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June 11, 1976
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25X1A Wpproved For Release 200te4tibERIADP77-00432R000100400002-i? NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES INTERNAL USE ONLY This publication contains clippings from the domestic and foreign press for YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use of selected items would rarely be advisable. 11 JUNE 1976 NO. 10 PAGE GOVERIVF-NT AFFAIRS 1 GENERAL 25 EASTERN EUROPE WEST EUROPE 30 NEAR EAST 35 AFRICA 38 EAST ASIA 41 LATIN AMERICA DESTROY AFTER BACKGROUNDER HAS SERVED ITS PURPOSE OR WITHIN 60 DAYS CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 Apriroved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 Goverflmentai.. AffairS WASHINGTON POST 11 JUN 1976 - Charles B. Seib CIA. Taint on the ress A There's no point in beating ?a- dead bOrse. But want to take just one more. swing at the one that daily becomes more aromatic. out behind .CIA head- quarters. T-.? ? ? ? ? ? ? talking about the CIA's involve- Meat _with_ the :,Pre_s_a=thil......CSMAtrY'_ and. the worlds. The superspies persist In their refusal to provide details of this relationship, past or present. And the press, for all its investigative zeal, just. can't, Seem to get interested in doing anything about it. Two 'developments prompt me to re- turn to this unpopular subject. The first' is the recent Soviet charge that three, leading' American. correspondents in. Moscow work for the CIA. The second is correspondence between CIA direc- tor George Bush and several journalis- tic organkations... ? To set the stage, the CIA's stated posi- tion on its use of the media is that, as of last Feb. 11, it has sworn off "paid. or contractual relationships with any full- time *or part-time correspondent ac- credited by . any US. news service, newspaper, periodical, raciiO or televi sion network or station." .-- ? 'The agency insists that its past rela- tionships with journalists involved no Impropriety or any intention to influ- ence or harm the American press. It also says it has no intention of reveal- ing, now or later, the names of journal- ists who have worked for it. What does. all this mean in concrete terms? Just what does CIA mean by "accredited," for example? The Senate Intelligence Committee recently re- ported that until early this year the CIA had undercover "relationships" with about 50 American journalists, and that more than half these ties were continu- ing despite the Feb. 11 statement. The Senate report also said that staff inves- tigators found that two employees of - "general circulation U.S. news organi- zations" were still functioning as paid .undercover CIA contacts. . . And that brings us to the Russian charges. Literaturnaya Gaieta, the pub- lication of the Union of Soviet Writers, asserted late last month that , Christo- pher t' Wren of The New YOric Fthies George.::Krimsky of the 'Associated' ? Press and Alfred Friendly. Jr. of News- week were associated with the CIA. ? There Is no reason to believe the charges. No hard` evidence was pro- duced, and there have been strong de nials from the men, highly regarded journalists,inii.their publications. -. But .1e:it not reasonable to believe that the CIA's unwillingness, to cue its ties to American journalism feeds the suspicions that lead to such ?Charges? Does not that same unwillingness make it more difficult to refute the charges? A number of journalists and journal- istic organizations have called for the publication of the names of news peo- ple who have been in the pay of the CIA, and. of news organitationa that have knowingly provided CIA cover. . That, it isarguedOs the only way the American press can be cleansed of the, taint of spy work. ALso,,to be pragmatic,: Such 'publication would be quite,effec- tive in discouraging future CIA-press: relationehies. But, as it noted in Ira 11 policy 'statement, the In- tention of doing that. Which brings us to the Bush letters. On May 3, the National News Council, a press-monitoring body, wrote to Bush expressing deep concern about reports of CIA-press?,ties _end asking_ for more information on the ties and the portent they hold for a free press in a free so- ciety. The council noted that it was not asking for publication of names of indi-? vidnals employed by CIA. - In reply, Bush said that he had hoped the Feb. 11 statement 'would relieve. the minds of those in the field of .jour- nalism." He said that "it has reassured Many with whem I have spoken pri- vately." , . , On May 14, directors of the Fund for. Investigative Journalism, which under--, writes journalistic projects, wrote- a much stronger,, letter than the News' Council's. It sai4 the clandestine use of American news people by the CIA is "destructive of the fundamental weirs- ises of a free press and corrosive of the First Amendment." Thefiind's board urged that the CIA gobeyond its earlier statement and an- nounce tentination of the use of all- BALTIMORE SUN 11 June 1976 Journalists, ' including freelancers: stringers and part-time reporters- and editors, whether or not accredited: That brought a reply in which. Bush said he had "talked privately to a nuin- ber of -members of 'the Fourth Estate. Although' not all "of 'them are totally' haPpy.with the situation as it is, I have met -,with considerable quiet. -under- standing. One top figure in the national media told me privately that he thought that after issuance of my state- ment, no more could properly be de-, manded of us." ? Bush went on to say that "in a per- fect world,'we might be able to run the intelligence business in response to the criticisms of each and every point of. view, but I'm afraid that perfect world, Is not yet here." .Bush is right aboid the imperfection of the world. But questions Inuit be raised about his claims. ,of support for his position within the news business,. ;Who are those members of the Fourth Estate who have privately given Bush, the "quiet understanding," whatever that is? Who is the top figure in the na- tional'media who said he was satisfied_ with the CIA position? What we are faced with now is not only the knowledge that the CIA has been and continues to be the employer of an undisclosed number of unnamed American journalists, but that its stone- walling has the support, or at least the acquiescence, of a number of media people?at the top level, we must as- sume. But they, too, are unnamed. Could there be a Catch-22 here by which some of those who, have shown "quiet understanding" also have or have had an involvement, direct- or in- direct, with the agency? ? - We don't know. What we do know is that the taint of CIA involvement con- tinues to pollute the American press as a whole. We also know that because of the taint, charges such as those leveled by the Soviet magazine are bound to find a more accepting audience. Senate panel wants delay in CIA's destro yin Washington (AP)?The new Senate intelligence committee has unanimously recommended a six-month moratorium on Central Intelligence Agency plans to destroy files of impro- per and illegal activitieS. The decision was reached by the panel in a closed-door ses- sion Wednesday and publicly disclosed yesterday by its chairman, Senator Daniel K. In- ouye (D., Hawaii) in a letter to Senate leaders. "It is the further recommen- dation of the committee that - the CIA and other intelligence agencies should submit an in- ventory of the records to be de- stroyed" to the panel, Mr. In- ouye said in a letter to the Sen- ate majority leader, 'Mike Mansfield (D., Mont.), 'and mi- nority leader, Hugh Scott (FL, Pa.). Senator Mansfield and Sena- tor Scott earlier in the week had left it to the new panel to decide whether the CIA should be allowed to -destroy its files on its past misdeeds. g of files The controversy was prompted when the CIA direc- tor, George Bush, wrote to Mr. Mansfield and Mr. Scott to tell them he planned to destroy the files now that congressional in- vestigations into allegations of improper conduct had been completed. These same Senate leaders had been the ones who had asked the CIA to save the files Iwhile Congress was investigat- ing the alleged misdeeds. WASHINGTON STAR 27 MAY 1975 'CIA Won't Sever All Free-Lancer Ties CIA Director George Bush has turned down an ap- peal that the agency sever all ties with its estimated 25 free-lance journalists overseas. he Fund for Investi- gative Journalism had asked for a total ban on CIA use of journalists, including free-lancers. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 NEW YORK TIMES 7 JUN 1976 tilwelet to The New York Times WASHINGTON, June 6?Following IS the text of the conclusions of the final: report of the Senate Intelligence Com- , mittze on the activities of the Central" Intelligence Agency. In, the text, D.C.I. Is the Director of Central Intelligence, D.D.I. is the Directorate for Intelligence, D.D.O. is the Directorate/or Operations, .and N.S.C. is the, National- Security., Council. ' - The C.LA,-, was conceived and estab- lished to provide high-quality- intelli- genceto senior policymakers. Since 1947, ,the agency?its structure, its Wade with- in the Government and its function?has undergone- dramatic -"change and expan- ? sion: Sharing .characteristics common to most large, complex' organizations, the C.I.A. has-responded to rather than arie- ticipated the forces of change; it has accumulated functions rather than rede- fining them; its internal patterns were , established early and have solidified; success has come to those who have made visible contributions in high-pri- ority areas. These general character- istics have affected the specifics of the agencys development. - The notion that the C.I.A. could serve as a coordinating body for departmental- intelligence activities and that the D.C.I. could orchestrate the process did not take into account tlth inherent institu- tional obstacles posed by the depart- ments. From the outset no department . was willing to condede a centralized intelligence function to the C.I.A. Each insisted on the maintenance of its inde- pendent capabilities to support its policy role: With budgetary and manaaement authority vested in the departments,?the agency was left powerless in the execu- . tion of interdepartmental coordination. Even in the area of coordinated national intelligence estimates the departments did not readily provide the agency with the data required. It was not until John McCone's term- as D.C.I. that the agency aggressively, sought to assert its position as a coor- dinating body. That effort demonstrated the complex-factors that determined the- relative success of corrununity ,manage- ment. One of the principal influences. was the support accorded the D.C.I. by the President and the cooperation of the Secretary of Defense. In a situation where the D.C.I. commanded no re- source or outright authority, the posi- tion of these two individuals was crucial. While Kennedy and McNamara provided McCone with consistent backing in a variety of areas, Nixon and Laird failed to provide Helms with enough support. to give him the necessary bureaucratic:. leverage. It is clear that the D.C.I.'s own prior- ities, 'derived from their backgrounds and interests, influenced the relative success of the agency's role in interde- partmental coordination. Given the limi- tations on the D.C.I's authority, only by making community activities a first or- der concern and by pursuing the prob- lems assertively could a D.C.I. begin to make a difference in effecting better management. During Allen Dulles' term interagency coordination went neglected, and the results were expansion of corn. peting capabilities among the depart- ments. For McCone, community intelli- gence activities were clearly a priority, and his 'definition of the D.C.I.'s role contributed to whatever advances were made:Helms' fundamental: i?tetesinclinations lay: within the' agency; -.and he didnot;plish his marida,,tetelt." po sible;Umits. ? basic'TrOblerts2havehee& competing claims On his time andatten- tion and the lack or ;real authority for; the .iotecution of thecantral intelligence funetion. As presently defined,. the D.C.t.'S job is burdensome in: the. ex; treme. He is to serve the rotes of Chief' intelligence adviser to the President', Manager of community. Intelligence ac- tivities; and senior executive in the C.I.A.!, History has demonstrated. that the Job- of theD.C.I: as community manager and- as head of the C.I.A. are competing, not; complementary roles. In- tenni Of bothi the demands imposed by each function:1! anclthe expertise requited to fulfill the; responsibilities, the two roles differ:con.7?:: siderably, In the future separating the functions with precise definitions ? of au-, thority and responsibilities niay Prove plausible alternative. Although the agency was established primarily for the purpose of providing' intelligence analysis to- senior policy- makers, within three years clandestine operations became and continued to be the, agency's pre-eminent activity:, The single most important factor in the transformation was policymakers' per- ception Of the Soviet Union as a world- wide threat to United' States security.' The agency's large-scale clandestine ac- tivities have mirrored American foreign, policy priorities. With political. "opera- ? tions in Europe in the 1950's,'-paramill.- tary -operations: in Korea,Third. World activities,Cuba, Southeast' Asia, and currently narcotics control,-: the C.I.A.'s major programs paralleled:: the' inter-. national concerns of the United States. For nearly two decades 'American pol- icymakers considered- covert action vital in the struggle against international Communism. The generality of the defi- nition or "threat perception" motivated the continual development and justifica- tion of covert activities from the senior" policymaking level to the field stations. Apart from the overall anti-Communist motivation, successsive Presidential ad- ministrations regarded covert actions as a quick and convbnient means of ad- vancing their particular objectives. _ _ - Internal incentives contributed- to the expansion in covert action. Within the agency D.D.O. careerists have tradition- ally been rewarded more quickly for the visible accomplishments of covert-tion than fpr the long term development of- agents required for clandestine col- lection.. Clandestine activities will: re-- main an element of United States -for-. eign policy, and policymakers will di- rectly affect the level of operations. The prominence of the Clanciestine Service within .the agency may moderate as money for and high-level executive in terest in covert actions diminish.' How- ever, D.D.Q. incentives which emPhasize . operations over collection and which-' create an internal_ demand for projects will continue to foster covert action unless an internal conversion process forces a Change. s In the past the orientation of D.C.I.s such as Dulles and Helms also contrib- uted to the agency's emphasis on clart- destine activities. It is no coincidence that of those D.C.I.s who have been Agency careerists, all have come from the Clandestine Service_ Except. for James Schlesinger's brief appointment,. _ 2 ;Pie beifirdireitedbYlti- ,trained-analysr..;. The qualities demandedi ,of individualsin the D.D.0.-,-esSentially1 management of people?serve as-the basis for bureaneractic skills in the or- ganization: As a result, the agency's', leadership has been_dominated by D.D.a.1 careerists. ? : Clandesting*Ilection and covert ae.., flow have, - had, their successes,, dividual activities halite attained their stitted objectives. What the relative contribution etelandestine activities has, been?the- extent to which they "have contributed to or detracted from the implementation of United States foreign policy and:. whether the results have been worth the risk?cannot be eval- uated ;without wide access to records on covert operations, access the corn, mittee did not have. Organizational- arrangements within the agency and the .decision-making structure outside the agency have per-- mitted the extremes in C.I.A. activity. The ethos of secrecy which pervaded the D.D.O. had the effect of setting the directorate apart within the agency and allowed the Clandestine Service a measure of autonomy not accor&o.i other directories. More importantly, the compartmentation principle allowed units of the D.D.O. freedom in deft:e operations. In many cases tie.4 burden of responsibility fell on individua. ments?a situation in which :lapses and , deviations are inevitable. Previous ex- cesses Of drag testing, assassination planning ? and domestic activities were. , supported by an internal structure that permitted individuals to conduct opera- tions .without,the consistent necessity' or expectation of justifying or revealing their activities.. -. , . ? 'Blurred-Accountability' - 7.1/tim'ately, much of the responsibility for the scale of covert action and for whatever abuses occurred must fall to- senior policymakers. The decision-mak- ing arrangements at the .N.S.C. level created an environment of blurred ac- countability which allowed considera- tion of actions without the constraints- of individual responsibility. Historically the ambiguity and imprecision derived from the initial expectation that covert operations would be limited and there- fore could be managed by a small, in- formal group. Such was the intention in 1948. By 1951 with the impetus of the Korean war, covert action had be- come a fixed element in the U.S. foreign policy ,repertoire. The frequency of covert action forced the development of more formalized decision-matting ar- rangements. Yet structural changes did not alter ambiguous procedures. In the late 1950's" the relationship -between Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' and Allen Dulles allowed informal agreements and personal understandings to prevail over explicit and precise de- cisions. In addition, as the scale of covert action expanded, policymakers- found it useful to maintain the am- biguity of the ,decision-making process to insure secrecy and to allow "IpIaus- ible deniability' of covert operations. No one in the executive?least of all: the President-7-was required to formally sign off on a decision to implement a. covert action program. The D.C.I. was 'responsible for the execution of a proj- ect but not for taking the decision to implement It., Within the N.S.C. a group of individuals---held joint responsibility- for defining policy objectives, but they- did not attempt to establish 'criteria placing moral and constitutional limits - on activities undertaken to achieve the Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001004000024 7.0.61groliP; , coniOfl*Wthint .110-?tgt!t, 411 r I V A-`'",?????":' ? -hx.agforalfpti" ma?.the . - poia Andir4Olaicacs". ? , me os1,4117:, cfp,Aa., 11S0t. ks r r -;< *WO ,tiost '.1ecuri ojhe tress--a7na1lgroupi-ef_indi numb iniduas,inyo ?apprtiv4:roc?s OsAtibri as_ weiltas; thit,:assuniritiok411W beSObje446,diatsid :1414.41,1f,eC9n#:ThiltecL'AP??4,01444:av ;.soyettactio*aitd...ici *40, Ap',j. - -eSt1-04.111ge: -- , ? 4 . , ..,. .. ? ,.., ? ;41 i . ?"4:,..00401414if i d?t:ts t,:r*"- , Ocala.' Es?efitriill..' thg.',ffilifilifrOCIPtaii*? . functoried 1 EtS_ ,,,.,' 'etr4(0..', Otitinizat:3044 /her:, niaintaing. ,?, POile reef tracks nitic??ted..intb-.',otte,7, Individuals firtillirf, 7 - tee itkif 'Llbe4 other- In Illeciii the'D.V.O*Ctriiiitesthiefiot lection functiOri ilipulclhay,e;Orittib,tiMck!: to the D.D.U,s. analytic r.caPacity.:rlid*.!;; ever, D.D.0, concerns about maintain,-;. ing the. ',ilta,'., operations'. and protecting the identitylOribragehts,-anck D.D.1" conces about measuringLthe re,, liability of ift-',s61.1r.ces. :testriCted* inter- change between ? the tWci:;directrorate.s..-;?-, Fundamentally, this. lias!..ifepriVert the D.D.I. of a- major, . Sou* or InfOrmarlOM.1 Although D.D..1.-D.D.OkfontaCt heCin-'!.:4 creased during; t14-lasti:Are!f-ITaxsititi remains'. limited:-..,.:,,Vt.,',!!,1%.4.1:,', informed, of sensitiyel:,4W.erti,c)Peratlouvi undertaken by: the 'D:D.6.-' Thi.T., has -* #14 teeter!' the respectly....MiiSiiiii:Eire' bOth-',4 directorates. - The ClandeStliin,'-.Servicet has net had the bent.ififidt}:fritellifiencir.! support' durine.considetatiOn' and iniple--',! Mentation of?itti operations-Ae?Bayot, ?Pige-itwasiorrwan rin: instanc*IkwhiChril AD-L, allair"! eve4-lhe-:PPPIAY;Pirec.4I tori for ? Inteiltgetfce;':,-werekupinfq.PriettA and represents a :`-4,1tUaticill, 4ai',..".',$.-1piSittf timely' analysis-Of ipriliticirt-tsren _ ,aiirt- - basic-, geograr44, nlightha**.ada 16 del ferenceelpet,-histint?cletidiorCbrenik/ bark on:11i4:7opetatioeelck the th,lt*iolaiiti 14 for e:;"05Mttfiee W. thil* tl..":- laCk P. -k4Owlec107400'uf :' aPrift0tig'*441';e.O. ' plicated)aridi.,Aindesinined44'n?Zariattiti effort. Information on a p-.WitOsored --, political action progrant'WOuld.g,affecti Adgments:-abOittAt resuitiotkfigpi Ar1A1,41 NEW YORK TIMES 30 May 1976 ?-?Y ''.7-LiaAjAP,W.I:' Mr ICISSIngerW: ?-,PTP ?Orodooei recthipqbiem *Atm- ? ther?-dotrw44.'` illathertthan- _.."agenqf - .A..41g1.1044 atopn .".F.soentraU ? II /it ". #:Iat:r 4ce ltittithrift124,, tr 11. .40i7", J 4 ? A,A,A 1,44 .411:th fri")!Ip t't Onttc I; ` rk cr . paratISCatE areil ;g0Ye7.00-en :telligence e? of national,: ewe. estirnates .otheti intelligencer: nitatiOrfs'!.: engage:: -overlapping flrganalysisPAT- ..,*....14ther.-41),aa.f4iMkthfiliroited ordinatmn f4; M00 :t.:.wfq,C.P.eateckltn agency became: arprochrder of finished intelligenet'.itildist-ently9 &fronded its: areai,,.0t.risponsibilityuOolitiCaf 'ItiirtstrztfegiOrriallfgencithrtunidecitrauf OtattalYglai.*74.0;,StaTWAPiAtnea! itOcf, agenty-,:tof AS -the filter "!. itesOilearcir.f in; Odier-40044.- Pd1;;.4: tP):0-Z,t- f C:tiliii4A'Orikr1)44dcireii.64-4ttelf,:tot* ?*40 -414111.,th?4. ? 4611 Work , Inman WO ?"bati eenz. Inmit21- ttrbcess mrole4.?in?the Itcrinteiligerie ? 14,11*.es numerous tae associati .:itttr'4,71.At,ettee::-Ethc**34.4:eilliWYntalce.tiza.11ig;i7c.,;4.iotiic:e4wie'lli?*iPi4rodod4s:uct,sa:es:.4.11Y7sti;41.1.,..;.t brf. qttaPer$ de.o6.1etlqn. ?naiysis fiOntreq*I4Ctil *fi1tige#01,r0#h. dis Taikdireanifigt,:144) reatiorci :e174191.15, I1.S.7 is. Chaffengiitg . . , :'Rufe-Making Pulic '?Kissinger Briefing ? ? `, - .. 4 WASHINGTON, May.29"(AP) ?The- State Department hslde - (tided to 'apes!- a Federal. Court ruling :Imam effort to keep four comments/at a news ? briefing on the Vladivostok arms accord -from being attributed 'directly to Scretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, a spokesman says. ' A State Department ?-laF4of said the p.ractice of ittributtng marks to-rserrior Uniterf.Statesi Officialis.. important. ? even though "it May sound.. silly to people-who dtaffkrtpw how the.. game. is played, ' ,? ? '?????????.:);. 7Hesaidoffl4a1pub1katite7 rtiens:by Mr. Kissinger could ffirce other- goVernments - to react, .but they could choose to itnicire remarks -attributed only to United States official; ? The ruling, if ? it-stands, would identify Mr: 'Kissinger, as the official who briefed the press on Dec, 3;.- 1974,,when "a 'senior United States official' ..repor- tedly'...gave details' of the nu- clear 'arms abcord;Teached by President Forct...'und Leonid g'? ?, A! ? .1..54.1 15, *.10; kr? , A s5i A recfpra1 ones ? 4;2' 4rN, ;I 0,0 ? ;I = A s A , L ? bilitles their'ctiOPO PreOlder) tilOokert to thefagett chfel.-IfO4 113:kg.e# the ;agency could .borforte overt.:?-OperatiOni,:decisMrt-? .P14.14.,_ #0104 cletktmidenti .reliance ;son the:;'CLA2[S',Iritelligence ca edicillaifiderrtrisatieZitt tIr'sPtIelast at foolvssire4mscribe,*Yript4oes eh rieLof iiiroiination, of Which-Intelligence gei)attAkWa.1-John,,,F, determined'; John I .et,exelatiyo,intluence:.hytodefining rtilefit0:4ZOtnia-nO*4701Finding Dik- t4::*(401;*qc.eiSkiV***L dons-0*-": O.P.,4:fiCWOlitc1CcNiXon'''whi) littlitettffie40eiK;;Of-R1460[0:rehni;an objectivitSr,,may,:be.'me..ranse.desirabie objective frequentlyA ,Wha senidir,Off:letgs ,want to hear about their PO:aiit4l4kii3st-'!a4si).?P'Selireiits are 00,1t,t(i 42e', iixtgli=tnizi- of in . u..4*.1.4e3ekriOvezei414,* Whether Oti*Pik inchi4act. aniOng, them CtitOrti: tqlsig;:airyears the phit * ? - Laiftotioll:Ati litavlougs....*fict4O4titut ,thU4 1ntellxgenceprofession: Th -queStion;heir. the , insittui --itilv?best? ? ."'' United. States District Judge Tune Green ordered -a transcript Of. the briefing turned-over' to Morton Halperin, who iled' suit to: obtain., it under; the. Freedom of Information Act Mt.Halper-. in. disclosed the ,inling on -Fri:- day.- ,The State Department has distributed a transcript of most of the '1974 briefing and gave. a copy, to4Mr. Halperin, but it classified four passages as con- fidential,., contending "attribu- tion these remarks to the Secretary of State could da- mage the national security:. Jiidge Green ruled that there was noauthority in any statute 3 -`????? for dos.- saying information. The, judge also noted that the remarks had been made to 32 reporters-, two of them foreign,, who' had no sectirity, clearances: Halperin, director of a. Center 'for'National Security project is seeking puoric -sure of a varitY of Federal ac-' tions for "open public debate."hi Remarks at the briefing, ac- cording to Judge Green's ruling,: were originally to be attributed! to 'a senior-official and remarks identified as being on '"deep background" were not tote at-' tribined to anyone. - sThe State Department .lawyer said he could not recall' who-, ther the four censored pitssagei- _Were background or deep back- 'grounclin Both Mr, Halperin and the lawyer said- they did -not ;know what the four comments Were. ?,?? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 :CI -ROP77-00432R000100400002-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 NEW YORK TIMES 7 JUN nTlir FAILED TO RIF R'KEY'TASK Report to Senate-Unit Saw , ? Analytic Work, Sufferef:-?, as Covert Acts Grew:'t PRIaRITIES., QUESTIONED Lag:Is'ee,n in Operatiol* on Economics,. Drugs, and, Communism By-DAVID BINT.,1.1", Special to The New Yzy:% Tin:23 ? WASHINGTON, authoritative hitor:, Central Intelligence Agency re-4 leased today holds that the agency has failed over the last three decades to fulfill several of its essential missions. - The study;sprePared with the' cooperation the agency for 'the Senate SeledeCommittee tOJ 1Study Governmental Operations' With.. Respect to Intelligence Activitiee; fiirther concludes ' that the aeency, over the years; became a bureaucracy that ran amok because of conflicting: interests. ' ?? It says that, the agency, :de- spite its successes, especially in. scientific and technical" fields:. was "distorted" -very early by rboth its' directors and their . [superiors, and ?Moved ? away. [from its prime task of prowl& s ing high quality, intelligence analysis forrn the American litical leadership. ' Others Share 'Blame ; For example, the history' notes 'that the agency' had: novi estimate of Communist intertt'.. tions- in Korea before the North,.! Korean attack om South Kaik. in 1950.` It also notes that eco- nomic -'intelligence- -and inter- national naiveties traffic Intel- ligence were given Priority only. in the last decade-and that at- tention _ to underdeveloped countries did not begin until the 1960's. - ? . Th d history, Which has heed thoroughly read and declassi- fied line for line by agency officials, also says the agency failed to become a truly "Cen- tral", intelligence 'service :Co-' ordinating all espionage re- sources of the United States. The study blames a succes- sion Of. Presidents, Congress, the armed services and the agency itself for the shortcom- ings. But its principal conclu- sliitTlikhielfirtr.A.:beiiiiiii7 WI, itairPectiliaric nature, .: was destined.: to, develOp- contrO, 'VeraiaLqUalitiee;-.2 - .-..i,.-- . - ? _, . . 'Mei 9S.pagerT-ltory *was written,' by , Anne, karaleltie a young:Harvard-trained: itittor. i It.Contains no tliobking dis- closures about individual aber- :rations- or covert action disas- ters. But it does tell about rivaltY in: the ArneriCan intelli-, 'mince coMintmity; a lack of a.c- cotmtabilitY .. tO;:,:the 'executive sand some OeCTIliOr priorities. Miss- Karalekas ,, spent two inonthi studying -the agency's !c4vitc, hiStories,... numbering 7,5 'Volumes; and eight months in- terviewing 60 present and 'former agency officials. ,. Her fiv,e-page conclusion says the agency "responded to rath- er than anticipated the force of 'change" over the last 30: years and ' "accumulated functions r tilua redefining them.'' internal patterns were established early' and have so- - Rivalries Persist. She further concludes that the agency never succeeded in, overcoming rivalry' from other intelligence services, ,operated: by the four armed service! 'branches:- The one mat-to blame.; feti:thit, she; w? ;Allen:AV.-Dulles; who- directed 1the from4953-,to 1961.. f. Thehistory:sjsuggeststhatthe Chief.,CLA. ob, %Director of !Centrar':` Intelligence. involves too many tasks.;.