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October 13, 1975
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Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010038O006-i5 CONFIDENTIAL INTERNAL USE ONLY This publication contains clippings from the domestic and foreign press for YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use of selected items would rarely be advisable. NO. 21 GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS GENERAL EAST EUROPE WEST EUROPE NEAR EAST AFRICA EAST ASIA LATIN AMERICA Destroy after backgrounder has served its purpose or within 60 days. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380006-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77.-00432R000100380008-0 U.S. NM- & 'TORID REPORT 13 Octcber 1975 Exclusive interview With The vice President EXCEPTS r1 Do you clear your travel and your speeches with hire? A On my first trip for him, to make a speech in Chicago, there was quite a big press corps. I was sitting in the plane with the reporters, and they said, "Were you given a speech?" And I said, "No." And they said, "Did the President tell you what he wanted you to say?" And I said, "No, he never talked about it. He just said he wanted me. to make a speech." And then they asked, "Well, did you get instructions from his staff?" And I said, "No. He just asked me to make the speech." And he's asked me to make a lot of them. He's never said what he wanted me to say or not say. He's, never given me any instructions except when he wants me to do some?hing, like working on the CIA Commission. We have an extraordi- nary relationship. 0 Could you cite several of the things you're working on? A Sure. Bicentennial, CIA follow-up, the Capitol Hill Club- ON CIA: $` E ARE IMPEDING IF NOT DESTROYING" VITAL U.S. AGENCY of Congress and their televised hearings'- lliFu. Rocfcete3r was chairman of a. White House cony E"i No, you couldn't head off the committees of Congress. mission that investigated and reported on Central Intelli- This is a hot issue, and they were going to grab it. There genc eAgency activities inside the United States. From was no question of that. his U.S. News & World Report interview: The allegations that started this whole thing were that Qt Mr. Vice ['residers are the investigations by Congress there were massive violations or infringements of civil ir:to the acth tits of the Central Intelligence Agency ham rights and of statutes barring the CIA from domestic actia - ties: We investigated those allegations. We did a thorough perint; the Agency's effeetiveiess? job. We came up with recommendations that, if carried out, A I think they are seriously jeopardizing both the cur- would protect the public in those areas. rent activities 4 the CIA and its sources. A lot of sources Should we have gone further? The Administration feels- abroad are very hesitant now to co-operate with the Agen and I think a large percentage of the American people cy, because if &ey should be identified, they could well be feel-that to go backwards over nearly 30 years of CIA shot or bumped off. That's one damaging effect operations, to go ' into activities relating to covert actions Another area is the CIA's methods of operation: Once abroad, would serve no useful purpose. Sure, those activities methods of cal acting information are kiiown., they can be were all dramatic. We all watch those television spy shows, counteracted if t?he r? are understood by the.opposition. and they're exciting. And you can make a good show out of This is a vew serious and adverse moment for the effec CIA activities. But is it in our national interest? I think not. tiveness of our intelligence at a time when we need it more 0. Some people want to reshape. the CIA to eliminate or than ever. Let's face it: The Soviets have an. intelligence reduce its covert activities. How do you answer that? effort that mu be 2 to 4 times as big as ours. And all the A There are certain elements of national intelligence things we tier r about the CIA doing in this country- that involve gathering information either by human intelli- gence or by technical means. And then you analyze and Russians. ? interpret the information. Few would argue about that dz in this may. function. A Sure, all atcr the country. They can listen from a mile Then there are certain actions that are known as covert- away to our c versation in this. room by focusing a device actions that fall between the worlds of diplomatic action on that window cane. Or they can pick up everything on and of war. If diplomatic action fails, and you don't want to point-to-point tdephone broadcasts anywhere in the coun- try-and this in dudes secret plans that the Defense Depart- go to war, and our national interests are involved, then ment may be marking on with a contractor. there is this gray area which the public had been aware of Q Do you the the public has lost confidence in -the CIA ' only through television shows. That. goes on, and now it and the Cover ernt's intelligence operations? comes out that it was just as exciting as TV-only it is real dni A No, I reaMr don't think so. I think the public is fed up life. with the investigations. I think it is terribly disturbed that This gray area is there. It offends all of us. But it is a secrets about mmy CIA activities are being brought.aut and reality. The alteThrtive may be war. Covert actions are that we are i ?ding if. not :destroying one of. the most. better than war. These are the sort of tough realities of the effective parts f our tuAional defense. situation that we must face up to. Frankly, I tik the course of the investigations and Let me give you another example of the tough realities attacks on.thee is just about running out. we face: One of the big issues is keeping files on Americans. Q In retrosp t, do you regret that the Administration's But now we are all worried about people shooting at the commission topsobe the CIA, which you headed, did not go President. Well, how are you going to know who is about to as do that if. you don't know about the people who belong to beyond eyo as Cothe t+ namuw :, doiop' scope of its investigation-perhaps you headed, bey? mi dangerous organizations, who ate dedicated to violence or A And pu,L on a, competitive three-ring circus? No. who are unbalanced-unless you ve got files? We're iii a very interesting period in this country where Q There are some Who feel oa }r investiliat g aarr mot:: srissi ravghf N. ~:~ tl~ 'tl~lg+ cfsr7:Y+ 4#108 :11DINI 1.91a `-~6r48i2 fl 088 it to know every- thing that is going on, and at the same time we urge privacy Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380006-0 as never before. Those two goals run in different directions. Q, The latest charges against CIA deal with opening the snail of private citizens, including prominent Americans- A Let me put that in perspective. There were 4 million letters a year that were under illegal supervision. Our commission pointed that out in its report. We traced the history of it. We made it public. It had been stopped before we got there, and we suggested methods to prevent any- thing of that kind in the future. Now what has happened? They pick out names of 2 or 3 or 4 people or foundations whose mail was opened. This is an exciting headline. But what does it all prove? We were there to protect the American people's interest in their freedom and their rights and their liberties and also to protect the effective functioning of an organization which represents American national interests. 0 Dir. Rockefeller, you have been involved with intelli- gence activities for many years-working with Presidents, serving on advisory committees. Do you think any major -CIA action was undertaken without the knowledge of the President? A I've got to say to you that, in my opinion, no major action was undertaken by the CIA that wasn't either known or approved by the White House, directly or indirectly. This is something that's a little hard for people to face up to. Everybody would like to slide away from that conclusion and say, "Here's this wild organization-the CIA-off by itself, doing these terrible things." But that's not the real truth. 0 You talk of "White House" knowledge, not the Presi- VIPCINIAN-FILOT, Norfolk 19 September 1975 'The Central Intelligence Agency's abiitr to conduct covert operations in fcreign countries on behalf of the Unit- ed States Government has been com- promised beyond repair by. the revelations elicited in the ongoing in- gTsiries into the U.S. intelligence com- munity's foreign and domestic activities. The Ford Administration has no choice but to deprive the CIA of re- so3nsibility for conducting such opera- tions and assign it to another-perhaps new-arrt_ of the Federal Government. In this less than best of all possible worlds, Washington must retain an ap- paratus for conducting covert opera- tions in for_ibn lands, primarily to counter the 'foreiga political activities of the Soviet Union and its allies. But these should be authorized only at the highest level, sharply limited in num- ber. and kept under tight control. On the evidence, many middle- and lower- level CIA operatives have been uncon- trollable and not a few of them unsta- ble. Apparent attempts by some CiA representatives to enlist the American underworld in attempts on the life of Cuban dictator Fidel Castro may or may not have been directed from the top. but the secreting of poisons in s,em:ing defiance of two Presidential directives requiring their destruction has the look of insubordination. . . dent's. Are you choosing those words intentionally? A That's right. I've worked for six Presidents. And it was always the feeling that where an action could be misinter- preted, it was better for the President to be in a position to be able to say that he did not know about it, or to deny it. Now, that can be accomplished in many different ways- 'delegating authority to somebody, for instance. Q When you talk about advance White House knowl- . edge, do you include assassinations? A Our commission got into that matter, and we couldn't produce any hard evidence that would give us the justifica- tion to come to conclusions that we could prove. Therefore, we didn't comment. Q Are the CIA investigations a partisan matter? A This business of going back and trying to-pin the tail on the donkey-or pin the trunk on the elephant-really is ex post facto. I don't know what it proves. This hasn't anything to do with Democrats or Republicans. This is a very unhappy phase of the world we live in. it is a tough reality. Q Is there any truth to charges that the CIA investiga- tions in Congress are being used to divert attention from delays in coming to grips with other national problems? A It is a diversion as far as the public is concerned, but I'm not sure that it is the reason for inaction on the part of the Congress. In any case, airing of the CIA issue is healthy because that is the way a democracy works. We've got to go through it until we sort it out. Only a democracy, and only the United States, would do what we are doing. This country is strong enough to absorb it. the .United States, opened Americans' mail, experimented recklessly with LSD, and assisted, however minimally, the Nixon White House's burglary of the office of Dr. Daniel Ellsberg's psy- chiatrist At the time of its creation shortly 21t er the end of World War II, the CL-1 contained within itself the seeds for abuses small and monstrous. Among the duties of the CiA enumerated in the National Security Act of 1947 was the duty of performing "such other func- tions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council. may from time to time direct. Moreover, the, subsequent Central Intelligence Agency Act exempted the CIA from all Federal Laws requiring disclosure of the "func- tions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency" and gave the CIA Director power to spend money "without regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of Govern- ment funds.... such expenditures to be accounted for solely on the certifi- cate of: the- director -[which] shall be deemed sufficient voucher." ,The "other functions and duties" clause in the National Security Act per- mitted the CIA to run a secret war in Laos, launch the Bay of Pigs debacle, intervene in the Congo and Chile, and- engage in other similar _ enter prises. It was disingenuous of 'President Truman and Senator Stuart Symington (D-Mis- souri) and others to disclaim in later years that they had intended for the CIA to become involved in peacetime 'cloves-:and-dagger operations. The CIA started up such operation during the Truman tadmirthstrabion--a.nil in doing so'it simply extended tradi ions t, o- lished by the Office of St te4c Ser- Aces (OSS) during World War 11 The truth is that the CIA has done what it has'done largely at the bidding of Republican and Democratic Administrations and with the indulgence of successive Congresses. It has had' sue- cesses and failures. But now its cover has been blown. "WVilliam E. Colby, who operated in Nazi-occupied Europe as a young U.S. Army ofticer assigned to OSS, did not become Director of the CIA to preside over its dismantling, but its dismantling may have begun. The CIA should survive as an organization dedicated to collection and analysi3--o4' infor;nation-functio-s for which it is superbly staffed and equipped-but only if. it is transformed into an ac- countable and highly disciplined inte?li- 1lgence service. At the moment, it seems Ito be neither. f. Z4 Restructuring of the CIA is desirable as well as 'unavoidable. The CIA has teen embarrassed fatally, by the dis sores that it spied ttpo'1~.pW&rPr Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380006-0. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 CIA-RDP77-00432R00010b38000$-Q THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDA OCTOBER 10,. 1_975 Hearings: In 1. ?' es .+ h'e'm , vn 'e a . C ''IC1713LAS M, HORROCK QThe C.