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September 12, 1976
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,-Approved For-, Release. 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-004328000100390001-4 .... . CONFIDENTIAL INTERNAL USE ONLY This publication contains clippings from the domestic and foreign press for YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use of selected items would rarely be advisable. NO. 17 GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS GENERAL EASTERN EUROPE WEST EUROPE NEAR EAST AFRICA EAST ASIA LATIN AMERICA 17 SEPTlt11BER 1976 DESTROY AFTER BACKGROUNDER HAS SERVED ITS PURPOSE OR WITHIN 60 DAYS CONFIDENTIAL 1 25 34 36 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100390001-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100390001-4 Not all its covert actions have succeeded, but the agency did manage to outfox Congressional investigators. 2V WaVE90lT M1-RMOTM There have been enough revelations about the Central Intelligence Agency over the past two years to keep diplomats, prosecutors, reporters and philosophers busy for entire careers. Three separate investigations not only stretched the imagination with show-biz material about cobra venom and deadly skindiving suits but twisted the lens on the American self-image in foreign affairs. The investigations rewrote history-the history, for example, of the relationship between the United States and the Castro Government in Cuba. They showed that the C.I.A., in some 900 foreign interventions over the past two decades, has run secret wars around the globe and has clandestinely dominated foreign governments so thoroughly as to make them virtual client states. In contrast to Watergate, the C.I.A. investiga- tions proved that abuses of power have not been limited to one particular Administration or one political party. They also established facts that few people were prepared to believe-such as that distinguished gentlemen from the C.I.A. hatched assassination plots with Mafia gangsters. With all these surprises percolating, the most interesting surprise has been largely ignored. And that is how the C.I.A. investigations ceased. The topic faded away so quickly as to make the whole episode look like a fad. Unlike the F.B.I. issue, which has moved to the prosecutors' offices and stayed on the front page, the vaunted trial of the C.I.A. has already become a memory. And the agency itself has survived the scandals with its covert operations intact, if not strengthened. The collapse of the C.I.A. investigations has been due largely to in- eptitude, poor judgment and lack of will on the part of the Congressional committees. But the agency also played a role. Its strategy was flawless. "Those guys really knew what they were doing," says a staff member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence chaired by Frank Church. "I think they defended themselves just like any other agency would, except they're better. They had a whole office set up to deal with us, and I some- times had the feeling that they ran operations against us like they run them against foreign governments. It was like the C.I.A.' station for the Congress instead of for Greece or Vietnam." The story of how they came out ahead of their investigators says a great deal about both the Congress and the agency, and about the problem of reconciling the demands of the superspy with the democracy he is supposed to protect. In the spring -of 1975, the Church committee had been spinning its, wheels for several months without much success. Charged with the task of investigating more than a dozen intelligence agencies, any one of which' was an enormous challenge, the Senators became cnsnarled in debate over how to proceed. The agencies were stalling, hoping to deflect attention else- where. 't'hen the committee got a break. Approl*A FlwslR se i- $JJQ8 ~~Cl4 RDP77-00432R000100390001-4 Taylor Branch is th,e Wcwhingeon columnist Pike. Approved For Release 2001/08/08-: CIA-R0P77-0.0432R000100390001--4- under Vice President Rockefeller that January, , to inquire into charges of illegal domestic spying by the C.I.A., announced that it had received evidence of, C.I.A. involvement in attempts to kill foreign leaders. The news created an instant sensation. Rockefeller said his commission, which was completing its work, had neither the time nor the mandate to pursue the matter, and he turned the evidence over to President Ford, who quickly passed it along to the Church committee. Suddenly, the Senators found themselves with a large batch of classified documents and with responsi- bility for the hottest issue since Watergate. For five months last year, the Church committee focused its energy on assassinations. Other investigations lapsed. Staff members were pulled from other projects. While it is no mean feat in the Senate to obtain sus- tained, personal effort from Senators on any single subject, the members of the Church committee went to C.I.A. briefings day after day to be intro- duced to the agency's arcane methods. In November 1975, the committee published an interim report on this one aspect, and Senators and staff alike were proud of it. As an exploration of the Machiavellian underside of American foreign policy, it was, in fact, a tour de force. Yet it failed to build public support for investigating or controlling the C.I.A. Press and TV coverage was intense but shortlived, focusing on certain salacious details: the gangster plots, the titillating reports of. an affair between President Kennedy and the mistress of one of the gangsters, and terest was down. Assassina- tions proved peripheral to the main business of C.I.A. covert action, and the investigation of that unknown realm had scarcely begun. With in- vestigations of the other intel- ligence agencies, including the F.B.I., still ahead of them, five crucial months had been lost -along with much of the committee's momentum. The Senate's February 1976 dead- line for the completion of all work loomed large. And Church wanted to wrap up his investigative chores in. order to begin his own Presi- dential campaign. The Church committee had gambled heavily on the assas- sination report. And lost. a few exotic spy plans worthy of a television serial. In this last category, ecnrdinrr to Mitchell with a chemical that would make his beard fall out and thereby destroy his,' s ecial counsel-dur- P f t r....,...7.. l:....6...7 h..r.-r-.. ' te d..-?~? t r l c e rest o he ma was ext comp e a con s i l d ti d th f ll i i h f c expec- Were LCI1La ve9 an a11b LIIC rama e assass on p e nat s ort o . tion, the crux of the inquiry tations that had grown up. The committee did not claim to have found a "smoking gun," in the from the agency's point of view form of a kill order ringing down from the Oval Office, through the C.I.A. was covert action-secret in- chain of command and out to some mysterious trigger man in a foreign terventi6ns abroad by means capital. Quite the contrary. Where the American efforts to kill were most of propaganda, bribes, manip- direct and persistent-in the case of Castro-they were unsuccessful. And ulation of foreign agents and, where the foreign leaders were actually killed-Lumumba in the Congo, Tru- in some cases, paramilitary jillo in the Dominican Republic, Diem in South Vietnam, Schneider in Chile force - as distinct from gath- there was no hard proof that C.I.A. operatives actually took the ering and analyzing intelli- murders. In some cases, the agency seemed to withdraw at the last moment. genre. The promotion system In other cases, "someone else got there first. Of the Diem assassination the for C.I.A. case officers has committee could only say that the C.I.A. had sanctioned and encouraged a been built around operations, coup against his Government when there was a reasonable chance the plot- and C.I.A. leadership has been drawn from the operators- ters would kill him. But no direct orders to assassinate. Everything was a Allen Dulles, Richard Helms, little blurred. Even the most direct written communications, as in the Lurnumba case, William Colby-instead of in- were couched in opaque C.I.A. language:-- telligence analysts. Veteran "Hunting good here when lights right." agency operatives often say Smoking guns are considered thoroughly that without covert action the unprofessional in clandestine operations, C.I.A. would be nothing but where secrecy is paramount and it is a mark a collection of sophisticated of skill to channel existing forces subtly. The professors with mounds of in- assassination report, on the other hand, was' telligence, and the agency it- publicly judged by self would be only a more spe- Dominican strongman, how cialized version of the State standards built for palpable Department. and exotic murders. Because the agency provided assur- The C.I.A. approached the no foreign leaders were, ances of support to those who Congressional investigations killed outright by American: plotted against him, how initiative, planning and ex- C.I.A. officials smuggled with one central objective: to. ecution, the C.I.A. benefited weapons into the country and protect the means and prac- from a general impression exchanged cryptic messages lice of covert action. It was in line with this strategy that that it came out of the - on the likelihood of a success- assassination inquiry with ful assassination. In keep'ng Colby and Rogovin gave ground on the marginal issue clean hands. This impression with its courtroom definition of assassination, cooperating is false. of assassination, however, -the with the Church- committee, committee exonerated the turning over more informa- of many thousands agency of Trujillo's murder on of people have died as a result the ground that the weapons tion than the committee could of secret C.I.A. digest, helping the committee paramilitary it smuggled in were probably use itself u Then, when the interventions in countries P- ranging from Laos to Cuba to not the ones used in the kill- ranging report was com- the Congo. (The Church com- ing. pleted, Rogovin became tough, mittee obtained some casualty "By the time we finished about information to be grant- figures but did not publish the assassination report," re ed for the `remainder of the them at the agency's request.) calls the leader of one of the investigation - especially in And, in the case of selected committee's task forces, "we . regard to covert action. The killings detailed in the report, had lost three things-the committee was floundering; the fine between involvement public's attention, much of Rogovin pressed his advan- and actual murder is often our own energy and will tage. "We agreed with the shadowy. For example, the power, and our leadership. committee that they could Church committee reported Quite candidly, we had lost have access to information for extensively on the maneuver- Frank Church," The Senator, six case studies in covert ac- ing that preceded ti~~ L nsatinn of Rafael "1 ninon n can policy turned against the vailing atmosphere. Public in- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100390001-4 of secrecy oaths that they would not even. let the names of the other five countries leak." The case study he chose was Chile-a selection favora- ble to the agency, since a lot of material on the C.I.A.'s in- tervention in Chile had al- ready leaked to the press: "It was a bad deal," says F.A.O. Schwarz, the commit- . tee's chief counsel. Many of the principal staff members opposed the settlement. What little they had learned about covert action in the course of the assassination investiga- tion had made them realize its was one of the hardest but also one of the most important issues to deal with. "That i$ why we went so heavily into Mongoose in the assassina- tion report," Schwarz ex- plains. Operation Mongoose was a covert action designed to weaken and destroy the Cas- tro regime through an orches- trated program of economic sabotage, commando raids .and paramilitary harassment. It was the heart of the agen- cy's effort to overthrow Cas- tro; simultaneous' assassina- tion attempts complemented Mongoose rather than vice versa. Although the campaign failed, it was kept so secret that the American public was left with a fundamentally dis- torted view'of United States- Cuba relations for more than a