Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
June 20, 2001
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 1, 1975
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9.pdf8.8 MB
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 CONFIDENTIAL NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES INTERNAL USE ONLY This publication contains clippings from the domestic and foreign press for YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use of selected items would rarely be advisable. OCTOBER 1975 1(-). 20 PAGE GOVERNN'ENT AFFAIRS 1 GENERAL 28 EAST EUROPE 33 WEST EUROPE 34 .EAsT 37 AFRICA 41 EAST ASIA 43 LATIN NIERICA 48 25X1A Destroy after backgrounder has served its purpose or within 60 days. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 50 Words geted y Colby By George Lardner Jr. Washington Post Staff Writer Central Intelligence Agency Director William E. Colby defused a move to hold him in contempt of , Congress by turning over a stack of subpoenaed documents to the House intelligence committee late yesterday with only a few dozen Words deleted. The secret records were delivered to Chairman Otis Pike (D-N.Y.) with a covering letter declaring that they were being submitted only with the understanding that President Ford would have the last word on what could be made public.. ? Pike accepted custody of the documents pending a meet- ing of the full committee today to decide, whether to accept the arrangement. Quick approval is expected. . "This crisis is over," said one committee. source. "Now we can get on with our work."' ? A dispute with Secretary of' State Henry A. Kissinger overt access to State, Department witnesses remains to be set- tled, but . the committee ap- parently plans to step up itsf investigation of U.S. intelli- gence agencies and keep up the pressure on Kissinger at the same time. ; ' CIA special counsel Mitchell ilogovin handed the sub- poenaed documents to Pike and explained to the com- mittee chairman the reasons .for the scattered deletions. They ranged from the names of secret agents to derogatory remarks about various per- sonalities that Pike agree d! . were unnecessary to the cone; ruittee's work. Pike told the. Associated Press that in his`judgo, I Colby was no longer "in c i ce:, A1 jjj 711 mad tempt of Congress" and that I only extremely sensitive mai{ terial, covering about 50 words in all, had been deleted. Pike reportedly was in- clined to keep pressing for a: vote of confidence from the' full House on the committee'si battle for classified documents as a matter of principle, but it appeared unlikely that the full committee would want toi keep pushing .that point. -President Ford cut off the committee's access to all new classified information and demanded the return of 'se- cret documents the committeel alreadY had when it insisted on the right to declassify sen- sitive information on its own. Overriding CIA objections. . the committee disclosed a ; four-word phrase earlier this , imonth about Egyptian corn- tmunications security on the 1 eve of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. i Colby then refused to honor la fresh committee subpoena for secret documents bearing on the Communists' 1963 Tet offensive in South Vietnam and maintained that the dis- pute over who had the right to make them public would have to be settled first. Mean- while, Pike and the committee kept insisting that the admini- stration had no right to lay down any conditions before ;complying with congressional .subpoenas. . The dickering led to a meet- ing between President. Ford and House leaders last Friday. - But White House aides follow- ed up the conciliatory ges-. ture with a hard-line proposal not only giving Mr. Ford the? last word on what to .1-flake public, but also setting down new, broadly worded restric- tions on. what infermation would be supplied to the com- mittee even in confidence. By a vote of 10-3, the com- mittee decided Monday to re- ject the "compromise" and carry the battle to the House floor with a resolution deplor- ing the administration's non- compliance with its subpoenas and directing Colby to comply with the Tel subpoena "forth- with." ! The next step for the corn-I otittee's resolution would have 1 ii8Vg&alh09ffar08 -0 . The -CIA -letter ' delivered with the subpoenaed records 'yesterday reportedly made no mention of any restrictions ? on the types of information be supplied to the com- mittee. As a matter a practice, the agency will probably con- tinue to delete the names of .secret -agents and similar data from the documents it supplies. But the - CIA will have the burden of explaining the reasons for the deletions and Pike will be free to in- sist, for example, on knowing the identity of a secret agent in any specific case where it might be pertinent. If the committee wants to make any classified records orntestimony public, however, the government agency? in- volved will be given a chance to voice its objections at an executive session. If no agree- ment is reached, the dispute will go to the President ' ? .. Any written certification by the President that disclosure would, in his view, be "preju- dicial . to the national secu- rity" would bind the com- mittee and keep the disput- ed material from being made public. The committee could still litigate the issue in the. courts but that is not 'coositin maid likely. i "It's not a great victory for! US. to be quite blunt abouti1 it," a committee source said. . At the same time, Pike has said he has been assured that? the President himself will re-. I view any material the com- mittee insists on making pub- lic despite the intelligence community's objections. While the dispute with ? the administration over classified documents appeared virtually' settled, however, the commit- tee's battle with Kissinger stepped up a notch after an abortive hearing ' yesterday morning on the 1974 Cyprus crisis. It foundered' over what the State Department's former di- rector of Cypriot affairs, who had been called as a witness, WASHINGTON POST , Wedneadav. Oct. I, 1975 ? Moynihan Rejects .. CIA Label's Clout Reuter UNITED NATIONS, Sept. 30---U.S. Ambassa- dor Daniel Patrick Moyni- han said today that to be described as a CIA agent "should not be seen either to add to or detract from . the public reputations of described as explicit orders not to disclose the recommen- dations he made improve U S. Pike accused Kissinger of blocking the ? committee's in- vestigations with "preposterous" restrictions on witnesses under his caltroi. The Cyprus expert, Thomas D. Boyatt, a Foreign Service officer now awaiting reassign- ment, said he was told by Law- rence S. Eagleburger, deputy under secretary of state for management, yesterday morn- ing not to tell the committee about the recommendations he made, not even in executive session. ? - "I don't think it's the Pres- ident of the United States who's causing our clinical-. tines," Pike told reporters la- ter. "I've said it before and I'll say it again, 1 think it's Secretary Kissinger." In first enunciating the si- lence edict to the' committee last week, Eagleburger cited' the Red-hunting investigations of the 40s and 53s as a major reason for Kissinger's order prohibiting junior and mid- dle-grade officials at Siatei from testifying about policy recommendations they made .i.O their superiors. ; Eagleburger sogiseSted that foreign service officers might be discouraged from givine their "candid advice" it they felt it would not remain - confidential. Pike made plain that he feltt Kissinger was snore interest-I :ed in protecting himself. The! New York Democrat dis-i missed the State Departs; mends hints of a potential' resurgence of MeCarnisisea as "wholly a red herrino." "I don't think this commit--; I tee has taken to . exposing' junior members (of govern-I merit agencies and depart-1 meats) as evil,' Pike declareci.! He said the committee's ore-; liminary work indicates ind stead that "it is at the upper! level that things go -wrongn that messages don't get passedi 'on, that advice is ignored." those so charged." He was responding to a letter circulated last night by Spanish -Ambassador Jaime de Pinies who quoted from a book in which Mexican President Luis Echeverria was linked with the CIA. laloynitian said tens of thousands of statesmen and women have been ac- cused of CIA ties. : CIA-RDP77-00432F000100380007-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 NEW YORK TIMM 3 October 1975 SENATE MI Rill TAX DNA filESE BY EH, AND CIA, Revenue Service Was Used to Harass Groups Seen as Political Hazards :By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK Sped tt to The 5oYark Times .WASHINGTON, Oct. 2?The Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investi- gation used the Internal Reve- nue Service, apparently illegal- 1Y, to harass ;groups that 'they felt were politically threaten- ing, according to evillence pre- sented today at a Senate hear- ing. Senator Frank Church, Demo- crat of Idaho who is chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, said in an open- ing statement today, "The com- mittee has found evidence indi- lcating that the F.B.I. his widely !misused the LRS. tax inforrna- Ilion to disrupt poliEetal activ- !ists." He said the balk of this !evidence If;ouid he made public Iin hearings on counterintelli- gence. - ; ? Commission Disclosure - At today's two-and-a-half- hour session it was disclosed that the V.8.1. had obtained a list of contributors from tax re- turns in a scheme to disrupt the fund-raising of the Rev. Martin Luther King jr,'s.South- ern Christian Leadership Con- ference. ? The CIA. was disclosed to have urged the I.R.S. to 'open an investigation of Ramparts' magazine in 1967 ha an ;effort to head off a series of articles on C.I.A. infiltration of the Na- tional Student gssociation. Earlier this year the report of Vice President Retkefeller's Commission on the C.I.A. said the agency had obtained tax return information illegally.ut the evidence on the .Ramparts incident showed that the C.I.A. wanted to go further and use the information to harass the magazine. The two incidents were the first time it has been estab- lised that intelligence agencies used the I.R.S. for this purpose. During the Senate Watergate hearings, it was established that the Nixon Achniniatration ;sought to use the rakentie serv- tice Io punish its political enemies. 1 In a C.I.A. racanorandum dated Feb. 2i 196,7, at unidenti- 'he had briefed -Thomas 'Forty, then assistant to the Commis- . Isioner of I.R.S. and Leon Green, then an assistant to the assist. ant LIU: commissioner for; compliance, on the -"current Status of the Ramparts matter" and he -sought their "coopera-1 tion." ? The .memorandurri said: ; "I told' the flier the informa- tioit and rumors we have heard !about 'Ramparts' proposed ex- !poses with particular reference to the U.S.N.S.A. tUnited States iNational Student Association] ;and [partial deletion, presum- ably a designation for C.I.A.]. I !impressed upon them the direc- tor's concern and expressed our certainty that this is an attack on C.I.A. in particular,' and the! Administration in general,! .which is merely using USNSA1 and [deletion] as tools." The memorandum went on; to say: "I suggested that the; corporate tax returns of Ram- parts, Inc., be examined and! that any leads to, Possible; financial supporters be followed I uP by an examirratiOn of their! individual tax returns. It is un-! likely that such an examination! will develop much worthwhile; information as to the maga-I -zinc's source of financial sup- port, but it is possible that some !leads will be evident." The C.I.A. man went on to ;say that the "political sensi- tivity of the case is SUCIT that if we are to go further than this, it will be necessary for the agency to make a formal ;request for the returns under la procedure 'set forth in Govern-. Imentaregulations. ] "If such a request is made, the commissioner will not be ? in' a position to deny our in- terest if questioned later by a member of Congress .or ? other competent authorit." the mem- orandum said. "This matter contains the elements for po- litical repercussions against the- internal Revenue Service as well as this agency and Mr. ?Terry feels that we can make ino move until he has briefed the commissioner." Owners' Tax Return . In a memorandum dated Feb. 15, the same or another iden-? tilled C.I.A .official, reported that he had access to the tax return information of Edward Keating, who had reported that he owned Ramparts. In general the memorandum indicated that Mr. Keating's ownership was routine, but in the following paragraph it appeared the C.I.A. was giving I.R.S. advice on how to proceed in a tax case: "The statement of owner- ship, management mid ci?reula-: tion published in January, 1967, issue of Ramparts as required by law and postal regulations !lists five stockholders, ... This is not consistent with the solel ownership of Keating as report- ed to Revenue as recently as! fiscal year 1965. We intend tol check this fact- and so does! Revenue inasmuch as Keating: has been claiming 100 per cent losses on his own tax return." In May, 1967, the C.I.A. re- ported in a memorandum that Washington Post 3 Oct. 1975 Grain Data Collected By CIA By Dan Morgan WasSangton Post staff Writer The Central Intelligence Agency has been collecting detailed information from private U.S. companies on their sales of grain to the Soviet Union and other countries, even though the same data is gathered by the Department of Agriculture. The grain export in- formation ? obtained by the agency's domestic collections branch, which often debriefs businessmen who travel abroad ? is used to make assessments of the strategic balance in grain supplies. CIA officials have indicated in the past that they consider grain supplies to be an im- portant element of national security; and possibly a useful gauge of international behavior of the Soviet Union, a major grain importer. A recent series of detailed CIA inquiries to grain companies includes iequests for in- formation on worldwide Russian demand for grain, and estimates of world sales to the Soviet Union, or East Europe, including American grain sales on a weekly basis. NEW YORK TIMES 28 September 1975 New Effort to Make Public C.I.A. Budget IsScheduled Spectal to The New York Times . WASHINGTON, Sept. 26 ? Representative Robert N. Giaimo, a member of both the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee and the ? Select Committe on Intelligence, will attempt again next week to make the budget of the Central Intelligence Agency Public for the first time since 1947. Traditionally the annual cost of the C.I.A.'S operations are discuised as part of the Depart- A Department of Agriculture spokesman said yesterday that he had no idea why the CIA was collecting the in- formation. In 1973, Congress -gave the department responsibility for compiling weekly reports of all grain sales abroad. In addition to those weekly reports, U.S.- based firms are now required to inform the department within 24 hours of any sale exceeding 100,000 metric tons. Referring to the duplicate - commercial export in- telligence gathering of the CIA, the chief of one major -grain company said this week: "They stay in touch with us all the time." Edward W. Cook, chairman of the board of Cook Industries, Inc., of Memphis, said in an interview that he often reports the same information to both the CIA and the Agriculture Department. "They stay in contact with people who are doing business with areas in which they are interested," he saki. "It could be Brazil, could be Russia, or it could be ! France." Cook said the CIA I gets no more information ; about the sales than the ; Agriculture Department gets, adding, "There doesn't seem to be- much coordination in Washington." A department official said recently that it sometimes seemed that the CIA's export ' data was reaching top officials of the Agriculture Department before the department's OW11. CIA officials could not be reached for comment yesterday. ment of Defense's appropria- tions. Giaimo, Democrat of Conneeticet, led an unsuccess- ful fight to get the Appropria- tions Committe to publish the figure Thursday. He said that- he planned to offer an amend- ment to the defense appropria- tions bill to?remove the agency budget item from the section where it is disguised as a defense request. If this amend- ment is successful. he said he would offer an amendment to make the figure public. For years authoritative intel- ligence sources have said that the C.I.A. spends S750-million to SI-billion a year. its informants to the I.R.S. Thei memo said: ? "If they determine that non-, bonalide .transactions are in-i volved, they will infoem me and will discuss further the investi- gative procedures to be used, by I.R.S. in ascertaining wheth- er or not there are violations of the internal revenue codes 'in- !volved." Sheldon Cohen, Commissioner Ithe release of tax information on Ramparts to C.I.A. He said Ihe had talked to Mr. Ttrry grub IMr. Green last week and neither Iof them could recall talking to !him about the matter. 1 Under Fedei at Law. it is a mrime for . anyone to make an. ;unauthorized dissemination of the information frem a Fr.-Real' ;tax return. The current I.R.S.; !Commissioner. Donald C. Alex-I !ander, has, ordered an investi-1 eti f LI I r ; o Ified C.LA.. official renorted that tt.was e.assinp inf !or meal LR-? S. al. ILLS/a? on o ) s n A Approved I-or xelease/604106108': Wk-,IRAFTK-91,144-444y,pliqp38:itgRoas. it was 2 ,revciate. serviee Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R00010038000-9 II.ANC-2,17,E1 TThIS 23 September 1975 LITY VS NATIONAL SECURITY '74 SA_Ija PETT 005peciat Cmespondent ViTAS.FMTON---Jie began by re- -calling -that when be finally told his daughter zhat he did for a living, avhfseh w espior.aeee work, she said, "But isoft?klat kind of dirty, Daddy?" He ccll the interview with a kind of entraterearbra "IL 2is. Pve had .to dO. things I'm !rot ,prticularly. proud of. It's . been a daf6le life, :sometimes unethi- cal and ilkgal.. Bt I think I've been. usefel, evil I'm nr.,t envious of any mate'smer standards." Ha plater his g"-Isses and dug into his wallet.. He hoped, he said; he was not a-'1.7.ocit a be corny. Then, from a tattil scrap of paper, this big; peaful-leaking man read ? aloud, with some emo&ria, the words of -Nathan Pirla-t "I wish ttbe useful, and every kind of service, necessary to the public. good, brames honorable by being neiteasa-nry. If the exigencies of my coo:m.17e thmancl a peculiar service, its cleamis: perform that service are '.vas Cc rationale of Dave Phil- lips' tie the Central Intelligence Ageneen His (tau-gator had thought he worked' for the Department of State_ It it.'"t" been, of course, the ra- tionale of tile CIA_ the FBI, the mili- tary ?Inten-gence agencies and, in fact., si all the heroes and rogues in ? hiAno.?t.:, tytiol served the altar of na- tional siczeity. Now, in the wake of Watergate anti Vietrain, the morality and the mentality a the huge American in- teiidgence .apparatans are being ques- tiontof as sever befrare. Do the. tiechnionaes of intelligence in-ea-I:ably compromise ademocracy? What is tie morality of men who seek. Fri ted, name ter country, to turn. men a airther country into traitors. men -who Ile, steal break and enter. blazkmail and bug?.' Should Mr. Bond. at lang lase he housebroken? How s:emzet should a secret opera- te?) inafree and open society? At -what penia, such as in that village in Vietnam, .b we ritak the destruction of nerty In the name of its salva- ? tiorff In a world hehich is not a rose garden, are the qtoestions themselvez naive and iTkely tee, bring more dam- age than feety V.-edld correct? ? e: Fins; does- a nanhon that historically ?'weati ftseh." to the a,-indole of self-de- _ ?totereeimatiast justafto secret plots to fest: eae the leaden and the lives of .ethee reeenns? How did honorable, meta-at:gem men bring themselves'. - even to &amass assassinations? 0'1 Are we forever locked into the e the tairieration that a)- ter-.,hers 'Munich and Pearl. ? iriiessaneer?7..-a there no alternative to that. view because einot'ner Pearl liar- lanr timald 'an the iseest? anyffng gazdNPIPKAYgdeFQ.1"- An most anything to in. a cold war and an. uneasy detente? It was Pearl Harbor that Harry S. -Truman had in mind when he asked Congress to set up the CIA in 1947.. Clark Clifford helped write the legis tat ion. Before he became secretary of defense in 1968, Clifford served eight years on the president's Foreign In-; telligence Advisory Board, most of: them as chairman. ? ? "Basically," he said recently, "an intelligence operation is an anachro- nism in a democracy. It is secret. it sometimes uses questionable means. The public can't be informed about it or even told its cost. It is inconsistent with:democracy, but it remains a ne- cessity if we are to preserve our form of government. We can't fly blind ,in- the world today." But the CIA .troubles Clifford pro- foundly, for startling reasons,. and so .he urges new legislation by which joint oversight committee of Con- gress would tether the agency within new, sharply defined He is particularly troubled by the growthi of the "intelligence syn- drome" over the years of the cold war. "As the agency went on -growing," he said. 'there developed a psycholo- gy within the CIA: those who were 'experienced in international intel- ? ligence were uniquely qualified not only to carry out orders but, to con- ceive new projects. "As time went on, they developed a concept of a higher loyalty, higher even than that which they owed to their own director and the President, a loyalty to country tAich carried with it the idea that others, only temporarily in government, would not be able to understand the great - rewards that awaited the country if they were left alone.. 'I know this existed. I'm not guess- ing. Their thinking was that Pres- idents and directors come and go while they were devoting their lives to this service. So. they found con- cepts to blunt what the Russians might be doing in their covert opera- tions. maybe overlooking the fact that the Soviets operated from a dic- tatorship and we, a democracy. "In my years on the President's ad- visory board, which had the power of the President .behind it, I felt we were given full information in some areas but not in others. They held back on us and they held back on the President. They thought that nonex- perts really were not qualified to make decisions in these areas; they would make them." Clifford chose not to cite specific examples. But a former CIA officer, in his time one of its top men, agreed with Clifford's picture of the extraor- dinary elitism by which information was denied the President of the Unit- ed States and the mati he appoints to direct 'he int el nmmee Releaqen 1/Q8/NE. ; A4pli? 3 ? - utk!.7 ficer said. "They tended to regard elected officials as transitory. And they sometimes withheld things from the director, depending on the direc- tor. In an internal investigation, the agency's inspector general also was sometimes blocked -off from certain' areas. 'You see, the compartmentalization was intense and information wasn't '.alWays restricted only on a need-to-- -know basis. It was, sometimes kept from those who should know but might object to a given idea." By law, the CIA is responsible to the President and reports directly to the National Security Council, of which the President is chairman. The other members are the Vice Pres- ident, secretary of state, secretary of defense, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CIA director. The NSC, too, Clifford says, was at times kept in the seMidark as a result of ?agile footwork and a relentless momentum that would develop with- in the CIA for a given project. "Let rhe give you a hypothetical example," the former secretary of de-. fense said, "and my guess is there was a lot of this going on. "We start with the CIA director telling the . NSC, 'Here's a little project we have in mind. We've re- searched and studied it thoroughly. It's not very expensive and we want to go to Point A on it.' - - "It sounds innocent, and so it is au- thorized. That's' the last the NSC hears about it. 'When he gets to Point A, the di- rector reasons, 'Well, it isn't very far to Point B and we'll get a much bet- ter result?At Point B, he feels that task is incomplete and he goes to C. At C, he says, 'Well, this has been helpful but if we're really going to accomplish our purpose we have to go to D.' "Now we're launched on Cod- knows-what, and D turns out to be a complete catastrophe. When he is asked about it later, the director says he was authorized to do this. What gets lost is that he was never author, ized to go beyond Point A." It is the insistent contention of the. CIA that it may operate in the dark but not in a vacuum, that what it does secretly is simply the invisible arm cf what the President, .in his .foreign policy, does publicly. It is also the implicit contention of 'recent history that elitism in govern- ment, or what David Halberstam called "The Best and the Brightest,". was not confined to the 125 serene, verdant acres the CIA occupies in the pines of Langley, Va. From Franklin D. Roosevelt to Richard Congress was told less and less by in- creasingly powerful Presidents. Fath- er knew best, and Big Brother was not far behind. -00432RGQ0,10a3811010789a terrible war, beginning with the surprise at. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 tack on-Pearf Harbor, which might ,lave been much less of a surprise if -any arm of government had put together the separate pieces of infer. _mation- separate departments had. In that war, the men who later be- came the nucleus of the CIA served :in the Office of Strategic Services.. .They performed with great dash and "distinction, breaking enemy codes, ,parachuting behind enemy lines, hatching enemy leaders. It was our: last declared war, the last one we didn't debate, and the rules were few. 111 the CIA, as a result of real ac-' ,Complishments and the times, a mys- que grew up around these former Warriors, many. of whom came from? ?*the Ivy League, many of whom were -idealistic liberals. It was our Peace. :Corps," one said. The mystique was aided and abet-, :ted by Joseph Stalin, who seemed in- :tent on gobbling up Europe and more :through ubiquitous tentacles. Spies brought him the secrets of the atomic bomb. On this side of the world, there were Joseph McCarthy seeking to frighten Americans about the -Communists under their beds and. - John Foster seeking to make- anticommunism a moral crusade in the world. It was a time when Americans had only five years' respite between, ?wars, when colonial empires were collapsing and much of the globe ap- peared rine for plucking by an ap- parently monolithic enemy, when Americans were not questioning American motives and Presidents were still trusted; a time when scien- tists and technicians seemed to hold. the future in their hands and laymen were cowct-d by experts. . "To argue with the CIA," said Torn Braden, a former member and now a critic, "was to argue with knowledge." The late Stewart Alsop, columnist and former OSS man, sought to ex- plain how some of the best minds in the Kennedy administration agreed to the Bay of Pigs invasion: "The answer lies somewhere in the: .mystique of the secret service profes-i sional vis-a-vis the amateur. Some- how in such a confrontation, the amateur tends to put a childish faith, in the confident assertions of the professional." And this from an intelligence offi- mial, talking to the Washington Post' about dealing with the Forty Com- mittee, a supersecret oversight group within the executive branch: "They were like a bunch of school- boys. They would listen and their eyes would bug out. I always used to say that I ?Add get $5 million out of the Forty Committee for a covert operation faster than I could get money for a typewriter out of the or- dinary bureaucracy." Basic to the ?ndersttanding, of the intelligence mentality, its practition- ers say, are several facts of interna- tional life: the world remains a dan- gerous place despite detente; the KGB, the Russian intelligence appa- ratus. is very good and ubiquitous and lids the advantage of operating from a closed society: intelligence, in any case. cannot be operated within ?Marquess of Queensberry rules, - ? -CIA Director. Williarn B. Colby: "If you get to the logical end of de- tente. then Ve would have estab-. Iished a relationship with the Soviet ;Union of mutual respect for each oth- er's strengths, so that our differences ican be negotiated about rather than ,fought over. This, in turn, should en-. courage the Soviets to believe that :they ought to be more open with their information. But that's not the :situation now. ."Today the Soviet attaches can go -to almost any newsstand in this. countiy, pick up a copy of a technical aviation or space magazine, and from it learn a vast amount of detail about our weapons systems. Unfortunately, we have to spend hundreds of mil- bons Of dollars to get comparable in- formation about the Soviet Union." . , On another occasion, Colby eon- trastcd his job with that of 'hiltits-- -sian counterpart, Yuri ,.ViadirnroVich ' Andropov, head of the KGB. s.."MrAndropof. faces sa :veritable cornucopia of- easily 'acquired !infor- mation ! about front- -,pub. lished and public sources. but of this,: he must pick. these facts -which -are. significant and assemble them into an accurate assessment of America:. "My task is to search forindiVidual facts.kept in the utnioit, seerecy! ' elpSed ipoletiessancl with. these facts trY to Construct whole,!azsessments, in :somewhat the way 'one extrapo- lates a ,reproduction of the skeleton of a brontosaurus from a thigh bone. of, clandestinelY: acquired informatiiin;. brontosaurus could . in some situations be Very deformed. indeedinao':.m.es_ Thus eipionage.: -?! And espionage Dave Phillips .points otit:is a' crime! In everY'cotiri- ty of the world. So, 'obviously,, is, treason. One is fed by the other. Like Other governments, the government .!the United, States. sends ? men; 'atircaci ,to spy and encourage treason and 1,voiild rather; not 'hear of. .:the :crimes' 'within. the ;criMes?bribery, theft, blackmail, bugging.' of if distasteful but vital,'!! says , Dave. Phillips, clinging to his Nathan Bale qUote. It was his daughter?whd , keaCtedi,With. dismay when, he told, her how, be served Phil- lips recently resigned after 25:y,ears in the CIA to form an association of :former intelligence officers ' ,ithe. '.hope Of helping the agency's image. : "My daughter's reaction shook me. Alp," he says. Tean remember when, kids used to romanticize and think highly.ofintelligence work." ? ltight and wrong become inopera- tive, useless Words in espionage, says Sam" Halperin, who was CIA execu- Li've: assistant in clandestine services. He .retired recently after 20 years with,the:OSS and the -CIA. He is a short, thin Man who, looks more like, li:Brooklyn accountant than a James Bond. . ? ' . draw the line on torture," ? he said. "But if I was told to recruit, I'd .use -all the tricks of the trade?mond. ey, sex; blackmail, anYthing that gives ine control ? oVer's people. That's 4 "what getting spies means and every- thing :else is hyprocrisya! : s' Rough as espionage is there, seern -to ! be' ',limits, . practical if notTmora.1 .-ll'In:that-bulture," said Sen. Frank Church, chairman ?Nil& Senate lect committee on-Intelligence,-"spies. don't kill- other. In fad; they`scrupit-. avoi,d it. NoW,Tin!notAalking about .douldle agents..But -while they watch each other careftillY; the KGB leaves the -CIA-, alone' and the 'CIA leaves --the KGB alone. -.They ''don't shoot each other. It-wonld be as bier:- 'ficient as gang warfare." . a game of :wits, not muScle: pa'vc,:Phillips:said..','For example; it- w-Onld be 'easy ,for Us to kill a courier. Owing/the:Other side's secret doc- 1,1*n.t,s,?b1.4. P-16'si the same to tis'; and pretts0on nobody Would .have couriers ", .'Pragmatmcaliy( it. doesn!t make,' rich' sense,i!!' Sam Halperin yo're':"a KGB man and youkill mer yott:then.liaVeto _go. to the time and, so - 'trouble of learning who my replace- went is.r CIA men insist, however, that the 'Russians are not above killing defec- tors or others who have "turned ..sour arid might carry off secrets :with them. The KGB, they say, has a _ special department for carrying out eliminations known grimly among American intelligence people as "the Department of Wet Affairs.' Wet for blood. Does the CIA have a similar spe- cialty? "I have never heard of anything -like that practiced by any intel- ligence system in the Western World," said a longtime veteran of American counterintelligence. - Would he admit it if he had? "No," the man said. In the beginning, the CIA was pri- Inarily intended to coordinate and ..evaluate for the President the infer- 'nation received by the government's various intelligence arms. The law establishing it said nothing about vrhat has come to be known as "covert operations," the manipulation of events in Other countries. But the law did say that the CIA was to perform "such other film- bons' as the National Security Courts: , cil might direct. With that catchall phrase as its authority, the CIA over the years has conducted covert oper- ations around the world with massive resources of money, men and tricks neat and dirty. In Western Europe, Iran, Guatemala, Greece, Cuba, Laos,. Vietnam and other countries, it has poured money into elections and en- gineered or tried to engineer the overthrow of governments thought to be inimical. The general rationale was "they" do it, we have to; it's them or us. Or as Colby said in a recent interview, quoting Vince Lombardi, "Winning isn't the main thing. It's the only thing." "But the question," Sen. Church, said "is how much like the devil do we want to be? At one point, do we become our own worst enemy?" Church admitted there are no easy answers. Ha thinks a good argument could be made for the infusion of CIA Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007f9 money into the Rattan elections of 1947, which defeated thE: Communists. and helped keep a war-wobbly Bu- ? rope from sliding into Stalin's lap. Similarly, he thinks a good case might be made more recently for CIA -intervention in Portugal ?tapparently it didn't intervene ,on the grounds that a Communist or .Rus-sian-backed minority sought to thwart the demo- cratic will of the demonstrated ma- jority. But there is no, justification in terms of political marality or Ameri- can security for the CIA. intervention in Chile, Church said. "The Marxist Allende government was the choice of the "Chilean people, made in a free and honest ejection. Furthermore, Chile did not pose any threat to the United States unless it was the dagger notated straight at the heart of the /TT_ "Besides the moral question of our right to control the alfairs of another country covertly, there is a practical question. What is the political cost to the United States of such ventures, even when successful! "Sooner or later, they become ? - known but the advocates never con- sider the price we nay for these things throughout the Third World, where we are resented and feared and, in many places; hated fully as much as the Soviet Union." - the CIA's general answer to criti- .Chs,n of its covert operations is that. they were legally- guthorized and that the agency, a :ereature of the President, was carrying out his ? foreign policy. Thus, the question of CIA morality bee0111eS the morality of that policy. And that policy was best summa- rised, according to one of its critics, by a statement he atteibuted to Hen- ry A. Kissinger. The critic is Morton Halperin, a former ahesoistant to .Kis- singer on the Nattional Security Council. He was one of 13 govern- ment officials whose phones were tapped by the Nixon administration in its search for security leaks to the media. Halperin said Kissinger once said, during a meeting of the Forty Com- mittee, which is an arm of the NSC: "I don't see why we thhould permit a country to go Communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people." Kissinger has denied making this statement. - - CIA Director Colby is fond of point- ing out that a covert operation pro- vides a President with "a choice be- tween sending a diplomatic protest or sending in the Martens." He is also given to observe frequently that the CIA has been a prodnuct of its time and changes with the times. In May of this year, he said the CIA now conducts "very few" covert "political and paramilitary openations." "This is the revolt_ of the changed world . . . but I meet point out that this changed egorhi seems to be changing again_ Our country might again need the cepa:a:ay to provide some quiet influence or assistance to friends abroad withant. Artri306fiditeFor formal diplomatic or military might of the United States." * Most covert operations, we are told, are small and routine. "Mostly, intelligence work is a lot of little transactions," said John Bross, a for- Mer CIA deputy director. "Generally, its a case of making friends so you can influence people to do or not do something," said Dave Phillips, who was CIA chief of Latin- American operations. "Like trying to slow down the flow of hard drugs to the United States or to have someone get tough with terrorists kidnaping our diplomats. And that friend might be a newspaperman or a government official or a local Bernard Baruch or the mistress of the foreign minister. "A foreign minister, for example, is. not likely to tell the American am- bassador that his country is about to devalue its currency or blast us in the United Nations. Only intelligence people can gather this kind of infor- mation and hope to influence the events with covert action which makes it appear indigenoos to the country and not the desire of the U.S." Intelligent people tend to view the . world in terms of unpleasant choices 'and if you question A, they ask back, would you prefer B. Thus, Sam Hai- perin has little patience with persons who say it's all right to spy but im- moral to interfere with the internal affairs of other countries: ? "The essence of espionage is get- ting spies and a spy, by definition, is a traitor to his country, and what is so moral about turning people into traitors? In my book, it's much more moral to buy an editorial in a foreign newspaper or put money into an election. - "We interfere in the internal affairs of other countries all the time by giv- ing or .withholding something?mili- tary assistance, the AID. program, food, loans, whatever. What the hell is so different about the President de- ciding we've got to win a foreign election covertly? "Teddy Roosevelt didn't need the CIA to detach the Panama peninsula from Colombia. Eisenhower ordered troops into Lebanon, Johnson sent them to. the Dominican Republic. Wilson chased Pancho Villa. -All of This was interference. The Germans and the Italians interfered in the Spanish Civil War, the West didn't, and we got Franco. Maybe we should have kept Hitler from marchingb into the Rhineland. That would have been interference, and what's the dif- ference whether it is overt or covert?" - None of the intelligence people apa proached for this article- saw any- thing immoral in the Bay of Pigs in- _ 'simian of Cuba. It was poorly planned or badly executed but it was not, in their eyes, morally wrong. Af- ter all, they said, nobody had elected Castro and he was talking about ex- porting Marxist revolution- in -Latin America and he was inviting 'the There IS a- kind t of .relentless momentum implicit in this logic that; gathering speed, can gallop easily to-. ward the ultimate in covert .opera- tions----political assassination. It. 'usually carries with it the; reminder. that the world might . have been spared tragedy beyond measure if somebody had killed Adolf Hitler. And if Hitler\awhy not Stalin, why not Castro? After all, . this reasoning goes, wouldn't it have been better to kill one man than to have hundreds die in the Bay of Pigs and later risk the deaths of Millions in the, missile crisis? Church said.. his committee had "hard evidence of. CIA - involvement" in assassination plots... Colby said there had been suggestions to assas -sinate.r. but they.. :had -been turned., .down. . . - Former CIA men interviewed for, this story ,denied -knowledge of any. such plots but they did esay they, could understand how some persons might have considered them.. "In any, big crunch"' a man long counterintelligence said, "there are. always' people below, the -top level, who talk about miracle solutions for problems. But can't. imagine any CIA director even contemplating as-- saination without going to the-Pres ident or secretary of state.'n ? - "Castro represented a real threat," another .former CIA officer said; "and if I'd -been President I would've con-- sidered assassination as an option." can'imagine," Dave 'Phillips said,. ,"a few people getting 'together and' saying, 'The Mafia did a remarkable job for us in, the European ports dur- ing World War II. Why don't we talk - to them about knocking Off Castro?' . ? "Butis that involvement? Or if wet support an indigenous movement to overthrow.a government, there is no way we can turn-the taps on or off and know what the people are going todo. If the overthrow results in ant assassinationtis that involvement?" In any case, Colby said, he is op-' posed to assassinations because "I think, they're wrong 'and they fry:, :quently bring about absolutely una; controlled and unforeseeable results ?usually worse results than by con- tinuing to. suffer .the problem you're facing.'t Church, whose. committee will at- tempt to prescribe ,limits for the American' intelligence community, says, "No agency of, government can be licensed to commit murder." It would seem, then, there finally is a line beyond which the perceived needs of national security must note trespass. But'.'. . . "Murder," Church said, "cannot be permissible when undertaken against leaders of countries with which we have peaceful relations or be an in- strument of ? foreign policy against small countries whose leaders could not, possibly threaten us." Does that exclude the leaders of large countries who. . Russians in only 90 miles from Amer- "We're in a field of vagaries where jean shores and the Russians did it is tomossible to draw clear lines," Refigfig@INDifititAdes. taliriP77-0943SRIOR3OM8090-7n9 conceive of Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 it, but' there are those who contend; for .example, that to amid a nuclear catastrophe a President might have to take- an action short of war, and. assassination might become. necessa- ry... "But the :President e the United' ,States must never beceeme a glorified', 'Godfather,' with 'hit men' available to carry out his orders!' - There is. or there is step.posed to be,- a double standard in irttelligence by which the golden rule iis neatly: re- versed. We do to others what we don't do to ourselves.. We may spy, lie, bug, bribe, break and enter, steal' or blackmail abroad but ilot at home. This is the law. ? ? "But the problems which have aris- en in the domestic field cannot be fully understood and eliminated," said Erwin. Griswold, a of the Rockefeller Corranissiora which in- vestigated the CIA, "unless they are viewed against 'the role which the CIA has undertaken to play outside the United States. BeCaTf.q.: of the se- cret nature of its operations, legal and . moral limitations may not al- ways be kept in mind. It this situa- tion, it should not be surprising that ? personnel, when workinee in the Unit- ed States, should not always feel that they are subject to ordinary- re- straints." ? . - Thus, the CIA has spired on Ameri- cans in the United States, maintained dossiers, intercepted and opened mail, infiltrated protest .groups and ,engaged in wiretaps and break-ins. The CIA insists none of this was "massive" arid says that where it oc- curred it was necessary' to national ? security. Its prepenents also remind ;its critics of the unsettling riots in the '60s and '703. They recall a statement._ LONG ISLAND PRESS 18 Sept. 1975 More. slwrbing CIA revelations by FBI Director Clarence M. Kelley: "Let me remind those who would criticize the FBI's actions that the United States Capitol WAS bombed; that other explosions rocked public and private offices and buildings; that rioters led by revolutionary ex-: tremists laid siege to military, indus- trial and educational facilities; and: that killings, maimings and other atrocities accompanied such acts of violence from New England 'to Cali- fornia." Against this background,- the CIA, says it sought to determine whether there' were foreign connections be- hind the eruptions. -"Remember," the veteran of coun- terintelligence said, ? "that the KGB succeeded in its biggest recruitment of spies- back in the '30s, when there, was the Oxford Cambridge group which . said it wouldn't fight in its country's wars. "That was similar to the recent. wave of protests against the Vietnam war. It was a time ripe for Soviet re- cruitment, and many of the protest leaders traveled abroad." "Intelligence simply cannot operate within basic American precepts," said Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, former execu- tive director of the CIA. "And it is in-c credibly naive, to be shocked by the fact that letters were opened. This is done by every intelligence system in. , the world." ? ? Colby said the CIA no longer opens mail. He also said the current uproar , over its methods has caused damage.?, He speaks of other friendly intel- ligence systems abroad growing wary of dealing with the CIA. Of. ?agents quitting because of a fear of exposure. Of "people we were -just about to do business, with changing n _Central Intelligente Aaency, officials, led by its . ? 'director, Williarri2Efolby, have .testified about the 'use of deadlY bioll"gical and chemical. poisons in, :Overseas spying activities. Not only have agents been supplied with: Such substances to kill them- selves rather thap' :make damaging confessions to potential captors,i,but handy gadgets like battery- powered dart: guri..4-that shoot poisons have also been stockpiled foi% ,'.offensive use Thus the inves.U'ga. tion-of CIA activities by a Sen-, ?ate select comrra,..;ee has assumed a James-Bond !,-,atmosphere .4j,ctional 'spies and their. super "weapons ? brought to?life. But the CIA hasn't just. ? been involved in realistic theater, it has- also been - involved in militay" coups. abroad, and in equally illegal and dangeous spying. at ?home. Moreover,. some .CIA officiaLi,have gone so far as to defy an , order from the President of the United States. This is-the most Startling and scary testimony : to emerge from-.the public hearings. To his credit, their minds." Of American corpora- tions. now afraid of finding them- selves . on .the, front 'page as "CIA. fronts." "And all that means," he said, "is that we're not getting the informa-_: .tion we should be.". Church said neither he nor his committee intends to emasculate the CIA but they are concerned by the growth of Big Brother government. "We've come a long way down that road. It's time to stuff the intel- ligence genie back in the bottle be- fore we wake up one morning to find we have spawned a secret police and a government which has become the enemy of the people." Church admitted that laying down new specific ground rules for the American intelligence apparatus in an unpretty world would be delicate' nd difficult. "The range of permissi :ble activity Will' always: have to :pend on the good sense of .the men ;rnnning our government. The whole ;Solution-cannot:be the Writ- :ten law no Matter how, carefully itis- ',Written." ? en ? ? ? sse Which leaves us where? In the whole search foierules, its, ? standards. in' a field which has :few; a:scerie keeps coining to mind - 'from 'a 'Movie, "Buteh Cassidy and the Sundance Kid." . ? . ? , ? Cassidy, is talking 'quietly with a Mutineer hi his gang of cutthroats. Suddenly ,Cassidy jeska his knee into the man's groin and the rebel goes down; surrendering to the knife. at his Adam's apple. ?, ? . . ? ? moment later, Cassidy is asked .what they ' talked about. He smiles and .says,', "Oh, he *wanted to know the rules in,a knife fight." .? ? former Presiderit. Nixon ordered such biological 'weapons as a deadly shellfish toxin destroyed. The CIA disobeyed the order. . . Mr. Colby also deserves some credit. When he ;learned that the.