-LA. was involved in; William Miller, on tha subject confrontation was avoided. several attempts to kill Fidel; far longer than its importance{ Hoviever, the Pike cern^~it`,eY spueai to The New scar nines Castro, Premier of Cuba; had' justified, and second that by :has begun to establish a body WASHINGTON Oct. -Q--After a peripheral involvement-in the keeping the discussion of the of evidence indicating that the, mire: months of delving into the death of Rafael Leonidas Tujil- ? plots behind closed doors, he $7 - billion - a -year intelligence j activities of United States in. (lo. Molina, strongman of -the cut the public off from the apparatus may- not, in fact,, tellige:nce agencies, Congres- Dominican Republic. and once very kind of information thatf be very efficient. In recent pub-! lineal investigators seem adrift plotted to poison the. Congolese might have helped it form a lic hearings he has called au- 4n a lea of information, stunned leader, Patrice Lumumba. view of the intelligence commu- thoritative witnesses who con- by, the magnitude c,Indeed, assassinations ap- nity. tend that the intelligence .agen- of the task and parently became so . accepted As you will remember," one dies failed to predict any of less _ sure o?' their a . policy theme that the C.I.A. member of the committee.said the major. crises of the last' objective than 'set up a permanent section' privately, "we were going to decade. when they started, . to plan them; called "the Exe- have completed most of our No one yet appears able ta, .. interviews in both cutive Action Group. public. hearings and be prepar- evaluate how tins nine-month .the Sedate and House disclosed. .fThe C.T A., the F B.L and the ing our recommendations by, scrutiny has-affected the intel= The: objectives last January 'National. Security Agency have this point- We have not; done+ ligence agencies. Publicly, intel- .appeamd clear erough. Infor conducted extensive intrusions either." ligence officials have said that] tion.unccvered in the Water- on either, telephone, cable, - or Senator Church has publicly the disclosures have harmed 'gatteinvestigation and a report { mail comunications or on 'ail stuck to his -decisions. He said 'the United States : and made in The New York Times sug- three, . he believed that televised pub- their task harder. gested' that. the intelligence, f-_ ?ecIntelligence?" agencies- have lie hearings on assassinationsf But privately, many of them agencies had conducted a large, i I lied to Congress almost routine= !would , have- done irreparable tell a more sanguine tale. The' and probably -illegal, domestic: i1y:?In one case, the statements harm to the American imageI bulk of the disclosures werel surygiilance operation in then !of =a former: C.I.: director, abroad and'not served truth.{ already known to foreign intel-) late- nineteen-sixties- and, early Richard Helms, 0n.: the coup. Whether it has been distract-II ligence services and the new nineteen-seventies. d' at in Chile were reviewed ed by the assassination matter,: details can mainly be used to These allegations provided by the department- of Justice or by other problems, the fill in gaps in knowledge, re- the impetus for a Presidential. to see if they constituted perju- . Church committee is far behind sponsible intelligence. officers .commission and two Cortgres- ry. No prosecution was recom-{ schedule. It has had three brief admit. sional- investigations, one by a mended. spurts of public hearings in In fact, there is some feeling; select- committee in the Senate;, 4iLawlessnes. under the guise 'the last several weeks. Hear- that the intelligence community! another "lay a select committee.' of national security seemed to Zings on the N.S.A. were post- -with 'fihe' help of Presidenti in theHouse.? I have become almost common- 1poned this week at the request; Ford and his able lawyers--has1 The Presidential connnission,, -place, during and after World of President Ford, and the com"staved off the worst," as onet source put it. In other words. headed by Vice President War II. The F.B.L admitted mmittee may not open others I I Rockefeller,' took . -n narrow 238- burglaries 'aimed -at Ameri- ' until the end of the month. the agencies are surviving what Scope.- It investigated wrong-. can citizens; the I.R.S. audited . Several staff members. pri- many had thought would never doing,-by the Central. Inteili-. persons whose politics it didI vately contend that the com- come, a full Congressional in- genre- Agency alone and issued- not like, and forgery of letters, mittee might just -as well write vestigation. oritative report now The upcoming confrontations a repot in June, finding vast anonymous threats and other fan auth intrusniYns on privacy as, well forms of coercion became stand-i and forgo. televised public ses- will not be on ,further disclo- as specific violations of the law, and . tools in the F.B.I. s count linvestigation lions. sure, sources in Congress and and of-tl.e C.I.A.'s jurisdiction terintelligence operations. - "The idea that every Senate the executive lug st, bu{: onI under the National Security But the disclosures--and list is another Water- the issue of "oversight." } Act of "1947 is long--are scattered shots and; gate is a- myth," one senior, In general, the intelligence The Congressional investiga: without theme. !staff member said in an inter agencies regard self-regulation, tions.were given broader?.man- "This ,is very unlike the view. "The question is---can inspector general style of in-1, dates : covering foreign and. Watergate investigation," said you get good legislation any- trospection backed up by exec domestic -intelligence activities. one. Senator, "because- this is 'way? I think you can." olive orders, as optimum To the sophisticated in Wash, not a simple conspiracy. There ' ' Part of Senator . Church's White ? House and intelligence ington intelligence circles, it ' is no single band of lawbreak- .technique has been to avoid sources have talked about this, ers ' or ,single group of people , confrontation and to negotiate ; privately for some time.. deemed an impossible task. ::Foreign Operations who made bad judgments. This for each piece of evidence from They rest their case on the; liz foreign intelligence open- has gone on for 30 years." the intelligence community. He 'fact that many of the instances T The disclosures are not for believes that Congress has an of wrongdoing were dug up;. a"tiona-'' of the United States the' sake of disclosure alone, ! absolute right to the informa-' by C.I.A.- itself in May, 1973; alone-cost nearly $7-billion a most Congressional., sources tion, but that it is better toi 1without ' Congressional over- ye ar;`according to reliable re- agree. Senator Frank Church, `!sight. prts:and encompass the active chairman of the. Senate select obtain the material without the Mr. Church's committee, ities "of the C.T.A., "Defense time delays of court fights. committee on intelligence, has however, has already raised Intelligence Agency, National His House counterpart, Rep- Securit A$ency, State Depart= was said that necesss s believed disclosure {serious questions about the Y`ary, so the public resentative Otis G. Pike, a C I A.'s ability at- self-regula-j could -see -for itself whether tart-tongued Suffolk County r , lion. It has uncovered instances meet intelligence, Federal Bu-, reau of investigation and?intel- there had been a pattern of Democrat beLeves differently. [where -even middle level C.I.A. 1i ence~nnits of.the armed fore- Mr. Pike took over the House g unacceptable behavior. committee last summer after a officials were apparently able es. .on, "It-is for this public support membership mutiny dislodged 'to disobey with impunity a Domestic intelligence has in-- that Congress draws the power clod all or some of the above; to ass legislation , to meet the previous chairman; Lucien Presidential order to destroy as well as the Internal. Revenue p gi ? N.. Nedzi, a Michigan Democrat. deadly poisons. - these problems," he said. - I Mr. Pike's committee voted Most persons interviewed bo- Service, the Drug Enforcement -But his critics argue that ational Iieved that the committee will t bli k ' c secre n e pu to ma Administration, the Alcohol,; :Senator'Church has made deci- Tobacoo, and Firearms Bureau lions that defeat his own security information - without propose and receive support and theSecret Service. the approval of the executive for a Congressional oversight {strategy and retard the utvesti committee, preaably a joint Already the files and eeordsi ation: In one instance, . last branch, thus precipitating a g athered. in the Senate investi-I confrontation over whether committee and that the rear gation are larger than any E spring, President Ford threw 'Congress or the President con- battleground will emerge over the hot potato of C.I.A. political jtroLS national secrets. the subleties of its powers. single -investigation previously assassination -plots ' to the conducted by the Senate. The, Church committee. But after . two weeks of Will it be able to subpoena Senate-has a staff "of over I00,` Many persons on the commit- sword-rattling by both sides, [officials and documents of the the House committee, another tee privately believe that by Mr. Pike and the White house entire intelligence community 40 or-so- focusing on e plots, the panel settled the issue-access to ; and call for contempt citations The investigations have either some secret intelligence evalua against 'those who do rot con!- directly, or by their pressure, .has allowed the rest of the tions on the Tet offensive in ply? Will, it have a yell-paid produced a startling , pattern !investigation to drown. They 1968-without settling the fun- and adequate permanent staff t f damental question. Mr. Pike's to conduct investigations2 of disclosures about the. meth- fault Mr. Church on two counts; one that he tied up critics thought that Congress These are the "ut" issues, ods the various" agencies. the commission counsel, FAO. sional prerogatives were several sources said. These include the fo c . has worried many on- 11V8 - Arai Hill is whether the Can-. 000.b;14066 data Aftelf- 9 17,1 t s,' i Goal's V-nclezar Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001.00380006-0 PvILADELPHLA BULLETIN 29 September 1975 Y ? li - The papers have been filled.lately larly the USSR, on a global scale. with letters and statements from var- 'What CIA did in Chile, or instance, . f l l e o examp ious people about the CIA, all of is held up as a ccilossa erha s a it ll A f which have one thing In common - .their authors, some' of whom are quite highly placed, don't ,now what they are talking about. On December 31, 1173, I took, early, retirement from CIA' after over 22 - years- service: therefore, I think I know whereof I speak. It is not 'that there is not plenty" wrong with the CIA, because there is. .Its promotion and transfer policies are frightful - beyond description: Twenty years. ago, to get anywhere. in CIA one almost had to be an Ivy League, graduate. Today- the pend- ulum has swung so far.. in the other direction that this. background is con- sidered a hindrance. To get ahead today one has to be :silting to be transferred anywhere. On the other :`hand, one way CIA gets rid of people it doesn't want is to offer them transfers' to Timbuctu or similar places. If they refuse, this is valid grounds for dismissal.. CIA also forces retirements at age 60 although Civil Service regulations say that e5 is the retirement age. p s p y, ctua per idy: w CIA's most brilliant coup in years. A little background is in order. It has been said that Aliende was a democratically elected President. In actual fact he squsaked in with only a drop over one third of the vote. The t w o other ' candidates' spit. the anti-Cornmunict voa in half because they were both too stubborn to bow out.. Between theta -:ti;ey had two thirds of the vote but neither one had quite as many votes as A:ilende. In many other countries this election would have resulted in the loan with the lowest number of votes being eliminated and a rerun tang place between the two. In Chile this would certain1v have resulted in. a conservative victory. People forget that Allende had nias- sive Soviet support in his campaign including, some think, a successful Soviet undercover effort to keep both 'ether candidates in the race so that his opposition would be split. ' Upon taking office Allende a-, once seized the Chilean subsidiaries of However, this kind of thing is com- Anaconda Copper, I.ennecott Copper, paratively unimportant. All Govern- Bethlehem Steel, Inter national Tele- ment agencies are monuments of phone and Telegraph etc., in fact the confusion and CIA is probably run" Chilean assets of all U.S. companies.' better 'than most of them. This seizure of billions of dollars What evaryore has;.forgotten, or worth of property was countered by never knew, is the 'reason for the the CIA with the allocation of the CIA's existence: to oppose the moves , very small sum of $3 millien to help of our -Communist enemies, particu- ' the truck drivers union continue their BALTIMORE SUN The Washington Star 9 October 1975 Levi. weighing CIA wrongdoing Washington (AP)-Edward H. Levi', the Attorney General, expects to decide early next year whether to prosecute Cen- tral. Intelligence Agency offi- cials involved in illegal domes- tic activities, a Justice Depart- ment spokesman said yester- day. The decision may hinge on whether there is evidence that .any President authorized such l activities, a top department of- ficial involved in the investiga- tion said. strike against the Allende Govern-. n:ent. It was used mainly to feed- them and their families during this period. ' . When conditions finally - became completely chaotic the Chilean Army seized power, an event that the. CIA did not,plan, although it did hope that. 'Allende and his Communist, support ers would be overthrown by the anti-. Communist majority. I personally approve of such actions en The part of CIA. I was involved in, the Chilean affair, in a somewhat re mote way because L collected infor, mation from a . large ? company that. was in the process of having its. C hi- lean. properties seized. It. kept - me. and, through me, CIA and the U.S. Government, informed on a daily, basis. This is the sort of thing I did for 22 pears and I was proud of my' contributions io our country's secti= ; rity. Upon leaving CIA I at once began x'orking as a foreign political consultant to a large U.S. oil com- pany and after one year shifted to a second oil company in the same ca- pacity. 