decade. Before the committee's re- port, it was generally accepted that the Kennedy Administra- tion ceased hostilities against Castro after the Bay of Pigs, until forced to act defensively by the unprovoked introduc- tion of Russian missiles on Cuban soil. The Church com- mittee revealed that not only were there repeated attempts on Castro's life before and after the missile crisis but covert Mongoose raids were being intensified throughout the period. The assassination report quotes the minutes of high-level meetings, less than two weeks before the missile crisis, at which Attorney General Robert Kennedy spurred the C.I.A. on to hit Castro harder. The assassination report, outside sources generally agree, was the high point of the committee's investigation. After that, the staff divided into two groups, one known informally as "the lawyers"-. a group of attorneys drawn together largely by Schwarz -and the other as "the professors," who were gener- aly foreigaa - policy experts with academic routs or Capi- tol Hill exl e,^:c re:. Under task - force leader William Bader, the "professors" be- came responsible for the C.I.A. investigation, while .the "law- yers" went off after the F.B.I. Frictions developed be- tween the two groups, the Bader group tending to criti- cize the lawyers as too prosecutorial and "Watergate- minded," and the Schwarz team hinting that the Bader group was too soft in its handling of the C.I.A.'s pros.. In any event, discouraged by the covert-action compromise, the "professors" never recov- ered the initiative. n the House, the Select Committee on Intelli- gence chaired by Otis Pike-the counterpart of the' Church committee- pursued an arduous and in- dependent course. Created only after a long internecine squabble over its leadership, its mandate weakened by con- tinuing- feuds in the House, the committee struggled through the summer of 1975 to breathe life into itself- seeking, on one occasion, to justify its existence- by leak- ing the sensational but un- verified story that Nixon aide Alexander Butterfield had been a C.I.A. "plant" in thel White House. The story was refuted, leaving the committee with less credibility than ever. By fall, the traditional jealousy between the House and the 'Senate had flared up behind the scenes, and Mitchell Ro- govin, negotiating with both committees, was finding them competitive. "Church," says Rogovin, "held his `,toxin hear- ings' because he was afraid Pike would do it if he didn't." By December, the House and .Senate committees were set on opposite courses. Pike wanted to impale the C.I.A. for its abuses. Church wanted to show that a Senate committee could handle national secrets responsibly. The Ford Admini- stration played the commit- tees against each other. When Pike demanded information and denounced "delaying tac- tics," Administration spokes- men would point to the ex- emplary behavior of the Church committee and appeal for a, more cooperative spirit. When the Church committee cooper- aced, the Administration tended to see it as a sign of weakness and feel freer to hold back on information. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and C.I.A. director William E. Colby simply boycotted all the covert-action hearings, and the conunittee accepted the rebuff instead of subpoe- naing them. "The object of the exercise," says a Church committee staff we were not Pike. We were not going to move the Con- gress or the public by more expose. What was going to 'carry us was the kind of edi- torial we finally got in The Washington Post: `An Intelli- gent Approach to Intelli- gence."' The committee evi- denced an increasing aware- ness of its public image, of its ability to keep secrets. avoid leaks and work in some semblance of public harmony . with the C.I.A. Many on the committee staff endorsed this approach as the path toward "establishing a relationship" that would serve the Congres- sional committee that was to be set up to exercise over- sight-supervision of the in- telligence agencies. Some of these investigators have, in fact, moved on to jobs with the oversight committee, now in business. Their attitude was infectious: Even today, many former Church committee staff members are more reti- cent in discussing C.I.A. mat- ters than C.I.A. officials them- selves. n Dec. 24, a band of unknown terrorists assassinated Rich- ard Welch, the C.I.A. chief of station in Greece. Welch had been identified as a C.I.A. official by a small anti-C.I.A. magazine, and a .furor immediately arose over whether the revelation had anything to do with his death. The Senators on the Church committee received a flood of letters denouncing its work on the grounds that exposure of C.I.A. secrets is an invitation to the killing of C.I.A. offi- cials. Sources on both sides of the C.I.A. investigation now agree that neither the magazine nor the Church committee is likely to have caused Welch's death. He was a relatively well-known figure in Athens, certainly to the kind of organ- ized political groups likely to have killed him. These proba- bilities were overwhelmed, however, by the emotional power of the tragedy, and the C.I.A. encouraged the idea that C.I.A. critics might have contributed indirectly to the murder. Rogovin would only tell the. Church committee that its own investigations were not "directly" responsi- ble. Colby lashed out in public' at those who revealed C.I.A. secrets as being more sinister than the secrets themselves. Ford made public statements to th,,e effect that inquiries into C.I.A. methods were unpatriotic. No single event (lid more toa turn 1 uh!it: opiY ion at `Hirst the investigatae its than the Welch affair. As 1975 ended, the press was shying away from ,the C.I.A.,issue, and ?huy- tility toward the inquiry was building up-in Congress itself. As to the C.I.A.'s private thoughts on whether naming senior officials makes them more vulnerable to "the other side," a move that escaped public attention may provide some insight: Welch was re- placed in Athens by a man who had been identified as a C.I.A. official. by Greek news- papers and an American -magazine. On Jan. 29, 1976, Represent- ative John Young, Democrat of Texas, offered a motion on the House floor to suppress the final report of the Pike committee. The ensuing de- bate was not distinguished. Some speakers argued that the report-which they admit- ted they had not read -- would endanger national se- curity and align the House with the murderers of Richard Welch. Others, like Wayne Hays, argued for suppression on the grounds that the report would be boring: "I suspect that when this report comes out it is going to be the biggest nonevent since Brigitte Bardot, after 40 years and four husbands and nurrer-- ous lovers, held a press con- ference to armounce that she was no longer a virgin." Views like these prevailed, and the House, by a vote of 246 to 124, ordered its own report to be locked away in the clerk's safe. The document did not re- main suppressed very long. it was leaked to CBS co.rres- ?pondent Daniel Schorr, who in turn leaked it to The Vilage Voice through a series of inter- mediaries. When The Voice published the report in two special supplements under ban- ner headlines, it became the most spectacular leak of the C.I.A. investigations. Pike developed two themat- ic criticisms of the C.I.A. First, he amassed evidence of repeated intelligence failures, showing how the agency had failed to anticipate such major world events as the 1968 Tct offensive in Vietnam, the Rus- sian invasion of Czechoslova- kia the same year, and the 1973 Yom Kippur war in the Middle East. Citing various bureaucratic entanglements and preoccupations as the cause of poor performance, Pike took the agency to task for bunging the one function - gath ering intrellir e:nce - ageinst which tl,:ere is no am diyle dissent. Pike':. secot,ci line of craicisrri was more subsi.antive: Un attackcd Cu"- C r't? as 'iii"s't b;r revs iia~t; a fe et; I don't think we' . ve got a conflict on this one, Toni.. SNYD.ER: What if Jimmy Carter is elected in November? What happens to your job? DIRECTOR BUSH: I serve at the pleasure of the President. And I would not make it difficult for a new President to get rid 18 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100390001-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100390001-4 of me. And I'll tell you why. I don't believe the agency or the Director of CIA, Director of Central Intelligence or the head of CIA should be partisan. But I do believe strongly -that-whoever heads the intelligence community, the Director of Central Intelli- gence, must have the confidence of the President. He can't serve intelligence well if he doesn't. And the President is ill-served if he can't have confidence in what the Director is telling him. And so there is a certain compatibility separate and apart from politics that is in the national interest. And so-what happens, I don't know. And I really think it's far less important than whether this community stays strong, the intelligence community. And so I would say "Mr. President, any time you want to get a new man in here, please proceed so to do." And I don't think that is. making partisan a nonpartisan job. It's simply my conception. of hoI4 government ought to operate. SNYDER: I don't have historicity in my head as to what happens when a President of a different party comes into office. Do you remember what happened.... SNYDER: Yes. When Johnson came in, or when Johnson left and Nixon came in. DIRECTOR BUSH: Well, Dulles -- Dulles was eventually replaced by Kennedy. There was a little period of time. I mean President Kennedy replaced.... SNYDER: Replaced Allen Dulles. DIRECTOR BUSH: ...Allen Dulles. I can't -- I'll be honest; I haven't looked back. SNYDER: Who was in when --- does anybody in the room know when Johnson and Nixon.... DIRECTOR BUSH: Well, Dick Helms. SNYDER: Well., he remained. DIRECTOR BUSH: But I don't remember. I thought you were talking about turnovers. I.can't.... SNYDER: No, I'm just wondering. The minute Kennedy took office from a Republican, Eisenhower, did you fire the CIA Director? .- DIRECTOR BUSH No, no. SNYDER: I don't think so. DIRECTOR BUSH: No, no, no, no. SNYDER: And.when Nixon took it from the Democrat, Mr. Johnson, did he fire the CIA Director? DIRECTOR BUSH: No. But in fairness.... SNYDER: And I'm not trying to dictate.... DIRECTOR BUSH: No', but in fairness, Tom, there has never been a Director who has had as active a political past as I have. And so just as I understood the debate on my nomination before the Senate, I would understand a review of. my position, if- for no other reason than because I had been actively involved on the Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-0077-00432 R000100390001-4 Approved For-Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100390001-4-. other side of the political spectrum, .you know, should your hypothesis work out. But again I come back, not trying to sound holier thin thou, lbut that's inconsequential. What really is essential is now. It's working well. The Director Aof'Central Intelligence'' is given access to a Pros e _ _ n strong foreign intelligence community. 1t:And Jthat's what's-essen-- U tial whoever I P , s resident.. And my future, my getting a job really is .coincide t l: n a SNYDER: We will continue after these announcements: I hope y o u ' l l crag r. d ne SNYDER: You mentioned that you feel it's proper that 11 Carter, the Democratic nominee, be briefed on certain.iitems. Who decides how much he will be told? DIRECTOI BUSH: Well, in the final analysis, the President. The President's instructions to me, as head of the'intelligence com- munity, is the determining factor. But the President took a very broad view. He said I think that it's most important that the that Governor Carter be given intelligence briefings. But then I worked out, as the designee of the President, with Governor Carter the parameters of the briefings. And we decided that they should 'be'on intelligence, that they should stay away,from policy and that - they should stay away from sources and methods, which is a certain code for the things I am to protect under the law. Governor Carter recognized that he didn't need to know at this juncture the sources and methods of the intelligence. And so our briefings-have consisted of-finished intelligence. I,'ve attended 'the. two briefings on'intel- ligence, and fortunately fore him with me went some of our very top experts in the areas that he'was interested in. And we're not holding back. The President has made clear to me he wants Governor Carter fully briefed, and this is what we're doing. And the bene- ficiary is the United States of America. SNYDER: Now in the briefings -- and if you can't say, you will just say "I can't say." I,understand because I'm a neo- phyte and I don't want to get into areas of great sensitivity. But do you brief. the opposition candidate on methodology, per- sonnel, location, or do you brief him on things that are happening currently incountries,where we operate intelligence installations?