-;poisons -had not been destroyed as ordered, he told the Senate investigators. His predecessors, particularly Richard Helms, left much to be desired, both-in the-way they:did their job and in their later recollections. ?-? - Helms yesterday, for example, said he in- 'tended to obey the presidential directive to destroy ;the poison stockpile, but never issued a written ! ,order to have it done. His assertion that the,reten- lion of the poison supply was "one of the few in- stanees I know (inn 25 years where an order has been disobeyed"- must be suspect. We wonder if it is rather an instance where the truth became known, to the entharrassment of CIA officials. The revelation.: of CIA actions, and non-actions, ; makes more urient than ever the need for better; oversight of theeapy agency. We believe Mr. Colby condo the jobevihich must be done, but no director! no matter ha* competent should be allowed "to- operate without the full knowledge of the White; House and Congress. . 6 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 :.CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007L9 NEW YORK TIMES 25 September 1975 ilt S.,SOVIET,CHIM .REPORTED AIDING PORTUGAL, ANGOLA Secret Funneling of Millions Seen as Part of Struggle to Control and Influence C.I.A. LINKED TO EFFORTS European Socialists Said to Be Conduit?Russian Total is Put at $50-Million . By LESLIE H. GELB saKial to aew '14rk Times ? WASHINGTON, Sept. 24 ? Millions of dollars are being poured *covertly into Portugal and Angola by East and West, according to four Official sources in Washington. The . funneling of the funds is part .of the continuing struggle for control of the Mediterranean and for influence and raw ma- terials in Central Africa. United States money for the ,Portuguese Socialist party and other parties is being funneled by the Central Intelligence Agency through West European -Socialist parties and . labor . unions, the sources said. The C.I.A. involvement, the sources said, amounted to several mil- lion dollars a month over the .last -several months. ? It is also reliably reported that the Soviet Union and its East European allies have poured $50-miilion to Si 00-mil- lion into Portugal since April, 1974, and hundreds of tons of military equipment into Angola since March alone. ,- Chinese in Zaire The sources also said that ..about 200 Chinese military ad- visers were operating from bases in Zaire to help at least' one of the two liberation fronts; being supported by Washington. ? Until the spring, most of the. _Western aid to anti-Communist, forces in Portugal was being. *given secretly by the West ? German Social Democratic .party and. the Belgian Socialist :party without any American Involvement.? ? The sources said that the fundi earmarked for two anti- 'Soviet liberation fronts in. -..Angola had been dispersed ,mainty through President Mo- butu Sese Seta? of Zaire. In order to maintain good rela- tions with Mr. Mobutu, the State Department has oeen seeking to arrange a refint4P .-bf hundreds'. of 'millions of doll 'labs in Zaire's short-term debts! and to increase American aidi ,to Zaire to about $60-million 'this year, from about $20-1 o I o In Angola and Portugal, the; ! sources estimated, Soviet aid is! .far more than American aid and, at least in the case of Angola, has included several* direct shipments of arms. It is reliably said that the Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, East Oermany and - others-have transfered the bulk of the funds going to the Por- tuguese Communist party through a bank in Lisbon and a bank in Zurich. 'Soviet Aid Outlined The following details were reliably Supplied on Soviet aid to its supporters in Angola: - In March, several Soviet planes landed in the Congo Republic, Zaire's neighbor, with. arms and ? equipment that were -then shipped to Angola; In April, about 100 tons of arms were delivered in souhern Angola by chartered aircraft; in April, two Yugoslav vessels unloaded arms in Luanda, the capital of Angola; in May and June, four Soviet merchant ships unloaded ? vehicles, machine guns, ba- zookas, rifles and ammunition, cif Angola, and two East Ger- man and one Algerian vessel delivered similar materials. The Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola reported is close to controlling Angola, which is .scheduled to become independ- ent Nov. 11. In Portugal, the anti-Communist situation sta- bilized somewhat last week With the installation of a Gov- ernment including members of the Socialist party. The Washington sources said that C.I.A. operations in both countries have been approved by President Ford and are be- ing carried out, as prescribed .by law, with the knowledge of several 'Congressional commit- tees. Both sides, first Moscow then Washington, were filling the coffers of their supporters in Portugal at the very time when' President Ford and the Soviet party leader, Leonid 1. Brezh- nev, were signing a pledge in Helsinki, Finland, not to inter- fere in the internal affairs of other European nations. Kissinger Voices Mann Secretary of State Kissinger, speaking to representatives of African countries last night and answering Soviet charges of Western involvement in Portu- gal, said: "We are most alarmed at the interference of extracon- tinental powers Who do not wish Africa well, and whose involvement is inconsistent with the promise of true inde- pendence." The C.I.A. cash-funneling op- erations to Portugal were said to have revived dormant but traditional connections between the 'agency and anti-Communist West European socialist and labor movements. And the op- eration in Angola, the sources said, led to the reactivation of Holden Roberto, head of the , -Wan or An .1N.c211q.11 ve 11 ilaFblaR ot&tr in 1962 by 'President John F. Kennedy and the C.I.A. to forge a link-between the United Statesand the indigenous groups who were expected to drive Portugal from Angola' one day. Two of the forces stressed that -all odds now favored vic- tory by the Soviet-backed Pop-, ular Movement in Angola, less the United States and China rushed huge transfusions of aid, which is considered highly unlikely. - As described by these sourc- es, the main purpose for the covert American effort in An- gola -was to underline the Ad- ministration's support for Pres- ident Mobutu, the man on whom Secretary of State Kis- singer is banking to oppose MoscoW's interests in Africa and to further Washington's' interests in various interna- tional forums. The funds going to Portugal from the United ? States and Western Europe were said to be aimed at keeping non-Com- munist parties intact, in the streets, and in the business of competing with the Commu- nists for the support of military leaders and soldiers. ? One source said: "The Presi- dent almost blew the whole Portugal thing last week in his interview with The Chicago Sun-Times. But nobody picked him up." This was reference to Mr. Ford's reply to a question about the absence of C.I.A. involve- ment in Portugal. He noted "our strong stand" along with NATO allies against a Com- munist government in Lisbon, then said: "I don't think the situation required us to have a major C.I.A. involvement, which we have not had." The source was pointing to the fact that Mr. Ford was not denying that the C.I.A. 'had an involvement. The sources maintained that William E. Colby the director of the agency, had notified members of six-Congressional subcommittees several months ago of the covert operations, and that no serious objections were raised. Mr. Colby gave the notifications after the op- erations were already under way, as he is permitted to do under the law. Requirement Cited An amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 stipu- lated that no funds conld be anent by or o-n behalf of the CIA for covert operations "un- less and until the President ;finds that each such operation. is important to the national !security of the United Staten land reports, in a timely fashion, la description and scope of such ;operation to "the Senate and !House Appropriation and Armed Services committees, and to the ;Senate Foreign Relations Corn- Imittee and the House Committee. land the House Committee on 'International Relations. In each case, the full com- mittee delegated the duty of. wgitti.U0142to iions, the members of these 1- subcommittees are regarded, as! - conservative. The sources either di not, know or would -not state when the covert operations began. But two of the sources indicatcd that the funds going to Portuaall predated an interview given by ? Mr. Ford to U.S. News & Worrd . Report early last month when he talked of the virtual irnpos-i sibility of .CIA involvement in; Lisbon, Speaking of aid going "qt.tet-; ly" from Moscow and Western; Europe to warring factions in Portugal, he said: "I think it's very tragic that, because of the C.I.A. investisa-: tion and all the limitations' placed on us in the area of Covert ? operation, we aren't able to participate with other Western European countries." "The American people shouldn't handicap themselves from meeting the challenat', as we were handicapped in -Sontll Vietnam and as we are handi- capped in trying to be a par- ticipant in Portugal." - One of the sources said that Mr. Ford and Mr. Kissinger made the decision some time after they went to Bresi7eis for a NATO meeting in late May. It was after consultations 7.-ith heads ? of state there, the source Continued, that they saw Ihow strongly the West Europe- ' an leaders felt about maintain-i ing. a non-Communist Porznaal. The source then explained: "We wanted to show them that we would stand with them on this one, and also more money was needed." ? - Another source said that the West Europeans were already "giving plenty" and wouid . given more, but "it's just we can't keep our lianci.3 out of anything." ? Two of the sources said that West European trade unions that they would not identify were smuggling small arms and ammunition to the Portu9In?.se Socialists. The Portuguese -Com- munists: they said, had been previously armed by Moscow. The decision to begin covert- ly financing these anti-Cemmu- fist forces marked the latest step in a long process of re- versing policy toward post-Sal- azar Portugal. For almost a year following the death of Antenna deOliveira Salazar, the admtn- istration's policy was to lamer.: privately but say nothing pub- licly about the leftward trend among the Portuguese military leaders. The theory was that more harm than Toed would come of any American involve- ment. But the recent decision t'a! take a strong anti-Communist: stand in Portugal, inchol'aig covert financing, was very mnen in keeping with the history t,f American policy toward me countries on the northern rim of the Mediterranean. Beginning with the Ccrnmu- .nist-inspired instabality in Greece and Turkey after World War II, and running throezh the threat of a Communist ro-e in the ttaiian government in early nineteen-smties, tb C.I.A. has been acttve in 3?01147h9the same holds tr:e itor Africa, particularly beaeo Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 Ining with Moscow's attempt' to gain a foothold in Zaire, which; was previously the . Belgian i - Congo. From the lime Patrice Di.mtunba was ousted, through Ithe short career of Mois:-..;; Tshombe, until General Mobutu' 'come to power, a number ,of authoritative sources related, the C.I.A. has maintained I its, largest African station in. Zaire.' ,. At . about the same time, in the early si7;.:ties. the sources .said, President Kennedy deter- mined that Portugal, an Ameri-., can ally in NATO, could not sustain control ovec her Afri- can colonies indefinitely and ; that contact most be made with future revolutionary lead- ers. 10 1962, on the advice of the C.I.A. among others, Mr., Roberto, the . brother-in-law of General Mobutu, was selected as a future leader for Angola. ' Roberto 'Deactivated' ' The sources said .that from, 1962 to about 1969, the C.I.A.; supplied Mr. Roberto. with money and arms, but to little avail. At that point, they said, he was deactivated and put on ,. M. Roberto was reactivated BA SUN 2 Octobe.:,' x-r-1 iLfr Zfr,921 Washington. On tbe surface, an astounding tis.g7ea of irresponsibility has ;bstu displayed orr both sides in the congressional investigation of the CIA. ? The agency has been disclosed to b-a. careless of American citi- zens' right to privacy, the public's right to know what the public's employees are doing and to con- trol those activities. It has been demonstrated, that the manly cliche covering high-level admin- istration---"the buck stops here" ?itself stops when it comes to the upper reaches of the intelligence community. . Among the congressmen, the disclosure of information provid- ed on a confidential basis has ,one beyond anything attributa- ble to mere carelessness. Members of bath houses have aggressively pushed into public view facts that are of surpassing interest te.the CIA's counterpart agencies in Moscow and else- wiicre. They have done this evao alter being warned that to do so was to give aid and ..i)rifort to the po.tentiLl enemy Such favors arc not prudent even in a period of al- leged detente. this spring, accordig to the; saarces,; at about the time it became clear that the then communist-leaning government. in Portugal ordered its armed forces in Angola to give active support to:the Soviet-backed Popular 'Movement or the lib- eration of Angola headed by Agostino Neto. But the sources said that C.I.A. operatives and American diplomats * judged that United ;States support should also be ;thrown behind Jonas Savimbi, the leader of the National Ur, non for the Total independence ,of Angola. It could not be learned 'whether Chines- and American officials had ever discussed or ou:?,ht to coordinate their el..' forts against Mr. Neto. What. was learned was that American funds were being used to buy arms for both Mr. 'Roberto and Mr. Savimbi, and that the. Chi- me were providing military ad; ,visors for Mr. Roberto and per- haps for Mr. Savinmbi as well.. It could not ? be learned _whether any, C.I.A. operatives. ,E0 wear also: 'acting as military, s.:i% ;sons. ; Cabinda a Ney Factor ; At take in Angola, beides ithe, enlargement ci Soviet in- fluence, i a region deemed rich :in copper, industrial diamonds and Oil. Of particular interest to the United States and to President Mobutu, the sources said, is Cabinda, an oil-rich area bordering on Zaire end,, separated from Angola by tho Congo River. There, the sources related, the .Gulf 'Oil Corpora- tion continues to pump- ovei' 100,000 barrels- 'a ditY. The sources said, that the Admini- stration believed that Mr. Mo- butu would like to annex Ca- binda in the likely event of a Comintmit tak-over in Angola. All the sources said, that it was Zaire,that was.of primary concern to the Administration. It is believed that Mr. Kissin- ger is about to. select Sheldon' B. Vance a former A.mbassa-; ,dor to Zaire and a close friend' of Mr. Mobutu, to be Assistant ? Secretary of 'State for African Affairs. He would replace Na- thaniel Davis as Assistant Sec-, i ? , iretary. Mr. Davis was in charge! of Deane R. Hinton, the amhas-i isador Who was ordered out of! ;Zaire some months ago amid, charges by President Mobutu, that the C.I.A. had designs on the President's life. ; It was Mr. Vance, two of the ;sources said, who this summer ;began to contact Zaire's many ?creditors in the United States sand' elsewhere to see if the mil-, ;lions in debts that were soon: Ito come due could be refi-) Inanced. It could not be learned 1whether Mr. Vance had corn- Ipieted this task or had suc- ceeded. ? In the: meantime, the State !Department has approached several Congressmen with a. 'view toward increasing Ameri- can aid to about $157million. This year, Zaire was to receive !about $20-million, but the State ;Department is now aiming for 1$60-million. This would consist lof $20-million in development !aid, $20-million in Export-Im- port Bank loans, and $20-mil- lion in Food for Peace credit. Several officials said that so far, Congressional response had .been decidedly negative. ? ,v?and Oxe t)yfiront c?.?4,.., And yet, when the Congress is done and erstwhile hawks and doves have-been alternately out- raged by what is laid on the rec- ord, we will understand that this has been another healthful func- tioning of our cumbersome sys- tem. Skim a few of the .outrages and consider ? O The Central Intelligence Agency illegally opened the mail of leading politicians. including Richard Nixon, Edward Kennedy and Hubert Humphrey. O The agency kept a store of super-deadly shellfish toxin- after Nixon ordered that all such mate- rial he destroyed. - O It did indeed get into the business of assassination of for-. cign loaders, to what extent and with what success Still fortunate- ly not spelled out in public. ? And at nearly every new dis- closure, we have heard top offi- cials of the agency allow that they personally did not ic,mw about that, or that they"gave orders that were not carried oat, or that we used to do that but we doii't any more? unless of course it still goes on without the head Man's concurrence. It is entirely possible that the head men involved were telling the truth when they said they did not ',mow, and it may even be standard procedure in the spy trade for the front man to avert his eyes carefully while his anony- mous underlings continue dirty tricks deemed essential to the na- tional security. Eventually, how- ever, he must be called on to ac- count for everything that was done by .his agency,. whether he literally or formally knew about it or not. The buck cannot be pas- sed downward. As for the Senators and con- gressmen, some of them have in- tentionally put out data consid- ered by the agency and by con- gressional tradition to be secret. The great flap over the House' committee's access to further CM papers, which may and may not have been solved by the agency's producing a stack of slightly cen- sored material., was provoked by -earlier disclosure of key words from a classified divurnent. Robert Ciahrio of Connecticut is dedicated to making public the total spending figure for CIA ac- tivities, a matter long held to be of high value to the KGB. The Soviet agency makes ou side work hard to guess out corn parable figures hidden in the an, nual budget from the Kremlin Without waiting for a vote on Lb issue, Giaimo said Tuesday the ? CIA funds were covered by a 5 billion-plus line in the Mr Fore budget. ? - Irresponsible publicity seek Ing? Perhaps. But the drive for pub licity, which means the drive t get re-elected, is a fundamental o life in Washington. . 0 0 It is required of an intelligen official that he keep as much o his work under cover as possible and it is demanded that the mei who make the laws and vote th money try to drag out as manic supporting data from the agenc!. as they can. The tug-of-war between Con gress and the executive, betwee secrecy and publicity, is built iotr the system. When the- emotion drain away, the CIA may he marginali weaker, but the system will me di. monstrahly stronger. $.7;oinide Watergate -a precedent. 8 Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 _ Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001003800017-9 WASHINGTON POST 26 September 1975 enee By Murrey 7.?.1arder Wfuthirtlz.un Post 5nll Writer - The Ford administration gave unin- tended credence yesterday to reports that the United States is supplying millions of dollars to anti-Communist forces in Portugal and Angola to offset larger Convinunist aid_ by refusing to. eaafirm or deny the accounts. . "Ws` on of these `danxned if you -do, damned if you don't' situations," said one official. describing the administra- tion's dilemma. ? Central Intelligence Agency funds :conveyed to ? Portugal's Socialists through Western European political parties and other groups ranged from about $2 million to nearly $10 million a, month since June. the Associated' Peess reported, citing a .State Depart- ment official source. Last night one high official scoffed at that range of figures, but gave no others. , . Portugal's Seidalist Party leader, . Mario Soares, made an official dis- claimer. 'We have never received aid of that sort, even less so from the United Stites," he said, attributing the report to 'journalistic speculation." The aid to Poteuears anti-Commu- nists reaches them circuitously, never- theless. ft has been known across Europe for months that Western European Social- ist and ?Christion Democratic parties hare been sending millions of dollars into Portugal. The purpose was to counter reportedly kinge amounts of aid to Portugal's Communist Party frcra the Soviet Union and Eastern Eu- ropean countries,. Outside nations similarly have been channeling money, plus weapons, to the competing pro-Communist and ? anti-Communist liberation farces in Portugal's huge African colony of An- CHICAGO TRIBUNE 23SE.FD21.414nli 1975 --Peoo'n 1 .4 - ?Theie has Leen a tot. of fuss in-Wash- ington latelY'aivrt.t whether Rep. Otis Pike ED., N. Y.3 has been leaking classi- - tied material to such undesirables as the _ Atherican people and the national press. Just last: week Presideret Ford himself. ;angrily demanded . the return of any ;Classified material in Pile's possession :as chair' man of the HErzse Select Corn- . wIttee on Intelligence_ just last week wrote Foal a latehiPptletithiVlar S erg r ff5PTI: arita gala, due to become independent on Nov. D. The Soviet Union and China. have been known to he involved in this activity, supporting opposing groups. Until yesterday, the Ford adminis- tration's position. was that it was stay- tog out of any entanglement in either country. The United States and the Soviet* Union have cross-warned each .othere against intervention in Portugal. - .President Ford publicly, and Secre- tary of State Henry A. Kissinger pri- vately, have portrayed the United States as being blocked from using the CIA to help anti-Communist parties in Portugal, because of the furor over CIA operations elsewhere. Mr. Ford has described this as a "very tragic". hini(ation on covert operations. The Ford administration yesterday, however. shifted to a "no comment", position in response to a barrage of questions initially touched off by a re- port in The New York Times that the United States was participating in the competing flow of aid. Kissinger acknowledged in a press conference on Sept. 9 that. the pros- pects of the anti-Communist forces in Portugal had suddenly improved. The United States. Kissinger ,said, "supports the emergence el' a pluralis- tic system there reflecting the public's view" and he said, "we are Working in the closest harmony on this problem with our European allies,". ? d Last week a new overwhelmingly anti-Communist Portuguese coalition cabinet was sworn into office, with ma- Jo.- rocs or the Socialist and Popular Democratic parties. White House press secretary Ron Nessen. State Department spokesman Robert L. Funseth and a CIA spokes- man yesterday declined to confirm or .deny that American money has been- channeled to Portugal or Angola. - Administration officials conceded that by not denying the reports they. ? lent credence to the accounts. What particularly troubled many U.S. offi- cials was that their silence tended to equate the covert American aid sent to ,Portugal and Angola with the amounts. of Soviet aid. U.S. sources said that equation is un- warranted, because, they contended. the amount of 'Soviet support is much higher. These American sources said they were barred from being specific about U.S. support. . Sen. Lloyd M. Bentsen D-Tex.) said in July that on the basis of informa- tion from the State Department' and the CIA, Soviet aid to Portugal's Com- munists reportedly ranged from S2 million to $10 million a month. Kis- singer said at that time that the infor- mation he had "makes $10 million seem high.". In Angola, there are three contend- ing liberation movements, one backed by the Soviet Union, with at least one of the two opposing groups backed by China and now the United States as well. Sen. Dick Clark (D-Iowa), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations sub- committee on Africa, who visited Angola last month and talked with leaders of all three forces, yesterday said: "It's. a very bad idea for us to be- come involved in any way." Clark said that publicly and privately, "I've taken a very strong position with high officials of the State Department" cautioning that "outside intervention by the superpowers obviously is only going to escalate the conflict." did have a classified document illegally, :d -he:was more than happy to return the. thing? It seems that Roderick M.. ..[Rodi Hills,-. counsel_ to the. President- .:and --husband of- Ford's ONLY woman icabinet. member,- Carla, visited .Pike's . office last July. Hills?normally one of -those excessivey tidy, wary -and effi-- cient people who often become lawyers ?accidentally left a red folder on Pike's . desk. The folder 'contained three pages stamped "stiper sensitive", two letters from CIA Director William Colby and . some -newspaper clippings. Hills, realiz- ing his goof, asked for the folder; Pike, realizing the breach of security, refused_ .Until last week: Then Pike wrote in his letter to Ford that he "detested" in- formers, would not inform on the person :involved but would' offer "a hint -with. ?which I suspect the FB( will be able- to - ':track him down. He is the husband of a -member'of your cabinet." How did word. tiEw REPUBLIC 20 SEPTEMBER 1975 'Ma zSiiiiif.A3 Literature ROCKEFELLER AND HIS C.I.A.-SOCIAL- IST" FAKE LIBERAL AND REAL RIGHT WING AGENTS in the media (New Republic through National Review), government, union misleaderships (-Soares" Woodcock through "Salazar" Mearty), etc. peddle the SAME anti-Communist, anti-Soviet LIES. They offer you the SAME fascist LOOTING by Chase Manhattan and the World Bank from New York City to Bangladesh in your "choice" of "progressive" "moderate", or "conservative" guise. Have these C.I.A. lightning rod sham choices diverted your energy away from the real alternative: NEW SOLIDARITY, Marxist newspaper of the U.S. Labor Party (N.C.L.C.). Exposes the C.I.A. hand behind crises in N.Y.C., Portugal, India etc. and the C.I.A. crimes that Rocke- feller and church conceal (C.I.A direction f - - 1-1? leak out? about the leak? U. had the agent?provocateur groups e _entire letter printed in the Congressionai Black S. eptember, etc.) 50 issues S12.00. ork 0001 Rerte0S4-2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-0043f0164111/08Wica 1`1, 231 IV. 29 St., 9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 NEW YORK TIMES 27 September 1975 Europe Socialists Deny Routing C.I.A. Funds to Party in Lisbon Speclal to Tate New York /Imes LONDON, Sept 26?The Gen_ Icial Demociatic party emphati- eral Secretary of the Socialist I cally denied today any transfer- International dented today that ring of funds to the Portuguese Western Etnopean Socialist Socialist party on behalf of parties were passing on money the C.I.A. to the Portuguese Socialist par- ty that was provided by the American Central Intelligence Agency. " "'There has been no such involvement :whatsoever," the General Secretary, Hans Tanit- schek, said. A Washington dis- patch in The New York Times yesterday telEarg of such an involvement, he said, "does great damage to the cause of socialism in Portugal and also in other Western European countries." Mr. Janitschsk said that he was seeking advice about how to undertake legal action. against The Times, a paper that he said he had hitherto regarded as "one of the finest in the world." 1 "What I particularly resent," he said, "is that The New Yorki Tunes did not feel it necessary ' to check \Vail me before pub- lishing this amount." Had that been done, he went on, he would have informed the paper that 'any assistance given the Portuguese Socialist party byi sister parties of the Socialist, International came not from the C.I.A. but from party mem- bers, and was "very limited indeed." The Times report: did not mention the Socialist Interna- tional, but sprite of Western European Socialist parties and labor unions. _ _ A Denial in Stockholm ? STOCLHOLM, Sept. 26 (Reu- I ters)--Swederes governing Sp- NEW YORK TIRES 22 Septerber 1975 _ Hunt Said to Link Nixon Aide in Plot To Kill Anderson -IS- WASHINGTON. Sept_ 21?E. Howard Hunt Jr.? who is serv- ing a jail term in Florida for his role in the Watergate bur- glary, has told "associates" that he was asked about five years ago by a '".nior" official in the Nixon White House to assassinate the. syndicated co- lumnist Jack Anderson, accord- ing to a meport today in The Washington Post. Neither Mr. Hunt nor his lawyer, William. A. Snyder, would comment en the article, which was displayed across the top of Page One in The Post. Mr. Anderson said today that he did not think it was possible that anyone in the Nixon White House would have seriously suggested his minder. The Post said that the assas- sination plan was alive for "several days" in December, 1971, or January, 1972, and "Everyone who has visited, Portugal and seen the Socialist party at close hand," a Social 1Democratic spokesman. here / said, "can testify that the party 'is hardly wallowing in money. ,On the contrary, its economic situation is very difficult." The Portuguese Socialist leader, Mario Soares, is expect- ed here Monday to attend the annual congress of the Swedish party. U.S. Sources Confirm Aid - WASHINGTON, Sept. 26 '(AP) ?A State Department official said today that the Central Intelligence Agency had been sending $2-million to $10-mil- lion a month to the Portuguese /Socialists, but offered no over- all total for aid thus fah. - The official's comment came as sources in the State Depart- pent and the 'intelligence com- munity confirmed that the aid twas going to Portugal's Social-- ;Communist labor unions and. The sources said aid was - ;sent through a roundabout net- iwork. involving C.I.A. co.ntacts Iwithin Western European cound Itries, such as West Germany's. /Social Democratic party. Other conduits for the overt laid, the sources said, were anti- Communists labor Unions and ibusiness organizations that operated within member na- tions of the. North Atlantic: /Treaty Organization. ? "canceled" at the last minute." The article did not identify the White House official .or give the reason for the cancel- lation. In hi s book, "An American Life," Jeb Stuart Magruder, a former Nixon campaign aide, wrote that G. Gordon Liddy, another convicted Watergate conspirator, had taken him se- riously when he offhandedly remarked, "Boy, it'd be nice to get rid of that guy [Mr. Anderson ." Mr. Magruder, who was also involved in the Watergate scandal, wrote that his assist- ant realized that Mr. Liddy had taken Mr. Magruder's com- ment literally. Mr. Magruder ?wrote that he had immediately called Mr. Liddy back to his office to explain, "Gordon, I. was just using a figure of speech about getting rid of Anderson." "Well, you better watch that," answered Mr. Liddy, -ac- cording to Mr. Magruder's book. The Post article said that there was no connection be- ween the Hunt assassination an and the Lidde incident. NEW YORK TIMES 28 September 1275 TGOVERN SEEKING J,AIISgO1CURB f? lans Legislation to Extend ? 4? 15-Million' to, Portugal and Ban Covert Activity aa By. LESLIE H. GELB armee epeaua to The New York Tines . -MT-WASHINGTON; Sept. -27- 7.56nator George S. McGovern 0:itnouneed today that.he would :.'introduce legislation'to ban' -further, United States covert ?Intelligence activity in Portugal and to' give the Government of .);tortugal $55-million in regulart keeonomic aid.. e ? ? - ? ? a? speech prepared for de- livery to the Senate on Mon- Oeye the South Dakota Demce ,crat, ? who recently a returned ,from a visit to Portugal, says that Moscow's secret support lor Portuguese Communists is intr., excuse for covert American taVolvement.? He charges,that dntral Intelligence Agecy's `interference "will poison the politics of that country." The Senator's proposed ban is in response to an article in, The New- York Times on, Thursday. ? .It 'cited official sources as -acknowledging that the United States, through the C.I.A.'s connections with West European Socialist parties and . labor unions, has channeled several million dollars a month" since last spring to help non-- Communist parties in Portugal. Denied by Socialist . White House and State De- partment spokesmen would' neither confirm nor deny this report yesterday, but the Portu- guese ? Socialist party leader, Mario Soares, denied the alle- 'gation. The report also cited official sources as saying that the C.I.A. had been channeling money and arms to bolstertiwo national libreatiOn fronts in An- gola against a third front that is heavily supph_dd by the So- viet Uniin. and its .East Euro- pean allies.-The report also said that about 200 Chinese military advisers -were helping one or perhaps both of the anti-Soviet fronts. Interviews with a number of Senators and Representatives, :indicated that thereewould little support for Mr. McGover- aern's proposed ban. Most of those interviewed said that be- cause of information that Mos; cow's covert aid in Portugal and Angola predated and ex- ceeded covert American action, C.I.A. involvement has been ap- propriate and justifiable. A few felt with Mr. McGov- ern that such aid would damage non- Communist elements in Portugal and should be stopped, and one Senator said that he would introduce an amendment 10 to ban covert American intelli. gence activity in Angola. ? Administration officials saidl that they now expected rnovesi in Congress to prohibit these! activities but 'hoped that the.. measures ,could be killed in; committee or with the argud ment that no action should be taken until. the Senate and; House Select ,Committees on; Intelligence -make recommen-d dations early next year. Panels Had Been Informed, ., As prescribed by law, Will- lam E.: Colby, Director of Cen- tral Intelligence, had informed, members of six Congressional subcommittees of the opera- tions in .Portugal and Angola.. , Informed sources said that not serious objection had been raised by the legislators. Mr. McGovern's amendment to the pending foreign aid bill ? would 'authorize $20-million for development projects in. Por- tugal and $35.anillion to assist - refugees from Angola over the $20-million already - in the bill for this purpose. In his statement, the Senator also called for channeling this aid, as far as possible, through multilateral international or- ganizations. "Multilateral aid is the best way to. meet Portugal's critical economic needs without. raising the threat of percep- tion of interference with Por- tuguese self - determination," the statement reads. - ? Since last ? _spring, official sources Said, the C.I.A. has been providing arms and finan- cial aid .to Angolan -liberation groups through President Mo- butu Sese Seim of Zaire. For this assistance. the State De- partment has 'been seeking to wbrk out aid and financial ar- rangements to help President' Mobutu with his mounting fi- nancial debt. Soares Criticizes U.S. ,. sateen to The New 1' r,rk Tants 'LISBON, Sept, 27?The Pora thguese socialist leader, alirio ? Soares, criticized the United, States today when he learnedi that the State Department had) refused to confirm or deny a) . New York Times report that, millions of dollars had beeni channeled to his party from!. Washington through West Eu-i ropean Socialist parties and la4 bor organizations. "That's a mean trick of thel United States government." he! said, "because we didn't receive/ any Money." "The Portuguese Socialist party has always taken great care not to receive any help in money from anyone." he said. "Maybe there 'has' been some diplomatic support, that sort of thing, but no money." Mr. Soares said that there had been some supplies, such: as copying machines, from the. West German Socialists hut' that he had paid no attentien! to these details. "As a lawyer, I must remind you that it is up to the one who makes the accusations to give. the proof. :not the other way around," he said. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100-380007-9 WASHINGTON STAR 19 September 1975 By John Fialka Wa rigtcai Star Staff Writer For 15 years now Erie H. Bidclle ? ? Jr. has been trying, unsuccessfully, to come back from the cold. ? . On the surface, he has every possi- ble credential one might need to suc- ceed in Washington. He has excellent social connections, coining from a fa-. mous, "main line" family in 'Philadelphia. His academic credenr tials are impeccable, he prepped at the Haverford School and graduated from Harvard. He is regarded bY his friends and even some of his enemies as an hon- est, hard worker. He has demonstrat- ed experience and skill, at overseeing . multimillion dollar programs. "He is the ideal civil servant," states an evaluation report once done by one of his supervisors, "with a very high standard of performance to which he consistently adheres." ? Yet, Biddle, at age 6, has seen his hopes for a meaningful career in the federal government shattered. ? FOR FIVE YEARS he has been a "nonperson" at Action, the agency where he works. He is not invited to policy meetings. He may not compete for high-level promotions. Although he was, until recently, a GS-15, his work was reviewed by a GS-12. Fre- quently he has been assigned fo do ? nothing, and, frequently, his superi- ors have tried to act as Biddle does not exist. Why? Because Eric -Biddle is still regarded as a "Spook." He succumb- Wed, along with many of his Ivy ? League peers in the early 1950s to the blandishments of government re- cruiters who promised jobs with the "most exciting agency in Washing- ton." It was the heyday a the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency and Biddle - was one of the thousands of bright 'yeing men whit signed on. Although Biddle resigned in 1960, no one has -ever let him forget it. Now the "agency.," as Biddle calls it, sometimes with respect and some- times with gentle criticism, is going through its blackest days, tarred with attacks from the. press, Con- gress and even the White House. ? Many of Biddle's class of "bright young men" are now getting a taste of what Biddle has had. He believes there are hundreds, if not thousands. who are having great difficulty find- ing jobs. There have been complaints of -discrimination against ex-CIA agents by private employers, but Biddle's case, now pending in Dis- trict Court is believed to be the first one charging that his civil rights are being violated by the discrimination of one federal agency against anoth- er. ? "Because, in the first place it is " interesting work and they are de- voted to it It is also hard to get out, very hard if you're married and have a family. Now it must be much hard- er than ever." IT IS DIFFICULT for him to.con- yey to a younger generation, a child of the Sixties, the aura, the feeling that young, liberal idealists were charged with in the early Fifties. "I wanted to serve my country. It was the-old Rooseveltian concept of service. That's why I majored in gov- ernment. The CIA was considered to be the most exciting place in Wash- ington. That's why so many of my peers were recruited, because of the . aura of mystery and adventure.. "I was asked, for example, when I was interviewed whether or not I was. willing to jump ? parachute ? into the Soviet Union. I didn't know whether that was a realistic possibilh ity or not, I had no idea. I sort of, gulped and said yes." The State Department, once the Mecca for blue bloods like Biddle, had been demolished by the McCar- thy era. But the CIA was unscathed. "Because we had passed such a rigid security screening, we were immune from suspicion of disloyalty, even though most of the people I knew .were .rather liberal in politics. For example, they were for Adlai Steven- son in 1952 and skeptical of candidate Eisenhower's promises to 'roll back' the Iron Curtain. He had taken Russian at Harvard. And, in the spring of 1952. Biddle took nine months of more intensive Rus- sian lessons at the Navy's language school in Anacostia. The competition for overseas assignments was in- tense, especially for the Eastern European sector, and Biddle was sure that was where he wanted to be. He wanted action and he got it. During the next two years he trained, dispatched and monitored agents, some of them, he says, for missions within the Soviet Union. This is the 'art of spy handling, or "agent run- ning." Biddle, the practitioner, stayed in the background, operating from bases in Germany and else- where. - HE DESCRIBES IT as a kind of gentlemanly game. Although there was considerable thievery and tres- pass, there was none of the James Bond hugger-mugger. Poison darts did net whiz around the arena and CIA and KGB agents were notscontin- natty trying to waste each other with exotic weaponry. "The two absolute no-nos were that you did not take away the other guy's diplomatic pouch and you didn't lull or even physically harm anybody on the other side because that went both 6'4) , kni-th During those years, however, he began to feel symptoms of career frustration. "I was hired toward the end of the CIA's big recruiting drive. They had recruited too many people. The people in key positions were . guys not much older than me. I could 'see the promotional possibilities were going to be very, very slow." So when Biddle returned to Wash- ? ington in 1955, he was tempted to ac- cept a fellowship for Russian studies at Columbia University in New York. His supervisor, on the very day Bid- dle mentioned that, came up with an assignment to Greece. Eastern Europe might have been where the action was, but Greece, in those days, was where much of the "action" was mounted. "We, I mean the United States, practically ran that country in those days. There were a lot of (CIA) operations there. Besides, Greece was a decidedly bet- ter place to live than Germany." Bid- dle spent much of his free time ex- ploring ancient monuments. Another reason Biddle enjoyed Greece was because he fell in love with a Greek woman. He wasn't en- tirely sure he wanted to marry her, but he decided he would clear the possibility, anyway, with his superi- ors. ? They turned him down flat, even -though he'd offered to subject the woman to a complete security check. CIA intelligence officers were not permitted to marry foreign nationals, he was told. That was the beginning of the end for Biddle's CIA aspirations. "It was totally unjustified. It was ridiculous to make a generalization that all foreigners are automatically security risks." IN THE LATE FIFTIES, when Biddle returned from Greece, he made it clear to his superiors that he was leaving the agency as soon as he could find an acceptable job. He began spending long weekends in New York, visting personnel of- fices on Mondays. At first he found few takers. "When you leave the agency, you have this peculiar bur- den. you can't say what you've done. The only thing I had to talk about was my foreign experience and lan- guages." Finally, in March 1960, Biddle de- cided to make a clean break with the .agency and spend all of his time look- ing for a job. He resigned and was given a glowing letter of recommen- dation from G.M. Stewart, then the CIA's director of personnel. For a while Biddle worked for a drug company in Philadelphia, later he shifted to a major international engineering company in San Francis- co, but he decided that working in the private sector was, after his experi- ence, just not that interesting. ? In November 1963 when John F. Kennedy was assassinated. Biddle when was sure he had to "get back into 7-00432 ROM) &GO Cieteig fu I work." At first he decided that the, way to Biddle believes tizatAthe ? r Vs.0u$ there was no knowirwie his former peers arerkT,8EV8r Reier?au ;limos : CIA-RDP7 ne IA. 11 r; Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 do that was to become active in the Episcopal Church. In 1964 he started work at Union Seminary at Columbia University in New York on a masters degree in religious studies. To finance his education, he worked for the Na- tional Council of Churches. The following year, however, he decided that he needed a higher pay- ing job and returned to Washington, looking for full-time government work. Biddle has always been fussy about working in Washington. In 1952 the exciting new agency, the magnet for the idealists, might have been the CIA, but that era was gone, perhaps forever. The new magnet was now the Peace Corps and, of course, that was where Biddie had to be. In the late summer of 1905. Biddle had an interview with one of the corp's chief "talent scouts" that he has never forgotten. It was the way she did it. He had been in an outer office, completing his forms, when a lower echelon official told him that, be- cause of his CIA background, he could never be eligible for a position in the Peace Corps. "I said I'm not satisfied with that answer. I want to talk to somebody higher up." Then he was introduced to a woman who seemed, at first, very interested. After running- through his background, Biddle added that there was something he felt she should know. "Is it intelligence?" she asked, cheerily. "Yes," said Biddle. . "Bye," said the woman, sweetly, waving at him. ' LATER THAT YEAR, Biddle sign- ed on as an inspector for the Office of Equal Opportunity, which was then in charge of waging President John- son's War on Poverty. ? Biddle's work as an inspector for 0E0 often required him to travel to various communities to see whether. the antipoverty funds were being abused. According to several of Bid- dle's associates, his work was leg- endary. "He had all sorts of strange ways to dig up information. The peo-. pie out in the field were afraid of him," said one. The problem was that Biddle didn't march to any recognizable drummer. In the late 1960s, during the great emotional outpouring for inner city blacks,'Biddle was at work digging up stories of wholesale diversion of poverty program funds in the black community, and was investigating the financing of such groups as the Black Panthers. Later, at a time when there was, .considerable sympathy for the plight of the American Indian, there was Biddle, pointing out that leaders of the American Indian Movement had police records and that bands of armed thugs fought over government money and positions at various In- dian reservations, assertions that later turned out to he true. By 1970, it became perfectly clear to many 0.E0 workers that if they wanted a lengthy career in a govern- ment agency. 0E0 was not the place to be. The Nixon administration had marked the agency for extinction. . Approved ? . Biddle then signed on with .a new agency, the Office of Voluntary Ac- tion, but not, however, without a few skirmishes with minor White House officials who concluded that Biddle would be "too anti-Communist." RIDDLE'S NEW BOSS was Christopher Mould. Mould was im- pressed with his work, promoted him to GS-15 and assigned him to a new task force that was drawing up plans for a new agency, Action, which would merge 'the Peace Corps, Vista and other volunteer groups into one unit. It was arranged that Biddle would go over to Action when the agency was authorized to begin. It was ar- ranged, that is, until Mould took it upon himself to tell Joseph Blatch- ford, then the head of Action, about Biddle's CIA background. Blatchford, Mould has later sworn in an affidavit supporting Biddle's case, "concluded that Mr. Biddle could not remain in any part of Ac- tion because of the damage his pres- ence might cause the Peace Corps overseas." Mould, who became associate director for Action, asserts in the affidavit that, as a result, "Mr. Bid- dle was persona non grata in Action and was given little or no work and was essentially isolated from the day to day work of the agency." At the time, however, it was not clear to anyone just how long Bid- dle's "nonperson" status would con- tinue. Biddle, who worried about his previous rejection by the Peace Corps, remembers being reassured by Mould: "Don't worry, you're going into Action, not into the Peace Corps." But Biddle did worry. He worried enough to ask the CIA why there was such a taboo about joining the Peace Corps. He was told, he said, that in the early daYs of the Peace Corps, when Sargent Shriver was its direc- tor, there was a secret agreement with then-CIA director Allen Dulles ,that, in order to keep Peace Corps volunteers above all suspicion, the CIA would never use the corps for a "cover," and that no ex-CIA agent could he hired by the Peace Corps Within five years after resigning from the CIA. OFFICIALLY, Biddle was a GS4S program analyst in the agency's domestic Policy and Program Devel- opment section. Unofficially, he was given few assignments and encour- aged to find another job. He tried, sending resumes at first to other agencies. The Office of Management and Budget, the Environmental Protection Agency and the Depart- ment of. Commerce's East-West Trade section were among his first choices. Later, as his search became more desperate, the list was broadened to incude the Departments of Health Education and Welfare, Agriculture, and the General Services Adminis- tration. There were no takers. "In the old days at CIA," Biddle reminisced to a reporter, "we used to, laugh about Agriculture, ? that being sent there would be like dying or something. The CIA was the swinging place to be." ? 