1-here is virtually no ce mtry in the world on which I e.o not consid- er myself-wail informed, due to my Have I,' however, wasted my-life? I think not and hope not. May the CIA flourish as the guardian of our coun- try in the future as it has in the past when -I vas privileged to contribute in a 'small. way to its success. Ric lard Par, ' Philad::Iphia o Considers'Shuitz . IgAmnA-vp: United Press International investigations have revealed major: President Ford is seriously consid- - improprieties in the agency's opera ering giving former Nixon Cabinet' tions over the years. But Ford appar;; official George P. Shultz a major role ently is in no hurry to replace CIA in a revised intelligence operation, it Director William Colby, who has was learned today. "-cooperated in disclosing past impro' Shultz, President of the Bechtel prieties. 7 Corp. of San Francisco, is reluctant According to sources,' Shultz hasl to return to government service. the "strong personality" needed to; Both Ford and Secretary of State handle the job. Shultz headed the Henry Kissinger reportedly feel University of Chicago ' business: .Shultz has the proper qualifications school and 'has served as secretary of, for a sensitive positions labor, director of the White House: Sources speculated that Shultz Office of Management and Budget.-,' might be named to head the Foreign and secretary of the Treasury. Intelligence Advisory Board,- which gressiorial investigations have will probably be strengthened in its hie is respected on Capitol hill and established a record of suffi.= oversight of the CIA and other intel- is all the more acceptable because he cleat wrongdoing to lay the ligence agencies when the President has "no political ambitions," sources: groundwork for -Congress to makes public a plan for overhauling said. vote a -tough,. permanent over- ' ? U.S. intelligence-gathering. . Shultz is currently the President's; sight panel for the intelligence Ford has been planning to shake representative at planning. sessions: lcommunity. that question can- up the CIA since the Rockefeller ? for international econonic monetary notbeanswered until the inves+ Commission and congressional meetings in Paris later this year. ttigations are complete. J proved For Release 2001/08/08: CJA-RDP77700432R000100380006-0' -.1 A .Approved for Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R00010038000$-0 ssTURt Y R."~IE 9 August 1975 erican Traditio ns and Secret Police. America's fast-approaching Bicenten- nial Year furnishes a useful back- drop for the widening debate over the CIA. The main issues growing out of an American undercover organization' were anticipated by the handful of young. men who were later to be called "Amen- ca's Fourdittg Fathers." Both in their arguments against Great Britain in the struggle for independence and in their exploration of ideas at the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention, the young founders rejected the notion that there could be any justification for . interfering in the internal affairs of other countries. `a hen the American Revolu- tionary leaden told Great Britain to re- spect our right to self-determination,: they thereby fixed our own. obligation to respect that same right for others. They, would have fo-j the U.S. can step up its de- Mr. Kissinger. tart', technological and eta- mands in negotiations with they Last May in a speech in St. rmmic superiority worldwid?."i Soviets and. need not hesitate. Louis. Mr. Kissinger defined the "So far, detente has serve: to demand a clearly egnmar j Administration's detente policy in the following words: '- 'The United Stares is'. de- termined to maintain the hope- fut new trends in U.S.-Soviet relations on the basis of realism and reiprority. But it is equally determined to resist pressures or the exploitation of, local conflict." Pi i YORK TIMS 26 October 1975 r7' f tion of a large missile, were` lens,the officials said, the Na- %il d of primary importance and that tional Security Council in Sep- #j~ 11ll [~rit $ t he talks might well fail over ternber presented the President; me reached in 1972. Moscow these issues. with nine alternative proposals,i the agreed to limit its-deploy- The consensus among offi= and, Mr. Kissinger gave Foreign! merit of large SS-9 missiles to M1SSII E ,: Minister Adrei A. Gromyko in; 3091 ? cials is that if there is no agree- New York a new proposal that Bezhnev Wants Linkage ex ye Prssiin ull he knewwvodbe t was unacceptable. N PEIII sent before j}(} election next ear is in f full At Vladivosstok, it was agreed E ORTED 1l swing, the odds against a final that ?.neither side could exceed U.S. Officials, Differing With Kissinger, Doubt an Easy Resolution of Issues settlement will increase 2,400.strategie delivery velueles land- sharply. Many feel that Soviet- defined as intercontinental land- based .missiles, long-range sub- American detente could not marinealaunched missiles and survive failure. long-range bombers. Within Problems in Accord f this ceiling, neither side could The of icials attributed the] bavee' more than 1,320 missiles with re-entry vehicles equipped difficulty, to the three follow- with multiple warheads. By LESLIE H. GELB ing factors: Four, . major problems soon Specie; to The New York Times CIThe complexity of recon. appeared: on whether to count the Backfire and the cruise mis- WASHINGTON, Oct, 15 - tiling Soviet strategic forces, sile?.as part of the 2,400 ceiling, 1Several authoritative Admix- weighted with large land-based: on the definition of a heavy tration officials say the tal'ksi missiles, with a more. balanced missile--and on how to verify with the Soviet Union on stra- American land, sea and air pos- whether a deployed missile con- topic arms limitations are in Vie,. along with the different' tained multipie.warheads. Toe Backfire problem emerged trouble.. . 11 directions being taken by the because Mr. Kissinger never jThe officials said in inter- itwo sides. in the devlopment stated at,Vladivostok that this views that the Administrat isa 1 f of new weapons. navr bomber should be included was waiting for a responsef in the ceiling. When, at Penta- The many rnisunderstand- from tloscow to its latest' pra~ ton i 1 mgs that the officials said had ; insistence, he later raised posal and expected that the the : issue, Moscow contended sponse - would not move ttI ben created by sloppy and hur- that the Backfire was only a bomber and negotiations, now stalled, sic dent o negotiions between d and Leos d I. Brezh- should not be included. very' nnuch The issue of the cruise mis- nev,' the Soviet party leader, site, was eft ambiguous in This estimate stands in teas 1 !tract to Secretary of State lI in Vladivostok last November, Vladivostok. The Russians sub- coupled with seetai instances sequently contended that they Sunday that "about 90 per cos I of Mr- Ford's and r. Kissingea.'s assumed that any missile-with b k} , f s a rannge of more than 600 kilo- e s n of the negotiation is substan- tialiy completed." The official said Mr. Kissinger was trying to be upbeat . Differ on Significance Some officials agreed t SO per cent of the important is_ sues had been resolved. lac said hard political decisio_ , sill needed to be made on sec- :ondary matters. Other officia:ai !contended that the unresolved' 'issues. concerning the Sov za bomber called the Backfire the air-breathing Americac. snot=e :t issile and the defini- io ac ng aural nom conc s previously made. meters ?(360 miles) would count. QIinpottant philosophical dif- Washington sad it had assumed that-missiles would be counted ferences between Mr. Kissinger only if they were ballistic, that and Defense Secretary James is, 7aveled outside the atmos- R. Schlsinger over the signifi-, phe. Cruise missiles fly in the cance of the Backfire bomber)I atmosphere. Irz Helsinki, last August. Pres- and over how necessary it was, ident Ford proposed to Mr. to conclude this particular arms,' Bre4nnev to include airlaunched agreement with Moscow. f cru+we missiles with a range of The officials also talked about[ more than about 2,000 miles. what_ they would not ay pub-t This; was not accepted. The liely;,,namely that Mr. Ford United States has not offered would tin kany -future conces- any~range limit on sea-launched sions to Moscow to the strength crui a missiles. of conservative opposition to Te issue of how to define a detente in his own party. hea'3y missile dates from the As a result of all these prob-f intelim offensive missile agree- Since then, Moscow has con- tint d to emphasize heavy mis- siles and wants to retain this advantage. The Pentagon.wants it stopped. The fourth major issue con- cerning verification of missles with multiple warheads has been settled in principle. Mos- cow has agreed that if a missile has' been tested with multiple warheads, all missiles of that kind shall be considered as counting against the 1,320 ceiling. However, Mr. Brezhnev told Mr. Ford that he would make this concession only if Mr. Ford made concessions on the Back- fire' and cruise missiles. A'*ter I the National Security Coti:.:cil meeting, on Sept. 17, had. considered nine alternative proposals, Mr. 'Ford asked Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Schlesinger to kvork out -a new proposal between them. Mr. Kissinger presented this proposal to Mr. Gromyko on Sept. 21 in New York. Some officials said it sought a bal- ance between the ' number of .d'.aci?fires that Moscow could deploy above: the 2,400 ceiling with a roughly equal number of American cruise missiles above!, the ceiling. From Mr. Kissinger's point of view, it is not a matter of importance that the Russians be allowed a 200 to 300 Back-1 fires, given the thousands of l delivery vehicles both sides al- ready have. For him, the con- cessions are minor _ compared with the importance of having, the agreement. From Mr. Schlessinger's per- spective. the benefits of detente are illusory and the advantages of concession suspect. Officials said he would not be alarmed if this agreemet were not co- chided. THE ECONOMIST OCTOBER 4. ]31S WIN 9 ,,,Carry on cruish A If a missile deaf makes the Americans give up the new weapon that counterbalances Russia's lead in megatonnage, it will be worse than no deal at all The nub of detente is Sam .Make no mistake about it: they may be, are peanuts compared with regulating the grain sales. i-isas for journalists, grudging permission strategic nuclear systems of the superpowers. If the big for Russian chess mace r! ter still, reduced troop reductions in .e~ ~~ ;~'ttestr~a6re tttoup / 'in~a -'sta` bifisin0g~tti~~ ~ etente. If they Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380006-0 cannot, then the cornerstone of detente has ceased to exist, and no number of toasts, documents and ballet dancers can make up for it. Since the Americans and Russians are still groping for a new agreement in the second round of their strategic arms limitation talks (Salt 2),.it is important to get this straight. Easier said than done. The results of Salt 1,. when criticised as inadequate or worse, are often defended on- the ground that, even if defective,-, they did something. for detente; at, the same time other people tend to excuse the inadequacies of detente in general by the. idea that the.other deals between Russia and America have somehow aided Salt. Clearly this cannot cut both ways. An equitable nuclear agreement is what it takes to make the. world safer; but "equitable" is the key word, not "agreement," ' which is too often and too, readily used with approval without asking whether a particular agreement is good or, bad. The. best o'f a bad'Miry-job There are three main issues that must be' settled as .part of a new Salt deal:. how to handle.- multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles (Mires), the Backfire bomber and, the cruise missile. The Mirv problem is best-known. Salt 1 did not deal with Mires; the preliminary understanding President Ford and Mr Brezhnev reached at Vladivostok last year specified that 1,320 weapons on each side could have Mirvs, but it did not solve the problem that has skewered every arms control parley since the second world war: how do you check it? The Russians as usual refused to permit on-site inspection' and would like the Americans to take their word for it. The Americans have searched high and low for a technical solution that will permit camera-carrying satellites to tell reasonably well which silos have the Mirvs, and which haven't, without being able to -see inside the missiles themselves. They have also suggested that it might " help if both superpowers physically grouped together their clumps of mirved missiles, in different places from the, un-mirved ones. But it seems certain that whatever is -agreed upon will leave some room for cheating. The signs are that the Americans are now prepared to shrug their shoulders about this. The best that can be hoped for is to keep Russia's cheating within limits, while looking harder at the other two problems-which are likely to prove the sticky ones. Russia has relied much more on missiles than on bombers for its intercontinental nuclear power. But the supersonic Tupolev bomber (codenamed Backfire by Nato) came along a couple of years ago and created a new roadblock for Salt. The Russians claim it does not have the range to reach the United States, and is thus a tactical weapon which should not count against the Vladivostok total of 2,400 offensive strategic systems allowed for each side. The Americans reply that range doesn't matter because bombers can refuel in the air- just as their own huge B-52s are equipped to do. One possible solution is to count the. American FB-111 (the specialised American F-111 that is used as a strategic bomber) , against. the Backfire. But the reverse- counting neither-will not do at all..The Americans are NEW YORK TIMES - - 30 September 1975 e1 'inki'Aft math not going to.buiid any more FB-1IIs; but it looks as if the Russians think they may have a winner in the Backfire, and plan to build a big fleet of them. So not counting either could leave the Russians with a large, uncounted; advantage. But America's cruise missile may turn 'out to be the biggest problem of all. These missiles will be relatively cheap; they will fly low (under 200 feet, following the terrain), thus making radar detection extremely difficult, and they are slow, which gives them a long range but makes them fairly