was whether the United States could dis- patch troops for the second time." . WHATEVER THE rea- son, the Hungarians "were being told far more than they (U. S. officials in Sai- gon) were telling anyone else at that point," accord- ing to one source. The message -which the Hungarian and Polish ICCS delegations gave Polgar was that it would be possi- ble to arrange a truce for the purpose of an orderly evacuation of Americans and some South Viet- namese. A safe corridor from Saigon to the South China Sea for the overland movement of refugees to Vung Tau or some other seaport was mentioned The message also con- tained or implied ? it is not clear which one ? that the Communists would negoti- ate an end of the war with some acceptable adminis- tration in Saigon. That meant somone other than Thieu with the _preference Eptrt e4V MigafPaga Minh, the general known '-'from his large stature for a Vietnamese as "Big Minh." He had been a weak and ineffectual South Viet- namese chief of state for 14 months after President Ngo Dinh Diem was overthrown and murdered in November 1963. The French embassy in Saigon was active behind the scenes at the same time. Ambassador Jean-Marie Merillon was told by his contacts that the Commu- nists were willing to com- promise an end to the war with Minh, once Thieu was removed from power. This information supported the Hungarian and Polish mes- sage and seemed to confirm it. The military situation was looking desperate as NVA troops closed in on the Saigon area. On April 10, Ford asked Congress for an emergency allocation of $722 million in arms aid to Saigon, plus $250 million as an "initial" amount of eco- nomic and humanitarian aid. This was presented as a possibility of saving South Vietnam, although Kissing- er conceded later a lesser goal which he had only implied at the time. THE COURSE then being pursued, Kissinger said April 29, "was designed to save the Americans still in Vietnam and the maximum number of Vietnamese lives, should the worst come to pass." The prospects for salvaging the military situation even with massive new aid were "somewhat less than 50-50," he added. But there were hopes of negotiating an orderly end- ing. Then on April 17 the CIA received a more detailed account of the late-March decision. A source in COSVN reported that there definitely would not be any truce or negotiations with any governmental entity in Saigon, whether headed by Minh or anyone else. Instead, the report said, plans were being made to attack Saigon as soon as preparations were com- pleted and to capture it. de- stroying any semblance of organized opposition to Communist rule. One detail offered to substantiate this was that radar units were being put on Black Virgin Mountain to direct captured American-made planes for an attack on Tan Son Nhut. Black Virgin Mountain is a volcanic cone that rises 3,235 feet above the Mekong River plain 55 miles north- northwest of Saigon. A site for American cornmunica- CM*8307-srainttoctitloo war, it ha een capture )45 ? 657 NVA troops on Jan. 9. . Within two days after the COSVN report was re- ceived, photc reconnais- sance had confirmed that radar was being emplaced on the mountain. But de- spite this and the very high ? rating given the report's probable reliability, it got a mixed reception in Saigon and Washington. THE MILITARY reaction was quick. The U. S. Navy and civil- ian American vessels had been on alert in the South China Sea since Ford mobi- lized ships for the evacua- tion of Danang and other coastal towns at the end of March. A higher stage of alert for an emergency evacuation of Americans from Saigon by helicopter was put into effect April 18 as a result of the new intel- ligence. The U. S. aircraft carrier Enterprise sailed into Mani- la harbor April 18 for an an- nounced five-day visit. It abruptly left a few hours later. The carrier Hancock, which had arrived at Singa- pore April 16 for a sched- uled seven-day visit, also sailed April 18. All over East Asian waters, Navy ships were marshalled for impending collapse in Sai- gon, with most of them arriving off the South Viet- namese coast between April 19 and 21. The State Department sent a cable to Ambassador Martin which seems to have, been triggered by the intel- ligence, although this con- nection cannot be confirm- ed. It asked him about evacuation plans. EVERY U. S. embassy in a hazardous situation is ?supposed to have an up-to- date plan to evacuate embassy personnel and other Americans. But the' Saigon plan was out of date and inadequate to the situa- tion in mid-April. Martin had always