- DIRECTOR BUSH: It's` the latter. We don't go into metho- dology. Sources and methods of intelligence we don't go into. SNYDER: Like in country "X," Mr. "A" is doing such and such to make sure that political .Ir. "B" will not advance. That kind of thing? DIRECTOR BUSH: No. We don'.t go into the source or method'. What we go into is here's the way one conceives the strength of the Soviet Union, for example, where it's up against NATO, you know' Or, here's what we think that might happen in China after Chairman Mao passes on.. Or, here's a current Intel-- 1'igen'ce briefing. Here's the status of what might be goin-o in some area, maybe the Middle'East or Africa, or wherevergitnis. SNYDER: I understand. DI:RIsCTUP, BUs11: We stay out of policy. We give him intelligence. We respond to questions. And I hope its working 2n Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100390001-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100390001-4 to-his satisfaction. The people at th.e CIA, the professionals with whom I work, feel that the briefings have gone reasonably well. SNYDER: Will there be more before the election? DIRECTOR BUSH: That. depends on what Governor Carter feels he requires. SNYDER: I see. Now what.... DIRECTOR BUSH: The President has authorized me to give him what he needs in terms of intelligence briefings. SNYDER: Has he asked for anything you wouldn't tell him? DIRECTOR BUSH: Now, Tom, you're getting into.... SNYDER: I understand. DIRECTOR BUSH: No, I don't think so. I don't think he has. No. And I don't think we had any differences with the `Governor. SNYDER: What arrangement is there, though, and I'm cer- tain there must be some, between the President and Governor Carter in terms of using information supplied by yourself and your associates as. campaign issue or campaign speechmaking source? DIRECTOR BUSH: Well, I don't -- I don't --- if there is some arrangement that they've discussed, something between them of that nature -- certainly I've not been any intermediary on that kind .of an arrangement. I don't expect that kind of an arrangement exists. I think that any recipient of highly classified intelligence in the position of Governor and certainly the President recognizes he's dealing with sensitive information. And I don't expect there will be an abuse of this information. But should that have been discussed, it hasn't been dis- cussed with me, nor should it be. That would be an arrangement, a policy kind of a thing that would be worked out elsewhere. But I don't believe there's such an arrangement. u now are at . dDing .goo yo this kind SNYDER: But you really are ood I' g . m out of time. But you really are good at this,, and you should do it more often' It would help you, and it would help -your company.-.. ..Thank you for being here this morning. DIRECTOR BUSH: Thank you,-Tom. PIIILAD;sLPi{IA INd~UIRhTj 6 16 SEp i P!Tll>il 197 Quotable: A matter of choice "I don't lie; I just choose -what f say." Former CIA director William ('o11 )y. spooking to students at the University of Pennsyivania Tuesday night Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA- RTP77-00432R000100390001-4 Approved For Release 2001708/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R0D0-10O39000't 4" ._"`' WASHINGTON POST 1 6 SEP 1976 A charges of bank robbery, and who wound up, in an ironic turn of the story, working briefly for the Interna- tional Rescue Committee of which '?Cherne was chairman of the board. . Early last year Casey persuaded the 1los Angeles Times to send him and ,two st.aff reporters to Hong Kong at a reported cost of $15,000 for a prom- ised rendezvous with Hearst. The newspaper subsequently described the episode as a hoax. Casey, acknowl- edged that,the Hearst trip "bummed out." Casey's career also encompassed a tiine-month period as director of spe- :cial projects for Boys Town, the Ne- -braska community started by Father, Flanigan, from which he was fired in a dispute with the administration over. the alleged theft of 3l files for *an MGM television production. (`.'One of my jobs," he said, "was to get them publicity.") When Cherne found out who had turned up with his notebook, lie noti- fied the intelligence staff and was advised "to play it down and not make it appear to,be important." The initial judgment was that the loss was not of great security significance. Cherne maintains that he first learned that Casey was employed in the Los Angeles office of the Inter- national Rescue Committee as a con- sultant during an Aug. 22, 1975,'phone conversation with him. "i said, 'I don't think terribly much about you' association with IRC and when I de- cide finally, I'll ask. for your. resigna- tion.' The green notebook was returned on Aug. 2G, 1975, and Cherne turned it over to. the intelligence, staff. Three weeks later he called Casey and asked for h:s resignation. "He submitted cheerfully, always cheerfully," Cherne reminisced. On Sept.. -2 Casey sent a Mailgram to the p_csiding judge in the Heist case, Oliver J. Carter, in the name of the IBC. "We, p.?ayfully request that Patricia Hearst be admitted to bail." the tele- grams read. "Picasv consider that Patty Hearst was directly and Indi- rectly i esponsible rror the, safe cvacua- timr of :m:97 men, women and childr::n W tit ;,;t reg:tl;I i'' ,)to!- own safety dur- ing th4 last. week of \pril, 1975, at Srti ai Smith Vietnam." 'I?nc lclegrani was inmmedi'ately re- purtiate:l by the IBC, on Chernc's in. st; uctinns. In i'elr nary of this year ChM-11e was appointed to the Intelligence Oversight Board by -President. Ford and also named chairman of the For- eign hutciligence Advisory Board, of which lie was a member at. the time of his European trip. Ills' offices here arc in Iito Executive Office Building,. and lie cnnuturtes from New Y rr?k an avcrarie of twice a week. 11) Itlto-ch, a rcnoricr for the tiara M. e n Evening '. Tribune, Robed t)ielrich, ,.all"d Cherne: e:,platninz; that Casey had showed him the contents of the notebook. e By Laurence Stern Wasnlnufo i Post Staff Writer Leo Cherne, one of President Ford's chief intelligence advisers, . is a cen- tral' figure in a 'justice Department national security investigation that i>i being described by federal officials as "the green book affair." The green book is a government note pad in. which a staff aide to Cherne recorded briefings with diplo- matic and intelligence officers during a trip to Europe in March, 1975. Cherne is chairman of the Presi- dent's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and a member of the newly :formed three-member Intelligence Oversight Board. The notebook, officially described .as having contained "classified infor- mation. . injurious to. the national security of the United States," disap- peared immediately after Cherne and his aide, Cmdr. Lionel H. Olmer, re- turned from the European trip. Here the plot thickens. Olmer. an intelligence officer during his entire "19-year naval career, says he, has no idea how the little green notebook got out of his possession. He ? is described by associates as an extremely meticu- lous professional experienced in the '.handling of classified material. 'Within several hours after his ar- rival at his Rockville,: ] Id.. home, he called _ Wheaton. Byers, executive see- retary-of the Foreign ,Intelligence Ad- visory. Board and advised him of the notebook's disappearance' 'he' said yes- terday.. An investigation was con? ducted and the notebook was. pre- sumed lost when the aircraft cabin was cleaned. The mystery was solved-to' the greater consternation of :Cherne and. Olmer-on July 24, 1975, when the in- telligence adviser received a tele- phone call from Michael James Casey of Los Angeles. "He said, 'I have your notebook,' " Cherne recounted yesterday in de- scribing what he called a "14-month ordeal." It was during this and subsequent telephone conversations that Cherne learned that Casey had served two years at Soleclad prison near Sall Francisco., Casey. further , explained that he had recovered the notebook' from sympathizers of Patricia Hearst, who was then at }are. Casey contended that the finders of the notebook had hoped that. 'it "might be exchanged for considerations in their behalf and I -told him that 1 wouldn't do it: even if I could," Cherne said. Casey, in a tctepiioitb interview from Omaha. wh re lie was acquitted yesterday of a "felonious entry" rhargo, insisted: "1 was-not. trying to burn Chcrnc. I 101(1 him how I got the hook and the interest of the people who had found it." Casey is a '32-year-old Californian who prides Itiniseif on his work in rc- setllenr'ni. I)[ Vietnamese refugeca, who srtught. io appear as a witness in behalf of ilearst at her trial on The notebook, according to in- *nrmeci sntuces, contained notes on briefings with embassy and Central Intelligence Agency officials about a number of issues, including reactions to news stories about the CIA. the im- pact of the massive flow of petrodol- lars 'ram the West. to the Arab states, as well as '.'unprecedented unemploy- mert aa.rl. catastrophic inflation" in European countries. There was an-early refe?eo^ce-in. the notebook, both Cherne and Casey. ac- knowledge, to New York Times re- porter Terry Robards. Casey located Rnhards in New York, he said, and it was the Times reporter who specu- lated that the initials "L.C." in the notebook must have referred to Cherne. This, said Casey, is: how he concluded that the notebook belonged to Cherne. Dietrich wrote a story in the Trib- une last April 14 charging that he had tried tq alert the FBI to his discovery of docun,ents "containing the names of 100 or more ;CIA agents" and that the details "were in the hands of an ex- convict with ties to the Ameri- can underground." Dietrich also charged he had been intimidated by myst-rious phone calls and an armed visitor who "asked about Cherne and about copies of Ca- sey'i papers in this reporter's posses sion." Dietrich's story raised more ques- tions at the time than it answered. Word of the report also leaked to New Times magazine and was the subject of a column by its West Coast editor, Robert Scheer. Cherne said that reports were being circulated that the oot-cbook had been ;found "in a 'Paris whorehouse-an outrageous ii'. .. ' visited no whnrc- houses in any European city or else- where." In the course of these events the se- curity priority of the notebook was substantially upgraded by the CIA's Office of Security, and a Justice De- partment investigation was launched to determine how it was lost and who found it. The CIA declined comment on the inquiry and Justice Depart- ment only confirmed that an investi- gation was under way. Cherne said he initiated the request for an investigation of the entire epi- sode. In the course of yesterday's in- terview his desk was covered with documents that. detailed the develop- ments in the extraordinary case. One of the curiosities is that Olmer, who took the notes in, "cryptic short- hand," was never asked to hell) de- code them by'CIA security officials. He is still baffled at the disappear- ance. "haven when I went to the men's room dvrin- the trip I took the note- book out of my attache case and car- ried it with Inc." he said. Cherne, who lamented that: lie had sucnessrully stopued smoking for sev- . era] ye?n's, had three packs of ciga- no hip d':sk yesterday, which tic shared u itli a reporter. , . 22 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100390001-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100390001-4 WASHINGTON POST 1 5 p 1976' F : Inquiry ?