easy to shoot down if spotted. The Americans have been -'moving ahead rapidly in the, developmeni of these weapons, and it now appears certain that by the mid-1980s they will' .have cruise missiles that can be launched from aircraft, surface ships., or submerged. submarines, will travel 1,500- 2,000 miles and land within something like 30 feet of their . target. (Yes, really.) The Russians are behind in the technology . required to make such missiles, and consequently want to put severe limits on their numbers or their range. The Americans feel that they should not slow down or stop development ,of these weapons and sacrifice their technological supremacy in this field for anything less than a genuine and comparable self- denial by the other side. . There are other reasons against a deal to limit cruise missiles. Their small size, their ability to be launched from almost ' anything and their similarity to small unmanned aircraft would create almost insurmountable verification problems. And the extreme accuracy of the new missiles; combined with recent advances in con- ventional explosives, makes the cruise missile a useful weapon for conventional war (and would require fairly large numbers when used this way). So even a fairly mild Salt limitation on the cruise missile would amount to selling the ' same horse twice: not only would it restrict an American -nuclear-war weapon, but it would probably rule out a conventional-war one as well. It's the counterbalance There is no good measure of the power of any strategic weapon, but the ' cruise missile is harder than most to fit into the usual pattern. Nobody knows what: another war would be like, and how important the special features of the cruise missile might then be. Even if these things were not true, the Russians have little to offer in return. The main elements on which their power depends-numbers of missiles, and their capacity. to carry heavy warheads-were set in concrete at Vladivostok, and the limit on numbers is so high that it represents almost no real restriction. The Americans have in the past compensated for Russian pre-eminence in numbers and throw-weight by developing superior technology: such things as greater accuracy, and Mirvs. Now the Russians have Mirvs and are improving- their . accuracy to something near American standards. The cruise missile is a major element . by which the United States can make up for Russian superiority in other areas. It is important that the Americans should not bargain away their lead here merely for the sake of having a Salt 2 document to sign. Something is not always better than nothing. ,and' Secretary ,of State Kissinger, who defended; iii. `-' utility and importance of the Helsinki-' Declaration and . its pretentious signing ceremony. As Dr. Luns notes, "the emphasis placed on inter- national ideological struggle by leaders-of the Soviet .Union has so. far continued 'unabated, ' as ' have the restrictions on human rights in its own country." And the NATO leader correctly points to the vast difference in -attitude.indicated by his organization's action in notifying-, Moscow and its allies of Western military. 3A-RDP77-00432R0001003.80006-0 Dr. Joseph Luns, Secretary General of the' "North" - Atlantic Treaty Organization,- has become the first major Western official to offer an evaluation of the Con- sequences to date of the signing of the Helsinki Declara- tion. last, summer. His criticism that Moscow is not living up to the agreement tends far more to support last July's skeptics than it, does to back President Ford Approved For Release 2001/08/08 Approved. For Release 2001108/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380006-0 maneuver's in Europe. while there has been no reciprocal ction from Moscow regarding the current series of.. ".varsaw Pact military maneuvers. Meanwhile in the Soviet Union itself a series of pokesmen have made plain that Moscow will imple- tent the Helsinki Declaration's provisions regarding iicreased civil rights as it sees fit. One of the latest if these dispellers of illusion is a Soviet .Foreign* "dinistry official, Yuri Kashlev: Mr.- Kashlev asserts that -many bourgeois publications propagandize that which is contradictory to Soviet legislation and to the morality of Soviet society." Charging that many Western media spread, anti-Communist ideas as well as "racism and chauvinism, the cult of violence and pornography ....," he then asks, "Is there really.anyone in the West who seriously hopes that the socialist countries will some- time allow the 'free circulation' of such `information' in their society?" In other words Soviet censorship and restriction of foreign publications remain essentially -_ the same, after Helsinki as before. WALL STREET JOURNAL, Thursday, Oct.-.16, 1975 REVIEW & OUTLOOK SALT in Your Eye Secretary of State Kissinger has been making public remarks about the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks that are optimistic on their face but certain to be interpreted pessimistic- ally. His friends in the press are writing that the talks are in deep trouble. This is an almost certain sign that Mr. Kissinger has agree- ment with the Russians in view, and is now turning his attention to sell- ing it to the Americans. _ A false sense of urgency has been one of the hallmarks of the strategic arms negotiations, partic- ularly in selling to Americans the series of agreements that have been milestones along the march toward eventual Soviet strategic superior- ity. We are now being told that a SALT agreement is needed to pre- serve detente.. At other times we are told that the chief purpose of de- tente is to reach SALT agreements. And of course, that the agreements are needed immediately 'because this is our last chance to stop the "spiral" of the "arms race." The facts are that while of course each side competes with the other, there is no "spiral" and no `'race" toward some Armageddon. At least not on the U.S. side. In terms of read dollars, the budget for strategic weapons has now declined to less than a third of its peak total. The aggregate destructive power of deployed weapons has also sharply declined as the weapons have be- come more accurate. Technologies are now in sight that would allow replacement of nuclear warheads rci'ls convenFional ones for many .tr, ets, but the agreement Secre- triry Kissinger has in view would pr t->bably curtail them. This false sense of urgency has '-vc'tghed heavily on the American side of the negotiations. Despite they understood, or also includes the air-breathing cruise missile. Not so incidentally, there was not one Secretary Kissinger's preposterous military adviser in the American claim that the Sov:.ets have made party to Vladivostok. - "all" of the concessions, the only " The ? -one unambiguous thing arms development any of the agree- about the clause is that it applies ments has stopped so far is the only to air-launched missiles. The antiballistic missile, in advanced clauses on land-based and sea-based development by the Americans but missiles specify that the ceilings not the Russians. Similarly, the sal-. are on ballistic missiles. So the So- lent fact about tLe Vladivostok viets are now asking for an inter- agreement-to-agree is that in terms pretation that would count against .of missile "throw weight," or the the ceilings both air-launched and lifting power that determines the sea-launched cruise missiles with potential number and size of war- ranges over 600 kilometers. First of heads, the Soviets codified an ad- all, we have the guidance technol vantage of roughly three-to-one. ogy within reach, they don't. Sec- A further and more immediate ond, most of our major cities and example lies in the development of many military targets are within negotiations since Vladivostok. The 600 kilometers of the sea, theirs }} ostensible purpose of these talks is aren't. Third, there is absolutely no to work out the technical details of way to tell from looking at a cruise the agreement in principle. In fact, missile what its range is. On this the chief Soviet objective has be- point we would have to take the come curtailing an American Bevel- Russian word. opment not even mentioned in the Obviously, American assent to Vladivostok communique. This is such a proposal would be worth a the cruise missile, a pilotless air- great deal to the Soviet generals. plane with super-accurate guidance. They might even buy it by dropping,, This development is the best chance some of their more outlandish posi- for the U.S. to offset the Soviet lead tions on other outstanding issues, in throw weight, and also the oppor- maybe even throwing-in a cosmetic tunity to replace nuclear warheads concession on throw weight to ease with non-nuclear ones. Mr. Kissinger's troubles with Con- How this issue worked its way gress. On past form, this is the kind into the supposedly technical follow- of bargain we can expect, one that on talks is itself an example of the ! codifies Soviet advantages while hazards of haste. The agreement in, foreclosing ours. principle stated that the agreed lim- There is no urgent reason to ac- itations on total weapons would ap- cept such an agreement, no reason ply to "air launched missiles" of not simply to wait until the Soviets over a certain range. The range it- are willing to strike a more even self is at issue, being variously de- bargain. The technologies non on scribed in Mr. Kissinger's state- the horizon point not to a vastly I ments as "600 miles" and "600 kilo- more dangerous world, but to a meters." But the bigger question is slightly less dangerous one. And no whether the term "missiles" means meaningful detente can be built ex- "ballistic missiles," as some Ameri- cept on the basis of true equality can negotiators have privately said and true reciprocity. _ a Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380006-0 35 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432 000100380006-0 THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR Wednesday, October 15; 1975 Helsinki -- A Soviet view The Soviet public thinks highly of the part the United States played in preparing and conducting the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The Soviet Union was quite pleased. with the statements made by U.S. spokesmen who highly assessed the results achieved in Helsinki. However, alongside the positive assess- ments of-the conference, voices can be heard in the U.S. questioning the value of the conference from the point of view of the interests of U.S. foreign policy. These people give the impression that because the Washing- ton administration was not firm enough only Russia has benefited from the conference. The U.S. is being criticized for "having made concessions" to the Soviet Union in the final act signed in Helsinki, thereby recognizing the status quo in Europe without receiving any- thing in return. Is this an accurate evaluation? The Eu- ropean conference set forth 10 principles of security and cooperation in Europe. In our eyes, they are all equally important for the relaxation of the tensions and for maintaining peace on the European continent. Since the American criti('S are'particularly disturbed by the principle of the inviolability of European frontiers, let us consider whether the recogni- tion of this principle is a "concession" on the part of the U.S. which does not meet its national interests. True, the Soviet Union is vitally interested in keeping the existing European frontiers intact. Thd recognition of the principle is considered to be a summation of the political results of World War II. Is there any need to reiterate that 34 years ago, our violated frontiers resulted 'in the loss of 20 million Soviet lives in the war against fascism - a system which sought to alter Europe's politi- cal map? Fixing existing borders will be the most important guaran tee that disastrous events of Europe's history will not be repeated. The Soviet Union will not be. the only country to benefit if this principle is put into effect. Are not France, Belgium, Holland, and Denmark, which also experienced the horrors of Nazi occupation, just as vitally interested in making their national frontiers inviolable? Doesn't this principle promote the security of Britain, Italy, and the Federal Republic of Germany as well? Most certainly, it meets the interests of all European nations. Moreover, it meets, to the full extent, the basic national interests of the United States, as a country that has never been isolated from the dramatic developments in Europe.- Any major armed conflict in Europe would inevitably. involve. American interference. If this is so, what has the U.S. "lost" or "given up" by signing the final act of the European conference? It is America's vital interest in maintaining peace and security in Europe that compels it to support the other principles laid down in the final act which form the backbone of peaceful coexistence between the European states: sovereign equality of states, renuncia- tion of the use or threat of force, territorial integrity of states, peaceful settlement of NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY,, OCTOBER 8,4975 disputes, and nonintervention in internal affairs. ,International cooperation in the fields of economics, trade, science, technology, and environmental protection are all questions discussed at the conference. The promotion of such cooperation is now justly regarded as something that will heip to ease tensions among nations. One will lose only when the principles of equality are violated, as was the case when the U.S. Congress tried to force the Soviet Union into making political concessions. By interfering in Russia's internal affairs, the U.S. desired an exchange for granting the Soviet side the most-favored-nation status in trade. As a result, the loser was not the Soviet Union, which 'is successfully developing non- discriminatory trade relations with other countries, but the United States. If one is' to speak of "concessions," all the participants in, the European conference have made concessions to one another. The very results of the conference were made through compromise. However, this was a com- promise for the sake of peace. The partici- pants in the conference, by exerting coopera- tive efforts, have laid down a foundation for a new system of international relationships. We believe that these achievements are the best retort to those who are questioning the value of U.S. participation in the European confer- ence and belittling the importance of the results of the conference for the U.S. Mr. Druzhinin is a political analyst for the Soviet State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting. This article is supplied by the Novosti Press Agency. Reciprocity After Helsinki -83- Georgi A. Arbatov MOSCOW-After mateiy to war. To -prevent these ten- I 'the -Final Act sines is in the vital interests'not only was signed at the Helsinki Con- ference on Secu rity and Cooper ation- in Europe,' the West began; making attempts to reduce the,,, significance of the :conference; to- two proposi= tions: the consol- idation of , the' postwar Euro- pean frontiers .