taken the atti- tude that Thieu's regime would last indefinitely, and therefore his subordinates ? most of them hand-pick- ed for loyalty rather than competence.? had not been pressed to follow State De- partment regulations on this. Some administrative divi- sions of the huge embassy had been asked to turn in lists not only of Americans but also of Vietnamese whose lives might be in dan- ger if the Communists took over and therefore should be evacuated. These were tossed into a box and when 01944ion finally fell r`f They could not be Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1 found in the panicky chaos of embasssy administra- tion. Martin's answer to the State Department's query ' was that he had no plan to evacuate local Vietnamese employes because there were too many of them and besides an evacuation would induce panic in Sai- gon, possibly causing Thieu to fall. At the same time, Martin's deputy, Wolfgang J. Lehmann, was telling embasssy division heads at staff meetings that plans were being made to take care of their high-risk em- ployes, for whom many of the other diplomats felt great personal responsibil- ity. One officer in the embas- sy says flatly that Martin lied to some embassy per- sonnel about evacuation ? plans, but others report only evasions. U. S. Air Force planes were evacuating some per- sons from Saigon at the ? time. They were mostly em- ployes of the U. S. Army, while others were waiting for further word from the embassy. KISSINGER CABLED back after getting Martin's answer, saying it was inadequate. Under pressure from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and other congressional units, the secretary of state asked Martin to speed up the reduction of airplane evacu- ations so the number of per- sons who might need to be lifted out by helicopter would be manageable. But Martin felt no great urgency. On the basis of the Hungarian and Polish mes- sage, he did not think a heli- copter lift would be neces- sary. The evaluation in Washington was complex. Every morning a number of groups met around town to review the latest develop- ments, and late every after- noon a meeting was con- vened at the State Department. Chaired by Philip C. Habib, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, it was attended Most of the time by Kissinger's No. 2 man, Deputy Secretary Robert S. Ingersoll. Representatives of State, the National Security Coun- cil, the Pentagon, the CIA and other branches of gov- ernment met with Habib to try to make plans. But they were almost overwhelmed by the mass of sometimes conflicting and often confu- sion reports, according to one participant in the meet- ings. Commenting on the April 17 report from COSVN, this source said that the CIA usually failed to indicate clearly which reports out of a mass of intelligence de- served more credence than others. A desire to protect ? CIA agents obscured the fact that this particular re- port came directly from COSVN, the source added. APPARENTLY reflect- ing the intelligence, Ford said in an interview April 21 that he had the impression in the previous few days that Hanoi was seeking a The Washington Star Monday, October 20, 1975 MOSCOW a Party to Deceit' ri Last Iays of Saigon? By Henry S. Bradsher Washington Star Staff Writer With the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) massing troops around Sai- gon late last April, the United States did not know whether to expect the ? city to be overrun militarily ? forc- ing an emergency helicopter evacua- tion of remaining Americans ? or an imposed but peaceful ending that I would establish Communist predomi- . twice while permitting an orderly . U.S. withdrawal. The situation was confused, the evidence conflicting. On April 21, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger said that the Ford administration was seeking a "controlled situation" which permit a negotiated end to the long war and an orderly transition from the regime of President Nguyen Van Thieu, who resigned that day, to Communist control. ? "Various negotiating efforts are going on," Kissinger added, "but it would be inappropriate for me to dis- ? cuss them at this moment." ONE CHANNEL was through the French ambassador in Saigon, Jean- Marie Merillon. Heplayed a key role in convincing Thieu to resign be- cause of Merillon's understanding from Communist contacts that with Thieu removed it might or would be possible to reach a compromise. peace arrangement. But more important was the word from Hungarian rand Polish delegates on the International Commission ,of Control and Supervision (Second of two articles). (ICCS), established by the moribund Paris cease-fire agreement of January 1973. They were telling the U.S. Embassy in Saigon that a deal was possible. It would include a truce and a corn-- dor to the sea for the evacu- ation of Americans and .some Vietnamese. On the other hand, the Saigon station of the CIA had received reports from agents of proven reliability ,in the Communists' Central Office for South Vietnam, or COSVN, which were con- 'tradictory. A report of April 17 in particular said that in late March the Communists ?,,had decided not to compro- mise ? that, instead, they would overrun Saigon and ,smash any semblance of organized resistance. A detail of that report added that radar was being put on Black Virgin Moun- tain 55 miles north-north- west of Saigon to guide warplanes for an air raid as part of the attack on the city. U.S. aerial reconnais- sance confirmed the radar installation. This report triggered the abrupt diversion of U.S. Navy ships to evacuation duty off the South Viet- namese coast. But it did not convince Ambassador quick military takeover, but there was "no way to tell what the North Vietnamese will do." He noted that a lull in fighting had set in around Saigon earlier that day. This turned out to be a five-day lull, beginning as Martin, Polgar and the French ambasssador, Merillon, finally convinced Thieu that he should resign for the good of South Viet- nam. The lull seemed to substantiate the Hungarian and Polish message of an evacuation truce, but evacuation went ahead only fairly slowly while high-risk Vietnamese remained in their jobs. Officials here decided that, because of the conflict between intelligence and diplomatic reports, the possibility of an arranged end needed to be checked with North Vietnam. The Soviet Union was asked to inquire in Hanoi. Tomorrow: The denoue- ment. Graham A. Martin in Sai- gon or senior officials in Washington that the Hungarian-Polish hope of an orderly end were false. THE NEGOTIATING -possibility was closely held in Washington by President Ford and. a handful of offi- cials around Kissinger. The secretary of state was, as usual, playing an almost lone hand in the tightest secrecy in apparent hope of pulling off a diplomatic miracle out of a hopeless. looking situation. He decided to ask the Soviet Union ? in the spirit of detente ? to see if it could learn from Hanoi what Vietnamese Commu- nist intentions were. This might resolve the conflict in available information. According to several sen- ior officials, the Soviet ,reply was ambiguous. Asked if it were true that a truce and orderly evacua- tion were possible, Moscow came back ? ostensibly after contacting Hanoi ? with a reply to the effect that the United States could proceed on that assump- tion. One official called it "ambiguous," and another said it was "vague and uncertain." Kissinger said in an 46 Approved-t- or Release AlCf1705708 :-CIA:RDP7T-D11432RUII010p380-095--.1 ? interview. May '5,* "The .:Soviet Union played, in the -last two weeks, a moder- ately constructive role in enabling us to understand ? the possibilities there were for evacuation, both of Americans and South Viet- namese, and for the possi- bilities that might exist for a political evolution." SOME LOWER officials feel that Moscow was a :party to the deceit of get- ting the United States to be- lieve it could get out of Vietnam smoothly and re- spectably. But other offi- cials refuse to accept this, suggesting that the Soviets were kept in the dark by the Vietnamese Communist Jeadership arid put off with -a deliberately uninform- ative answer when they tried to aat as intermedi- -aries for Washington. Apparently referring to- the Soviet channel and messages coming from the Hungarian and Polish ICCS delegations in Saigon, and maybe the French as well, Kissinger said April 29 as the evacuation ended that "we did deal with Hanoi and with the PRG (Provi- sional Revolutionary Gov- ernment) through different intermediaries and we were in a position to put our Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001'00380005-1 'views and receive re- sponses." - . _ The secretary of state ...added that until ISunday 'night, April 27, Washington time, which was Monday morning, April 28, in Sai- gon, "we thought there was some considerable hope that the North Vietnamese would not seek a solution by purely military means. . . ." Duong Van Minh had then become president, and "we thdught a negotiated solution in the . next few days was highly probable. "Sometime Sunday night the North Vietnamese obvi- ? ously