-',"'. It, ; It says, giving evidence,, that the agency ':.'was': Very, early pointed in the, direction of -covert'operations abroad at the expense*Of'dassical analytic in- telligence work and that the 'agency "complicated" rather than minimized,. problems of dirplietitkini of intelligence. It says. that, even after 30 years of operationithe agency- re- Mains an:, organization. with Sharp,,, rivalries '.between "its clandestineand'analytical sec, Finally, It., says the agency's Main -product, its so-called na- tionals, intelligence estimates, shavalargelf gone unread by its !intended consumers,i, including successimi.of Presidents.," Karalekas writes that' the evolution- of :the agency,' 'which w she describes as "undi- rected," was deterinined by four factors internatibnal environment as ` Perceived by the Administration of President Truman, the, inillen ofintelli- gence institutions, the agency's structures and values and the personalities of the agency- Directors; - - ' In other terms, She said; this meant the, growing cold 'war with the Soviet Union, the -jeal- Ow of themilitary intelligence services and- the temptation for C LA. officials to seek spectac. tiler "successes." ? Miss Karalekas notes that at the end of World War II there was a predisposition among American policymakers to cen- tralize the Government's many intelligence functions. , ..F-ThenreitstfiC',Stte' the experience of Harbor.- attack.irCI90:-.1*,' .ban when bits' of' intelligence 'icttilted 'by one asency ',ielched'otherlittellieneeenal- vsts:Whe could have to ritedict-the assault; " t'i.'-'1?a*s.Itaralekas; names- Cie& Donovan,-.,the- wartime head-of the Office' of -Sttategio, Services; -James' V. ....FOrreittl, Secretary -of the Navy.,::'Prqsi- dent Truniartt, and Ferdinand` Eberitadt; arileveitment':banle er,:. as the', f9trad#K.: ii?jr4ziid the CIA; ?4??- ' But she 'rietee"-triat the-( -predecessor organization of tC,', 'Jan 1940,,:aCkettpiciner4and. per- sonnel - and 'was onteseed- the emilitary services and he State Department.. At that,1 three of the four initial Direc- tors of the Central Intelligence Group were military men.. , In the beginning J.. Edgar Hoover's Federal Bureau of In- vestigation refused to allow the central intelligence ? organiza- tion to touch Latin America. And until 1950 Gen. Douglas A. MacArthur( barred clande- stine operations In the Far East., Clandestine intelligence col- lection began about 1950 under Gen, Walter Bedell Smith, who became Director- three years after the C.I.A. was. formally constituted. _ Under General Smith, andi under - the pressures of. thei Korean war, the agency swiftly assumed. the basic" shape, it now has, the histoty That ,is,? 'it was-:foimedtai handle Ovett. itiut;,;-clindestine operations, "analysis coor dination, of:: overall:: Amen intelligence-activities: The Soviet, Union..vias Made the princip4. target! of:Arne' 'can intelligence in' March- 1946, three years,: before ,.the---Rus. sians. exploded theis first at IC. weapon. The agency then had 1,816 employees. Five years I later, under General Smith, the number was 3,338. But Mist Karalekas also, ;Ihei. 'expanding '.. American; "Intelli- gence effort; such imno correct! estimate:in 1960. ori Communist intentionssin K?re?virtual de- pendence:en' fitendir foreign intelligence. agencies for dans i_destine reporting-and tr heavy concentration on,turning out a "daily Intelligence summary" instead_ 'of-long-range estimates: "Its. 'intelligence became di- rected-to a wOrking-IeveI au- dience rather than to seniori policymakers," ,she says. "In] attempting to do everything it 34;at 'contributing almost noth- Miss:3KaraIekas also- reports that fotiryears after the agency was -established 24 Government' dePartniefits and agencies were. Stial..-L4.1*.flucing economic in ,tailigenec" In 1962 there were . research groups in:th.C.L.A.;., alone,. a situation that: Was ,,not rectified until The- history; attributes this continuing' duplication of effort to the ambition of the agency leaders to outstrip the rniiita7-y intelligence services and to'gain greater access to ? the White House. r. As a result; it' 'concltfdes, there "tension" within the agency and a proliferation of intelligence, products the officials they were intended for. One retired analyst, is quoted as having said: "Our big- gest problem was whether or not anybody would read our product." It . was a complaint also frequently made by William E. Colby When he was director from', 1973 to 1976. , 11 ? ;.. o0encyNrk.covert actions !began in 1948, a year after Ithe establishment of the C-.LA. iMiss ICaraleicas attributes-their conception f to George F. Ken- man; then- director of polity planning at the State Depart- ment. * She quotes Mr: Rennin' as having said he was alarmed later over the massive covert .operations undertaken on What he had regarded as a mOdett suggestion. WASHINGTON STAR I MAY 1976 Defense Intelligence Agency Gets Chief Lt. Gen. Samuel V. Wilson, who has served in Viet- nam, the Soviet Union an-d with the CIA, was named yesterday as head of the Defense Intelligence Agency. -DIA collects 'information through the military at- tache 'officers in 'embassies throughout the world. Wilson will succeed Lt. Gen. Daniel 0. Graham, who, resigned last fall after James R. Schlesinger, was re- placed as secretary of defense. Wilson, 54, served in Vietnam with the Agency for International Development from 1964 to 1967, and was U.S. defense attache in Moscow from 1971 to 1973. He has been deputy CIA director and most recently was deputy assistant secretary of defense for intelligence. The DIA has been under intensive congressional investigation, along with other U.S. intelligence agen- cies, during the past 15 months. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 'Approved -FOr Release 2001/08/08 CIA-ROP77-00432R000.1004000021 NEW YORK TIMES 7 JUN 1976 Ilis :?:-..-,?:,-- -7. T--- -s. -.--- "*" - s i orr Fa , :.__. w fArt;?,-r,,.;:...7':.:: araf''' - C ' " '"4?.. ,. .,`,..; ekas.:_ 4.-. ',,,,,..,:..,:.-,:..? ... . _., - , .? .,.. ?. ,.%- ,',:i'. ,,,?,..;.. - :?'?,11 ?d-:-.. :. ' '.i .aneha.istheiteerork'ninst-- - :1.7 at _,... Latin , , the Girls'" b:'sehedb '.."-- Sbi worked' knnnier 'vaell1.-.1V0eir-.W.illiatitilili. Bader of - . wASRINGTOil .. June - 6z..:. ?.. in. Bostgow recalled'iher as tions front.. school &tot -eled-' ? the Senate Select' Committec, Untitk, last: summer, : ? Anite-;_ '? of the brightest, well- - cal assistant:. at the Boston:. -. on Intelligence' Activities be Karalekaes' only; acquaint- ,. qualified ed students?I'!evirl,,,liSympho, law znt,*aandrecepati_oni....?_?st at.;i:,Igan...1.ti........A..fooljsing,eandidfotititecsademlealwr4 nom- with.:91e nether world !-; ' she . 'aiw4Y6;=1.v.-"r.: ti- assistant at annivemiTY.77,;17..Fils1. hiitoMlie:tuloledi of .?tererga- intelligence serv- -know 'why."' ??, ?- .,.-.,4, ,, ? ,, ..,,.t.,.____ sor.,...}refratiich ... e.iii,._.?4i1.,jprofessmmaw:...., "She vac Ices wax ;ter- ? study; ',` for ...i,:- :: miss'. Kaildefai41. iee10-lbeii.-10-=.77L , heilo. gol.tia., '..:;:ii..tte-'first.,anie, who .? On ?,tiii '-... f'r ''',he* doctoral the- --- 'Roy ? fl? 1946 a- Mei '"'t"ew' ? ' d - ? - ? -.:?, inr,nribidr-..liftt:,MOY ? .' . ' ' ' ' 7 ' ' '?Ina:, nate school an - , t!fatitaa- -Mai of :'ret.;Oir4s - " :inenth&befOre,Pe (tri ? --."-, her troirneet it, May; a mar..5. - to.,,,!it -AI ,;coirversatton4- 'cect ''' 5:43Ittil**''' :, ffeirtV*ent.innor----, -dii-o-ti,rG"-Yt.*theet.:'th4diistailde;141ii;' vardhad heihistXteaP%lit _;'-.71-h...''''5:ver3tiHtli42. tr" '''''-cini-Miss't'': -kaialekasa':wiltes'idlitS-T*6"1; . .-..', :?? 44167116 '' cl? ..' 2 - - - - ? - -.--- '- ' -----'-'' ' -: ? Vtl'hile-t,workingi,loward . ttc,; hatilt .clearentind."-",lietp,s1K - "i*,-,-4. --'''Greel*r.' *Ill- ',.; seneeklten-er4,6?Ir:in... ';.ninsteeidegree, iidisRaralei!,ithatAlliSSaraltlits:smies Par-6 ci? ?It4,ridge tkal4iiirr.aht ':- turpuziczka},waaitti, ' .70.*.forohia. . oft.:10,:loork.,:fiet444y;i_t ,-m-w.-.7.becauser; 'irlit'digllet*ies*IG; "'?bus41*944stSJI6 '....`44'.L...--4.1e" - -at , Massachusetts : General she had ' i4itirenneral &nit- weeks," and.'.ellpeeltd.,E,1.4.1nentarin:cschoOky,in, ,B,r-Aqzn: ' ? ital., in . reldministrativak...:.tio poii ' a Harvard. c!,..tkr-1 'entree into," #1?-_____. deq11-,-.1m..i:;Atild gerida.' .- ..-?"..':... ' .. and supervisory capacities.. -. --11.:''.? Studied' Secret Voltnnekk 1 and--.' living."' Ilrgriline-5 YI K'-'-??No:: Oriels' fors itteken" in . . , ger, ,, ,:tinctonti, , . . thesiv_n-' ..,1 - r -- , , : ,_.,_,0 "...., AniVina= spies 41*?____agen_lt.,*-?:''the KarideitaiIiiinee;!*iltioh :4adinted trota.heitbeintlit..,,? Pe-Orme in Feeetegm;', he,he*becme.aa aurz...1.4-s?';'-.'!.''.4? ithatiler ltsWifrikff*--Nsgrested ImGreeeelanctavent ,ontAY..ear itgov:in'alt assign- State;-,o..ilho*,tr,.,,lits*rYt,.k,?t'heeihthee','':6'_ _ebetittf*-_,?,.,Seltti,V1 *in'. - mg' -tacincoborate,sotnething4f,,ment that carried-An- en4ua1i s*:----' "::'''' .?:. 4A a Greek --'!..L'Sjig,,alt-a-41W ttini-' the iter..." During one Salarret..$19;09.0. she ,Akisees,,.,_ 4W7; i':-:',..'` assign- 4 r "'kV tif*leit?, a, *eekt ;Mr.. .nummet; gie,,_Tesearthed.1- re.:-...,-.ehehttd;...kieen -,nomPlelett,', Ir*M51. ?Kag*leka3:.....U...i'f'j'.-4.1:_alt_ - fi478 YeTittg'. Bile:she;.flaw...L66" eeritly. released_ .: British diplo-.., free7,-to decide nOW MI _AP- t., Vr#S ??-'.1v+Itiw.,'"?-'11Y- ?aireiSO ill.. Greek--.0*,-,!'COOK4 4natie.files-at therPublic7Re-, Ptnanst-the-Lsnhiect,-and ,Aen- yearciti., ;?ual- hit_t?Ornt ..' Greek &hie- eini?oceasionalz?-? postwar American mtelli- ly wears Greek costume jew7 cord . Office in London. - The ' spent the first two., months , . . _ thesis, "Britain, the, United - - browsing, _ States and Greece--I942 to, through 'a secret -- genCe operations for the ... pi,..,. Senate's Select Committee to ..? ?' 75-volume- compendium.. ;of Study Governmental ()Pere- Thankful for 'Standards' - 1945," was completed in Au- C.I.A. history.. ? ,,, - ,.F,?-i ? tons with Respect to, intern.. :,- At Girls' Latin, she was in: 'gust' 1974, and her ' degree . ' Then she began &series:Of ' gence Activities. .,.._ , , , . ?honor student.rall four yearsi was granted three months la. ..' 60 interviewswith Working The tall, slender Beston and she remains- grateful- to ter.- , ".; . .. . ? , .. - and ? retired agency 'emi-' native was, ,chosen. .from a - teachers such as Mrs, Lapi- In: the meantime Graham!, Ployeett. Miss-Karalekas cern- field of 15 candidates partly; du., Elizabeth Condon.-and T. Allison,: profear of ?oft- pleted., the, history in- early: on the -Tecommendation- of -.....Eclith. Carapbell,!-.alr retired, s - tics,-; at. Harvard's ' John .-.M.:, = spring, Ibizt. it had to pass ' her associates at .Harvard' .:,14.r ' V711' --ge.MaTimit:'s.terg.- . -, Kennedy School of Govern- . through agonizing bargaining and partly on the bags of her p.',. dards?"' -,.- -.1 - -,,,r? .i,7,..',-',- ?-??. meat, -asketke..htgas .Karalekas:'' sessions, with top C.I.A. peru doctorial dissertation:- on . On a Merit scholarship, . she ? to work' ..94.4:a.: series of. -.sonnet. over what could and America= and British,acii*-;,-ettee-de4 -.g'illeater.C011ege;.,...,yrojects.:f.:9=-:::defense ? and:-...72.couktnetbepublishetz. ,-,A1,,: -ties hr wartime ....Greacei4.. ..V%yhen-,.tt:i..wao,stillOglied,-1-4..-,-:::arn*corttitsfitiolicy.,,L,...i-- -.--:-?.z,Afiss Karalekas. isnot sine- "n was alWaywinterest- ,44.4giri. - school' rather- tharr, acl.,*: -- - Ile.said#akshehicirpcov-= :,?,?whe.ther,?"shei-Wantst to, etnt- --' :eitiknimary,',,,:saidterlite.th414.`!ionlonf.g:,011etbr tt-TtOday,7:-,-..ett tkbfkletititt..and_hidwitt:litittOi'' ...44X7166i, the Intel'-; Helen ICaraleigagi 4; W40*,?1 ';',4*.tet:' IFift15e4 CLISIS141004g:a-,. szave,:,itc nonagioir,a..projeetw,-,ligendet -qt'eitk-!noie ? thiCitert 'viiirint- for the Stater. Street' -career in irt-7-Instetrr; .' ortudlitattoperationshv. .k*altglittent. is over "i . 4 concentrated- 7t.itiocioinlitz,tioid*t ;',*T,;=.0m7te,ti few. articlee'Eo= ' rs - 1talknnit Itust,C0P2PalV,10.V.t ,r?orate . -- -' .`SItieAlw.alrs iiien4,:.1;titriaght-i... llisto. a.::: ''',:...wiltingia.; -tePort-on foreign- Wienee:7- whe; eaktz 'I glites..l ' , ? -shey witatectto-entnnAltrik ., ,, - -, 4iniiitstktia7-'4t. tilet?:AblitAT, ,. t_. ,-- ''. '-a*:;-:".indePendent,t.::2,,thors:itinad-ihsa*. reviiatil - ..,..?,,,. ,,,, '..headeti, by:for-?,...,;:fenOrl'et,',.,?*:eztaict.::51141. . ..`"A?iiese?r:-AVit? MIL: .., . ? - -. Robert!. ::,- riaisitsw. .......,H,"...... 1 2" ' - - - .r.-.1,;..,-e.......,e, ../31.; v4,1-7A?ge.,q.,,,.:, ?litift_ ,Islovi--#... _ ,. . i'? . . _ NS DAY LONDON TIMES 27 May 1976 -18 May- 3.97 CIA: No Newsmen Need Apply Your editorial "A Case of Subversion From With- in" ? May 5) has come to my attention. In it you said my statement of last February II "seemed to promise that journalists would no longer be hired." My statement said: "Effective immediately,: CIA will not enter -into any paid or contractual relation- ship with any full-time or part-time news correspon- dent accredited by any U.S. new service, newspaper, periodical, radio or television network or station. As soon as feasible, the agency will bring existing rela- tionships with individuals in these groups into con- formity with this new policy." - This policy is being carried out. _ You may base the views in your editorial on state- ments in. the Senate Select Committee report. .The committee was working frcrn brie f- and necessarily highly sanitized case summaries. We do not necessari- ? ly agree with their conclusions. Although the body of your editorial says nothing ? about subversion, the caption over it does. I can as- sure you it has never been the intent, nor is it the in- tent now, nor will it be the intent in the future, for the CIA to attempt to "subvert" the American press. George Bush, Director Central Intelligence Agency - ?Vashington, D.C. E. _ Penkovsky Papers-- ;From Dr Robert Conquest - Sir, Owing to travel, I have only to- day seen The Times Diary in your issue of April 29, which alleges that the Penkovsky Papers have now been proved a fabrication, and attacks me for. maintaining, .the. opposite. ? I It is true that students of- Soviet ;affairs have on -occasion endorsed. or partially endorsed, fakes (as with Deutscher and Cam in the cases of "Budu Mdivani " and the "Litvinov Diaries." respectively): and had your Diarist's' assertion been true, I would naturally have admitted my error. But it is not. ? All that even the-egregious Senate Committee's report on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Ameri- cans, which your. Diarist quotes, in fact says. is that the book was. pre- pared and written by CIA "agency assets", but on. the basis of the- "actual case materials". But this is no more than a hostile way- of saying that the materials came through the CIA (who were, rather naturally, Colon el P en ko vs ky's American contacts), and that there- after they were translated and edited by someone in the CIA's con- fidence... There is nothing new here, let alone any proof of "palpable forgery". And that such editing took place has never-been disputed: it is indeed stated in the book itself. This is obviously not an entirely satisfactory situation, but it leaves the question- of authenticity as one of . Judgment of the actual. text. Criticism of it, as against mere anti. CIA abuse, has been based solely, on criticis' misunderstandings of. trivia. and on amateur telepsychology (" Colonel. Penkovsky would not have . . ."). Until the CIA releases the- original- "case Material", as I hope it will, one can only .say that the arguments for general authen- ticity (and the negative arguments against "forgery ") remain incom- parably stronger than- their con- traries. At the very least, the in- expert intuitions of Mr Brogan can- - not be taken very seriously, any more than your Diarist's' attempt to squeeze implications- out: of the re- -port of the Church Committee. That Committee has itself been attacked in the United States even by liberal columnists as largely a politically motivated farce. To find Times con- tributors who go a good deal further is a little disturbing. Yours faithfully, ROBERT CONQUEST, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Smithsonian Institution, Washington, May 12. - - - Approved For Release :2001108/08 CIA4RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 THE I4EW?it01411i1W4,?-1976 abrst Cites U. S. Risk in De ay an *ASKING ; acy TON 3-1A tralatta# en the FordAtInlinis- ma kin, jinklYst1;t1;4011all' onPelicy working On P' yhee 10.7:11/ Nov Yto thaw ititioraz repreeem*, m30... 'sentora-liMiliet; 0e. the Cell tratiOn's gollovf7 IA intelligintta-,tienCTop ?Liana.", ft ttential eleegerei' leiler article teMpt/Og to distance twice he- .sueE',0.1.*het-erity..--7'' IiiritnillreiWelitgATA. tween'iditartr t nio4Bover 'whe- Mr; Brown's article, ace' orchng canrelationshinwi iobooi Of thought , . - ? United States,movt urgently to matters related to China.- They settle the Taiwan isSue and per- suggested' that. the agency must haptestablish some kind of mi- be. ander heavy .criticiant for if- Unity ',relationship' with China? law flin PublicatiOn or the It China 'after Mao is to move article and-that it was no at, away from Washington, 'how far might it move toward Mos- and th ? ?t ei?rtleiliile 1 The ? u-e Is ted. states should Administration officials, Plat that ett(delaYttvniiin c*:4141C4tiri Matilda-12* the?' the' tions itivarely in the IrCiSt l*Cdgrtigidt 'blab* (UMW' Art loci' e 41,40 9ver novr,be ingagediulnzavegn negotiations re.; aciesannHot grow of expect., about if (1646*jilii 'Se' new '4 tb.(11-14 nwin inetudinfinureof Chinese4m irgu.ess. that' the _Me agency- aPairee!sel' Theeelssrteltev.eleaa Then , missed, badly on- an farefrmil.fleunw presenting his tuallY theeesermtancsree" get purtexPeuTprerbction, ? un- tung and that without Mr. Mao death, of. Chairmen M-.---es" Tall- own, ?oPationst- end that the mending that ng- enotigh to s Mr. ,-- thiPlaguicorPoreigh ;fifes' ? line is, tPL*fl On , , the Ambition of the with Tat, looked. viirid recentlY Peking: ostutieP17.;.9-qted lationt with China, .eact relations inagazinetteleiseGlenn Brown ln?4a3"1" rimerstra wltbi Peking's thlre; when mutual defense treaty tie: dominant group 9 to hold the -Western-oriented groupS together., aline I move either toward httionism or . toward ace da.withi,iUnT agency jacoOraged the pubhca- tion- .of scholarly articles, but * comment en 'po&pA the a' undersmy., Their latest effort to bring this about failed last ium- Thatarm!' Predicted that men after the-capture of Sai the,Presi'dential tlon looming. ? , ? Premier -Chou. En-tat - was al, st ',certain to 'be succeeded 'acting Prime' htinister Tang ;- ping, ? ? successor, lisAlarndstGroun however; was - Hua Kuo-feng eludtaty: s, wouldof state Henry A. Sone-wain. he was 35T1I ?AA that Rather, the debate 'occurs whose: cominitment to. recent goes ligteadoeiot,with mo iiasbe4 moljZt,,,-;"gena over more specific issues about foreign policy is reportedly less which, the analysts have little than Mr. Teng's. .....,cow and Peking aintilinderedt for "414 -"Yeare; '' four hard evidence evidence is foreign policy ' Mr ? Brown arguei4n his ar-? arr' : source ofteverage which %Wirt spent' on Chna, t major- factor in the recurn4 ticle.that. foreign . policy issues. 'Moscow . ... -.:.- hat,,thi article was written last, struggles for power in Peking? are. e,, major factor in interne/ -. , :-Iilavrt-In'theMinoritY . - 4.1 ,:? h4;, .. ' ' ear and that ha"was...,,elt Cur"'".,_, If it is, does the opening to the Chinese 'pelitics. He also sug- . ? uY wurruug on' anything 'wet depend on Mr. Mao sand gestt Ahtt Mr. Teng's recent his well-known distrust of Mos, fall front cswer may be tied MI article' are-specifically iitt,ii#, to ,Seyeritl ',Administration off- none ceetilliterintiii.elgenccly sunus, naLlThreiy isiist? *ell-fCarhinon,thimeayi- the end of cbu year. should theinilitarytechnelogy - .' 'The views, expressed in the do with Chine. ? be the author's own. t ails said that Mr. Brown wits caw? If es seems likely most Pere' t.?- ? efforts t? seek analysts, Mr. Mao. dies before western- technology, including' WASHINGTON POST 4 JUN 1976- ;' ? ? mt-.1?4:: ? ,54;V *len Chink and Russ Is -dfingsnedinlViahIngt01$211efidg3r . once was. An *Wein the new Issue Foreign Poli*,braogeitaro'fai?-4 Ice analyst at the CIA; warns the admini istration that'll& policrcOuld lead Pe- king to. seek an accommodation with; Moscow:To avert, this, he recommends. full US: recognition of :Milk, which would entail the breaking co!' diplomatic; ties with Taiwan,, and thae provision of! U.S. military equipment So the Pekingregime.t is untuaa.. not to unprecedent- ed, for, the CIA to join in A Public de- bate about the direction Of U.S. policy. - An, editorial note explains that Browe, 'itt? presenting his Own views, not those' of the CIA.. But the article will, inevita-- bly, be seen in someloreign capitals as:;.. a deliberate signal Of the administra- tion's intentions. - ? ???: Nothing could be further from the truth. Indeed, administration officials fear that the appearance of the article may Complicate US.: relations, with!" both Mom* and Peking. They are an- 'y with the CIA for clearing the arti- cle for publication. They are also con- cerned that some of the Issues raided by Brown - 'may become . involved in ,the,, election campaign. Ronald, Reagan has already denounced the. administra- tion's -plant to. "sacrifice" Taiwan, and Kiting* has gpOptttdenied that ',hart to keep:, prttiate.T, There is sindlart debate within the CIA Itself?not; indeed,, about the pctil Icy' the U.S shouldfollow,tlinaithe CIAf ta supposed:to. keep:Outot policfmak higi but-abutnaIyaiathatshOuk besupplied tilthepollermakeriL. crverivhainiing weight Of *Woe, within; the intelligence community-of, Which the CIA is only-one segment? has long been on the side of those. Who/ believed that there was no serious-pos-I, ability of a Sino,Soiiiit It therefore followed that there-was no: pressing need td mollifyPekhig either, by ditching Taiwan. or by' offering arrow to. Chink? Bit. a small minority ;Of am! lysts, made up of seven, men who were ? listed as "diasentersr Ins State' Depart ment memorandum last year, believed otherwise. ? : Brown says that it has been a prendsei of U.S.:, policy since 1989 that relations; between Peking and' Moscow are likely to remain hostile, and- then proceeds to question; its ,validity. He. argues that prolonged stagnation inSino-U.Vrela- lions could help to undermine the power of those Chinese leaders who are favorablydiSposed toward-Washington,' and strengthen the pro-Soviet elements in the leadership. Then, in the power. litrtiggleihatfolloWs the death of MOO;': China tight "seek a general accommo- dation with Moscow,-'. 6 ,ernent these eventnalitlet are cl :dot In the, hest interest of the linitedi_ Stabil,' he says, "I believe that ;Wash-, ington-Sbould:consider recognizing king" before -'Mao's death. -MK- he! Alrildea.lnightinfluence the configurai -don of politiCal power in China, and thel courdeathe Post-Mao succession stragl He :sees China's recent purchase a Rolle Royce fighter aircraft engines; from Britain as a strong indication of: Its interest in Western military technoP ogy. He argues, by implication, in favor of similar U.S. sales, since these would lead to increased SinoSoViet tension; "thus . inhibiting any moves toward Sino-Soviet reconciliation." - The first serious proposal along these Ithesovat made last fall in a Foreign; Policy article by Michael Pillsbury, a: Rand Analyst who was strongly , at-, tacked by Washington officials fort what they described as a wrongheaded and irresponsible approach. But., the, very vehemence of their attack showed'', the -importance of the issue they were. trying to play down. Now comes. the; Brown article, hard on the heels of a full-scale CIA study entitled "Prospects for a Sino-Soviet Rapprochement after Maar!" 'which- clings to the established line. The CIA's basic conclusions "are,?tTW even if a desire to reduce differences should emerge among Chinese and-So- viet -leaders. after Mao's death, Peking: Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : GIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 . ;?'? APproved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RIDP77-00432R000100400002-1 i&IMOseowOuld bie obstacles, created by- conflicto, ing% national interests would circut*i Scribe the ciiicessions each could offeti M tha!other. But the* Ouestions fir* raised by Pillsbury; have hada corisklerf; able hipact on Washington's policy- maker% if not on *analysts. , A mesnorandtim Nandi sent tO cainlitimtelgutPetitstiAtbsiAstePteil 1 Paitmentli oiveintelligence-orgfaiisHb--?, lion listed a:series-Of -questions potied by Kissinger.- "What- should we b& doIiig"lt 'asked, In deter a Chinese-So- viet rapprochement??.., * ,."We doubt".. said a response (jatedi May 6, "that any faction an Peking) 'Amid dare to. undettake a major for- -eign po1lfisflOfl, Rather, than ask: wliatwe shield do to deter IS Pn040Tbitt,:titiffirggkenl.Pkt:P111011! Saw/day, hese to: Irritate irritate China_Articlit By Henry. S'..litradshet, ,WpbteNeStarStaft 'Writer - CIA 1' Director:. George, Bush has ordered a? revieVe of the agency's, policy On allowing US employes totj publish articles following what a- CIA. ? spokesman called, misinterpretation ok an article- on America* China policy. The article, appeannfri the current- issue. of thei cinarterly magazine :fort ? eign Policy, says', theUnited States shout& consider establishing- full diplomatic. relations with .Peking be- fore they aged and feeble Mao Tse-tung diesAir hopes that- -this.[-might infMen Chinete'politiet:k'[[H. . tionistnr patch .up relatiOns witht-the Soviet:Vide:lit-after Mao dies.. accarding la. the- athdrttoger4SlenprBrown. Tiktfte C.I1r4 He. suggesta that .11%;?-?rectignition.- ? ot:1.- Peking- Could give :?.1.11,taithingtOn: - THE --ARTICLE; 'T.caused, itritationi yesterday at the ? State ? '::Department,,q which 'bad beconieeware of itonly -a dayer twaearlier. Senior Officials fel the. CIA. _mime :was -being. Med. 1. to -jostle :policy ? wnrking "iquiely-towardfultrelatiOns That hav-,,,been ??stymied; -however; -[.? the- :la& defense treaty coiittl the :Chinese..-Nationalist regime -cut 'Taiwan,: - with, ., which .[Washingtoa?.1tas,-Inlidiplo- ;matic?relations.1-.. 1' :While-the formalities of diptornatic recognition . were switched from Taiwan ,to Peking fairly., easily by countries:. -luck, as -Japan,. -these countries.' lacked the complication of- being: com- mitted to, Taiwan's .defense against Peking.- , Brown simply suggested -that "the United States .could follow the: `Japanese model' 'without explain- ing what to do about the de fense tie; Secretary State Henry A. Kissinger said at the close of. President .to Peking-, in fbecembe7that the Taiwan treaty was an resolved problem- Switch- ing relations., This still is STATE Depart- inents spokesman, ' Robert FUnseth, said 'yesterday that commentaries by gov- ernment officials' on foreign policy "should be cleared in advance by the State De- partment." ' K CIA spokesman said Bush's order for a review of the agency's publication policy was not the result:of any complaints from out- side the agency. It was, de- cided upon in order to avoid problems of inisinterpreta- tion such as.. occurred' Over Brown's article, he said. , The articla.was -*tit* statemeut. Via "Shear tions.7.But even this, the memorandum, suggested;.should wait until liter in the year, When the`, analysis might be found -Useful by a new administ.ration, But.* what if Mao -dies first? If Kissinger: really wants to know what to do, he will have-to read-Brown's article. ' - -eami.vietorsona. licatiom Poll in that it represented [ attitudes, 'although Brown was identified, as. a seal analyst at the agency's. of- fice of political research, .? , Bush does not intend to prevent all publfcation of CIA material, the spokes- man said.. In recent years CIA. analysts have'; been publishing increasingly widely in academic jour- nals, congressional studies and other forms. Most-arti- ' Cies have dealt with factual material- on ? foreign coun- tri es assembled and analyzed by. them, rather than, U.S..