(which the West or the. Soviet Union but of all other European powers as -well. It , is a mistaken' concept that the Soviet Union must "'owe" something The Soviet Union is consequently hard-pressed to understand the anguish with which this question is discussed in the West. As the Soviet people see it - all these are normal s h f , p eres o to someone for such a commitment. ' cooperation that will develop along The Soviet people have already paid . , with the deepening of detente and the in full for the existing borders with. growth of mutual confidence. This, in what is most dear: twenty million fact, is happening right now. lives. Death is a price paid by many In terms of international scientific other peoples as well. exchange programs, Soviet scientists It is a distortion to assert that now know well that it is much easier for that the Soviet Union has obtained their United States counterparts to get everything it wants, the, future of . an entry visa to the Soviet Union. For d(Aente. Will depend on the size of this purpose, United States scientists "smart-money" _that it gives to the must simply apply West - through 'unilateral concessions personally to the Intouri~t Agency . ! in its internal affairs. Not only is this ? claims is a great For a Soviet scientist to obtain entry formulation wrong but behind it one ~ 1 , into the United States he must re- expects treU. for can easily discern attempts to under- , ceive an official invitation by an or- conch the the whi P Yme) mine the effectiveness of - this major ganization or a person who will vouch and what is termed in diplomatic, achievement. language the "third basket," covering The notion of the. "third basket" for the Russian's "good behavior." In of coo oration in itle hu- everal spheres, contacts are simply quesuons p is . generally applied to provisions per- prohibited: For instance,' if an official manitarian and other. fields. - taining to the intentions and readiness of a Soviet trade union visits the It -is this latter consolidation that of states to cooperate in such areas is the payment that the Soviet Union s culture, science and education, and United States in any capacity, he. gets mst give to the West for the West's information. Also included are the' an official warning, along with his recognition of the existing European interests in solving various humani- fish entry visa, contacts wshatithh any United attempt States a trade frontiers. In fact,- this appears to be tarian questions, including family ties s tr the only point of interest to the West unions will be regarded as a violation Y P and marriage between citizens of dif- Of the law. in the entire document. signed this ferent countries. On signing the Final -. The Soviet-Union intends to con-- summer. Act, the Soviet Union expressed quite' Any suspected or '.real attempts to', clearly its intention to fulfill these time developing ties and contacts in . alter frontiers have always led to conjunction with the Final Act and 'provisions on a reciprocal basis and other signed agreements. It should. suspicion, . an arms, race,. and % ulti- in strict conformity with the spirit of. ? be stressed that this i a i l , rec proca . Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CFO-RDP77-00432R000100380006-0 Approved For. Release 2001/08108 CIA-RDP77-00432 R000100380006-0 matter: The' implementation "of the "third-basket" provisions, as well as other. sections of the Final Act, will require efforts from both the Soviet and Western sides, especially because of the blocks set : p against these ties., The sponsor's of the campaign di- rected against. the Conference . on Security and Cooperation in Europe expose their intentions eloquently by the fact that the full and true content of the Final Act has not yet been made known to the public in most of the Westerncountries. . In reference to the item in the Final .Act on freedom of information, ti,e Soviet Union. intends to earnestly fu1- r. fill all provisions recorded. Howeder, if some people regard , them as an invitation to fling open the door to subversive anti-Soviet pro-violence .propaganda, or to fan. national and . ties c6nducte3 E by the' radio stations racial strife, then they are laboring in Radio Liberty .and Radio Free. Europe; vain. Neither the document signed in which have the official backing of the Helsinki nor detente 'will permit such , United States Government: occurrences. The organizers of the present cam- It that,. in establishing diplomatic rela-, tions, in 1933, the Soviet Union and the United States undertook not only: to refrain from. interfering in one another's internal affairs, but pledged themselves to prevent all individuals paign have intended to distort the agreements reached 'fn Helsinki and, by laying more and more claims on the Soviet Union, to make it appear as if the Soviet Union is violating. these agreements. This, ? in turn, will. lead to a questioning of the validity and organizations under the Govern- ..Of the agreements and of detente as meet's direct ..or indirect control, a whole. . including organizations financed by the Government, from committing any Georgi A.. Arbatov is director of. the overt or covert act which might-do Institute of United States and Cana-. damage to the tranquility, well-being, da Studies of the Soviet Academy order or security.of the other side. of Sciences. It is not clear, however, how' this. can square with the subversive activi- THE W'ASHINGT.OIN POST WEDNESDAY OCTOBER 15.'' 1975- SUMMA Possibilities Two cheers are in order for President ,Ford's decision to hold a summit meeting with leaders of the. other main industrial countries in Paris next month. If nothing else, the principal countries can arrange to stop maximizing their problems of recession and inflation. As -an added :bonus, comparison with other leaders may cause President Ford- to see how inadequate are the men and machinery he ,,has put together for managing foreign economic policy in Washington. Behind the coming 'summit is the in-, creasing tendency of the major industrial countries to perform as a single economic ;,unit. Because they have come to trade so piueh with each other, their economic ,,pctivity has become synchronized. Thus in 1972 and 1973. for the first time, the United States. Japan. Britain and the- European Common it . larket countries all ,surgedsimultancously into a boomand high nflation. In 1974 and 1975. the pattern was ,,gxactly reversed. Tht?y all suffered, and 'continue to suffer. high unemployment and recession. . In retrospect it is clear that the plight of "all the industrial countries was worsened b each -.1 ___ .._ --- .... y The dominant agenda item will be ,pne. Thus in 1972, partially for election.-.. -coordination of economic policies to reasons, the leading governments- wete ~.:: smooth out the rapid alternation between stimulating their domestic economies. ? - Business men sensing the boom ahead bid like crazy for raw materials and labor. The Russian grain shortage and then the oil boycott intensified the fever. Between Jute 1973 and June 1974. consumer prices in all the industrial countries, including the United States and excluding only Germany, were running at well over 10 per. Joseph Kraft turbulent ups and downs of the past few years. It may even be possible that the Germans, French and Japanese can persuade Mr. Ford that all countries will be better off if he puts a little more steam behind U.S. recovery:.. With inflation rampant the policymakers in each country then moved .in unison to apply the brakes of budget stringency and tight money. Money supply.- ,was cut by 50 per cent in France and the United States, and by more than 90 per cent in West Germany. Economic growth in all the industrial countries went sud- denly slack. As Sen. Hubert Humphrey put it in .a remarkable speech in Chicago on Sept. 25: "Taken, individually, these policies meant a slowdown in, economic growth-not cessation. In combination... the result was worldwide recession."' . ._ . . Precisely because of the recession the" ' two strongest leaders: in the industrial world-Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of West Germany and President Valery Giscard D'Estaing of France-have been pushing for an economic summit. After several months of fencing. Mr. Ford finally agreed, and the talks will be held in mid-November with Japan, Britain and .perhaps Canada joining the United States, Germany and France_ inflation and recession. That is the kind of subject which only the top political leaders-as- distinct from finance ministers who stick to technical mat- ters-can talk about with confidence. But with any luck at all, the political 'leaders can organize their economic policymaking so: as to smooth out the Though less tangible, a second beneficial impact of the meeting will be the effect on President Ford. Three days with the likes of Helmut Schmidt, Harold Wilson and Valery Giscard D'Estaing should show him that managing a modern economy is serious business-the most serious political business now going, and not one that yields to gladhanding trips through provincial crowds. Moreover, comparison with the policymaking apparatus of other countries should drive home to Mr. Ford the weakness of his own system. Unlike the other leaders, he is not himself an economist, nor 'does he have a chief economic adviser to whom he can turn with confidence. He has to thrash out issues in a kind of guerrilla warfare with his secretary of state and his secretary of treasury. So the experience of the economic summit should point up for Mr. Ford a 'widely recognized point that was voiced with special force the other day by John Anderson, a highly respected Republican leader in the House. "The United States does not have a coherent and comprehensive foreign economic policy,". Mr. Anderson, said. "The major obstacle to the formulation of such a policy is the lack of a White House mechanism' for resolving policy disputes among administration officials." Approved. For Release. 200't108/083CCIA-RDP77-0O0432R000100.380006-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380006-0 NEAP YORK TINES 6 October 1975 VVe BALTIMORE SUN tice is the case of Andrei Tverdokhle- 6 October 1975 bov. It is not yet so well known as Bukovsky's, but in its way it is as. George F. Will important. For it indicates the Soviet fear of international efforts to protect human rights. Tverdokhlebov is a physicist who ,joined Andrei Sakharov, the .great -So viet nuclear scientist and defender of freedom, in forming the Moscow Hu- ritannica Taken n 'by So'iet Semantics man Rights Committee yin 1970. For Washington. "the major political. party," that and for defending others he lost Referring to one of the En and-this is my favorite-the his research appointment. In 1974 he cyclopedia Britannica's 15 ar-= organization' through which helped to start a Soviet branch of titles on the 15 soi-disant re- "political life in the republic Amnesty International, the respected, publics of the Soviet Union, is largely organized By Anthony Lewis non-partisan organization for human Warren Preece, editor of the: Professor Misiunas sug-, rights. new edition, says: "I've got gests that the reason why thei BOSTON, Oct. 5=-A leading Soviet On April .18, 1975, Tverdokhlebov ? eight people at universities in articles "are replete with du- authority on American affairs, Georgi' was arrested. The same day two Other our article who] were not all bious statements or insinua- A. Arbatov, recently deplored viola- members of the Amnesty branch had that egregiously false." tions" is "the unawareness on tions of human rights in the United:, their homes -searched. Another was It seems fair to take Mr. the part of the editors of the States. He told the readers of Izvestia arrested, eventually released, and ex- Preece's statement as indica. Britannica of different Soviet that Americans suffer such abuses. Pelled from the writers' union for be. tive of the editorial standards and Western definitions of as wiretapping, the keeping " of .Gov- longing to a "bourgeois organization." used when compiling the Bri- such key terms as "democra- ernment' dossiers on. individuals and Tverdokhlebov remains in custody, tannica's new-15th-edition cy" and "elections." But the "shameful court .reprisals .-against awaiting trial on a charge of slander- that cost $32 million to pro- problem is philosophic, not se- dissidents." ing the Soviet system. duce and sells for $600 a set. mantic. It pertains to percep- _ Inhumanity is so deeply imbedded All the articles on the Sow tions of reality, not definitions. human ty to ,man, the world in the Soviet `system, that outsiders- et "republics" were written of Words. should probably be grateful to Mr,. may well despair- of having any effect by Soviet authors recom- The problem is that the So- on it.-That" is an understandable mended to the Britannica by viet Union has no democracy. Arbatov for providing comic relief.American reaction to a society-South Novosti, a Soviet propaganda Someone should remind the A spokesman, fora country where the, Africa is - another example-where agency often but wrongfully ' Britannica's editors of the er- scrutiny of individual minds is a major law is an instrument of official referred to as a ""news a en- industry complains about imperfections g ample Lincoln used to give: If in American freedom and privacy-it. 