12 For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 In February 1972, when Howard Phillips was assigned the task of demolishing 0E0, he asked Biddle whether he'd be interested in a temporary transfer to 0E0 to work as a program auditor. Biddle, who was bored and frustrated, accepted. Unlike any of the former directors of 0E0, Phillips used all of Biddle's reports and then some in his all-out effort to abolish the agency. Biddle was not pleased by the highly politi- cal nature of Phillips' attacks and, when Michael P. Balzano Jr. took over as the head of Action, Biddle was back after his old job. IN THE MEANTIME, however, 'someone had leaked the story of Bid- dle's, former CIA experience-to the press. There were several headlines. about the existence of an "ex-CIA man in Action," and at least one arti- cle talked about "former spooks" serving in 0E0. e Because Biddle was still officially an employe of Action, Blatchford felt it necessary to issue a memo empha- sizing that the Peace Corps would always maintain its bar against for- mer CIA employes. Referring td Bid- dle as "this individual," Blatchford noted that he had made considerable efforts to find Biddle another job. ""Action cannot and would not dis- charge this man, who has civil serv- ice rights," said Blatchford. Under the Balzaho regime, al- though he had had assurances that there would be no more discrimina- tion, it became clear to Biddle one morning that there was still a prob- lem. He had made arrangements to go to night law classes at George Wash- ington University, arrangements that seemed to be satisfactory to his su- periors at the time. One Aug. 27, just before law sehool was to begin, he received a memo- randum from Marjorie Lynch, who was then the agency's associate director for domestic and antipoverty operations. The agency, she said, had decided on a "partial decentraliza- tion," of Biddle's office. The part that was being decentralized was Biddle, who was being assigned to Kansas City. When Biddle threatened to take up the matter with the Civil Service Commission, plans for the -partial decentralization" were suddenly dropped. THEN, LAST SEPTEMBER, Bid- dle's unit was hit by a reduction in force. Biddle's GS-15 slot was abol- ished. Shortly afterward, a friend, Fred Patrick, then head of Action's Internal Audit staff, offered Biddle a CS-14 slot and Biddle accepted, pro- vided there was an understanding that he would not be prohibited from doing anything in the job's descrip- tion, which mentioned auditing trips to scrutinize Action's foreign and domestic operations. The real test of this came this spring when Patrick quietly assigned Biddle to audit Peace Corps activi- ties in Belize and-Costa Rica. Nobody objected, so Biddle went. There were no coups in Central America while he was there, and no foreign leaders were seen to be stricken by mysteri- ous poisons. But when .the trip was discovered there was an explosion in ' Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 Action.. Patrick, according ton letter he later sent Biddle, was summoned by Jorge Cordova, then Action's general_ counsel, and told that the Peace Corps ban on CIA employes extended to people auditing the Peace Corps. Based on meetings with Cordova and other Action officials. Patrick wrote Biddle that "the opirrion of the gener- al counsel will serve as a restriction prohibiting your future involvement in Peace Corps work. assignments." ? Eric Biddle is ori familiar grounds now. He is fighting a gentlemanly but desperate battle_ lin December, he took his case before the Civil Service Commission, which rejected his argu- ment that his civil rights have been violated. In August he-brought suit in Dis- trict Court, here, against 13alzano, Action and the Civil Service Commis- sion. All:along, his opposition has been formidable, but gentlem only. For example, Phillip Bourbon, Ac- tion's personnel director, asserts that Biddle's charge of discrimination is "simply not true." He defends the agency's latest regulation on the matter as being necessary to keep the Peace Corps inviolate. The regulation MOW prohibits all former government intelligence offi- cers. from holding any job in the Peace Corps or any Action support facilities ,that deal with the Peace Corps. Bourbon seid .the regulation extends to former f,e,telligence agents from the armed 7orces and might even bar a former FBI agent, al- though he said that would have to be examined on a "case-by-case basis." Biddle is convinced that the regu- lation was written expressly for him.: Bourbon denies it. ? "He (Biddle} is a geed man," said Bourbon, I don't think anybody's ever questioned that.' - WASHINGTON STAR 23 Sep tember 1975 NEW YORK DILY NEWS 21 SEPTE,IBER 1975 'RIGHT ON!' iA.Ax- . .es clere to ofi w re ilizicaLian 9 4 i (7.7 0 IT if ? 6 P L . - . . The ne:4* Aszariation of Re- 1 Phillips, 52. is the former; ed the convention were touchy ler said. "And I try to do 'my tired Intelligemze Officers is !chief of Latin American oper-I about djscussineintelligence -part from the library." going, to stay out of partisan !ations for the Central intelli-' ' operations at all, most, like 1 Lewis Regenstein, 32, the politics but is trying to do igenee Agency. He said he; all it can to polish the tar-I"opted for early retirement"; John . Horton, who spent 27 !youngest member, is a con- nished image of intelligence I in May to promote the group.; years in CIA clandestine -,servationist who works for operations and. according to ;which he says is a "private i operations in the Far East and the Fund for Animals and re- its founder, s man too." !port or guidance from anylLatin America, expressed comicently finished the book, "The "how we're hu- ;organization receiving no sup- About WO .ex-spies and :governmental agency." , cern about the future of legiti- !Politics of Extinction." He ?1 mate intelligence gatherings, used to work. out of Bong' other former members of the I Most of the organization' S.,' ?1; don't think there's any Kong, watching - to see when intelligence community at-I4.25 members are former CIA !doubt that the exposures and Communist leaders were fall- , tended the association's first: agents, although Philipps saidi revelations have hurt our ing out of favor- . -conventioa this week. which ;an increasing number are for-; work," Horton said. I At the press conference, : was held -so toe would have ; mer members of military in-; The association's - oldest. Philipps said the organiza- an irientEty." aecordine- to I telligence or agencies such as; and younrrest membet's also tion was not formed to de- founder David A. Phillips of i the FBI or the National Se-were present. ; fend the mistakes of some Bethesda. 1 curity Agency. I Vienna-born Hugo Knopfmae- !people in the intelligence I Tha two-day eon ye n I, i on! He said it was a coincidence her, 85. said he fled the Soy- 'community: closed last night with a press :that the convention was being; iet Union via the Gobi Desert 1 "There have been a lot of conference sal banquet ati held at the same time (helmn 1920. He joined the CIA in !mistakes. There are bound tol the Ratmda Inn in Alexandria !House Committee on Entelli-11952 and worked as a research- i he mistakes in any instittil - and annonticerami of the ap- I genet, was holding hearings on; cc. Ition. We're trying to put I pointment of IQ-member ;OA excesses. 1 "We have always tried to !things into perspective," ne! I board of govern:qrs. I Although some who attend-, find the truth," Knopfmach- ' said. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 13 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 WASHINGTON ST AR 19 September 1975 Retired Agents Don't Fit the Image By John Sherwood ra Washington Star Staff Writer ' The ghostly Oliphant CIA sktillmasks with the beady eyes simply Were not there. These spooks might have loolsed the role during their active role-playing days, but it's hard to flash a sinis- ter cover when retired and attending a mini-spy convention-reunion at a local mOtel. Maybe at the Hilton-Bos- phorus, but not at the Ramada Alexandria. Coffee urns, styrofoam cups and beehive hairdo t a spook do not make. These faces were IBM, Federal Triangle GS. The two-day convention was the first of the Associa- tion of Retired Intelligence Officers (AR10), who came in out of the rainy cold yes- terday to come out publicly in a kind of evangelical "Fairness to the CIA" poli- cy. Some of the old, -spook 'spark was still crackling, however, in the cover of someone who looked like a bowling lady. The visitor reached for a paper, and she stopped him, asking the THE CHICAM TRIBUNE 28 September 1975 UM use -lir 2- . ? r.ex-a ?-? . ? ? ? the-Central Trail- liginc"A"genCy:: iiust be :changed sp., that abuses Such as those being splashed. "across' newspaper front pages and= television screens do- not happen /gain, David Atlee Phil- lips" a former CIA agent told a Chicago aUdience Friday. ' . . . . *. Speaking to member of the Woman's Athletic Club, Phillips -admitted ,thes intelligence agency has: rnacle...-"some.-.bad :mistakes" and did not attempt to ...defend them'" - ??J'Actions:77.v,,hich .aret.unconstitu- tional canna; he ? defended," Said Phillips who,'resigned from the CiA five months-ago. alto:- 23 years in such hotespois as. Cuba, Lebanon, s' lii proper authority if it was okay to hand out the stuff. IT WAS extremely dif- ficult for these retired intel- ligence people, most of them ex-CIA types, to admit openly that this was how they spent most of their lives. The paper concerned was entitled "Periscope," and it handed out the official ARIO line: "It is the belief of ARIO that neither the Central Intelligence Agency nor any other intelligence organization of our govern- ment needs defending or justifying. However, recent events have made it clear that a great deal of patient explaining is called for. People just do not under- stand what intelligence is and how important it is to their survival. Unfortunate as it its, they really do be- lieve the wild-eyed cowboy tales they read in the press and get the impression that intelligence officers are a lot of maniac-poisoners, burglars and assassins." ? The spirit behind this offensive defense is a and .the Dominican Republic:e liE WAS IN Chicago ta start :a nationwide sPeaking. tour to explain- the role Of intelligence in American society. today..SaturciaY he spoke at a?tefninar sponsored by the Chicago Council on-Foreigi Relations in Lake Bluff., ".? : `.'The successes of the-,CIA were accomplished in the .'40s; -'50s, and ' American foreign Policy; of tourse, there is always the- Valid question whether the foreign--policy was successful," he said. rt youthful-looking David ? ex-actor, ex- playwright, ex-editor of "The South Pacific Mail," and now, ex-CIA intelli- gence officer. During a tape-recorded interview yesterday with Phillips and a Westing- house newsman, a suspi- cious bystander got to the point where he didn't trust anyone. WAS THE GOY with the tape recorder a plant? Was the -ashtray bugged? Was the retired Phillips a newly hired tool of his alma mater? Why did that cur- tain just move? What was in those _sugar cubes? Why is my head spinning? The convention's work- shops were closed. Okay, Phillips. What did The Director (Colby) say about this move on your part to blow your cover and talk? "He said he preferred that I stayed in the agen- cy," said Phillips. "But he didn't object. in fact, he wished me luck." Of course, Colby also knew that it was Phillips' inten- tion to defend, not to attack. How do we know the CIA isn't paying you to do this, Phillips was asked? "You don't," he said. "Obviously I can't prove I'm not under cover, except that I testi- fied under oath before the' Senate Church committee that I no longer have any connection with the CIA." Do you think this conven- tion is being spied upon by the CIA? " "IT WOULD be impossi- ble" said Phillips. "They would be crazy to pull off any domestic, covert spying at this stage of the game." Some 150 attended the convention (including 31 from Maryland, 53 from :eatTheri: were zigs and iagi, "some., Virginia and 41 from Wash- ington), assembled .mainly .f-Phillips 'said. }U.'. heft"; thi-s4endyir: to develop some kind of because-1 he ? v?ias. frustrated.- 'and- ? . statement to .be concerned" at .the lack' of tinder-,pro-CIAanounced tonight. sianding,.by Americens.of the iole Phillips, of 8224 Stone "ofttintelligencee and intelligence ? Drive, Bethesda, said agents. He-formed the-Association Trait of Retired Intelligence Officers. to. educate. the.: public.' , .sorne. sp'Ooks . .to. coine. in out. of the cold and explain ththr function,'?to.. present:therm.; s lv es 2 Sz' hU1112.11'd,he- ? . he retired early four months ago to fight for the CIA cause when it appeared it needed fighting for. "I started getting people together through my Christmas card list,? he said, "and went on from there. Now we are in the process of establishing chapters and scheduling volunteer speakers." Phillips, who spent most of 25 CIA years in Latin America, is now on a pr CIA lecture tour. He re- fused to quote his lecture fee, saying that was a ques- tion for his agent. "LET'S SAY this, though," he added. "My agent told me I could make between $5,000 and $10,000 a year speaking for the CIA, but could make from $50,000 to $100,000 speaking against it." He described himSelf as "not an assassin, a burglar, or a purloiner of docu- ments, but a manager of spies. Mostly, I attended meetings. I had managerial responsibilities. But I can't go into detail about my duties." However, he added, "if there was even one political CIA assassination I would be surprised." The "tragedy" of the whole intelligence contro- versy, he said, is- that an agency such as the CIA cannot defend itself by quoting "the good things it has done. Because ot its very nature, it cannot give out such information." ; JUST BEFORE leaving for the picnic last night that rain forced indoors at Stone Ridge School in Rockville, the boyish Phillips was asked once more about any double-agent status. "No," he said, quietly. "I've told you the truth." But there was one more question. During your early years as a playwright, what was the name of the one suc- cessful play you wrote? "The Snow Job," he said, trying not to laugh. WASIITITGTON STAR ? (GREEN LINE) t7.EPT.Fiar:37R Te 7)75 SATURDAY NIGHT SPECIAL? . . . Ear hears that Gordon Liddy had one of those super-secret CIA laser zap guns that Congress took a peek at recently. The weapon has a beam that locks in on a target and ziopo, what happens next is so secret even Ear can't hear it. Only five were made. Liddy told a pal that he once carried his while toting S40,000 from the 14 White House to a downtown bank. He was said to be disappointed that no-one held him up. "It's so simple even a child can Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RD14?-100437Rbtift00380007-9 ? Approved For Release 2001/68/08 : CIA-RoP77-00432R000100380007-9 TIME Mitgazatne 6 Oetc-leoeh 19.75 Those Secret Letter Openings In the edlearof the ever-vigilant CIA, even Richard Nixon nray not have been above smanicien. When he was cam- paigning flew 1.1=. presidency in 196S, the agency secretly opened a letter that he received Sloan Ray Price, a speechwriter traveling En .Meecows the contents dealt nob' with latizon's election prospects. Idaho's FmankCiturch? chairman of the .Sertate ferael Ettence! -Committee, dis- closed last Tale& that the Nixon letter was one ormattay thousands that were il- legally phtretageaphed and filed away .foatn. 1951 ao 1973, when the program W2S stopped co orders from former CIA Director i7ATIM Schlesinger, now Secre- tary of Derfert.=.. Even, after Nixon be- came Preskleine he apparently was not are of eat eurloined-letter program ?an indication of how far the CIA had escaped Emectaieeconuol. The W?tehlist. The operation was centered het The US. post office at New York's Kennedy Airport, where as many as sEhe cale agents worked in co- operation with asp U.S. postal officials to open, sraan and photograph the let- ters. Anyrame whose name was on a '"vratth list' heel his mail opened if it was sent to or came from the Soviet Union. The trenernittee revealed three names on be=leetic list Biologist Li- nos Pauling, The left-leaning Nobel lau- reate; Labael.ater Victor Reuther; and John Steiratteckethe fate novelist. The mairtamany people not on the list was a1s emlinizede Among them: Federal Me-setae Chairman Arthur Burns, Senator Hubert Humphrey, Sen- ator Edo:a-nil Kemerly, Congresswoman Bella Abereeege Martin Luther King, his widow Oocesta and Jay Rockefeller, a likelyDerreencratic candidate for Gover- nor of Wesellirdia. Church had a per- sonal quartel Withthe CIA because it had opened .a ratter that he wrote to his anotheretrteaaw he Raise, Idaho, while he VMS touring Ramie, in 1971. Also rou- tinely mothhored was mail to or from Harvard Utaiteraiy and the Ford and 'Rockefeller fratedation se Nixon'saamsrent unawareness of the prograue was disclosed ? by Torn Hus- ton,34, reputed. WITb.Or of the 1970 White House plan glia proposed illegal break- ins, wire tteet ?=d? mall intercepts to .coonteract.iliodactivity. The plan, he now conced, was largely irrelevant be- cruise the Crate hadalready adopted many of those prreeeketsdtlf we had known all these tools: were being used and were still not getrialgressits," said Huston, "it might have .'changed our whole ap- proach." vainly because of the oppott sition of an Director J. Edgar Hoover and Agorae-he General John Mitchell, the plan veasTejected by Nixon five days .after he had :ap14.:Wed it. As if nothing had happened, tir&CIA continued its mail steering. Huston still Cetainded these practices in the conteett terthe tumultuous 1960s. What had avorriel him .was "revoln- tionartevionce .the lives and prop- erty of panole who were being sub- jected to violence, the 2.0Ct00 bombings that occurred ineree year and the 39 no- ? offi ceradho teese kilted." The White House was also worried that the vi- olence mletteet be turtiatly directed or funded fro..?ea abroad. Ygiaijitlafttl Fr the opinion of the President's Men, did not seem to be making a sufficient effort to establish the connection. Huston-admitted that his?and the CIA's?remedies could have become worse than the disease. "The biggest mistake I made was that I assumed the integrity of the intelligence people would be so great that despite the sweeping na- ture.of their powers, they would be used only in the most narrow and restricted circumstances_ I didn't consider that the person' using that power would not be tformer CIA directod Dick Helms but [convicted Watergate burglar) Howard Hunt." And, he added, "the danger is that you move from the kid with the bomb to the kid with the picket sign to the kid with the bumper sticker, and so on down the line. The risk is that you slip over from a national security pur- pose to a political purpose. You end up with these people going into the Watergate." Vitally important. Sounding scarcely different from the most critical Senators, Huston, now an Indianapolis lawyer, said, "It seems to me that these [intelligence] agencies _operate in a world of their own. They are not ac- countable to anyone. The problem is that .you must give these agencies enough independence to protect our lib- erties and yet mill hold them account- able to higher authority." One of the week's witnesses still clung to the notion of unaccountability. James J. Angleton, '57, had been chief of the CIA's counterintelligence until he was pressured to retire last year because of his unyielding cold war stance.. From 1955 to 1973, Angleton was in charge of the mail program. He told the com- mittee that the operation was especially useful because the Soviets did not re- alize it was going on. Angleton refused to retract a statement he had made ear- lier in closed session: "It is inconceivable that a secret-intelligence arm of the Government has to comply with all the overt orders of Government." Certainly Angleton had not done so. He conced- ed that it was an error to examine the mail of Nixon or a person of the stature' of Church: "But from a counterintelli- gence point of view," he added, "it was vitally important to know everything possible about contacts between U.S. cit- izens and Communist countries." Angleton described how helpful the cast had been in the case of the Weath- erpeople who blew up a Manhat'tan town house, where they were making bombs in 1970. rat files contained little infor- enation about one of the fugitives, Kathy 'kaolin. The CIA, on the other hand, was able to supply more than 50 intercepted letters dealing with Boudin's activitiei. - The committee then "decided to find out just how much one surprisingly un- portant person knew about the letter- opening pro-am and other activities by intelligence agencies that harraesed groups and individuals on the extreme left and right. The Senators voted unan- imously to ask Richard. Nixon to tes- tify. Compounding the former Fresh d=t's problems, U.S. District Judge John Lewis Smith ordered Nixon to gide a sworn deposition in the civil suit filed against him and other White House of- ficials by Morton Halperin, a onetime National Security Council aide whose phone was tapped for 21 months from R4fiage126b/10137tfas !CE411143P7 7 -0 15 Not Poison, Just Some Drugs It was as hairy and scary as assas- sination plots come, and the alleged target was one of the nation's most prominent muckrakers, Columnist Jack Anderson. Or' so, at least, reported an- other top journalist, the Washington Post's Bob Woodward. Last week he wrote that Watergate Burglar E. How- ard Hunt told some of his former CIA as- sociates "that he was ordered in Decem- ber 1971, or January 1972, to assassinate Anderson." Citing "reliable sources,' Woodward said the order came from "a senior official in the Nixon White House." A poison was to be supplied by a former CIA physician, and it was guar- anteed to leave no traces. The plan was eventually dropped, wrote Wocdward,. for reasons unknown. The plot, he added, was devised be- cause Anderson was widely hated in the Nixon Administration for printing sto- ries based on national security leaks. Ex- ample: the disclosure that Nixon secret- ly favored ? Pakistan in the India- Pakistan war. After the Post story ran, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence pressed to obtain Hunt's testimony to get to the bottom of the accusations. The CIA pledged its cooperation. Anderson himself expressed shock. He recalled ? that he had received threats from the Mafia, but "I just didn't believe anyone [in the Nixon Administration) would se- riously suggest murder." ? ' By Hunt's own account, nothing so serious as murder was ever considered ?but a drugging of Anderson was in- deed co.ntem pl ated. In an interview with TIME Correspondent David Beckwith, Hunt, who is serving a 2- to 8-year sen- tence at Florida's Eglin Air Force Base prison camp for his role in the Water- gate, break-in, gave his version of the plot. 'According to him, former White House Counsel Charles Colson suggest- ed that Anderson might be discredited if he appeared on his live radio program. under the influence of a drug that would cause him to ramble incoherently. With another Watergate conspirator, G: Gor- don Liddy, Hunt set up a lunch with a physician who worked for the CIA. Wild ideas. Hunt and Liddy ex- Plored with him methods ocdruseashig a man to make him ineoherenteThe three discussed placing on the steering wheel of the victine'a car a drug that enters the body directly through the skin, but that idea was abandoned as too chancy. Then they considered slipping a pill or capsule filled with a hallucinogen into the victim's regular medicine bottles ?but there was no telling, when the pill would taken. Finally, the three de- bated .dropping a drug into the victim's drink at a cocktail party, but since Hunt knew that Anderson is a teetotaler, the proposal fell by the wayside. After the meeting broke up, Hunt decided the plan would not work. "It was just another wild idea that never got beyond the proposal stage," said Hunt. "Liddy and I engaged in a -fact-finding mission, not an operation." For his part, Colson angrily denied he had ever heard of such a plan. But How- ard Hunt, busy last week assisting in the 04A OA t Qiittsmcamp after Hur- t? Vd 16 r. the last word. Said he: "1 simply followed orders." Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 TUE URI REPUBLIC Et October 1975 The "Company" Banality of Power With the recent revelations of myopic US intelligence. on the outbreak of the October 1973 Middle East war, congressional investigations of the Central Intelligence Agency may be on the scent of one of the agency's most important secrets: its bureaucratic banality. Behind the imperial manner and machinations, the CIA has always belonged more to Max Weber than to Ian Fleming, a hostage to clients, careerism, inertia and root medi- ocrity. Understanding the banality,as %veil as the outrages of the CIA (the two are often synonymous) seems essential to authentic reform of US national intelli- gence operations. Bureaucratic influences account for. some of the more serious and ridiculous mistakes of what CIA minions call the "Company." Moreover legislative prohibitions of specific acts such as assassi- nation may be unavailing in the larger policy sense if Congress does not confront at the same time underly- ing organizational motives which may only reappear in new abuses. ? The missed signals on the October war were largely the result of a common bureaucratic phenomenon. Like the Foreign Service, in whose embassy precincts they masquerade, CIA stations abroad are heavily depend- ent on "client" relationships with their counterparts in best countries. Up to a point, sharing intelligence with friendly powers is simply maximizing channels of information. But as so often happens in the Foreign Service, these relations may tend to obscure the critical, boundary between US interests and the client's. The strength and accuracy of the client's views can affect the standing of the Americans dealing with him, can influence the rationalizations orus officials abroad and the scramble for attention and money in-Washing- ton. The CIA has other problems: the credibility of shared intelligence in the past; and the sheer laziness that grows with such dependence. The dangers are worst when the client is also.qargeted" at the Soviet Union and thus able to provide information of great interest to Washington. By several accounts, all this made CIA report's from the Middle East in the fall of 1973 particularly vulnerable to the flaws and neglect in Israeli intelligence, whose nearly fatal miscalculations naere almost identically reflected in US estimates. Israel is hardly unique in this respect. For many of the same reasons, US intelligence in the Cyprus crisis was crippled by reliance on the Greek junta, while officials wv?re skeptical of less "reliable" contacts among a more independent Makarios government in Nicosia. If an international race war broke out tomorrow in South- ern Africa, CIA intelligence in the region 'would be similarly blinded by the cozy relations cultivated, over the years with the Rhodesian and South African security services, the outgrowth less of overt racism than of CIA's amoral operational affinity for technically sophisticated clients who also worry (or at least say they do) about Russian trade delegations and Chinese textile engineers. Obviously there is ideology in this problem. Yet if they probe deeply enough, congression- al investigators will probably discover the CIA's zeal often owes .as much to the "professional" seductions of cliency as to cold ?var passion. 16 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 Ideology may be most easily jettisoned at theagency's higher levels in Washington, where the fate of whole sections, and the careers in them, can depend on staying in the action, often regardless of the political niceties_ This constant .bureaucratic search for a rai5en (Vette is ? another. time-honored motive for policy throughout ? Washington, and the CIA, however bizarre its methods and purposes, is no exception.- As a member of Henry Kissinger's National Security ? Council staff in 1969, I was once invited to a lunch at CIA headquarters where. a high official discreetly sounded me out about the receptivity of the Nixon White House to a little CIA mercenary operation to save a failing side in a disGht Civil war. There had been "inklings," as the official put it, that the President actually disagreed with prevailing State Department policy. A quiet operation could be mounted, at minimal cost, of course, to see that the President's "side" got at least an even break?and Secretary of State Rogers and his boys need be nonethe wiser. It was a classic twist, worthy of John Le Carr. The CIA, we both knew, N'as already supporting the eil;cr side through the auspices of a friendly intelligence system; and the people the agency official was now proposing to help were getting aid from the Chinese Communists and were opposed by most of our allies. The whole war lay far beyond any political or military interest of the US. The unspoken point was that his colleagues were busily reporting successes and perils to the director at staff meetings, while this man, graying heir to a swashbuckling tradition, ran a section that hadn't toPpled a government in almost a decade. My impression was that in his condition, he could have been persuaded to turn his operation on London or Ottawa; the political stripe of the "target" was of next to no importance. The episode illustrated another prosaic bureaucratic drive in .the CIA, one that the current congressional inquiry has too frequently ignored. For all its arrogance and license, the CIA has also been, like other bureaucra- cies, anxious to cash in on the momentary policy whims of the White House, and there have been abundant opportunities in the last 15 years. The official who came to lunch ready with his mercenaries would have been, after all, serving "national policy" if he had been given a presidential go-ahead, which was not impossible. Similarly the CIA did not embark on its own on a decade of ruthless meddling in Chilean politics. That interven- tion proceeded from the paranoia of Presidents Johnson and Nixon about the impact of left ,wing electoral successes on the fragile order in Latin America. Thoueh ? it exploited and often distorted policy for its own purposes, the CIA did not originate the embroilment in Laos, the commitment to autocracy in Iran, the preference for repressive if pro-American regimes throughout Latin America and Africa, the myth .of Fascist "stability" in Portugal and Spain. As Congress and the public recoil from many of the CIA's past actions, from murder to political mayhem, they are also seeing a faithful, albeit sordid reflection of American foreign policy over the last quarter century. Nor is there any wonder that so many CIA officials, past and present, are said to be bitter about the current attacks on the agency while, they argue, responsible State and Defense Department officials of past ; Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 administrations, men who sanctioned or applauded the most savage coverts actions, now sit unsummoned and, uncharged in foundation, law or Wall Street sanctu--:- aries., It is in this sense too that the CIA must be seen as one more bureaucracy, part of a larger problem. For liberal congressional critics of the CIA:this unacknow- kdg,ecl dimension of th -investigations will demand much more courage .and wisdom than the burial of a - discredited cold war zealotry among lesser, largely anonymous officials_ To blame and. purge the failed James Bonds will be too easy; to fingertheir numerous high-ranking Democratic cohorts around Washington at the time will test Sen. Church and his colleagues severely_ None of this should diminish or cloud the sinister quality of the CIA record. No government organization in American history has operated with such pervasive contempt for the democratic basis of public policy, nor, up to this point, with such shocking collusion from the Congress and the rest of the ? Executive. But the absurdities -and dangers .:of the past will not be dispensed with until there is a n awareness that much of the outrage is simply thenvay of Bicentennial Washington. The anxious claimant on dwindling budgets, the victim of clientstAd careerism, the leading but hardly the. lone participant in government-wide disdain for CorygressAnd obeisance to presidential power and secrecy, the CIA has also been a bureaucracy in search' of a mission, not unlike NASA gambling its last thrust on the dubious scientifiC virtues of the Space Shuttle, or the navy 'hustling to extract from Congress- nuclear aircraft carriers ("You can't strut on the deck of a submarine," said one observer.) There will no cloaubt always be a need for a sizable national intelligence apparatus, in machines if not in men. But there seems no question either that with political and techndlogical change, the CIA has lost a good part of the reason for its bloated bureaucratic being. And the real stopper to genuine reform is not some stentorian guard of cold war assassins, but rather what mires reform all over Washington?that leg,inn of little people, whose?cloaks are ki i t suits and daggers are government-purchase cafeteria butter knives, with suburban mortgages, children in college, and lives invested seemingly beyond return. When Congress faces up to the hamane purge demanded by that problem, it will not only begin to bring intelligence under better public ,control, but also will chart the way toward needed reform in other areas of government. is-tlanta September 1975 Failing surgery on the bureaucratic heart of the problem, however, the prospect.seerns inescapable that the CIA, like its fellow bureaucracies, will improvise new ways to justify its size and perquisites, to ea-. blish its worth, whatever the structural, nominal changes contemplated by the Ford administration. The possibilities are interesting. In an era where scarce resource is power and where spreading interna- tional corporate- control and price manipulations can topple regimes faster than troops around the presiden- tial palace, covert action will turn from itingles- to boardrooms and stock exchanges. it yill no longer be the minister of defense or the police chief we must own, but the director of minerals or the economics professor close to the premier. And there still should be a chance for some old-fashioned fun:, pipelines to he blown, refineries to be sabotaged, strikes and demonstrations to be mobilized. Even assasina lion might be easier to justify when that oil potentate is trying, as Kissinger put it, -to strangle the industrial world.? The catch in all this is that in anachronistic, overpopulated CIA. finding its outlet in international economics will expose its own customarily unwitting public to reprisals in kind. There is no reason to assume that such a CIA will be more discreet or more successful than in the past, and there is ample precedent to predict that its newly powerful adversaries in the developing world would retaliate with embargoes and their own price fixing. The 'cost of- CIA adventures then goes beyond national embarrassment to the pocketbooks of families in Duluth and. Dallas. Whatever the plausibility of thi; speculation it is clear that the world of- the 1970s is far too diffuse in power and delicate in allegiance to afford the bureaucratic impulses toward intervention we have learned to expect from the present incumbents in. the CIA. The Congress now has the CIA in one of the rane moments of public censipre and presidential diffidence in which genuine reform is at last possible. But the moment is fleeting. The investigation must dig deeper and wider than Congress has been willing to go thus far, and. the senators and representatives must be prepared to -confront not only generally condemned aberrations, but also equally repulsive products of business as usual_ The banality of the CIA is a searing commentary on the whole structure of government _ There will never be a better place?or perhaps another Lime in this generation?to begin the reconstruction_ e- omoiiett ? Rumors :have hem- flying -I-gently .aa ani it now appears- that the l'homb--- -about a 'bombsheir to be exploded:7; shell". was of a megatonnage, perhaps ? "anon hy Sen. Frank Church's commit- sufficient to. ruffle the petals of a. ye investigating Cl?, misdoing. - L. peenie. It seems some minor CIA. ? . ? ? functionary. --- disobeyed .-President With allegations el domestic spyir.g - Nixon's order and the law by hiding ? and other illegal CIA activity con-. - small aounts of super-deadly poisons. --firmed by the Roclefeller Commis- Bad news? but not exactlyexplosive. on,....with reports of assassination . - lots- and deals ';eth Marlmi,:- with- Two lessons may be drawn front revelations conct,m-=irig experiments ._ this episode: (1) The CIA has stepped :involving mind-altezing drug., people - out of bounds far too-many-times and rtaaturaily-..wonderel- what -sort of - needs to be put firmly under ,control bombshell could top all that. and made answerable for its activity; ? - - - and (2) Bombshells-sometimes turn Roger Morris NEW YORK TIMES 20 September 1975 ' C.I.A.-Suit Opposed PROVIDENCE, R. I., Sept. 19i -(AP)?The federal Government! has asked United States Dis- trict Court here to suspend a, suit dealing with Central Intel- ligence Agency surveillance of i mail because it could interfere with a Justice Department in- , vestigation. A statement filed 1, by Deputy Assistant Attorney! .General Kevin T. Maroney ar- gued against continuation di the suit brought by Prof. Rod-I Tiev Driver of the University of Rhode Island. The court has' issued no deciiiion on the Gov-I rnment request. : Some .inform. glare 415_19k101.*For Reiltigakki12:130:1/0?/08., haftsgrarill0432R000100380007-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 THE WASHINGTON POST Sunday, Sept. zrs uise e liTTEME A MAN runs for Presi- Itt dent of the United States, the effort should yield something lasting, some lesson or truth in all the cam- paign speeches and slogans spewed out over the electorate. When Pat Paulsen ran for the Democratic presi- dential nomination in the winter of 1971-72, he gave to the New Hamp- shire electorate the doctrine that un- derlies the way this country runs the Central Intelligence Agency. He may not have known it, but Pat Paulsen, serious comedian and funny politician, provided a reconciliation of. philosophies that ranks with the work of Thomas Aquinas. He explained how it is that a democracy?a government of, by and for the People?can have, a secret government agency whose saes. eest and activities are unknown to the people who pay for it and in whose name it ants. Paulsen had a flair for pointing out the absurdnm of serious matters and the seriousness of absurdities,. allowing and encouraging his listen- ers to examine the two together with- out for a moment confusing which was which. The Paulsen Doctrine came in a_ stock campaign speech he dead- panned to audiences of young people newly enfranchised by the 26th ? Amendment. It went something like, this: "I feel. very secure and comfort- able being an American, because in America any boy can grow up to be President. It's not so much that you'd wont to. It's just knowing that you could." It was a good line. Because here was Paulsen, a most improbable can- didate, running for President. "Every- one knew that he didn't stand a, chance of carrying a New Hampshire township, let alone the election.. And it was a goad line because Rich- ard Nixon had grown up to become President. In rettvspect, it seems an even better line because we now know that in the same primary election campaign in which Paulsen was giving that speech, Richard Nixon's dirty tricksters were plotting to put in the fix so that for four more years only their boy could be President. But mostly it was a good line be- cause that concept?"It's not so much that you'd want to, it's just knowing that you could"--Lunderscores a major irony of our democracy: too much hinges, upon the necessity that people not exercise their prerogatives. No- where in government is this forbear- ance more evident, and nowhere does democracy intrude less, than in the secret activities of the CIA. Auditing in the Dark TWIHE VERY EXISTENCE of secret IL intelligence operations depends By Edward Roeder Roeder is a freelance journalist based upon noncompliance with the consti- tutional stricture requiring that ". . . a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time." in Washington. .tors were unaware of Operation CHAOS, the CIA's domestic spying op- eration, until they read about it in the Rockefeller Commission report. Ac- cording to that report, CHAOS went on for six years, employing at its peak 52 people (not counting agent-inform- ers) and three branch chiefs. Not being "witting," the auditors didn't inquire about the program. So they didn't learn of its excesses. So they didn't report on them. So it went on. "Congressional Overslght" rrHE PAULSEN DOCTRINE also works in Congress, to keep mem- bers comfortable Without keeping them informed. Because information is compartmentalized, it is possible to learn a great deal about how the Agency theoretically works, and to learn about a number of programs, without .even getting a hint of the ex- istence of other programs hidden in other compartments. Being a coequal branch, Congress has the authority to learn whatever it wants about the CIA. But because much of the information is so "sensi- tive," Congress. has set rip elaborate procedures to restrict the flow of a"sensitive" information to and around the Hill. The formal rules and in- formal procedures provide that only the legislative and appropriations sub- committees dealing with defense/ .intelligence matters are informed of CIA activities, and usually only the chairman is apprised of the most sensitive matters. Even when the sub- committees hold formal closed hear- ings, on highly sensitive matters, mem- bers are forbidden from discussing what they've learned with other mem- bers. The briefing papers, charts and even the hearing transcripts are not kept in congressional safes for easy access, but are stored out at Langley. These remain subcommittee property, and will be brought to the Hill on re- quest by special couriers who wait while materials are examined and then return with the papers to CIA. No photocopies are kept on the Hill. This doesn't prevent members from overseeing the CIA, it just makes it difficult. The subcommittee chairmen know they can examine any CIA docu- ments?at least any they can identify ---at any time. And knowing that they could . . The remaining members of Congress have put themselves in a more ambigu- ous position. They have passed rules Virtually all of the highly classified activities of the' CIA are overseen at one level or another through the Paulsen Doctrine. Those responsible are satisfied knowing that they could find out what's going on,. so they don't bother actually to find out. The people, the Congress, the White House, the supervisory boards and committees, the high and mid-levele officials, the auditors and inspectors, and the managers don't seem to want to know any more about the gover- ment's deep, dark secrets than is absolutely necessary. But everyone in a responsible position insists upon being told that they could find out, if they had a "need to know." CIA internal auditors can hardly be expected to review signed receipts for bribes to members of a foreign parlia- Ment. Who would sign their true name to a receipt for a bribe? Auditors can't ask foreign politicos to certify that they .are on the take from the CIA and to verify which votes they sold for how much. Suppose the bribes' go through many intermediaries? Sup- pose the person being bribed doesn't even know it is the CIA bribing him? It's just expected and hoped and cer- tified that the bribes find their way into the right pockets. Of course, if an auditor suspected that a CIA employee or agent was skimming off the money budgeted for bribes, the auditor could make an is- sue of it and possibly trace the route of the money by demanding to know the true names of people who handled the funds. But in order to gain access to such information, the auditor would have to make a good case that he had dneed to know." That's Catch-22: - Unless you know something iS wrong, ' you can't get access to information to prove it. And without access, you can't find out that something is wrong. So the auditor takes his satisfaction from reviewing records made available to him, certifies that the books he's been given balance and feels secure knowing that, if he knew anything was wrong, he could request authority to find out more. It's not so much that he'd want to . One result of operating under the Paulsen Doctrine was that CIA audi- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 2 ?Ap p rove d For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 and accepted customs that- deny th.ena access to the information they would need in order to make reasonable judgments about CIA appropriations and legislation. A majority doesn't want to know and doesn't want the rest of the members to know; But in theory, at least, the rules could be changed and the chairmen could be challenged?if the members wanted to... The CIA's secret budget for fiscal year lg76 has been marked up in the House. It probably has been more closely examined than any other CIA budget in history. And probably less is known about it, and known by few- er people on Capitol Hill, than is. known about any other federal agency's budget (with the possible ex- ception of other intelligence agencies). The CIA. isn't trying to prevent con- gressional analysis; the last thing the CIA wants is to appear to be avoiding congressional scrutiny. No, the CIA wants Congress to be implicated as much as possible in the agency's ac- tivities, and that means Congress must be at least tacitly aware of the agency's budget. And the members are trying to learn what they can, if for no other reason than to avoid being ac- cused of what they surely will be ac- cused of anyway for their past over- sights: nonfeasance. Every time one hears the phrase "congressional over- sight" applied to the CIA, one wonders whether the term was deliberately chosen for its ambiguity. . The difference between Paulsen enunciating his doctrine for a humor- ous campaign speech and public (or secret), officials using it as a philosophy of governance is that Paulsen knew that the notion of finding security in "just knowing that you could" is often absurd. Paulsen had really tried to pick up a few convention delegates to ex- pand his forum. He was spending time, effort and money, and he was failing. He knew how absurd it was because: he had tried. Nal YORK DAILY NEWS 18 September 1975 Probing the Past NOW CONGRESS is trying to see what it can learn about the CIA, about things members thought all these years they didn't have to learn because it was enough to know that they could. But the fact is that at the agency and in Congress responsibility and accountability atrophy when they are not used. ? Congress has not exercised its re- ' sponsibility to find out what it is pay- ing?and allowing the CIA to do. Now Congress finds itself lacking in mem- bers and staff with insight and talent to find out. The CM has not been held accountable for its actions. Now it finds itself in the awkward position of not knowing how to go about being investigated. Compartmentalized secrecy and a history of non-oversight by the execu- tive branch and by Congress have pro- duced a situation whereby the only people who know where the bodies are buried are the members of the burial parties and the only people who know who was in the burial parties are the members of the hit squads. And they ain't talkin.' The current hassle and hustle on Capitol Hill concerns the past: what has the CIA done? The agency is not reluctant to be chastized for its past sins, so long as it is not precluded from future sins. So the Senate committee investigating intelligence is grabbing headlines by picking up on CIA sug- gestions that it interrogate past and present CIA officials about failure to destroy poisons when ordered to do so by the President?an "aberration," ac- cording to former CIA director Rich- ard Helms. What will coine of all this?a law requiring that executive branch offi- cials obey presidential orders? No one is asking, "What is the CIA doing now?" or even, "What have they done to us lately?" And on the House side, Chairman Otis Pike's committee is fighting the wrong battle on the wrong battle- ground, asserting its right to release classified information about past in- telligence failures. The committee will win, and find that it has won nothing: the material could have been released in the committee's final report, when it would have been too late for the President to cut off the committee's access to classified information. Chair, man Pike's pique is arouse-d by execue tive branch assertions that the Con- gress may not unilaterally disclose classified information, an implicit sug:. gestion that elected officials in the. House cannot truly perceive the na- tional interest because- they are just . cheap politicians (the executive branch, currently having no elected officials,. has no such taint). A. Mechanism TO .A DEGREE, Congress Will suck ceed and fail he finding out what the CIA has done in the name of the United States. Except for historians', it doesn't really matter. But what does matter is the degree to which Congress sets- up a mechanism for knowing what the CIA is doing henceforth? in every sensitive detail, This mech.: anism can't be another you-can-if-you- want-to system that requires congres, sional initiative before information flows to the Hill. It must provide that many members of Congress, not just a handful of sympathetic chairmen, are force-fed information about CIA's activities, so that Congress can be held accountable for having known of the CIA's activities. The fact is. that no . official entity of government?not the White House, not the CIA, not the Congress, not - any of the oversight boards and com- mittees?is capable of learning with certainty what went on under the CIA's aegis during parts of the agency's 27- year past. In theory, of course, they -could find out. In theory, of course, Pat Paulsen could become President. But to the extent that we rely upon the Paulsen Doctrine to run the gov- ernment's most sensitive operations; we will only in theory have a govern- ment of, by and for the unwitting ? People, --. By SAM ROBERTS ? - . . . . . Councilman Carol Greitzer, 'chairman of-the City Council's Mass Transit.Com- rt.:Wee, called yesterday for .a full-scale investigation into the "simulated attack" on the city's subway system by the Central Intelligence Agency. Ms. Greitzer. a Manhattan Democrat, urged the city's con- gressional delegation to ,pursue an investigation. She also , promised tu question Transit Authority ;thief executive officer John De Moos about the incident when he testifies before her ?committee tomorrow. She's Shocked 'I'm shocked to think that the federal government -not only turns down New York City for - aid." she said. "but now it turns :out that they've actually had- us ' under attack." ' ing the mid-1E160s in the city's _. ... .. _. ducted a "simulated" attack dur- spokesman ? -. politely declined. "You're talking about operations, an dtraditionally the agency does not discuss them," he said. - - - But city -Air Resources Com- missioner Ethan Eldon said he would ask the agency lor all, germs actually were released, al- available information on . the thOugh certain harmless ? gasses incident. Eldon's department were used to check: how egrms does not monitor air quality in would be distributed through the the subway . system, and any miles of underground -tunnels. such testing would require ap- The -project, developed- by ? the proval of the Transit Authority. - agency's biological branch, was Daniel - T.