- governinentak policies. AT THE TIME of esca-i lating U.S. involvement, in. Yietnarii, the" quarterly Maga;i. Eo&viga.Afrairs4 EDITOR & PUBLISatii 'I MAY 1976 -JCIA doubletalk a different putdicatio* frinn -Foreign Policy. published an article sup:- porting .the -commitment,: w.Titten. by. George A Ca47=: er. He was identified only, as' a Specialist in Viet; namese affairs. - This caused an outcry itt Washington. Carver, was then a senior CIA- helping shape Vietnam- ; policy; and the . failure to , tell readers of Ibis Connec- tion brought congressional: and Press complaints. The identification. of-, Brown in the present article apparently was intended to head off such complaints', But- despite the' distlaimer,, article appeared- stiletto&viewpaint Withinthe gepernmeati In February, CIA Director George Bush issued a state- ment saying: "Effective immediately, the CIA will not enter into any paid or contractual relationship with. any full-time or part-time news correspondent accredited by any U.S. news service, newspaper, periodical, radio or television net- work or station." E&P (Feb. 21, page 6) applauded the statement as did many publications. Mr. Bush repeated that statement last week in response to a question before the annual meeting of the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Washington. Now the report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelli- gence Activities discloses that "of the approximately 50 U.S. journalists or personnel of U.S. media organizations who were employed by the CIA or maintained some other covert relationship with it at the time of the announcement, fewer than one-half will be terminated under the new CIA guide- lines." The committee says the key word is "accredited" and the agency interprets it as applying to those who are "formally authorized by contract or issuance of press credentials to represent themselves as correspondents" leaving all others (executives and free lancers) as not included. This is CIA doubletalk. The damage to the integrity of all responsible news people continues with this sham. Mr. Bush should immediately clarify the CIA position by saying "all news people" are included in the prohibition, not just some. 7 Approved For Release 2001/08148- p40900-271 - Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 BALTIMORE SUN 5 JUNE 1976 unset re u es By RENRYI. ?14 Area[ ? WaslaugtonBureau of Itie Sun Washington?The State Do. pertinent frostily rebuked the Central Intelligence Agency Yesterday_for an article adv.?, eating early formal recognition of China. Robert L, Funseth, the State Department spokesman, did quiteput his comments in those terms. But he left no other ob- vious inference.'T. Yes; he said',,thetState De partment felt articles: by gov- ernment officills.,,on foreign policy should be-' cleared through the department,, even when they were framed as per- sona, opinions. No, that had not been donein this case. - He refined:10 cominent: on the suisian-en7a the article by Roger Glenn Brown. in the mag- azine Foreign Policy.' Mr Brown, 35, :was described as-a' , former :specialist on China for thegX now assigned to anoth- __. WASHINGTON POST 9 JUN 1.97s His article is labeled as a re- flection of his Own personal, un- official judgment. It advocates complete normalization United . States-Chine relations before the death of Mao Tse- tung, the Chinese leader,. who is 82 years old and visibly feeble.- : , As Mr:FunsethImplied, it impossible for a CIA analyst to publish Anything. without. ? :carring policy, overtones, , President ford already is irider fire politically.forsileged-plana to sever former ties with the Nationalist governmentnnTai- wan -quickir if he is elietid in November,. ?? , That, accusation - w made by several members. of Congress. Ronald Reagan, Mr. Ford's Republican challenger, has translated it into a sugges- tion that the 'administration plans to "sacrifice" its defense commitment of a generation to Taiwan. ? The: administration's : cThii"iet.n one : - ' :16-yreivis H. Diupid_ and Don Obeitorfer viiteeineo_itlosi sten mum ',Th cetrui7bite1111161a1 ,kigner black-marliett transactions to:-Iinarice it ; activities.. in Vietna*.., Chile even while. other vageneles,, worke out. curruP tion jtrj:sboi.e up,, ,:t;110Wee?fitoollie4.,_?._,Ugetcl fernier' Offetin...,- ha*. swith CIA- The Itietnaint. , ? invoiveiVintillionsZof, ci.o_ traded for PL._ blacksiarket ilivitongsl(Ong according to these sources. , 'One -fernier .offic 'sal it that at ? $iime petit's', dtir4 ink the war nenFly, all .the foreign currency .sRent : the Seigon, station .of 7 t,h 'WC ivao,- kiw44*o ul ?oich transactions: 4:- ales. A. -Corlier;:. ,wli iiroott.4O : an economic a visor t6,413.e:U.S.enshassy 1 Saigon: in 1968-8-snit.?mhtic,ri ter -counselor for!',:e&iioinicli there in 1570-3,-; gOit'itk-;re4 *Mtn* 4,01.- Sueollfglallajilid CIA officials ,told: him' theii Preferred , to -:obtifiv. .funds through': ?.litii..:?,4,blick- hagw. ftonta. 'Hong.. Zong.. due:: to:3. !"operational' reasons" 2and: .because : .,inch. transactions i 'nada their budget 'gO: fin-,:4- ther, j'-,--.' ,:?:',- ,, ,_ -..,,:f-? . I.CeoPer, kiiti'=, he, did not knew what -proportion et', Saigon.,, CIA expenditures4 were _financed : through: black-market transactions. ' ,`.-Ttie?seSIe of.,CIA:spendingl economic19 $aigon during 'his time tauiILfor 4 effeet' view . in. m?eh'41iiikec, outlays; Tt; th4titgX, 4Iege b, militarythe ?anc 1.44 .'Ditring" "the' intensive phat,erof'jit";iriilitarY opera itsizirete4:1fiiii:,111643iirthe- offi aiati eicehangeliatii?h0Plyingt t?'U.S government traniaeg tions was. 118 plasters t the* del/ar;.'t Blickunarket._, rated were' often .-1.*o of thret0 plaster for most, purposes 275 to the', dollar in October,' , 1876, under, heavy' sure( and, successive: adinst, ? , Molts In later lege/ rata ereper : pushing inn realistic ratesLi;tr.s.i. policy *ma?' Week-market,-market,#41#7'04 actions.. 4. '."Testimony .:-- hi: it j)itssY bifida befera'Senfj -ate, subcommittee in 'N?isieM4 her,;:1982; .saidlhose dealing' in the .black: market' `!igive. aidr:' and eomfort.' eneriir._ -7,, and -Make _the 911etneinese economy' more unstable and subvert .efforts' to. establish econAnde:StithlW ity in Vietnam.' A former CIA official who, eslCO not :to be quoted by:. 'name' said - he believed the ? ? _ -agency's resort to the black market' in the early 1970s' was due at least in part to a heasak,.: budgetary drain: on China recognition call - sponse has been theraierepeat, edby Mr, Funseth. Hexecalled that the Shanghai cottununique, bistiectduring former-Presi Richard 1IL Nixon's trip Fto China4n- 1972* committed the two.-governments tit eventual norinalizatiOnef have. been step.* step he said, but there ; t.t0 r;..;10?.__!,:ter_t_nrd_tmeol:_the*, ' oluelOent normalization would take& the timing. The tiinin Lwas said: to-remain- sped many specialists in the US. argue for sooner rather: than later.; The Critical question on terms nornialization -con- eerns the :U.S.? aefense treaty with Taiwan.' at I publicly; has- satd Must abandoned as a precondition for normalization. The U.S.: has hedged, and Mr. Funseth' Said yesterday he did not know U.S. plans in that regard Otherwise it generally is ae- i cepted that- the nOrmalization will follow the pattern set by 1 Japan; -political recognition of ?Peking: while' maintaining eco- nomic ties with Taipei. But giv- en the uncertainties of domestic !'pOlities, the issue is a- hard one for the administration to deal th Wi now: -? _. . , ,Mr.":Funseth sidestepped the question whether swift recogni- tion-was-advocated by-many in the administration but prevent- . _ ecl. ROPOutiallY hY H019 A.. Kis- Singer, Secretary of State. Nor- mally, he said, there was a wide range of: views on. foreign poli- eYin8leavnthia4he bureaucra- cY;The Brown...'-- . ' ' ' article Was sym- bolic, at least, of howsuch con- flicting interests sometimes are translated into pressure for a specific- goal. But several- offi- cials with otherwise conflicting viewurejected the idea that the publication represented in any tway a disguised effort to test public opinion. ?:;.. ? 'goosed by the: effort to se- cretly_ . raise- a sunken:;:Rus- sian' submarine, in the; Pat cifie. ? ? The CIA.6.,..etfort to raisei . the- Soviet,' sub' spe.v eisiO research. Atig: the: Hughes Reicher!" Glomar' earl* iri Incriorltii,' cost -has been' estimated- is, asi--$20ft, 'CIA' purchases Of Chilean'eurr?1 on. the: : black ma ket were at a time when the: U.S.-embassv:theree, was. pur- *uoiruCZ ,''',OPout.,.. $30,0 linonthly, in-Chilean escudos ?fjuitaide: the countrY. hi' Ars leatini-Z. ,;e?:!': -al -.1 c ? ' , . :.i.?:DinrinVifS!'t:lieriod thek, A-a4-? 141614 to 'shore u).7-4 the :Chilean econontr-insuppartet,Presi., ' NEWSWEEK. 7 June 1976 _ SHAKE-UP AT THE CIA When the dust settles, six of the CIA's top eight men will be new to the job. The replace- ment of CIA chief William Colby by George Bush and the ascension of veteran agency ad- ministrator Henry Knoche into the No.2 spot are only the most prominent changings of the guard. William Wells will become the new head of clandestine operations, replacing t William Nelson, who recently resigned. ..\ Others reportedly planning to leave office ' include Edward Proctor, deputy director for intelligence; George Carver, in charge of final "estimates- on intelligence, and Carl Duckett, chief of science and technology, who led the attempt to raise a sunken Russian 8 sub with the Glomar Explorer. cient-gduarrIn-Fret _ After theelection' of Sal.,! .-Y410 Allende as president of Chile in November -1870 blitek'nler4451 rate$;4Wilielk-, previously, maintained.. 25. ,per cent Profiiitui,[4.bove. the legal- market,, soared as 'high Polle5k41_4411e4;efierPlv against the' new: regime. The: CAA 'is.,. said., tq have in- creased' its Meek-market Vtinsietiene diniiiit:Ole Al- lende period to 'Include ,eratioital ' forbid any Amezican.-r.- official, 'abroad' from -dealing' in ?blascksitiric, ett be currency. CIA,- -spokesmen, said yeterd al thatagency had no comment on the re- ports of black-market. trans.,: ..c..4014-1??? t 44,11, Act., - Approved For Release 2001/08/D8 :CIA-RDP71-00432R00010040000.2-1 Abproved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 THErltSW= YORK' 6r176 - - - - - naiizing Aidel' ? !tight' -to Know,"' ?which wnsr _ Special to The tteirT :PRINCETON; N.J., :Time William E. Colby; the. director of Central proposed today that any, rw straints en,,penaltieS'on: the release, of .sevret:doeumenti to, press should be p4aced on Federal officials instead,ot". on reporters.-7 , ,Thinkow' .ifltige lieedi the sanie icatei(pro Aim-end no `ntere---4hae? ,affertl-to your inetime; te* turns," Mr. Colby Said. -41f. Internal Revenue " Man Av return,: , TCOOMite. MOM" iriexpliinlnghb 4.? PtiiPosa4 !An ;T0100 inidedterCibra** :t."41*-1 -:f400_1(4'. *PO 014 tiwigedionce_:. not-to - Daniet, ever .got the 40%5,40: telklie, 'cMSoT dAt440 reporters.- protected'. undeil the First Amendment:!! ,Me. Colby made hinckgniarkai at a round-table discussion * "The Ethics of teaks: Right to Withhold Versus thlit attended by seven', journalists,.. including' Mr: Schorr; the CDSt_i TV ` investigate -= reporter- WHO gave The Village-Voice a copy of the House Intelligence Corn- Mittee's 111300,: ciiL. the npoalurt. The.:,.'Da}J Princeel tonian, ? the student newspaper' it ?Piincetoix,VhiversOtY: as one of!-?the:: alumni reunion; itf4,that have been going on-here', W./weekend:- In :discussing -ways to eilmif discLosutes *died the; idea of-an'offl seciiire'lict'. with criminal Ptintdtlei:-Sgainit'the transfer' of confidential information to nongovernmental " personnel,, - with the ndien itg.? "There are inatead ways. to im- prove the discipline of, ;hose who know the secrets.":_. ? Mr., Schorr Said: he concurred ,with Some of : *Mr. Colby's, su illestions 'Um- preventing un- authorized disclosures. _1,4 L -it's the job of Government NEW YORK-TIDIES 5 June 1970, _ U.S.DisavOwstgOlitySt On Articklbaut Chin-Ties ? WASHINGTON, Juan ;t -The United Statelk disnesoci--!. a* itself totray-littottiv:com4; mend:Pim by a senor analyst CeePist-= ktelligeP-51 Agency that 'POY 024ed, consider:: fulIz,:rimOglitione.;:- of4 China before the deatk4,:g4ed4 --:WState.OePartnient tpekb.S4 '-nier*-Ilohert pcinSetit: said. thel Untied Stites:, reinsisted..-com- mitted in normalizing 'relations With pelting butAtat not:Sec.': deadline for accomplishing It. it. : :Writing in the,citiarterlyinak. ezinei, -Foreign" Policy, R Glean.Brown:the'C,.T.X analyst,4 saidAhat" failure to act ,beforel Mr. Mao dies, eiould,undenninei thes;',pro.Americart: faction,. in; Peratig and- strengthen pron,i1 Act Orem' DIF? Mao is 823 and is re?d to'hethfrat NEW YORK TIMES 16 May 1976 John ants onv TO the Editor: , ? At e. time when we- are taking: ati Close look' at the actiVities of the CI and the F.R;L:,,I would like- to, noini nate for the"..quotation of die day th following, Let Us preserve our terimer; our iiisdonx: our humanity and civility: / though bur, enemies are everidaY, renounain,g theirs., John Adams Data job of the press to try to f out :what's going'on,. Mr Schorr said. "But once a (earn alist has..a secret, there is no constitutional power. for ,the Government to try to grab -it back." Salpfk warned tha ntils getback on arreVen 'Course in this county anAL away 'from Watergat, we 'will need .a certain amount of wins- -He added: . ,"If ohs intelligence agencie in a great, and painful inquest can cover op anything as they have dope in the past, one way -tethe suni- they ;wilt not th futnre'ls to haVe a Young mai Who. will leak and leave: the SalutarY benefits -.of _leaking 'to society." - `-.; ? Edward Barrett: &eche,ofj .the Communications institute and former dean of, the Colum- bia Journalism School, sup; gested that Mr. Colby's pro- 4.1 ? I? "--71 :posal b 'modified to include a 'bipartisan blue-ritbon appeals panel composed of ,ctizens with WASHINGTON POST 2 7 MAY '37 1 security .clearances.. i i 'This should be an indgpend- ? ern. body that people -like Dan- il Ellsberg can appeal to if they "feel information is being, int- vProPerly withheld," Mr. Barrett explained. Daniel- Ellsberg has, {said that he' gave the "Pinta:. Igen Papersk to the press. c , ' ;r7 Jose Ferrer 3d, editor of the 'isivt-SigtiOnet.rune inagazine; , :disAgregdwitiv Mr.,Colbry's pro- al., - -,f7,,,-,--,.. ,,..-E_=. '., -.:::?-?,, ,. -,.., ? -, ...',`Tin ,fit, Con'vince -.03:balt-thei -depth of the problem calls' fon new- laws,",, Mr.' 'Ferrer -'said "''Wetergate seems to Paint:7i1 the other ' directicat.' Legiala ?126 Ici=ptishbeck to anera okgreat- er secrecy,- Is not -now .? Others, on .the panel were William Attirooai the publisher .of- NewsdaY; !William Ewing Philadelphia',,, a lawyer , and Donald, Oherdorfer? a national-. Laffairs reporter for The Wish-1 ingt,on Post: John L Oakes editorial page editor of The, New York Times, was the mod- erator. :aiOni- .4.k,..:ift,*-it.-tit* 'deneywould still tli 40:12:tm .._---a....,,,,,, ..,t,,ing!i,?,....- .....litiatitik'sei*i .,:?.pieuifreliiittia*F7wahh461, 7.,..131gt. irbiirtit'rifigar., ..- Idtpacit -fall into . the.; -eate-A te4.13.404gi-fir*Citit*Tr4:.: 'gory of. tboie. "accredited".-i ,1 -ortit?ieck:o-**.tin- .--ii.i.?.P.1,,` ,,tc''Y*. 7.:32.iela::-. . - ' 4 th?thei_sitpati* 4-, 4:44:f,t' The' Senate intelligence iiim -1170- 74* C'C' , committee; ;in rt.:resent re4 a letter'..tO;The Rintifltar'24,*4,74:-..tundandk port '911-, the agency's use of - ,. . ve -Ioutnallsre `.top'.0 ' rriedie:%tritd.).:z_o_rt..- ninelisti,:': said: that3, ashingtoli-b*se&:6 - .0,4F-iy) as?pfrAto4iger..47w4e!,1 .4... ,t0 "that he thought thatJAIre?Pa4C-0;n041-bags-ot art: i7:1 d.-reutieste - that.. ;r0tef.,',421020*-..', - ',clot .1,WritteWwere. on, con.ii hi? ..'"the=z-reeridtiiiiit?; --:ment, no ? more' could- ,.1440t,7,11.!%,-,1,11t:ONe4c11:-..0,Per uue 4Isrftlit llitielli. . is !Ventral., ..,.._.? er1Y-tie, detnandedied ies,71 , , .? t.,-,_ _ t.l'esr._._..s. :. e -,.'i--'!'';:""-t,:.;ir.-rt.,---';'..: ..- of *t. I0Y1:11,171.7:::A;'-i'i'iiit.eierit issieit ' free-lancers, -. '" - ' - -'-, i. - - , _The' repOrt alsOzsaidl.hatil .,?..ii ?.,4_4.4,4' ' , ,.,te '..- Feb.. , 11,:?'? shortly: after- he , two full-time, aecreditedeor-.1 -,M.,,,."- l'''''n,'`...,,;,..,._ , 7,':.rt``-`' ?'iltioltliver: as. CIA,--dtreeto4;i: gespondents.-.:-Shioad ,-. ' had: ,i'?,4.461r. f'2-::' ' '11-."'"'''Bush announced.1,...:that, thdf ''.',. Working' relationships .-- with : , _ ' ' 'aces MaY 21_ ageneY wouldpolOgir eng?-;.fi the CIA BB last k,n,....._..e zu".}itz,',..-tile:W?e?:':?f: 'ri'Ofiti?12s7witiii an. .,;f*tir4fx t-1, thelournalists he consulted ..'?:".'Werifiaile public by ter into 'paid'Or contractuak , -''While Bush durtick name p.,--8,.....4 4*-,i'.-,,t4e.:?...- Soviet' ., --Or:- Part-time neW.-. ,.'...-:corret--:: on. his Polley, he conferred, weekir.,-,.Litrary *Gazette:7:: soondent:-"accredited. by i-,.: _With editors. of The New:. f;flat:. -near'. cirre'..,',. U.S.: news serviceii:ngwsPa'7' ,Yeref,Times and executives. Op lideseaw .: are , per, periodical, radio or tele, &I eat 'and the W-, Nfackint far the, CIA,'. _ .., . visou, network - or: tleit.', , .......,eilla; __o_tli-, .1-3 ....musnnetwork shortly if- , /AdamsT wrote- this , in IC letter, t'or, Joseph Ward when the British- were; Making destructive raids and burning towns on the plevrEnglanci. coast. ROBERT J. TAYLOR.. ? EdItOr iii:C,hief,:.-The Adams Papers Roitcrri; May 4; I976"`.? There was no elaboration 56ermi ugliviho'cl3eusif tint, ndii91-.s..iilitz-i.i .w1:1,01 '. : . -?'. "'irector,' The three SessionS :;-, ? - ter his instanation-,as CTA! accredited means., d kniglitintliertM,journalis; .'.;.r.' '',11eiiin said. that ther:',-.;*ere.:-. conducted.: privately.; *e community; he recalled, ., agencywould bring existing , .4-tiring. a: visit- by BuslaL,toi that he had enunciated his - relationships with such lour-. - -New- York' ? - ,-- ----- ? -,-...L.i".....L.;.",!:._. 9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDp77-00432R000100400002-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 "IIE NEW YORK 'TIMES, WEDNESDAY, MAY 26-1976,,, . Moscow,1 I a er-m: 1.?,.**4= ' '777 Aleiati-jaa#' *LT Ongfi ' ivtosco*-kty 21k ;..f The Soviet weekly _Literatur naya Gazeta; in fits iasue- for tomorrow, suggested that th American, news correspondents' accredited in Moscow were sedated with the United Stat Central Irrtelligence? Agency:. -?? . The Correspoedents, -_wer Christopher S. -?Wren of ?,The ? NewYork Times, George Krim.. sky of The Associated.: press and Alfred' PrlendlYi,'-',". Jr. .of Newsweek. ? ? Liters.turnaya- 7:Gaeta, .ehe publication of ,the Union or, viet? Writers, gave no &ideate& to support its; allegation: Aplproved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE 30 May 1976 James 0. Jackson Soviet libel of U. S. newsmen requires a CIA unmasking MOSCOW?A false and scurrilous So- viet attack on three United States news- men last week underscored the urgent need to identify and disown all quasi-" correspondents who have ever been on the payroll of the Central Intelligence Agency. The attack, published by the weekly Literaturnaya Gazeta ? [Literary Ga- zette], showed that the CIA's shortsight- ed policy of employing journalist-agents has armed America's ideological ene- mies with a powerful new weapon. Literaturnaya Gazeta [itself a notori- ous tool of the Soviet secret intelligence services]. was able to allege, with abso- lutely no supporting evidence, that the three reporters were in the service of the CIA. The libel was made believable by the CIA's own admission that it em- ploys reporters abroad. There is nothing new, of course, about Soviet newspapers attacking American reporters. What is new is the use of the CIA smear, which is a marvelously neat MANCHESTER GUARDIAN 24 May 1976 ?r;4 r; murder, ? From pAvip TONGE Athens,: May 23 . :. The. continuing mysteryituri- :, rounding the ' Minder; -- of : Richard S. Welch,-Athens CIA.: ' station chief, has been high- lighted by a? Greek- press report: today, claiming that Mr Welch: had been shot by a man Who,; ? the paper, Eleutherotypia ,LsaYs, had been a CIA contractikiller for 20 years- and is novKliving in the Balkans. Senior .Greek:. 'officials todaY?titid that, they .had indeed questioned a qreet; living in Yugoslavia who, they had heard?' connected with the murder,- but that. he had had a - flint- alibi- for December 23, the night of the However, the:. official add that the suggestion that the CIA -ordered Me ? Welch's murder: to stop: United States Congresiional pressure.- on the agency is among several that cannot be totally- excluded, although they express the reser- -Vation that,. as: fir as they know, the CLi. has no previous record-. of takiug,..4.4,g11..fird-, and useful one as far as Soviet propa- ganda hacks are concerned. It explains everything in the three little letters, CIA. The Soviets might say: Why did the reporters write stories about Soviet problems? The CIA paid them to do it. Why do they talk to dissidents? The CIA pay e them to do it. Wby would they write eiee? The CIA pays them to do it. Before the CIA smear beetheee availa- Ne, Soviet propagandists eoula jeerge American newsmen and women elett, with sexual misbehavior, black marke. teering, or alcoholism. Those were weak and vulnerable libels, because they did not contain within themselves an expla- nation of why reporters wrote critically of the Soviet Union. !In the old days, a typical Literaturna- ya Gazeta attack might have accused a correspondent of going to bed with young women. But that did not neces- sarily mean that he was anti-commu- nist, since pro-communists, one would presume, else; sleep with young women. -e *tet(4.70-00Plirltiel'eeNre:eepNeee Oileee :deemed the emurder.-44,-; an, "association. of: oftleera of !nationalist IA eel le and ." November, IT,'; a:group: which 'purports to, be of:the extreme Left This second group-posted - ,a .two-page tract; against Imperialism to jourmilists here but the police are extremely -douliftid. about, whether. the group really exists and suggest that- the authors% of. the tract may have sought publicity fOr this._ to" draw: attention, away frqm Atter possiblechannels.of inquiry. One Week iftei the -crime, foreign- journalists were:: tele- phoned by men -who claimed to- 'have carried. out the- and who told- them the location ;of the stolen car; 'which they- Said they bad used. -A--,,Siinc.a was duly found where they' said it would- be, but police-are not convinced that this was used. ' ? Since thert; all Cypriots who Might conceivably have been involved have been investi- gated, aS- have many- Arabs in Athens. Following both these-- inquiries and the outcome of agents' work in- various Arab- countries, the Greek security services now- doubt Whether groups from the Middle East were involved. They have also eliminated the possibility that Mr -Welch, whose :riame and: address had been published in the local press;-was murdered because of his: previous activi- ties in Peru:- ' - JudiciallY; the case- has now been tranFferred lero-rn thp mra. - mining to a higher magistrate: The same is true of black marketeer- ing or boozing. Half the population of the Soviet Union engages in those two activities, so it hardly makes a corre- spondent anti-Soviet if he does the same. But the CIA smear has a beautiful symmetry to iti It not only undermines the journalist's integrity, it also explains why he writes as he does. It saves space, it saves time. And it saves the hacks of the Soviet press the uncomfortable ne- cessity of trying to challenge the truth of what American journalists write. .7.ut, /ere is more to it than that. The CIA szetee not only endangers a journal- ist's credibility, it also endangers his lice. There are enough misguidc-..i is this world who believe what the,y read in the Soviet press to make a reporter's life uncertam in such places as Ulster or Beirut, where guerrillas, terrorists, zealots, and assorted cranes run around armed to the sideburns. . A correspondent falsely labelee'. as a CIA agent by an irresponsible Soviet newspaper will face an extra measure of danger in covering the news, espe- , daily in trouble spots of the Third World. He will never know when some mad Marxist, taking a Communist libel at face value, will murder him in the ! street. That is why those who compromised the press must be named, and why they must be purged from its ranks. It may happen that in this process some great reputations will be ruined. It may bap- pen that careers will be wrecked, that I friendships will be ended, that promises ! will he broken, and that illusions will be shattered. But better that, -far better, than to ellew this eerie, shadow of .suspicion to eat an!,' at the honor, the credibility, ! and the usefulness of a fundamental American Institution. (James 0. Jackson is The Tribune's Moscow correspondent.), NEW YORK TIMES 5 June 1976 1Federatludge Rates-Mk May: Keep ?Budget Secret : WASitu4GTON,..line"4:-IAP1z4 A Federal: judge ruled- today that the Central Intelligence Agency may continue to its budget a secret. -_ - ? ."The court concludes -that th 'secret: classification arrlied to the C.I.A. budget and expend,. ture flies is rroper, both proce- durally and substantively,' Dis- trict Judge John Lewis Sm th 11 ? The: decision came in- a- suit filed by. Morton K. Halrerin, wio. sciught -O.I.A. records on it budgetauthority for the cur- rent fiscal Year and. its actual expenditures,for tke, 1974 fiscal 'Halperin fanner na- tional security adviser; filed his 'suit under- the Freedom,. of In- formation- Act- which' requires many Government recOrds to! be disclosed to- the public. _, ? A-pprovett,For Release 2001/08/08-: CIA;RDP77-00432R000100400002-.1 ? ? ? ApproVed-FcirReleate 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 THE NEW YORK TIMES; AIONDAY, MAY 3/, 1976 Press betrayed. Fur By'Edward P. Morgan -,--WASHINGTON--What bothers me is the calm after the storm. The Press has: been had by the Central Intelligence - Agency. That shocking fact rolled like/ thunder through the .report of the Sen- ate Select. Committee on intelligence - Activities. Yet where the loud col;: lective otitrage from_ what Inie td,t. consider the honorable trade of jourvf ,nalism, the only one l'have Can We minions of the news medIa ,be so busy righteously defending free- doin of the press under the First' .Amendment that we have no time to discover , (or admit) that we bavto been subverted? - In highlighting the committee report -released by chairman Frank' Church4 Democrat , of ?Idaho. The New York Times noted that '!as Of last February;; some 50 American journalists- or ern, ployees of domestic. news-gathering organizations' maintained covert links . to the C.I.A. Even under new restrie- tive guidelines, half Of these relation- ships will be continued." ' - How free is a press 'riddled with spies and informers?' Hew can you: argue that such. : a porous head of, journalistic cheese is entitled to pro-.' teetion under the-First Amendment? How da you publith or air what the- public has a right to-know if you don't knoW yourself- whether it is tainted: with distortion andiror -lies? The in-' sidiousness of -the situation has just( been intensified by totally unsubstari, !dated, allegations of. a Soviet_Weekli:: that, the MoscOviZcorteXPondents The NeW.-iYork.110m*Newsweek an The, Associateckyresnare-working: -the- CIA.. ;The ag asencrb uncorked-I lirracidthateata. 44,03004,- itraQgithi -10terti 'That's - Only part of the problemi,ib:,== Depling* PrisVeritiaVerde4Ille agei4 ct continues -.."covert' ties"' with intW: drecls of academie scholars. -1967: the Church report says, " the C:I.A; "published - or subsidized well over 200 books"; In 1969, the , total. _reached 25O' The agency supports a press in- stitute with a galaxy of reporters, and a foreign-based publishing institute. ? ' George Orwell'i Big Briitheilik* be. Pm' 40404 to- hang Ilikgiv4OndOraskik-Caueqn,:the" line aditarsittiv*,reptitedlY1,wp day 'and nightrevising the Soviet E& -cyOneltaitigrttinibmt.TWthWetian*I Fait,LLICt'engiit'''OfeW of hiaterflin4t,het green ...with envy. r For all. I. know, the; C.I.A.' may -be-Covertbilientlying; even; i nowar Soviet Encyclopedia-ki counter-;:! felt' of a; counterfeit of -history. . 'It is easy but risky to jest on thisi. subject. Even if the new Senate Intel- ligence Committee maintains- a tough, and skeptical overview and a tight leash on the C.I.A. budget an iffy prospect), how can We be sure how or whether the agency actually removes its honey- comb of activities from the catacombs of official secrecy, where the skeletons of power abuse still twitch? , .,--When I was director of CBS News,. briefly,:: I', beard Our. Cairo stringer: worked for.:,the-,C.:S.A. He was home on, 'Alava I askekbiti. He denied it firmly.! and, 1 thOuglic-joiwincinglir 13ut hew4'. could; r really know?He resumed his Cairo; post.' What should I have. done?... HO* refreshing to note that, it takes:, suspicion7and insidiousness to . defend shoakt_the: 4 .ilAirwer, t- cak mcgi ,fea/100's believethia tionshi 4kuilfurcr lx0sgf "mike tW;TheM1* hv8..-startecrtheirtoo) OreinizatknTh- :ghost expos,. pre- and; cl ignIction:Wthe sgoad!'-eTt.,typ&snter* a'plot dei vice called aManGuffin.brEitehpbek .14a: eGuffin whatall the rmnm rig around :.**34441.:ATIlinP.---31* fihitt_vieiintspyr....arganiza" titairean.';p0i.eibly corkiipCkik harttforighilit, That view Was a rein ininei;Lneetinly by many filriS of the tOs (e.g., 'The SPyytrhOCarne Prom' .tbe_,Cotity..-"Tbi:,1peresi -FileZ. *a): but. also worheitiatreit'illtelienellfwelf:vtkrheexh4 Ong! dent; for iiiier,,Kty60.-J:-:`-'? ? ? The problem with "air the President's Men" is 'more iLoriOletAW-rnoile-? Beeititrtu.,:be;- for most?ifita-r* vog tkok;axeli-pladei7,1ast7:peeettnewspapeT:00117-41,1 thousktheTililiO7makerilifi**Cogirety_sOived tlf* tenblenterhiinta fikkabon:tilligi:guyataticingtn a of PebPletktalicritios, and the anditinceS:keernbaf4 fled, however, by the confusion of tone of the "last X' minutes .of the film.. in his efforts as a produ- cer to inflate the seriousness of the film beyond the limit the movie can support, has included/a:Anat.