'oppression. But the feeling of helpless-: Cy. Moreover, the-article on I call a tail a leg, how many is deliciously brazen, ness is. wrong. Czechoslovakia, like the arti- legs has a dog got? Five? No, Th f h P l d d d f h - - - -- - - - reprisals against dissidents." In the - the maze it so. ine soviet union Leningrad . dancers, were finally Cai Communist parties, which finds it useful to say it has de- Nixon years there were - American. allowed to emigrate " after boycotts - explains why there is not a y mocracy because saying so is prosecutions that amounted to official 'and. protests by Western dance and. syllable about unpleasant 'enough to befuddle such West- revenge against dissidents, but one ? theater people, and finally direct inter- things like the 1968 Soviet in- ern institutions as the Britan- after another the attempts failed. In , vention by Prime Minister Wilson vasion of Czechoslovakia. ? nica. the Soviet Uhion they never fail. of Britain, had made the case too - Writing in the "Slavic Re- This does not mean that .Consider, for example, the case of` embarrassing to the Soviets. Andrei view," - Professor Romuald the folks at the Britannica are Vladimir Bukovsky-a heart rending Sakharov,. in a book to be published Misiunas of Williams College ' in the gri of a noxious ideolo p - one even by the. standards of official. soon, "My Country and the World," rather too politely suggests gy. They just don't'know any cruelty in the Soviet Union. Bukovsky" says the Panov episode "confirms" that."the policy of unqualified better. That is why they ac- is a young scientist who most effec- ` the need for "the strongest pressure" use of Soviet sources in future cepted an article on Spain tively brought to the- outside world's from outside. . ? editions needs re-evaluation." partially written bu a former attention the misuse of psychiatry in There are realities that limit what we Charitable to a fault, Pro- Spanish Cabinet officer in the U.S.S.R. to punish dissidents.. : `. can, do for the victims of totalitarian' fessor' Misiunas notes that charge of promoting tourism. Oukovsky was first arrested at the the , societies. It is necessary to have rela- "the greater portions of the A Britannica vice presi- age of twenty, in 1963, for having, tionships with governments we dislike, articles are devoted to geog- dent has suggested that the a, copy of Milovan Djilas's "The New. in the interest of avoiding war.. We raphy, flora, and fauna" and new edition is "edited from a Class." He was declared insane and must have a healthy sense of what is these portions are adequate. world point of view . . . as held for *eighteen months in a psychi, effective, avoiding `empty gestures. Evidently not even the dis- though we were looking at the atric ward. After his release he demon- Some would put Senator Jackson's eased imagination of the Sovi- earth from the moon." A point strated against the repression of oth- amendment to the trade bill in that et regime has yet contrived to that seems to have eluded the ers and in .1965 went. back to the category, because 'it did not bring breathe ideological content in- Britannica's editors is that mental word for six months. In 1967, Soviet agreement on emigration, but. to a description of the Ural there are no writers on the after another protest, he was sen- Sakharov argues that- it failed -only Mountains, moon. And there is no such tented. to three years in a labor camp. because - of Western disunity-other Mr. Preece clings to this as' thing as "a world point of ? Out in 1970,,he ,gave the foreign pre4s countries offered the trade credits evidence that the Britannica's view." copies of the psychiatric : diagnose$ of that we withheld. - critics are making mountains Presumably the Britannica a number of dissenters=documentary One shibboleth we must put aside out of molehills: "If you read wanted disinterested scholar- evidence that aroused pressure by, ? is the notion that- we must not the articles, what the hell, ship. But prayer scholars do -Western psychiatrists against the So-' intervene in the "internal affairs" of. two-thirds of them are devot- not need to go to the moon to lviet practice. the Soviet Union and, other countries. ed to the topography of the acquire a disinterested point Secretary of State Kissinger says that, area Nobody's complaining of view. in 1971 and again held for psychiatric and so do the Soviet leaders, but about our facts there." . Here on earth, the last .examination. After. widespread pro- neither pays the least attention to the But critics are com lain- P place a reasonable person tests he was declared sane, but -he supposed rule when it is inconvenient. ing about the Britannica's looks for disinterestedness is ,was tried, and convicted for "anti- What the United States actually treatment of such fauna as the from governments. Yet in Soviet propaganda and agitation." His follows is a policy of selective non- Communist party The arti- their mindless pursuit of what sentence was two years in prison, five intervention. The 'question is how we cles on the on the Soviet "re- they evidently think is cosmo-x make the selection Do we cons ire . p in a labor camp; then five in exile, He - publics. refer to the party as politanism, the Britannica's is in a camp now_ reportedly gravely against a left-wing government in "the guiding political oreani- -A4+-- 611,1 . blish a - -- e u th t '-"r^--'-- %141.'31 a are liluilulilCma VJ in Spain? In the end, we come to our political or agitation" "the I A recent example of using the.lav, 1 Wh en n g ax-grinding parochialism. in reprisal against those whg0lplq-tyged Aown e' ISe 0 i/U8 ?j-R6 79d0 FW1071 880006-o ------ Stand: III e act is tat outsi e nreccura a es on n an an n a were because calling it so doesn't. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380006-0 THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITCP Spain gives. By Joseph C. Harsch Washington Spain's execution of five terrorists is dis- rupting the West and aiding communism more than any world incident since the American invasion of Cambodia. The five have become martyrs in a protest movement which makes it possible for the -communists throughout Western Europe to put themselves arm in arm with socialists, liberals, moderates, and intellectuals. It has ended their political isolation of recent years. In effect, it has put them back in business. 'Peking seems to be appalled at the spectacle of an event which is so much to the advantage of Moscow. It is saying virtually nothing at all. Chinese foreign policy has been to encourage unity among Western democracies. That unity is being seriously damaged. American support for Spain is once again opening a rift between Washington and Western Europe. This is obviously regarded as bad news in Peking. Moscow treats it in a calculated tone of "more in sorrow than in anger." Its press and radio avoid the shrill note of protest. It can afford to sit back quietly and watch as the local communist parties. in the West again have a popular bandwagon which they can board and then attempt to control. The worst immediate damage is in Portu- gal. There the political moderates and cen- trists were just getting a government formed and in operation with excellent chances of success when the Spanish incident gave the communists a golden opportunity to take to the streets again with a popular rallying cry. The once bright hope for a moderate solution to Portugal's political problems is in danger. The damage inside Spain can become worse. There is a sudden political repolarization. divide begin again to think in terms of civil war. Spanish nationalism has been enflamed has swept over -the rest of Europe. It has been There is, of course, a limit on how far they assumed for a generation that the memory of can ride this particular vehicle. After all, the the Spanish civil war of the 1930s was a sure executed five had killed policemen - and that safeguard against another. That assumption is a crime in any society. Damage-control .now is in question. operations are under way. An immediate casualty is the effort to end Washington is doing what it can to try to Spain's isolation from the rest of Western.. prevent the re-isolation of Spain from settling Europe. That has been a priority American into - a fixed pattern. The wave of popular project .,for 'a decade. Progress was impres- revulsion against Spain may subside as sud- sive. denly as it surged up. Suddenly, the rest of Europe is repelled by But we have before us right now a startling an act in Spain which - no matter how reminder that there are communist parties in justified in many Spanish eyes - seemed every Western European country', that these unconscionable to the rest of Europe. The five parties are always ready to seize a popular were terrorists.-But two of them were Basque cause when one comes along, and that once nationalists for whom there is much sympathy seized they know how to make-good use of it. in other European countries. In this case they have already used it to The Pope had urged the Spaniards to refrain delay a return to political stability in Portugal from the executions. They plunged ahead. and to head off the American project of a Travel and communication between Spain and reconciliation between Spain and the NATO the rest of Europe is down to a trickle. Spain allies. has re-isolated itself. The moral of the affair of course is: Don't Communists in Europe have had a poor time give the Communists popular causes. since the. Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia The reaction to the execution of the five (in and the beginning of the American withdrawal Spain) has become one of those events which from Vietnam. Through all of Western Europe shakes the political pattern of every country in those twin events put them on the defensive. Europe. It is like the reaction to Soviet tanks Mostly they lay low, went dormant, or surging into Budapest or Prague. Everyone concentrated - as in Italy - on makinga new feels it. Those events did untold damage to image for themselves as good citizens. communism. In Western Europe no commu- They themselves were in bad odor for the nist party ever really recovered from 'hem. shameful deed in Czechoslovakia, even though But now Spain provides a partial antidote. ,most of them had publicly repudiated it. And What a pity! - Washington was doing nothing on which they could build a viable propaganda campaign. THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY They have been long without any good NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY,--o CTOBER 9, 1973 Moscow Links U. S. Silence Over. Sp-arn'. t?_ Bases Spacial to The m torleTtmes MOSCOW,. Oct. 8-The Gov- ernment newspaper Izvestia .charged 'today that Washington (cynically' withheld criticism of Spain's executions of terrorists last week to obtain. ar_ agree- ment on American military bases there. . of political isolation around the regime is tightening it has got tangible support from across the ocean." The Soviet Union also has capital punishment, and it is not only against those convict- ed of murder but also in certain other crimes such as corrup- li I i e . p on. n m d-S ptember, for in- Over the ratests - of many I p y position toward the executions) stance, the death sentence was European nations, the Madridlin Spain was duly rewarded"; ordered for a factory official !Government executed five 'ter-, Criticism Muted and Veiled in Kazakhstan who had been i rorists who were convicted of killing policemen and civil Eguards. The incident pro, ;yoked violent demonstrations throughout Europe, and six countries-Britain, West ? Ger- many, East Germany, Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands, withdrew their ambassadors :from Madrid. The United Statesi did not join the protests. "While the whole - world protests against the new malici-' .ous crime of the Madrid re-1 By DAVID K.. SHIPLER gime," Izvestia wrote. today,Iment," Izvestia declared. "At i le ' i"they in-the United States rvni-the moment "'hien th rc e c this issue is.profitable for them and whch is not." Contending . that Spain had been reluctant to permit the retention of American military bastes in the country, the paper wrote, "Over the past weeks, they became more accommo- dating The s ecial American elsewhere abroad, but it has taken issue with-- Washinton's foreign policy recently, ionly muted tones. The Soviet press, for example, has been generally aiming its criticisms. at vaguely defined "imperialist circles" without naming the United States. No such euphemisrh appeared today, however. "International public opinion condemns the new American-Spanish- agree- reported that the Spanish exe- cutions were carried ' out against men convicted of mur= dering policemen and members of the civil guard. The terror- ists, part of a group of 11, included three members of a leftist guerrilla group known as the Revolutionary Anti-Fas- cist Patriotic Front,..and two who belonged to a Basque na- tionalist, movement.. _ Communism By -Tom Wicker. ROME-"I see no need in Italy for . state ice cream cones," says Luciano Barca, a high-ranking economic plan- ner in the Italian Commurrist party. He - is only partially joking about the fact . that much of Italy's food industry, in- eluding some ice cream production, is state-owned or shared. The ironic fact is that the Commu- nists are saying that their economic program. might reduce the nationaliza- tion of private interests in Italy and even "reprivatize" some concerns that haven't worked well under state con- trol. Actually, with 45 per cent of Italy's gross national product already being produced by state-owned or shared businesses, Mr. Barca and other.. Communist leaders say they are think- ?ing more of "socializing consumption rather than socializing property." This approach is also infh}enced by - "what Mr. Barca sees as the failure of Keynesian economics to produce in _ Appruved fur Ube. 49,7R000100380006-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380006-0 an society a stable relationship be- twee employment, the rate of infla- xt and the balance of payments. Iir, for example, has sharply .im- p Dyed its balance of payments=but o ly at the cost of a drastic cut in d stand, brought on by declines in e iploy'ment and production, now good. In agriculture, for example, over production of some crops-such as tomatoes-is perennial, but some other. staples-beef, .for instance-are pro- duced in such