changed signals. Why ? that is, we do not yet know . . . What produced This sudden shift to a mili- tary option or what would seem to us to be a sudden ? shift to a military option, I have not had sufficient - opportunity to analyze." Until Sunday, Kissinger said, "the battlefield situa- tion suggested that there was a standdown of signifi- cant military activity and the public pronouncements were substantially in the direction that a negotiation would start with General Minh. There were also other reasons which led us to believe that the possibil- ity of a negotiation remain- ed open." SOME INFORMED oh- servers think the five-day lull or standdown was mainly a preparatory peri- od for the NVA, although it began when Thieu resigned April 21. But it fit with the whisperings of a truce and orderly American with- - drawal, and also with the analysts of U.S. Hanoi- watchers in Saigon. Ignoring the absence of further references in Communist propaganda to carrying out the Paris agreement's provisions,' which had significantly 'disappeared by early April, these analysts felt that it was in North Vietnam's interests to bring the war to a negotiated end. The. analysts reasoned ? that by making a deal with Minh which left some sem- blance of a continuing Sai- .gon administration, al- though it would be subordinated in 'a Communist-controlled superstructure, the Communists would be able to claim the legitimacy of the, agreement which had been endorsed by world powers. They also would have some claim to Ameri- can aid for reconstruction. There were other ele.- ? A piess report from Mos- cow April 18 said Soviets in contact with North Viet- namese and the Viet Cong did not expect them to try to achieve all-out victory by conquest. And on April 19 the PRG's representative stationed at Tan Son Nhut air base on the outskirts of Saigon under Paris agree- ment arrangements, Col. Vo Dong Giang, hinted at a peaceful arrangement rather than an attack. ALL OF THESE rein- forced the Hungarian-Pol- ish message, creating a conviction by Martin and some others in the Saigon embasssy that a deal was being struck. Apparently after some further detail from the ICCS Communists, and with receipt of a Soviet reply, the word went around in top embassy; cir- cles that "the fix is in." On Thursday, April 24, Martin's deputy ambassa- dor, Wolfgang J. Lehmann, telephoned his wife Odette in Bangkok, where she had been evacuated with other embassy dependents. Leh- mann told her to come back and bring a long list of per- sonal supplies, because a deal had been made and they would be in Saigon for some time to come. . This was at a time when, the White House said, Ford had ordered American per- sonnel reduced "to levels that could be quickly evacuated during an emer- gency." Martin's embassy was operating on its own interpretations, with what looked in retrospect like wishful thinking strongly affecting analysis of the situation. Another embassy official who had just made ar- rangements to pack up and ship out his valuable an- tiques and oriental objects d'art halted the arrange- ments. He had been told he was on the short list of per- sons who would stay. support equipment," ac- The word in the embassy cording to the wording of was that an agreement for the citation when Secretary a truce and orderly evacua- of Defense James R. tion also included the Schlesinger gave him the Vietnamese Communist ac- Pentagon's ighest civilian ceptance of a small award. continuing U.S.. Embasssy That afternoon, Monday, in Saigon. The fact that this April 28, the radar on Black was in flat disagreement Virgin Mountain went into with Liberation Radio and action. Hanoi media denunciations of any American presence On April 8, a South Viet- was overlooked in the coin- na mese pilot named cidence of this idea with the ? Nguyen Thanh Trung had analytical assumption that defected and bombed Hanoi would want an Thieu s Independence Pal- American misson in Saigon ace before flying north. He to handle reconstruction was later revealed to have aid. ' been a longtime Communist agent ments contributing to hopes KISSINGER'S BELIEF -According to the Far for a truce or creation of that the situation changed Eastern Economic Review IDOHMIkatts1601001116800131 OIASIROPi97-110.4412R860(1 time ? showed a -lag in American perceptions. The Giap-Dung article said that the final offensive began at 5 p.m. Saturday, April 26 -- early Saturday morning in Washington. By early the next morning in Vietnam, rockets were being dropped into Saigon and attacks had started on QLI5, the road from Saigon to Vung