-meet- ing with peep: Throat that seems to imggesf;?Woodn the wrongdoingv In the. CIA. While- nd publisher. _fivfth-tiie intelligence community? Ab- surd! During the Cuban Missile crisi.v John -Scab, then, my ABC colleague: was a vital conduit of information be-, tween,theWhite House and the Sovief Embasit; when Official: tions between between Moscow and Washing- ton sputtered so _unreliably. Allen Dulles-and other, chjefs gaverne ri-eluablbriefhtiet-"eantiets . fore- seine foreign- trig. Other, corte-1 spondenes received: similar treatment., Its when. the ,.cloak-and-dagger' are thrust . upon _air. American journalist that I draw ; line, We asiiime that ,the than front Pravda,: Tass,orilzvestta is doing double dufrtvith espionage:-; It's a different' ball 'game_ if, some, United - States news agency' bureaul chief in Bangkok is Working for George Bush. ,(I have no' knowledge that one"! The' - The C.I.A.'s penetration- of the: Fourth Estate has created a treacher-1 ous and intolerable situation. It could well undermine what respect and in- _ _ , tegrity the press has left with a skep- tical public.. We We simply cannot pretend to have a free press if we don't purge our- selves of' this subversion. To fail "to do- so would sun us. a red badge of cowardice: !,believe the names of the correspondents, publications and agen- cies still working for the C.I.A. should be exposed: In this: sinister, age of bugs and' tap* and other invasions of privacy;-must 3- be'rml,",_ brother'! ;!eeper? Not if jegraulisrasi ..070*.ge z..,Zi4:..rAfJATA:)24 WOod .1iirts*ttimat. -Mat begabillfitarekidliiiii irativeiy folielnvestigatiens the CU; they literaij WAid-rioCatt4It-aeenis out of keeping with the ilteraf- 'W-:tbe restq Dm t suggest sticjt 47tenriecticsk tn ofsamee in thAboott-**1,04-,thiltati:i tnal legeL-thw see* in the fIlth peetwobekrotbainao.: moratton?Whereasi:litcordilitte ..thOriOls,.. it .pectirrect four months later' after the'other paperr, Judp:Slrica, and ;the Congest-tar:gotten into _ the; *gm*. De* Ilkoat'scalitaient4,in thebook:Segn tOelelerring to Iiii*radtutOistiatrOstriftehiPti to cover up.; Watergate'aeUvities byiettettylurthey=.: were related to CIA activities. :This; sequence la' ,;th furthert leaves the'impression that.-Woodatein were being 111-4 ,TeitigatecAnCthiiatened;j3eeaUse of. their :work.-- Woodstenbithkbook say the precaution's they took againit,beinthriliitigated Were Toolisli and melodra- matic" and the 'final sentence in that sectionis, "They -never, found: any' eridence that their telephones had been tappett-brthat anyone's life had been in danger.* One does not set that feeling from, the sequence in the . L4le _ . , :are attract ed to these two fib* because of *seriousness:I' :inwapc. eat, Or..-7Thige, Thignot tbe_ceindoelvas. that of a ;mildly" stiek:psentio-Wittheticidan thriller, : and the appeal tit 'All the. PreSidept'S Mee! was best delimit by a student of Mine- atittisqingeles- CUT College whoi, nicknamed the: rdm.:The:,aiindance Kid and the Grad- uate rGet Tait -STEitiPEL13 jlak4.11.!Y_FJ1 Approved-for-Release-2091/08/08 ::CIA-RpP77-00432R0001004000024... Aj3proved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 PUBLISFER' S WEE= 17 MAY 1976 Senate Group Finds CIA Now Active Only in Books Abroad The book publishing program of the Central Intelligence Agency, once con- sidered an important weapon of long- range propaganda, reached a high wa- termark in the year 1967 and has subse- quently been sharply scaled down and limited almost entirely to books pub- lished abroad, according to the recently released report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. With the exception of one reference to Praeger and several other pre-1967 book publishing ventures, the report contains no names of individual au- thors, titles or publishers. A spokes- man for the Intelligence Committee would not go beyond the contents of the report in commenting on relations between the CIA and the world of pub- lishing. Press officer Spencer David told PW the Committee had an agree- ment with the CIA not to disclose sources of information or methods or the names of individuals and organiza- tions involved without their consent. "The civil rights of individuals and or- ganizations used by the CIA without their knowledge have already been ab- rogated," he said, "so we don't want to turn around and do the same thing." "The publicity which in 1967 sur- rounded several CIA-sponsored organi- zations and threatened to expose oth- ers," the report noted, "caused the CIA to act quickly to limit use of U.S. publishers . . . Thus since 1967 the CIA's publishing activities have almost entirely been confined to books and oth- er materials published abroad. During the past few years, some 250 books have been published abroad, most of them in foreign languages." The CIA denied to the Committee the number of titles and names of au- thors of the propaganda books pub- lished since 1967. Brief descriptions provided by the Agency indicated the breadth of subject matter, however, in- cluding the following topics enumer- ated in the Committee report: (1) com- mercial ventures and commercial law in South Vietnam; (2) Indochina repre- sentation at the U.N.; (3) a memoir of the Korean War; (4) the prospects for European union; (5) Chile under Al- lende. During the pre-1967 period, the CIA had developed a complex pattern of PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER 26 MAY 1976 News focus IMIMM???????0?41, By Charles Bartlett EXCERPT : Congress still wants to hear about CIA secret operations but the in- ? telligence agency hasn't learned how to live with the ? leaks that result. Only a few hours after CIA Director George Bush told the House Interna- tional Relations Committee that the . relationships in which it could get books published or distributed abroad without revealing any U.S. influence by covertly subsidizing foreign publica- tions or booksellers; by initiating or subsidizing indigenous national or inter- national organizations for book publish- ing or distributing purposes; and by stimulating the writing of politically sig- nificant books by unknown foreign au- thors?either by directly subsidizing the author, if covert contact were fea- sible, or indirectly, through literary agents or publishers. Prior to 1967, the CIA had produced. subsidized or sponsored well over 1000 books, the Senate Committee said. Ap- proximately 25% of these were in Eng- lish. "Many of them were published by cultural organizations which the CIA backed, and more often than not the au- thor was unaware of CIA subsidi- zation," the Committee report states. "Some books, however, involved di- rect collaboration between the CIA and the writer." Some books were pub- lished without any knowledge on the part of the publisher that the writer had been subsidized by the CIA. But there were cases where publishing houses contracted with the CIA to publish books, the Committee said. In 1967 alone, the CIA published or subsidized well over 200 books, rang- ing from books on wildlife and safaris to translations of Machiavelli's "The Prince" into Swahili and works of T. S. Eliot into Russian, to a parody of the fa- mous little red book of quotations from Mao entitled "Quotations from Chair- man Liu." According to the Committee, the CIA has recently been particularly sen- sitive to the charge that CIA covert relationships with the American media jeopardize the credibility of the Ameri- can press and risk the possibility of propagandizing the U.S. public. Former director William Colby ex- pressed this concern in testimony be- fore the House Select Committee on In- telligence when he said: "We have tak- en particular caution to ensure that our operations are focused abroad and not at the United States in order to influ- ence the opinion of the American people about things from a CIA point of view." The new director, George administration plans no covert steps to affect the Italian elections, the news was leaked on Capitol Hill. Some hope the Senate's creation of an oversight committee will per- suade Congress to repeal the Hughes- Ryan amendment, which obliges the CIA director to report all covert ac- tivities to at least six committees. Over the past 16 Months, virtually none of the information conveyed to Congress under the amendment has been kept secret. Bush. has made similar assurances. The Senate Committee, headed by Senator Frank Church (D.. Idaho) went a step further, however, by noting that there is domestic fallout even from covert propaganda abroad, including books intended primarily for an Eng- lish-speaking foreign audience. "For example. CIA records for 1967 state that certain books about China subsidi- zed or even produced by the Agency circulated principally in the U.S. as a prelude to later distribution abroad." Several of these books on China were widely reviewed in the United States, often in juxtaposition to the sympa- thetic view of the emerging China as presented by Edgar Snow. At least once, a book review for an Agency book which appeared in the New York Times, was written by a CIA writer under contract. E. Howard Hunt. who had been in charge of contacts with U.S. publishers in the late 1960s, acknowledged in testi- mony before this Committee that CIA books circulated in the U.S. and sug- gested that such fallout may not have been unintentional. ''Question: But, with anything that was published in English. the United States citizenry would become a likely audience for publication? "Mr. Hunt: A likely audience, defi- nitely. "Question: Did you take some sort of steps to make sure that things that were published in English were kept away from American readers? "Mr. Hunt: It was impossible be- cause Praeger was a commercial U.S. publisher. The books had to be seen, had to be reviewed, had to be bought here, had to be read." [Frederick A. Praeger, who in October 1963 left the firm which he had estab- lished in 1950, told PW in 1967 that "on- ly 15 or 16 books" were published which had any CIA connection?fewer than 1% of the books which the compa- ny had published since its estab- lishment?and that most had been pub- lished in the late I 950s. He declined to identify the titles but described them as dealing with Communist parties or movements abroad. He said that some had been suggested by the CIA and some by himself and that in this regard the publisher's role was "no different from our relationships with other gov- ernment agencies." He insisted that "the CIA at no time had any editorial control whatsoever."] SUSAN WAGNER PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER 13 MAY 1976 Japanese court officials are alleged to have traveled on CIA funds. A Communist member, of parlia- ment, Atsushi Hashimoto, charged that the San Francisco-based Asia Foundation was a CIA front. Jastice Minister Osamu Inaba acknowledged that more than 50 judges and prose- "cutors had received money from the foundation for travel abroad between 1966 and 1975. The sums ranged from $500 to $700. He said the subsidies were "unpleasant" and would be bar- 13 red to judicial officials in the future. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 WASHINGTON POST g MAYIEL_. asiro By George Crile III Crile is Washington editor of Harper's magazine and a ' Writing a book on the CIA's Cuban operations for Dou- breday. His article on the CL4's-man in Havana, the Cuban agent codeLnamed AM LASH, appeared in Out- ; look on May 2. In this article, lie-examines the CIA's' other major attempt to plot the assassination of Fidel Castro, which failed for what may have been similar-reasons. vir ANY ODD TRIBUTES have been offered to the _VI American character, but few can rival that of Sen... Walter Mondale upon reviewing the total failure of the CIA's persistent efforts to kill Fidel Castro.. "Thank God," he said, "we're just not very good at that sort of thing." Most thoughtful observers seemed to draw the same reassuring conclusion. Even the American Mafia dons who had been recruited by the Agency to carry out Cas- tro's-execution were seen as too incompetent to be really evil. The portrait drawn by the Senate Intelligence Com- mittee casts them more in the light of characters out of Gang That Couldn't. Shoot Straight," bumbling' after; Castro but apparently never getting around to making attempt on his life. - Such interpretations of these deadly undertakings are no doubt comforting, but they are unlikely to be more than exercises in wishful thinking. To begin with, Sen. Robert _Morgan (D-N.C.) tells us "the theory that pre- vailed in the [Senate Intelligence] Conunittee was that the Mafia never tried to kill Castro, that we-were being used." ? The committee did not pursue this, but an indepentV ent examination of the available record of one of the key Mafia figures involved in the plot makes us consider the troubling possibility that at least some of the CIA's Mafia associates were working with Castro. Such a combination would hardly have seemed likely in 1960 when the CIA set out to recruit the Mafia. Almost all the major underworld families had invested heavily _ in Cuba and Castro was fast moving to seize their hold- ings. He had even put some of their members in jail. The ' Mafia's willingness to do the CIA's dirty work would not then have required explanation. Sam Giancana and John Roselli are the two mobsters generally identified with the Mafia-CIA plot. But a third,. Santo Trafficante Jr., was perhaps the most important of the three, for it was his men, botli in Miami and Havana, who were supposed to carry out the murder. _ Trafficante is generally identified as the don of south- ern Florida, but he is also one of the chiefs in the Mafia's loose national confederation. Once the Agency decided to turn to the mat), it was inevitable that Trafficante's as- sistance would be sought. Alone among the principal dons, he had lived in Cuba. He had built a large organiza- tion there and still had a number of associates in Cas- tro's Havana. ? Moreover, his professional experience made him ideally suited for assassination work. He had learned the business from his father, Santo _ Trafficante Sr., who came from Sicily in 1904 to Tampa, where he built and ran his crime family for the next 50 --- muc one 14 years. In. 1954i Yeai aftei siii*IVinifillio,41ni attempt on his life, Santo Jr; succeeded his father:. ? ' - Iii the first few years Of his Tule, Tampa was plagued with gangland murders. He was -himself a leading sus- pect in the 1957 barbershop execution-- of-Albert Anasta- sia, the old chief of Murder Incorporated, Accompanied by a Cuban associate, Trafficante had been in Anasta-, sia's New York hotel suite the night before the killing. . _ .According to reports of the Senate Permanent Investiga- tions Committee, Anastasia had been. atienipting to, move in-on Trafficante's Cuban gambling operations The following month, Trafficante was arrested-at thgc Mafia national convention at Apalachin,. N.Y. Ten years. latet his eminence was again confirmed by his appear- ance at the La Stella Restaurant in New York with Car- los Marcello, Carlo Gambino and several other. of the country's leading dons. He was, in short, one of the major crime bosses in the United States and, significantly, the don most deeply af- fected- by- Castro's revolution: Not only were his gam: bling casinos seized but he had been jailed in Cuba. One: would assume that such a man might have contemplated: taking on Castro independently. At that time, in 1960, Castro's grip on Cuba was by no means. secure: Once Trafficante accepted his CIA commission, Castro's days should have been numbered. A Question of Loyalties- THE INITIAL PLOT called for poisoning Castro in his favorite Havana restaurant, where one of Traf- ficante's men worked. The CIA's Technical Services Divi- sion supplied deadly botulinum toxin which Robert Ma- heu, who was coordinating the mob's efforts for the CIA, passed to a?xile associated with Trafficante at the Fon- tainebleu Hotel in Miami Beach. From there Traffi- cante's courier was to deliver the poison pills to the man in the Havana restaurant. , All of this took place in March and April of 1961, just before. the 13,1y otPigs. Accounts vary as to Why the plan failed. One version--is that-the authorization to adminis. ? ter the-poi:son never came through;- another, that Castro stopped going to the restaurant. The most intriguing theory was proposed by the CIA's 'deputy inspector general, Scott Breckenridge, to a Sen- 'ate staff member. Breckenridge, who had been responsi- ble for investigating the CIA-Mafia plot, maintained that Trafficante-had been providing Castro with details of the plot all along. But why would Santo Trafficante, of all people, -do this? One 'possible. explanation is proposed in a July 21, 1961, report on Trafficante by the Federal Bureau of. Narcotics: "There are unconfirmed rumors in the Cuban refugee population in Miami that, when Fidel Castro ran the American racketeers out of Cuba and seized the casi- nos, he kept Santo Trafficante Jr. in jail to make it ap pear that he had a personal dislike for Trafficante; when in-fact Trafficante is an agent of Castro. Trafficante is al- legedly Castro's ?outlet for illegal contraband in the -country." _ , The report goes: on to summarize contradictory re- ports on Trafficante's relationship with Castro but, be- cause of its date, the allegations quoted are of great in- terest.- Back in 1961,- the Mafia's anti-Castro credentials were impeccable.: The informants relied on by the nar- cotics agents may have been wrong in their conclusions, but it is hard to think of a possible self-serving. motive for fabricating such a story. Th ? som mo ton ear _ ere are other indications that there may have been e working arrangement between Castro and the b. Several reliable witnesses ? most notably Grays- Lynch, who wasn senior case officer with the CIA in mi for eight years ? assert that during the crucial y 1960s Castro relied on Cuban Mafia contacts for h of his intelligence in the exile community. And e again Santo Trafficante emerges as a central fig- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 itie;' for Castro is reported haiia 'paid' off his Mafia agent's through the Florida numbers racket ? Bolita ? iwhich Trafficante runs. - Here another Bureau of Narcotics report' one -prepared by agent Eugene Marshall ? is instructive: Fidel Castro has operatives in Tampa and Miami making heavy-Bolita bets with Santo Trafficante Jr.'s or- gailization. The winning Bolita numbers are taken from: the last three digits of the lottery drawing in Cuba every. Saturday- night." According to this report, prior to the., drawing, these operatives communicate with Cuba and'., -advise Which numbers are receiving the heaviest play.. The Cuba lottery officials then rig the drawing. .." Ac- *cording to this report and others, Castro's agen& were robbing Trafficante of ?arge share of his profits. The Narcotics Bureau Was afraid that, if Trafficante's Bolita operation were ruined, he would Concentrate even more. on the drug trade.. But Trafficante was in an even better position thatv the feds to know about raids on his profits. Had he cho- .sen to, he could have solved' the problem overnight by shifting the payoff numbers from the Havana lottery to the weekly dog races in Miami, as he finally did in the late 1960s. If, then, these reports are to be belived, Traffi- cante's Bolita may have served as one of the paymasters to the Cuban intelligence network in the United States. Divided Loyalties rir o THOSE ONLY loosely familiar with. Cuba in the 1950s, and the Mafia's intricate role there, it must seem absurd to suggest that the underworld could col- laborate with Castro's intelligence. But the Mafia is not a monolith and not all of its branches had been Castro's enemies. The Mafia had placed most of its bets on the dictator Fulgencio Batista, but it had also served as the gun runners for the revolutionaries. Castro; as well as mosVother important Cuban revolutionary leaders, had previously dealt with and relied on one or another un- derworld family for arms to carry on the fight. , As the owners and managers of the luxury hotels and 'gambling casinos in old Havana, the Mafia had played a pervasive role in Cuban life. Soon after Castro's victory its leaders were no longer welcome in Cuba as its opera- tions were progressively closed down; but it still had friends and former business associates high in Castro's government. The complexity of the Mafia-Castro rela- tionship is exemplified by the ambiguities that surround the Imprisonment and release of Trafficante himself in 1959.. It was a time when thousands of enemies of the revo- lution (and Trafficante clearly seemed to fall into this category) were being summarily taken out and shot. The Bureau of Narcotics report suggests the possibility that he had agreed to work with Castro and that the jailing Was designed to provide cover. But officially, he got out of Cuba thanks to the services of his, resourceful lawyer, - Rafael Garcia Bango. Bango is himself another good ex- ample of that _era's ambiguities ? not least because his brOther Jorge was and is one of Castro's closest friends and advisers. (He is Castro's regular handball partner and is the minister of sports, a prestigious post in Cuba.) ? ? After getting Traficante out of Cuba, Bango stayed on for the turbulent first seven years of the revolutionary government. Then, in 1966, he left for Miami, where he came to the attention of a federal anti-crime strike force ? which had Trafficante under surveillance. According to one strike force official, the two men had whit amounted to a "father-son relationship." Eight months later Bango was arrested and jailed in Spain for passing counterfeit American money. Significantly, Bango is now back in Cuba. That an im- portant mob attorney, whatever his family connections, should find life palatable in the new Cuba is at least cu- rious. But there seem to be nothing but contradictions in the lifestyles of Trafficante and his friends. 15 Mysterious Grafitti .1p OR THE NEXT PART of Trafficante's history we must turn to Jose Aleman,, an exile in Miami who- became involved with Trafficante in 1962 through his--! cousin, Garcia Bango. Aleman had 'been a rich young revolutionary in Havana, one of the leaders of the al- most successful 1957 attack on Batista's presidential' pal- ace. His then considerable wealth had -enabled him, to-. maintain a base in Florida where he owned the Trade- winds Motel and much other Miami real estate, includ- , Ing the Miami Stadivm. The Tradewinds figured promi-, nently in the revolution, for by 1957 most of the leading, revolutionaries in Havana had fled' into exile, including many of Castro's followers, and most ended up by stay- ing there at Aleman's expense.-? _ ? ? After the revolution, Aleman returned to Cuba and' stayed' a year before he was forced into exile again.? this time as a pounter-revolutionary. On arriving in the United States, he was met by George Davis of the FBI with a subpoena to appear as a witness against a Mafioso named Norman Rothman at a trial in Chicago. Aleman had had frequent dealings with the Mafia when he was buying guns for the revolution. He had met Rothman in 1958 when the latter was trying to save his Cuban investments by ingratiating himself with the anti- Batista forces. Rothman offered to flood Cuba with fake currency in order to bankrupt the economy and bring down the government. In return he wanted to be able to maintain his gambling operations. Aleman had rejected his offer. He tried to avoid testifying, but the FBI re- minded him that, if he did not cooperate, he might be subject to prosecution for illegal gun running. Aleman's relationship with the FBI had initially been -hostile. The. Tradewinds "was an armed barracks," ex- plained George Davis, who was assigned to monitor the exile activities, and the FBI had tried to close it down. But by late 1958 the Bureau had cause to change its mind. Aleman had visited the State Department. to warn that Fidel Castro was a Communist, and he persuaded one of the Communist revolutionaries staying at the Tra- dewinds to brief the FBI on the nature of the party in Cuba. All of this stood Aleman in good stead with the Miami FBI office, particularly after Castro revealed his politi- cal affiliations. And after his testimon in the Rothman trial, Aleman's relationship with the Bureau grew very close. The FBI men came to rely on him, not only as a useful source of information, but as a guide to under- standing the customs and thinking of the exiles. "Jose's a real nice fellow," the now retired Davis remarked. "He's a reliable individual."' After his appearance at Rothman's trial, Aleman con- tinued to meet regularly with his contacts at the FBI to. report on exiles he suspected of being Castro agents. He also told them of an extraordinary series of meetings with Trafficante. Traffieante's Indiscretion ? WHEN ALEMAN'S FATHER died, his stepmother inherited most of the fortune and the inheritance taxes were so high that Jose Jr. (who had already lost his land holdings in Cuba to the revolution) was forced to sell the Miami Stadium and the Tradewinds Motel. By .1962 he was in debt, with his only asset the three-story Scott Bryan Motel, on Collins Avenue and 33d St., in Mi- ami Beach. Some time in September of 1962 an old revolutionary colleague who rented an apartment at the motel told Aleman that Trafficante wanted to see him. The col- league explained that Trafficante felt indebted to Ale- man's cousin, Garcia Bango, and wanted to express his gratitude by helping Aleman out of his financial diffichl-. ties. He was prepared to arrange a sizeable loan from the Teamsters Union. Aleman's friend assured him that the loan was perfectly legal and that it had already been cleared by Jimmy Hoff a himself. Aleman was understandably, wary ? particularly Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 since' he had so recently testified againit a Mafia leader.' But mire enough, the Tampa godfather did visit Aleman, at the Seen Bryan and offered him the loan $1.5 mil- lion to replace the ramshackle motel with a 12-story'. glass-wonder, complete with a penthouse apartment for Aleman. Aleman says that Trafficante spent most of the even- ing philosophizing. "He spoke almost poetically about democracy and-civil liberties." But then he turned to the Kennedys: they were -not honest, they took graft and. they did not keep a bargain. He complained about their attacks on his friends, saying, "Have you seen how his brother is hitting-Hoffa, a man who is a workers; who is not a millionaire, a friend of the blue collars? He doesn't, know that this kind of encounter is very delicate. Mark my words, this man Kennedy is in trouble, and he will set what is coming to him." Aleman says that he argued that KennedS, would get reelected, and Trafficante re- plied, "No, Jose, he is going to be hit.", ' , Alenian says that he reported this conversation to his FBI contacts, who expressed interest only in Traffi- canted' business proposals. Aleman assumed that they dismissed the Kennedy warnings as gangland braggado- cio. For the next year, Trafficante used the Scott Bryan as his business headquarters, renting an apartment when; ever he came to town. Aleman met with him frequently, to discuss the Teamsters loan and Trafficante soon be- gan to lead Aleman into other kinds of conversations .and to introduce-him to other Mafia figures like Angelo Bruno of Philadelphia. Aleman, like his FBI -contacts, could not -quite figure out what Trafficante was doing. But he played along, hoping the loan would come through. Also the FBI considered his information valua- ble and he Was pleased to be of service. Starting in late 1962 and continuing through the sum- mer of 1963, Aleman says that three Cubans he had known in Havana and at the Tradewinds, who had gone to work for Castro after the revolution, appeared in Mi- .ami and then left for Texas. He suspected them of being Cuban agents and he told this to the FBI. "I advised the FBI in long conversations that I thought something was going to happen: .. I was telling them to be careful." By. this time Alemari?ays he -was meeting quite frequently with his FBI contacts.