small quantities " as to make huge imports necessary. The Communists propose that the state-owned food industries work out a five- or nine-year program of buying various farm products in guaranteed quantities. This would give farmers an element of security and greater ability to plan production; and they could be encouraged by such guarantees to di- versify production, reducing-if the program worked-both surpluses and imports. Moreover, Mr. Barca believes, the plan would cost less than the cur- rent level of Government subsidies to farmers, many of whom are growing crops usually in surplus. "Blocs of demand" to be newly or- ganized, in addition to agriculture, would include housing, educational buildings, transportation, shipbuilding and energy. - Communist plans include a "restruc. turing of industry" in several direc= Lions-a drive, for example, against d .wee to about 70 per cent of capacity. The approach of "socializing con- s rnption" envisions, instead, a state' it tervention' to organize demand, not or;ly in imports but internally, in such a way as to give priority to "social dt rnand"-for schools, - hospitals and he using, for example. New demands wi ul'd also be created,. Communist pliinners say, in such a way as to make it less important to nationalize companies like the privately owned Fiat automobile manufacturing plant. ' "We don't even pose the problem of natfartalizing Fiat," Mr. Barca said. In- stead, the Communist program would call for major investment in public transportation-particularly intercity trains and urban mass transit-rather than on roads and trucks. Fiat would have little choice but to shift some of its production into railway rolling stew r. The idea, Mr. Barca says, is to avoid de r elupment of "bureaucratic social- ism." with everything run by the state, but to influence entrepreneurs to choose the right options for the public ITALY, , waste and the draining off of resources to pay salaries to a "non-producing ' bureaucracy." Heavy emphasis appar- ently would be placed on research and development, so that the low level of Italian technology could be improved. Small businesses would be given ac- cess to Government "think, pools" to aid them 'in necessary research and planning.' All of this seems carefully designed to: avoid any hint of the kind of heavy. handed socialization of most aspects of the economy that is to be. found in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. But it also seems well-tailored not only to Italian political realities but also to Italian economic needs. The Communists may not -even have to take seats in the Government to get at, least some of the program into effect. A party that won 33 per cent of the votes in the June regional elections, Mr. Barca points out, should find it possible to "condition"-that is, to in- fluence--a Government so shaky polit- ically, and with' such a record of in- eptitude, as the present center-left coalition. The Communists may be able to "get results" even without power be- cause businessmen and industrialists as well as workers are looking for new approaches to Italy's problems; and because the regional and provin- cial governments are becoming more important in Italy, just as the Com- munists have greatly extended their power in those governments. Christian Science Monitor 16 October 1975. So~ts see art, Portugai lawyur says By Takashi Oka Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor Blackpool, England The major Western cultural contribution to Portugal since last year's revolution has been pornography, Professor Diego Freitas do Amaral told a British Conservative Party audience here recently. The Communist bloc, by contrast the said), has been sending operas, ballets, folk dancers, and other concert artists in a steady stream. The artists contribute their earnings to local Communist coffers, thus swelling the Commu- nist war chest. This was only one example among many, Professor do Amaral said, of the intense effort the Soviet bloc has been making in Portugal since the revolution. By contrast, Western help has been fitful and hampered by the law (which the Communists disregard) that no Portuguese political party may receive a financial contribution from outside the coun- try. (Western concerts and other cultural contri- but ions have ceased mainly because of foreign exchange difficulties. Pornography slips through the loopholes caused by the lifting of censorship and illegal remittance of funds.) Professor do Amaral a lawyer in his mid- Professor do Amaral's main concern in visiting Britain was to underline his con- tenti.)n that although the Socialists under Mario Scares have played a key role in the fight for democracy in Portugal, "they are not alone in the struggle." And as Dr. Soares appealed at the Labour Party's recent Black- pool conference for British help, so Professor do Amaral asked for the sympathetic concern of conservatives and Christian Democrats throughout Europe. The major difference between Portugal and Spain, Professor do Amaral told his audience, is that Spain is still under a dictatorship, whereas in Portugal a democratic revolution overthrew the dictatorship, only to be threat- ened by dictatorship of another kind - that of the Communists and their allies. . The European Economic Community has recently voted to give Portugal. $130 million in economic aid. But Professor do Amaral opined that until the present acute phase of the struggle between the Communists and the military-led coalition government is over, there is no effective authority to see that the aid is wisely spent. He was hopeful about the outcome, but underlined that in the present context, "anything can happen - a Commu- nist coup, an extreme right-wing coup, or civil war." thirties, heads the CDS, the only Christian "Between the twin political poles of commu- i)c?rnocrat party permitted to function legally nism and fascism, the democratic parties are in Portugal. The CDS won a surprising 8 fighting a very difficult battle"Professor do percent of the votes in elections for the Amaral concluded. "Your understanding, ('untitltuent Assembly last April. It did so in your friendship, your support is vital. If you the face of continual harassment and in- decide to help its. pleLse do it today. Tomor- t imiclat ion by ykppMi f?9 ri ' i ge.001 /08(98'Cc -RDR3t7.O0432R000100380006-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08.: CIA-RDP77-00432R00010.0380006-0 Sinai_Pact- Stirs Misgivings Among . .r I journalists and politicians see moderate . voice in the Arab that Mr. Kissinger, on his last By HENRY TANNER it. These men are convinced world for the time being. (visit after the agreement had Spat' to Tim 24s7 York Tres that Israel will give up further Assad's Role Weakened been signed, told President As- BEIRUT, Lebanon, Oct: 3- ground in the occupied Syrian 1sad that the United States Many Arab diplomats, scholars territory and the West Bank Egypt, this reasoning goes, ,would try to "get something" and journalists outside Egypt, of the Jordan River only under could be an effective leader for Syria before the American sharp pressure from bashing- toward a peace settlement only election but that "he could not believing that the Sinai agree ton. f she. maintained her creden? promise." Tent has crucially weakened; I Mr. Kissinger's reassurances tials as a confrontation state.1. "What kind of step-by-step the Arab side,. are convincedi to the contrary, they just do along with Syria, and. if she is that?" the diplomat asked. 1 that . the pact will prove and not see any such pressure be- (remained in a position to in- West European dirlomats in obstacle to peace rather than fore or soon after the American. jfluence policies within the the area moreover express fear elections next year. And this, Palestine liberation movement., that' the United States will. not a step toward it. y The critics further say that ? in their view, means another be able to meet the hopes of Despite disclaimers by Anwar; stalemate and therefore- drift the Sinai agreement has weak- economic assistance and invest-$ el-Sadat, the Egyptian Pres ened the position of President toward another war. ment in Egypt. that have. been ident, these critics--Syrians,' A - Palestinian university Hafez al-Assad of Syria in face created by the agreement. Palestinians and Lebanese---' teacher said: of more unyielding officials in; Damascus. This, in turn,' has contend that Egypt, ? The needs of Egypt are astro- the most . "You are doing what you ? reduced his ability to enter nomical. And if President Sadat populous and militarily power always did. You say that you. - ! fails to solve his economic ful Arab country, has been bro-, are making Israel- strong be- Into a disengagement agree- g g problem because the Arab oil ken out of the Arab front' cause only strong Israel can lnent of his own, the critics' against Israel. They assert that, make concessions. But thf op- add. .producers are not willing to I give the mthat the United - givee cannot money on provide, the then United with American encouragement( posite is. true. How are you' Specialists on Palestinian of- g a psychological and political, going to prod Them now? You[, fairs moreover report that the agreement would lose its justi- demobilization will taike place have made them immune to l Sinai agreement has strength- in Egypt, with the result that' your pressure for the next IO creed the extremist leaders fication even in the eyes of Egyptians, these diplo- any ! mata mats average Egyptian will be- years." within the Palestine liberation m !come inward-looking and non; For President Sadat the most ilauthority moveme t and sud h the They point out that the only longer concerned with the Eater?important reason for wanting moderates as Yasir Arafat who Arab leader who has publicly ; of the Palestinians, which is (( the Sinai agreement was than , endorsed the Sinai agreement at the heart of the Arab conflict f until recently had been working. r r he thought-and still thinks so far. is President Gaafar al- with Israel. It will take another that it will lead to direct Ameri-? closely, if discreetly, with Pres- ndd Sudan. King war to reverse this trend, the' can involvement in the Middle. it ident Sadat. ha dy of the Khaiid of -'Saudi Arabia was critics of the Sinai agreement say. The critics in Damascus and Beirut also charge that neither American nor Israeli attitudes have changed as a result of the Iagreement. They insist that the publication of the secret Ameri- can-Israeli understanding re- vealed- that the United States Jremained totally committed to given Israeiveta power over of Israel while the other-they `mistsyareyunderstoodfto be de-;drawal to the pre-1967 lines, inj 1any contacts between Washing- Soviet Union-gave more half-I manding that Mr. Arafat de-ireturn for a real peace accord.! Informed diplomats here re-' ton and the Palestinians. thearted backing to the Arabs. flounce the Sinai agreement as l Advanced Arms an issue it is also hoped that the! "Egyptian treason,, and thatl; approach that'this actually was the The critics note that Secre-~ mood resulting from the agree- he publicly pledge not to attend pproach chosen by Arabists ment i will bring investors and any kind of Geneva conference ment the United earlier r this summer, but' !promised Israel $2-billion to S3- and si he liArabfrcounth es West Smatter what the circumstan I that it was dropped`as political-1 ;billion worth of advanced weap- o . ly unfeasible because of ex- .ors, and they, contend that it Egypt to help salvage her ailing. I Arab critics of the agreement Y petted opposition from Israel's will be a long time--especially! (economy. "'contend that American motives supporters in Congress. in view of the coming Ameri- Mr. Sadat's critics concede: have once more become suspect; Criticism of the agreement can elections-before Mr. Kis- that their contention is based among Arab nationalists. Extre is admittedly based on the as- `singer or another Secretary of! on the expectation that Mr. mists accuse Mr. Kissinger of sumption that Mr. Kissinger State, will even think of inter- Kissinger will be unable to deliberately seeking to split rupting the new flow of wea-1 bring ano not d able bring about I about another disengage- Egypt from the rest of the; another disengagement nt on "he' pons as' a means of persuading; ment on the Syrian front. :Arab world. Moderates say that Syrian front. if' he did-and Israel to make further withdra-' Syrian, Palestinian and Leba-, whatever his intentions, this the chances seem slim-the) wals from occupied Arab terri- nese critics fear that the agree-( is the result by which the. 'great first obstacle would be; tory: ment has isolated Egypt, neu-~ Americaa action has to be surmounted and momentum to- This goes to the heart of tralized President Sadat andi ,judged. ward peace would be achieved, the problem, as Arab scholars. muted the most effective; A Syrian diplomat recalled even his critics concede. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 :.C4~-RDP77-00432R000100380006-0 1 East, on the Arab side as well' {Gain for Palestine Extremists ,as the Israeli. C If the power struggle within The Egyptian leader had -the Palestinian leadership cul- come to the conclusion that minated now, those who reject the Arab-Israeli conflict could negotiation might well win, not be solved and that Israel could not be induced to evac uate the territories - she occu- pied in 1967 - as tong as one of the two superpowers-the; specialists here say. This was not the case a few months ago. I than the Sinai agreement, al- Negotiations are reported to most all critics say, would have be under way between Mr. Ara been forI~the United Statesilin quoted by -Mr. Kissinger as being in favor but has not, said so himself, and others have been cautiously silent. Alternative Suggested Approved For Release 2001/08/08 CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380006-0 NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY,'XrCTOBE.R.