- Scannell. former . The. couneilmans call for an vast subway system to develop ways to infect passengers with deadly germs. A 1967 staff memo - to the chief of the CIA's technical serv- ices division reported that no to study the vulnerability of the- chief operating officer of the su- 1 i inquiry followed CIA - Director subway system to germ warfare. thority, said he had no recol!-- William Colby's disclosure Tues- Asked yesterday for- further tion of any CIA request to con- i-J-ty- kbat--tba--ayy---411pkncy---co- .d tad -oliaehar_oeteennfaLA......ductatestaan the_al-WW3X .{):i*taiii. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 :'CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 .19 TIME, SEPTEMBER 29 19:5 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 , Towar est.n.! e It was a year ago this month that the first revelations of Cen- ral Intelligence Agency dabbling in Chilean politics came out. Since then, more than a quarter-century's worth of skeletons (not to mention exotic weapons) have tumbled from the agen- cy's closet Today the CIA is the least secret espionage service in the world, and its director, William Colby, the most visible and in- terrogated master spy in recent history. The agency has been in hot water before, of course. But unlike the uproar that followed the Bay of Pigs fiasco in 1961, the current controversy threatens the very existence of the CIA. The CIA has lost, perhaps forever, the special dispensation that it was allowed by many Americans and their elected rep- zesentatives for the first 27 years of its existence. Few people today accept unquestioningly the notion that clandestine foreign peratives are a necessary evil. Even fewer would unblinkingly buy the assurance voiced by former CIA Director Richard Helms: "The nation must to a degree take it on faith that we, too, are hon- orable men devoted to her service." Almost daily, newspaper ed- korials, legislators and some presidential hopefuls characterize the CIA as a wasteful anachronism at best, an international men- ace and national disgrace at worst. This month populist Can- didate Fred Harris drew cheers from an audience of Democrats in Minneapolis when he proclaimed, "We've got to dismantle the monster!" In light of the reports of the commis- sions headed by former Under Secretary if State Robert Murphy and Vice Presi- dent Nelson Rockefeller, released in June, and of the recommendations that will be forthcoming (probably next February or March) from the Senate committee head- ed by Democrat Frank Church and also from Democratic Congressman Otis Pike's House Select Committee, there is no dan- ger that the agency will escape long-over- due reforms. The real danger is that all this intensive scrutiny will lead to ill-conceived corrective measures that could damage the CIA. The legitimate and vital functions of the CIA have already suffered severely tTIME. Aug. 4). So has morale. "Until this becomes a truly secret agency again," said a high CIA official last week, -a lot of our people are not going to be able to do their jobs- Thus the challenge to Congress is not how to pull the agency apart but how to put it back together. Few critics have questioned the CIA's intelligence-gathering activities; they zero in on the agency's omen activities, which should be de- fined and controlled but which cannot be abandoned altogether. Part of the problem has been that the assorted Washington hearings on the CIA have concentrated too narrowly on specific horror stories, which have led many Americans to regard the agency as a bureaucratic Frankenstein's monster that has run amuck both at home and abroad. This is a simplistic and unfair impression. Considering the size of the agency (an estimated 20,000 employees operating on a budget that may be as big as 56 billion a year) and the enormous volume of activities it has been called upon to perform in its 27-year history, the provable in- stances of malfeasance are comparatively few. Moreover, the CIA to some extent was a victim of historical circumstance. When the Chile story broke last year, the military and foreign policy es- tablishments had met their Viet Nam. The presidency had met its Watergate. Congress was reasserting itself. The CIA was the ob- vious next candidate for scrutiny. In the welter of publicity that followed the Chile revelations, much of the evidence confirmed that the CIA had indeed from time to time violated its charter and the constitutional rights of Americans, not to mention common sense. A number of these vi- ations can be blamed on the zealotry, villainy or stupidity of some CIA operatives, especially among the "spooks," or covert-ac- tion specialists. Many other abuses were, at root, presidential abuses. For example, the agency's illegal surveillance of the anti-Viet Nam War movement reflected Lyndon Johnson's ob- sessive suspicion that Communist infiltrators were behind much the opposition to his Administration. "I just don't understand why you can't find out about all that foreign money that is be- hind those war protesters." Johnson complained to Helms in 1967. The CIA was just one of a number of federal agencies that Richard Nixon tried to subvert. Although the agency gave some istance to the plumbers who broke into the office of Daniel ecess ry CI Ellsberg's psychiatrist, it later sidestepped White House ploys aimed at involving it in Watergate. Partly as a result, Nixon re- placed Helms in 1972. ? If Presidents have misused and abused the CIA, Congress has ducked its responsibility to supervise the operations and ac- tivities of the agency. So far, there has been relatively little ev- idence proving that the CIA acted without presidential autho- rization. On the other hand, there is much to indicate that it bypassed congressional oversight?largely because Congress did not want to be bothered, or was embar- rassed by supervising its activities, partic- ularly the agency's covert operations. What then should be done? Gerald Ford has indicated his determination to su- pervise the CIA closely. Legally he has to: Congress last year attached an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act requiring that the President personally "certify" all for- eign covert actions. A case can be made that this law should be repealed. The Pres- ident of the U.S. is now the only head of state of a major power who is not insulated from public responsibility for a clandestine Operation should it be exposed. To help protect the presidency, and per- haps to restore a sense of checks and balances in the field of in- telligence, Congress should establish a joint Senate-House over sight committee that would replace the four congressional units that have so inadequately watched over the CIA in the past. In- deed a similar proposal was made by the Rockefeller commis- sion in its report to the President. The committee membership should rotate in order to avoid the past situation, which allowed the agency to mount covert operations abroad?and counter- intelligence activities at home?with the passive, usually ex post facto blessing of a few old reliable friends in the legislature. Pre- sumably, the agency might also find it more efficient and secure to report to one committee of Congress rather than four'. The new committee should be empowered to approve?or disapprove?in advance any major clandestine activity by the CIA, like the army of Laotian tribesmen supported by the agen- cy from 1962 until 1973. The Constitution's provision that Con- gress alone has the right to make war should extend to small, secret wars as well as large ones. Covert armed intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries, apart from being ex- pensive and often ineffective, has fostered worldwide suspicions that the U.S. is behind nearly every political upheaval that con- forms? to American interests. More congressional supervision might reduce the number of such operations and reduce those sus- picions?though there is no guarantee of either result. On the other hand, the CIA probably should be allowed some leeway to carry out, on its own recognizance, smaller-scale projects, es- x pecially those in which intelligence gathering and covert oper- ations overlap. The CIA must also be able to carry out nonmilitary clan- destine actions, such as the funding of pro-American political forces in countries where the Soviets are backing their own can- didates, as they did in Portugal earlier this year. But these too should be regularly reviewed with the oversight committee. It should also be allowed to see a breakdown of the CIA's budget, arid should be informed about the agency's use of "proprietaries," like the defunct airline Air America, cover firms (private com- panies that allow the agency to use overseas branches as fronts), and any American individuals or organizations it intends to en- list in its projects. Closer congressional scrutiny of the CIA, com- bined with more thoughtful presidential supervision, would pro- vide a check against the CIA 'S getting involved with organized crime, as it did in the anti-Castro ventures. But even stronger congressional scrutiny cannot assure that the CIA will run properly. There is a basic contradiction be- tween the secrecy and even deceit required by an organization like the CIA and the full disclosure and responsibility expected of a democratic government. It is a contradiction that the U.S. somehow must live with, since no organizational reform can com- pletely solve this problem. Moreover. Congress is a large and sometimes undisciplined body of individualists. The more widely a secret is known in the Capitol. the more likely it is to be leaked. Thus both the House and Senate need to strengthen their existing regulations for pre- 20 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 venting breaches of security?perhaps by penalties as severe as dropping from committees those members who can be proved to have illegally leaked secrets to the press or the public. One dan- ger involved in haying more congressional scrutiny of the CIA is that members of the House and Senate, as well as their staffers, will become the target of increased espionage by Washington- based foreign agents.. One Communist secret service is known to be beefing up its Capitol Hill contacts already in anticipation of Congress's playing a more active role in U.S. intelligence. Unfortunately, the facts of international life that always made the CIA more of a necessity than an evil are still real. Despite detente and the ending of the cold war, for example, the branch of Russia's KGB (committee for state security) that is in charge of for- eign operations has stepped up its clandestine projects around the world, often using foreign Communist parties as conduits for money and bases of operation for agents. Western experts report that the KGB department with responsibility for Japan, India, In- donesia and the Philippines has increased its budget, apparently in response to Moscow's belief that the U.S. is still on the defen- sive in Asia following the collapse of South Viet Nam. In the current furor over the CIA, genuine reforms under- taken within the intelligence community have tended to be over- looked. During his brief tenure as CIA director in 1973. James , Schlesinger ordered an extensive housecleaning and began sweeping out the unreconstructed cold-warriors. Colby, a vet- eran of the covert side himself, has followed through on that pro- gram and reoriented the agency toward more relevant, "clean- er" enterprises, such as providing economic and agricultural intelligence and combatting international terrorism and narcot- ics smuggling. While much of the controversy so far has concentrated on co- vert actions, there have also been shortcomings in the collec- tion, evaluation and dissemination of information through the Government. Ray Cline, a former deputy director for intelli- gence at the CIA and chief of State Department intelligence and research at the time of the Yom Kippur War, is convinced that BALTIMORE SUN 28 September 1975 Roe Ele `?1-7.,;"!-Q ? ;vba..,n",a Senator Frank Church predicted in an in- terview with Muriel Dobbin of The Sun some time -ego that the Central Intelligence Agency would be rereakd 23"a rogue elephant rampaging out of con- trol," a number of knowledgeable officials respond- ed that tbe spy agency had never done anything without presidential approval. Now, after two weeks of public hearings by the select Senate comit- Joe studyfr.g intelligence operations, the Church pre- " diction: lents right on the nose. ? Presant and former high-level CIA officials have 11...iiiifietilte the effect that various agency operations were carried on illegally and without orders from als?raority. Indeed, in two cases, the CIA did _things ergressly forbidden by Presidents. In one ;case it opened mail after President Richard Nixon -ordered it to, then changed his mind and ordered it not to. The CIA was already doing that when Mr. corAdered ordering it to. His order to do it and hismIL-..,,equent order not to do it were something of a jatia: to the CIA. As Senator Church, chairman of the select committee, put it, the President is not the "commanLer in chief to the CIA, just "a problem." In anther case President Nixon ordered the ?agencyln destroy some poisons so toxic as to sound :like science fiction potions rather than something from the real world. The then director of the CIA, Richard -Zalm.s, said under oath he relayed the order .only orally and didn't check up because he "read in :the newspaper" that the poisons had been destroyed. if that doesn't make Mr. Helms a perjurer, it makes . him a sitaErlarly incompetent chief spy. The CIA of- :fide' dirraly responsible for destroying the poison :sap he drid.:a't do it b,.:cause he considered the pres- aidential cater "unwise." That is the hallmark of a 'liareaticraaay out of control. -1.7ach nwelation creates a new picture of the for- , mealy haARI11.19Y00cf.1141W9liga% -cies casually and routinely broken the law by open- the failure of the agency to predict that war would break out in the Middle East was due to a lack of coordination between State. CIA and the National Security Council. "The furor over alleged cloak-and-dagger misdeeds of the past diverts attention from the fact that our central intcnieence system is in deep trouble for an entirely different reason," says Cline. "It hie; not been as ef- fective as it should be in its crucial central task of coordinating and evaluating information relating to the national security." Presidential Candidates Harris and Morris Udall, former De- fense Secretary Clark Clifford and other CIA critics have rec- ommended that the CIA should be confined exclusively to in- telligence gathering. They propose that covert actions, now in the hands of the CIA's deputy director of operations, should be as- signed either to the Pentagon or to a new agency. This is not a good idea. First, intelligence gathering, especially by covert means, and clandestine foreign operations inevitably overlap and often involve the same agents. To divide them artificially would risk duplication, inefficiency and?more serious?the possibility of intelligence gatherers and clandestine operators bumping into each other and being discovered. For the Pentagon to oversee co- vert actions, as Harris suggests, would give the military a license to initiate paramilitary adventures. That might be a cure worse than the disease. Since clandestine operations are justifiable chief- ly as a means of heading off full-scale conflict?what Colby calls 'Ian alternative between diplomatic protest and sending in the Marines"?they should be kept separate from the Defense Department. The best official report to date on the CIA?more thorough and fair than the Rockefeller study, in the view of impartial in- telligence experts?was produced by former Under Secretary of State Murphy's Commission on the Organization of the Gov- ernment for Conduct of Foreign Policy. The report concluded: "Covert action cannot be abandoned, but it should be employed only where clearly essential to vital U.S. purposes and then only after a careful process of high-level review." The CIA is Still the most appropriate Government agency to carry out that difficult, often unpleasant but inevitable mission. Strobe Talbott ant is Night ing mail (and breaking into homes and offices, wire- tapping and planting bugs, combing through income tax returns, etc.); not only has it ignored presidett- tial directives. It has also bungled its principal func- tion of gathering and assessing foreign intelligence. The House select committee demonstrated that in 1967-8 the CIA totally misjudged or, what may be worse, deliberately misreported, Communist strength in Vietnam. In 1973 the agency believed no war was likely in the Middle East?even as hostili- ties were about to begin. The congressional investigations have already developed facts far beyond anything found by the Rockefeller Commission, many of whose cautious recommendations now seem inadequate to the task. It is easy to understand why many critics want to disband the agency, but that is too drastic a remedy. The Ford administration's current attempts to shore up the CIA during the remainder of the investigation may he necessary but should not be confused with real reform. A start toward the basic changes that are needed could be made now by dusting off one ROckefeller recommendation that does deal with one of the underlying problems. It proposed that an "individual of stature, independence and integrity" from outside the intelligence community be brought in to head the CIA. The time has definitely come for that. If ever an organization needed a tough manag- er, it is the CIA. Many of its top and middle leaders developed their ideas of their mission in World War II and the worst days of the early Cold War, when anything went. A complete shakeup at the top may be needed, and possibly extensive reorganization of the middle levels, too. Only a new director, from outside the agency, can be expected to do the exten- sive work that is needed. Even that is likely to be on- 8 :43kbyoupAt.t.tpm Amotgeenr imty into the rot. 21 Approved NEW YORK TIMES 20 September 1975 Dignity Restored By Russell Baker For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 WASHINGTON STAR 28 September 1975 Crosby S Noyes The news that Dr. Frankenstein is -alive and flourishing in Washington will surprise no one who follows world politics, and international death plans. Politicians everywhere commonly view wience primarily as an instrument for conveying -death to disagreeable peo- ples, and if science is at the-service of - death in Washington, it is not a unique' alliance of genius and hack. The same alliance functions around the earth, and has through the centuries. The peek. we are now getting. into Washington's scientific chamber of iterror is merely a titillating reminder of the alliance's existence. What makes. it entertaining, if not particularly startling, is the small-bore triviality of the death plans in which the Gov-. ernment has been dabbling. Death on the scale deliverable by, nuclear physics appears such a dull 'mathematical abstraction that it. scarcely seems like death. The Pen- tagon does not even talk much about deaths any more when - weaponry is discussed. The common, term is "megadeatha." It takes one mil- lion deaths to make just one mega- death. If one succumbs in a nuclear strike,' causing eighty rnegadeaths, one's loss , to humanity can be measured as one eightY-millionth of a megadeath, which makes it seem a thoroughly negligible event. In a ,sense, this is the worst of all. the indignities heaped upon us by. politics' perversion of science. A per-' son's death ought to be an event of some note, 'not a fractional triviality, so negligible that it would 'bore .a baseball statistician. The .scientific corpse-production. labor now being discussed in Washing- ton has the virtue of restoring some meaning to death because .of the small scale on which these weapons. were built to operate. As a result; it. is a refreshing reminder of what the grandeur of nuclear science has con-, ditioned us to forget; to wit, that politics and science between them? never close down the charnel house.. The CIA.'s .secret stash of cobra venom and iihelifishi? poison, so suga gestive of bad spy ne4ic1s, reminds us that death is officially prepared by men who act like people in bad spy' novels. The few deaths these poisons. could create are ludicrously insignifi- cant compared to nuclear science's megadeath, and -for this reason, ? they suggest real death more pungently than anything the physics experts have been able to conjure in our imaginations. We may assume that similar death instruments are being created in laboratories abroad, of course. Primi- tive politicians were quick . to turn mineralogy into weapon science. Surely, Russians and Englishmen have been no more reluctant than Ameri- cans to do the same for biology. The C.I.A.'s electrically-fired poison., dart gun, with silencer, presumably Un pressed with the . . You will have to forgive me. It must be some kind of glandular deficiency. But for whatever reason, I am simply incapable of working myself into paroxysms of moral indignation about the Central Intelligence - Agency. I am even beginning tq feel sorry for the poor slobs. I realize, of course, that all of our prob- lems in this country today are the result of "abuse of executive power", with its "mania for secrecy," and that if only the "representatives of the people" in Con- gress were running things, we would be spared such vexations as the Vietnam War and Watergate. I also realize that the CIA, as an untouchable, super-secret branch of the executive, is an awf ally inviting target for congressmen who hold that "full disclo." sure" (of other people's secrets) is a sure- fire political formula. I suppose, therefore, that I should find something pretty ominous in the news that a CIA laboratory worker failed to carry out a presidential order from Richard Nixon in 1970 to destroy existing stocks of toxins and various kinds of bacteriological weapons. It was discovered last May that about 11 grams of shellfish toxin and 8 ? "milligrams of cobra venem had been locked away in a CIA storeroom, But, alas, I can't. For one ,thing, it seems to me that the presidential order of Feb:" 14, 1970, applied to military stocks. For another, it specificaqy exempted toxins (such as snake venom. or shellfish toxin) being used for experimental pur- poses. The order reads:- "The United States renounces offensive preparations for and the use of toxins as a method of warfare. "The United States will confine its mili- tary programs for toxins, whether pro- duced by bacteriological or any other for creating death in fairly important individuals,displeasing, to our Govern-.. ment, is the kind of weapon small boys dream of. A rush job at the toy. factory might create one of the sur-- prise merchandising successes of the approaching Christmas shopping sea- son. Its charm, of course, is that it- is designed to cause one single death, not the boring megadeath of physics. Here we. have government dispensing the favor of dignified, individual death, thus making one's demise an event. Even the mbre elaborate deathi'pro- grams which the C.I.A. was preparing when it made a mock attack on New York subway riders by pumping harm- less substances into the underground would cause deaths only in the thou- sands if duplicated in Moscow with real poison gases and germs. If things came to that, presemably, we and the Soviets would both be dispensing megadeaths hither ,and yon on the landscape; so that .the few thousand dead in the Moscow subway would, enjoy deaths of uncommon singularity. Reading the Dr. Frankenstein stories .from Washington, one is struck by the playful spirit of politicians and' sci- entists engaged in these labors. It is almost as though they were trying to get us interested again, by amusing us, In their varied death programs. IA flay biological method or by chemical synthe- sis, to research for defensive purposes only, such as to improve techniques of Is immunization and medical therapy. "The President has further directed the i destruction of all existing toxin weapons and all existing stocks of toxins which are not required for research programs for defensive purposes only." ? Kindly note that this order did nothing to eliminate huge stocks of lethal chemical warfare agents ? such as nerve gas ? which still exist for retaliatory military purposes. It does nothing about hundreds of substances quite as deadly as shellfish toxin or cobra venom. Rattlesnake venom, for example is extracted daily by a num- ber of public and private agencies for a variety of purposes without anybody mak- ing a fuss about it. In all, I find nothing very sinister in the fact that a middle devel CIA scientist should have locked up his shellfish poison on the quite understandable theory that it was valuable for purposes of research and/or defense. To think otherwise, I sug- gest, is symptomatic of the paranoia of the day. I am equally unimpressed, I'm afraid, by the revelations of the House irreestiga- tion that the CIA failed to predict the Communist Tet offensive in Vietnam in 1968 and the Yom Kippur War in the Mid- dle East in 1973. Underestimating the capacity and inten- tion of the enemy in Vietnam was par for the course throughout the war in Indochi- na. In 1973, the Israelis were even more surprised than we were. When it comes to the present harassment of the CIA, the important thing to remember is that imperfect intelligence is better than none at all. Why else would the C.I.A. have chosen the poisonous hole that is the New York subway to test mechanisms for spreading infectious diseases? The seine ironic humorist's hand is at work in the C.I.A.'s choice of the Food and Drug Administration's drinking-water supply to test techniques for spread- jrig death through the water cooler. We detect him again in the use of 5,a3lAloS IIImF1 oiintid atin- to help create the killer shellfish- poison, and in the frolicsome frater- nity-house spirit with which both C.I.A. and Army Scientists slipped LSD into the coffee of unsuspecting human guinea pigs. It would be idle to fault science for. its faithful service to politics in the death industry. American scientists who serve it can justly point to more unpleasant states abroad and say, "They all do it." On the other hand, it doesn't hurt the rest of us to be .reminded from ? time to time that sci- entists are secretly working away at death with politicians, and that secrecy favors lunatics. Ah, here is the latest warning to ? the public from a consortium of con- cerned scientists. It tells us to beware of astrology. A false science, says the bulletin. That kmust mean the Govern- ment can't find a way to use it for killing somebody. 22 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 LOS AIIIIETES. -7DIES 13 September 1975 ANT POiSW. CALLED DEADLIER rd of a Hdd Toxi s sjited BY GEORGE ALEXANDER . Times . The last thing in the 7.ror1d that Dr.. :Findlay Russell wants lo find plas- tered someday on Um door of his 'USC laboratory is az="..p-i reading: Closed because of the &.'=.ger of mass poisonings. Russell, a USC profe-----an,- of neurol- ogy, physiology and ft-logy, and a widely recognized expat on toxins, :is worried that- some 51:ate or local governmental body mi.F.:5t take a cue from U.S. Sen, Frank Catrch (D-Ida.) and pass legislation tharlt would ban? the sort of medical ,and 7biological re- search that 111.11,haseIeeen working on for years. "Church revealed earFisr this week ;that the Central Intellice Agency had kept small amounts of paralytic shellfish poison (PSP)-. aTel cobra yen- -em for the last five years, despite a . 1970 presidential order to destroy all NEW YORK MIES 25 September 1975 The C.I.A. Toxins Should Be PreS;z1.-ved To the Editor: .. Unfortunately, the rerent investiga- tion of the C.I.A.'s "stockpiling" of two toxins, has lett to seat-ous miscon- .ceptions on the part. c.7 the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, -headed by Senator Frank Church, and the news media. ? *Although we do not ,zondone the C.I.A.'s apparent intended use of saxi- toxin (produced naturally by "red-tide" bacteria and concentrated in shellfish) and 'cobra toxin, w app':-.aud the fore- sight of the checnical section to preserve these in Suable sub- Stances. It is ridiculous t?i? assert that the eleven grains (less than one-half ounce) of saxitoxin and &:e eight milli- grams (a tiny drop) of cobra 'toxin could be used as a "mass murder weapon" in the same sense as the tons Of nerve agents ?and t..-Tle countless plague and other germs: that were stockpiled by the Defense Department until recently. indeed, most pest ex- 'terminators have much i-..irger cluanti- -ties of lethal chemicals (e..:;?, parathion, -the rat and insect poisont chat is only ()0 times less toxic them saxitoxin) WASHINGTON STAR 21 SEPTE_':43.ER 1975 ? stocks of such toxins. ? In making, the announcement; Church said that the toxins-10.9 grams of PSP -and eight milligrams (thousandths of a gram) of the snake ? Venom?were ? capable . of .killing . "many thousands of people." The tox- ins attack the central nervous system. While agreeing with the: senator that the CIA's acquisition of the poi- sons should be looked into, the USC expert disagreed with Church's eval- uation of their public hazards. ? ."Oh, if you injected 200 peOple with a few micrograms (millionths of a gram) of these toxins," Russell said, - "you'd kill a few. But there are more effective poisons commercially avail- able, including ant poison." The' USC professor-physician said that. if Church was worried about ter- rorists pouring toxins of this sort into a city's water supplies to kill large numbers of people, then the senator's. on han dthan the C.I.A.'s stockpile." To destroy this priceless supply of saxitoxin would be nothing short of criminal and makes as Much sense as destroying the heart drug, nitrogly- 'cerine because it is used in explosives or morphine because it is found in the opium plant. Saxitoxin's potential Value to medi- cal and chemical research cannot be 'overstated and we urge that the Sen- ate Committee recommend that these materials be turned over to the re- 'search laboratories of the National Institutes of Health. Not only does it seem probable that knowledge about saxitoxin and its toxic effects will pro- vide an antidote to "red-tide" (paraly- tic-shellfish) poisoning, which can be fatal to -people who eat contaminated shellfish, but also, as Dr. Murdock Ritchie of Yale points out,. it will pro- vide essential knowledge ? about nerVre action and the diseases of the central nervous system. . This supply of saxitoxin must not' be ? destroyed simply because it was studied as a possible espionage agent. (Assoc. Prof.) GORDON W. GRIBi3f.E Research Assistant PHILIP D. KuTzENco Dept. of Chemistry, Dart mouth College Hanover, N. H., Sept..,18, J975 . ? ? ? - HUSH, HUSH, DISCONTENTED CUBANS ET AL . Tim CIA soon won't, have to open any letters to read nasty things about itself in print. Ear hears a lot of folks are getting in their licks in- books. Victor Reuther, (his letters were - opened, Earwigs, becatme he was -Union- mister Walter's brother and UAW for- eign policy chief) roportedly reveals some startling stuff on CIA and unions abroad in his book-to-he.. Then, "Cuban Terror and the CIA," coming soon from concern was both dated and remote. There was a time when a number. 'of nations, particularly Israel, feared that such biological warfare might be waged against them. But, said Rus- - sell, these toxins lose their potency when mixed in large volumes of wa- ter and, ,moreoever, they are. not very effective when- taken orally.. "It's just not very lethal this way," he* said. . ? "Everybody looked into this-sort of thing a few years ago," he said, "and we all pretty much came to the same conclusion?warfare with these ?tox- ins was not possible, probable or practical." . But if these poisons aren't of much.; use for . widespread killing, Russell - said, they are eminently useful in le- gitimate biological research and med- ical treatment for certain diseases.. ? One of the constituents of. cobra :venom, isolated and purified, is currently being used by, physicians-to relieve the pain suffered by some patients, and to treat certain neurological disorders, hesaid. Russell himself is deeply involved in biological and med- ical research of this sort and he maintains a colony of sev- eral dozen highly poisonous snakes in his. laboratory. He "milks" them for their venom and he said he, can make 10 times the 8 milligrams now held by the CIA without any trouble at all. The shellfish toxin, however?the PSP?is a different - story. This can be obtained only from clams and mussels. contaminated with dinoflagellates, the microorganisms that give rise to the red tide. ?eRussell estimated that it would cost $100,000 of more harvest enough containinated shellfish to . yield even a , small quantity of PSP to satisfy his own USC laboratory's. research needs. ? He said that he would prefer that the Senate committee, disbribute the 10.9 grams to legitimate -researchers like hithself, but that he doubted if it would be done. "A key issue here is whether all these stocks were de- stroyed as they were supposed to be," Russell said of for- mer President Richard M. 'Nixon's command to destroy such chemical and biological warfare materials. ? Russell said that he was most Worried that some state legislator might try to go the U.S. Senate one step better and ban all research involving poisonous substances. "We wouldn't be able-to keep our snakes,' lie said, "and we'd be-out of business." , and Bernard Barker. It's busting with in- SING ALONG WITH BILL COLBY side stuff. For example: the CIA spent, .-. . :On top of that, the Village Voice says the past 15 years recruiting and training ?-? that poet Allen Ginsberg's song '-'CIA thousands of discontented Cubans, with a ...Dope Calypso," which goes on about the little help from pals in the Marine Corps; - _CIA's role in dope traffic in Southeast to help fight American battles 'in the Asia, is on the verge of publication. ,. Congo,' Cambodia and Vietnam. In ex- ..-: -' - change, they gor the CIA's pronrise .to : help overthrow Castro. The CIA is wel- I Harper's Magazhle Prms. was fed by Watergate burglars Et:Appr,o116adtEer ROMS 200110011/68s:rialitt-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 23 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 NEW YORK T IECS 28 September 1975 The Case of Redford vs. the C.1. By WILLIAM F. BUICLEY Jr. "Three Days of-the Con- dor" has everything, and one thing too many, wherein alas lies its chic. But for the ter- minal protuberance, we would have an expertly di- rected, trimly jigsawed, ade- quately acted spy-suspense story which catches the view- er with the opening scene: What can that mysterious man in the parked car be ? about., checking off the names; re by one, of the half-dozen people as they: :saunter into the 'American Literary Historical Society" , on Manhattan's East. Side to begin a day's work? Why, what he is doing is making sure there's a full house, be- cause at lunchtime, he and his accomplices ace going 'into that staid old building to shoot them all down in cold blood, made wider by. the special ice pellets. used ? at least, that is one inference ?by specially designed_ car- nage-machines. What was Robert Redford doing while his colleagues were being mowed down? He was out for lunch.. Specifi- cally, out to fetch lunch for his colleagues, it being his turn to go to the delfrtessen. But, in Order to avoid the: rain, he ignores prescribed security regulations and bounds down the staircase and out the back door; which is closer to the and anyway, it is time to estab- lish him as a man of rather independent habitra. who makes the boss of this super- secret C.I.A. front perpetually uneasy ("Are you sure you are quite happy working for us, Turner?") with that roam- ing, restless intelligence. (The 'director, Sydney Pollack, is unwilling to blemish Red- ford's beautiful face with any? of the scars -of The Thinker, but makes the concession of having him, CYCOIS 'wear glasses. He does not wear glasses when he makes love to Faye Dunaway, but then this is not a moment when his restless intelligence is his dominating concern). Redford's job at the "Amer- lean Literary Historical So- ciety" is to apply hies ency- clopedic-, knowledge and om- nivorous curiosity to the scanning of routine material in search of 'Slirreptitious en- emy activity_ He has oecently come on an anornalet A ? Wifliant c. Ruchleyk. is au- thor of the afpcominz, novef, "Saving Cie Queer." hosed Oil the adventures or et C.I.A. agent. tain bestseller has been translated only into Dutch ' and Arabic.. So what, you say? So you would never, qualify to work for the C.I.A. ? because Of your restless in- telligence. Redford has sent down to Washington,' through his superior at the- Manhattan front, the datum, on which he frames a hunch , which is mercifully unexpli-; toted, and the lunch-hour ? carnage is the result. Redford , had stumbled over an opera- ? tion of international signifi- cance, and it is a lucky, lucky thing that it was his day to go to the deli and that he used the back door, else he'd be stone-cold dead, along with the boss, the beautiful Oriental secretary, and all the others. On bringing in, the hot dogs and finding everybody dead; Redford decides he had better report the event to Washing- ton,. but he is good and scared, and so are you in his behalf, I'm telling you. 'So when he calls Washing- ton, and is told by the bigger boss which alleyway to re- port to at exactly what hour, Redford says, No sirree, I'm not going to report to any alleyway to meet up with a perfect stranger. How do I know I'm not talking to the chief killer himself? It is therefore arranged that the unknown boss will be. accompanied by an old friend of Redford's from another division of C.I.A. Recognizing his old friend, Redford will say to himself?and would _even if he didn't have a rest- less intelligence?"T-hat's my -old friend all .right, so the guy with him must be O.K.". But what happens is that as soon as the three men ? get together,- the boss sud- denly whips out a pistol and the general shoot-out Red- ford's friend is killed, the. boss is fatally wounded, arid Redford knows he's in real trouble. So he kidnaps Faye Dunaway, a perfect. stranger Of the kind Robert Redford would come upon, and over the next couple of hours the plot proceeds along its an- fractoous way, and the view- er has a superb time as assas- sins come and ge, and gets a true sci-fi thrill out, of the display of intelligence hardware, of which my favor- ite is a machine that flashes a map showing the location of the telephone being used by the caller. However, Red- ford's restless intelligence at some point in his life put him on to everything any- body ever knew about tele- phones, and he manaaes to cross the lines of halt the telephone trunks in the city and sits -comfortably on a? ganglion that makes a laugh- ing stock out of the. Central; Intelligence ? Agency's tele-' phone-spotting machine. . By now we all know that ? 'the Mr. Big who ordered the' killings is very high up in government. Our govern- ment. Indeed, by the laws of compound interest, if the .movie had endured another half an hour, one would have been satisfied only If the President of t the - United - States, or perhaps even Ralph Nader, had proved to he the energuinen behind ? a 0 Thus.-it goes right to the smash ending, as unbalanc- ing as Jimmy Durante's nose. The viewers would, at that point, have been left totally saddled by a traditional double-agent theme?Mr.. Big was really working for the. Soviet Union; or, if that is not trendy enough for Pol- lack-Redford, a Chilean colo- nel. It transpires, however, that. Mr. Big is a 100 . per cent American who had to eliminate all those people at the "American Literary His- torical Society" because they might hak'e become privy to a contingent operation by following the lead turned up by Redford's restless intel- ligence. Then, in a dramatic side- walk confrontation, Mr. Ju- nior Big explains to Redford that it is all high patriotirri, working against a future na- tional shortage of oil, and invites Redford to come back ,into the company and accept. the requirements of orthd- doxy in the modern world. But Redford says. taking off. .his glasses,- No, never! This very day I have told every- -thing ? to . . . the camera slithers up to a marquee ; above the two men who are . talking and you. see tile logo of . . . The New York Times. .The director failed only to 'emblazon under' it, ?"Daniel Ellsberg Slept Here." Mr. Ju- ? nior Big reacts like the witch -come into contact with ava- 'ter. He snarls and shrivels 'away, and 'says, half-d.esper- ately; "Maybe they won't print ? it!" But Redford has- by now seeded the audience with his restless intelligence, and we all know that The New York Times , wilt. print it, and we. shall all be free. ?'r he film's production notes state: "Over a year ago, Stan- ley Schneider, Robert Red- ? ford, Sydney Pollack and Dino de Laurentiis decided to create a film that would reflect the climate of Ameri- ca in the aftermath of the Watergate crisis." "The cli- mate of America" is, a pretty. . broad term. They really mean: The climate of Ameri- ca as seen by I. F, Stone, Seymour Hersh,. Susan Son- tag .arid Shirley MacLaine. One ,recalls Will Rogers, re- turning from the Soviet Union where he had seen a communal bath. "Did you see all of Russia?" he was asked. "No," Rogers said, weighing his answer. "But I saw all of ports of Russia!" Redford-Pollack-de Lauren- tiis have shown us the cli- mate in all Of parts of Ameri- ca. It sure is cold out there. VI CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY'S ADULT EDUCATION 29 September 1975 ETHICS OF ESPIONAGE & THE CIA $20.00 Wed., 7:00-8:00 p.m. Rm. 119. Caldwell Oct. 1?Nov. 194th & Mich., N.E. C B ol. Milton W. . liffington (Reid. Ed.D.. 3M. In WWII, Col. Buffington served as a military intelligence officer overseas, following which he joined the CIA in a ..ey policy planning capacity. He retired from the CIA in 1970. He will discuss moral and ethical questions in support of national security, routine sources of intelligence, mission- impossible techniques, right of privacy, ethics of assassination, censorship of communications, paramilitary support of the armed forces, books by es-CIA agents and an overview of the history of espionage in this and other countries. Col. Buffington will address himself to these questions with the added exper- tise of his training as a professional lawyer. 24 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 ' Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 WASHINGTON STAR 22 September 1975 ExmiC1 A. Argaly3t - ? Tet fsk,2 ? By Norman Kempster Washington Star Staff Writer Skepticism about their own conclu- sions and "petty bureaucratic" re- strictions ? not deliberate distortion of the facts ? muted the CIA's warn- ing of the 190 Communist Tet offen- sive in Vietnam, according to the former intelligence analyst who accurately forecast the attack. ? James V. Ogle said he tried to tell his version of the story to the House Intelligence Committee but was re- buffed. So he provided a copy of his prepared testimony to The Washing- ton Star instead. "We had predicted the Tet offen- sive," Ogle said. "It was all there, on paper, in the cables. But we didn't believe it. ITIE PREDICTION was based on captured documents and the -speeches of North Vietnamese Communist leaders, Ogle said. The evidence pointed to an offensive but there had been similar evidence be- fore which had proved incorrect. Later, when the Saigon office where he worked was riddled with bullets and spattered with blood, Ogle said he and a fellow analyst finally realized just what had hap- pened. "'Now we know what they meant,' Joe (Hovey) said. There were tears in his eyes. 