-They listened to-what he said but rarely seemed interested in his speculations. . About the endof October, 1963, the same exile who had introduced Aleman to Trafficante asked Aleman to sign a petition bitterly critical of President Kennedy. Aleman was no great admirer of the Kennedys. He signed the petition but immediately had second thoughts, especially when it was reproduced in several Cuban newspapers in Miami. On the day of the Kennedy assassination, Aleman ar- rived home to find' that the FBI had telephoned. "I was worried that, because of the petition, they might suspect me." But what they were interested in was Trafficante's previous statement that Kennedy was going to be "hit." "Two agents [Aleman is quite certain one of them was Paul Scranton] came out to see me: They wanted to know more and more. I finally had to tell them he didn't say he was going to do it. He just said Kennedy was . going to get hit." The agents stayed until they had ex- plored every possible angle and then _told. Almeman to. keep the conversation confidential. The only source for all of this is Aleman, who 'claims that he personally repeated everything to various offi- cials of the FBI; especially George Davis and Paul Scran- ton in 1962 and 1963. Both agents acknowledge their fre- quent contacts with Aleman but both declined to com- ment on Aleman's conversations- with Traffieante. Scranton explained he would have to have clearance: "I wouldn't want to do anything to embarrass the Bureau." The Enemy of My Enemy IN' SEEKING to destroy both the Castro regime and the Mafia empire, the Kennedys had aroused two des- peratl'enemies, each, With a tradition of violence ant; covert action. No proof that either was connected witir the assassination of President Kennedy has ever been produced._ But their traditions and their predicament at, the Moment whin Kennedy was cut, down make eitheel eligible suspects: And when the two-front war that the; Kennedys were waging is viewed through the experi- ence of Santo Trafficante, it becomes at least interesting; to speculate on the possibility:of these two powers oper-., , ating in concert. ' The possibility becomes even more intriguing if one,' chooses to take seriously a memorandum to the director: Of the CIA recently declassified from the Warren Com- mission files. It reports the conversation of a gritish, journalist, John Wilson (also known as Wilson-Hudson) at the American Embassy' in London just four days after Kennedy was killed. Wilson said that in jail in Cuba After the revolution in 1959 he had met an American ,"gangs-- ter-gambler named .Santos who could not return to the U.S.A. because there were several indictments outstand- ing against him. Santos opted therefore to remain. in pri- son for a period of time paying Castroin dollars for his rather luxurious and definitely non-prisonlike accom- modations... While Santos was in prison," Wilson says, "Santos was visited by an American gangster type named Ruby." It is tempting to make much of such a document but ? more needs to be known about the English . journalist, about the memo and about Jack Ruby's travels before any conclusions can be made. Probably the only witness who could help answer the questions raised here are the CIA's old Mafia associates. The Church committee Only managed to interview- one of them, John Roselli. Sam Giancana, due to give his testimony, was executed the day before. Santo Trafficante was never called as a wit- ness. The committee 'staff claimed he could not be found. None of the extraordinary possibilities that have sur- -faced here offer a documentable refutation of the sole - assassin theory. As in all such explorations touching on the Kennedy assassiAation, the trail goes cold as it ap- proaches Dallas. But that does not mean that there was not a conspiracy. There is simply no assurance that con- spiracies, when they exist, must inevitably come to light.. Many secrets prove not all that hard to keep. Just consider the numbers of people who knew about the CIA's secret war against Cuba in the early 1960s ? about the Agency's mammoth station in Miami with its 400 case officers, its 2,000 Cuban agents, its navy and small air force, its arsenals, safe houses, and its paramili- tary operations against Cuba. Certainly thousands of people had a rather general knowledge of that massive campaign. And yet it was not until last year that the American public even learned that President Kennedy had gone on to wage a covert Cuban war after the Bay of ,Pigs. Similarly, nine years ago, Drew Pearson and Jack -Anderson reported the CIA's assassination plotting with the Mafia. But no one paid any attention. ? It is a well known psychological phenomenon that you can't see what your imagination is not prepared to ac- cept. In a recent interview, Sen. Howard Baker (R-Tenn.) reflected on his experience over the past few years in exploring Watergate and the world of U.S. intelligence: "The great fear that I have is that I'll wake up 10 years ? from now, and it will all suddenly fall into place, and I'll realize what a damn fool I was." eiffie, George) Cril? 16 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT 7 June 1976 A U.S. Ambassador says the President of the country where he is stationed told him: "III talk to you frankly, you will report back to the State Depart- ment, and soon everything I said will show up in Washington newspapers.- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 WASHINGTON STAR 28 MAY 1976 By Tad SZUIC Reprinted by permission from The New Republic IC) 1976 by The New Republic, Inc. The FBI and the CIA engaged in a cover-up of highly relevant informa- tion when the Warren Commission was investigating President John F. Kennedy's assassination in 1963 and 1964. President Lyndon Johnson and Atty. Gen, Robert F. Kennedy be- came party to the effort which con- sisted of withholding key facts from the Warren Commission. The cover-up continues even now, 12 years later: The FBI still refuses to turn over to congressional investi- gators some of its most sensitive files on the circumstances of the killing in Dallas. A delay of six months is expected before the new Senate Intelligence Oversight Committee decides wheth- er to reopen the investigation into the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, Chairman Daniel K. Inouye, D-Hawaii, said yesterday. Inouye, who spoke with reporters after the committee's first meeting yesterday, said the committee will concentrate first on drafting new charters for the CIA and other intel- ligence agencies. Results of an investigation of the Kennedy assassination by the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, which spent 15 months studying the case, are expected to be made public with- in the next two weeks. Senators who have seen the report are predicting it will raise more questions than an- swers. The 172-page report, drafted by a subcommittee, will focus on the per- formance of the CIA and FBI before and after the Nov. 22, 1963, slaying and will go into the possible motives of Lee Harvey Oswald. The report is expected to detail both allegedly deliberate and acci- dental failures by the CIA and FBI to provide the Warren Commission with information. The Warren Commission was never told that Robert Kennedy se- cretly formed ? before his brother , was killed ? a special intergovern- mental committee which included FBI and CIA representatives to look into the ,possibility that Cuban Premier Fidel Castro might organize attempts on the lives of high U.S. government officials. THAT THIS committee existed has been kept secret although informa- tion about it reposes in FBI files. The top-secret ' committee was: created by Robert Kennedy presum- ably out of concern that Castro might retaliate against CIA attempts on his'.7 life, carried out directly by the agen- cy's operatives and with help from; the Mafia. That anti-Castro assassination.; plots were afoot in the early 1960s was unknown at the time (they were disclosed last year by the Senate Se- lect Committee on Intelligence Ac- tivities) and the Warren Commission', was not told of them. Only Allen W..: Dulles, who had been CIA director;;- _ _ had knowledge of the anti- Castro plots. In its ignorance the com- mission couldn't search more ? intensively into the possible motives of Lee Harvey Oswald in killing the President. The commis- sion concluded that Oswald ?was the lone assassin in Dallas, but it acknowledged its inability to come up with the motive. IT DOES NOT follow, of course, that the Warren Commission would surely have traced Oswald's mo- tives had it known of the anti-Castro conspiracies and of the establishment of Robert Kennedy's secret group sometime before Dallas. There is no proof that Castro was behind Os- wald. But the cover-up made it impossible for the commis- sion to seriously pursue a line of inquiry in this area even though there had been much discussion of the sig- nificance of Oswald's links with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee (a pro-Castro group in the United States) and his aborted effort to go to Cuba two months before he killed John Kennedy. Robert Kennedy, the CIA and the FBI decided to keep from the Warren Commis- sion the fact that the special group had been set up. To justify its existence, it would have been necessary to expose the CIA's own conspiracies against Cas- tro. ;These were among the most closely held secrets of the Kennedy-Johnson peri- od. THAT THE CIA failed to inform the Warren Com- mission of anti-Castro plots ? even though the agency was under presidential orders to provide maximum assistance to the commis- 17 sion ? was confirmed in a memo on April 20, 1975, written by CIA Insp. Gen. Donald F. Chamberlain to CIA Deputy Director E.H. Knoche. It said: "As far as we can tell from all of the materials a* our, d4osition, no one dis cussed with the Warren 'Commission any alleged plan to assassinate Castro. There is also no evidence that anyone known to our records made a decision not to tell the Warren Commi- siute iip. ing about this topic or any other matter." Chamberlain added that "we have no evidence in our material indicating Castro's knowledge or the possession of documenta- tion of alleged assassina- tion plots directed against him." Two days later, on April 22, 1975, Raymond G. Rocca, then deputy chief of the CIA's counterintelli- gence staff, informed Knoche that "our records show at every point a marked intent to make as much available to the (Warren Commission) as was consistent with the se- curity of the ongoing opera- tions." ROCCA ALSO reported . that his files do not show whether the Warren Com- mission was informed of a 1962 report from the CIA's station in Guatemala ac- cording to which a state- ment was made at a Guate- malan Communist party meeting that "we need not preoccupy ourselves over the politics of President Kennedy because we know, according to prognostica- tion, that he will die within the present year." Although, as Rocca put it, the counterintelligence staff was the CIA's! "working-level point of I contact with the Warrenj Commission," plans to, assassinate Castro were not: "known to us in CIA staff." .1 In all likelihood Johnson,1 who knew of the anti-Castro' plotting, also knew that Robert Kennedy had set up his special committee. But there is no indication that he shared that knowledge with -Chief Justice Earl Warren when the commis- sion was organized in Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 November 1963. Robert Kennedy's testi- mony before the Warren Commission likewise omit- ted mention of his own fears that assassinations might breed assassinations. BUT IT IS part of the public record that Johnson subsequently commented, without elaborating, that President Kennedy- might have been killed in retalia- tion for his administration's anti-Castro policies. At the I time, this' remark was taken to mean possible re- taliation for the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion and subse- quent CIA operations against Cuba. All these facts, secret at the time, may have influ- enced the Kennedy family in its decision to oppose any reopening of the assassina- tion probe. Again, a new investigation might have led to public disclosures of the CIA plotting,, and tar- nishing the memory of John and Robert Kennedy. Robert Kennedy's inter- est in aggressive operations against Cuba was reported in a document written by John McCone, then CIA director, on Oct. 4, 1962, de- scribing a top-level strate- gy meeting chaired by the attorney general. McCone wrote that "the attorney general reported on discus- sions with the President on Cuba; dissatisfied with lack of action in the sabotage field, went on to stress that nothing was moving for- ward, commented that one effort attempted had failed. . . ." ANOTHER ELEMENT of the cover-up was that in at least 50 instances the CIA had, according to an inter- nal FBI memo, ignored materials supplied by the bureau on Oswald's foreign connections. The responsibility for fol- lowing up such FBI- leads was in the hands of an ad hoc group built around the CIA's so-called "D Staff," a clandestine operations cen- ter then headed by William Harvey, a senior agency official. The CIA's coun- terintelligence office, di- rected by James Angleton, reported directly to Har- vey's "D staff," and it too was involved in investigat- ing certain aspects of the Kennedy assassination. Sources contend that the CIA actually destroyed some of the materials pro- vided by the FBI. Angleton, according to those sources, may have suspected Soviet "plants" in the FBI materi- al. The Warren Commission never knew about any of it. As has been reported earlier, the FBI destroyed at least one letter Oswald sent to the Dallas police de- partment shortly before the assassination. Oswald de- manded that the FBI stop "harrassing" his Russsian- porn wife Marina and threatened to blow up the Dallas police headquarters if the FBI failed to desist. THIS BECAME known only last year, and the FBI never offered a conclusive explanation for destroying the note. Likewise, the FBI inex- plicably failed to place Os- wald on its "dangerous list" although it did so with other members of the Fair Play Committee. A CIA memorandum to the Rockefeller Commis- sion, which last year inves- tigated CIA abuses, said that the agency still feels, as it did in 1964, that the Warren Comrnission should have given more credence in its final report to the possibility of foreign links in the conspiracy against Kennedy. The memo said that there were promising leads that were not followed up. This statement contra- dicts the FBI memorandum now in the possession of the Senate Select Committee that the CIA refused to pur- sue leads obtained by the bureau. However acute rivalry between the CIA and the FBI already existed at the time ? they actual:y stopped cooperating alto- gether in 1970 ? and their estrangement could ac- count for the contradic- tions. THE COVER-UP is lamong the reasons the Sen- ate Select Committee voted on May 13 to recommend a congressional inquiry into the role of the intelligence agencies in the Warren Commission investigation and into Oswald's moitives. The Senate committee first learned of the cover- up a few months ago. This is the new evidence the panel claims it has obtained about Oswald's motives. Sen. Richard Schweiker of Pennsylvania and Sen. Gary Hart of Colorado, who constitute a special sub- committee on the Kennedy assassination, have written a separate report on the subject. - Neither Schweiker nor Hart has publicly revealed thus far the nature of the new evidence. There is said to be great pressure to sanitize this report while the full secret information would be turned over to the Senate's new permanent oversight committee on intelligence or whatever other panel might under- take the recommendation investigation of the Kenne- dy death. The Subcommittee re- port. to be issued in mid- June, will first be inspected by the FBI and the CIA, to remove what they consider "embarrassing informa- tion." ALTHOUGH senators are far from certain that the proposed inquiry would actually provide a conclu- sive answer about Oswald's motives the trail has be- come cold in the opinion of many senators ? the FBI and CIA could find them- selves under charges of ob- struction of justice for hav- ing withheld significant material from the Warren Commission. Among the questions likely to be raised in a new investigation is why Dulles concealed from the Warren Commission, on which he served, the plotting against Castro by the CIA. CIA's own records, released in mid-May, show that the agency had already begun to plan Castro's assassina- tion in March 1960, when Dulles was CIA director, and planning had by then begun for the Bay of Pigs. Excerpts from tran- scripts of the Warren Corn- mission's executive ses- sions (published in The New Republic on Sept. 27. 1975) show that Dulles informed his colleagues that there were certain CIA secrets that he would keep from everybody except the presi- dent. Dulles was addressing the still unclarified question of whether Oswald, as maintained by some assas- sination buffs, had been an. undercover FBI informer_ A SIMILAR question could be raised with John McCone who was CIA director during the Warren Commission investigations and who should be called to testify in any new Senate inquiry. McCone was famil- iar , with the anti-Cas-, plots and probably abeut Robert Kenneti, ?-; cret committee. All the indicatioe . are that the existence this committee was known to 18 very few people: Robert Kennedy himself. probably Dulles and McCone. FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, and a few selected associ- ates. Several aides of Robert Kennedy. including a for- mer assistant director of the FBI, said in interviews last week that they had not known of the Committee. Theysaid, however, that it was possible that the group could have' been acting in secrecy out of the White House or attorney general's office before and after the Kennedy assassination. The Senate Intelligence Committee teamed of the cover-up in the course of its long investigation of the intelligence community_ After references were made by witnesses to the Robert Kennedy committee in testimony touching on for- eign assassination plots by the CIA. the Church Com- mittee .asked the FBI and the CIA for their relevant files. - , IT IS UNDERSTOOD that the CIA made some material available; the FBI refused to do so for many months. Only recently did the bureau agree to allow Senate committee members to read parts of its secret files, but the senators have to do it at FBI headquar- ters. It was in this manner that senators learned of the scope of the cover-up by the intelligence agencies. They've, now requested additional materials from the FBI. Some senators are said to believe that further vital information on the Kennedy assassination investigation may turn up in the FBI files. It remains unclear why, after 12 years, the FBI is still reluctant to let sena- tors see all its files on the assassinations. There are no indications that the bu- reau has been under any pressure from the White House ? President Ford was a member of the War- ren Commission ? to with- hold material from the Sen- ate. In fact, Ford himself' now may be unaware of the contents of the FBI files. That raises again a funda- mental question: Is the White House in full control of the intelligence agen- cies? U.S. (c;; WORLD REPORT 7 June 1976 Administration officials report an -in- telligence backlash" in Congress, with some members getting heat from home over their harsh attacks on CIA operations. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 SATURDAY REVIEW' 29 MAY 1976 CIA Reform: How Much Is Enough? by George C. McGhee 'The recent report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities provides an excellent basis for congres- sional action to reform the CIA. The President's own recent reorganization of the agency, however, ignores key issues that must be dealt with by Congress. The very word intelligence is prejudi- cial in its own favor. Everyone agrees that a government should base its activi- ties on the best available intelligence. The Central Intelligence Agency, which, as its name implies, has been the focal point for such activities within our govern- ment, has been brought into serious question. Yet it has important responsi- bilities which are vital to national secu- rity and must be continued. How do we separate the good in the CIA from the bad? How can we clarify, in the public mind, the difference? How can we build a new intelligence structure which can perform the essential functions with pub- lic confidence? In my view, the Presi- dent's executive order has not answered these questions. The present agency was spawned by the Second World War. It was created at war's end as a "grab bag" not just for the intelligence activities of the Office of Strategic Services but for a varied group of other covert activities. Pro- tected by wartime security, these opera- tions had not been under normal moral, legal, or resource limitations. In retro- spect, it was, I believe, a mistake to have included such diverse operations under one umbrella. It was particularly mis- leading to call it an intelligence agency. Obviously, much of what it did went far beyond any ordinary definition of that term. Moreover, it provided continuity for wartime methods and objectives. War was succeeded by "cold war," with little change in outlook. It should be understood, of course, that the CIA does not have a monopoly on intelligence. The Pentagon has its Defense Intelligence Agency. The De- partment of State, comprising some 7,500 people in Washington and 16,000 abroad, is in itself an enormous intelli- gence-gathering organization, not limited to its Bureau of Intelligence and Re- search. There is no obvious cutoff point between what should and what should not be done by the CIA. The agency has engaged in many activities, such as support for the National Student Asso- ciation, because it could get the funds from Congress and State couldn't. Nevertheless, as we continue to de- velop our overall intelligence capability, I believe we should also perpetuate an independent intelligence agency as a normal arm of government. There is, of course, the supporting theory that intelli- gence estimates by such an agency will be more objective in assessing the suc- cess or failure of policy. There is also - the need for expertise and continuity in particular specialties which can perhaps best be provided by an 'independent agency. A case in point is the analysis of aerial photographs from satellites. It must be emphasized, however, that most CIA intelligence githering is,, like satellite photography, quite open? and- aboveboard. Only the results need be kept secret. Many data are obtained from passive radio intercepts made by the mili- tary National Security Agency. Provided one has a place to put one's aerial, inter- cepts are an accepted tool. Often, how- ever, in the search for intelligence, the line of legality must be breached. Covert means must be employed. Calculated risks must be taken. Spies are used. Someone is paid off. Forced entry is made. We must also protect ourselves? through counterespionage?from similar activities by other governments. In a dan- gerous world this is an accepted "gray" area in which all nations must compete, including, under appropriate restraints, our own intelligence agency. BEYOND THIS, however, as everyone knows, the CIA has been engaged in a wide range of covert activities which do not constitute intelligence collection at all; indeed, they are separated by a deep chasm. What I speak of, of course, is the whole array of covert operational activi- ties, or "dirty tricks." This includes all secret attempts to manipulate the rest of the world in our favor. This is what was on trial before the Church committee and world opinion. It is these activities which have, by association, blemished CIA's legitimate intelligence function. The principal rationale, moreover, for putting them under the same roof, i.e., that the same agents do both, is not believed to be overriding. Results could be more objec- tively analyzed by an intelligence succes- sor to the CIA if the two arms were separated, yet closely coordinated. I was amazed when I came back into the State Department in 1961, after an absence of seven years, to learn the extent to which the CIA had become involved in covert activities all around the world. The Bay of Pigs operation, which lay ripe for plucking on the drawing board, was only one of many. I considered most too risky for the possible meager gains in- volved. We were operating in many countries. Some were close allies whose friendship we were risking. We were still supporting democratic parties in Western Europe long after the countries involved had recovered economically. Most of our operations were relatively unimportant to our national security. When a government agency goes op- erational covertly, there is, of course, a variety of choices. You start by subsidiz- ing foreign magazines and newspapers to influence popular opinion, then pro- gress to support for political parties and discreet bribes to officials. In the past little attention has been paid to such ac- 19 tivities; however, this is only the start. With know-how and funds available, you attempt to control elections, bring about the fall of governments, or even assassi- nate political leaders. On the macroscale this leads to what is, in effect, uncle.: clared-war. It was an open secret that in Laos the CIA for years ran a war in- volving large-scale air and ground forces. The CIA was deeply involved in Vietnam -before our military took over. Where do such activities start and end? What is their proper role? How can they be controlled? I believe that responsi- bility for covert operational activities must be separated from the intelligence function. These operations must also be reduced greatly in scope. They must con- stitute the exceptional rather than the usual instrument of policy. Any decision to employ them must take into account the long-range impact on United States and world opinion. People all around the world are now convinced that the CIA is manipulating their governments and people. Americans abroad are suspect as being under "cover" for CIA?our em- bassies, our companies, our professors, and our tourists. We are paying a high price for marginal gains. Authority for covert operations must stem from our highest authority?the President?even if he may not always be forced to admit it. Those directing the operations must also be responsible to the Congress, preferably through one joint committee of the two houses. Every effort must be made to maintain secrecy. Guidelines must be set. Most Americans would insist, as a minimum, on a total taboo on assassination?and on unde- clared war, that is, one not first approved by Congress. The joint committee itself could decide what should be approved by Congress as a whole. The agency devoted exclusively to intelligence should be an open operation, staffed by professionals. It should need little "cover." Covert operations beyond in- telligence should be conducted by some new, anonymous agency reporting di- rectly to the President. Any undeclared wars tacitly approved by Congress should be run by a branch of the military, upon whose expertise it would draw. Most important, however, we must understand that today's world cannot be manipulated by us in such an obvious way. A prominent CIA official once bragged to me that their operations had saved 13 countries from communism. He did not mention countries where we are considered the enemy as a result of abor- tive CIA operations. We win dubiously in Chile, but we lose in Cambodia. We give Soviet arms to the Kurds and use the re- sulting appearance of Soviet intervention to justify furnishing arms to Iran. We give arms to Holden Roberto in Angola, and when the Soviet-backed Popular Front appears stronger, we feel com- pelled to raise the ante. What is cause and what is effect? How do you win such- a game? I recently heard a leading English jour- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 nalist berate America for sabotaging our CIA just when it could have won the struggle against communism in Portugal. Does anyone really think a few million dollars can control the destiny of 10 mil- lion people? If we are to produce-the open and wise policies that will-earn for us the place in the world we deserve, we must first rid ourselves of the delusion that we can win by the cheap and easy way of covert manipulation. At the same time, we must regroup and reform our varied intelli- gence activities?building what is appro- priate into an independent and a re- spected arm of our government. When we venture into the murky area beyond, we should do so under new auspices, strict guidelines, and complete responsi- bility?not just to the President but, through the Congress, to the American people. For it is they who will have to pay the price of any failures, as they have done in Vietnam. 