~ . On Leftist Party Halted Long Probe Finds Wrongdoing by Socialist Workers done` routinely. It's 'no' coincidence that they picked the one organization that has been laying bare all the FBI's abuses and illegalities. We think they did It in hopes that we would end our lawsuit and put a stop to the revela- tions about what the FBI has done." :Perkus said the SWP plans to con- tinue prosecuting its suit. She' added that the SWP will ask Judge Griesa to issue a permanent injunction barring any further FBI activity against the SWP and to order the bureau to turn over immediately the names of all- present and past informers infiltrated into the party. :'The SWP, whose national member- ship is believed not to exceed 2,000, has its ideological roots in Trotsky- ism, a revisionist Marxist ideology based on the theory that permanent, worldwide revolution is needed to maintain economic systems beneficial to the working classes. The party has insisted for years that it has no connection with the Communist Party or movement and does not advocate violence as a means of, overthrowing the U. S. capitalist system. . ' 'In its suit, which originally asked damages of $37 million, the SWP charged that its pursuit of legitimate' political activities had been seriously undermined by an FBI "dirty tricks" campaign. The FBI activities included the use of paid informers, wiretap- ping, interception and opening of mail and burglaries of SWP offices and the homes of its members, the party al- leged. Also named as defendants in the suit ;were other federal agencies, in- cluding the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency and the Internal Revenue Service. The suit Is still a long way from res- By John M. Goshko Washington Post Staff Writer The Justice Department reveal- ed yesterday that it has ordered the FBI to halt its 38-year investi- gation of the . Socialist Workers. Party-a small left-wing political .group whose counterattack helped to plunge the FBI into crisis. ' The bureau had been pursuing the SWP since 1938 without producing any evidence of wrongdoing by the party or its members. The FBI's activities caused the SWP In 1973 to file what has become a $40 million lawsuit against the bureau and other federal law enforcement agenc- ies, charging them with illegal harass- ment and intimidation. As a result of evidence uncovered by the lawsuit, the Justice Department has been conducting a seven-month Investigation into allegations that the FBI carried out widespread illegal burglaries against suspected "extrem- ists" during the past five years. Justice Department spokesmen con- firmed that the FBI had been ordered to stop investigating the SWP after it was learned yesterday that, the depart- rnent had sent letters to the SWP and to Judge Thomas P. Griesa, who is hearing the suit in U.S. District Court in New York, notifying them of the action. The spokesmen said Attorney Gen- eral Edward H. Levi had issued the -order following a "systematic review" .of how recently issued guidelines cov- ering domestic security investigations apply to the SWP and its youth' affili- ate, the Young Socialist Alliance. The spokesmen insisted that Levi's decision came in the course of review- ing the cases of all political groups under investigation by the FBI and had no connection with the still pend- ing lawsuit. ' Levi's guidelines stipulate that' the FBI can investigate an organization or individual only if it has evidence that they have been engaged in some spe- cific Illegal act.. The guidelines bar the FBI from maintaining surveillance of a group solely for the purposes of gathering intelligence or because it suspects that the members might do something illegal. FBI Director Clarence M. Kelley also released a statement last night, saying that the bureau had partici- pated with Levi in the review. Kelley added. "1Ve;agree it is now nece:;sar;y to discontinue such investigations." In New York, Cathy Perkus. 'a olution. But it already has triggered a' number-of sensational disclosures that include: ? An unprecedented admission by an FBI agent, George P. Baxtrum Jr., that, prior to 1965, he participated in at least 50 burglaries of SWP offices in New York at the direction of his su- periors. . ? ? Use ,by another FBI agent, Joseph Furrer, of his Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination - the first known instance 'of an FBI of= ficial taking the Fifth - when ques- BALTIMORE SUN 11-Sept. 1976 Ex-chief Colby defends CIA's_ worth to nation tioned about his knowledge. of ' bur-' glaries against the SWP. Disclosure that an FBI informer, Timothy J. Redfearn, committed three burglaries against the SWP - the most recent in July - and turned doc- uments taken in these break-ins over to the bureau's Denver field office. ? A charge by a Portland, Oreg.,' man, Alan I-L._Selling, that the FBI had paid him to join the SWP and act as an informer against the party. Sell- ing also contended that he was 'in- duced by FBI officials to commit an illegal burglary, but he said that was directed against an organization not connected with the SWP. ? Revelation that the bureau, over the years, had used approximately 1,- 600 persons as informers against the SWP and still retains 66 informers posing as members of the party. The lawsuit also has had repercus- .'sions that go far beyond the FBI's in= volvement with the SWP. Earlier this year, Judge Griesa ordered the bu= reau to search the files in all its of.- .fices and turn over to the SWP all documents relating to the party. The resulting documents search turned up a previously secret file in the New York field office indicating that the FBI had committed burglar- ies in the course of domestic security investigations during 1972 and 1973. Previously, the bureau had said it ceased such so-called .'black bag jobs" in 1966. - . This information prompted thr Jus- tice Department to launch an investi- gation. that has spread across the ;country .to a number of cities. It has resulted in the empaneling of a fed- 'eral grand ?ury ;" cew York to.probe the break-ins there -and consider 'whether the FBI officials involved should be Indicted on. criminal charges. Sources familiar with this investiga- tion said yesterday that the grand jury should complete the first phase of its inquiry b), the end of.this week or early next week. In this initiai phase, the sources added, Justice Department lawyers have concentrated on presenting to the grand.jury testimony or informa- tion from FBI agents who, during 1972 and 1973, were assigned to the New York field office's squad investigating the radical Weather Underground. gal case'initlated by the Socialist Worker's' party over government spying on domes- tic dissidents and insisted, in the face of a hostile questioner, "The CIA does not train people to torture." Mr. Colby, under whose direction the intelligence community made public many of its past controversial activities, by DAVID ZIELENZIGER insisted that under new presidential direc- Speaking dispassionately and almost as tives and with adeouate congressional if he had never been fired as director of oversight previous abuses will not have a the Central Intelligence Agency 10 months chance to be repeated. ago, William E. Colby last night defended "It may be again necessary for the CIA the intelligence community's ability to to assist decent local people suffering un- cope with threats to national security in. der a racist despot," Mr. Colby said, "but the future. from our mistakes in Vietnam we have While he spent most of his 35-minute. learned that we don't use military assist- lecture at Towson State University de- ance to solve a political problem." scribing the rationale for intelligence op- "One doesn't discuss disbanding the ar- erations, Mr. Colby also admitted "we did my or the police because of mistakes that but now we were made in handling a case," asserted do things wrong in the past , l n woman for the Political Rif:trts have corrected them." the 56-year-old attorney, "and that same )efe I~efcnsc t~ und, %%hich is financing the SWIG suit, s: id: Approved For Rpjj r - f-004 !,~ QQt9~eth epee." ...If .. t__1. t r, he r t a e- ~0 s trf3ed the lecture.. YF1, ,AVit 4 I4-I,I:Y V" ?IIA~ 411.J YY 111 23 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIARDP77-00432Rbb010O390001-4 WASHINGTON POST 1 2 SEP 1976 Alton-Frye ssu z curiosity in Cuba, implying that, had his request been granted, t d An inquisitive American learns many things on a visit to Cuba. One of the most surprising is that high officials in Havana seem genuinely hopeful that the investigation of the Kennedy assassination will be re- opened. They are convinced that there was a Cuban -factor in the murder. - Conversations with senior officials of the Cuban government, including Deputy Prime Minister Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, make clear that they have followed closely the disclosures by the Senate Intelligence Committee casting doubt upon the Warren Commis- sion investigation: The Cubans are well aware that the doubts center on the failure of the CIA and the FBI to inform the Warren Commission of the several plots mounted by the CIA to kill Fidel Castro. Knowledge of these plots appears to have been withheld even from the FBI and CIA officials who were responsible for investigating the President's murder and for sup- porting the work of the Warren Commission. As a re- sult, there was no special effort to explore the possi- ble involvement of either the Cuban government or. Cuban exiles in the assassination. Evidence developed by the Senate committee makes both hypotheses plau- sible-and a new inquiry imperative. - The situation is murkier and more perplexing than ever. Those who are resistant to conspiracy theories and who have been prepared-ever: eager -to be- Iieve that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone can no longer rely on the Warren Commission report as an The writer is a senior fellow of the Council on For- eign Relations. adequate prop for their predilections. The commis- sion did not know that on Nov. 22, 1963, at about the very. hour Oswald struck in Dallas, an agent of the Central Intelligence Agency was meeting with a rank- ing Cuban official (code-named AMLASH and re- cently identified as Rolando Cubela) to plan the mur- der of Castro. Simultaneously, in Cuba. a French re- porter, Jean Daniel,,was spending the day with Cas- tro, conveying to the Cuban leader views expressed by President edy in a brief interview at the White House-on, Oct. V:, persuading Castro that Ken- nedy wanted to explore ways to normalize relations. Thus, at,the. moment. the President was killed, U.S. policy toward Cuba appeared to be moving not only on two tracks but in opposite directions, and rtwvo- ment on'dithertrack could have provoked violent re- sponse by one or another Cuban faction. ,perceptions inside the Cuban government re- sponded to both tendencies, in U.S. policy. There is good reason to suspect that the AMLASH operation involved a double agent, or at least a singularly inept one. Castro almost certainly knew of it. The CIA even- tually concluded that the AMLASH activity was "inse- cure" and terminated it. Among other discoveries, within two days of the assassination it was known (but not., to the Warren Commission) that AMLASII had been in contact. with Soviet personnel in Mexico City, where Oswald had gone in September 1963 to visit. both the ('uhan and Soviet consulates. WW'bether these facts are significar.t or merely coincidental, one can- not 'tell. In retrospect, Cuban authorities note with some relief that Oswald was denied permission to visit a the finger of suspicion would surely have pointe Havana. Perhaps more suggestive of a direct leak from AM- LASH to Castro was the sequence of events on Sept. 7, 1983, when the CIA re-established contact with the Cu- ban conspirator for the first time since the preceding year. Late that evening, Prime Minister Castro called in Associated Press reporter Daniel Harker for an un- expected interview. Only three Western reporters were based in Havana at the time and their contact with Castro was quite limited. Evidently, the Cuban leader had a message he wished to get on the record through Harker. He charged that the United States was aiding terrorist plots in