'They meant what they said.' " ALTHOUGH earlier reports had indicated that a Communist offensive was planned for sometime between Jan. 15 and Feb. 15, Ogle said a cable which would have pinpointed the start at Jan. 30 was not dispatched to Washington even though the evi- dence was available three days be- fore the attack. "The cable was never sent for the petty bureacratic reason that the translation of the captured document had not yet been assigned a com- bined document exploitation number and so did not pass the tests set up to avoid double reporting," he said. Ogle said he decided to speak out after Samuel A. Adams, also a for- mer CIA intelligence analyst, told the House committee- Thursday that the CIA and the military intentional- ly underestimated Viet Cong troop strength for domestic political rea- sons, resulting in an underestimate of Communist military capability. Ogle said he prepared the testimony after receiving indications the Pike com- mittee wanted to hear it. However, he said he was riot called as a witness and was told later by a staff member that his testimony tectuld not be required. IMAMS SAID the intelli- gence community was gatity of "corruption" of its reports. He said the inte.n- sons should be affaseoj ant tinn was to fool CongrAppas roveAForoRektaisey2laSliiwwp 0 rfl ? iJ and the public but that it ultimately contributed to U.S. losses in the offensive. In his testimony, Adams said a CIA team in Saigon ? Ogle, Hovey and Bobby Laton ? forecast the offen- sive but underestimated its power because of too low troop estimates. Sipping black coffee from?. a yellow mug, Ogle said in an interview that Adams charges were "irrelevant" because the Communists only used about 67,000 troops in the offensive. "it was not an intelli- gence breakdown," Ogle said. "I realize the conven- tional wisdom is that it was, but it was not." Ogle was bitter at the failure of the House com- mittee to listen to his rebut- tal of Adams. "I THOUGHT they were trying to get at the truth," he said. "I am now sure they were trying to make. political hay. They are guilty of the same thing Adams accused the CIA o , ignoring some of the facts for political purposes." Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, who briefly headed the CIA, said yesterday the Tet offensive did represent an intelli- gence. failure. But Schlesinger, who ap- peared on the CBS inter- view. -program "Face the Nation," said present con- gressional investigations of the CIA already may have gone too far and damaged national security. He said it is appropriate for Congress to review the agency's ac- tivities but "we do not want to throw the baby out ? with the bathwater." IN ANOTHER reaction to Adams' sensational charges, two members of the House committee, Reps. David C. Treen, R-Tenn., and Dale Milford, D-Tex., demanded that Chairman Otis Pike, D-N.Y., call as witnesses 12 individuals who Adams said had played' a part in developing phony troop estimates. . "Mr. Adams made seri- ous and personally damag- ing charges against a num-- her of persons," Treen and Milford wrote. "In accord- ance with rule 4.4 of the rules of our committee we believe that all such per witnesses." "We believe that it is ex- tremely important that the committee pursue the alle- gation that distortion of the military capacity of the enemy was the result of deliberate policy," the law- makers said. "If the allega- tion is true, we need to know who is responsible for the formulation of the poli- cy and the means by which it was carried out. TREEN, MILFORD and Rep. Robert McClory, R- Ill., tried unsuccessfully Thursday to end the public testimony of Adams and take the rest of his state- ment in a closed committee meeting. , They were out- voted 6-3. - Treen and Milford are part of the conservative bloc on the committee which has been consistently outvoted by a bipartisan group of liberals. Ogle insisted that con- trary to public -opinion, the Tet offensive was a defeat for the Communists be- cause of the frustration of their hopes that the South Vietnamese civilian popu- lation would join the insur- rection. But he conceded that most Americans view it was a defeat for the allies. UNION,. San Diego OGLE ALSO dinted Adams claim that the only reliable U.S. infiltrator who was able to penetrate 21..e Viet Cong was killed i the. Tet uprising. Ogle, who was in Saigon while Adams was assigned to the CIA's Lang- ley, Va., headquarters, said the man Adams described had not penetrated the Viet Cong at all. He said the man was really a very skillful "ana- lyst" who was able to pre- dict Viet Cong actions on the basis of information he obtained from the outside. Ogle said the CIA did not rely much on information supplied by infiltrators anyway because he said most of them were "at least triple agents," who were usually unreliable. On one thing, Ogle agreed with Adams ? the problem with intelligence in Vietnam was a failure of proper analysis, not a lack of information. "MERE WAS never a shortage of intelligence in Vietnam," Ogle said. "There. was always tozi much, too *many low-level bits and pieces. As in all intellectual endeavors. if the bits and pieces didn't fit the puzzle you were worlicg on you tended to. ignore them." Several members of Cr:a Pike committee have u plained that the CIA spends too much of its time gather- ing bits of information and too little trying to mal-le sense out of the data. 11 Sept. 1975 c!At'ShOtil,d_ Since early this year. the Rockefel- ler. Commission and ? congressional ? committees have been turning up instances of abuse and potential law, violations by the Central Intelligence'. Agency. It is significant ? that these i revelations have not .? changed the; ? public's conviction that the Urtited.1 - States of America needs its CIA. ? ? A. recent national poU showed that! an ovenvhelming 80 per cent of .thei 'respondents oppose the idea of aboll .1Shing the CIA. Further, the weight ofl opinion is that the agency's problems can be . solved within its presenti framework, rather than by restrucl _turing it entirely. ? -z Washing the CIA's dirty linen in! public ? as harmful as this has been has also demonstrated to Amerd cans how dangerous it would- be to our national security if an intelliLl A-RDPAW4tateft501-i101)W0664t-Were doinc, its job. , Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 ARGOSY Magazine September 1975 GEORGE CLIFFORD ? If you _want to know what goes on . in the briney deep, ask the They've got the ocean bugged! allahe cluster of Navy men strained . El in silence as they listened to the tei radio transmission. Their sensi- tive equipment amplified many strange sounds from under the sea, but there was one distinctly different, more unusual and more frightening than any they had ever heard. Tapes of the transmission were played back for other experts and for high American defense officials. All sat in horror as they heard what no one had ever heard before: the ter- rible pressures of the Atlantic depths were crushing a submarine. It was like a fat man stepping on. a light bulb. "They just sat there," one govern- ment source told APCOSY, "and they could hear the bulkheads snapping." The technology that permitted the. sounds to be heard had been one of America's greatest military secrets. It was this fact, as much as any other, that the Central Intelligence Agency. tried to keep secret. When several news organizations learned of the CIA's attempt to salvage a Russian sub from the Pacific floor this sum- mer, for example, it was CIA Director William Colby whopersonally.inter- ceded to keep the cover on the story for reasons of "national security:" ? Nevertheless, the story did get out that the Glomar Explorer, a deep-sea mining ship ostensibly owned by Howard Hughes, was attempting to recover a.Soviet sub that was lost 700 miles northwest of Hawaii in 1968. -How, the public wanted to know, did the CIA know when and where the vessel went down? The secrets contained in the crushed hull of the Russian Golf class sub were not as important to the men in the Pentagon and their cloak-and- dagger comrades as keeping their own secret, and the Russians would soon know if it were publicized that the U.S. had located the Russian sub. Now the Russians know, yet the se- cret is still kept frotri the American people who paid the bill for one of the most successful enterprises of the Cold War: the coastal boundary of the United States, and of other places 26 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 held vital to America's defenses, are guarded by ultra-sensitive listening devices. The equipment, though im- proved from time to tim, has been in these locations for some years. The shrouds of secrecy around the project are so thick that we have not been able to learn precisely when America first began using the under- water listening devices, but sources insist that the first submarine dis- aster recorded by the equipment in- volved an American ship. Some say it was the nuclear sub Scorpion, which was lost with 99 aboard off the Azores on May 21, 1968. Other* believe it was the Thresher, also a nuclear sub, which disappeared with a crew of 129 at a still undisclosed location in the Atlantic on April 10, 1963. The knowledge that it was an American ship added to the horror Of the moment when men; safe and warm at their post, listened to the sounds of a submarine disaster for the first time. On huge plotting boards the Navy keeps track of the move- ments of all major ships on the world's oceans. Within minutes after the listeners heard the bulkheads break, they were able to determine' that the doomed submarine was one of their own. ? There was nothing anyone. could do to save the crushed vessel. . The United States and the SoViet Union have spent untold fortunes for the ability to detect and?if neces- sary?destroy each other's sub- marines. Submarine reseue, however, remains a virtually unknown art. Yet even if a rescue ship had been nearby, it could not have helped. The listeners knew from the sound of the splintering steel that everyone aboard would have been dead in seconds. - It was not merely the Navy's abile ity to detect submarine sounds that. pushed CIA Director Colby to beg for continued secrecy. Sources pointed out that the Navy's use of sonar buoys has been common knowledge for years. These buoys have a rela- tively short range and short lifespan. What was significant about the in- formation brought to light by the mission of the Glomar Explorer, they said, was the proof of America's abil- ity to pinpoint the location of -a Rus- sian submarine more than 700 miles north .of Hawaii in the vast, rolling Pacific. This, the sources said, repre- sents a major increase in the range and accuracy of underwater sound systems over that of any previously known to exist. Ever since the Russians equipped their long-range subs with nuclear- tipped missiles, American defense planners have been using all the tech- nology at their disposal to keep track of the underwater attack platforms. Regularly, American submarines pick up Russian subs as they leave their bases in the Atlantic and Pacific, and follew them on their cruises like gum- shoes after a philandering husband;.. There is little secrecy involved in the exercise; the subs can hear each other. But the information about the way the Russian subs move, and the direction of their voyages, is impor- tant to U.S. officials. (Russians sim- ilarly monitor American submarine movements.) Still more Americans are employed listening to all radio communications to and from Russian subs. This not only gives more information about submarine locations, but offers the - cryptologists and computer experts at the National Security Agency an op- portunity to crack the Soviet codes. More information on the activities of the Russian subs and other ships is gathered daily by "spy-in-the-sky" . satellites, which regularly send their information back to U.S. listening posts. All of this data is correlated in Washington, and in times of inter- national crisis, the National Security Council and its co-ordinating com- mittee, the Washington Special Ac- tion Group, receives maps every day showing the position and direction of *the Soviet vessels. These movements can be a key to Russian policy. At the time of the war between In- dia and Pakistan over the indepen- dence- of Bangladesh in December, 1971, for example, knowledge of the movements of Russian submarines and other vessels toward the Indian Ocean was crucial. It demonstrated that promises made by top Russians to Indian officials to prevent?by force if necessary?a task force from the U.S. Seventh Fleet from inter- vening on the side of Pakistan could be backed up with steel. ? The ability to pinpoint the location and direction of Soviet ships was also crucial following the capture of the American freighter Mayaguez last May. Both diplomatic and in- telligence sources indicated that nei- ther Russia nor Chills was eager to block a U.S. mission determined to re- capture the container vessel. Coded cables arriving in Washing- ton under the highest security classi- fications indicated a number of rea- sons fee the apparent lack of interest by the communist powers. The Cam. ' Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDF'77-00432R000100380007-9 bodians had not shown proper grat- itude to their sponsors in Moscow and Peking during the first sweet days of their victory celebration. The capture of the Mayaguez was thought to he a foolhardy act. by an inexperienced government. Most- importantly, it seemed that the Americans, just booted out of Southeast Asia, needed a taste:of an old Asian remedy?the lace-saver. The recapture of the May- aguez, or so .the reasoning went might cool American tempers enoteo- to prevent a bigger, more arnbitioe- - adventure. The whole world knew that an American naval task force had been ordered into the Gulf of ? Siam, where the Mayaguez rode uneasily at anchor under the droning buzz of American patrol- planes. The men responsible for co-ordinating the military alternatives were aware of the worth in the cables, but were also on the lookout for cold hard facts. They knew, of course, that China lacked significant .air and naval forces, and separated from Cam- bodia's coast by more than 1,000 miles of Laotian and Cambodian terrain, was incapable of a military response. Russia, however, was another story. The Soviet navy had made the...Indian Ocean its own, with constant patrols by mcdern, missile-equipped destroy- ers and cruisers, ever-present sub- marines lurking beneath the waves, and a cluster of space satellite sup- port ships, whose powerful electronic equipment is also useful for inter- cepting radio messages from Ameri- can ships and planes. Russia was not only capable of stopping an American essault to free the Mayaguez, but could have used the incident to touch-off a nuclear Armageddon. All of these were factors that had to be weighed in the State Depart- ment, the Pentagon and, most of all, the White House. Nervous .officials waited for reports to come in from around the world. The information arrived quickly, considering its scope and the vast stretches of the globe to be covered, but to the men in Wash- ington, it seemed to trickle like a wa- ter torture. At last, the positions of the Red fleet were marked on charts, and copies were Made for the Na. 27 tional Security Council. It did not take expert analysis to determine that the Russians were staying far from the Cambodian shore. - If there were to be a response from Russia, it would be in words, not bul- lets. The way was clear for the Navy and Marines to move in and free the Mayaguez. This is where the exact location of enemy submarines in wartime is vital knowledge to the United States. One Russian sub, equipped with nuclear missiles and properly positioned, could conceivably destroy the key sections of the megalopolis that sprawls from Boston to Washington, or the West Coast population centers. Now the American undersea listen- ing network gives the U.S. the awe- some power to hear the foot-by-foot progress of Soviet subs as they glide beneath the surface far off our shores. With exact knowledge of the sub- marines' position, chances for a suc- cessful pre-emptive strike are greatly increased. Such a listening system has been under development for years off the ccast of Florida. There, sonic devices have been tested and proven so sensi- tive they can even detect. the maneu- vers of small boats smuggling drugs and other contraband into the U.S. The stories that finally appeared about the Glomar Explorer and its partially successful attempt to raise the Russian sub also focused atten- tion on the long-standing and cozy relationship between .the CIA and the even more secretive Howard Hughes. There were many reports of their interdependent relationship. Probably the most recent one was the tax dispute over the ownership of the Glomar Explorer itself. In June, Los Angeles County assessor .Philip Watson told the press that men pur- porting to be from the CIA had as- sured him the ship was owned by the Federal Government?not Howard Hughes?and that the $300-million vessel was therefore -exempt from lo cal taxes. Since the men declined to produce a letter from the CIA stating the Government's ownership, Mr. Watson sent a tee bill to the Summa Corporation (Mr. Hughes' holding NEW YORK TIMES 23 September 1975 company) for $7.5 million. One man who connects Hughes with the CIA's less publicized deal- ings is John Meier, who was Hughes' science advisor in the 1960's. Now in- volved in complex litigation with the billionaire recluse, Meier asserted that Hughes had him place business consultants in a number of Latin American countries. "I helped a bunch Of these people. get themselves set up," the former Hughes employee said. "I used my own contacts to open doors for them. Then one-of the men I was helping let it slip that he?and all the others? were CIA agents. He thought I knew. I sent word to Hughes that I wasn't going to help with that project. anymore.". Meier was soon off the Hughes pay- roll, and burdened with legal suits that only a person of Hughes' wealth could afford to defend. Meier insists that the CIA has continued to side with Hughes in their dispute. Earlier this year, Meier .was hospitalized while in London on business, and sent word that he would have to postpone a court hearing in Nevada. Meier asserts that a CIA agent then came to the hospital and took copies of his medical records. "The CIA," Meier said, "is paying a hell of a price for Hughes' help." In the meantime, the Glomar Ex- plorer has returned to California for modifications and refitting. It was only partially successful in recovering the Soviet sub, part of which sank again as it was being raised, and the CIA is trying to get permission from the White House to make another salvage attempt. According to in- formed officials, such permission may never be given. Maybe olio of the reasons for this is the great stir that was created in the newspapers, which made it clear that we were, after all, investigating a Russian vessel. There's a good chance,, however, that the reason might also be to allow the American people: to forget the incident?and possibly cease wondering what the CIA has going for it. under the sea waves.fil . ; :Ex-C.I.A. Analyst 1 tried' to tell his version of the'lWith bullets and Spattered with', ! !story to the House Intelligenceiblood, Mr. Ogle said, be and a i , l 1 !Denies Distortion ,Committee but was rebuffedifellow analyst, Joe Hovey, fi:!: iSo instead he gave The Wash-jnally realized just what. had 1 Of Tet Troop Dat,?IiiIngton Star a copy of testimonylhappened. " e would have presented. . I "'Now we know V.,hat they' . 1 . "We had predicted the Tetlmeant,' Joe said. There were . The WashIngten star - !offensive," Mr. Ogle said. "It 1 tears in his eyes. 'They meant WASHINGTON, Sept. 2.`"--1was all there, on paper, in the what they said.'" 'Skepticism about their own ;cables. But we didn't believe it." j Although earlier reports had ,condusions and "petty bureau-1 The prediction was based on I indicated that a Communist of- el-R.:tic" restrictions?not delib-jcaptured documents -and theifensive Was planned for some--' erate distortion of the facts?Ispeeches of North Vietnameseitime between Jan. 15 and Feb.' ;mated the Central Intelligence!Cornmunist leaders, Mr. Oglej15, Mr. Ogle said, a cablegram. Agency warning of the 1968isaid. The evidence pointed tojthat would have pinpointed the Communist Tet offenSive ? inian offensive' but similar evidstart at Jan. 30 was not dis. a foronidence before had proved in-ipatched to Washington even ?Vietharn. according to' ""--.;correct. I though the evidence was avail- jr..:c..1igence analyst. I_ Later when the Saigon off icel,a13:e three days before the AINMOVellbffOlURDlietaseidaeGinted0RotkGIA*RDRIZZE004432R000100380007-9 -, Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 LONDON OF=i. 21 Sept. 1975 The price of your petrol will depend on the meet- ing of OPEC next Wednesday. But are the big oil companies who buy the oil from OPEC really battiirig on behalf of the consumers to bring down the price and break the OPEC cartel? ANTHONY SAMPSON Is author of a new book on 'The Seven Sisters' : az so, Shell, Texaco, Gulf, Chevron, Mobil and P. Here he investigates the curious relation- ship bettveen the companies and the producers. NEXT WEDNESDAY in Vienna? the members of OPEC will meet once again to setue the tua-1d peice of oil, while the coms.untirreg countries will watch helplessly to await the size of the bin It is two years since the crisis first hroke, which first doubled, and then doubled again, the nil price. The first sense af outrage at the power of the cartel has given way slowly to a sense of pained resignation to the fact that it will nal break apart, together with am acceptance?at least in Britaiii?that perhaps the price of oil should remain where OPEC has fixed it. At the name time the con- suming countries have been questioning the role of the Seven Sisters, the inter- . nationat oil companies to whom for the-last four decades they had virtually delegated the task of obtaining cheap and secure oil_ First the consumers and politicians particularly in Arnerica?wmee appalled in 1973 to tfiscover that the com- panies had lost overnight all their bargaining power to keep prices down, and were power- less to prevent the embargo. Then they wiere further en- raged IV the vast increases in the compan3r rofits. After the crisis, the oil companies have emerged as the richest of all corporations- In the annual list puhlished by the American business magazine Fortune, the TCP1 bigges t world com- panies now imiclude eight oil companies; led by Exxon (or Esso) with Shell close behind. Then a sinister aspect of this financial power was revealed in a- succession of disclosures in Washington about oil company bribes.. First it emerged that Gulf oil had paid large bribes in dif- ferent countries, including $4 million ,since, 1966 to the rul- ing party in 'Korea. Then several oil 'companies were found to have paid bribes to Italian political parties; Esso alone had made secret politi- cal payments totalling $51 million oven eight years in Italy. These huge bribes, coming out of the immense profits, raise sharply the old question (in both the literal and general sense) of the accountabilitY of the oil com- panies. But the most serious ques- tion about the giant com- panies from the West concerns their relationship with the OPEC cartel. Are the com- panies really representing the interests of the consumers ? Or are they in fact serving to underpin 'the- producers' cartel ? It is important in the first Place to look back at the way in which OPEC CUIlle about, From the moment of its foun- dation in 1960. OPEC was con- ceived (as one delegate put it) as a cartel to confront the cartel.' Without the past his- tory of connivance of the companies, who for 30 years had administered the Middle East's oil production be- tween them. OPEC woold never have happened. Nor could it have solidified with- out a single extraordinary blunder in the New York 28 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 boardroom of Esso. In July 1960 the Esso direc- tors agreed --against the advice of their Middle East expert, Howard Page ? uni- laterally to reduce the 'posted 'price for Middle East oil : a decision which was swiftly followed by the other six Sisters (with some pro- tests from BP). Thus all the producing Governments found their revenues from-oil taxes, which were based on this posted' price, drastically re- duced overnight by the actions of a group of private foreign companies. It was a certain recipe for Arab unity, as many experts had warned; and it worked. The key producers clubbed together to form OPEC, and even the Shah swallowed his resentment of Arab radicals, in his anger at not being consulted, and joined the new club. In spite of such mistakes, throughout the sixties the oil companies were permitted by the 'Western Governments, and particularly by Washington, to maintain effective control over international oil policy. Thus, in the critical October of 1973, the confrontation with OPEC was once again left in the hands of the Seven Sisters (now joined by a few indepen- dents), in spite of the fact that, only two days before, the Middle East War had broken out, which transformed the whole political equation. Politicians astonished The negotiation about the oil price, not surprisingly, quickly broke down. The breakdown marked: the his- toric turning-point when the West suddenly lost all its ability to settle the price of oil, . producing the precise reversal . of the situation at the forma- tion of OPI.':C 13 years earlier. The OPEC cartel was suddenly established, to the astonkh- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000106380007-9 ment of consumers and the incredulity of politicians: the old cartel of the seven companies was abruptly re- - placed by a cartel of 13 nations. Many experts, including ? William Simon at the United - States Treasury and (for a time at least) Henry Kis- singer at the State Depart- ' Ment, confidently expected the OPEC cartel to . dis- integrate, letting prices once again tumble down. The im- - mediate world shortage of oil was soon over, as the world recession, itself partly caused by the oil prices, cut down consumption everywhere. The economists and advisers waited expectantly for the strains on OPEC to show them- selves, as each country would compete to keep up produc- tion, and thus push down prices. ? But nothing happened. Con- sumption went down and down: :tankers were laid off, storage tanks were overflow- ing, freight - rates dropped lower and lower. There were eveo hopeful signs of disunity between the chief members of OPEC : the Shah of Iran ? talked with increasing rancour about Sheikh Yemeni, while the Saudis became incteas- ingly worried by the Shah's .imperial ambitions. Yet still OPEC held together; and the basic price?with small local variations?held up. What on earth had gone wrong? An important part of the answer lay in- Saudi Arabia : . for the Saudis, as far the big- gest producers, were the key to the cartel. Like the Texans in the 1930s, the Saudis real- ised that they must bear the chief burden of regulating pro- duction. And the Saudis had one huge advantage over the Texans, as guardians of the -cartel; they did not particu- larly- need the money from extra production. As 'Yamani explained to. me, talking in Riyadh last February: Usu- ally any cartel will break up, because the stronger members will not hold up the market to protect the weaker mem- bers. But with OPEC, the strong members do not have an interest to lower the price and sell more.' ? et The 'Saudis as Yamani was able to show in the following' months, were quite prepared to cut back their production, to make sure that the price did not come down: in the first six months of 1973 they produced an average of only 6.6 million barrels e day,. corn- . pared with ? 8.1 million the year before. Other big produ- cers, Ktiwait, Iran and Libya, followed suit: in Libya pro- duction in the same period went down from 1.9 barrels to 1.2 barrels. But why were the old split up so many attempts at cartels in the past ? Why were Iran and Saudi Arabia riot constantly competing for pro- duction, as they had done through the sixties, using every manoeuvre to produce an extra barrel ? It was not that none of them needed the extra money, for even at the Quadrupled price the Shah was soon expecting to go back -into debt: No, the real key to the continuing cartel was not the self-restraint of the pro- ducers;it was the fact that the oil companies, the familiar Seven Sisters, were in effect conducting their rationing .system for them. ' It- was' the companies, with their global system of alloca- tion, . and their control of world-wide markets, ? who were making sure that there would be no glut, who were holding the. balance between the rival producers. The Shah and his oil Minister, Dr Amoy- zegar, both explained to me that they had to be grateful for the companies' role in running the cartel : With the Sisters controlling every- thing,' said the Shah, once they accepted, everything .went smoothly.' ' Why try to. break them up,' said Amotize- gar, 'when they can do the work for us ? ' The fact that the giant com- panies were fully' integrated,' with their own tankers, re- fineries and gasoline pumps throughout the world, made the maintenance of the OPEC cartel system infinitely easier. It was the kind of situation that the producers of other commodities, seeking to- form their, own cartels, might dream of: in the words of The Economist (no enemy to the oil companies) : 'Many poor primary producers would give their eye-teeth if big foreign capitalists, would kindly ..arrange a semi - monopolistic distribution network for their products in the. West, down to tied filling stations.' What had happened, it emerged as the evidence slowly unfolded, was not that OPEC had usurped the old cartel of the oil companies, but that they had simply joined themselves on to it, and had manoeuvred the com- panies into the position of be- ing their allies and instru- ments, with no interest in breaking the OPEC cartel. In the words of Senator Church's report in January 1975, at the end of the most comprehensive set of hearings on the oil crisis, 'the primary concern of the established major oil companies is to maintain their world market shares and their favoured posi- tion of receiving oil from OPEC nations at .costs slightly lower than other companies. To maintain this favoured members.' + Not such a mystery -Thus the puzzle of why the -OPEC cartel did not break was not really so mysterious : it , was being underpinned by seven of the biggest corpora- tions in the Western world, who had no commercial inter- est in destroying it. In fact this had all been part of the grand design of OPEC, and particularly of its most intelligent delegate, Zaki Yamani. Back in 1968, in the .. aftermath of the earlier Middle East war when Arab fortunes seemed at their low- est, Yamani had conceived of his plan for ' participation,' by which Arab Governments would acquire shares in the oil companies' concessions. The object was not only to in- crease the producers' revenues and give them a stake in their own resources; it was also, as . Yemeni carefully explained to correspondents in March 1969, to create a bond between the producing Governments and the oil companies which 'would be indissoluble, like a Catholic marriage.' Yamani knew that outright nationalisation of concessions . was a dangerous policy: it might cut off the producing country from whole networks of world markets, as it cut off ? Mussadiq of Iran in 1951. Instead, participation would guarantee the co-operation of the companies, who would be lured into the agreements by the promise of cheaper oil than their lesser competitors. ? 1.7arriani's policy, after some resistance from the compan- ies, was triumphantly success- ful : the seven companies, and some others, had all been per- ? suaded to enter into mar- riages by 1973; and though some producers, like Algeria. preferred outright nationalisa- tion. they took care to give preferential treatment to fay- pored companies, thus ensur- ing their support. In the immediate wake of the 1973 war there were .new demands for total nationalisation, but in the subsequent negotiations the producers took care that the marriage would not be damaged to the point of divorce. It was the embargo, in fact, that revealed in a highly- dramatised form that the oil companies had already changed sides, and that they were most vulnerable to pres- sures from the producers. As the Shah put it to me : The companies were the first to say "I serve and obey the orders of the producing countries ".' The embargo could never have been effective if there had not political forces of disunity status, the international corn- been comparatively few com- betweethen natiops not spgteing up cartelWarCM MCA Re I eawd PanliA?Cranifk 31..t 00432R1Y018100880007,9in the key 29 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 producing countries of the Persian Gulf. . As Professor Stobaugh, an oil -expert from Harvard, expleined,giyine evi- dence about Saudi Arabia to - the Church committee: 'It is clear that it is easier to have an embargo when you have 'only four companies to deal with. The embargo was really a forewarning, in the heat of battle, of the situation which was to emerge in the following two years : to put it bluntly, in the language of the busi- ness, the companies were found in bed with the pro- clucers. It was an ironic outcome to the long history of the Seven Sisters. They had been en- couraged, sometimes even pushed, by the Governments in Washington and London to go abroad to find cheap oil for 'Western consumers; later they had been given huge tax bene- -fits, and special clearance from anti-trust laws in Washington on the grounds that their pre- !settee in the Middle East was crucial to Western defence and the future of the free 'world. Yet now, when the real .crisis broke in 1973, they were found to have suffered the fate of so many dubious ,adventurers in the past : they gone native. When the Saudis insisted that the .Aramco partners must cut off all oil from the United States Sixth Fleet, they meekly sub- mitted?at the height of the international emergency. We are thus, I believe, faced with a remarkable neW trans- formation in the character of the Seven Sisters. Here are the biggest corporations in the world, owned by Ameri- can or European shareholders, . and theoretically dedicated to 'safeguard cheap oil and democracy, which have now emerged with their principal loyalties directed towards foreign powers. The interests of these powers might become .diametrically opposed to those of the 'home' govern- ments of the oil companies, which now find themselves (committed to a cartel to main- thin expensive oil. , In- the context of this de- pendence, it is now much easier to see why the OPEC cartel has continued unbroken for two years; and why Kissinger and Simon have, like the Big Bad Wolf, huffed and puffed but not blown the house down. There is nothing con- sciously conspiratorial about 'the company's support for OPEC. The oil executives can, and do, insist- honestly that they are constantly oper- ating according to the market, trying to take oil where it is cheapest and refusing it where it is too expensive, as they have done in Abu Dhabi and Libya. Like Rockefeller's executives a hundred years ago, they can boast that they are operating the most eco- nomical and efficient system imaginable. But they are oper- ating within a monopoly, and they will do nothing, beyond exploiting the local differen- tials, to offend or break that; basic cartel. Of course there are plenty of smaller adven-, turous companies which would be glad to buy and sell cut- price oil wherever they could find it; but the OPEC coun- tries can easily enough keep them under control, provided they have the use of the global networks of the Seven Sisters. How they dodge tax The Seven Sisters have existed for so long?Exxon for a century, Shell for 70 years?that they have become regarded as facts of life, like nations or mountains. The need for giant integrated com- panies has been ? held to be essential to security of supply; so that Shell oil . can be pumped into Shell tankers to be carried through Shell re- fineries to Shell filling sta- tions. But in fact there has been nothing inevitable or irreversible about these oil empires : they have been the result, more than anything, of deliberate governmental de- cisions in past years, .which have guaranteed tax relief and diplomatic support overseas, as part of a deliberate foreign policy which is now totally outdated. The 'integrated companies developed increasingly into tax-dodging devices: the tax concessions led to absurd dis- tortions in the accounting of the companies, who arranged to make most of their profits out of foreign production, where they paid minimal taxes. But now the whole logic of the integrated company has been turned upside down. The vast machinery for extracting cheap oil and selling it through global networks has been used for the opposite purpose : to ensure that expensive oil will always find markets, and will not be undercut by cheap oil. The integrated companies have become like a heavy blunder- buss, seized arid turned round by the opposite side. ? This new role of the com- panies, together with their in- creased profits, and the revela- tions about bribery, all point again to the question, are such huge companies really neces- sary ? It seems clear that, without the instruments of the Seven, OPEC's maintenance of their cartel would become much more difficult. If the big companies pulled out of their Participation agreements and long-term contracts, and be- came more like trading com- panies in 01 her commodities, OPEC'S outlets would be much less assured. And if Western governments were to take over directly the task, of buying oil frOm .OPEC they would pr- sent a much more effective counter-group on the con- sumers' side. The old argument that huge companies are essential to sup- ply the resources for develop- ment is now much less con- vincing. It is often the smaller companies, like Atlantic Rich- field in Alaska or Occidental in Libya, who have been most . adventurous in exploratioq; and the real strength of the giants, Esso and Shell, rests on their control of the markets more than their record Qf exploration. The giant size of the Seven, and their joint consortia in the Middle East, were origin- ally the product of a quite different historical context. Thus the Iranian Consortium (which includes all Seven Sisters) was encouraged by the State Department in 1953 as a means to restore the Iranian economy after the ? disaster of Mussadiq; and thus the four partners of Aramco (Esso, Texaco. Socal and Mobil) were riven toe concessions and dinlomatic supnort to keep Saudi Arabia in the Western camp. Now the tables are turned. and the giants have become much more useful to the pro- ducers than to the consumers; meanwhile their size IS se overwhelming. and so 1;9- ! accountable, that they ey den rniis growing fears a pe. untie control of them. 'Time Seven Sisters: The Greqt Oil Companies and the World They 1ViaLde,' by Anthony Swap- son is published by Hodder and Stoughton tomorrow . eriee ?4.95. 30 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 LONDON OBSERVER 28 Sept. 1975 Anatomy of the oil game by CHRISTOPHER TUGENDHAT' THE SEVEN SISTERS by Anthony Sampson (Hodder and Stoughton ?4.95) ONE of my most vivid memories of writing about oil is of asking a director of Esso's parent company in New York what he con- sidered to be his company's greatest achievement. ' To have survived,' he replied, and he was quite right. In most industriesu the great names of the 1920s have either disappeared, merged, or been taken over by govern- ments. One has only to look at aircraft, cars and coal, to appreciate how difficult it is for individual companies to withstand far-reaching- politi- cal, economic, and technical changes. But in oil the seven sisters ?Exxon (Esso's parent). Mobil, Standard Oil of Cali- fornia (Chevron's parent). Shell. Gulf, Texaco, and BP ?remain among the world's largest companies trout one generation to the next. Their names change from time to WASHINGTON POST. 30 September 1975 Joseph Kroft The 0 time, but their vitality con- tinues unimpaired. This is a remarkable achievement. Anthony Sampson sets out ? to describe how it was done. Half his book traces the story from their nineteenth and. early twentieth century origins to the formation of OPEC in 1960, and the final third deals with the last five. years during which OPEC has? assumed responsibility for setting oil prices, and raised them to . undreamed - of heights. He concentrates on personalities, and confines himself to those aspects of the companies' record that now seem- most newsworthy, notably the attempts to form cartels, the acquisition of concessions, and dealings with governments. As one would expect from his previous books, the result is highly readable. There are some marvellous descrip- tions of individuals and EC Charade The price rise set by the foreign oil cartel last week shows how little this country has a foreign economic policy. For the increase comes at a time when excess supplies should have forced the cartel of exporting countries known as OPEC to cut prices. That OPEC was able to stick to- gether and then to hike prices at all is only thanks to help from major Western oil companies. The big com- panies favored the foreign cartel large- ly because they got no contrary sig- nals from their own governments, not- ably from the Ford administration in Washington. To understand all this it is neces- sary to have a feel for the strengths and weaknesses of OPEC. The cartel is powerful when demand for oil ex- ceeds supply. It can then set very high prices which member countries will gladly adopt and enforce. That. is what happened in 4.973 and 1974. An excess of supply over demand, however, poses vexing problems for OPEC. In order to hold prices high, production has to be cut. Deciding which member countries should ac- cept which cuts in production?and therefore in income?has up to now proved beyond the capacity of OPEC. Thus Abdul Amir Kubbah, a for- mer OPEC official, mentions in his events, and his eve for the vignette which tells more than several thousands words of explanation is as acute as ever. At times he succeeds in transmitting a sense of atmosphere so vividly that one almost feels he must have been present at the occasion he is describing. - But this approach gives the impression that the com- panies are run. like Mogul and other TV creations, by small groups of polymaths constantly taking-. key decisions, letting across the world, and carrying all the details of their business in their heads. The reality is, of course. far More complex and prosaic. The arguments against considering the his- tory of a nation ? with refer- enee-driaV to kings-and battles are now widely appreciated, and apply just as much to - directors and companies. The directors of the seven sisters are popularly sup- posed to be masters of poli- tics and diplomacy, but that idea hardly survives this. book. As the author points out, most of them have tech- nical backgrounds, and he describes the route to the tcip at Exxon as being through ? the " Texas pipeline "?tin through the technical univer-: skies, the refineries, and tanl- farms.' He suggests that top oilmen are generally out Of their depth in politics and diplomacy. and his account of some of their activities bears this out. . The. US sisters failed entirely . in their attempt to' influence Nixon's foreign policy in favour of the Arabs before the Yom Kippur War', and Sampson is very critical of BP's handling of events leading up to Abadan. The mistakes he describes adds mournfully, "nothing ever came of it" Thanks to the recession and a mild winter, 1975 was a time of oil glut which put OPEC to the most severe test in its history. Consumption of OPEC oil fell from a capacity .of about 40 million barrels a day to an actual figure of about 25 million barrels per day. So if the cartel was to hold, if prices were to be kept 'steady, the exporting countries had to withhold from the market 40 per cent of their productive capacity. They had to eat?or, as the term goes, "lock. in"-15 million bar- rels a day. The great miracle of 1975 is that the OPEC countries paiSsed the test. They sustained prices (at a basic level of about S10.50 for the marker crude) all through the year by huge cutbacks in production. Moreover, they assigned the cut- -backs not in a crude, across-the-board manner, but in a highly sophisticated way which inflicted least harm on those countries least able to bear pres- sure. Thus the biggest producer, Saudi Arabia, which takes in much more revenue than it can spend, absorbed by far the biggest cut. in production, It locked in nearly 50 per cent of pro- duction in April and well over 40 per cent subsequently. and the misjudgments for which he holds them respon- sible are such that many readers may find it hard to understand how they have survived for so long. The more- recent fiascoes of the political payments in Italy. Bolivia, and Korea, revealed . since this book went to. press,- must only confirm that im- pression. Certainly -politics and diplomacy di) not provide the explanation of the corn: panics' longevity. This lies, unfortunately',- outside the terms of refer- ence he has set himself. The companies have beeu astonishingly successful at finding oil under conditions of every sort in practically every part of the world; ita developing new uses for .it which in turn enabled them. to expand and diversify, and in creating a distribution system that even today most governments feel unable to replace. That is why even so chauvinistic a country France still relies on them 59 years after la u tic (ling an. official policy designed to build up French alternatives, and why they still handle the vast hulk of Middle East oil. Their executives are also for, midable, highly pi-ofeisiuril and sometimes ruthless busia nessmen. who usually manage. to get the best of their rivals. However, within his terms of reference Sampson has pro- duced an exciting and enjoy- able book. Anyone wishing fo- understand how the relation:: Ship between OPEC and the companies has CVO !vetl over the last few-years, and what it means to the consumers, will find this account absolutely fascinating. When it comes to describing a power struggle Anthony Sampson has few masters. with only tiny cuts in production. Thus the second-biggest producer, Iran, which consumes almost all of its oil income in development, cut back its production by only between 15 and 20 per cent. Exactly how the cutbacks were ar- ranged In a way so well caculated to minimize friction among OPEC mem- bers is not known. But it is very clear that the OPEC countries and the inter-- national oil companies were in cello- sion. For example, Armco, a conglom- erate of American companies which runs the Saudi oil industry, decided . on the level of Saudi production each month according to the world market. But the Aramco decisions were subject td the control of the Saudi govern- ment which owns 60 per cent of the company. In this way Aramco com- bined with the Saudi government to make the cartel work. Conversely, American companies did not use their power to break the car- tel. Iran, for example, would have been highly vulnerable to a threat by companies to cut back, say, 90 per cent of their purchases from that coun- try. Under such a threat the Shah would have probably been forced to hook on OPEC that its first resolto Conversely, countries heavily de- break the price and bust the cartel. 