0 ? Monday, May 17, 1976 THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR Kennedy assassination questions ? More than 12 years after the assassination of President. John F. Kennedy there are still very serious questions that need to be answered if that tragic event is to be laid to rest. It is not only that small group of writers and investigators convinced that a conspiraey was behind the Dallas shooting who doubt that- Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone. Polls show that 60 percent of 'Americans do not accept the find- ings of the Warren Commission. David Belin, senior staff member of both the Warren Com- mission and later the Rockefeller Commission which last year probed CIA operations, has called on Congress to reopen the inquiry. - Evidence has emerged showing that the FBI had information on Oswald, yet his name was not on a Secret Service list of per- sons considered a threat-to the President. It has been shown that the CIA failed to tell the Warren Commission about its plots to kill Cu- ban Premier Fidel Castro, and that the FBI de- stroyed?a threatening note delivered by Oswald to FBI offices just before the. assassination. TIMES HERALD, Dallas 2 May 1976 4-4.1 4 ; 4.,#) 1. -41 3 lq .7 \If= < ?3 e., more ONE MORE CHORUS, now, with a little more pizazz and guts from you citizen voices on the back row. Newly named CIA Director George Bush is taking hold, as you expected, and he said something in Lawrence, Kan. the other day that really puts this whole intelligence ruckus down to the earth level where we concerned folks can read the message. In muted answer to 1,000 plus critical pages from the ravenous Senate Intelli- gence Committee staff that accuses the FBI and of everything but effectiveness, Bush said simply, but tellingly: -WE NEED. a covert (hidden, se- cret) capability. I believe we can oper- ate in as clean a fashion as we can. But there are some grubby things in this spy business . Certainly and Congress knows it ? there are some "grubby" things in intelligence operations. That's what it is all about or we wouldn't have a CIA and an FBI. You don't hand your card to the enemy, domestic or foreign, and say "Pardon me, old man, but. An agent knows when he acts that it is your nation, your society, your life ? or his. And the sooner we get off the whelped backs of CIA and FBI now trying to cleanse their houses of decades old questionable past practices the bet- ter chance far this society, this nation. The opposition points have been made ? and some were well made ? ? but hOw the hunters had better start listening to very cold warnings from men like. Bush and get realistic about The possibility, of a link between the. Ken- nedy shooting. and U.S. plots to kill the Cuban leader is just too strong to ignore. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has reported that on the dayMr. Kennedy was assassinated, the CIA was outfitting an operative to kill Mr. Castro. Now members of that Senate committee have called. for a new, investigation to go beyond. the "who" to the "why," and this seems entirely called for, given the new infor- mation that has been revealed as well as grow- ing public doubts about the original findings. It may not be necessary to entirely reopen the whole matter, but these latest questions should be answered. President. Ford, who was a member of the Warren Commission, some months ago agreed that such a limited reinvestigation is neces- sary. With the Senate about to consider a new intelligence oversight committee that could un- dertake such an investigation, now is a g000 time for Mr. Ford to reaffirm his support. chorus ? with guts this endless donnybrook they have initiated. Mr. Bush, a totally reliable man pushing to re-route objectives of the CIA into unassailable legitimacy, now warns that in the next decade interna- tional terrorist threats against the United States could be more dangerous than conventional military or political threats. He told his Lawrence audience that there is increasing danger, with proliferation of nuclear weapons and materials, that terrorist fanatics will acquire nuclear capabilities. TO COMBAT this prospect of horror, there must be support ? not endless carping. Relentless pursuit ? demonstrably past constructive remedial processes ? could decimate the entire intelligence apparatus. It has been said here over and over again, but the congressional wolves have made their good and bad points and should now move to other areas that need repair far more than the FBI and CIA. In fact, if the current bushwhacking continues the public might well demand to know precisely what is behind all this persistent clamor to "get" the FBI and CIA. To repeat, valid points have been made and certain practices should be abolished as totally out of American character ? notably foreign assassina- tion plots and the misuse of the FBI by every American president back to Franklin D. Roosevelt ? but we must not lose our perspective about overall intelligence in the headline frenzy of the moment. 20 Sen. Frank Church., D-Idaho, who first chaired the Senate Intelligence Committee and then conveniently slip- ped into the Democrat presidentiai preferential race after getting rave notices from networks and big press, is making few ripples out among the people. If we properly read the public in the hinterlands, they are weary of Washington's daily blast and not suppor- tive of continued attacks based upon very old information. NOW WE read of the "chilling" .Senate committee report that "docu- ments" a 40-year pattern of "official lawlessness"! In 400 pages prepared by eager young staff workers, we are told that Presidents since 1932 have been sleazy operators who used the FBI to track down political enemies. Most of this' adds up to a desire on the part of some members of Congress to take over intelligence operations by imposing strict controls from a single oversight committee. This could be the blunder of the century if these same Congressional members handle other "secret" matters by leaking information all over Wash- ington ? and the world. The Senate liberals ha v e been temporarily choked off by a more sensible Rules Committee amendment that would require any oversight com- mittee to share jurisdiction with other committees now involved in intelligence oversight. If all worked together ? and kept their months shut ? intelligence could be steered in the proper direction. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 FOREIGN POLICY Summer 1976 REORGANIZING THE CIA: WHO AND HOW /n FOREIGN POLICY 22, Peter Szan- ton and Graham Allison wrote that the time had come to -seize the opportunity" and restructure the American intelligence community. In the exchange that follows, William E. Colby and Walter F. Mondale comment on their proposals and Szanton and Allison reply.?The Editors. William E. Colby: Indeed we have an opportunity to rethink and restructure American intelligence. A year of intensive investigation by a presidential and two congressional committees, world- wide concern over sensational accounts of CIA deeds and misdeeds, and a series of Con- stitutional confrontations between the ex- ecutive and legislative branches cannot dis- appear into our history books without changes in American intelligence. The first and easiest action would be to tinker with the organizational structure of intelligence. When in doubt, or under pres- sure, reorganize; this is an old bureaucratic ploy. It is also a tempting panacea for infi- nite problems. With due respect for the ideas suggested by Peter Szanton and Graham Allison, but without agreement with many of them, I believe this opportunity should be seized in more important fields. The fundamental lesson of the year of investigation is that American intelligence is ? a part of and must operate under the Amer- ican constitutional system. This perhaps ob- vious fact for Americans is a stunning nov- elty in the long history of intelligence. It is as startling an idea to many developed de- mocracies as it is incongruous to totalitarians. It does not reverse any early American dcarine to the contrary. but it does over- turn longstanding and comfortable practices which grew up before the question was squarely faced. Three conclusions stem from this new status of intelligence. First, the place of in- telligence in the governmental structure must be established and understood in open stat- utes and directives. The National Security Act of 1947 made a start in this direction, and the CIA Act of 1949 provided statutory authority for many of the essential attributes of our intelligence service. Both contain several vague and encompassing clauses, however. The resulting ambiguities led to actions which in retrospect fall below to- day's standards. President Ford's executive order of Feb- ruary 18 makes a major stride in the direc- tion of providing 3 public charter for Amer- ican intelligence, describing its structure and functions and clearly delimiting areas of au- thorized, and unauthorized, activity. Sub- stantial parts of this order, however, should be enacted into law, our constitutional pro- cess of establishing and recording our na- tional consensus on matters of public import. George Washington once said that upon "secrecy, success depends in most enterprises" of intelligence. The past year has shown al- most a total lack of consensus and even un- derstanding of the role and limits of secrecy in American intelligence. What were leaks rose at times to flood stage proportions. Strong voices are heard advocating almost every variation on the spectrum from a mod- ern version of "open intelligence openly ar- rivea at" to the contention that an Official Secrets Act should protect an intelligence structure totally hidden in the recesses of the executive branch. President Ford has recom- mended legislation which will impose the es- sential discipline on intelligence personnel to keep the secrets they learn but leave untram- meled the First Amendment's guarantee of a free press. We have laws and sanctions to protect many secrets necessary to the preservation and operation of our free society.. The se- cret ballot box, the confidence between at- torney and client, advance crop figures which might upset the market, all are protected by criminal sanctions against individuals who might disclose them. Intelligence secrets. however. are in effect only protected against the foreign spy. But their disclosure to our free society makes them available to the for- eigner as well, and can cut our nation off from sources and information which are es- sential to its safety in a world which has not yet been made safe for democracy. Better protection of our sources through law would apply to the intelligence profession the same discipline that journalism has. found essen- tial to its functioning. The second conclusion from the new sta- tus of intelligence under the Constitution is that it must be responsible and accountable. This burden must rest not only on those in intelligence: it lies with equal weight on all three branches of our constitutional struc- ture. President Ford has moved to strengthen executive control and responsibility for intel- ligence. The stronger position of the director of central intelligence, the interagency com- mittee structure for the review of the policies and programs of national intelligence, and independent review and supervision by the private citizens of The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. all will increase 21 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 the control and accountability of intelligence to the president himself and to the senior members of the executive branch. Congress has an equal duty to arrange it- self to exercise its constitutional role with respect to intelligence. It must assume its full responsibilities in all senses of the word. It must organize and carry out full and cur- rent reviews of the intelligence community, assuring that it not only remains within the guidelines set for it, but also that it is effi- ciently and comprehensively accomplishing the tasks assigned. Congress' other respon- sibility, however, is to do this without de- stroying the ability of intelligence to carry out its duties. Thus the secrets of intelligence must be protected on Capitol Hill as well as at the CIA's Langley headquarters. The min- imum number of people, congressmen as well as staff, who truly "need to know" should be informed and should be subject to sanc- tions for improper disclosure. A single com- mittee, in each House if necessary, should represent their colleagues in this function, ending the present requirement to brief at least six committees. The third conclusion which derives from intelligence's advent to constitutional status is that it must serve the constitutional pro- cess. Traditionally and in other lands the servant only of the executive, it must now demonstrate its value to the Congress and to the public. It must earn the large invest- ment needed by modern intelligence, the risks and inevitable occasional failures and embarrassments incurred, and respect for its professional discipline and secrecy. This must be accomplished by sharing the fruits of the enterprise with all participants in the Amer- ican decision-making process. Perhaps this is the most challenging task ahead for intelligence. It must develop the distinctions between protecting the secrecy of its sources and techniques and making available the substance of its information and conclusions. It must face public criti- cism and political challenge of its assess- ments. It must maintain the independence and objectivity of its judgments apart from the policies and programs they may sup- port or question. Internationally, we must insist that an intelligence judgment is a step toward policy, not a reflection of it, wheth- er relating to ally or adversary. In a political debate where knowledge can be power, in- telligence judgments must be supplied im- partially to all factions, to help the best so- lution to emerge, rather than a favored one. This will require many changes in intel- ligence habits and concepts. The photo- graphs must be published, the background- ers attributed, the publications edited to protect the sources but circulate the sub- stance of their reports. With these changes, intelligence can be distributed regularly to all members of Con- gress. not held under such high classifica- 22 tions that it cannot be circulated and made conveniently available. The estimates will be debated and the sage unanimity of the intelligence cloister challenged by those close to the struggle and fearful of irrational and foolhardy, but real, surprises. Out of the process, however, will come a better under- standing of the role and value of modern in- telligence, as well as better intelligence itself. "Seizing the opportunity" to implement these conclusions will mark a major turning point in the discipline and profession of in- telligence. In its wake may come some of the structural changes suggested by Szanton and Allison and by others joining in the close examination of intelligence sparked by I975's investigations. Some of their and others ideas will not be adopted. and ad- ditional ones will arise for consideration. But the coming of age of intelligence as a full participant and contributor to the con- stitutional process will start a continual re- view and renewal of intelligence to meet the challenges of the future. Among more sub- stantial substantive benefits to the nation and to American intelligence, this will make unnecessary another sensational and shat- tering updating of American intelligence. Walter F. Mondale: Like most Americans. I have strongly sup- ported the necessity of our government's conducting intelligence activities. But after witnc.'ssing hundreds of hours of testimony the Senate Select Committee on In- teliigence. I am also convinced that basic reform is necessary. The committee heard respected former of- ficials of our nation talk about institutional- izing an assassination capability in the CIA as though it were just another option. We studied how the United States has used brib- ery, corruption, and violence in almost ev- ery quarter of the globe, and saw how es- pionage is aimed at our friends as well as at our foes. The committee reviewed how our academic institutions, press, and religious institutions have been exploited for clan- destine purposes, despite the special place these institutions must have in our dem- ocratic society. It is clear to me that we have paid an ex- tremely high price for any resulting secret success. American covert intervention often undermined the very democratic institutions we sought to promote. Because of our clan- destine activities, the United States is re- grettably regarded less and less as an example of democracy to be admired and emulated. Almost anything bad that happens in this world is attributed to the CIA?including the murder of King Faisal. And at home, the confidence of Americans in their gov- ernment is weakened when our leaders use Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 covert intelligence operations to mislead the public and short-circuit our democratic pro- cess. I have come to believe that there must be some fundamental changes in America's intelligence activities or they will fundamen- tally change America. The proposals of Pete i Szanton and Gra- ham Allison in the spring issue of FOR- EIGN POLICY go in the right direction. They improve upon similar recommenda- tions I made last fall. I recognize the costs in such a reorganization. and George A. Carver. Jr.. in his comment on the Szanton- Allison article, also in the spring issue, has pointed to certain aspects of them. But in- sofar as substantive problems can be met by structural change in the executive branch. I believe that the gains would outweigh the costs. The problem, however, is deeper. As the committee took testimony day af- ter day on assassination plots, my first im- pression was that we were grappling with some of the darker forces of human nature: the undertaking of acts which would be un - thinkable if not done in secret: the enthtt ? siasm with which we emulated our enemy; how patriotism and loyalty could be per- verted to the point of dishonoring the na- tion: the spectacle of men of great respect offering explanations and excuses at the mar- gin of credibility. My initial conclusion was that the an- swer lay in better accountability?vigorous congressional oversight plus a system in which officials cannot hide responsibility for their actions. To this end, I have supported a new Senate oversight committee with the power to authorize all national intelligence budgets. But the problem, I am afraid, lies deeper still. It is not just a problem of means, it i? a question of ends. When America saw itself as primarily re- sponsible for countering the Soviets and Communists throughout the world, our in- telligence services responded. Since Vietnam,. I believe America's view of its responsibil- ities has changed. However, there has been no redefinition of our rote in the world, nor of the policies to be served by our intelli- gence activities. As a start, I would suggest the following: > Avoiding nuclear war is most important. It requires the best possible intelligence. The continuing suspicion and antagonism be- tween the United States and the Soviet Union and the levels of nuclear weapons on each side, place a premium on the most ac- curate assessment of Soviet military capa- bilities and political intentions. Agreements to control nuclear and conventional arms need a strong intelligence base to ensure both sound agreements and compliance. To this end, I believe the Soviet Union and its allies must remain our Number One intelligence priority. > Containing Soviet adventurism is the re- sponsibility of all free countries. Each na- tion must look to its own resources first. If U.S. help is needed, covert action could prove vital. But, in general, I see little rea- son why U.S. aid should go through covert intelligence channels. Except in extraordi- nary circumstances, nations wishing Amer- ican support should be prepared to admit it. The American people and the Congress must not be left in the dark about new commit- ments. > Support for democracy. America remains the greatest friend of liberty in the world, if no longer the sole defender of every regime that calls itself anti-Communist. But help- ing the shattered democratic parties of West- ern Europe survive in the late 1940s is one thing, and seeking to overthrow a democrat- ically elected government in Chile in the 1970s is quite anothr. Moreover, despite possible short-term success, covert action can be the enemy of democracy. it often amounts to corruption and nothing is more destruc- tive of a democratic political system than corruption, in particular from a foreign source. If American aid to democracy is es- sential to offset Soviet subversion, we should find a way to do this openly. Perhaps our political parties can assume some of this re- sponsibility, much as European Social Dem- ocratic parties have in Portugal. > Meeting the problems of hunger and dep- rivation and building a more equitable world economic system are urgent tasks un- suited to clandestine activity. A foreign pol- icy which relies heavily on covert interven- tion and espionage will be self-defeating in this area, for it will cast doubt on the le- gitimacy of our cooperation and assistance. > Clandestine activities may prove essential to protect and advance our national interests in certain critical situations, such as thwart- ing terrorism, controlling narcotics, and bringing truth to nations blinded by censor- ship. But it has been naive for us to think that we could change a country's history with a couple of lies, a few guns. or a packet of dollars. We have ignored the strength of nationalism and people's determination to shape their own destiny. The Marshall Plan and NATO. along with the underlying vital- ity of the countries themselves, saved Europe from the Communists, not the CIA. The Al- liance for Progress contained Castro in the early 1960s. not Operation MONGOOSE. In most cases. I believe- America can be more effective if we are direct about what we want. Diplomacy- and economic cooperation, backed by adequate military strength?these are the tools that America uses best to se- cure its interests. I find myself in the unhappy position of not being able to take the stand that U.S. 23 covert action should be banned. 'With the Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 world as it is. I am afraid we may some- times need it. But it is clear we have under- taken too much clandestine activity in the past. We need to control it through the kind of structural changes proposed by Szan- ton and Allison and make it accountable through strong congressional oversight. But beyond this. I believe we need a new state- ment of the role of clandestine activities in U.S. foreign policy. I hope that the next president of the United States speaks to the American people and the world as follows: It will be the policy of the United States to conduct its relations with other countries on a straightforward basis. We will deal with other governments in con- fidence but not in stealth. \We will be plain and direct about our own interests and concerns and about what we expect from others. We reject a policy of covert intervention into the internal affairs of other nations. America will continue those intelli- gence activities essential to its security and that of its friends and allies. We will do what we can to check Soviet adventurism and to promote democracy on an open basis, but these are first the responsibility of the countries concerned. Covert action will be reserved for extraordinary circum- stances in which the security of jeopardy. The na- tion or of its allies is in serious eopardy. The era of covert day-to-day manipu- lation of media, people, and events by the United States has ended. American intel- ligence activities will be restructured ac- cordingly. Peter Szanton Graham Allison: Surely, William E. Colby is right in as- serting that the fundamental lesson of the past year is that American intelligence must operate within our constitutional system. And equally clearly, Walter F. Mondale is right in arguing that the deepest problem of American intelligence is one of ends, not means: a problem to be solved not by tinker- ing with the intelligence community but by rethinking and restating our values and ob- jectives in the external world. But two aspects of these attractive and WASHINGTON POST 21 MAY 1975 . large-minded concepts are troubling. One is that Colby, after a professional lifetime in the executive branch, asks Congress to rectify the constitutional balance, while Mondale, a leading figure in the Congress, looks principally to executive leadership for improvement. It is hard not to conclude that the country would be far better off ha'd Colby spent the last eight years in the Con- gress while Mondale occupied the White House. The second is that while focusing on constitutional and high policy issues is help- ful in clarifying the transcending problems, it also tends to foreclose attention to lesser but still quite important questions. This is the nation's first opportunity in a quarter-century to rethink what it wants ? from intelligence and how to get it. Absent further scandals or disasters, it .will likely be the last such opportunity of this century. Once the constitutional balance has been struck, and once we have, stopped asking our intelligence agencies to perform unjustified or repugnant or useless acts abroad, there will still remain the problem of how to im- prove the performance of these agencies at what has always been their major task: pro- viding the U.S. government with early and authoritative understanding of developments abroad. In recent years, the community's analyses and assessments have proven high- ly variable in quality and far from satisfy- ing. Their too frequent misuse and nonuse by policy-makers is a closely related problem. The already receding opportunity for reform should be used to insure not only that the community operates within constitutional boundaries and in the service of a support- able policy, but that it performs its hardest. least glamorous, and most important task to higher standards, and that the results are heard. Neither alertness in the Congress nor policy leadership in the 'White House, essen- tial as both are, will solve those latter prob- lems. Their solution will require far strong- er incentives within the community to treat the work of analysis and assessment as par- amount, and to enlarge the skills and pre- serve the neutrality necessary for such work.. They will also require arrangements which more reliably confront decision-makers with the results. In short, organizational reform_ Senators Named to New Unit on CIA Senate leaders yesterday named the 17 members of the newly created perma? nent Senate Committee on Intelligence Activities, with a hint that Sen. Daniel K. Inouye (D-Hawaii) will be- come chairman. Majority Leader Mike Mansfield ..(D-Mont.), an- nouncing the eight Demo- crats who will serve, gave Inouye's name first. There had been speculation earlier that he would become chair- man. Another Democrats: Birch Bayh (Ind.), Adlai E. Steven- son (Ill.), William D. Hatha- Way (Maine). Walter (Dee) Huddleston (Ky.), Joe Biden Jr. (Del.), Robert B. Morgan (N.C.) and Gary W. Hart (Colo.). Republican members, named by Minority Leader, Hugh Scott (R-Pa.), are Clif- ford P. Case (N.J.), Mark 0. Hatfield (Ore.), Barry Gold- water (Ariz.), Howard H. Baker Jr. (Tenn.), Robert T. Stafford (Vt.), Strom Thur- mond (S.C.), and Jake Garn (Utah). Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 24 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 GENERAL WASHINGTON POST 16 MAY 1976 _ Jack Anderson Teii6rist. Tisk ?TourrAs- A. terrorist group his rebuilt a com- mon tanker truck into a modern Trojan, horse to infiltrate America's bi- centennial celebration and Canada's Olympic games. Confidential law en- forcement reports show many terror- ists have now fixed on.these two events 'at their next battleground. -.