Cuba and warned U.S. leaders that "if they are aiding terrorist plans to elimi- nate Cuban leaders, they themselves will not be safe." This threat of reprisals seems less inflammatory and more understandable now that we know what Castro knew at the time, namely, that the United States was in fact'stepping up its covert operations against Cuba during the summer and fall of 1963. Yet it seems an exception to the main lines of Cuban pol- icy as it was then evolving. For months afer the missile crisis of 1962, Castro had been displeased with the Soviets, and there are signs that he' was interested in an opening to Wash- ington. On Sept. 5, the Cubans quietly proposed talks with the Americans at the United Nations, and Ken- nedy soon responded with interest. Also, in early Sep- tember the Time magazine bureau chief in Buenos Aires, Gavin Scott, travelling on a Canadian passport,, spent two weeks in, Cuba. Although key U.S. officials have no recollection of consulting with Scott on that occasion, the Cubans recall his questions and com- ments as hinting of American interest in a possible ac-. commodation, much as they were later to interpret. the discussions between Jean Daniel and Castro. Then and now.the Cubans' attitude toward Ken- nedy has been a compound of political antipathy and- personal admiration. While critical of Kennedy's role in various counter-revolutionary efforts, Castro and, his associates voice a warm, almost affectionate re- gard for the President's courage and realism. They profess to have seen his death as a grave setback to more hopeful relations between the two countries. The John Kennedy of 1963 was not, in their judgment, the same man who was inaugurated in 1961, but a more mature, poised and forward-looking leader with, whom they could have done business. With this frame of reference, Cuban officials specu- late that the real origin of the assassination lies in an- ti-Castro circles, with which Oswald also was in touch. They emphasize that assassination is incompatible with their own revolutionary doctrine and that they never contemplated it even against Batista, the pre- vious Cuban ruler. And they volunteer the suspicion that the recent murders of Sam Giancana and Johnny Rosselli, the Mafia figures who consorted with the CIA to kill Castro, surely have some connection with Cuban exile politics and the Kennedy murder. Castro has said publicly that he has no proof "count-, er-revolutionary elements" planned the assassination, but that is clearly the consensus in Havana. Further investigation may still be inconclusive, but, far from, seeing it as an impediment to Cuban-American rela- lions, the Castro regime welcomes such an inquiry. Their curiosity seems greater titan their complicity. U. ,?,, woP'LD i?',',.PORT One. result of widespread attacks on the Central Intelligence Agency: Co- vert operations by the Agency, insiders say, now account for only 2 per cent of the CIA's work. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RD77-00432R000100390001-4 avana The JFK ass Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100390001-4 WSEPO1976 AR By Henry S. Bradsher Washington Star Staff Writer The Ford administration has be- come concerned about the extensive Soviet program for civil defense and the lack of any comparable effort to protect the American people in case of intercontinental nuclear war. The first comprehensive official study of the large Soviet civil defense program to be made in many years is now under way at the CIA and elsewhere around town. A National Security Study Memorandum is being coordinated at the Pentagon examining U.S. civil defense needs. The NSSM,, pulling together differ- ent agencies views in order to arrive at a top-level recommendation to the President, is due to be completed by Sept. 30. It will provide the basis for a presidential decision whether to fit an expansion of civil defense work into the 1978 fiscal year budget. But so far the interagency materi- . al focused on CIA work has not pro- duced a clear picture of the Soviet program. There is disagreement on whether the preparations to protect the Soviet people from nuclear war by shelters or evacuation to the countryside which are described in Russian manuals are being carried out. THE SOVIET PROGRAM and U.S. needs are connected. by apprehen- sions of some American military analysts that an imbalance in civil defense programs would make this country vulnerable. In a crisis situa- tion, the Kremlin could threaten the American people with destruction while sheltering its own people, thus reducing the U.S. ability to negotiate from equal strength, these analysts warn. But this contention that the mutual deterrence "balance of terror" has been eroded is questioned by other analysts on two grounds. One is that a protected population could not long survive if its cities were destroyed and its air-and crops poisoned by fallout, so that protection from nuclear explosions might be meaningless in the medium or long term. The other involves whether the Soviet Union really can, or on the basis of present intentions will be- come able to, protect its people from nuclear attack. U.S. policy during the 1950s was to try to protect cities against bomber attack, and the advent of interconti- nental missiles led to the backyard air raid shelter boom in the early 1960s. But by the middle '60s official doctrine switched under Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara to an TION the findings of people like Goure on which such warnings are based. A recent study by John M. Collins of the Library of Congress's Congressional Research Service said Soviet plans "are impressive on paper (but) how practical they would be in practice is problematical." Col- lins thought "no U.S. authority as yet has satisfactorily answered hard questions" about the Soviet program. One senior administration official handling arms control negotiations says U. S. Embassy personnel in the Soviet Union and travelers have fail- ed to see the kind of evidence that would be expectable if the paper pro- gram really existed as workable civil defense protection. A government expert on Soviet affairs reports a widespread suspicion that little more has been done than earmark re- sources. The main realization which had de- veloped in the administration by last spring as a result of publicity like the House hearings was that not enough was known about Soviet civil defense efforts. The CIA had not taken a seri- ous'look at the subject for more than five years - since before the post- ABM treaty program expansion that Goure detected. SO A MULTIAGENCY STUDY was commissioned. It should have been finished two months ago. In- -stead, each draft report had pro- duced new doubts about the reliabil- ity of available material. "The basic problem is that we just haven't been putting enough re- sources on this," an informed observer commented. "It should be possible for the U.S. intelligence community to determine whether. Soviet shelters and evacuation plans and all that really do exist, but the subject hasn't been getting enough attention so rar." The National Security Study Memorandum was ordered by the White House after the study of Soviet efforts had begun. It is being coordi- nated in the office of Donald R. Cot- ter, an assistant to Secretary of De- fense Donald Rumsfeld for atomic energy affairs. An administration official said the NSSM was the result of accumulat- ing concern about the U.S. civil defense posture rather than any specific alarm over what the Soviets might be doing. But even if a gap is found and a threatening imbalance discerned, the chances of organizing an effective civil defense program in this country in anything less than an alt.-out, war situation are considered small by some informed officials. Therefore, the realistic options open to Cotter's study team stop somewhere short of the kind of ... ...,r .,. ...hi h S i 1:? a c ov et . QJ.lMlll t/,1 VFI 41,Ci4 {.IL openly expressed. But the Soviet Un- )ireeze blew in from the sea. Oleander state-building has displaced the search ion has provided him with a first-class and jasmine were in bloom. for unity of.-the 1950s and 1960s, secu- modern arsenal of -more than 2,000 Could this be the center of world larism in.public life has made'sweep tanks, Migs, surface-to-air missiles, terrorism of .which President Gerald ing gains, and most Arab leaders have and even the dreaded SCUD-a. .Ford spoke the other week? The So= ground-to-ground missile with a range i viet. Union's new Middle Eastern come to believe that the Arab-Israeli of 190 miles. springboard? The fief of the "madman ? conflict should be-settled by political The Soviet Union may see Libya ,of Tripoli," as President Anwar Sadat negotiation.,. only as a sort of supply dump, where now describes: the young Libyan Some argue that the moral and ma- ~? weapons may. be stored for future ruse, leader? . . ?terial, support that . Qaddafi gives to f. There were two high points of the his cherished causes around the world a11 n intermediary to arm the festivities: a midnight tea party given is no more than proverbial Bedouin Progressive side. Soviet arms have ,'by Prime Minister Abdul Salam Jal- hospitality run riot. It is said that found their way via Libya to Lebanon, and they may also be reaching the loud in the gardens of the former someone with the right ideological Polisario in the Western Sahara. royal palace, and Col. Qaddafi's own coloring has only to seek his help to For Qaddafi, however, the mere fiappearance at the anniversary parade, be directed to the jihad (holy war) . presence of his vast armory provides where he was mobbed by an adoring fund, a sort of vast petty-cash box un- clout. The truth is that the achieve- crowd. ~ der religious control. merits that are realistically on to The two men could be brothers. , Libya's population is little' more him are not Sadat's overthrow, nor a They share an unaffected manner, a than. 2 million and the country is far great blow struck for .distant Moslems plain-speaking candor that has be- from the heartlands of the Middle or frustrated Palestinians, -but rather come the hallmark of the Libyan revo- East, but Qaddafi's ideas, underpin- the extension of Libya's influence in lution. It is striking how little they ned by an annual oil revenue of the-central Mediterranean. are encumbered by protocol, pomp, or around $8 billion, have made him the . He has Malta in his pocket, and has even security. precautions. main pole of opposition to Secretary guarantee( His trouble-making reputation of State Henry Kissinger's Pax Amer- :plaiinedwiitl cits se after lratiallin 1979. Brit's is ten abroad has perhaps blinded outsiders lea. to what. Qaddaft has achieved at couraging Sicilian separatists and is home. In seven years, and at a cost of Qaddafi-is out to destroy, by every meddling in Corsica, Crete and Cy-? possible means, the American-spon- ? prus. He has patched up his $20 billion, he has created one of the sorrel peace with Tunis and stayed friends with At. world's most lavish welfare states, 1 Ptroces;;, which he be- world's d schools and une tI 1ieves is a betrayal of Arab and Pales. geria. Libya is already a Mccliterra- scatte the land and begun to turn t1111,11111 interests. Sadat's Egypt, the mean power, if not yet decisively an linchpin of Kissinger's' step-by-step, di- - ,? Arab one. ., 1 , WASHINGTON POST ;) SEP 1976 Y 11 Till 91 6Y b c axa 1":! 4rI By H. D. S. G'recnway wnfllnuton Post i orcJOU survlce TEHRAN, Iran Sept. 2-SAVAK is worried about its image. +,. ~c?u u11 t.L \ anct t'131 roiled Into I Ft LL one, .uid as such it tl enjoys a 1iarful rel?u,t:itian as an 36 Europeans, uniformed Soviet top with Qaddafi's political messianism. -brass, a special envoy of Fidel Castro, He thinks he is a man of destiny, the ~ I a. i". i astve 01101 all-powerful ec rct police that ;rules by tortu 1 re and. ter; ur, rend eru'hes all dissent. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100390001-4 Approved For a eR T a0 The weekly Economist of London haq estimated the number of political prisoners languishing in SAVAK jails at 20,000 to 40,000: Other estimates have put. the number as high as 100,000. SAVAK officials grant interviews relatively infre- quently. But its deputy director, Parviz Sabeti, is Worried about all the bad press his organization has been receiving and, in a recent interview, said it is. unfair. "These torture charges are pure fabrication. and not at all true," Sabeti said. SAVAK should, get credit from the Western press for fighting comn3ti- nism, he contended, but instead "they are sticking it to us. . , "In 'all Iran there are only 3,200 political prison- ers. We don't have enough jails to house 100,000 prisoners," Sabeti said at SAVAK headquarters, oil the eastern edge of Tehran. "Put.. this in. your newspaper," Sabeti said: "Article 131 of the criminal code states that any government official caught torturing anybody will get six years in prison," he said. Sabeti castigated the FBI for not keeping closer watch on Iranian exile and student groups in Amer- THE BALTIMORE SUN 3 Septeinber 1976 New Delhi (AP)-The Indi- an Parliament voted yesterday to invesiigaiie one of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's most outspoken critics-Subraman- Ian Swarm, aright-wing, oppo- sition leader and . a former member of the Harvard Uni- versity econornics faculty. The vote came amid accusa- tions from Mrs. Gandhi's ruling Congress party and pro-Mos- cow Communists that the Unit- ed States Central Intelligence Agency is aiding the 36-year- ,old Mr. Swamy. Political sources said the on- `precedented investigation could cost Mr. Swamy his seat in the upper house even though he has four years remaining in his term. According to the govern- ment, 'fr. S?,vamy fled to the. West in January after evading arrest during the 14 months since the government pro- claimed a national emergency "Ind detained many opposition leaders. He returned briefly to India early this month to sign the at- tendance roster in Parliament I to keep his membership active, but then escaped abroad again, opposition sources said. . Ora Mehta,..the minister of home affairs, accused Mr. Swa- my of carrying out "anti-Indian propaganda calculated to bring ,lea. The CIA, he said,, was "no help at all." SAVAK has been "quite successful" in rounding up terrorists in the past, Sabeti said. He expressed confidence that the persons responsible for the mur- der of three American civilian technicians in Teh- ran last Saturday would eventually be caught. SAVAK believes the group responsible for the killings is the M11ujahidden E Khalq which began?as curious mixture of Marxism and Moslem con- servatisin. The number of active 'terrorists at large in Iran may not exceed 100, Sabeti said. The Americans were involved in "Project IBEX," a secret electronic intelligence gathering system { which the U.S. firm of Rockwell International is in- stalling for the Iranian government. Sabeti said althougli there had been anti-state ac- tivity in the past, political assassinations by killers trained abroad and supplied with the latest 'Soviet weapons was a comparatively new phenonienori for Iran. . , i Before 19711, Iran had not felt it necessary to exec- ute people for anti-state activities, he said. But the new wave of terrorisei has "caused its to get a bit rougher," he said, and now terrorists frequently are ent v s pro e a le 7 m- I the Parliament,' its reenrbers, position have every right to say ii the government and the nation in and out of this house what we as a whole into disrepute and want," said Vishwanatha Men- contempt." ' on, a Marxist Communist mem- In a reference to an earlier b r. "Ile {Mr. Swarnyl must he warrant for Mr. Swainy's ar- allowed to say what he wants. rest, Mr. lehta said the econo- We need not spare the ruiiog mist was guilty of "evasion of party." . law and fleeing from justice Yogendra Sharma of the and legal processes, flouting pro-Moscow Communists de- lawful orders and generally be- nounced Mr. Swamy for having having in a manner unworthy of said, according to an interview a member of this house." published in the 'Toronto Star Mr. Swamy: has reportedly in Fabruary, that the.Commu- traveled in the United States nists in India might try to as- and Canada since leaving India, sassinate Dirs. Gandhi. . . often addressing rneet.ings and "We Communists will save giving press interviews to de- the prune minister at the cost nounce Mrs. Gandhi's eitergen- of our lives," Mr. Sharma said. cy rule. "It is the fascist elements in the Mr.. Swamy taught econom- country who wart to kill de- tcs at Harvard from 196' to mocracy, playing into the hands 1969 and was a visiting profes- of the CIA, while putting all the son of economics there in 1911 blame on the Communists." and 197;1 be:ore being elected ? Haresh De.o Malviya. a to the Indian upper llnus': in member of the Congress party, q accused the CIA of helping Mr. With dr. Swamy s own col- Swamy operate abroad..... leagues in the right-wing Jana Singh party absent from the ? "I see the invisible hard of chamber because of a continu- the CIA." he said. "It is the poll- info boycott by the non,-Corn- cy of the CIA to destabilize gov- munist opocsition, a leader of errments not in their favor, and the Marxist Communist party -'their hostility to India is' well was the only person to oppose known. - the government's motion to "I dcfiniteiv feel Mr. Sub- start the investigation, ramanian Swami is an agent of "When the democratic sys- the CIA who has infiltrated into tern is being broken down by this house. We should e spell the ruling party, we in the op- him, the earlier the better." .. 37 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 CIA-RDP77-00432R000100390001-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100390001-4 Taaesdoy, September 7, 1976 The Washington Star One of the storied traits of tyrants is that, no matter how impregnable they might seem to be, they never feel safe. Is this one of the explana- tions for Indira Gandhi's current bid to bury In- dian democracy under further layers of parlia- mentary and constitutional assent to her one- woman rule? Otherwise, the Gandhi government's demand for substantial new powers would seem to be un- necessary. Under the "emergency" authority she already claims to have, Mrs. Gandhi over the last 14 months has proven herself completely capable of jailing thousands of opponents, in cluding three dozen legislators, imposing a sweeping censorship that suppresses news even of parliamentary debate and cowing a once proudly independent judiciary. With her major critics locked up, resistance to her dictatorial course has been pathetically weak, and the world's most populous democracy lies dormant. And since Mrs. Gandhi's. Congress party enjoys commanding parliamentary control, there is no question about the government getting whatever legislative backing it wants -- including support for changing the constitution. It is by the constitutional amendment route that Mrs. Gandhi seeks new legal embellish- 'ment of her bosshood as prime minister. Powers of the judiciary to review legislation and en- force civil liberties would be curtailed. Parlia- ment would be permitted to ban "anti-national activities and associations." And the prime minister, acting through the figurehead presi- dent, could simply order further changes in the THE WASHINGTON POST Friday, Sept. 17. 1976 aC k An de .gon and jeq Whitten sa constitution without even the need for a parlia- mentary rubber stamp. Some members of the parliamentary opposi- tion still at large were scathing in their denunciations of the Gandhi regime's constitu- tional proposals. "All the pillars of parliamentary democracy are being converted into pliant tools of an all-powerful executive," said H.M. Patel. "The main thrust of the bill is to establish a totalitarian rule of one-party dictatorship," said a Marxist member. Mr. Patel and his supporters walked out in a boycott of the parliamentary proceeding to avoid giving "a semblance of constitutional legitimacy to the move to throttle, democracy and impose authori- tarian rule." The parliamentary give-and-take seems to have a democratic ring until you realize that only foreigners like us can read about it, and even our correspondents are hampered. Censor- ship prevents the Italian people from learning the substance of the criticism voiced against the Gandhi program. The opposition also accuses the government of going back on a promise to permit public debate of the changes. As for editorial critiques of the constitutional plan by India's once-lively press, we regret to report virtually nothing along that line. The nearest an editorialist came to questioning the proposals was with reference to the plan for executive amendment of the constitution. An editorial in Tile Statesman called this "ex traor?. dinary indeed." That may be the most pregnant "indeed" ever written. S,. file s In blunt, blistering language, Saudi 'i't Saudi oil minister was con- Arabian officials have accused the, vinced that the United States was de. United States of building up the shah- liberately bolstering the shah's mili- of Iran for an armed invasion of Ara- tary power and that "Iran's extraordi- bian oil fields. - nary military buildup' was quite The respected Saudi oil minister, clearly aimed at occupying the Arab Ahmed Zaki Yamani, warned that the states across the gulf, the emirates, shah was "highly unstable mentally." Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and even Saudi If the U.S. authorities failed to recog- Arabia itself." nize this, added Yamani, they must be The Saudis had become persuaded, losing their "powers of observation." Akins noted, that "in the next Arab-Is- The Saudis confided their fears last raeli war, Israel ... would be encour- year to James E. Akins, then the U. S. aged to occupy Tobuk in northern ambassador, who relayed the message Saudi Arabia, and Iran would be told to Washington in startling secret let- to occupy the Arabian littoral." ters and memos. If such a situation developed, Ya- One "nienioranduni for the file" mani warned Akins: "Iraq would be in- dated Aug. 1x1, 1975, describes the ex- volved immediately and so would be plosive conversation with Yamani. 'l'he the Soviet Union. But if Iran should oil minister, according to the secret succeed in occupying part of the Ara- memo, said "the conclusion the Saudis bia-a coast, it would find only smoking were reaching was that we had an rttins, and the Western oil consumers agreement with Iran to let it take over would face caatastrophe." the entire Arabian littoral of the Per- Akins responded, according to Ills scan Gulf." secret memo, that "such a plan would Yamaani believed the United States be sheer ni adness." Yamaaai agreed "head urged the siaaail to naalce peace that Altins "was quite bat tadd- with Iraq," Akins added, "so frail, ed: "We think you may have- gone would have a freer hand ita, the lower mad." Gulf." Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100390001-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100390001-4 NEW YORK TIMES 17 SEP 1976 Challenge to the Shuttle Kissinger's Tested Style of Negotiating Faces Minister Vorster. But in the interim, thel A Very Different Range of Problems in Africa riots and killings have occurred South Africa, and they have made it difficult) B JOHN DARNTON for African Presidents to explain howl By they can countenance conversations with Special to The New York Times a man their own newspapers decry as DAR ES SALAAM, Tanzania, Sept. 16 Secretary said, referring-'to both whites 1 a butcher of black children. So far, Secretary of State Henry A. Kis- and blacks, is "the reluctance of anybody Mr. Kissinger is new to Africa, and singer's mission to bring peace to south- to admit that negotiations are possible i some would say he has yet to acquire ern Africa has shown only the delicacy, before they know that negotiations will; the necessary feel for the politics and complexity and immensity of the job in- succeed." special sensibilities. Days before his arri- vplved.