Tau. The hope of an agreed evacuation had in- cluded the Communists' leaving open that Corridor to the sea. The big American-built military logistical complex at Bien Hoa, 15 miles north- east of Saigon, was also under attack. On Sunday a team led by Erich F. von Marbod, a principal deputy assistant secretary of de- fense in charge of military aid to Indochina, recovered some valuable aid equip- ment from Bien Hoa while under artillery fire. Von Marbod had gone se- ? cretly to Vietnam to try to get back as much U.S. aid supplies as possible before ?the Communists captured it., The Pentagon was worried about congression- al criticism of losing more than the approximately $800 million worth of military equipment which had al- ready been abandoned in northern South Vietnam. After being shot out of Bien Hoa on Sunday, Von Marbod went to see Martin on Monday morning. Mar- tin. advised him that it was unnecessary to take chances because there would shortly be a halt in fighting during which sup- plies as well as personnel could be evacuated by ar- rangement with the Communists. VON ,MARBOD WENT back to Bien Hoa anyway. Again under fire, he "supervised activities for the distribution and recov- ery of critical high-value a deception. Approved . 147 North' Vietnamese-pilots to fly American-made war- planes which had ,been cap- tured in Da ,Nang. Tseer A37 Dragonfly light bombers. Tan Son Nhut late Monday, causing surprise and a ris- ing sense of panic. Panic peaked at 4 a.m. Tuesday when a rocket and artillery barrage hit the air ; base. It was the beginning of the final Communist offensive. But Martin found .that hard to believe. AFTER DAWN HE went. out to see for himself where the shells had landed, kill- ing two U.S. Marine guards and others. Back at his embassy, Martin told staff- ers that he could not under- stand it. He still refused to believe that the Commu- nists would persist in a military takeover, but in- stead thought there could or would be a political settle- ment. Washington never seem- ed to understand, much less accept, the degree of cer- tainty which had gripped Martin and some others in his embassy. The barrage at Tan Son Nhut led ,to Ford's ordering the final helicopter evacuation. Mar- tin strung it out as long as possible, getting the maxi- mum possible number of Vietnamese removed at the last minute after having failed to provide for them earlier. Martin had been a con- troversial figure in Saigon since Nixon sent him there in 1973. He 'had sought to distort reports to Congress and in the press so as to put the best possible face on the situation. In. the final month, he seemed unre- sponsive to the realities as viewed from Washington. It was not just Congress which was exasperated with him during the delay in reducing the embassy staff, to easily evacuated limits. Persons who attend- ed the crisis meetings chaired by Habib reported very critical comments about Martin by Habib and others, at least in part re- flecting the distress of embassy personnel in Sai- gon about the lag in ar- ? ranging for the safety of Vietnamese for whom they felt responsible. But the degree to which Martin was being led as- tray by the Hungarians and Poles as well as his own wishful thinking was never properly appreciated here. While Kissinger and others allowed theft- hopes for a peaceful settlement to rise about April 21, officials here kept in sight the need for a final col- 00t438601118ri Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1 lapse Martin apparently ' did not. THE ULTIMATE result of the Communist decision in late March to smash all resistance came on \ Wednesday, April 30, in Saigon ? late Tuesday here. After the last Ameri- can helicopter had gone, leaving behind panicky thousands who felt aban- doned, NVA troops march- ed into the capital with little resistance. The Giap-Dung article said that "at exactly 11:30 on 30 April our army planted the flag of the F'RGRSV (PRG Republic of South Vietnam) atop the puppet presidential palace and the Ho Chi Minh cam- paign achieved complete victory." At 10:24 a.m., Minh had broadcast an order for WAS} NGTON STAR October 1975 rammusgmamataminess OPTIGIAlfaMolthIgrAle... southern soldiers to stop fighting. He said he was waiting at the palace to meet PRG representatives "to discuss the ceremony to hand over power. . . ." But that meant Minh claimed to head a still. functioning regime which could deal with the Communists. They would have none of that. His offer was ignored. At 3:22 p.m., some hours after he had been captured, Minh came on the air again. "The president