- The 'terrorists have transformed the tanker truck into a rolling headquar- ters. On the outside, the truck looks perfectly normal. It even has spigots that can drip oil. But instead of petro- )eum products, the tank holds a terror- ist office, dormitory and arsenal. It can accommodate 15 to 20 raiders from the hellish side of politics. American agents know about this mobile terrorist com- mand post, but they haven't caught up with it yet. . Modern terrorists come from all sides Of -the political spectrum, but they share the concept that their cause will profit from disruption, disorder and bloodshed Some are highly trained commandos, skilled in the nightmarish uses of our modern technology. The government reports warn ominously that terrorists might even use "nuclear materials" as radioactive poisons or to build bombs. The United States and Canada are working together to prevent the terror- ists from spoiling the bicentennial and Olympic spectacles. Both the FBI and Royal Canadian Mounted Police are re- doubling their efforts to stop the ter- rorists before they strike. The Customs Services of both countries are watching for smuggled weapons. The State De- partment has appointed a_"s2o_rdinato_r_ for combatting terrorism." An informal White House task force and the Cana- ' dian Ministry of External Affairs are also working on the counter-terrorist campaign. The classified working papers of the two governments read like grim text- books on insurgency warfare. The offi- cial documents show how the terrorists plan to follow classic' guerrilla warfare strategems, mixing with the local popu- lace between hit-and-tun attacks. The terrorists also employ smuggling tech- niques from the worldsii)fiRtestiationaL Wednesday, Noy 19, 1976 The Washington crime and espionage to move their weapons across borders. The official reports discuss a variety of disguise-and.diversionary tactics that the terrorists are known to use. They convert the ordinary into a cam- ouflaged 'weapon. For example, cam- 'era-laden tourists are a. standard sight at such events as bicentennial pageants, and Olympic games. But the official re- ports warn some "tourists" may be dis- guised terrorists,- and' their cameras may be deadly Weapons. - Lawmen have discovered, for exam- 'pie, that the new Polaroid cameras with large film padcs can conceal small pistols whose grips have been removed. The ordinary Kodak film box, one intel- ligence report says, may be used by ter- rorists to hide tiny lethal devices known as "Dutch mini-grenades." Government agents have also learned_ that terrorists may conceal small machineguns in attache cases. Trigger extensions protrude from the ease. What appears to be an ordinary briefcase _cap be held "under, the arm_ (to) fire into a crowded area," according ' to one document. Intelligence reports suggest that the terrorists are most likely to strike in Ju- ly, the month that the bicentennial cel- ebrations reach their climax and the Olympic games open. Enormous num- bers of tourists are expected at these events. U.S. and Canadian customs officials have pinpointed, some of the terrorist organizations that are expected to cause trouble. The Japanese Red Army, as a prime example, is described in the confidential reports as a group of now more than 30 anarchists. Yet they suc- ceeded in shocking the world by mas- sacring 28 people at the Tel Aviv air- port in 1972, hijacking a Japan Air Lines plane in 1973, bombing Shell Oil tanks in Singapore in 1974 and seizing the U.S. ethbassy in Kuala Lumpur in 1975 There is also the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberation Nacional Puertorriquena, which ostensibly seeks Puerto Rican in- dependence from the United States. ___ACe.Ording to the 'official documents, Star . _ this terrorist group blatantly claims credit for 10 U.S. bombings in October 1975. The official reports warn this group may work with the Puerto Rican Socialist Party, controlled by Fidel Cas- tto, to disrupt the bicentennial. . An anti-Castro terrorist group, .the Frente de Liberacion Nacional. de Cu- ba, may "cause problems" at the Olym- pics because of Cuba's participation in the games. This. group, according to the documents, "is known to possess a large amount of C-4explosives, which it may use against pro-Castro and Soviet tar- gets." Perhaps the strangest group of ter- rorists, identified as a bicentennial and Olympic threat, is the "Rastafarian Movement." The intelligence data say the group is also known as "the Niya- bingi Order, the Miyamen, the Beards- men, the LoCksmen, the Rude Boys and the Dreads." , The Rastafarians, one of the oldest of -- the terrorist groups, is an all-black cult ? originating in Jamaica in 1930. They be- -. lieve "that the past Emperor of Ethio- pia, Haile Selassie, was the living God . . . and that the ways of the white man are evil." The documents say that the Rasta- farians advocate the liberal use of mari- juana and have been associated increas- ingly with violent rebellion and terror- ism. In New York City alone, they have an estimated 3,000 members of varying levels of activity. Law enforcement agencies on both sides of the border are beefing up,their anti-terrorist campaign. But the key to defeating the terrorists lies with the populace. Terrorists need confusion, chaos and a submissive populace to op-, erate successfully in any country. They describe themselves as the "fish" who will hide this summer in the sea of tour- ists. If the people of the United States and Canada deny the terrorists the strate- gic hospitality they need, the fanatics among us will have more trouble and less success. int United Features Syndicate Soviet Milibry Spending Up 5 or By Henry S. Bradsher Washington Star Staff Writer Soviet military spending has been rising for the past three years at an annual rate of 5 or 6 percent, the CIA says in a new study that predicts con- tinued but perhaps slower long-term growth. In what- it called "a major revision of past estimates," the agency raised its calculations of military spending 6%, CIA Esti ates- _ - from 6-or 8 percent of the Soviet -iwo-thirds larger than the Soviet . gross national product to between 11GNP. and 13 percent since 1970. In the corn- ' A 17-page CIA study, which was ing fiscal year the United States circulated on Capitol Hill yesterday, plans to spend on defense slightly said about 90 percent of the increase under 6 percent of a GNP roughly - ? 2 5 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 In its- estimates came from "changes in- our understanding of ruble prices and costs," and the rest from- broad- er information on. Soviet armed forces. The estimate of Soviet mili- tary spending last year-was approxi- mately doubled, the study said. _ TRE REVISION "does not affect :OUP appraisal of the size or capabil- ities of Soviet military forces," the Study pointed out. Nor does it change , earlier estimates that Soviet military spending in 1975 was about 40 percent' more than American, when calculat- ed in dollars, But it does show Kremlin leaders more Willing to-give their armed , forces priority over consumers than previously realized,, the CIA said. It did not attempt to. judge foreign poli- cy attitudes which lay behind-this.. The study emphasized the tenta- tive nature of the-conclusions drawn - from "a major reassessment . . . undertaken in the face of an unusual- ly large body of new information." The estimates have "a margin of uncertainty, which for some items could be substantial." This uncertainty seemed certain to .! provide the basis of continuing dis- pute among various intelligence analysts and on Capitol Hill over the ? size and significance of the Soviet military effort. THE NEW information has been " available for a year. Pentagon analysts, who have long contended that the CIA was pegging the Soviet mijitary effort-too low, have argued for the agency to admit it has been wrong for years. But now the way the data is used could provide the basis for further argument._ . a -; Former Defense Secretary. James, R. Schlesinger has in recent months said that on the basis, of the new information the Soviet Union. is: devoting -"at least 15 percent" of GNP to the military. Lt. Gen. Daniel 0. Graham, who retired from run- ning the Defense Intelligence Agency when Schlesinger was fired by Presi- dent Ford last autumn, has put. the figure at 15 to 20 percent. Commenting on the new CIA study, ? Graham said he found it "to still be extremely conservative. . . I find it incredible that they didn't go to 12 to 16 percent" of GNP on the basis of information with which he was famil- iar. ' - . "It is awfully toughlor a group of ' analysts? to admit that they were as ' wrong as. they (the CIA) have been," Graham added. "It's nice to see that they do admit as much as they do." SEN. WILLIAM Proxmire, D-Wis., whose subcommittee of Congress's Joint Economic Committee has held annual hearings on the Soviet and - Chinese military effort, commented. that "the revised intelligence esti- mate has little to do with the size or effectiveness of the Soviet defense program:' These are unchan ed b the Soviet military machine has been I shown to be more inefficient and wasteful, Proxmire said. Proxmire and other congressional critics of Pentagon warnings about the growing size of the Soviet armed forces have often used a CIA esti- mate of a 3 percent annual growth in the Kremlin's military spending. It, was based on dollar calculations. The new study estimated the growth at less than 3 percent in 1971 WASHINGTON POST 5 JUN1976 Atomic Fuel In Taiwan -Not Inspected By Don Oberdorfer Washington Post Staff Writer International Atomic En- ergy Agency inspectors checking Taiwan's research reactor early this year failed, to inspect- 10 fuel rods con- taining a total of one-half ki- logram of plutonium, ac- cording to-a report that has caused concern among gov- ernments acquainted with the case. U.S. experts said this amount of plutonium would not be enough to make an explosive device, though it - would be enough to provide some laboratory experience in handling sensitive materi- als that, in larger amounts, could be used for bomb-mak- ing. American officials famil- iar with the incident said the Nationalist Chinese in charge of the reactor report- edly told the IAEA inspec- tors that the fuel rods had been taken to another loca- nd 1972. But new weapons, especial- ?. While this is not unusual in some nuclear operations, the governments hearing the report were surprised? and concerned?that the in- spectors evidently did not insist on going to the other site to inspect the fuel rods. David Fischer, assistant ? director for external rela- tions of the Vienna-based in- ternational inspection agency, said the January in- spectors' report from Tai- wan showed "no significant amount of material unac- counted for" and "no reason to suppose any kind of irreg- ularity." Fischer said it is his un- derstanding that inspectors would not normally see ev- ery fuel element during their semi-annual inspec- tions. Such a physical inven- tory of all materials is re- quired less frequently, he said. The Taiwan Research Re- actor, which was supplied by Canada, is similar to a Cana- dian-supplied reactor uti- ? lized by India to make a nu- clear explosive device. The Indians secretly built a re- processing facility to con- vert used fuel rods to weap- ons-grade atomic material. tion. 26 ly "a new 'generation of strategic missile systems," pushed it up to 5 or 6 percent for 1973-75, for an average over the five years of 4 to S. percent. Procurement of those missiles probably has peaked and the annual rate of growth will taper off until the next generation, the study added. Pentagon officials have reported that next generation now under develop- ment in the Soviet Union. TIIE ARMED forces are now "ab- snibing almost 20 percent of the out- put of Soviet industry," the CIA`,. estimated. Other sources said thi and other calculations of the militani effort had not yet been coordinate:d? with CIA estimates of the entire Sov)----', et eacnomy, however, and thus Old; new study was considered very tentat-1 ? five by economic analysts. -. .. ? ? "Because the resource impact of; the defense effort on the Soviet', economy has been considerably! greater than we previously recog- nized," the study said, "we now real- ize that Soviet leaders have been - more willing than we thought to forgo, economic growth and consumer satis- faction in favor of military capabil- ities. I. I "Nevertheless, we see no evidence ' Ithat economic considerations are, !deterring the Soviets from continuing - *the present pace and magnitude of f their defense effort." In recent weeks there has been evi- dence that a majority in the Soviet , leadership is seeking to restrain mili- tary spending. This has developed since the death last month of the! - powerful defense minister, Marshal Andrei A. Grechko, and his replace-. ment with a military production ex- pert rather than another soldier... U.S. officials said they are confident Taiwan possesses no such reprocessing opera- tion. They said that the United States is concerned about the case of the unin- spected fuel rods primarily because it seems to demon- strate inadequate procedures and a lack of zeal on the part of the international in- spectors. Nuclear material and fa- cilities supplied by the United States and most other advanced countries are sold on condition that they be used only for au- thorized purposes and that they be subject to periodic on-site inspection by teams of the Vienna-based interna- tional agency. ' The IAEA has been sharply criticized in some quarters for having only 60 Inspectors to police more than 300 nuclear facilities around the world. Congress has added $5 million for IAEA to a pending military assistance bill in 'an effort to improve the inspections. Nationalist Chinese Pre- mier Chiang Ching-kuo said last September that "we ad- mit we have the ability and the facilities to manufacture nuclear weapons, but - we will never manufacture them." Taiwan has formally agreed not to make an at- omic bomb by ratifying the nonproliferation treaty. Taiwan is in the early stages of a multibillion-dol- lar nuclear power program that seeks to generate nearly half of the island's power needs through nu- - clear power plants by 1985: The United States is selling Taiwan the nuclear fuel and most of the reactors and other necessary equipment. American experts pointed out the extensive Taiwan nuclear power investment is in a sense a hostage against weapons production. This is because the United States has the ability to shut, off the required flow of ura- nium fuel if there is evi- dence that Taiwan is cheat- ing -on its international com- mitments. The United States did not stop shipments of ? essential nuclear fuel to India after that country's atomic explo- sion. The Nuclear Regula- tory Commission is holding hearings to determine whether the fuel shipments Should be stopped. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1. WASHINGTON POST 9 JUN: 1975 Opium Poppy Fields Said Destroyed Mexico Heroin Flow By John M. Goshko ? Washmaton Post Staff Wylter The 'United States and Mexico announced yester- day that almost all the. opium poppy fields in Mex- ico?the source of most of the heroin.' entering the United States?have ? been destroyed by an intensified eradication prOgram. The announcement was made jointly here by Attor- ney General Edward H. Levi and Mexican Attorney Gen- eral Pedro Ojeda-Paullada. They said that the eradica- tion campaign can be ex- pected,to reduce the availa- bility of Mexican heroin in the United States by late this year. Their statements were made in an atmosphere of cordiality. But , they came against a liackground of re- ports that efforts to stem the cross-border drug traffic may be endangered by crow- ing rancor between narcot- ics agencies of the two coun- tries. Washington Post 'ibecial correspondent Marlise Si- mons reported from Mexico City that Mexican officials are extremely angry at what one characterized as the "insolent and inept behav- ior" of U.S. Drug Enforce- ment Administration agents operating in Mexico. _ Simos quoted Mexican. official sources as saying that "American agents and agents Provocateurs are act- ing against our Will and be- hind our backs" to engage In entrapment of narcotics dealers' and other activities that are against Mexican law. The Charges ete denied here Washington hy Ojeda-Paullada and by DEA Adminihrator Peter B. Ben- singer. Ojeda- Paullada told _ . _ _ WASaNGTON POST 2 2 wh_ eroin Hits at Horn The WikIlington Post '-et, aerial" redonnalisinee' ti relations, because Attorney 3 subsequent destruction 13.5 ' G,enerat Levi and Mr. Ben- herbicides sprayed froniliel- singer 'lave accepted fully icepters: , ? that U.S. officials in Mexico- In addition; the American must at in strict accord- officials added. the 'MeXi- ance with Mexican laws and cans have increased "their= author*. There have been . campaign from -a once-a- - and am sure there Will kear;lour-niOnth effort to a continu?e- to be from/time to- year-round program; Since 4 time differences of opin it takes only 90 days to Culti- , ion ' ata lower'levels But . vate. a poppy crop; the, offi. there if absolutely no cri- cials noted, .'ear-arou-nd sur- sis.," - veillance should hinder nal.: , Some DEA officials said cOtics traffickers'from rear- privately that the Mexicans irig field -or finding new lo had certain -complaints cations. ? about 'U.S. activities but . Figures released :by the ! they have been acted on by' Mexican government say Washington and resolved. owe . "There is no crisis in our spot Poppy fields and their _ Bensinger said, "These re- ports are false on each count. The, only , ones who benefit from something like , this are the drug dealers." Still, the reports of fric- - tion have been so persistent that many law-enforcement sources are: inclined to be- lieve that they have some -basis in fact: There were; hints, in the guarded com- ments Of some officials, that the Mexicans might have been angry but had agreed to. ? withold open criticism in. exchange for Washing- ? ton's promises to correct the situation. In any case, the atmos; phere yesterday, both in the appearance of the two. attor- neys general before the Press and in ? a. subsequent visit by Ojeda-Paullada and Justice officials to . Presi- dent .Ford at the White ? House,. was almost deter- t minedly upbeat. Levi and Bensinger- put ,1 particular stress on how the Mexican government's ex- panded drive against poppy growing had greatly re- duced production , in the Mexican fields. ? They- said that the most , significant, features-- of this ?campaign involved the use that; as of the, end of May, . approximately 30.500 poppy , fields covering an estimated 18,500 acres had been de- stroyed. By contrast, -Ben- singer pointed out, during all of 1975, the Mexicans, us- ing searches on foot. suc- ceeded in destroying only 4,7 700 fields: ? . DEA officials estimate ?-? that Mexican brown heroin ?a term denoting drugs proc- essed from Mexican- fields into 'heroin?accounts, for roughly 85 to 90 per cent of -the heroin currently--enter- lug the United States. They "Say that this has been the case since 1972, when the, supply of poppies grown in Turkey and processed into berpin in France was Cur- tailed drastically by diplo- matic and law-enforcement 'action. . Officials at DEA said that no one can estimate with '7 any' accuracy the. actual amount of hei-oin coming into the country annually. , Their belief that from 85 to 90 per, cent currently origi- nates in Mexico is based on. the fact that Mexican heroin accounts for a similar per- centage of the amount seized by _U.S. narcotics agents.. Despite predictions that Use by Burma's Youth Invigorates Control Effort BY 'Lewis AL Simons Washington Poet FoTsign Service MANDALAY?Burma the apex- of :Southeast Asia's ,-Golden Tiiangle and a ma- jor source of illicit heroin, is snow facing a serious drug 'addiction problem at home, particularly among the -children of top government officials. The dothestic crisis has added impetus to the gov- ernment's drive- to destroy opium poppy- fields -arid jupgle heroin laboratories. Until recently, the ,sole mo- tivation behind the govern- ment's efforts was that drug trafficking funded die wide- spread insurgency along the Burmese border. 27 "The army hal always :taken the drug problem seri- husly," noted one knowl- edgeable Burmese .in this northern cit, "because they have " to face, the weapons the insurgents ,buy- with .'drug income. But now that some ministers and colonels find their children are booked, the government is the eradication ? Program will, redUce the Supply of Mexican heroin by late in the Year,-Levi and Ojeda- ; Paullada both cautioned that it will probably "take somewhat- longer before the effect of the program on' the U.S. heroin market is. billy Telt" . Bensinger- said that this is because there is no way- of telling 'hew much Mexi- can heroin: is already in the United States in storage or the smuggling pipelines that bring', it across the border. , ? .The DEA head -noted, however,. that ,the price of Mexican heroin?a key -in- dicator of its availability? has been going up recently. The "street 'price" of a milli- gram?the amount that it' brings when sold by retail den re r s to addicts?has gone from $1.15 in Decem- ber to $1.25 at present, he In her report from Mexi- co, .. Simons- said approxi- mately 30 DEA 'officials are assigned to that country to -perform lials,on Wcirk.- and exchange information with their- Mexican counterparts. Under :the Cooperation agreements between the two countries, 'their activities are supposed to be carefully circumscribed. The D E A agents are permifted to carry guns, for example, only; when. actually operat- ing with -Mexican agents; And capture of drug sellers by arranged 'buys," a com- mon tactic in. the, United States, is. forbidden by Mex- ican law.. - However, Simons report- ed, the American agents in Mexico are alleged by Mex- ican officials to have violat- ed these rules with ill-dis- guised frequency ? a -factor that she said forms the basis of many of the Mexican complaints? - ;suddenly paying a lot more attention to the matter." Among those children of top officials believed to have a drug problem is one of President Ne Win's- three eldest sons. According tore- liable Burmese and-Western sources, the young, man is said a heroin addict. ? . Capitalizing oh the grow- ing addiction problem in Burmese towns and cities, and the drugs-insurgency link, the 'United States has given Burma 12 helicopters and a small- spotter plane undet? a..$13 million grant Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 -Tor use. igainst 'growers and traffickers. An ? additional grant for six more helicopters has run ? into U.S. Congressional op- . ? position led , by Rep. Otto Passman (D-La.) despite as- .' surances earlier .this .month _ by Sheldon B. Vance, special adviser to Secretary ofState Henry A., Kissinger; that Burma had achieved an im- pressive' record in the last' nine _months with the assist- ance of the U.S. helicopters, which are, unarmed civilian versions of the Huey heli- copters. ' Passman, sources in .Ran-. goon said, apparently is con- vinced that the ? Burmese armed forces are using the., helicopters against insur- gent armies of minority. ethnic groups that are striv- ing for., autonomy or inde- pendance from the 'Central government in Rangoon. The Burmese counter that while it is often imPossible to differentiate between traffickers and insurgents, they do not Use the helicbp- ters against minority forces as such. "In most- cases, they're one and the same," said Kyaw Min, the author of a recent series -of articles, on Burma's drug problem. To illustrate' his point,. Kyaw Min displayed to a visitor a, stack of photo- graphs taken by Burmese army photographers follow- ing a raid on April 26 near the eastern border town - Along Hsat. NEW YORK TIMES 2 7 MAY 1976 By BERNARD GWERTZMAN Special to The New York Times WASHINGTON, May 26?The? State Department has apparent- ly given the A.F.L.-C.I.O. the right to veto all applications by Soviet and other Communist trade union leaders to enter this country. This practice, reportedly of long standing, was acknowl- edged today by the State De- partment after a Soviet news- paper complained that the United States was not living up to the Helsinki agree- ment's call for wider East-West exchanges. ? The paper charged that four Soviet trade unionists were barred from accepting an invi- tation from San Francisco Bay unionists to visit this month? in reciprocity for trips by the Americans to the Soviet Union in 1973 and 1974. In confirming that the visa applications had been denied, the department conceded in effect that A.F.L.-C.I.O. national: leaders were given an unofficial veto authority. It has long been assumed in Washington that George Meany, president of the A.F.L.- The phOtOs showed mod- ern mortars, Browning auto- matic rifles, -grenade launch- ers, light , machine guns, rockets an bandoliers of ammunition. Next .to the arsenal were , large quantities of either and drums of other chemi-? cals, beaters, basins, buckets and other equipment used to convert raw opium into refined heroin. The raid, which' was car, ried out ..with the assistance. of the U.'.-donated ? helicop, - lers, netted 30 pounds of,: heroin -and 288 pounds of raw opium, said Kyaw MM. Government officials said 233 rebels,were manning the, camp. Two soldiers: and nine insurgents were reported killed. U.S. sources like to stress that the' United States pro- s-ides no assistance or advice to the Burmese: "The heli- copters represent our only form of aid to this govern- ment," one - source said. "They maintain and fly them themselves." The helicopters, based at Meiktila, 90 miles south of Mandalay, have also been used heavily against opium poppy farmers,. members of minority groups who are not directly active in the insur- gencies. So far this year, ac- cording to 'US. sourCeS, hell: copter-borne troops have de- stroyed 17.000 acres -of. the 70.000 acres used to grow poppies in i3urina. ' By contrast, the United Stites hopes to help the gov- ernment of Mexico wipe out ,just ,10,000 acres of poppy fields in all of .1976. Mexico is the major source of illicit .- drugs entering the United States. Burma's policy, unlike that of neighboring Thai- land, is to destroy the poppy tields first and, -iyurry' about, providing farmers with a substitute crop later. The system is quick, but it in :creases minority groups' ha- tred of the central govern- ment. The United Nations is ex- pected to begin a 46 million crop substitution program in " Burma soon. A smaller but similar program in Thailand has so far produced limited results. The U.S. interest, accord- ing to an American source in Rangoon, is limited to helping the Burmese gov- ernment stem the flow of heroin out of Burma, through Thailand, and into the United States, where it comprises between 10 and 20 Per cent of annual consump- tion. According to an informed source in Mandalay, a pleas- ant, sleepy city of half a mil- lion on the Irrawaddy River, the local addiction problem is "serious and growing ? quickly." No figures are 'available, the 'source said,. I but a drug treatment center. has been established at a local hospital. In the capital, Rangoon', with its population of 2 Mil- lion, official figures show thit, as of last year there were 994 registered addicts, with 12,134 in all of Burma. Total population is 31 mil- ? Hon. An article in the Rangoon Working People's' Daily said an official survey revealed that of those registered for treatment, "the majority of ' the addicts are the children : of affluent people such as ! merchants and traders."' . "This is nonsense, ex- claimed U Ba Gyaw, head of , -the government's news and periodical corporation.. "We ? have no real problem. There may be a few' youngsters who .Smoke marijuana or use heroin- once or twice, , just for a kick, but addiction is small-scale indeed." But a Rangoon attorney said that ? based on his dis- cussions with government doctors and the number of drug-related eases he has handled, "I wouldn't be sur- prised if the addiction fig- ures were 18 to 20, times higher than the official sta- tistics." Although U.S. -officials profess to be "reasonably optimistic" about Burma's chances of reducing its drug output, the, odds' on elimi- nating the traffic are virtu- ally nil. As one U.S. source put it, "As long as a kilo of heroin can be bought. for $325 in northeastern Burma and sold on the streets of New York for a quarter of a million, there's no way they're going to dry it up." C.I.O., and his fiercely anti- Communist executive council had influence in denying Com- munist entry visas, but this was the first time the State Department had publicly ac- knowledged this practice, which apparently goes back at least to the 1950's when the cultural- exchange program began. Visa Rejection Confirmed Frederick Z. 'Brown, the de- partment spokesman, confirmed that the four visa applications had been rejected. "In handling the visa applica- tions, we gave due weight to the view of the mainstream of organized labor in the United States," Mr. Brown said. "The, national A.F.L.-C.I.O. is firmly opposed to labor exchanges with Communist labor officials on the grounds that such ex- changes would equate our free trade unions with Government- controlled trade unions." Later, in answer to further questions, the department said that it had never given permis- sion to any Soviet or other Communist trade union official to visit this country in that capacity, although some such officials many have come as tourists or in other guises. U.S. Seems to Let A.F.L.-C.I.O. Veto Union Visitors thi- country the reqeust Ernest Lee, director of inter- national affairs of the A.F.L.- is routinely rejected. Under the C.I.O. confirmed in a telephone current law, any Communist conversation that the A.F.L.? Part yofficial, or representative o C.I.O. routinely opposes visasf an organization controlled to any trade union leader fronn by the party, is automatically the Soviet Union because such: denied entry unless a waiver is an official is only "a Govern-i granted. ment trade front" who does not; Such waivers have never really represent Soviet workers.' been give nto trade unionists Mr. Brown said the view of coming to meet American trade the A.F.L.-C.I.O. was "very im- uniobists, the official said. portant" to the State Depart- The denial of the visas this ment. Privately, officials said time, however, has attracted that the A.F.L.