11 was in fact 105r Weave 2004/08101k :f4DIANROP77--00i3(2f4010040038010074 tion spoke of the nee(htanapam. "regulation of productiocir"Thil, e penditures were allowed to get by ? suggested by one major American 31 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 ? company. But the State Department discouraged any such counter-cartel actions by the American companies. What all this seems to say is that the Ford administration -- despite much official huffing and puffing? actually helped the cartel raise prices. The OPEC deliberations of last week ? were a kind of charade which made it ? NEW YORK TIMES 28 September 1975 possible fdlr some members?notably the Saudis?to look pro-American. -In fact, the cartel stood together from beginning to end. It will do so again?and to the great damage of the Western economies ? until the United States and other consuming countries come up with an interna- tional energy policy. While there are ? some signs of progress noW, I am reminded that the Saudi oil minister, , Zaki Yamani, once asked me: "Does the United States really have an oil policy?" 1975 Field Enterprises. Inc. U.S. IS SAID TO LAG Assessment ? A Calculus of (C+E+M) (S 4W).. PP stands Canada, China,- Japan, West Strategic Drift," published this for perceived power, C for the Germany and France. ni r week. . "critical mass" of population As for military strength, Mr. sTRAE(pt, i Mr. Cline, a former high of- plus terr:aory. E for econarnic Cline estimates the United " Fic;a1 in the Central Intelligence capability, M for military capa- States and the Soviet Union to Agency and director of intel, ligence in the State Department, Ex-tntellieYence Aide Finds _. has been critical of Secretary . Soviet Purpose Stronger of State Kissinger and has deplored the. impact' of recent Equal on the Basics - . ? ranks the United States slightly . investigations of the intel- Applying this . part . of the ahead of the Soviet Union, with, -- By DAVID BINDER - ligence community. 'Chira North Vietnam, Taiwan,! Specuti to-a-be :Nv:: Y4.:1-??. Times The formula devised by mr. .orinula -.,.i.r. Cline finds that ' " .WASHINGTON, Sept. n _ Cline, now an executive at the the So?7,et Union, the Uniaal North Korea, Pakistan and. Britain following. ! Genrgetosvn University Center States and China have roughly' The Soviet UniOn has twice the It is in the area of strategy; for Strategic and Internat;orial equal coefficients of population and will that Mr. Cline finds, ?."strategic purpose *and will ' to '?' ' ? .. .StudieS- .states that political and territory followed by' the United States seriously' S for strategic purpose be .equal in strategic weapons, and W for will to pursue trailed at a great distance by Britain, France and China. But national strategy. in total military capability he C pursue national strategy" ot power is a combination of more,india, the United States, according to or less measurable quantities:, ? Indonesia, Japan and lagging. He rates the Soviet Union at a coefficient of 1.5 and Ray S. Cline, a retired Amer-'nepulat:on and territory, and? . the United States at 0.7.*.He ican intelligence official who military capability, multiplied, In terms Of economic capa- also finds the Soviet bloc, in- has devised a mathematical-by coefficients of strategicibility, the formula finds the eluding Cuba, to have coeffi-I formula to support his thesis, purpose and the will:to pursu0.1nited States leading the Soviet dents of 1.0 or better. He rates! His formula provides a basisinational strategy. Union by about 12 per cent; West Germany, the Netherlands, fo..r his book, "World 'Power, The formula ? states: PP-trailed at some distance by Canada', Mexico and Israel Muchl higher than the United States in this field. The American Problem In his description the Ameri- can problem is this: "At pres- ent, the power of the United States is declining, not because it has become a weak nation, but because it is strategically muddled and because the num- ber of its reliable allies is de-I .clininga As remedy he proposes "to ? reconstitute a pattern of key !alliances?a kind of latter-day :Athenian League." He-speaks of this- as an ."oceans alliance" ? that. would link the United .States to a core group in which ..he includes Canada, Britain, West Germany, France, Italy? the Netherlands, Israel, Japan,: ITaiwan. Australia and New Zealand. The core of 12 would be augmented, according to -the formula, by a group comprising Mexico, Spain, Iran, Turkey, ,Egypt, Saudi Arabia, India, iPakistani. Indonesia, Singapore, !south' liorea, Brazil, Nigeria land South Africa. The book was published as a paperback by the Center for ,Strategic and International Studies and in hardcover by iWestview Press, Inc., Boulder, !Colo. LONDON TIMES 18 September 1975 -Less Red The new edition of the Encyclo- paedia Britannica, published last year, is to have all 15 of its articles on the 1.5 Soviet repub- lics revised. It is being done after readers complained of a pro-Soviet slant in the articles ?hardly surprising, since they were written by Soviet scholars provided through Novosti, an. official Soviet press agency. In the previous edition the articles on the republics were written by non-Soviet experts. Professor Ronald 1\ilisiunas of Willians College, writing in the Slavic Review, complains that the articles are written from a distinctly Soviet standpoint and do not conform to Western standards of objective fact. In none of them is it stated, for instance, that the Communist i Party s the only political organization permitted. . Warren Preece, editor of the new edition, said: "We are changing that. We are making it perfectly clear in the 'articles that some version of the Com- munist Party is running things, that there is a single party." ? None of the articles reports that: the 15 Republics are con- trolled from Moscow. "I con- cede the possibility of prejudice by omission", said Preece. ? 32 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 NEW YORK TIMES 14 September. 1975 PAIT ?HEW MILTON OaAMER The Drk Side of tural D?nte Le poliftcs of detels a wondrous thing? ? unlng us, as it (km; to believe that the earth is flat?a no less wondrous are the cultural elicies shat have followed in its wake with a promptittatise that can be effected nowadays csly by catnunissars operating on large budgets under government fiat_ The astronauts keep their rendezvous in space, the.Bolshoi mnorms the operas of Prokofiev at . ? Lincoln CenMa,. and the Metropnlitan Museum of Art ? dispatches its prized Old Masters to Moscow. God's in his heaven, you odght say, and all's right with the world! Right? ? Of comae there are isolate cranks, like. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, who, refusing all 'invitations to amnesia, insist on drawing oztain lesnons from. experience, but there is no shortage of Iltatal prartflits eager to discredit them. Between, say, The New Republifs recent attack on Mr. Solzhenitsyn's warnings and the statement by iosonnid I. Brezhnev that . "the Comm.anist party of the Saatiet Union and our Government iatiteve. itnecessaty to support and develop all kinds of cootna?ation which setae to facilitate the strengthening of muttael undersimding and mutual respect among the peoples," there is a perfect unanimity of sentiment. Werie could ask for anything more? Certainly not the Corrimut party off the Soi%at Union. Breah-rav's.,.,tattement is quoted from the Letter that appears as a prefane to thetteandsome catalogue of the exhibition callat "Master Paintings from The Hermitage and The State Russian Museum, Leningrad". opening this week at M. Ithoeciter & Co. Mr. Brezhnev's passion for the t masterworks'esteern painting has heretofore been a well-kept sea--..t. so far as one tza tell, but that is the wonderful tirheg about the politics of d?nte: it brings out all sorts of tenenspecteat tastes in art, science and the humanities. l, not nat....thaps in the humanities, where the requisite octhtsion of sztemory has a certain inhibiting effect, but w-tont- does matter? lot is what counts, eoes ? ? it not? For an exchange ,of Rembrandts, we can be expected to forgive soene of the seamier artdnaa. of Soviet culture. After all, we are ant being naked to stao.d in line to leak at them. Out of ght,. as the saying goes, out of mind. So the ?Cmortach ty,orchased by Nicholas 1, the Tiepolo purchased-by Catherine II and Lhea.. great Picassos and Matisses aCC5-fred by felaose Jewisth bourgeois merchants, Sergei Shchrki.o. and Ivan Moozar, in the bad old days before the Faetatiutiorn are comirg to New York, and .marvelous plettre.s than are. In Itta.shinntori, where these "Master Paireihas" ware shown tatt the National Gallery, they drew a large and apprenotative and the experience is likely to be .ranteated in New \tad:. And after New York, the show travels to Detrota, Los Angees and Houston, where .lines of eageataietvers :ran likewtte be expected. In addition to the. :n0 glorionn paintings by Western masters--Caaareentgio, tt,toussin, Vetaz.quez and Cezarine are among the cat_taz at...hates represented?the show also includes 13 works by Inatatian painters of 'inite pre-Revolutionary era. These cannot *.r_ expecoarl to cart the same spell, but they are not without interest. Flow delightfoL for example, to see Lon Bakstts 5i7;5 portrait of Seratti Diaghilev:Only Efterwards, e:taps, are we ovemorne by sober thoughts about the fate tatese a.51:-.111(1US esthetes would have suffered - if, Like. so inane others., they had tad the misfortune to live long enough ;..tetheir ntent_iive land re experience the tender mercies of Stattans ctaraIpolicies There is, *Ey the way, no representation in this Approved For Release 2001/08/08 exhibition at anything Produced by a Soviet painter since the victory of the proletariat?as they say in the U.S.S.R.? altered the conditions of artistic culture. Lest this omission be mistaken for undue modesty on the part of Mr. Brezhnev's ? government?a body not usually inclined to minimize the achievements pf Soviet culture?it is well to be reminded of t - the reasons for this conspicuous lacuna in a show designed to reflect glory on the Soviet state. ? ?? ? The work of the Soviet avant-garde, which flourished ' In the early years of the Revolution, is still under a rigorous ban in the Soviet Union, and in the period since Lenin first introduced the policies that led to the complete destruction of the avant-garde?some 50 years ago now? Soviet culture, so far as the visual arts are concerned, has -become for the most part a dead culture, tethered to the dictates of the Politburo. Its death is the direct result of the ? kind of murder and coercion finds spelled out in stomach-curdling detail in Mr. Solzhenitsyn's "Gulag Archipelago"?not a book Much recommended by tender- ? hearted partisans of d?nte, but not exactly irrelevant, either, to that "mutual respect among the peoples" we are ' being asked to bear in mind while our eyes feast upon the handiwork of Poussin and Picasso. There are, to be sure, those intrepid "unofficial" artists in the Soviet Union who persist in trying to keep alive the ? idea of a free and independent artistic life, but their work ? Gould scarcely be expected to receive the imprimatur of Mr..: Brezhnev's cultural ministry. So there was little choice, really, in what to send on this mission of "mutual understanding." The selection of masterpieces might vary? there is plenty to pick from in The Hermitage certainly? but it had, perforce, to he confined to paintings that found their way into Russian collections before the blieht of 'Revolution had its profound effect. Amid the undeniable pleasures of the "Master Paintings" exhibition, we might, then, give a moment's thought to what this signifies about .the fate of Soviet culture. .? We are, apparently, to have a great many more of these detente exhibitions. Dr. Armand Hammer, whose "fruitful initiative" Mr. Brezhnev gratefully acknowledges in his catalogue statement, shows no sign of slackening his - activities- in this realm, and neither does Thomas P. F. Hoving, the director of the Met, who sounds positively euphoric these days in speaking about his dealings with Soviet officialdom. It must be a relief, I suppose, for Mr. Hoving to negotiate?commissar to commissar, so to speak ? ?with Soviet ministers after his recent experience with . curators on his own staff. At the opening Of the show of master paintings from the Met in Moscow this summer, Mr. Roving was reported to have said of these Soviet officials: ''There are the best people we at the Metropolitan have ever dealt with outside our own country." What comparisons, do you suppose, he could have had in mind? Perhaps those French officials who refused to suffer in silence when he unilaterally reduced the size of the recent "French Painting" show? Whatever he meant, this is the sem of thing we can now expect to be commonplace in the rhetoric surrounding d?nte exhibitions. The language of diplomacy ha; never been famous for its moral rigor, and Messrs. Hoving and Hammer are not the men to challenge custom in this regard. What we can expect, too, is that nothing in these exchanges will be allowed to cause the Soviet Union the least trace of ideological inconvenience. This means, among much else, that the art in which the Western mind has: made - its deepest avowal of feeling in this. century will not be accorded the Slightest sign of acknowledgement. The principles of detente require us to act is if we too belonged to a dead culture. : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 33 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 WAS/UNION STAR 25 September 1975 Turkey, Snce (re nica By Ralph Joseph Specikol to the Was son Star - TEHERAN, Iran ? Since the comgressional suspen- sion of American arms aid to Turkey and the subse- quent takeover of the U.S. bases in Anatolia? a notice- able softening or Ankara's 'attitude toward the Soviet Union has taken place. There are even some in- dications that Ankara may be ready to negotiate a treaty- for friendship and nonaggression with Mos- cow. The suggestion was first made to Turkey by the Soviet Union in April 1972, when President Nikolai .Podgorm, made :,a state visit to Ankara. The Turks turned down the idea then. When Podgorny flew back to Moscow, all he had to show fed- his effort was a joint declaration between the two- countries to develop . bilateral ties on a .basis of peace,. friendship and good neighborly relations. NEW YORK TIMES, TURKISH officials then pointed out that Turkey's membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- tion made it inconsistent to sign a treaty of friendship and nonaggression with the Soviet Union, but that a joint declaration along the lines of one signed between Russia and France the previous year would be bet- ter. The Russians left it at that for the time being. A year after Podgorny's visit, feelers were again put out by the Kremlin, but once again nothing came of it. Moscow has not since re- newed its efforts. This time the feelers appear to be coming from the Turkish side. Last month, Turkish President Fahri Koruturk took advantage of a tour of ; some Black Sea provinces; to make pointedly friendly' references to "our northern neighbor, the Soviet Union." Reporters covering the tour were quick to point out that Koruturk's remarks were made soon after references by him to the strained relations between the United States and Tur- key. ? THE ISTANBUL daily Milliyet a few days later commented in an editorial that it was not common- place for a Turkish presi- dent to stress the signifi- cance of Turkish-Soviet friendship and to praise Russia: Nor, it said, was it common for a Turkish minister of state to say that Turkey could buy arms from the USSR, and could coor..serate with it in estab- lishing a war industry. The minister had indeed just made such comments. The paper also said that a "deeire to sign a nonag- gression pact with the Sovi- et Union had emerged and was spreading" among Turkish politicians. It is probably too early for 'Moscow to have shown any response, but the expectation is that when it comes, 'the response will be positive. In July the Krem- lin extended a large new credit to Ankara, said to be worth about $700 million. THURSDAY, OCTOBER 2, 19 75 (The exact figure has he reign in illisaO?raem By William Safire WASHINGTON, Oct. 1?America's ihterest. in Franco's reign in Spain falls mainly on the planes?that is, the air and !naval bases we have been renting, whcze leases are now being renegotiated. The world7s interest in. Spain these days centers .on the execution of five terrorists, including two Basque sepa- ratists, convic.ted by a military court of murdering policemen in the course of bank holdups. General Franco evi- dently decidsti that one way to dis? courage cop-killing was to put a handful of cop-killers in front of a firing squad. The world little notes nor long re- members the stern rnea..,-mres used be- hind the Ircm Curtain to "repress" killers of przblic ? officials. No voices are raised in. the Linite.d Nations to demand an accounting of the death ,pain march ordered by Cambodian Com- munists. No ambassadorS are with- drawn to protest the absolute termina? tion of press freedom in Saigon. But General Franco is a Fascist, not a Communist, dictator, and an \aging ?one at that. That's why his stern re- sponse to the murders of a score of policemen so far this year, including three*yesterday, met this international ? reaction: *Fifteen ambassadors from Euro- pean countries, including the entire ESSAY Common market, were recalled from Madrid or kept home. o Mexican President Luis Echeverria, with no relations to break off, found a way to express his rage by cutting off postai communications with Spain. o The Vatican, hardly a leftist re- doubt but conscious of the need to 34 apparently not -yet been established). This loan offer reportedly came from the Russians when a Turkish delegation was in Moscow ? earlier in the year seeking a much smaller credit. The Turks were surprised by the Russian response but gratefully accepted. THE RUSSIAN offer ap- peared to be a respone to the U.S. Congress which had had cut off about $200 million in military and eco- nomic aid to Turkey for fis- cal 1975 in February. ALL THE WHILE the Soviets have been wooing the Turks, their stand on Cyprus has been softening. Before Podgorny's visit in 1972, the Kremlin's friend- ship gestures through eco- nomic aid seemed to be consistently ruined by a hard line on Cyprus. ? It's pro-Makarios stand invariably angered the Turks, and Moscow even called for Turkish troops to leave the island, though both Greek and Turkish troops were stationed there, along with British forces, under the tripartite agree- ment between Turkey, Greece and Britain. At the time of Podgorny's visit Moscow merely called for a solution of the Cyprus issue by direct negotiations between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots. establish-a footing with the people who will come after Franco, expressed its displeasure after the Spanish Gov- ernment would not heed the Pope's ? plea for clemency. What can we learn from this? And - what should our own reaction be? ? The first lesson is that solemn dec- larations not to interfere in the "inter- nal affairs" of sovereign nations are hogwash. Almost every nation feels free to meddle and to moralize, re- strained only by threat of military or economic retaliation. Lesson number two is that leftist leaders are much better at meddling in rightist nations' affairs than vice versa. Sweden's Prime Minister is now contributing money to Spanish opposi- tion groups; he would cry havoc if the Shah of Iran or somebody were to help finance anti-Socialist activities in Sweden. ? Our first reaction should be to rec- ognize the right of any nation to int-, Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001003800074- ? etoSe a death sentence on Murderers a police or prison guards. We may dis- agree on capital punishment but the ? penalty is not beyond the pale of civilized national behavior. ?ext, we should set aside the temp- tation to bedeck murderers with the verbal garland of "guerrilla" or "com- mando" or even "revolutionary." A person who kills another human being in a bank holdup, whether in t,he name of Basque separatism or Synabionese . Liberation, is a murderer. (Radicals change terrorist to "guerrilla" in the same way liberals soften "involuntary" to "court-ordered" and conservatives harden 'involuntary" to "forced.") Does this mean the Government of the United States should continue to say nothing, to hold 'that terrorism in Spain?and the repression it desires and has triggered?is "an internal matter" off-limits to comment, and to keep our eye on the hall of the mill' WASHINGTON POST 30 September 1975 ? tary 'basis? ' ? n - ? ??? t??'' ? ? a ? ? Absolutely not. Fianco's transfer of the terrorists' trials from civil courts to military courts was wrong, and we should say so. The principle of sum- mary execution, without the right of appeal, is abhorrent to our idea of justice, and we should make our opin- ion known. Only when a state provides an individual with a fair trial can it claim the right to put the guilty to death. Secretary Kissinger would say that's all-Well and good, but to speak up would jeopardize delicate negotiations. Not necessarily so: A statement of our beliefs, including a unique emphasis on the tragedy visited on the families of the dead policemen, could-be fash- ioned- in a way that would not be unwelcome in Spain. An honest and reasonable statement by the U.S., especially at a delicate , moment, is important for our own self- 'respect as well as our image abroad. This is sneered at as moral poatiring by the power pragmatists on the: seventh floor a State, but unless they make some obeisance to international morality, they will be faced with the practical problem of a grand agree- ment and no Congressional approval. America is against terrorism and ? against mindless overreactions to ter- rorism. Saying so now requires some courage, some diplomatic finesse, and may cost Us a few million dollars on our air base leases. Standing for some- thing in the world is worth both the trouble and the mopey. .? We could become the only nation in the world consistent in applying a measure of moral pressure on dic- tatorships of -both left and right. If Mr. Kissinger persists in looking the other way, he will discover, as the embattled General Franco has, how foolish it is to -put all your Basques , in one exit Executio ns in Spain THE WORLD UPROAR over the execution of five convicted terrorists in Spain is entirely the result of a characteristic political decision by Generalissimo Francisco Franco. By responding to agpeals to commute those death sentences, he could have ridden out the . European left's storm. But he apparently calculated that a stern display of executive will was required to stabi- lize Spain in this the terminal stage of his rule. Thus did he assure that a far wider spectrum of opinion in Spain, in Europe and elsewhere would join the outcry and that the object of protest would spread from the ?xectt- lions to the whole fact and manner of Spanish fascism. The five, convicted by military courts under a new law denying- appeal, had chosen violence as a political meth- od to provoke state repressions and hasten the disinte- gration of the old order. General France's harsh over- reaction plays directly into their hands. - At 82 General Franco cannot last forever, and at his death the archaic Spanish political system is bound to start catching up with the forces that have been helping modernize the country's economy and its foreign out- look in recent years. In this sense, the terror which has been so prominent in Spain-12 police officers have been killed this year; the prime minister was assassi-? nated in 1973?is not aimed so much at ending his rule as establishing a position to participate in the political changes sure to come. With that in-mind, one can only express astonishment at some of ,the protests that have rolled in. Sweden's Prime Minister Olof Palme, for instance, so fervent in denunciation of American inter- CHM STIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 30 September 1975 Difficult negotiations for the renewal of America's bases deal with General Franco are now in their eteeenth month. Here is a backward look at some of the quirks and crises that have characterized 22 years of military collaboration between the United States and authoritarian Spain. Madrid In 1959 a member of the House Armed Forces Committee visiting American military installations in Europe got a rude jolt when he came to Spain. vention in Vietnam-, now proposes his own- intervention; he intends to donate. $46,000 to Spanish opposition groups with a view to ending the rule of "satanic mur- derers." Mexican President Luis Echeverria, who as interior minister a few years ago commanded the police accused of killing more than NO unarmed demon- stratingtstudents, at once cut off postal and communica- tions ties with Spain and demanded its expulsion from the United Nations. The moral selectivity of the inter- national left can be a wondrous thing to behold. As for the United States, President' Ford yesterday had his press secretary make a statement evoking all the compassion for human life and all the feeling for justice that you would expect from a government that is currently negotiating a renewal of Jhe American bases agreement with Madrid. Secretary of State Kis- singer, well known for believing that a gnat power cannot afford to bend to public breezes, is due to meet again with the Spanish foreign minister today to con- tinue the negotiations. Mr. Kissinger should quickly get himself a cold. Nothing new or surprising about the Franco regime has been revealed by its latest harsh -response to its tormentors. No new factor has arisen, in our view, to alter the strategic grounds on which the bases agreement has been made. in due course, the negotiations should go forward. But it is an affront to too many Americans, and to too many good Spaniards, for the United States to be doing business as usual With Generalissimo Franco at the very moment when the smell of blood is in the air. U.S.: the strain in Spain By Richard Mourrer to discover that the defense agreements signed in 1953 prohibit the flying of the Stars and Stripes over the American-built bases here manned by 10,500 U.S. airmen and sailors. - "I urge you, Mr. President," Congressman Kowalski cabled Dwight Eisenhower in Wash- ington, "as Commander-in-Chief of our great nation, to initiate steps to restore to our righting men in Spain the right and privilege Frank Ko A e214*.twedifettecR4mie z as was one on other American-manned - see But nothing happened, and the prohibition remains. Never in the 17 years since the bases became operational has the American flee been permitted to fly over them, not even alongside the colors of the host nation as is done in other countries where the . U.S. maintains a military establishment. Not even on Independence Day, wryly dubbed by some Americans here as."the Furtive Fourth." Nor was the Stars and Stripes flown at half-mast in Fr ?ImMZfillitrIleftegiltSbdig2FtedelifV806117e9a) Eisenhower's Passing Congre=nan 35 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 military bases around the world. Spanish pride and sensitivity about anything that might seem to infringe on their country's sovereignty is not the only reason for the American flag ban. Gibraltar is another. The strategic Rock on Spain's south coast was wrested from Spain by the British 271 years ago and the Union Jack has fluttered over it ever since. For many Spaniards this is an affront that makes them extremely touchy about any foreign military presence on their soil, with or without their consent. ? ? . From the start. of the Spanish-American association the Americans have leaned over backward to avoid jarring Spanish susceptibi- lities ? and those of Franco's authoritarian regime. Strict censorship rule.s were drawn up by U.S. officials for the American Forces Radio at Torrejon Air Base. The basic aim was to avoid broadcasting news items about Spain that the Spanish authorities had censored out Of their own broadcasts. A "sensitivity briefing guide" was compiled by the U.S. military which said, among other things: "References to dictatorship should he avoided. Be especially wary of comparisons between dictatorship and freedom." On one occasion Torrejon radio slipped up and was reprimanded for having broadcast a thriller set in a fictitious Spanish-speaking country in which the word "dictatorship" cropped up, EIN YORK TINES 1 October 1975 MUCH TORTURili J "illiES (ATP') The American military's self-cemaorsh, led, on occasion, to elaberate contortions to avoid connecting some event with Spain. In 1967 the former premier of the Congo (new Zaire) living in exile in Spain was kidnapped and flown to Algeria, where he passed on in captivity. Torrejon radio reported: "Tshombe had been living in exile and the country he had been living in may consider the kidnapping a breach of its sovereignty." Since then the Franco regime's control of. Spain's information media has eased and the Americans' self-censorship has followed suit. But by and large Torrejon continues to steer well clear of Spanish political news. The American bases complex in Spain took two years to negotiate and five years to build. Total cost: $395.6 million. When the job was done $30 million ?worth of construction equip- ment was given to Spain. Most of the installations have gradually ? been handed over to the Spanish so that today the American military presence in Spain is concentrated at Rota and Torrejon. In 1'54 Rota was expanded to serve as a base for U.S. nuclear submarines. The air base at Moron was put on caretaker status in 1970. Zaragoza was also closed down. but later partially reactivated so that United States Air Force planes stationed in northern Europe, deprived of a fair-weather gunnery range in Libya, could use Spanish facilities as a substitute. lids, ethnic origin or Mr. Jones and Mr. Wisser in- tettviewed 15 torture victims?a "comparatively high number, in ' L./ View of the prevailing fear of reprisals in the Basque region," said Amnesty International? and. 30 witnesses to the torture of others. Additional testimony ilvas taken from lawyers whose clients asserted they had been tortured in jail. : The investigation was carried out ?during the. last days of a three-month "state of excep- tion"?imposed after the killing if four policemen by the Basque separatist organization .--that suspended certain civil -rights in the Basque provinces of "Vizcaya and GuipUzcoa. . The report did not name any of those who said they had been tortured or had witnessed torture: It declared that every 'victim who gave testimony for .the Amnesty International re- port had been subjected to at least one daily session of in- terrogation and torture, and some to as many as five a day.' Interrogation sessions lasted ,from half an hour to six hours, according to Amnesty interna- tional and one victim asserted that he had been tortured 30 times in 21 (lays of imprison- ment. Aged 17 to 72 ? Amnesty international Tells of 'Findings in Spain Special to The 'Vole Times , LONDON, Sept. 30?Basque prisoners have been tortured "on a massive scale," an Am- nesty International report said today. The report said that a two- man mission that visited Spain in July received "personal and direct evidence" of the torture of ? 45 Basques and "credible and, convincing evidence" that torture was used systematically against at least 250 detainees. The 24-page report said that Basque prisoners were severely beaten, burned with cigarettes, nearly drowned, prevented from sleeping and subjected to psy- chological stress through mock executions, sexual threats and -threats to relatives. The evidence was compiled by- Thomas Jones, a lawyer from Washington, D.C., and Bu'rkhard V.7iser, a West Gar- man professor of philoaophy. AMnesty International is a Lon- don-based organ iZa don that cat,npaigns for the aelease of persons detained because of their political or religious be- ? The ages of the 45 victims whose cases were covered by first-ha nd evidence ranged from 17 to 72 years, but many Throughout 22 years of a military partner- ship Spanish-American relations have gener- ally been good, but on two occasions things got rather strained. The first, crisis was in 1965 when a 3-52 armed with four H-born5s crashed. on the south coast of Spain. The unexploded.' bombs were recovered, one of them from the sea. But thereafter Spain banned U.S. planes armed with nuclear weapons from flying over Spanish territory. Another crisis developed during the Mideast war of 1973. The pro-Arab government of General Franco announced that the bases in Spain would not be permitted to be Used "in any way, directly Or indirectly," in operations related to the Middle East conflict. But U.S. Air Force tankers based at Torrejon never- theless took off and refueled planes bound for Israel somewhere over the Mediterranean. The United States has furnished $3.2 billion in economic and military aid to Spain as the price for using the bases here. Now General. Franco is asking for a lot more: $1.5 billion in ? sophisticated military equipment over the next five years. The price is high because Franco has been unable to get from the United States what he really wants: a full-fledged military alliance, which would require the approval of the U.S. Senate. Mr. Mowrer is the Monitor's special correspondent in Spain. were in their 20's. - The women torture victims, of' whom there were 11 inter- Viewed, 'were so sadistically beaten and humiliated that it. was not easy for them to come forward," the report said. "They :told of sexual.' threats, Including sterilization, of being made to walk naked in the police station." . Several of the men spoke -of having a pistol put to their 'heads and the trigger pulled on a blank cartridge. One matt broke his leg while trying to escape and was tortured by having the broken limb twisted. ? The report said that Spa's. three -main police forces?the regular armed police, the para- military civil guard and the special security police--collab- orated.. in the torture of the Basques. "The torture and oth- er acts of official intimidation," the report said, "were aimed not only at dismembering the separatist organization but at Undermining its support and at discouraging aspirations to BaSque autonomy. ? Amnesty International ap- pealed to the Spanish Govern- ment, to investigate the report's findings. It asserted that tor- ture of political detainees was not confined to the three month's of the state of excep- tion or to the Basque region. ? . Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 - _ ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDPi7-00432R000100380007-9 NEW YORK TIMES . 27 September 1975 Some in Cairo Now Feel taae. ? ment that deliveries - of Per-I ishings could not begin before the early nineteen - eighties, K struck Egyptians as Ominous, issinger Misled 'Them Irather than reassuring: It was! !: seen as a sign that the United States and Israel both remained convinced that a state of war would still exist 10 years from now. "Thas makes a mockery of Kissinger's step - by - step ap- proach," an Egyptian said. ? More Spending on Arms The issue goes to the heart of the considerations that have led Egypt to accept Mr. Kissin- ger's step-by-step diplomacy. It is taken for granted here that Egypt, the most powerful Arab nation, must always match Israel's. armaments. If jsrael is slated to receive Per- shing missiles the Egyptian Government will try to get comparable weapons somew here. 1 As a result, it wilt be impos?i -sible for President Sadat tol reduce military expenditures and shift resources to civilian reconstruction and rehabilita tion, Egyptian officials say. They add that it was precisely the hope of being able to turn to civilian tasks that led Pres- ident Sadat to accept American mediation and American offers of economic and technological assistance. The feeling here is that the burden on the United States to prove its friendship for Egypt is greater than ever. Mr. March in a bitter Mood. recalted the summer of 1956 .when Secretary. of State John ? ? By HENRY TANNER ea'.1 Speetall to The. New York Times ..c.AIRO, Sept. 26?Some lead- :ingiEgyptiart officials have be- gun to express great bitterness .ciwer the attitudes taken by thee United States and Israel; since the conclusion threei weeks ago of the Sinai disen- gagement agreement. Some of these men are said to feel that Secretary of. State Kissinger misled the Egyptian tegbtiators by rmt telling them 'Verhad promised that Washing- steniwould sympathetically con- sider supplying the Israel's with Pershing missiles. The Pershing,s, with their rkrite of about 44) miles; would ,piltr the Aawan dam as well aseCairo within firing distance of the Israelis. They have be- cw_e -a pyschologicaI and poli- tical symbol here. Assurances Unconvincing Egyptian officials knew that large quantities of powerful and advanced American wea- pons would st conclusion of the agreement. But the Per- shings, in the view of these NEVI YORK TIMES 2 Oct. 1975 officials, constitute a dramat c move for . quality of American .weapons for Israel. American assurances that they will not be equipped with nuclear war- heads are unconvincing here. Arab critics of President An- wain el-Sadat of Egypt take it.a,sa confirmation of their belief that the United States, never be "evenhanded'? in the-Middie East and that Mr. Sadat's move to associate hini, self:. with WashingtonWas wrong-. -eyed Marei the Speaker the National Assembly ,and one of O'iraSadat's closest intimates, suggested in a conversation the other day that the only possible way the United States could correct ':the damage done to Egyptian eArnericare ? relations would be to provide Egypt with similarly powerful American weapons as well as with much greater and more visible finely; cial and technological assis- tance than is now contemplat- ed. Even the Pentagon's' state- DISP.111E FLARES ON MIDEAST LEAKS. Some U.S. Aides Say Secret Documents Were Modified to Trace Disclosure 'I3yLESLIEILGELB Spedal toTtrNzrs Tock limes WASHINGTON- Oct. 1?High Administration eilcials said to- day that the Stat.le Department, before giving congress secret documents about United States assurances to Israel, had made stylistic changes to be able to trace future Leaks to the press. The officials saki the do- cuments; as published by vari- ous newspapers two weeks ago. had a nuraherrng system and a style that ware unique to .the copies that lad been con- fidentially orovialed to Congres- sional committees. Therefore the leak must lave been on Capitol Hill, tie'; contended. The charge was promptly de-. tiled by Jack Anderson, the columnist, who first obtained the documents.. from Capitol Rill," he said in! a telephone interview. "They came from the State Depart- Intent Is In Dispute Two officials said that, before the documents were transmit- ted to Congress, they were r-e typed to change the numbering of various sections and to make stylistic changes. The purpose was to be able to trace leaks, they said. "The documents that Ander- son obtained could only have come from the Hill because that was the only place the documents existed in that form," one of the officials said. When asked about this today, a high State Department offi- cial acknowledged that the do- cuments, as leaked, were unique to Congress, but be in- sisted that thealterations were inadvertent and no effort had been made to trap Congress. He said that because of a clerical error, one sentence had been omitted from one. do- cument titled "Mernorandumof Agreement Between Israel and the United states." He said a secretary, in typing the do- cument, had left out one point- of agreement and tins, in Wen, led to the renumbering of the . "The documents did not cone sections. 'Foster Dulles Withdrew his 'of- fer of American help in building the .Amsayan dam, and opened the way for the Russians to do so, starting a 15-year period of Egyptian dependence on Moscow. Israeli attitudes since conclu- sione, of the., agreement have ..alSo., tt ern eS.a. here. 5-'Foreign Minister Ismail Fah- my, one of the chief negotia- tors, said in a conversation, that Egypt had regarded the agreement as a test of Ameri- can and Israeli intentions and that the result had been nega- tive on bath counts. I The stationing of American ltechnicians in Sinai, he said, !could have become' the begin, ning -of --a, new. _approach be. Israel , .and- the' 'Arabs to the" I issue ? of their mutual security ;because it gave them an alter- native to an arms race. Instead, he charged, Israel has gone ahead with her past policies as if nc.thina had , changed. Her shopping list, in- !eluding the request for Per- !shines, showed she still had ,an insatiable appetite for arms, he said. ? Second, he charged, the -IS: raeli Government ch .reM, . the days after the conclusion of The agreenientto,annourice that it would build a new kibbutz Ion Egyptian territory in Sinai I just south of Gaza. This, he added? showed that !Israel had no intention cf relin- quishing the territory she occu- pied in 1967 even though both :sides are ?riedged to regard the !new agreement as a step to- ward a full settlement. Several Papers Altered lie said the missing point was subsequently provided to Congress. But the other Admi- nistration officials insisted that changes had been made in more than one document. A Senate aide said the do- - curnents published by Mr. An- derson could not have been unique to Congress since the State Department typed these documents in the first place and must have retained copies. "They could have leaked their own doctored version," he ad- ded. Senator Dick Clark, an Iowa Democrat on the Foreign Rela- tions Committee, commented: "If it is true that the do- cuments were intentionally al- tered. I can't imagine that it will do too much to iestore a coopeative spirit between the two branches. - "It will oniy exagerbate the present situation because it re- veals distrust." who denied that the alterations had been intentional said it had never been the practice of Secretary of State Kissinger to play this kind of game with Congress. A former Under Secretary State, George W. Ball, saia of State, George W. Balt, said Democratic administrations had never coded documents sent to Congress. "I can't recall any time we ever did this and I doubt we did," he said. "And I had two presidents who were concerned about leaks. Our problem was leaks within the Administra- tion, not on Capitol Hill." The documents in question are the memorandum of agree- ment ibetween the United States and Israel, assurances from the United 6tates Government to Israel, assurances from the United 6tates Government to Faypt, and a memorandum of agreement between the United (Oates and Israel on the Geneva . peace conference. Approved For Release 2001/08/013 : Etris0519YrSlalliiitAIS Otr3131PRTT:9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 NEW YORK .TIMES 26 September 1975 JORDANIANS SEM B't MISSILE AFFAIR Ofticials,ComplainAboutU.S. Treatment in Deal for Hawk Batteries . By TERENCE SMITH Specbi. to The New Yee, Times AMMAN. Jordan, Sept.. 25 ? The compromise worked out last week to break the crisis ? over Jordan's desire to purchase 14 batteries of Hawk antiair- craft missiles illustrates the problems that arise from the United States policy of trying to influence both sides in the Arab-Israeli dispute and the delicacy of Jordan's position in trying to appean to her Arab neighbors as more than a client of the United States. The 5350-million Jordanian purchase from the United States. seemed gayety imperiled last Thursday when the Jordanian Government angrily denounced the restrictions on the deploy- inent and use of the missiles imposed by the Ford Adminis- tration at the demand et pro- Israel force.s in Congress. A 'formal Amman Government statement attacked the condi- tions of the sale' As "unique and abusive of Jordan's national - pride." But just 24 hours later the State Department announced in Washington that the "misunder- standing" had been cleared up ? and the deal would go through. This ISO-degree switch, the sources said, came about as the result of a face-saving formula under which it was agreed that the actual purchase contract would not include the restric- tions on the use of the missiles demanded by the pro-Israel ele- ments but that King Hussein's Government Would Make simi- lar pledges separately and privately: . Promises Already Made. The pledges include promises King Hussein had already made in a letter to leading Congress- men in which he explained that the missiles would be used in fixed installations to protect the? capital, array camps in nearby Zerka and air bases and airports in the heart of the country. ? Under the, agreed formula Jordan will he able to contend to her citizens and fellow Arab states that there are no strings: attached to the sale agreement. whiie the United States will 'still receive the assurances it ? sought. This formula was apparently harnmered out in hurried. ,meeting last Thursday night between United States Ambas- sador to Amman, Thomas R. Pickering, and Jordan's Pre- mier, Zaid al-Rifi, although the United States Embassy here de- clined to confirm this or dis- cuss the incident. ? Jordan's threat throughout the summer - long controversy over the Hawk sale was that if the United States refused to meet her air defense needs, she would turn to the Soviet Union. It' now seems clear that the deal will go through . and that this will not happen, but re- liable Jordanian sources said today that the Government would probably seek supple- mentary air-defense systems from European suppliers. It Strained Relations In any event, the "tempest over the Hawks," as one Jor- danian official put it today, has left the Government here smart-' Mg over what is regarded as a humiliating and, unnecessary episode. An element of strain has been injected into the tra- ditionally friendly Jordanian- American relations - and left King Hussein and his top advis- ers with deep doubts about the value of Administration com- mitments that must run the gantlet of the pro-Israel forces in Congress before final ap- proval can be reached. "We were stung by this ex- perience," Jordan's Information Minister, Salah. Abu Zeid, said lit an interview in his Amman, office today. ? "What, after all, do 14 Hawk 'batteries really amount ? to?" He continued, adding: "They are the bare minimum we need to protect our capital and air- ports. And they are nothing compared with what yew pro- vide Israel with in arms every year." - From the Jordanian point of view, it was, deeply insulting to have an agreement reached. in principle in late 1974 blocked as a result of the efforts of the pro-Israel lobby in Congress. The Original Request The Jordanians originally asked for 24 batteries of Hawks When they first raised the pos- sibility of buying them two and a half years ago, reliable sources reported here. The number 14 was reached by a Defense Department team that came to Jordan early this year to study both her requirements and her ability to absorb the complicated systems. When the Administration proposed this to Congress this summer, however, it created an uproar. Numerous Senators and Representatives protested on the ground that the sale would equip Jordan to enter a future war against 'Israel with relative security against the Israeli ? Air Force. The Jordanians denied that this was their purpose and pointed out. that Jordan was the only country in the region, Israel included, that lacked a modern air-defense system. NEW YORK TIMES 28 September 1975 ARABS WARN U.S. ON AID TO ISRAEL Groups at U.N. Says Arms Will Endanger Mideast By PAUL HOFMANN Spedal to The New York Times UNITED NATIONS, N.Y., Sept. 27?The Arab League ; warned the United States today that moves to supply Israel with large quantities of ad- vanced weapons, including mis- siles, were endangering peace in the Middle East. "The Arab states are follow- ing this situation with grave concern," said a statement made public today. "This sup- ply of further, offensive arms NEW YORK TIMES 29 September 1975 $adatSays Experts From U.S. Helped Israel in '73 War .! CAIRO, Sept. 28 (UPI)?Pres- ident Anwar el-Sadat said to- day that American technicians had helped Israel in the 1973 War. He said that he had accepted -the cease-fire ending the Octo- ber war with Israel when the United States sent technicians a7nd new weapons into battle against Egypt and the "Soviet Union was on my back." Mr. Sadat spoke at a meeting of parliament and the Arab So- cialist Union, the country's sole nolitical party, to observe the fifth anniversary of the death of President Game! Abdel Nas- ser. When I accepted the cease- WASHINGTON POST 19 September 1975 India Scores Criticism By Ford ? Vs= 'News Dispatches NEW DELHI, Sept. 18?The Indian government sharply criticized President Ford to- day, saying that he has no business commenting on In- dia's internal, affairs or crit- icizing Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's takeover of emer- gency powers. "It is amazing that the Pres- ident of the United States has chosen to comment on the in- ternal affairs of a friendly country without due apprecia- tion of the issues involved," a Foreign Ministry spokesman by the United States to Israel will lead 'to condolidation of Israel's continued occupation of Arab territories and her con- tinued denial of the nationa. rights of the Palestinian. people." , ? The statement added that the new American weapons would "encourage Israel ward a new aggression, as well: as maintaining her expan7; sionist policies?' The warning for Washingtoni was unanimously adopted at: day of . foreign ministers and other officials of the 20 coun-i tries of the Arab League. The: group has permanent observere status at the United Nations.: Representatives of the Pales-: tine. Liberation Organization,1 the guerrilia movement thati ilso has permanent observeri status at the world oreaniza-i tion's headquarters, parcipat-i ed in the session. .1 fire on Oct. 22, 1973?and I' Want our brothers in the Syrian Ba'ath party to hear this?I was facing both the Americans and the Jews," Mr. Sadat said. ? 