- His point, as far as black Africa is con- vat here, he caused a flap because press Ti. Following his talks with cerned, is not quite valid. The African reports said that he had been "invited" President Julius K. Nyererc leaders could retort that long before Mr. instead of "welcomed"-a distinction Kissinger entered the scene, at the Victo- promptly corrected by the image-con- News yesterday,. two dramatically n,Analysis contrasting news conferences ria Falls conference last year, they tried 1 scions Tanzanians. were held. In one, President negotiating for majority rule with the! Three Conflicts Involved Nyerere, sitting on the back Rhodesian Prime Minister, Ian D. Smith, The African presidents say they fear porch of his state house, passionately ex- using Prime Minister John Vorster of I that the United States Is acting out of plained his mixed feelings toward the South Africa as an intermediary. The fact I self-interest, to contain Soviet influence, American intiative and said, in effect, that the venture failed-because Mr. rather than out of a sincere commitment that he was less hopeful than ever. .Vorster was reluctant to apply sufficient to the concept of majority rule. If this! In the other, Mr. Kissinger, braced be- pressure on Mr. Smith, according to the is the case, they say, then America will hinds lectern at the Kilimanjaro Hotel, Africans-has left a sense of pessimism drift into an alliance with South Africa, suggested that President Nyerere's re- and even betrayal. which claims to be fighting communism, marks were the kind of thing that accom- The repuations of moderates, such as if the negotiations fail. panics negotiations and sought to portray President Kenneth D. Kanda of Zambia, But there is also a strong moral tone himself as nothing more than a conduit suffered in the growing nationalist fervor to' their position. They say they want for relaying views between black-ruled of Organization of African Community someone on their side because it is right, and white-ruled"countries, gatherings, and they have changed from and not because of fear of another super- But the fact remains that so far. the doves to hawks. power. The level of idealism clashes Kissinger trip has drawn a good deal of In the Middle East, Mr. Kissinger somewhat with Mr. Kissinger's brand of suspicion and doube from black Africa, worked for a peace settlement -after the realpolitik. some obviously for appearance sake but fighting had stopped. In southern Africa,; In the Middle East, the Secretary of much of it real. the fighting is continuing and, indeed, State could identify the conflict and the Those who traveled with Mr. Kissinger growing' parties involved. In southern Africa, there during his Middle East negotiations note; There is a constituency among the is not one conflict but three-over Rhode- that gloom is a perfect curtain-raiser for: blacks that says the fighting should go sia, over South-West Africa and potential- his style of diplomacy. With it, even a on. It steins from the conviction that the' ly, over South Africa. In the case of Rhode- relatively, minor advance-in this case, military advantage has swung to the) sia, the nationalist factions are so snlin an agreement for a constitutional confer- blacks and that negotiations undertaken' tered,that it would he impossible to know once on South-West Africa embracing all later, when territory is actually won, are whom to invite to the conference table. sides-takes on the appearance of a mira bound to be more advantageous. That White the nationalist leader are totally cle and can generate momentum. conviction is running especially strong dependent upon the "front line" African Some Call Gloom justified. now that the rainy season, which will residents to wage their struggle, the ' presidents But those who have followed events las, shift is the about tactical to begin in n Rh abegin ai Rodsia. T the sta. To - plisten to their opinions. And each of the presidents-except Joshua in Africa feel the gloom justified and negotiate, some feel, wauld be 'seen as Nkomo, the moderate who engaged in point out the vast differences between a sign of weakness. ths ago- is; the Middle East and southern Africa in There is also an element of pride and) talks with Mr. Smith Kissinger. terms of issues, multiplicity of factions l a sentiment for winning the war. Of all sispicious about Mr. Kissingand personalities, the African nations that have won inde- Most suspicious of all is Robert Mugabe, Mr. Kissinger has said privately thatI pendence, only two, Algeria and Guinea- the Rhodesian who is emeri ing as er- President Nyerere, whom he greatly re- Bissau, can honestly say they have dc- most popular politician sprang the guel' t rillas. Slgnifica:ntly, Mr. Mugabe has spects, is not "another Sadat." The impli- tested colonial forces on the batt,efield. , cation is that unlike the Egyptian Presi- The slogan of the Zimbabwe Peonle'si voiced reservations about a key provision dent, whom Mr. Kissinger has praised for Arnry, the nsair: fighting force of the Rho-~ to fire Kissinger plan, financial a bl an- I ices for whites in Rhodesia undor a bl;aek courage in negotiating with, the Israelis tie: tan blacks, is We are our own hbera- government. " who will 'pay blacks fort despite Arab criticism, there is no African tors." all their years of being exploded by the leader willing to run the risk of appearing Mr. Kissinger has stressed that during awhites? Ire said in being interview here last! moderate on the question of "liberation." his visits in April, every African head ?. ,, . WASHINGTON POST ~FP pent." Tass, the Soviet news agency, said. Soviet Union, Gaj.on5s Bo>! In Paris, president. Omar 13c,nl;o of Gahon dis go Blast i t? . I missed h.issinger's weekend talks with South Afri- U.S. Role in La'in' African .'1'Cll"ioli can Prince Minister John Vorstet as "nonsense, a 1"l onr Nr?u:Ilisputcltrs Was 10. of tilde." The Scwird. Union,v accused U.S, Secrr orster will not ch'tnge Ills policy. He is it racist tart' of State }teary A. eiday"er of using shuttle through and through. Sine no kind Of di,tlo ue can sneered a:i,h South .fruit, we will take in amts negOt.iations tletween black and white African lead' and do as we raid in :~n,,ola," i;open said yesterday acs to prop Ill) r;last, governments mid protest Amer- when hr arrived In the French capital for a .ho:,t. icon iiitr?.sti'ii ttl5, "The ostentation,,; of he Private bait. tUS.A. Brill rs said ho wilt 1110('t French I'residt nl. V,l!rry is. nothilli; else Irtlt, fe;tr of a chain ,eart.iorl which riscurtt r!?7afailtg before flying t6 Mf-.Xico Saturday was sini-ted by thr? crillnpse of l'ortuglit'se ctrl'ni;ll riri~, l,l,l m anti has noi~' Spread to other tsartss of tale t?c,llli? fo l. an visit, is Approved For Release 2001 /08/00yo-CTArt2DP7T=O'0432F20 139'0-OU-1=4-- --'-` Approved For Release 2001/08/08 :. CIA-RDP77-00432R000100390001-4 WASHINGTON POST !' S . a 1;l 75 sin By Murrey Marder Washington Post Staff Writer Deep distrust of Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger's African shuttle diplomacy was expressed yesterday by black representatives of the Rhode. sian and Namibian (Southwest Africa) liberation movements. A conference of African specialists, held in the Senate Caucus Room,, re- verberated with suspicion that the ul- terior motive of Kissinger and the Ford administration is to protect white interests and American invest- nientsin southern Africa. Kissinger's attempt to launch new negotiations for peaceful settlement of the guerrilla warfare in Rhodesia and Namibia was assailed as out-of- date, ill-advised, a serious subversion of African aspirations and even a strategy of racism. Warfare alone, even if protracted warfare, is the only solution now for Rhodesia, liberation spokesmen said. The criticisms graphically illustrate the obstacles confronting Kissinger's new round of African diplomacy, which the State Department is ex- pected to confirm officially today. Kissinger is planning a press con- ference Saturday to explain his new venture, scheduled to be launched Monday and starting in black Africa. Sen. Dick Clark (D-Iowa), a co-spon- sor with Rep. Charles C. Diggs Jr. (D- Mich.) of the African panel discussion yesterday, told the group at a luncheon in the Senate Office Building that "I think the chances are one in 25, or one in 30," that Kissinger's diplomatic mission will succeed. "But I think it is worth making the effort," Clark said. However, while concentrating on the racial struggle in Rhodesia and Namibia, Clark said, "I hope we never forget that the most repressive regime in southern Africa is the regime in South Africa." The Senate Foreign Relations Sub- committee on Africa, which Clark heads, is conducting intensive hear- ings on South Africa. In South Africa, Clark said, "total U.S. investment is estimated at greater than $1.7 billion," representing "40 per cent of the total U.S. investment in Africa." Several hundred spectators at- tended the Caucus Room discussion, which was sponsored by the Fund for New Priorities in America :rd the Women's Division of the United Meth- octist Church. To the disappointinent: of some of the white specialists on Africa, the lib- eration Spokesrnen for Rhodesia re- fused to consider any alternative to expanding guerrilla war. Callistus Ndlovu, representing the relatively more moderate wing of the Zimbabwe (Rhodesian) African Na- tional Council, led by Joshua Nkomo, who tried to negotiate with Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian D. Smith, said: "We do not see how the talks can be resumed ... We therefore believe that any attempt to resume these talks is bound to fail." Eddison Zvobgo, a representative of the more militant wing of the Rhode- sian liberation movement, led by Bishop Abel Muzorewa, said , that "every time the U.S. raises the ques- tion of negotiations" it is because a liberation struggle is "about to tri- umph" somewhere in the world. "The conference stage is over," Zvobgo said. "Negotiations are being carried out where they belong-on the battlefield. We should resist any Kis- singer seduction." .One white panelist, Alex Boraine, from Harvard University's Center for International Affairs, a former mem- ber of the South African Parliament for the Progressive Reform Party, asked the liberation spokesmen if they saw no course "complementary to the armed struggle." He asked if there is no way to reduce "the length of the struggle" in Rhodesia, and the casualties. Only "by politicizing our people," and "by rallying as many interna- tional forces as possible," replied El- ton Razemba, another member of the Bishop Muzorewa faction of the Afri- can National Council. "Destruction will be there," be said. "What is war about? Zimbabwe will be a better soci- ety" in the end. Zvobgo, his colleague, interjected: "The only way of shortening the [Rhodesian] war or limiting the num- ber of people killed or injured is to get the war over as quickly as possi- ble. It is a kind of 'quick kill' theory, to put it bluntly." The Rhodesian liberation spokes- men insisted that what is going on in Rhodesia in the conflict between about 270,000 whites and about 6 mil- lion blacks is not a racial. war. "We are not' just fighting to replace a white government with black faces," Ndlovu said. "1Ve are fighting to bring about fundamental change." American-Eritish plans to organize an international guarantee fund of up. to $1.5 hill ion to $2 billion to compen- sate Rhodesia's white settlers for their property and other assets, said Ndlovu, represents "guarantees of 4D privilege" which the blacks will nee tolerate. This idea "is predicated on the no- tion that it is impossible for blacks and whites to live together peace- fully," he said, and Zvobgo charged, "This really is racism." However, Nigeria's. ambassador to the United Nations, Leslie O. Harri- man, while criticizing much of Kis- singer's strategy, said, "I believe that the option of buying off the whites is realistic." Harriman said afterward, "We have done it in our own country [Nigeria] for independence." But he also said that, basically, "the military struggle is the only option left" for Rhodesian independence. Kissinger's diplomacy for Namibia equally "is bound to fail," said O.T. Emvula, deputy chief of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) mission to the United Na- tions. He labeled Kissinger's approach to Namibia "a serious subversion" of commitments made by the United Na- tions for the independence of that ter- ritory. Kissinger, Emvula said, "i'deliberate- ly complicates" matters by meeting with Prime Minister. John Vorster of South Africa, which rules Namibia under a mandate that the United Na- tions has ruled is illegal. If there "will he a negotiation," said Emvula, expressing a more moderate position than his Rhodesian col- leagues, "only South Africa and SWAPO shall he the parties." However, SWAPO, he said, will not enter any talks with South Africa un- til South Africa withdraws its military forces from Namibia and releases all political prisoners. Panelist Boraine said, "I think Vor- ster will do a great deal to get Nami- bia ... off his back." Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100390001-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100390001-4 'Log fntgefe5 Tiine Cornmunst Forces c3row i hail Flabby Government Bureaucracy Fails to Contain ,Insurgents "Intelligence -in the east has not, tie right now. Times Stall Writer vcw, wv CU uL aLc, au, 1 V U ' IL Marshal Siddhi Savetsila, secretary theory. This is the Communist Party 13ANGKO'K-Por eight years the general of the National Security of Thailand at work;' a Western dip. government of Thailand has entrust- Council. "We have good hindsight on lomat said. ed its campaign against Communist what has happened, but we know Still, the outside help is available insurgents to a semi-clandestine, nothing about what is about to hap- now. There are three fairly well de- a k b nown s ureaucracy rank-heavy ISOC-the Internal Security Opera- tions Command. And while ISOC grew progressive- ly flabbier, the insurgency grew ing the fragile period of democracy weather road extended through Laos from a serious nuisance into a hard since 1973, the rulers in Bangkok in- to Pak Beng, just across the northern jungle army of about 9,000 guerrillas. In the estimate of an American ex- pert, the Communist organization be- came "a quality product, well- trained, well-armed and largely self- sufficient." It has, the expert said, perhaps 85,000 active .workers within the country's political woodwork. Given the intrigues of the Thai mil- itaty structure--where some C00 generals and admirals vie for power and its rewards-it would be unfair to blame Communist growth entirely on ISOC's failure. The government's regular armed', forces are made up of more than 200,000 men, plus a paramilitary de- - fense corps of. 49,000 and a border police force of 14,000. Their effect- tiveness is a matter of debate. Gen. Saiyud Kerdphol, the ISOC commander, warned "+ recently: "My estimate is that we have about three years to put' our ; hotiso. ii1 order. If not, the combination''of internal and ,external pressures will make .the fu- ? Lure of this country:;very uncertain the test will come sooner. lie. expects that within the: next two dry seasons---a span of about 18 months-the insurgency will grow to niobile warfare and battalion-sized attacks against the ill-organized Thai military and government structure. M "They have the troops to do it now," he said. "They could overrun , any military or police, post in the countryside if they wanted to.!' The old-school politicians and gen- erals who run things in Bangkok are debating what to do. There are belat- ed plans to reorganize the army, buy-, more planes and enlarge "pacifica- tion" programs in the countryside. But sources with first-hand know!- edge of the Thai counterguerrilla program say that despite decades of experience. the government fre- quently lacks the most basic knowl edge of Communist activity. pen or what the insurgents are going fined supply routes through Laos to do the next day, But the Commu- from Vietnam, organized and nists know our movements." manned by North Vietnamese. The For years of military rule, and dur- Chinese send supplies on an ally directly have supported the domino Thai bor ler. theory by contending that the Com- The level of this aid is indicated by munist Party of Thailand was almost the light traffic on the Chinese road. totally dependent on outside help.. In one recent month, an official ado Aging Prime Minister Seni Pramoj, mined only t:;o Chinese trucks ill-suited to control the traditional turbulence of Thai politics, has tried came dow, n Yvith material for the ir.- s . to play it both ways. Until June he suge" Th T contended that foreign aid was mak- ing the insurgency more serious than ever. Last month he admitted before the parliament that he had little proof of direct aid from Peking, Han- oi or Moscow for Thailand's Commu- nists. Then he basked in the "diplomatic victory" when Foreign Minister Pi- chai Rattakul returned from Hanoi, where the two countries agreed to exchange ambassadors, and reported a pledge from North Vietnamese Pre- hai army has done little to e seriously disturb the Communists in their growing "liberated zones." While the generals make pro- nouncements and schedule "suppres- sion" drives, the actual strategy has been one of "containment," The Com- munist bases are largely centered around tribal peoples in' Jungles- and mountains, but there are relatively few government soldiers in a position to bar the insurgents from moving into more populated-and. ethnic mien Pharr Van llong not to inter- Government offensives are rare. fere in Thailand's domestic affairs. The only major battle of the year (The Chinese had made a similar : came about by accident. It started pledge earlier). June 11 when the jet pilot son of a But Seni knows better. The flow of Maj. Gen. Yuthasorn Kaysornsuk aid from Hanoi and Peking is a fact ' crashed his F-5 in the rugged moun-, of life along the border. tains of Petchabun province, about More important is the dismal fact 300 miles north of Bangkok and mid- I way between the insu rgent areas in that. during the decade of heavy the north and the northeast. American involvement in Vietnam, An immediate operation was while the Thais largely wasted $1.7 . launched to find the plane. A para- billion in aid, the Communists were troop unit was put in, got into a hea- building a force needing little outside vy battle, and called for reinforce- help. di cited the ment.s. For the next two weeks major diplomatic source fighting raged in the district, com- government.s record recently in the - plete with Jet strikes. At' least 200 distant southern provinces, which are_ Communist troops, and probably the least important of three major in- more, were killed, surgency areas. In little-noted Although. government -casualties clashes, insurgents there have cap- also were heavy, the few "activist" tared more than 300 weapons in, six , generals in Bangkok were elated months. The government is planning a $600 ;over the battle. A lot of intelligence million military budget this year. A 5v'theas insur picked gent up and forces there were being were bad signs. -? Western expert figured abstractly I' that the insurgents could fight for. +ly disrupted. addition, this was a? roughly 130 yeas on that. amount. It jital area where the shadowy Cen- t apes only 75 cents a day to feed and 4tral~Committee of the Communist clothe a Communist soldier and keep I arty of Thailand had been meeting; him in the field. In time, the Insur- ,*crcntll. " was. gents doubtlessly will need more ant- In vcr the fennel end, and the tile. missing operation e was munition and guns, but they nt ed lit. Xac4. ca,lled off despite the cliirn of the.' Approved For Release 2901/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100390001-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77=00432R000100390001-4 commanding general that "we'uiill never stop fighting." "They never would have started in the first place if a general's son had not been lost," said one disgusted headquarters official in Bangkok. This attitude gradually has permit- ted the, insurgents to enlarge, their areas. Gen. Pralong Veerapriya only this month stirred a public storm by say- ing that perhaps 10,7-o of the popula- tion was under the sympathetic sway of the Communists. Western experts consider this -a high estimate, but ev- eryone admits that the Communists now control large base areas with plenty of manpower for recruitment. They long since. have matured from. an organization dominated at the top by Chinese or Sino-Thai leaders, with the foot soldiers recruited from tribal "buffalo boys." land. ? ., Since 1952-when the first batch Two of the regional commanders_ ward the same goal for' years. They of 20 trainees was sent to southern Song Nopakun in the north and are following good Maoist principles China-about 2,500 military and pa. Udom Sisuwan in the northeast--are in preparing to encircle the cities litical cadre have been sent to China; from the countryside, an. d that con- old Bolshevik Sinn 'Thais who attend- ~, North Vietnam-and camps in Laos ed the Party's congress three decades times to be thWestern eir strat p y,? fecls that (often supervised by Chinese), ac- ago. The third, in the south, is Prasit, the Thaiepar y- will alter the strategy cording to intelligence sources. Thiansiri, an ethnic Thai believed to; somewhat to take advantage of the An efficient command structure be much younger. The Central Com- political weaknesses In Bangkok. has been built, now based around 15 mittee is now believed to number" " "What they are after here is a col- provincial" areas where the local about a dozen men, several of whom lapse from within,"' ithin, " he said. "Those: commander corresponds roughly to a are ethnic Thais, and the first.: guerrillas are not going to come regimental or.divisional commander, among-equals is said to be Charoelr' marching into Bangkok like the with attached political officers. Wanngam, also an ethnic Thai, who' North Vietnamese marched into Sai- Unlike the Vietnamese Communists is in his 50s and was trained in Hanoi gon. The way they figure it, they who had a proclivity toward putting ? and possibly China. won't have to." THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Tuesday, Sept. 14, 1976 To, a 11 By RnfiPRT L. BAATLEY PEKING-=The doors to the Great Hall of the People stood open, and after 15 min- utes waiting in the pleasant autumn sun. the force of the air conditioning struck the face like a cold breeze. It was a fitting sen- sation as one came into the presence of the remains of Mao Tse-tung, one of the most historic figures of our century. James Schlesinger, formerly U.S. Sec? was sontethtng of a syrrabolic substitute, for retary of Defense and now in Peking as a clearly the invitation was intended as a guest of the Chinese government, led the great honor for Mr. Schlesinger. Now the party of 12 Americans into the antechant- rest of the trip has suddenly been rein- her where they signed official registers, stated as well, an intriguing commentary and into the receiving line of nine of the oil the post-Mao regime and Chinese pr'lori- top officials of the People's Republic of ties in foreign policy. China --headed by Premier Hua Kuo-feng, An ` xcel)tional Regard' and Politburo standing committee mem- Obviously the Chinese government has bers Wang Hung-wen and Chang Ch'un- ch'iao. what one of its spokesmen calls "excep? Slowly walking 30 steps beyond the re- tional regard" for Mr. Schlesinger, who since his di Secretary ceiving line, the party spread into a re- by President t Fo Ford rdl has ass been fit t Defense the Johns b Johns spectful line before the glass coffin holding Hopkins University Washington Center of the remains. Motion pictures were taken Foreign Policy Research. During the under shining light, and the party passed mourning period, when, Peking's museums alongside the bier, three feet front the late werc officially closed, he and his party chairman. Mao's face was somehow More ~ were escorted to the Great Wail, the Ming square, more gray, and more wrinkled tong:; and the fantastic, Summer Palace, than one would expect from photographs. Members of his party were told that the But eyes closed and peaceful, it original Invitation for the visit came at the radiated Ik sett se of serenity and power. personal direction of Mao, and that the The procession passed behind one row dying chairman knew Mr. Schlesinger was of wreaths as the next group of foreign via- in Peking. itors cable through the receiving dine, then h ' rip e trots` ss tat iitraty was from the first down the steps past a separate lbte of blue tl'' P and green clad Chinese worker:n, and fi- uperl,u u it e:rr accorded a for. oigo visitor. Mr. 1k-hlestrtger and those of pally hack to Its procession of autos, Twin- lair, party who have trutycd tiu '; Sea n ty-five iitintitca after the party hat left its hold, the :"rlt?nt'u alai dif;nltied cer