-.16,'1g7S ` U. S. Seeks Rapid Aid to Zaire but .90M The GWERTZi44AN ; . Congress Is Warn Spedai to the New York TYmes diplomatic manners as bad as those of the president of Uganda. A double standard has always applied at the U.N, and it works t6 our disad- vantage. African dclc(;ates behind-the-scenes effort by the ways to help Cambodia, caused in part by a sharp drop its to help Zaire import spare State Department to shore up in Washington, reported last! in copper prices, General Mo-1 parts and other critical items the Government of -President ;Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire with !an emergency infusion of $60- imiW nz has so far failed to win Coe sessional backing. In an extraordinary move strongly endorsed by Secretary of Stat Kissinger, ? the depart- ment has sought to persuade key members of Congress to approve granting of,the aid now bypassing the normal, time-con- suming Congressional review roe:ss. State Department officials in- fornaed Congress privately that fore.~gn aid legislation e Fiord Administration to allows, !th !the economic assistance pro- gram without formal Congres-. siona,3 approval. But, fearingi that such an action might never thete5s cause a flare-up with Congress, the Administration has 1;.ressed for informal assent from the chairmen of the au- lthorhation and appropriation ,subcommittees, month that American help for the anti-Soviet groups in An- gola had been funneled through General Mobutu. Influence In O.A.U., butu shocked Washington by, needed to keep her factories II expelling its Ambassador, Deane' going.. - - R. Hinton. . 49Long-term credit at- favor- At that time, the aeneral.J able rates to buv American aa- power in the a ( a commodity - import program a.t African Unity to block of-I s,rce ne toox r..-...,n,. --1 early nineteen sixies. allowing _Zaire to buy goods 11 r-f. r ,n f rt or f fo o from the United Nations """ g with irri-I nere, treeing her to pay off hef tation at Mr. Hinton's ouster, and, to a lesser extent, at a heavy short-term debts- and, Kissinger sent Sheldon B. The meeting of the nonaligned bloc Vance, a former Ambassador $20 million A.I.D. IoanI in August.. . to Zaire and a reputed con., `?- ahas caused the most concern' In addition, it is reported, , d, nt of General Mobutu, to on Capitol Hill because suchf Mr._ Kissinger agreed that the Kinshasa to see the general ; large security - supporting as-! economic crisis in Zaire threat-; and assure him of continued, sistance in Africa is unparal-! ened General Mobutu's Gov-' American support.'This was the leted in recent years. Last 5 year,! ernment at a time when his result of a determination in; for instance, Zaire's total eco-i help was most needed. These Washington that Zaire was tool nomic . assistance was only! concerns led the State Depart- crucial to be s d $45-million - - bb nu e ... ment to give aid to.Zaire high priority-to show General Mo- Aid Package Promised Consultation With I.M.F.' backing him ?at-a time of crisis, and subsequent ones in Julyl!said. that France and Belgium! None of the Congressional and August-the emergency aid chairmen interviewed has con- package was put together and sented to the Administration! r'romised to General Mobutu. plan, although they acknowl- Key members of Congress - I'teasons .for Concern .. edge Zaire's economic plight.! ,were informed of it before the l bring her economy under con- Ai zs said thatMr. They seem to feel that. Zaire's August recess. At. that time, trol. The department has given Kissinger was concerned withthe needs should be considered in Mr. Clark and Senator Hubert, much attention to the signifi- Ienis of Zaire, Zairee, , though he nor- prob- the normal way, as part of the' H. Humphrey of Minnesota, cance of Zaire's agreeing to overall security-supporting as- chairman of the Foreign Re ma-?1y displays minor interest ,sistance bill for this fiscal year, lations subcommittee on aid,; I I'F. help. in Arica. -that is scheduled to be sub- sent a joint letter to the State) In a brochure supporting the Not only has General Mobutu ! shitted to Congress next week. :Department opposing hasty request, distributed to key displayed "moderate" positions Usually passage of such a bill, i action. i members Of m Congress, the in international forums at at?kes months. Mr. Kissinger,assigried Dell- Agency for International Devel- time ,:.lien the United States is Senator Dick Clark of Iowa,!Uty Secretary Robert S. Inger- being assailed by other third- ! soil, Mr. Vance and the African opment said the recovery-of world states, but his anti-Com- tions subcommittee on Affrica, I bureau the job of getting infor- Zaire's economy was "of sub - muai m is also regarded by Mr. has asked for a full-scale re-I mal Congressional approval of stantial importance to the Unit- Kissinger as important, given !view of over-all Americap re-1 the. aid package. Nathaniel ed States.' It said that the the unsettled conditions in !Iaiions with General Mobutu'sl Davis, the head of the African; United States had $750-million neighboring Angola, the aides Gisvernment, bureau, is resigning soon, in, in investments in Zaire that said I Although General Mobutu part because General Mobutu, would be jeopardized if she de; General Mobutu has report- opposed his appointment. Mr.l faulted on her debts. edly been helping Angolan has long been regarded in Af-! Davis has been accused of in-1 Zaire owes $550 -million `iii forces hostile to the Soviet- rice as a close friend of the) ?olvement in C.I.A. activity in short-term notes., Because the baciked Popular Movement for United States, many Africans;' Chile while ambassador there.[ price! fo copper, a major 'ex- the ".iberation of Angola. consider him unstable, a man' Related Components port,. has fallen from $1 a: )filmover, The New York Washington should deal with;: The aid package consists of',omy pound is to in ,55.a precarious Zaire's egon- i:nes, quoting official sources, cautiously. recarious s situaz Tier y, October 14, 1975 TheWasa;mngaMn Star Crosby S. Noyes 11 %...h 's Arni0 V% e.. J-10 11C-4111 ILL U.N. task - The fireworks that have organization. enlivened the opening of the Not only that: the un- Unoed Nations General , seemly exchange of invec- Assembly session in New- the has set back the evolu- York are not helpful. The tion to an appreciable natural combativeness of a degree. For it is one thing Daniel Patrick Moynihan for the American delegate may he stimulating. But it to respond with spirit to al>;e) tends to obscure a 't~a tut~j us atta~-.,}, tr i 1:rtaleful evolution 4 rP~Velfit dt'3 S1 .1?'R s V taking ,place in the world another to puton a show of $20-million: WASHINGTON, Oct. 15-A -the United Nations to consider- his, country out of a c . ' I gExport-Import Bank cred- .had helped Zaire recently and! that Zaire had agreed to con-! sult with the International) Monetary Fund on ways tol are genuinely shocked by displays of intemperance from the delegate of the United States - especially when it takes the form of a direct, personal attack which violates the most ele- mentary diplomatic nice- ties. Idi Amin, after all, is not the only racist murderer serving as a head of state. We have treaties of friend- ship and cooF rrntinn with quite a few of them. And and others expect to hoar despicaenle as he may be. n r t ' Amin gal ipne,tpn v r gasgt20 0 ciPhFADP77-004372ROOE1~fl~0O8A6 ate from about Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP7.7-0043280001-00380006-0 Yonians9 lead sweet life across road from native squalor tions of both sides. For the op- eration -of the canal and the management of the zone are' essentially by nature socialis- tic enterprises. To some residents it is all too much. They have moved. out. The company town aspect of zonal life is cited by Nor- man Werner, a 37-year-old canal pilot, one of the elite, as the reason for his building a house outside the zone. - "If I had known how much trouble it would be, I probably wouldn't have started," -he laughs. "But inside it really is an artifical life." Many Zonians have mar- ried Panamanians, without changing their views on con- tinued U.S. control. And al- though some seldom leave the zone, others have developed a deep affection for Panama and have retired there once they had to give up their as- signed housing. From the Pamananian perspective, growing numbers -encouraged by the govern-' meat of Gen. Omar Torrijos Herrera-are aware of and resentful of what they regard Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380006-0 9 pet-Cent ie-1973 to around 2 per cent this year. People in the cities have been hit badly! by high inflation and increased 1 unemployment. In the slum district of Chorrillo, where rows of rotting wooden tenements took across John F.? Kennedy Avenue to the green slopes of - the 533- square-mile Canal Zone, a lot- tery vendor complained . loudly about the rise in food prices. "The canal is just a pretext to divert our attention from the real problems," she went on, as a group of. barefoot children gathered around her. "What's going to happen if we get the canal? The Government will keep the money and in no time the zone will be as filthy as Panama City" Many conservative and left, wing- opponents of Brig. Gen. Omar Torrijos Herrera, who seized power in a coup in October; 1968,- believe that the Government's impatience to re- cover jurisdiction over the Canal Zone under. a new treaty is largely attributable to the 'country's precarious economic situation. . "The longer we wait, the more concessions we'll bet outs of the Americans," a member! of the-. Movement of Independ-! eat Lawyers said. "But the Government des-" ,perately needs the money from a new treaty -in order to stay alive: With stagnating economy and a foreign debt of over $1- ;billion for a country with just 1.5 million inhabitants, where else is, it, going to get thei money? So instead of the UnitedI States, Panama is making the! concession in the negotiations."! The Torrijos administration, which remains a one-man re- gime despite formal elections three years age, has responded to critics of the secrecy of the negotiations by publishing de tails of the. United States and Panamanian positions in the' talks., Evidence that General Tor- rijos is willing to accept an A.mericari military presence here for 25 more years as. part of a system of joint United States-Panamanian defense of: the waterway, has provoked` new criticism from opponents of the regime. Unlike the official Commu-1 nist party, the pro-Moscow; People's party, which backs thel Torrijos regime-the independ-t ent Marxist parties are ada-1 mantly opposed to any United] States military presence under ((a new treaty. Social democratic I and conservative factions be- lieve that a system of joint de- ense will merely insure indefi-I mfite military rule in Panama. More than anything, T.orri- jes wants to stay in power and, for that, he needs a new treaty for face-saving," AlbertoQuiros Guardia, an outspoken Socialist, who is a radio broadcaster, said in an interview. "But -a Isystem of joint defense will strengthen Panamanian militar- ism in the name of defending the canal." Wednesday. October 8. 1975 a-ciose tO By James Nelson Goodsell Latin America correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor New York Although senior United States officials say that negotiations on a new Panama Canal treaty are basically on track, many Latin Americans feel that something is amiss in the talks between Panama and the U.S. In fact, while Washington encourages a sense of optimism that the talks will soon produce a treaty to replace the 1903 accord, Panamanian sources here indicate that the two countries are still far apart on the terms of the treaty. , Other Latin Americans close to the Panama- U.S. talks agree with the Panamanians. A number of these Latin Americans, attending the United Nations General Assembly session here. add that Washington is deceiving itself if it believes that agreement is near or that the talks leading toward a new accord are making progress. "They broke off Sept. 17," a Panamanian- Govemment source noted.'While they will be resumed shortly, they will involve technical details rather than substantive issues." Still, United States officials maintain their optimism. They admit there are pitfalls in reaching an accord - including the threat of hemisphere-wide reaction if substantial prog- ress is not made quickly, and at home, the threat of a congressional refusal to ratify a new accord. But they minimize these points as they suggest that the Panamanian Government has a far greater problem than Washington does in regard to leaks of material concerning the negotiations. To many hemisphere observers this suggestion with regard to leaks seemed a direct slap at the Panamanian Government concerning its publication in late September of a statement on the status of negotiations. The Panamanian statement said the talks ree.. rne~at? were stalled by U.S. insistence on its right to continue defending the waterway indefinitely. As far as Panama is concerned, its state- ment "was valid and perfectly in keeping with "what Washington is doing," a high Pan- amanian official said. He was referring to an earlier statement by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger that "the United States must maintain the right . . . to defend the Panama Canl for an indefinite time." Dr. Kissinger quickly went on to say Sept. 16 that beyond defense and operating rights, the U.S. can make a variety of concessions on the- canal and the 500 square-mile zone surround- ing it. All this may sound like a big storm over a little bit of semantics. But the issue looms large on both sides. A United States source close to the negotia- tions said Washington is confronted with a major dilemma on the canal. On the one hand, the State Department, and that means the Ford administration, is willing to move toward some sort of new treaty. But it must be within limits that ippear increasingly tight - limits imposed by the vocal congressional and conservative opposition to any change in the 1903 treaty. Those limits have always included defense of the canal, but now they appear to include operation of the canal. . This, says the U.S. source, is not the way Panama previously understood it. Hence. it is using all the wapons it has to push its position. Those include "leaks" as well as efforts to arouse wider Latin American support. That support already is extensive - and Washing- ton knows it. . Thus, the U.S. would like an early con- clusion to the present talks. But it looks increasingly unlikely that it will get it.. 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