'Entered the Battle' a, "America with its strength And its new weapons that had never 'before left the United States," he said "They brought the weapons and experts and entered the battle in the days of the breakthrough." This was a reference to the Israeli move cross the ? Suez Canal. "Just as America and Israel were in front of me, the Soviet -Onion was on my back." the President said. "The air bridge' which brought in weapons was; bringing weapons that should; have been delivered in..1969." Mr. Sadat said that the Rus-I sians had flooded Syria with! weapons after his. decision to atespel Soviet advisers ,frorai Egypt in July, 1972. said in* a prepared statement approved by the government.. The rebuke, the strongesti aimed at the United States since the emergency was pro- claimed June 26, was directed at Mr. Ford's remarks in an in- terview Sunday ?with three re- porters. It marks a sharp shift in gradually warming U.S.-Indian relations, with the United States planning to resume de- velopment aid to India?cut off since the 1971 IndiaTaki-; stan war----and Mrs. Gandhi at- i tending a small dinner party; at the U.S.. embassy in New Delhi. In his interview, President Ford said that Mrs. Gandhi's recent actions represent very sad development, and I hope that in time there could - be a restoration of the demo - 38 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 " Approved For Release 2001108/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007=9 eratie protesses as we know them in the United States." He also indicated that he is unlikely to visit India this year, as scheduled. "We have a very full slate between now and January he said. The Indian statement ac- cused the Pri&ident of over- stepping diplomatic p?ropriety, and added that India :Iliad re- WASHINGTON POST 21 September 1975 Jac k Aildi,Yrson frained -from. Making. Similar comments about America. "There are many aspects of the internal politics of the United States on which it is possible to comment, includ- ing the situation of civil liber- ties and the extra-ordinary powers exercised by the exec- utive in certain circum- stances,". the statement said. tee.. eace Price: The closer Congress scrutinizes Sec- retary of State Henry Kissinger's Mid- dle East. peace pact, the louder the grumbling growa, particularly over the price tag and those 200 American "technician's." As it turns out, from secret State De- partment briefings of senior lawmak- ers, the American taxpayers will be asked to provide well over $15 billion in aid to Eept and Israel during the next five years. And the -200 U.S. peacekeepers, ac- cording to intelligence sources, will likely include "retired" CIA agents, an invitation to eenti7oversy no matter how good a job they do in the Sinai buffer zone.- Before the agreement can be put into effect, of anurse, the lawmakers must approve the stationing of techni- cians between fate two hostile camps. And a half dozen committees or more will get a crack at one phase or an- other of the firs-year $15- billion aid package. But this has nat made Congress. any more corafortahle with the interim agreement. Seine of the legislators we queried in the mist few days were wor- ried that there is still more "fine print" or "oral understandings" to come. For example, last week we revealed that President Toed and his wizardly Secretaey of State., have virtually prom- ised the lasaelts spanking new F-16 fighters and Pershing missiles. The missiles can reach targets 460 miles away and can easily be- equipped with nuclear warheads. Other portions of the secret accords have been priventely- disclosed to a few chairmen and ranteing members of cnmmittees in betea the House and Sen- ate, but younger members have been kept in the dart both by the adminis- tration and their own chairmen. Sonic lawmakers have even stopped US in the hails el Congress and fumed, "How eerie you find out about these thir as before vie do?" WASHINGTON POST 28 Septemer 1975 e "But the accepted. "-norms- and curtesies of internation- al relations do not permit of- official comments from out- side." All actions taken under the state of emergency have been taken within the Indian consth tution, the statement said, noting: "Every society takes measures to protect its stabil-' In this wavering economy: every mil- lion in foreign aid counts, and Kis- singer and his public relations men have been citing the figure of $2.3 bil- lion in economic and military aid for 'Israel and 400 million as the outer limit for Egypt. ? But at an executive session of the House International Relations Commit- tee, members were told that these fig- ures are bound to rise in coming years. By putting together these projections, congressmen quickly came up with a. five-year figure of welt over $15 Wi- liam The priee of one. portion of the. Is- raeli aid package is bound to soar. About $400 million of the money prom- ised to Israel is in compensation' for ? the oil they will lose next year by sur- rendering the Abu Rudeis oil fields - back to Egypt. Such payments will continue for all five years. Since the price. of crude is going nowhere but up, the American contribution for Israel's lost ellis cer- tain to follow suit. In addition; Ford and-Kissinger have given the Israelis an ironclad, written guarantee that they will be supplied ? with oil until at least September 1980. According to the secret accords, Is- rael is expected to "make its own inde- dependent arrangements for oil . . ." However, if they are unsuccessful for any reason, the documents state, "the United States government will promptly make oil available..?' In the event of an oil embargo, the Secret agreements imply, Israel would be supplied with oil from American stockpiles. Kissinger further vowed, if necessary "to help Israel secure the isecessary means of transnort." Another aspect of the Sinai pact that has created some furrowed brows on - Capitol Hill is the proposal to provide American technicians. Those "technicians," top-level intelli- gence sources confided to my associ- ate Joe Spear, will have very close ties 1:47;:? artid.1 T t 4.1 gr-tvr t-rr j.. - T-7-7 13 -iiii Ai 0 ,- . ri ?,,.4,77, 6-1.11 11 ti ti p ter..,-4-7 0:1 Vc.../-li -I. tt L.d.i.iLiti,.. n.kLi i'vii-, I ' blockinn the new Israeli- i Egyptian accord on Capitol ' Hill. 11, it. '-'? m C, trp1-111-.,:fil . Diploacy often turns on ot,64.3m0000Qa ity and ideals, India no less than the United States." The emergency began with the arrest of reajor non-Com- munist opposition leaders, sus- pension of most civil liberties and the imposition of press censorship, including the ex- pulsion of several foreign journalists. to the Central Intelligence Agency. In- deed, say our sources, many of them will probably be regular CIA employ- ees who will be "retired" shortly be- fore they report for their desert duty. The idea of placing American techni- cains in "early warning" stations was first suggested by Egyptian President - Anwar Sadat at a meeting with Presi- dent Ford in Salzburg, Austria. Concerned that Congress would see the technicians as an echo of Vietnam in the early 1960s, Ford and Kissinger originally balked at the proposal. Sa- dat was eventually persuaded to settle for United Nations personnel. 'Israel, however, adamantly insisted on an American presence. No Ameri- cans, no peace agreement, they de- dared. Kissinger, faced with the awful prospect of once ?again limping back to Washington in defeat, went along. Some key congressmen, however, are convinced that Kissinger is secretly de- lighted with the proposal to put Amer- icans in the Sinai. It forces Congress to put the stamp of approval on his peace pact and thus absolves him of full responsibility if it flops. In fact, say some of the experts we have consulted, the American teelmi- cianseare not needed. Ostensibly, they will be there to give impartial warning of menacing maneuvers by either side. Both the Egyptians and the Israelis, however, will be provided with sophis- ticated American electronic equipment to establish warning stations of their own. From their perch atop a 2.500sfoot prominence known as Umm Hashiba, the Israeli radars will be able to "see" -aircraft taking off in Cairo. The Egyp- tians will have a comparable facility, enabling them to monitor Israeli's huge Sinai air force base at Bir Gif- gafa. The American presence, therefore, will be largely symbolic. In more ways than one, it may prove to be one of the most costly symbols the American public has ever purchased. 01975. putted Feature Svuiate. By Murrey Marder WasSIrkgSon Post Staff Writer A bizzarre controversy I over putting an official t stamp of authenticity on se- -ieset documents that have al- ready been disclosed is r-4 Fte 10644" diA" aal tration critics charge. U.S. officials concede that this appears to be a hair- splitting conflict. In fact, they maintain, it is pro- foundly significant in diplo- matic terms, and unless soon resolved it can wreck the agreement laboriously negotiated by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and du to liegkn taking ef- fite accord, 39 ludicrous lengths, adminis- which, the administration Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 hoped to have cleared through Congress by now, is still stuck in committees. Unlike the other secrecy disputes between Congress and the administration, the central documents in this controversy have been pub- lished in the press. The ad- ministration insists, how- ever, that they must not be published as official records by the Senate Foreign Rela- tions Committee or the House International Rela- tions Committee. To do so, administration officials maintain, will de- stroy "diplomatic confiden- tiality" and "the protection of the diplomatic process." in an attempt to compro- mise, t h e administration submitted to the committees a summary- of the secret documents. The Senate committee spurned the summary as to- tally inadequate. The State, Department has offered to give the committees a fuller anti franker summary. Even this, critics protest, will make Congress look foolish, putting into its public re- ports lesddhan has appeared in the press. Some senators have pro- posed reprinting in the com- mittee report the texts of four documents published in The New York Times, The Washington Post, and repu- bished in ether newspapers, whether the administration likes it or not. Another suggestion in the Senate committee was to print the secret texts "without quotation marks," making them appear to be paraphrases or summaries. "We didn't leak these doe- umentsa'? said one State State Department official. "They .(the Congress) are not going to engage .the ad- ministration in a squeeez One high-ranking official said adamantly: "This goes to the heart of the confiden- tility of the diplomatic process ... We do not in- tend to publicize (the texts) of confidential agreements It is one thing for docu- ments to appear, based on a leak, in the press and there- fore continue to be unoffi- cial. It is something far dif- ferent for us to sanctier 'these documents as official." To comound the problem, administration leaders do not want to specify officially exactly what the distinction is in this case between offi- cial and unofficial disclo- sure. That, they say, would ? only. produce the conse- quences they deem so dam- aging. ? "It should be obviouse_ what kind of repercussions ? there would be," said one- source, especially on the position of Egyptian Presi- dent Anwar Sadat, "who has steadfastly denied that there are any secret agreements." ? When Egypt and ? Israel initialed thre?formal, public text of them few accord on Sept. 1, Sadat's Arab oppo- nents charged he had sold out to Israel and the Unied States at the expense of other Arab ? nations, ? ? Press disclosure of secret American pledges to Israel has exposed Sadat to more stinging attacks, especially over the U.S. promise to give favorable consideration to supplyig Israel with 460- ? ; mile-range Pershing mis- silos, which could . reach many Arab caital.s., ? Any supply of the Persh- lags ds years off, and many U.S. of privately be- lieve' they never will be given to Israel, but that has not prevented a furor over the disclosure.. Many U.S. officials out- side the negotiations regard the promise concerning the ? Pershings as a major blun- der. But the real blunder Kissinger's associates argue, I was unauthorized disclosure of the issue at a sensitive I moment. a Adminitration officials have been surprised by the way the controversy has es- calated. The immediate is- sue before Congress, and the only issue that Congress - is being asked to act -upon, they emphasize, is uthoriz- ing up to 200 American civil- ians to be stationed at elec- tronic early-warning stations between Israeli and Egyp- tian forces .in the Sinai de- sert. "At the beginning," a sen- ior associate of Kissinger said acidly, "everybody was rooting to get the agree- ment. Now that we got the two others to agree. We are in the position of frustrating it ourselves." Before Kissinger even completed the negotiations at the end of August, how- ever, demands were raised for "full disclosure" of all American commitments stir- ? rounding it. "Kissinger later said there was "an unprecedented ef- fort to. put before the Con- gress any American under- taking, to either of the par- ties." He also said, on Sept. 9, that there were consulta- tions With the Senate and House committees to make ?sure that "their definition of what constitutes an under- taking does not differ from curs." "There is, however," said Kissinger, "an area of diplo- macy that no country has ever made public and that does not involve undertak- ings, commitments of the United States." The State Department, he said, was letting Congress see "documents that have never been made available to con- gressional committees be- fore," and will work with the . committees on "an agreed method of publica- tion" that "will be the ful- lest disclosure of a diplo- matic record that has ever been made." All Kissinger's pledges, State Department officials say, have been kept. Nevertheless, Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho) and many other committee members, especially in the Senate, in- sist that the central issue is still public disclosure of se- cret commitments. "I think we've had it to the teeth with secrets," Church said last week. In a letter to .Kissinger last week, Church protested that, "Obligations toward foreign governments are not properly regarded as state secrets," . Two senators, Floyd K. Haskell (D-Colo.) and Mark. ?:rient was being withheld from it. ? To many members of Con- . ? :gress, there was little that was "voluntary" about this process at all; -except timing. ? Under 1972 legislation, stimulated by alarm that the executive branch was by- passing treaty requirements on a wholesale 'basis, and ? committing the United States to overseas involve- ? -meat through executive agreements;Congress passed what is known as the Case Act, named for Sen. Clifford? ? P. Case (R-N.J.). ? This law requires the - -President to transmit to Congress "any international agreement" ? within 60 days 'after it has entered into .force, other than a treaty, which has to be submitted in advance. However?this legislation does specify that the information will be sent. to the Senate and House for- eign affairs committees "un- der an appropriate injunc- tion of secrecy to he re- moved only upon due notice ' from the President." The State -Department's legal adviser, Monroe Leigh, in a letter to the House com- mittee, has acknowledged that two secret memoranda between the United States and Israel (among the four leaked to the press) do amount to "international agreements." One member of the Sen- ate committee, Sen. Dick Clark (D-Iowa) maintains that beyond being an execu- tive agreement, one of the documents virtually amounts to a treaty of alliance and should be submitted to the 'Senate in that form. ? It refers to "the long- standing U.S. commitment to the survival and security of Israel" and calls for con- sultations On assisting Israel if there are "particularly grave threats to Israel's se- curity or sovereignty by a world power." Administration officials contend that this only re- peats what has been said by "five U.S. administrations" in support of Israel. ? In that event, critics counter, why is the adminis- tration so alarmed about the disclosure of the document? Again, U.S. officials con- tend, it is to avoid formally acknowledging what they say are, in many cases, only "expressions of intent" which "leave our options open" as long as they are kept confidential, without the public label of official documents. 0. Hatfield (H-Ore.), yester- day urged the Senate For- - eign Relations Committee to - ? keep up the pressure on the ?'administration, delaying ac- tion on the 200 American ? " technicians "until the ad- - ministration discloses all agreements." An aggrieved high official said on Friday, "This is be- ing put in terms of a secrecy. issue, which it is not." ? "We agree fully," he said, that nothing "should be hid- den from the Congress or the public that involves American undertakings." He e said, "We proceeded in a most extraordinary process ?we voluntarily submitted documents on a classified basis" with "nMmoranda that are not linked to the proposals" for assign- ing American technicians. "We don't have any inten- tion," he said, "of submit- ting these pieces of paper for approval of the Con- gress." Instead, he said, they were only submitted on a agreement" with 60 days aft- -confidential basis to assure. Congress that nothing perti- 40 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010038000/-9 LOS ATIGELES TIMES 21 September 1975 Should BY CHARLES C. DIGGS JR. Despite the increasing strategic im- ? portance of the African ccintinent, this Administration continues to ac- Cord low priority to .that part of the world. U.S. policy, which traditionally has been the by-product of America's re- lations with its NATO allies and its Soviet adversaries, has not kept pace Rep. Charks Diggs (D-Mich.), a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, chaired subcommittee - hearings on Africa. He has visited Africa frequently. with new international realities.. Three principal developments have drastically altered the power rela- tionships of the international commu- nity: --The end of empire in Africa and Asia, resulting in three times as many developing countries as indus- trialized European powers: ?The". nuclear stalemate, which made war between the United States and the Soviet Union unthinkable, reversed the direction of the cold INZ7 and opened up an era of 'detente which included the rehabilitation of the Peoples Republic of China; ?The destruction of the post- . World War II economic order accom- plished in international monetary af- fairs by President Nixon's New Eco- nomic Policy of August, 1971, and the two subsequent dollar devalua- tions, as well as the consolidation of an effective oil producer cartel that , coold manipulate the supply and price of oil. These events have profound impli- cations for U.S. policy toward Africa. In the past, America attenuated its support for liberation of the African continent in order to mollify its Eu- ropean allies whose good graces were required to bolster Western defense against the Soviet Union. Detente has made the continuation of such unnecessary. During the late '50s and early '60s, African, Asian and Latin American countries were viewed as areas of East-West eompe- Howeeer, it became apparent with the Soviet backdown on uni- ? lateral arms supplies to the former Cm:ego in 1960 and 1961 and Krusha chev'e retreat during the Cuban mis- sile crisis in 1963 that the Kremlin woo; not willing to risk military con- frontation with the United States over Havana or Kinshasa. frica olicy As it became clear that the Ameri- cans and Russians had some common political and economic interests that transcended ideological differences, the source of potential world conflict was transformed from that of East- West competition to one of North- South confrontation over internation- al economic disparities between'. rich and poor nations. The need for eco- nomic security and an assured supply of raw materials is more urgent in the aftermath of the Vietnam war. The flagrant waste of American ?re- - sources in that conflict seriously weakened the United States' econom- ic and political position in the world. Hence, the greatest threat to U.S. 'security today is economic and not military. The United States will have to reduce its traditionally Eurocen- tric bias and seek a direct accommo- dation with Africa and the. other developing countries who are the principal suppliers of our raw materi- als. There are several economicreasOns? why U.S. interests dictate an im- ? provement in its relations toward . Africa. Trade bet weerrAfrica ,and the United States nearly tripled between 1.960 and 1970, and reached $4.3 bil- lion in 1973. (Total U.S. foreign trade for 1973 was approximately $140 bil- lion). The African continent has de- posits of all of the world's 53 most important minerals including 96% of? the world's diamonds, 60% , of the gold, 42% of the cobalt, 34% of the bauxite and 17% of the copper. Moreover, Africa supplies 54% of U.S. manganese requirements and the Malagasay Republic -provides 22% of our graphite. In addition, Africa's energy re- sources are diverse and plentiful. Nigeria, the world's sixth largest pro- ducer of crude oil, is the second lar- gest supplier of petroleum to the. United States after Saudi Arabia. Al- geria, Libya, Sudan, Angola and Ga- bon have substantial oil resources and the full extent of Africa's oil and natural gas reserves is as yet un- known. Furthermore, Africa holds 23% of free world uranium. There is a vast, largely untapped potential for investment in the majority ruled states of Africa. In order to improve its relations with Africa, the United States will have to demonstrate greater respon- siveness to African concerns for ra- pid economic development, end its support of minority rule in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa and ac- cord Africa the consideration and sta- ? tus its position in the global commu- nity merits. Paradoxically, while our NATO al- lies, especially Britain, France and Portugal, have admoniShed us to go slow on pressures for ending colonial ?rule in Southern Africa, they have - made an end run and concluded mu- tually beneficial economic agree- ments with African states?such as the recent Common Market accord with 46 African, Carribbean and Pa- cific states signed at Lome, Togo, early this year. They also have taken steps to decrease their support of South Africa. France has announced a modification of its arms sales to ? South Africa. Britain has abrogated the Simonstown agreement wit the Pretoria government, thereby ending special ties to a base once considered vital to the security of the Cape route. Even Portugal has approved the independence of its former terri- tories, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique .and Angola.. Nevertheless, after Por- tugal had conceded the inevitability of independence, the United States was the only country to veto Guinea- Bissau's admission to the World., Health Organization. The United States must begin to reassess its treatment and perception of African states and their leaders. Contrary to popular notions about political instability, about 11 African states have the same chief of state today as at the time of independence. , For such countries as Tanzania, Se- negal, Cameroon and the Ivory Coast, this involves 15 years of continuity. Few if any Arican countries have' been as politically unstable as the Fourth French Republic, Italy or the , post-Caetano government in Ports: gal. Indeed, in those countries that have experienced civil war such as Nigeria, Burundi, Sudan, Zaire and now, Angola, internal strife grew largely out of hostilities resulting - from differential treatment of ethnic- ? groups during the colonial period and have been exacerbated by overt - or covert intervention from abroad.. America would do well to recognize that political instability in Africa re- sults primarily from competition over scarce resources and not an endemic inability of African leaders to rule. African states recently demonstrat- ed that they share common interests with the United States when they ef- fectively blocked an Arab-led move to obtain the Organization of African Unity's support for the expulsion of. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : ClaRDP77-00432R000100380007-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 Israel from the United Nations. ? On the -ele of the seventh United. Nations special session and the 30th ' session of IM?.1.1.N. General Assemb- ? ly, the President and the secretary of ? .? state have an opportunity to begin mending fames in Africa. , Specifically the United States. should: - ?Take concrete steps to stabilize earnings at reamnable levels for African and other developing coun- try's raw triderials. . ?Provide more foreign assistance on better terms to African states. Africa contzens 16 of the 25 least developed alid 21 of the 33 countries most i_zeriously affected by the quad- ? rupling of le prizes. Nevertheless, this year the .A.dnainistration has re- WASHINGTON POST 27 September 1975 quested only $256.4 million in eco- nomic aid to Africa in contrast to the $488.4 million allocated in 1972. ---Take the lead in creating an in- ternational consortium to finance a long-range comprehensive develop- ment program for the Salielian coun- tries and for the other African states seriously affected by the drought.' ?Make a substantial contribution to food production in Africa and oth- er developing countries and maintain contributions to a world food re- serves program. ?Work for the repeal of the Byrd Amendment which allows the United States to buy Rhodesian chrome. If the United Statcannot support majority rule in Southern Africa, it should stop supporting minority rule. I Toward a oenstave ana It has been publicly admitted ?by Secretary. of State Kissinger that the U.S. does nothave a coherent African policy. But it is rants hyperbole to con- elude, as . did Michael R. - Codel- in The Washington Post on September 9, that as long as, the State Department -- remains preoccupied with Middle East- ern Affairs, decisions on our African policy 'will aintinute? to come out of Mnshasa and .Kampaila, and not out of Washington." Mr. Codel obviously holds -no brief 'for the policies of Presidents Mobutu Of Zaire and Idi Amin of Uganda," but. there is- no evidence that these two men, have been able to influence-our non-policies. in Africa. For. :many months now there has -been 'no U.S. Ambassador in Kampala. One may ject to President Amin's actions and pronouncements, but the question- is whether the Witdidra.wal of U.S. repre- ?sentation from Kampala is the ? wise Way to deal with !aim. Has:the -State ?Department nat. yet learned that its most successfiii ambassadors in Afriea. have been men who knew how toeoma bine the role at ambassador with that of instructor in international_ affairs? For many an African chief of state, the activities in Washington' are viewed as bizarre-at is African behavior to many Americans. The skillful -U.S. ambassa- dor insakfrica -ms.Ust. function as inter- preter to both-lxii -countrymen and to. the people to whom be iS--accredited. Failure to do se spellt?titsaster.'.;:- ? s Many-U.S. diplomats now; admit that the Davis- appaintractit as Asaistants Secretary of SWO:lor African Affairs . was a mistake. Although allegedlyt good diplomat. lack e African expert-,' ence is--a serious handicap for anyone .responsible for our Africa policy. Any Foreign Service.htficer who goes tra.Af- rica quickly teallies that the .*hole history of We,tern activities in Afrir.a Influences hisiber work 'in not so-sub' C ? Relaxation of the arms embargo against South Africa and encourage- ment of trade and investment there and in Namibia should cease. U.S. private investment in Nigeria now ri- vals that in South Africa and U.S. policy should reflect this reality. The United States is the last major Western country to seek an improve- ment in its 'economic and political re- lations with Africa. This country should use the ingen- uity it has demonstrated in its China and Middle East policy to capitalize. on the reservoir of African good will toward America. We must reassess African policy in light of the new in- ternational reality of global interde- pendence and the end of bipolarity. . POli6y _ the. Secretary.shimselfs: . been more' sensitive to' African ?pin; ions and- attitudes,: he would haVe rec- ognized the liabilities ? facing ':a.nyone: even remotely associated with out *Chi- : leap policy.:Multiplybi 20:our current concern over the power of the CIA.and one Will understand. the. fear aroused by this agency in the.Third World.: Your guest columnist laments What he considers to be ,'the disproportion- ate' influence of' the Black Congres-:. sional Caucus" given "our_policy vac- uum." Itis, however,' a fact that this group, Which is petentiallY a.useful in- strument for helping America develop a coherent African policy, is only now. being recognized by the administra- tion. Dr. Kissinger must certainly be sgiven a "C" for effort in being the first Secretary of State to give an audience to: this body.. Had the Black Caucus:- ? been as influential as Other non-' elected interest groups monitoring U.S. ,foreign policy, they, and not the African leaders, would have automati- .cally :challenged the Davis: appoint- ment:las detrimental to our relations ? with Africa. However, once the. Aid- - cans .had 'challenged Davis' n.onsina- 7 tion, the Secretary had to. support him.- ? No, strong state cart 'tolerate other states publicly criticizing whom it se- , lects-to conduct its policies.'; ?, The -Secretary. will eventually -Jewett', that the- time-is not Yet -ripe when" the. U.S.' can elaborate a common policy to-- :wards all mankind, Ambassador Carter, , . should therefore 'not be pilloried for; . meshing, a worldwide policy--- against:. ? the reality of-Africa. The mark of a ? brilliant .diplomat is to protect, the lives of-hiS fellow citizens. It is a mark: of failure if he sacrifices them, to. poll.- cies, which; in the:nature..Ofathings, are *fated to change.- Those of us,- who :have?avatched evolution of Dr. Kissinger's attitude ? ' wards. Africa ? since the, beginning . Of- , the .--Nixon administration have- been: --appalled by, its arrogance and naivete . "s masquerading; as-. "toughness" ? arid.? -. "realism?' .Nixthi's Nigerian CivilsWar ? -pOitcy was.:a disaster, our. Portuguese ?. policy unrealistic, ? our Sahelian drought policy miserly, and our South; ,Afilcart policy shortsighted..Equally la inentable has been the- callous atti? tudes of the State Department and the, . White House towards black. Foreign:" Service officers. These all too few per-'1. sons have been so unnecessarily iated that one Wenders whether there, is.- as caltulated . attempt, to. challengtir:: both their devotion to',- their careers,' and their country. Coming. as a sequel,: to .Ambassador Carter's mistreatment - , is the news that another., brilliant offi: cer,- Di: Samtiel Adams, Director .of.: sas USALD's African Bureau; - is being relieved:of hiS' Position just when his approaCh is beginning, to bear- fruits_ One hopes that President Ford will . soon ask his Secretary of *State to -des s velar a sensitive and worthwhile ? can policy. It is unfortunate that Davis is-now:?a . victim of ?America's _hesitation to :des velop a viable policy towards Africa.' It is also. unfortunate that Ambassador Hinton did not have the experience to s surmount the difficulties that. he faced In Zaire. But is it true that. Ambassa- - a dor 111.. Aav6rly'Carter was a victim n of ' II?obUtu's -pique at; the puolicity given tne Popular ,Ilevolutionary -Party? Or dict he-7as a skillful- diplomat who suc- :tes-sfully facilitated the. release of the ?ic?otiPrtmatologists, run. afoul -of Kis- - isInger's rigid policy toward hostages? , sa? P. Franz Boas Professor of Anthrorasletv...? eblumbia Un'v,rslcv? ? Chs, the 13oard nf the African- .? American Scholars Council.- . ruow at the Center for Advanced Study ?.; in the Behavorial SciencAs, 1915-76:.* Former U.S. Ambassador to Uover Volt.a.? Stanford, Calif. 1,t2 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001003800079 DAILY TELEGRAPH, London 16 September 1975 r IAN WARD on-the Corninnn4st, inngle-of-South.East-Ashr- CfOUTH-EAST Asia's militant , o1 e 13 Communist movements have 1? ill Thailand, be tne had their shortcomings, btit failing to signal their ultimate objectives has neve'r been one. - t ? In th South Vietnam e V ifa Viet Cong X min() to fall ? - ?? ? all along wanted victory through armed struggle. Broadcasts, docu- ments, speeches and other propa- ganda stated the fact ad nauseant / ; for almost two decades, -Likewise in Cambodia the Khmer Rouge, long before the Government of Prince Norodom Sihanouk was. toppled, exhorted its 'followers to pursue the glorious revolutionary war to its logical conclusion. A similar pattern was always evident among Pathet Lao in the landlocked kingdom of Laos. That Washington seriously thought she might deflect the Communist tide by agreeing to the 1972 coalition Government in Laos followed by the January 1973 Paris. Peace document for South Vietnam is testament. to the in- ?. credible naivety of liberal Ameri- cans who ultimately decided their country's policy on Indo-China. The two-Fact coalition in Vien- ? tiane plus the stated objective of ? a - government of national recon- ciliation for South Vietnam merely provided the Communists . with text-book conditions for vic- tories. throughout Indo-China. Yet despite the events of the past six months there still persists a wealth of world-wide public opinion?particularly in the United States and Europe?ready to be- lieve that the Communists drive, - having wrapped up Indo-China and SOfilehrne content with the 'results, will now subside. Following in the footsteps of their successful neighbouring com- rades the Communist party of . Thailand awl the Communist party of Malaya have very different views. In clandestine broadcasts both movements have gone to great lengths to underline the import- ance- of armed struggle ? and the need to gain power through it. ? in 'Thailiend., now sharing fron- tiers with Communist nations to the north and east, and considered. by some-observers to be the next- in-line domino, the political mood is of extreme apprehension. -Local political leaders, seeking to defuse public alarm over the possibility of the country's fall to Communism. emphasise the stabil-- ising factor of the kingdom's: unquestionakty respected mon- ' ? archy. They also seek solace 'in the' . fact that Thai history demonstrates -- a nation with an uncanny 'ability , to accommodate others. r But still the rapid fence-Mend- - ! fng ? with Peking following the fall of Indo-China hod all the overtones of a panic move. Aceempanying this came an almillitimenteldicblipppkei that :MST's establishment of diplo- ? matic ties with the Chinese, by counter-balancing Russian influ-, ence in Hanoi, would somehow allay- the disruptive forces suddenly tear- log at the nation's vitals. . The realists have set about stif- fening and expanding harder patrols? troops' along the Cam- bodian frontier and fast river craft along the meandering Mekong to the north and north-east. Security officials n-aw recognised that border ? patrol police, must be better armed.? Aiilitary commanders have step- ? ped up their anti-insurgency war- fare with notable successes in certain areas. But overall, obser- vers are concerned by the incon- . sistant co-ordination, motivation and morale of the Thai Army. Last month's bombing of the national memorial in . Kuala Lumpur together with the grenade ? attack on the capital's police barracks eight days later came after the Communists promised to increase urban guerrilla warfare? throughout Malaysia. As with the assassination .of the nation's police chief last year and . the gunning down since of several Special Branch detectives the cul-? tatty activity 'w.thin the two terri?-?,.. tories in the months ahead. ? The. first of these is that Hanoi, ? so involved with setting her house .Jo order, will not have time for ,. ? further adventures , among her neighbours. Taken a: step further, this envisages a breathing-space Of from five to 10 years during which. time Hanoi and her satellites can , be wooed into peaceful regional co; operation. ? ? ? The second is that the- Sino- 'Soviet split will so divide and corn- ...plicate the Communist world as to - make effective support of regional wars of " national liberation ? vir- ? ? tually impossible. Finally, it is . claimed that as both Thailand and Malaysia have demonstrated an _ adequate capability of containing . Communist activities to this paint 'there is every reason to -believe they will continue to do so. * The. ? ability of Thailand and Malaysia to cope with the expected ? increase in .Communist terrorism, say anti-insurgency experts, can einly_be assessed in the light of two ? varying but dominating factors. - ? These are: the degree of politi- . pnts of these .latest Communist incidents remain at large. Malaysian officials, highly sensi- tive on matters involving internal security, claim that foreign obser- vers place too much emphasis on the nation's military and police shortcomings and not enough on the Government's economic efforts for the benefit of the population at large. But the fact remains that one %vett directed psychological action by the Communists can negate months of well planned economic administration. It is in this context that valid criticism is being levelled at the effectiveness of Malaysia's Special Branch, which has suffered badly over 'recent years. Contrasting .with their ? " all-is- well " facade, Kuala Lumpur leaders recently announced the formation of a country-wide vigilante organisation to guard against crime and Communist sub- version. The Communist party of Thai- land is divided into three -largely ? Rejected theories autonomous military regions locat- ed in the north, north-east and Anti-insurgency experts in both southern sectors of the kingdom. Thailand and Malaysia overwhelm- Top of the Communist Thailand ingly -reject the three most popular hierarchy is thought to be art ethnic theories?ife md against the. l'k " Thai named Charoen "?tintigam, eta-4 26049DBYtY8 --OlistilkftIlb7,74100432E1011/440arla03a9C47-9ecre t a mot: en. cal stability achieved respectively by Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur: and the speed at which Hanoi ? of the region's two primary revo- lutionary sources ? is prepared to push the action. The. two influ- ences will naturally be inter-related and should not be undermined by the fact that Peking, the other centre for revolutionary inspira- tion, will probably emerge ideologi- cally at variance with Hanoi. Some political circles have spec- ulated that as Hanoi has so far failed to expand her involvement among the Thai Communists since her Indo-China victories, then per- haps her attentions are focused elsewhere. Against this the experts contend that they would not have expected the North Vietnamese to gear up for a fully active role within this time-frame. Latest Western intelligence appreciations of both Thai and Malaysian Communist movements show esse,ntially unspectacular; but nonetheless broadening iniraatruc- - tures over the past decade. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 eraL 'Mire is no Permanent central - co-ordinating committed as such; but on occasions that the leaders do meet the venue is usually some- where in southern Laos: Current estimates place full-time insurgents in Thailand's northern , sector, comprising mainly Men soldiers led by Sino-Thais, at 'around 3,650. In the north-east , where ethnic Lai-Thias plus an - assortment of tribesmen are led by Sino-Thais the statistics show some 3,650 insurgents. In the south. ap- proximate/y 1,300 ethnic Thai guerrillas, with a smattering of WASHINGTON POST 30 September 1975 Moslems,' are ?iiT1ed by Sind- 1: Thais. ? ? . On the other hand the Commun, ist party of Malaya,' which split into three rival factions in 1970, concentrate its primary military . effort in the northern regions along the Thai-Malaysia border. The three factions comprise the ald Communist party of Malaya, still led by Chin Peng, the CommuniSt party a Malaya (Marxist-Leninist) and the Cominunist party of Malaya (CPM revolutionary Malaysian intelligence - statistiqs. eaths hi. Cambodia Laid to U,S Policy By Dan Morgan Wtslthlgton Yost Stafi Write: At least 15,(E0 Cambodians died of starvation or malnutri- tion-related diseases in terri- tory .held by the United States-backed government in Phnom Penh in the last four months of war, according to a private study released yester- day. It attributed the deaths to an American policy that fa- vored effOots to sustain the Phnom Penh government mili- tarily over food relief for refu- gees who poured into the be- leaguered capital before it fell to Communist attackers April 37. The 67-page study issued by the Indochina Resource Cen- ter, a nonprofit oroomization that often has criticized ad- ministration poikies in South- east Asia, also challenged offi- WASHINGTON STAR 28 September 1975 dal assertions that the mass evacuation of the capital or- dered by the Communist vie- tors. was. an "atrocity" with a ! potential for causing wide spread famine. "A study of the available ev- Idence shows that the evacua- tion was ordered in responsel to certain urgent and funda- mental needs cf the Cambo- dian population and that it was carried out only after careful planning for provision of food, water, rest and medi- cal care, it said. American rice shipments to the capital in the final days of the war fell far short of re- quirements, and food was di- verted from the neediest, it as- sorted. . State Department officials,' who said they would have to ? show combined guerrilla strengths of the three operations ? to be 2,047 which breaks down on national grounds . to -give 875. Malaysians, 1,170. Thais and two Japanese. . Despite official claims of success- ful joint border operations between the. Thais and Malaysians the fact remains that border co-operation so far as effective anti-insurgency measures are concerned; is lamen- table. And while this state of affairs exists Thai and Malaysian units will continue to be beaten bv the terrorists at every, encounter. ? study the document before comment on details, took issue. with most of its main conclu- sions. While conceding that rice played a major role in the?out- . come of the war, they placed much of the blame for the starvation And misery ort the :Communists, who blocked rice ishipments to the capital in the final stages. ; The report's authors. Gareth i Porter and G. Q. Hildebrand, : said they relied on data sup- lied by private relief agen- cies and clinics for their 'esti- mates of starvation in the.cap- . ital. Dr. Gay Alexander. medical director for Catholic Relief Services in 1974 and 1975, de, dared shortly before the col- lapse that "hundreds are dy- ing of malnutrition every day." At the Catholic Relief Services children's clinic. 20 to 25 per cent of the children ad- mitted died there because ;their conditions already were , so poor, the report. says. "13ut these deaths were only ! ithe smallest tip of the iceberg I r ? 4, 0 ? NissnigerS 6.atrocity of _major proportion? s, dci.) "Er 7etrAdtt te--3 otake 121. 11 h - ?It, 44. *IL 4.-NI r1 111.C, tk.....kai By Robert W. Edgar It has been months since the last Ameri- cans left Cambodia. Soon after the cold ? lapse of the Lon Nol regime, the American public began to receive reports that the new Khmer Rouge government was exact- ing severe retribution upon the civilian population through the forced evacuation of urban areas. Based on my analysis of conversations with persons who have had experience with Cambodia, press reports and data provided by the State Department, it is my opinion that the evidence readily supports an alternate analysis. That evidence would seem to indicate that, rather than being a vindictive or rigidly ideological program of retribution, the forced evacuation of iof death by starvation and as- sociated illness." it adds. State Department officials said yesterday that in per cent of the canital's requirements I were met by an American rice; airlift in the final weeks, and the rest was covered by rice I brought in from the govern- ment-held rice-producing prov-i ince of Battambang. , The officals said malnutri- tion had increased and resis- tance to disease had lowered in the final months but the ; number of deaths couldn't be determined. . I In August, the State Depart- ment reported there was a ? !'growing shortage of food in Cambodia," whose main new rice crop will not be harvested. before November. The report, called "The Pol- itics of Food: Starvation and 'Agricultural Revolution in 1Cambodia," asserts the State Department ignored evidence of an "agricultural revolution" in the countryside that has made possible some planting of a second, irrigated rice ,crop during the dry season. Phnom Penh can be seen as a march away from starvation, away from urban epidem- ic and away from death in an overbur- dened city. 1 make no claims to having all the rele- vant rtirrnation, though I do believe that I sought and received information from a wide and responsible selection of sources. Nor do I speak in defense of the Khmer Rouge regime. I am merely saying that the evidence I have studied supports a differ- ent view of events in Cambodia than the one widely reported to the American pub- lic. ? Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, in a news conference on May 12, said that Cambodia was carrying out "an atrocity of tth Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 Approved For Release 2001/4)8/08 :_CIA-RDP77-00432R000100800079 major proportions:" Sm.