of the Saigon administration calls on the Army of the Republic of (South) Viet- nam to lay down their arms and to surrender uncondi- tionally to the South Viet- nam Liberation Army," Minh said. "I declare that the Saigon administration from the central to the local echelons must be complete- ly dissolved and turned over to the PRGRSV." ? A Communist voice then came on and said the unconditional surrender was accepted. Nothing was left of the Thieu regime's structure or the Paris agreement concept of a three-part shared transi- tional arrangement. TWO CONGRESSIONAL subcommittees have sub- mitted letters to the State Department asking that Martin testify about those last days. They are the legislation and national se- curity subcommittee of the House Government Opera- tions Committee arid the House International Rela- tions Committee's special subcommittee on investiga- tions. Martin had been in the United States for medical treatment late last winter and has been sick again since he was taken by heli- copter off his embassy's roof. The subcommittees have been told orally that he could not appear be- cause of illness. He was discharged from a hospital almost two weeks ago and now, while on leave, is haunting the State Department asking when he will be given a new ambassadorial posting. The White House has not decided what to do with him. Senior officials want to avoid any reopening of the Saigon' sore and therefore doubt that Martin's name will ever be put before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for another ap- pointment to ambpssador. OUP ie4i:kmdf- -'01- 'Get him to tell you the one about the big oil and wheat deal with Russia!' 48 Approved kir Release 2001/0'8/08 :-CIA-ROP77:06432RODOT003-800'05:1? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1 Friday, October 24, 1975 TheWashington Star By Jeremiah (Leary Washington Star Stall Writer The Ford administration will slow down on treaty ne- gotiations with Panama and the movement toward re- sumption of normal rela- tions with Cuba until after the 1976 U.S. elections. The "freeze" on progress toward eventual restoration of political and commercial relations with Cuba is gear- ed to the March 9 primaries in Florida, where there are many Cuban-American voters, as well as the No- vember elections. The nego- tiations with Panama for a new treaty on the canal and the Canal Zone will drag until after Americans vote next year. Officials say the Panama decision must be regarded as practical as well as po- litical. The administration and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger are firm in their desire for a new treaty with Panama that will result in eventual relin- quishment of control of the strategic waterway and the 10-mile-wide Canal Zone to the Republic of Panama. WHAT THEY have in mind is a treaty that would leave the United States in control of the canal until the early 21st century but with gradual sharing of func- tions with Panama and an end to the Canal Zone as an Ti-E CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR U.S. and By James Nelson Goodsell Latin America correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor The United States and Cuba are, in a sense, shadow boxing as they inch toward rapproche- ment. Both have in recent days set up conditions that on the surface might seem to preclude an early movement toward some sort of new U.S.-Cuba relationship. But these conditions are, in the view of long- time observers, merely bargaining points. Cuba last week reiterated its demand that Puerto Rico be granted independence and warned Washington that it would not give up its position for the sake of rapprochement. Earlier State Department officials had said that the Cuban position on Puerto Rico was a stumbling block in the path of normalizing relations. American enclave from the outset. But the administration realizes that any attempt to obtain congressional ap- proval for a new treaty poses risks in an election- year atmosphere. If the Senate rejects the treaty, or if the House exercises its prerogative to bar transfer of any property acquired with government funds, the forecasts of experts are that there will be violence on a heavy scale by the Pana- manians against the zone and the canal. Administration analysts do not wish to thrust a treaty on Congress in a na- tional election year when senators and representa- tives are most susceptible to both lobbying and voter reaction. There are con- gressmen who might vote for the treaty in 1977 who would not in 1976. And rejection of the-treaty in ei- ther House will be enough to thrust the United States into a potential emergency that might require military intervention. Since the last thing Wash- ington wants is any repeat of the 1964 riots, in which the U.S. Army faced Pana- manian mobs in pitched battle, Ambassador Ells . worth Bunker and ne gotiating team will go into low gear until the election period is past ] 11stt , .,,,,b0 ?te,, fa._ .,,ge . A's - ' ? 