-41 after that, columnist Jack Anderson ran a story -decrying the Cambiadian "atrocity,'' characterizing the evatsuatien of the urban population as a "death march." He quoted from a "White House docurnent" which predicted hundreds of thousands would die from hunger, disease,, and erahaustion as a result of the Khmer Rouge azaion. t Assistant Secretary of state Philip Habib held a briefing for rneenbers of Con- ? gress in June during with Lee alleged that ? there was a bloodbath in progress- in 'Cambodia. Habib said the famed evactia- ,tion was ?likely to result in death for up to a million people. In a folliziwup telephone in- quiry which my office made., an official at the State Department added that broad- ? casts of Radio Phnom Penh indicated that the evacuation was apolitical measure de- signed to purge corrupt7estern influ- ences. The assumptions umferlying this "death march" analysis are two-fold: that the urban population would starve to death if cast into the. countryside, and that they would survive if allowed to remain in the cities. The evidence l have seen does not support either assamptinn. In the final months of the war, Phnom Penh was a besieged, blockaded city. Sup- plied with food and fuel through a despera- tion airlift, the capital was totally depend- ent upon American aid. For the final years of the war, enalnutritien was widespread, and in the last weeks sitar:ration settled over the city. Although enough rice was being flown in by the United States to have fed the entire population, much of the food was earmarked for the Lon Nol military machine.. Water, power, sanitation, and food sup- plies were disastrously overburdened by the refugee influx from the countryside. - The Departthent of State 'timates that the population of Phnern Penh grew from 600,000 in InS9 to 2,000,660 by 1975, an in- crease of 333 per cent in Firge more than five years. . Rep. Robert W. Edgar, a first-term Democrat, represents a cliS tect just out- side Philadelphia. The spreading starvation among this population was described in a study by the State Department's Inspector General of Foreign Assistance in February, which documented an alarming drcp in the aver- age body weight for a sample group of two- year-olds. The statistics, aceparding to the report. "confirm the =Weisel medical im- pression given us be- these involved in Cambodian health and nutrition that chil- dren are starving to death." The situation in Phzeam Penh just prior to the fall, when the United States life-line was still open, was cnearly desperate. French dotenars. at Calinette aespitall warn- NEW YORK TILTe.,S 19 September 1975 P11,01 FOR SM13,1 !.CALLED RED AGETI, Bombed-I-idea Palace in Last Days?Trained in U.S. ed of a rising incidence of cholera and the threat of plague, there was a shortage of safe drinking water, garbage collection had ceased, and sanitation services had broken down. - What then could be expected to happen to the city once the massive airlift ceased? In response to my written inquiry, the State Department stated that "there is no question that there would have been urban- starvation without the U.S. airlift and U.S. airdrops to isolated enclaves." If the situation in Phnom Penh just prior to the fall was desperate, the situation just after the fall was clearly more desperate. Reportedly, the main water purification plant had been seriously damaged on the last day of the war. Power facilities were largely inoperative. The Khmer Rouge had practically no fuel for vehicles. One can discard the notion that Phnom Penh was in any way capable of sustaining a large population when the Khmer Rouge took control. These facts alone provide a compelling alternative to the prevailing analysis: Under the circumstances, it seems evacua- tion was the only thing they could do. . The .other side of the question involved the manner in which the Khmer Rouge carried out the evacuation. One of the more persistent allegations is that the Khmer Rouge forced the evacuation of the sick and wounded from hospitals. There are some indications that patients from these hospitals were evacuated from the city to Khmer Rouge clinics in the country- side. Other reports indicate that it was Khmer Rouge policy to replace foreign doctors with Khmer personnel and to clear out the wards only temporarily to clean them and then put them back into opera- tion. I do not know for sure what happened to the hospitals after the Khmer Rouge took Phnom Perth, but one can get a sense of what these hospitals were like before the war's end from this eyewitness account from two Newsweek reporters: . "In the Khmer Sovietique hospital, more than 1,300 patients struggled for survival last week. Doctors, nurses, medical corps- men, drugs and plasma -were scarce; -malaria, tuberculosis and dysentery were rampant." In February 1975, the Inspector General of Foreign Assistance reported: "The facilities were not only overcrowd- ed, for the most part they were crude and unsanitary. . . Death frequently resulted from infection arid lack of proper care, medication was not being administered to patients suffering severed limbs or gross traumatic abdominal wounds . . These, then, were the hospitals which the Khmer Rouge have been condemned South Vietnamese Air Force pilot who unexpectedly bombed the presidential palace in Sai- gon last April was the son of a Vietcong official and had been a secret Communist agent for years, according to a Com- munist newspaper that has be- come available here. At the time it was widely v.-"ZWIRSro difiRfegefe0g? p01Y00Y0 stet rrestuent guyen Thieu because his wife and HONG KONG, Sept. 18--The for evacuating. The evacuation was not as aimless panic. Most press reports indicate that the population was directed to specific areas for resettlement. As stated earlier, many of the "urban population" were in fact ? refugees from rural areas who had vil- lages and fields to return to. The remain- der, apparently, are being used in the cut- / tivation of the next rice crop. The State Department said that "there were very few instances reported of Khmer Rouge authorities providing food for the evacuees." However, a Time maga- - eine report stated that refugees interview- ed had been provided a ration of one tin of rice per day by the Khmer Rouge on the evacuation route. Although the State Department denies any knowledge of food surpluses being accumulated by the Khmer Route in an- ticipation of evacuation, William Goodfel- low, an associate with the Institute for International Policy who left Cambodia ir April, believes there was a sizable surplus - in the rural areas. In a New York Times article in July, Goodfellow says that: - "Since Congress forced a halt to the U.S. bombing, farmers in the "liberated" areas have had almost two years to rebuild irri- gation canals and dikes which enabled them to harvest a large dry season rice crop this spring . . . Starvation was al- ready a reality in the urban centers, while in the countryside there was a sizable food surplus." Despite my request to the State Depart- ment for transcripts of any refugee inter- views which tended to support the original State Department analysis of massive starvation as a result of the evacuatt the urban areas, no transcripts were pre- tided. Perhaps most significant is the fact that when pressed for an "on-the-record" projection of the loss of life likely to occur. the State Department offered a drastically scaled-down estimate: "While these are of course many unknown variables such as the availability of vegetables and other secondary food sources, on the basis cf current information we believe that ma:is-- thousands face the threat of starvation." "Many thousands" facing a "threat" of starvation represents a significant chanee from the hundreds of thousands who sue- posedly would in fact die. Because little information has leaked out of Cambodia since May, it is impossi- ble to provide a definitive analysis of the internal situation. Whatever toll the marca itself may have imposed is not clear. But clearly the evidence available to me sup- ports the analysis that the evacuation of the urban areas was a march away from starvation. .. baby were left behind when Da Vietnam?The Struggle, givesi Nang was abandoned to' ad- a rare glimpse into the work- ings of the Vietcong's secret apparatus. . 'Lot of Comedy to Act' According to the paper, whichl is described as the central or-1 gan of the' South Vietnamesel National Liberation Front. the pilot had had, "a lot of comedy pap,",,caeRiallv durina twoi re! IFYvnagP9Alkk?114VIMAt the Uniterit 1 - the Communist paper, South! States for training. vancing Communist troops without a fight. President Thicu escaped un- harmed in the attack involving an American-made F-5E jet fighter, but the incident added to the sense of panic in Saigon that eventually helped destroy 45 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDF'77-00432R000100380007-9 _ Several months before' the actual raid, the article said, he had received secret orders "to take advantage of any oppor- tunity to bomb Thieu's Inde- pendence Palace and then fly to the liberated zone." Several times after he informed his contact that he would carry out the attack, his unit was moved too far from the Saigon area. The pilots name was Dinh Thanh Trung, the article said, NEW YORE TINTS 25 September 1975 KOREAN VIETNAM. . IS HELD POSSIBLE Seoul's Policies. Invite It. Oppositien Leader Says ^ : By DAVID- BINDER Special toThe Nvrt TIrnes WASHINGTON, Sept. 24 The South Korean opposition leader, Kim Dee Jung, believes his .Country wtil stiffer "the fate a another Vietnam" unless the present Semi Government is eharig,ed, he wrote in a docu- ment released here today. Mr. Kim, eiho faces senteric- hag in South Korea Friday on chaeges, made this ob- servation in a memorandum pn the. security situation in East Asia. that he gave to Repre- sentative Stephen J. Solarz, Dernocra-t of New Yerk, in Seoul last month. "'don't bdieve that our pres- ent.situation is the same as the Vietnamese situation," he wrote. "But if we don't change the suppreasive and corrupted rule early, we can't avoid the fate of another Vietnam." ? Outlining is Vietriam-Korea analogy, Mr. Kim wrote: "1 believe most people in this country are ecomirig skeptical about figh-Lieg against Com- munism under the present dic- tatorial rule, disappointed with the big gaptitetween the haves and the haveenots and angry with the ,e'.'etent of corruption and ? the heearious- life of the. privileged cless. 'Their loyalties; to the natica are eroding day. by day." '1 don't see that there is an iminent threzt of an all-out attack from the North at pres- ent," Mr. Kin' sugested that, Kim Il Sung, the North Koerani leade.r, ?"will take a leson from; Indochina and riot repeat hs failure in the Korean war, that:. of all-out attack." 1-le con-1, 'He will try to organize guer- rillas to infilttate ainong a peo- ple dissestisfied with suppres- Sinn, poverty and corruption in the South. "He will urge :that guerrilla activities in the South are,1 staged with ts the South with!, no obvious connection with thel North. This is the precedent! of North Vietnam when it cam- i ?triunieed South Vietnam." As for the prospects of dia., and after his father, a district party secretary, was killed in. 1963 in a Government attack in the Mekong Delta, he adopt- ed the alias of Nguyen Thanh Trung. The alteration was made by "a close comrade" of his father's who also arranged to doctor their life stories. Examined For A Year Six years after the death of Mr. Trung's father, the article related, a Communist agent, identified only as "graying Comrade K," told him to enlist in the South Vietnamese Air Force. At the time he was a science student at Saigon Uni- versity. Mr. Trung's background and qualifications were examined for a year, the article said, and after that he was accepted . The article reported that on the mroning of the attack Mr. Thing was not scheduled to fly but volunteered at the last minute to fill in for another pilot who usually came to work late because his home was -in Saigon and the squad- Tuesdoy, September 23, 1975 The Washington Star Indochina shock still rocks Asian ances ron was based in Bien Hai, 40 minutes drive away. Most of the bombs missed the palace, the article con- ceded, but said it was because the pilot "wanted to avoid the servants' quarters." ; After the fall of Saigon oni April 30, .Mr. Trung was re- united with his mother. She; had nevre been told that he! Was working for the Com- munists. , - I Crosby S. Noyes Ever since the disaster in Indochina, the tone of the administration has been resolutely upbeat. Despite what happened in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, we are told, the United States will continue to "fulfill its cam- mitments" in the rest of Asia. The Mayaguez inci- dent ? somewhat patheti- cally ? was supposed to provide conclusive proof of continuing American re- solve. This has been backed up by a certain amount or tough talk? especially con- cerning Korea, which seem- ed for some time the most likely next victim of mili- tary aggression. Top offi- cials of the administration from President Ford on down have vowed to keep American troops on the ground in South Korea, where they would automati- cally be involved in any at- tack from the North. Secre- tary of Defense James Schlesinger refused to rule out the use of nuclear weap- ons if they became neces- sary for the defense of the peninsula. But what, in 'practical terms, does all this mean? How much confidence can Asian leaders place in such "commitments" by an American administration at this point? In the light of Indochina, ? how much weight does the word of an American secretary of de- fense carry ? or, for that logue between North and South, Korea, Mr. Kim wrote: "As long as there exists such a Government as we now have which lacks the confidence of the people in the South, the North Korean Communists Will never respond to calls for dia-, logue. - matter, the word of an American president? The answer, in brief, is: damned little. Today, in as- sessing the reliability of American assurances, for- eign leaders must weigh the mood of Congress and the people along with the promises of administration officials. The result often is depressing. There may be some parts of the world ? Europe and the Middle East, for instance ? where the United States still is considered to be a reliable ally. But the Asian conti- nent is not one of them. Ask the Thais how they feel about American reli- ability. We have duly rati- fied commitments to Thai- land under the terms of the SEATO treaty. The Thais were once among our staunchest allies in South- east Asia. But as far back as the proclamation of the Nixon doctrine in 1969, the shrewdest of the Thai lead- ers saw what was coming. With the departure of the fast American troops from Thailand next year, Thai- land will indeed be on its own And since Thailand does not have enough mili- tary power to stand up to North Vietnam, it isn't hard to predict what its basic alignment will be. As a practical matter, American "commitments" in Asia are now mostly off- shore. In addition to the Ko- rean peninsula, they in- "The Communists. believe they May communize the South easily if the present conditions eon ti nue." Representative Solarz said he had met privately for 9.0 min- utes on Aug. 11 with Mr. Kim, who gave him the memorandum when. they parted. 46 clude Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines, with all of which we have defense treaties. But even in these coun- tries, confidence in the American performance is being badly eroded. Pres- sure for the withdrawal of American forces from South Korea is growing. Detente between Washington and Peking has the gravest implications for the Nation- alist Chinese regime on Tai- wan. Familiar complaints are heard that we are sup- porting repressive dic- tatorial regimes in Seoul and Manila. There remains Japan. Domination of Japan by powers unfriendly to the United States would be a strategic blow comparable to the loss of Western Eu- rope, but it could happen. At this time, Japan has three options: continued total reliance on the United States for security, rearma- ment on a massive scale or, in case of a serious threat from one of the great Communist powers, im- mediate surrender As things are going, the final option is by no means incon- ceivable. No recriminations, of course, but the need for a hard look at what is hap- pening in Asia can't be avoided. So far, we haven't begun to. measure the dam- age of our defeat in Viet- nam ? either to the Asians, or to ourselves. ,Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007k9 ?WetJM; THE WASHINGTON POST By Ilturey Marder j demands to be returned, and I ? 3t Stay Witr I the United States cannot hold I Wasti=tom Fere ithem "against their will." ? -1 Presidult Ford:' has agreed I If South Vietnam refuses to: :to permit about- 1,600 refugees , accept the people on the ship,i .-to try to return to South Viet-Ithere could be a stormy propa- .nam fmen Guam, on a- ship leeanda battle between the Viet, , they will sail themselves. namese. Communists. and the .. There is? no certainty,- howT i United States, over who is re- ever, that Communist, atithori-, sponaible for the . impasse.' tics in Saigon will allow. hem:That possibility has troubled to lend. -.. many American officials for This is a "Inman dilemma." !months. said Julia. V. Taft, ?Viettiainl President Ford made the de- task force director, In an-lcision Monday night, with the nouncing the long-debated de-Iconeurrence of the National cision yaerday. - ? !Security Council, Taft said,. to About 128,00 refugees have meet the "adamant desire" of been resettled by the United, the refugees to sail back to States, site said, but the 1,600 'Saigon. or more wanting to go back to "This cannot be a 'Flying 'South Vietnam have reached I Dutchman' situation," said one "violent proportions", in tlaeirj U.S. official, referring to the WASHINGTON STAR 21 September 1975 legendary ship condemned to sail the seas forever. "We will receive them back at Guam" if they cannot land in South Vi-i nam, he said. Most of the refugees in- volved never intended to leave South Vietnam. They thought they would be landed at an- other port in that country when they lett in confusion as South. Vietnam fell under 'Communist control last April. They are confident they will be allowed to land, on the ba- sis of radio broadcasts and re- ports reaching them from North and South Vietnam,. al- though there is no official as- surance of that. ? The United States has agreed to recondition a ship that brought many of them to Crosby S. Noyes The contagion is taking h as Asia assesses the results The reason why all of the countries of Asia are drastically revising their policies in the wake Of the American disaster in Indochina is quite simple: . The leaders of Asia --.- unlike some in this country ? have never bought the no- tion that the.defeat of American policy in Indochina was in some way preordained, the result of mistakes .and misconceptions dating back to the early post-war period. On the contrary, they have seen it as an almost entirely self-inflicted defeat, a. pro- gressive loss of will on the part of the American people and its leadership, and, finally. a total repudiation of its commit- ment to prevent the military conquest of South Vietnam: Sure, plenty of mistakes were made. The sophisticated military theories of "meas- ured responsee" counter-insurgency, '!search and destroy" and all the rest of it, were all singularly inappropriate to the problem that confronted us. Tragic politi- cal mistakes were made in the frantic search for local leadership in Vietnam that would be acceptable to liberal American critics of the war. ? But the leaders of Asia have never .doubted that the dramatic collapse of South Vietnam was simply an extension of ? a collapse in the United States. So far as they are corn-erred, it started with the proclamation of the Nixon doctrine in 1%9 which sent sheekowaves of anxiety through all of non-ccerenetraist Asia. It progressed through the .ftsastrous Paris agreements of 1973. the destruction of Richard Nixon's presidency in the Watergate affair to ,the ultimate repeariatien by Congress of com- mitments under the Par-is agreements to support and a-an:rola, the government in Sai- gon. The Asian governments have hada num- ber of months to assess the results. In Southeast Asia, they have watched the emergence of a new Vietnam, possessing formidable military power and still unde- fined ambitions. The leaders in Hanoi may take their time in consolidating their victo- riesc But there is no doubt whatever that. the Y intend to extend their hegemony. over Laos and Cambodia. And there is no rea- son to believe that they will not use some of their huge stocks of surplus captured military equipment to support the insur- gencies they have backed for 20 years in Thailand and Malaysia, and wherever else the opportunity arises. . In the bigger picture, China and the Soviet Union are moving briskly to fill the vacuum left by the-American retreat from the Asian mainland, and rivalry between the two communist giants promises to keep the pot boiling for years to come. For the moment, China appears to have the upper hand in picking up the marbles. But the final outcome of that competition ? espe- cially which of the two great powers domi- nates in Hanoi is far from decided. No need to talk of dominoes. The term was never more than a crude visualization of the contagion that was certain to follow an American defeat in Indochina. The pub- lic statements today of Asian leaders from South Korea to Singapore leave no doubt that the contagion is taking hold. One way or another, all of them are saying the same thing: Without the Americans, we have no choice except to make the best deal we can with those with the power .and the will to take over. . 4 :Guam. the 437-foot vessel Viet- ? nam Thuong Tin, a 6.275-ton cargo ship. It will take about two to three weeks to equipl the ship for -the two-week voy- age from Guam to Vietnam,( officials said. It WU carry' provisions- for a round trip. I "We are not 'sending them! back,' " Taft said. "We are all lowing them to repossess the! ship they brought." The number of potential ren turnees has fluctuated. Now,I in addition to 1.541 on Guam, who want to return home, Taft , said, there are 47 Vietnamese in camps in the United States! who want to join them, plus! about 50 persons so far who have been resettled and ichanges their minds. ? Taft said "tensions have !peaked in the last few weeks; I on Guam with a series of out- bursts and demonstrations." Four U.S. marshals v. ere hos- .pitalized in an Aug. 31 'riot. The decision en letting them , sail, U.S. officials said, came after the United Nations High! Commissioner, Prince Sadrud-i din_ Aga Kahn, failed' to get? "any concrete word" from Communist authorities in Ha; noi during a trip to North Vi-, -etriain last iveek. ? , According to Sadraddin's: deputy, the North Vietnamese, authorities reiterated their ? "policy of receiving those .etnamese desirous of return-, ,ing to their homeland," and, said: "Such return will take! iplace as soon as possible after: Ithe individual applications for ;return have been examined." Taft said those applications; I were turned over to Commu- I !fist authorities in July. Other sources said the Ford' administration concluded that! the prince "struck out" for any refugee return in the near ! I future, and that the United? States would be in an impossi: ble situation if it delayed any longer. . The U.S. veto of U. N. mem- bership for both North and South Vietnam, unless, South Korea also is allowed. to enter the United Nations.,, clearly "has complicated this problem." one U.S. source ac- - knowledged. in addition,. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissineer is reported- to have put 'South - Vietnam and Cambodia on the list of nations where Ameri- can passports are invalid with- ; out specific approval, against: the recommendations of sub- ordinates in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Af-: fairs. The formal notice of that . action, published in the Fed- eral Register, cited -severe , hostility" of those govern- ments toward the United Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100A0PAZ. Communist 47 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 WASHINGTON POST 29 September 1975 e ss ring ary, C mai Jeers Greet U.S. Aide's Explanation of Panama Mks . ADoe.a.1 tante Washington Post 7 BALBOA, Panama Canal Zone?"It's kind .of like ?watching a hawk in a 'cage -with a canary," an Ameri-s .can resident of the Canal: 'Zone observed one night . last week after a raucous - gathering in Sthe Balboa: .JETigh - School auditorium. ? in this case, the canary yttati an official of the U.S. embassy in Panama, and the _hawks, hundreds of them, were irate fellow citizens who frequently jeered at his explanations of the U.S. 'policyto negotiate a new vanal treaty with Panama. U.S. officials are striving, through statements and pub- lic appearances, to calm the fears of many Zonians about. their future under a new treaty. Their efforts have hien met with skepticism, and recently, with. open hos- tility.. The United States and Panama have agreed in 'principle to replace the otaen-ended 1903 treaty with another of fixed duration that would lead eventually to full Panamanian jurisdic- tion over the 61-year-old At- -lantic-Pacific waterway and the surrounding, 550-square- mile Canal Zone. Neautiators still must re- solve major differences, however, and both govern- Monts face public relations tasks of assuring their re- teneetive peoples that vital .interests are not being sold Among the more difficult to persuade are the Ameri- ? ',can Zonians. There are es- , timated to be 39.200 of them. ? Many are second or third generation Zonians. There are about 9,800 civilian em- ployees and dependents at- ? tached to canal agencies, ? : 950 other civilians and 20,500 ? military -related people in- :.chiding 10,177" in uniform. , It is not difficult to un- - derstand why many are un-.: , easy. Driven-a; through Bat- ? boa, the Zone's main resi.- ? den flat and commercial area, ? one can see a slice of Mai ;town America transplanted ? to foreign soil but to a :meat :d?ree insulated from the culture. cittorits and laws Of the host coutur.y. ' ii is a company town. The . Panama Canal Co.. a U.S. .government agency, oper- ates the canal. Overseeing more than HMO ship pas- sages a year, and runs virtu- ally everything that affects the lives of the Zonians. It operates police and fire de- partments, post office, thea- ters, stores, schools, hous- ing, a hospital, a leprosar- ium and a 50-mile railroad across the isthmus. ? The contrast to adjacent alums of Panama City is evi- dent to Zonians .and Pana- manians alike, although the capital of the country has its affluent areas, too. fel admit we have mani- cured lawns, but that's bet- ter than having weeds," says Frank A. Baldwin, the Pan- ama Canal information offi- cer, who was born in the Zone. "Some American news- papers refer to manicured lawns as if it were a sin." . What seems to worry the Zonians most is the prospect of Panama taking jurisdic- tion over all of these sena ices. There is also concern over job security, wage level's and .personal safety when the Zone disappears as a separate .entity and be- comes a part of Panama. And there is a widespread attitude that the U.S.-built canal is "ours." ? Maj. Gen. Harold R. Par- fitt. the Canal Zone gover- nor, says the mood of Zon- tans is "great apprehension . . . because nobody reaily knows the details on what the impact will be on their lifestyle or on their employ- ment." - There were some clues when Panamanian negotia- tors revealed certain points of agreement last weekend. although U.S. officials have stated that even these "con- ceptual" agreements are subject to change in a final treaty package. The Pana- manians said it had been agreed that the Zone will disappear three years after the treaty takes effect, that Panama's National Guard will replace the -U.S. police force, and the Panamanian laws, courts. fire-fighting and postal services will func- tion exclusively. Panaman- ians arc to move increasing- ly into canal administrative Among. points of disagree- ment listed by the Pana- manians was said to be a U.S. proposal "to maintain the privileges of the Zonians and exclude them from Pan- amanian jurisdiction." Pan- ama rejected this and pro- poses that the Zonians' pres- ence "diminish gradually, maintaining certain guaran- tees in their jobs but with- out detriment to Pana- manian jurisdiction." ? Ambassador-at-Large Ells- worth Bunker, the chief U.S. treaty negotiator, met in pri- vate last week with leaders of the Zone's labor unions and civic councils. Gov. Par- fitt said that Bunker did not reveal specifics of the ne- gotiations, citing a need for confidentiality, and there- fore did not allay the appre- hension, "We still, know about as little as we knew three years age, said Douglas C. Schmidt, president of the Pacific Civic Council, which has 6,200 constituents in the zone. "Mr. Bunker continues to claim that our best in- terest is being kept at heart. But what that best interest is, he fails to say." , Bunker recently designat- ed 'John Blacken, the em- bassy's counselor for politi- cal affairs, as his liaison with the Zone. Blacken has. appeared seven times before various Zone organizations. Last week he addressed a general Zone audience for the first time. About 600 Zonians crowd- ed into the high school audi- torium to hear him. Others were turned away for lack of space. It was at the same school where students' in- sistence on running up the American flag angered Pan- amanians and touched off riots in 1964 in which 24 per- sons died. Today the U.S. and Panamanian flags fly on adjacent flagpoles at the school and other civilian in- stallations. -Blacken argued that the Canal Zone is "Panamanian territory under U.S. jurisdic- tion," that a new treaty would serve the interests of both countries, and that fail- ure to compromise in the treaty talks would create a situation in which "SOrlie form of confrontation would. be probable." The warning 48 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 about a Confrontation has also been Used before a skeptical U.S. Congress .and public by Secretary of State ? Henry - Kissinger, Assistant Secretary ? William .Rogers and Bunker. . Many of Blacken's listen- ers were unimpressed, as well as frustrated by the deck of details to support'. .Blackents assertion . that. "your ?interest will be pro- tected' in 'any new treaty submitted to the Congress of the United States. Hoots and jeers greeted his remarks that the Pana- manian government is "re- sponsive to its citizenry!! , and will be able to carry out: public services efficiently:. "I live in Panama, and my garbage' is picked up seven days a week," he said. Howls drowned him out. "Basically, we are guests in somebody else's terri- tory." Blacken said at an- other point in the question- and-answer period. -There were shouts of no, no." "You champion Panama's' aspirations and not mine." said one man in the audi- ence. He was roundly ap- plauded. An American soldier who had been arrested in Pan- ama while bird - watching said, 'If we cannot. defend American rights now, how the devil are they going to be defended in the future?" Iie, too, was applauded. No one spoke out in favor of a new treaty during the, meeting. But some people apologized to Blacken after- ward for hostile remarks - made by others, and the .; next day he 'received tele-:,1 phone calla of support. The fellow who saw the evening in terms of a hawk pouncing on a canary told a reporter outside: "My views are that the alterna- tives to a treaty are far less desirable for the individuals in the Canal 'Zone, as well as the 'U.S. government. So therefore 1 think that a treaty is the best solution to the problem down here." Thursday, Blacken will speak to another general Zone audience on the Atlan- tic side of the isthmus. Ho ? says that now he has a bet- ter grasp of what the Zon- ians' concerns are and he hopes to do a more convinc- ing job. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-8 NEW YORK TIMES 21 September 1975 -Chilean Junta Resisting (Critics t ? - By JONATHAN. HANDEL!. :.t saree to ykoNeVt York Times e SANTIAGO, Chile, Sept. 16? .. . two years after the bloody coup. that toppled the Marxist coa:i-i 'lien government of President! Salvador Allende Gossens, thel military_ junta that governs! Chile, has developed a siege mentality against critics of its harsh economic recovery. pro-I i 1gram and of its continuing Vig,i. lations of human rights.. [ Unemployment is at its high-i .s est in at least four decades aal industrial production has dropped sharply this year. , ,?But the: junta has vowed to. continue an austerity -program aimed almost exclusively at dampening the perennial ?rise in inflation and diminishing the 'slate's role in the economy. . ( Arbitrary arrests and ne I 'ports of torture have declined,. in recent months, apparently!. because of the military's con?-I fidence that the threat of sub-i ,version has eased. On the other! 1 hand; such practices have vir- tually been institutionalized, land the secret gralice apparatus! remains :pervatrive. There arel I still about 5,00 political pris- oners, according to the Govern-i ment -? 1 The junta also denies any knowledge of the fate of morel than 1,000 people who -Were de-I tamed after the 1973 co-up.!Lawyers and clergymen susd pect that many of these miss-1 sing prisoners have died in de- . i tention carhps and torture cen- ters. ' Government Cites Polls ? The human-rights controversy has stiffened the attitude of 'Chile's main creditor a, particu- larly in Western Europe, and- has forced the jrmta to renego- [time the 'country's huge for--, reign debzl. In Washington. the House of iRepresentatives has passed a .bill prohibiting economic aid to countiles that systematically violate human rights, and the Senate is et-pa:led to add its approval later this month. etle. though United States economic, aid to Chile now amounts to only about 825-aaillion a year. a complete cutoff could further discourage private loans and investment. In the last two years, less than S2-million in new foreign private investment has actually flowed into this country. "Chile will net. permit any foreign power to use temporary difficulties we are facing to interfere with our. sovereignty, even if such attempts are made under the guiiie of friendship," said President Aueusto Pinochet in a speech last week celebrat- ing the junta's second AtiOretv nary. ? "The immense majority of our compatriots accept and sup- port restrictions," General Rum- chet went on, "because they understand that they are the necessary price for tranquility,, order and social peace that have made us an island within a world invaded by violence, terrorism and :generalized dis- order." The Government has publi- dzed recent Gallup Polls indi.H eating that it still enjoys the backing of tide majority. Skep- tics, hOwever, question the value oil any public-opinion sounding in a society such as this ,in which fear of repression ts widespread among old sup- porters of Dr. Allende, who lost his life in the September, 1973, toup, and other politically dis- aanting groups. According to the Govern- ment, about one out of every 250 Chileans has undergone at least temporary detention sine the coup; church sources be- lieve the figure is closer to one out of 100. Marxist political groups have been banned; other political parties remain in a, state of in- definite suspension. Leftist pub- lications are prohibited and other journals are under Gov- ernment control through self- censorship. Junta's Support Slipping There are no elections at any level in society. Purges have sedeot Marxists from public ad- ministration, university and la- bor posts. Trade unions exist, but are forbidden to strike: they have no dear concept of what their role is supposed to be. The Roman, Catholic church,. which Counts 90 per :cent of the people among its faithful, has spoken out several times against violations of human rights. and. the growing plight of the poorest Chileans. ?But it has no stomach for an open confrontation with the junta that would risk political divi- sions in the clergy. Last week the Catholic bish- oo gave the junta a boost by asserting that the military coup saved the country "from a Marxist dictatorship that seamed inevitable and would have been irreversible." Though the church hierarchy decried the excesses of the junta, it treielemned Marxists for their l'atheism" and political "oppor- tunism." Despite the effectiveness of the political repression, in re- c=t. months a slow deteriora- titre of enthusiasm for the junta has become apparent among suite of its supporters. Eduardo Rios, president of the Maritime Workers Union, is considered the leading labor lezder in the country. After the coup. he went abroad to defend the junta at international labor conferences, but recently he re- fused to do so again. ? are concerned over the growing distance between the Government and labor, because a Et rtRittaletiSeP2101rt/0800 uner repercussions on workers, because of labor reforms With- 6 ed with th 50 centc mpar w e per out the advice or participation cent public deficit. of the last of workers," Mr. Rios said sev- year of the Allende Govern- eral weeks ago. "There is no !ment. dialogue with the Government."The military rulers assert Mr. Rios's opinions appear to. that the balance-of-payments be shared by most non-Marxist deficit will be a manageable labor leaders. $300-million. There is guarded The military inherited a cha- optimism that the price spiral otic economy from the Allendej is slowing because the inflation Government. Inflation had I index for ? August was 8.9 per reached an annual rate of about cent, down from 9.3 per cent 700 per gent; investment had! in July and 19.8 per cent in evaporated; industrial and June. agrarian production had de- . Soaring Jobless Rate dined sharply; there were wide- Otherwise, the effects of the spread shortages of all goods shock treatment have been dev- and a rampant black market; astating. Unemployment has climbed to 20 per cent, leaving 700,000 people jobless in a work force of 3.5 million. There was a 20 per cent de- cline in 'industrial output dur- ing the first six months of 1975, compared-with the same period of 1974. Construction and auto- mobile production have fallen by 'more than a third. Accord- ing to Government officials, the gross national product this year may well be ten per cent less than that of 1974. An economic survey prepared by the center-left Christian But inflation still ran at more Democrats, the largest political than 370 per cent?the highest party, estimated that real in- rate in the world?and unem- come would fall about 10 per ployment rose above 10 per cent with respect to 1974, by cent as the bloated job rolls of 18 per-cent compared with 1973 the Allende era were cut down, and by a full 40 per cent from With inflation running at 1970. For the Chilean working similar levels this year, and class, the statistics represent a with the added danger of a return to poverty levels not billion-dollar balance-of-pay- seen here in more than a gen- Inuits deficit, the Government eration. put into effect a "shock treat- The Government has begun ment" in May. ? an emergency work program The guiding, light of the jun-. that provides jobs to the un- ta's economic policy has been employed for 90-day periods at Milton Friedman, a conserve- a monthly salary of about 830 tive economist from the Uni- versity of Chicago who visited There are 100,0 00 openings but Santiago shortly before the they cover only about one out "shock treatment" j5rograrr of seven jobless workers. The took effect. The "Chicaer low income falls far short of Boys," as the junta's economi- the minimum monthly food re- advisers like to call themselves quirements of a family of five., The junta has also- been slashed public spending, re- sharply attacked by some econ- stricted bank credits and slowed the printing of money. .omists and businessmen for The only public expenditure Putting the wealth into fewer that has escaped the scissors hands. Before inflation is over- come the critics say, a drop in has been the military budget, ' sales and a wave of bankrupt- a taboo topic for public discus- cies will enable a privileged fear sion. Officially, defense spend- to buy businesses at 'bargain .ing is 23 per cent of the Gov- prices. T emment budget, compared with he privileged minority today 20 per cent during the last year are people who own finance companies.- The banks, still un- of the Allende era. But critics der state control, are restricting assert that a gond deal more, u 'ceedit but the finance comma- , military spending is hidden in I flies are extending it at exorbi- the Finance Ministry's budget.. ; tact rates. The idea behind the "shock' Since they are far more flexi- treatment" was to hit inflation bin than the-banks, the finance by cutting demand. Real income companies also attract money' would decline and force produc- from investors too scared by foreign debts had mushroomed to several billion dollars and foreign exchange reserves were down to $3-million. Moreover, copper?exports of which provide 85 per cent of Chile's foreign-exchange earn- ings?has been selling at de- pressed prices in the world market for most of the junta's two years in power. This was also a problem for the Allende Government. During the junta's first year, there were production increases in most sectors of the economy. en and distributers to sell their infiaticn to put their money goods more cheaply. Price con- trols were discarded as ineffec- tive, artificial mechanisms that would only hide inflation and eventually lead to a return to the black market days. ,to a bank or finance company The junta and its supporters to easily obtain 5 per cent in hard currency a month without already contend that there are some optimistic sighs that the .doing anything?" The question treatment is working. The pub- ?wras put by Orlando Saenz, a lie deficit or gap between Gov- 'former economic adviser to the outory9 one of its most into industries. "Who is going to invest money in any industrial, com- mercial, farming or mining ac- tivity if he knows he can aCe CA.'S 119 IllaVg37711111) Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9 The rise of unemployment, the decline in production and the concentration of wealth in fewer hands has led some econ- omists and businessmen public- ly to suggest alternatives. "Right now, the biggest threat is bankruptcy, not infla- tion," said one of the largest automobile distributors. "The Government is seriously 'under- estimating how difficult it is to start up production once it stops dead." He suggested that the Government act immedi- ately to stimulate production. Party Suggests Controls The Christian Democratic party, arguing that most Chil- ean businessmen have had an "inflationary mentality" for years, suggested that some form of price controls be imposed on a list of key products. The program also called for the Government to fix interest rates to prevent usurious credit dealings. To alleviate unemploy- ment, the party suggested art immediate ? increase in public spending, especially on projects that employ large numbers of workers. The most controversial aspect of the plan was the suggestion that no economic program could be successful without for- eign investment and aid and .that such funds would not be iforthcoming until the political iimage of the ceuntry changed.. The clear implication was that money from abroad would not arrive while President Pinochet remained in power. . , There have been some hints of dissent at high military lev- els over the economic recovery program. General Gustavo Leigh, the only :junta member with any real power beside General Pinochet, conceded pub- licly last month that the "so- cial eost" of the economic pro- gram had exceeded expecta- tions. General Leigh is said to have had an angry confronta- tion recently with the Finance Minister, Mr. Cauas, over un- employment. In his anniversary speech General Pinochet gave no hint that there would be a let-up in the relentless austerity program for several more months. "To try to avoid this social cost would. mean fooling the people and permitting them to live with false illusions," he as- ?serted. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 26 September 1975 Time to cool it on Panama The attack on the United States Embassy in Panama City by a group of 600 or more rock- throwing youths is an indication of the potential explosiveness of the Panama Canal issue. The incident, moreover, was the most serious since the 1964 anti-U.S. riots in Panama which killed 23 persons, injured - dozens more, and led to a break in relations between the-two nations. It is bound to make more difficult the task of Panamanian and United States negotiators drafting a new treaty to govern control and operation of the Panama Canal. Those talks, which several months ago were said to be moving smoothly, are now apparently 'snagged. Complicating the issue is growing congres- sional opposition to any new treaty and to any change in the present U.S. control of the canal. Added to this was a statement over last weekend by Panamanian negotiators com- plaining that the two governments are far ,apart on a number of basic issues. Washington was right in protesting the Panamanian statement which, at best, was ill- timed. Indeed, there is some speculation that the rock-throwing demonstration was sparked by? the Panamanian statement. Taken ? to- NEW YORK TIMES 25 September 1975 Panama Apologizes For Youths' Attack On U. S Embassy Srorla! to The New York Times WASHINGTON, Sept. 24? The Panamanian Government has apologized to the United States for an incident ,21ester- day in which dernonstratora broke about 100 windows in the American Embassy in Panama City, the State De- partment reported today. The oceanside building was attacked by 600 to 800 rock- throwing youths, according to gether, the statement and the attack on the embassy add new problems to the talks. Panama has rightly apologized to the U.S. for the embassy incident, which involved "in- adequate protection" by the Panamanian National Guard as the U.S. noted. What is needed now is a cooling-off period ? involving perhaps a new meeting between the chief negotiators, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker for the U.S. and Foreign Minister Juan Antonio Tack for Panama, to get the talks back on track. Then, too, the Ford adminis- tration should encourage Congress to hold off its attacks on a new treaty until it. knows just what a proposed treaty will include. Many of the congressional statements of late have been far off target ? commenting on the treaty as if it were already written. - ? And for its part, Panama needs to restrain both its negotiators from commenting on the talks in progress and its impressionable youth from violent acts. It ought to be self-evident to Panama that incidents such as the intemper- ate weekend statement and the melee at the U.S. Embassy only stir up the congressional opposition which could lead to eventual Senate ' rejection of a proposed treaty once it is ready. Robert L. Funseth, the depart- ment spokesman. They shouted anti-American slogans and demands that the 'United States pull out its troops from bases in the Canal Zone. Embassy officials reported that the demonstrators also de- nounced Brig. Gen. Omar Tor- rtios Herrera for "complicity" in attempting to negotiatte a. new Panama Canal treaty with the United States. No Americans 'were injured In the attack. -Several Pana- manian ational guardsmen were assaulted however when they sought to disperse the demon- strators, the embassy officials said. Yesterday afternoon Ambas- sador William J. Jorden sent NEW YORK TIMES 23 September 1975 authorized bv; U.S. Warns Panama Not to Air Details Of Talks on Canal The warning, Ellsworth Bunker, the chief United States negotiator in the Panama Canal treaty talks,. which began in June, 1974, was issued in response to publica- tion Saturday of a Panamanian' Government statement on the! status of the negotiations. The Panamanian statement,1 made on the orders of Brig.' Gen. Omar Torrijos Hen-era, had said that talks on the fu- ture of the canal had beers stalled by United States insist- ? ence on its right to continuel defending the waterway in-1 def initely, sfecinteesaxeavelemees WASHINGTON, Sept. 22 ? The United States warned Pana- ma today that public airing of purported negotiating positions on a new Panama Canal treaty could "hinder the balancing of mutual interest that makes any such treaty possible." a note to the Panamanian v Foreign Ministry "protesting the inadequate protection if-, forded the embassy by the Na- tional Guard," Mr. Funseth re- ported. Later yesterday Presidenz Demetrio B. Lakas called Mr. Jorden to apologize and this morning the Foreign Ministry sent a formal written. apology. The incident was the most. serious in Panama since 1964 when anti-American riots caused 23 deaths, officials here said. Meanwhile; the House voted 203 to 197 this afternoon to stand by and earlier resolution that the Administration should not negotiate "the surrender or relinquishment of any Unit- ed States rights in the Panama Canal zone." Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-R14977-00432R000100380007-9