14 ''- ' ,, s, INFORMED sources 'here believe that Panama's strongman, Brig. Gen. Omar Torrijos, well under- stands the U.S. domestic problem. While Torrijos has ? tight control in Panama through his well-trained Guardia Nacional force of more than 7,000 military and police units, even he could not restrain a violent surge of nationalistic reac- tion should the treaty reach Capitol Hill and be defeated there. Torrijos cannot afford to publicly acknowledge acquiescence with a slow- down in treaty negotiations, since he has made far too, many flaming speeches on the subject of the Canal Zone and Panamanian sovereignty there. But pri- vately, it is believed Torri- jos and his foreign minister, Juan Tack, will go along In general, the United States has acknowledged that the 1903 treaty needs revision so that Panama's sovereignty and control of the zone is realized; that many U.S. functions in the zone must be transferred to Panama; that Panama should share in control, operation and defense of the isthmian waterway for a period of years and then obtain full control. The main differences re- maining to be settled lie in the time span for the hand- ing over of the zone and the canal to Panama. BUNKER WILL continue to travel periodically to Panama for negotiating ses- sions, but the administra- tion no longer contemplates completion of the treaty or signing of the document by President Ford for at least 13 months The Cuban issue poses problems for any candidate in the Florida primaries where many anti-Castro Cubans are now American citizens and registered voters. The administration has made clear that it is prepared for a return to normal relations with Cuba if Premier Fidel Castro wishes this. But it also recognizes the explosive- ness, of the Cuban issue in Florida. Cuba actually made it easy for the State Depart- ment to reduce the pace of restoration of ties. When the Cubans made a big show at the United Nations General Assembly recently of attacking U.S. "coloni- alism"in Puerto Rico and supporting independence for the island common- wealth, the United States was handed an excuse. Only a minority of Puerto Ricans favor independence. The major issue in Puerto rico is whether the island should opt for statehood or continue as a common- wealth. Tuesday, October 21, 1975 Cu .a inch towar impediment to lifting the embargo on Cuba and smoothing the way to relations was the estimated $1.6 billion in claims against the Cuban government by U.S. citizens and companies whose interests were expropriated in the early 1960s. Cuba has rejected these claims. As far as Puerto Rico is concerned, Cuba knows that the majority of the Puerto Rican people have rejected independence, although many would like some changes in the present commonwealth status. Cuba will continue its support for independence, however, in spite of Washington's objections. And as far as the claims of U.S. citizens and companies are concerned, Washington is aware that there is little likelihood of any compensation being paid, although some token payments might well be forthcoming in a few cases. Yet the U.S. will continue to The United States, for its part, has on emphasize this issue. several recent occasions**ItutelbleRmiReleanca0001/4808ealGiA-RDP7M.S4024k achieve its goal on these points and its position therefore is not implacable. Meanwhile, Washington has acknowledged that the U.S. trade embargo against Cuba has become less and less effective. The Commerce Department in a report last week said that higher sugar prices have given Cuba more money to spend. "Unilateral continuation of the Cuba em- bargo becomes a bit more costly to the United States, though that economic cost is still relatively small," the report said. The U.S. in August eased the embargo by allowing foreign subsidiaries and affiliates of U.S. companies to do business with Cuba. The value of this business is relatively small, but it is seen as a sign of the time. There are other signs: Cuba recently returned $2 million to Southern Airways from a 1972 skyjacking and it granted a permit for the parents of Boston Red Sox pitcher Luis Tiant to visit their son during the conclusion of 015010138110065siason? j9.