-C.I.O. has al- more attention because of the ways had what amounted to !Istrong backing the invitations a "veto" right on any Communist,ihad in the San Francisco area. unionle d r ! David Jenkins, a labor leader in San Francisco, said in a tel- 'George eMany Won't Have It ephone conversation that in "It is a unique situation," !November 1973 and in Novem- one department official said, ber 1974 delegations of labor adding: "You may notice that leaders and some others from in all the exchange agreements the bay area had visited the with the Russians, there is no Soviet Union and spent consid- !mention of trade union ex- erable time with Soviet trade changes. There are exchanges unions. , of doctors, teachers, business- He said the San Francisco men, editors, publishers, farm- building trades council adopted ers, young people, language a resolution inviting a delega- teachers, but no labor leaders. lion from Soviet trade unions That is not accidental; that is to return the visit this month. ;because George Meany won't have it." were notified that four Soviet The San Francisco sponsors ! In practice, another official representatives had applied for' said, if a Soviet trade union visas: Georgi Y. Kanayev, dep. iofficial applies for a visa to 2g Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 ? tit"7chier of the international department of the Central So- viet Trade Union; Vitaly Provotomv, chairman of the4 Leningrad district trade union; Aleksandra P. Reksha, secretary of the Odessa district trade union; and Igor Y'. Yurgens, consultant in the central Inter- national Department. , , _ ' Late last month the depart- ment decided against the ap- plication on the usual grounds noting that "the national A.F.L.-: is opposed to such visits ion principle." . As a result Of, the rejectiOn2, the two California_ Senators,: and the bay area Congressmen,.,. i were asked, to appeal the deci- sion, but they were told last 'week?that 'the,, decision wage final. WA? 11\TGJUIV 19 POST Rote in Ili- ta worded statement -tharr *s1)ith public Ato assurances by. ? U.S. officials that no Amen. mte as can material was involved, there were signs that India used 'U.S.-supplied heavy water in its nuclear test pro. gram. The Connecticut Demo-. crat is chairmanof the Sen- ate Government Operations Committee, which has been" investigating the adequacy of safeguards, in- transfer- ringnuclear material to for - Laid to U.S. ? _Reuter . ? Sen. Abraham A'. ftibicoff said yesterday there were "disturbing indications" that the United States supplied an essential ingredient used in India's first nuclear ex- ploSion in 1974. ? eign countries:- - He said in ? a strongly Cemmittee Investigations t NEW YORK TIMES 30 May 1976 NEW YORK TIMES 8 JUN 1976 'SALT 'Violations': . For . more than a year conservative critics of the Strategic arms limitations talks (SALT II) with .MOscow have sought to discourage agreement by charging that the Soviets had been violating the 1972 SALT I treaty in order to gain military advantage over the United States. These charges have -been rejected not Only by President Ford and Secretary of .State Kissinger, but by ' former Defense Secretary James SChlesinger.- The disclosure,that Moscow. now, has achnowledged, a 'violation does not alter, that picture. The violation, which ....occurred in March, was a technical one. Moscow had Informed . the United Stites in 'advance, that it would occur. And measures- have been taken to rectify.' the two-month infraction. ' ? That was not the way it ,was leaked, -presumably by ,.some Pentagon, source, to Aviation. Week and Space -? Technology, which has taken the lead, in, -the -past in . charging Soviet SALT I violations. .That Publicatian's 'report made no mention of the. fatt'thaethe treaty`gaVe Moscow four months to dismantle-. land-based missiles after new missiIe4aunching ' submarines, 'their replacements, took to sea. Nor 'did it -indicate that the , issue had been resolved through the SOviet,American Standing Consultative ComMittee,.. that Moscow:- had agreed in April to put no further new submarines to sea until the dismantling? had proceeded apace and that the .dismantling was now virtually finished. The Soviet Union blamed bad winter :weather for the fact that by, the end of March only 11 of. the 51 missile 1 ? silos had been destroyed, a complicated process, but gave assurances?verified by American' '5!, all ' , had been taken out of operation.. This episode is typical of the confusion, stirred by 'previous, charges of SALT- violations. None-sat the half, 7 'dozen alleged violations of the past has been proven. The 'Soviet- ,--jateral American interpretations of thekSALTI provisions, .-,-which Moscow had never accepted, and also took some 'advantage of treaty -ambiguities; None of these issues :,was of major importance, and Moscow backed off when '-challenged in the Standing Consultative Commission. , ? *bat is proven by the alleged violations?and; the -outcome of their investigation by the United States Gov- ernment?is that unilateral American verification by sat- ellite and other intelligence means 'doe's .vii.hrk and $liat ? the Standing Consultative Commission is effective in resolving ambiguous-and disputed occurrences. The expe- rience gained in the process shows that mutual limitation Of strategic arms is possible and should he pressed vigorously to the further stage of missile reductions. MOYNIHAN CITES YOTE-BIJYDJG Py KATHLEEN TELTSCH ti;Intal to The New York Times UNITED NATIONS, N.Y., May 29?Daniel P. Moynihan, for- mer United States represntative at the United Nations, says he was aware his term here last fall that vote on critical Gener- al Assembly resolutions were bought and sold by diplomats. ? There were not many cases, perhaps only a half-dozen in- stances, but in one a vote went for as little as $600," Mr. Moy- nihan said in a telephone inter- view. ; It -should not be too surpris- ing that such sales go on he said, considering the high cost of living in New York for dele- gations from poorer countries, and especially for delegates be- low the rank of ambassador, who cannot get?by on their sa- laries. "There was a lot of loose money around and an influx of small, impoverished countries to UN. membersip at about the same time," he said. Mr. Moynihan declined to identify those involved by name or by country. Other Inducements Cited According to delegates, there are few cases of money's ac- tually changing hands. There was no suggestion that votes had been bought by any major , power such as the United States or the Soviet Union. "When the larger countries go after support, there are other wan of doing it such as an offer of a loan or profitable trade agreement," one diplomat remarked. Another delegate said 'there were more subtle, ways of ob- taining supporting votes than bribery. One of the most com- mon is to invite the leader of a small country for a state visit during which a friendship pact is approved and an offer of techqical assistance may be thrown in. Mr. Moynihan said he did not s find it shocking that countries P . . Ihavi that 21 tons of heaVy water supplied by ,the United States was used by India -in- nuclear reactors supplied by Canada to pro- duce plutonium,' "which is atom bomb material," Ribi- coff said. "The' United States has never publicly aciniowl= edged exporting heavy water to India," he said. "Instead, U.S. officials said only that Canada supplied the research reactor used by India to produce the pluto- nium for its explosion." engage in bargaining and saw not much difference in whether votes went for cash or wheat. "All countries sell their votes in one way or the other," he commented. "I don't find it sur- prising or shocking what coun- tries do to maximize their in- terests." The former United States de- legate made a similar statement about bribery in an interview !with CBS News when he was asked whether votes were bought at the United Nations. ' a number of other delegates I said they were certain that vateshad been sold-for thou- sands of dollars on some criti- cal' issues. . Two diplomats from widely' different regions and political groupings, who asked not to be. identified, gave ;Millar accounts of one attempted transaction: A delegate from one of the poorest 'countries was said to have been approached and handed an envelope by a North Korean representative with an urgent request that he pay careful- attention to its con- tents. This occurred at a time when both North Korea and South Korea, which are not members but have observer sta- tus, were pressing General As- sembly members to vote for ri- val resolutions on the situation in Korea. When he opened the enve- lope, the delegatefound that iti contained not only propagand material but also $3,000 in $100! bills. The diplomat involved' could not be reached for com- ment, but the two others ac- quainted with the affair said they were certain that the mo- ney had been returned. , A North Korean spokesman at the United- Nations, when asked about the report, said the accounts were absolutely untrue. CBS News 'said in a broadcast' Friday night that diplomats at' the United Nations had offered $1,000, an an Argentine diplo- mat and an envelope full of mo- ney to an Arab diplomat, but that the money had been re- fused in both cases. A spokes- man for the North Korean ob- erver termed the reports corn- letely false. 29 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 Western Europe DAILY TELEGRAPH, London aLy_ .,F7 6 How smack of soft Government and tactics- make a mockery of scifeguar Foreign eyes in Britain" RUSSIAN plans to build a huge new embassy com- plex in the leafy " IVAllion- aire's Row," Kensington? London's' biggest property development since the war ?seem likely to bring sub- stantial increases in the small army cf 'men from Moscow already based here. It takes a minimum of eigh- teen trained men to Mount a full scale watch on a suspec- ted- spy and it is with that and other figures in mind that the men responsible for Bri- tain's security are looking at the project. Strict control on the numbers of Russian diplomats has been maintained since Lord Home's expulsion of 105 of them in 1971. Nevertheless many Conserv- ative M.P.'s fear that with the Russian plans for expansion and present efforts to push trade between the countries. Whitehall' may have' to consider easing restrictions on the envoys and commercial officers. This concern is growing after the Foreign Office decision not to expel two bungling Hun- garian spies who were caught photographing the atomic wea- pons ? establishment at Burgh- field, Berkshire, two weeks ago This lenient approach is not uncommon now when dealing with Russian and, Czech diplo- mats involved in spying opera- tions. Russia now has 354 men posted to Britain compared with 550 before the 1971 expulsions. There are 87 diplomats and offi- cials at the Embassy; 56 in the Soviet Trade.' Delegation; 102 with quasi-official agencies; 71 factory inspectors; 15 officials of international organisations and 23 journalists. In addition there are some 500 diplomats and offi- dais representing Communist satellite countries whose secu- rity agencies are directly con- trolled by the K.G.B. After Lord Home dealt so forthrightly with the 105, who were not mere names picked out of the hat but were proven spies, the Russians in their con- stant efforts to rebuild their organisation turned to their Eastern European satellites and the Cubans to cany out missions for the voraciously inquisitive K.G.B. and its supporting mili- tary and political intelligence organisations. . 30 improvised Russian spy ds By NORMAN KIRKHAM, Military attaches have always been regarded as legalised spies and Lt. Col. Lajos Hajma and Captain Andras Toth of the Hungarian embassy were merely carrying out a mission which British military attach?might well attempt to carry out in Hungary. Russian representatives cannot travel more than 35 miles from the centre of London?a piece of tit-for-tat because of the restric- tions imposed on Britain's 82 diplomats and officials serving in Moscow. But these restraints do not apply to the Iron Curtain diplomats or the Cubans whose D.G.I. espionage setup is con- trolled from the Kremlin. _ TOM DAVIES and the Close-Up team It is because of this Commun- ist evasion, of the restrictions which are strictly applied to , Western .,diplomats in Russia_ that Lord lipmc told us: "It is a false calculation that if you catch- spies on the job you will Impress' the Russians and their satellites by dealing with them leniently. These men should have been sent packing at once. "I-have no doubt that detente - or not, the Russians and East I Europeans will go on with intel- ligence operations here. We must not relax our guard. The leopard does not change its spots." But it is the cost and com- plexity of maintaining that guard which is making life so difficult for our spy catchers. In Moscow the British Embassy uses Russian chauffeurs and handy- men, but they bring their own doormen and chauffeurs to Bri- tain and it has long been a rule of counter-espionage that the most important man in a Soviet Embassy is usually not the Am- bassador but is the K.G.B. chief who could be anything from First Secretary to one of those lowly chauffeurs. There are other types of spy as well. Espionage these days is not confined to military affairs; industrial espionage and agents of influence are just as important. Mr. Cranley Onslow, Tory M.P. for Woking, is particularly concerned abobt the activities of the 71 Russian industrial inspec- tors who have privileged access to many sensitive aspects of British goods, systems and are sent over when a deal is concluded to supply Russia with British goods, systesm and machine tools. Their ostensible function is to train in the use of equipment and to keep quality controls on goods. They some- times live in industrial towns with daily access to the factories over periods of some months. Britain exported 010 million worth of machinery, transport equipment, textiles and other goods in 1975 and there are firm promises that trade between Bri- tain and Russia will move for- ward dramatically in the next ? few years. This means that inevitably there will be yet more factory inspectors coming to live and work here.. They are already in position in every aspect of British industry. They are at Vickers, which makes tanks and warships, they. are at the Swan Hunter ship- building firm, they are at the John Brawn Engineering works, they are at precision machine tool companies, computer labora- tories and chemical works. The companies involved are obviously aware of the dangers involved in their presence and take care to keep them away from secret areas, but as anyone who has worked in a large con- cern knows, it is only too easy for an inquiring mind to collect details of military, and industrial processes. Another equally important aspect of the modern spies' work is to act ,as an 'agent of influence a man ,Nho can drop into the pub for a pint and then not only report back what his workmates' attitudes are but can attempt both 'political and cultural sub- version. It is this aspect of an agent's work which the West finds so- difficult to Carry out in Moscow because of the barriers interposed between Western representatives and the Russian people. . An analysis of the Institute for the Study of Conflict points out that Soviet intelligence acti- vities are continually increasing. This fact emerged :from an exam- ination of the growth of official, Soviet representation in Western Europe. It has doubled since the early Sixties to well over 2.000 throughout Europe and that does not include the satellites. Professor Leonard Shapiro, Chairman of the Institute's COun- cil told us: "We have estimated that around half of those accre- dited as diplomats to N.A.TO. countries are usually engaged in intelligence operations of one kind or another. "Russia's policy of detente has, in fact increased, for the Kremlin, the importance of sub- version in the West. Apart from industrial and military spy- ing, the aim is to spread propa- ganda and sow disinformation. They are out to create a favour- able climate of opinion." Apart from the problem cre- ated by the sheer number and industry of the Russian agents legally operating in this country, our counter-espionage teams have the problem of the divided opinion which exists in the ? F-dreign Office about' what to do with spies when they are caught. There were many senior men in the F.0'. who were horrified when Lord Home brought off his mass expulsion and for a long time before that they had carried out a softly-softly policy. This policy was in accord with ' Sir Harold Wilson's own policy of pursuing detente with Russia during his early years in office before detente became fashionable. This was a situation which infuriated our hard-worked spy- catchers who more than once caught Russian spies red-handed and were forced to let them go in the interests of higher policy. They were especially furious when we gave back the Krogers, the expert man and wife spy team, in exchange for Gerald Brook who had got himself jailed for acting as an agent of an anti-communist emigre organisation. The Russians brutally mis- treated Brook to force us to give up the Krogers. We did so. It may have been the correct decision on humanitarian grounds. But it did no good to our counter-espionage agents who saw two of their prize catches being given back. It was the softly-softly pro- tagonists who won again over the question of expelling the Hungarians?and were promptly rewarded by a diplomatic clout round the ear from the Hun- garian government. There are in fact a number of intriguing aspects of this affair. The first is: what were they doing there in-the first place? For the Russians have an excel- lent spy-satellite system and undoubtedly have fine quality pictures of every brick of the Burghfield establishment taken from their Cosmos satellites. I Is it then the people who work in the factory who interest the Hungarians and' not the bricks and mortar or the shape of the chimneys? Or is there a John Le Carre twist and did the Russians ? send the Hungarians there : knowing that they would be Picked up?our own reporter was quickly questioned by a friendly but firm policeman last week?in order to hurt Anglo- Hungarian relations which have been steadily improving in recent months? And if the British authorities really wanted to keep the affair quiet precisely not to disturb this new relationship how did the story get out? Was it a proud local man anxious to claim credit? Was it a dis- gruntled spy-catcher trying to make sure that the Hungarians didn't get away with it? There are many juicy permu- tations to delight Le Carre fans, but the reality is deadly serious: Britain is under con- tinual attack by an army of Soviet agents, an army which, because of detente, is likely to grow rather than decrease, an army with a new headquarters planned ? surely with a con- scious irony ? for Millionaires' Row. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1' sondai.4-430:11..976 Tift tAgiiiNdtdri kist Twa, t ? By George W. Ball HAUNTING EUROPE today is a specter of .commun- ism less ectoplasmic and more substantial than the one conjuredup in the Communist Manifesto of 1848. On June 20 and 21 the Italian people may cast such a large vote . for. the Communist:Tarty as to Provide it. with. a. dominant :dominant place In in Italian coalition government; two. years from now a left-of-Center: majority with a Com- munist component- could force a cOnstitutionaL crisis in ; F? rance;: -Though the prospect 'disturbs the-chancellories of Eu- rope, it upsets Washington even more, creating nervous palpitations in the White House and deepening Henry Iiissinger's Spenglerian gloom. If Communists were to , participate in Western governments, "there would," he told a meeting of. our ambassadors, "be a shocking change in the established.patterns of American policy." It would, he implied, mean the effective end of NATO and ? according to a. State Department spokesman ? require the United States to "reassess" its policies to- ward Europe. In contrast to most Americans (and particularly to the secretary of state and his staff), many Europeans are in- tellectually reconciled to the prospect of Communists in the Italian government. Their more relaxed view of the prospect reflects the fact that the Communist Party has been a familiar feature of the Italian political' scene for many years. What hai.made its entry into government an immi- nent possibility is the coincidence of a number of fac- tors. Most important, no doubt, are the economic reces- ? sion and inflation, aggravated by the quadrupling of oil p- rices which has borne heavily on a country with almost no indigenous energy. In addition ? for America is by no means without blame ? our efforts to milk the thea- trical potential: of detex!e:. have helped give Western ommunista respectability and, led the Christian Demo- crats to-be less fearful of a dialogue with the Commun- ists. If the Presidentond. the secretary of state can hob- nob with Breziinev and his cronies on the television Screens of thoworld, What is- wrong with Italy sharing governmental power with the Communist leader, Enrico Berlinguer, and his colleagues, who are, after all, good Italians and ? at least in Berlinguer's case ? of distin- guished family? Such a conclusion would find little. support if, regard- less of the Communists, the Italian political structure were not already near collapse from decay and corrup- tion. To many Italians the Communists appear not as -conspirators seeking to seize control of the government, - but rather as the-only plausible alternative to the Chris- tian Democrat. and 'a few small:parties that no longer seem capable of running the country. "If we?had.nOt al- ready tried fascism and thus knew, how.: frightful that -was," an Italian friend recently told'ine, "that is .whefe we would be turning now - ? Musical Chairs: . THOUGH has had 37 governments in the past _. three decades, they have all been Christian Demo- cratic variations on the tawdry theme of power ? a few gray men playing monotonously at musical chairs. Mean- 'while, the locusts have eaten the years: Italian industry, the Christian Democrats, the Catholic Church ? all have failed W.:Adjust their parochial interests to the conflicts and pressures building up in a society marked by mas- sive economic and' social changes. Ball, a former under secretary of state, "is now a New York investment banker. His latest book is "Diplo- macy for a Crowded World." 31 ' During Italy's "economic miracle" in the 1950s and 1960s, the booming hid; instrial cities of the Piedmont and Lom- bardy attracted vast migration of.' young peasants from the bleak, rocky, farms of the Italiaii boot. Torn fronithe? tutelage of family and priest and,sub- jected-to the squalor of the slums, these ;young, migrants beeame easy prey to a Communist Party that filled a vacuum. ward bosses Assisted the green- horns during the great waves of Ameri- can immigration, the Communist Party provided a substitute for family and church, paternalistically helping work- ' ers find jobs and housing, organizing, festivals and arranging leisure activi- ties and, at the same time, conducting an incessant indoctrination. As a result, in the last regional elections, the Com- munists won 33.4 per cent of the vote, only 2 per cent less than the Christian" Democrats. Meanwhile, the' Church led the Chris-. tian Democrats into bitter and divisive controversies. Incited by the Vatican_ to. Oppose the modernization of Italy's, me- dieval divorce laws in 1974; the Chris- tian Democratic Party suffered -defeat_ , An a referendum. Today it faces an- other disaster over a similar issue, that of abortion. -With \ the Church discredited as its central defining element, the Christian Democratic Party has largely lost its identity. In addition, through. years of indulgence in shabby politics, the party has spawned an overgrown bureauc- racy quite incapable of collecting di? rect taxes, administering anti-inflation measures or imposing industrial discip- line on an anarchic labor force that is completely out of hand. The enfeebled Christian ,Democrats have had to rely on tacit Communist approval to stay in power, although the Communists them- . selves have been barred' from formal participation in government ever since 1947. ? The "Historic Compromise"' THE COMMUNISTS have their own thoughts about participation in government. Even if a Communist-So- cialist coalition had become mathemati- eally feasible, the Communists would have resisted coalition with only a small' majority. Atavistically sensitive to Mussolini's destruction of the grow- ing Communist Party in 1926 and the 'recent experience of the Allende gov- ernment. in Chile, Berlinguer and his colleagues fear that, without the ac- quiescence of a large segment of the electorate, their assumption of author- ity might trigger a right-wing reaction. To assure adequate support, and a sharing of the risks, Berlinguer has pro-- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 posed an all-embracing coalition gov- ernment to *include not only Commun- ists but Christian Democrats and Social- ists, an initiative he has called the "his- toric compromise." The concept is not new; it has been prevalent in Commun- ist circles under different labels Mike the days of Palmiro Togliatti, the par- ty's first post-war leader. But Berlin- * guer's personality has helped give the' proposal credibility. The scion of a Sardinian land-owning family, he is almost the antithesis of the 7 archetypal Communist thug. Present- ing himself as a patriotic Italian, he has professed 'acceptance of Italian partici- pation bath in NATO and the Common Market for the time being. He has from time to time spread the message that la- bor should work hard and has made the ultimate pledge to democratic prin- ciples by announcing support for "al- ternation," which means that, if voted out of office. the Communists would to the v.'11.1 ,-r.f parliament and the electorate and retire from power. Moreover, he has tried to. make clear that he would never, play the sedulous ape to the I.:carn out would conduct an Italian government in the interests of the Italian people. Though he has rejected Moscow's claim as world communism's 'leading center" and has repeatedly 'announced the independence of the Italian Com- munist Party, pressures on him to pup- port broad Soviet policies are obviously* great. Berlinguer himself has said that "there is no no-man's land in the great arena of the class struggle," and he has' added that, if it were not for "our un- breakable ties of, solidarity with Soviet, Aussie, the other Socialist states and the whole revolutionary working class of the world . . . we should lose our Identity as a Communist Party." He and his colleagues have left little doubt that they would support the So- viet proposal to trade off the liquida- tion of the Warsaw Pact for the liquida-. tion of NATO. They would almost cer- tainly oppose the continuing outlays necessary to maintain adequate NATO defenses and would make increasingly difficult the maintenance of American military bases and installations in Italy. (13,000 of our own fighting forces with 45,000 civilians are now stationed there.) One need notunderline the re- sultant impairment of effectiveness of the 6th Fleet in the Eastern Mediterra- nean, where American interests are vi- tally touched by the Arab-Israeli con- flict and the troubles between Greece and Turkey. A further, but rather desperate, as- sumption from which many Italians draw comfort is that, even if the Com- munist Party should achieve a role in government, it would tffl be only a mi- nority within a larger amalgam and, hence, could be kept in its place. But to argue, as some do, that Communist par- ticipation holds no peril because Italian Communist voters are not "real Corn- mutilate" quite misses the point. For the party's representatives in the,. goverf- ment would not be a gross-section of the Communist electorate but discip- lined professionals, rigidly committed to a party line and party, tactics. While the Communists might cultivate the ap- pearance of responsible behavior for a period of time, the apparatchiks could well use that period in an effort to fur- ther the spread of Communist control. But what of the widely held argu-. ment that the Communista are- needed to restore Italy's flagging economy? For a period they might, to be sure, try to arrange a respite from industrial. strife, since Berlinguer has himself sug- gested the need "to combat attitudes that negate the human and social need to work" and to restore "the competi- tivity" of Italian industry. This is be- guiling stuff for some Italian industrial- ists whose predecessors admired a man. who could make the trains run on time. Long-Term Goals v ET, EVEN though the Conunun- A ists might make a show of reliabil- ity for a brief period, that does not mean either that they could effectively control Italian workers over the long pull or that they would, be prepared to go very far down' that road. Italian la- bor today is the most militant in Eu- rope and within its ranks are strong extremist elements: 'Thus, if Commun- ist leaders within the Italian govern- ment acted to salvage the rapidly disin; tegrating Italian economy, it could well mean that, as the American journalist Claire Sterling has pointed out, Moscow itself might undertake to finance and ineite a more radical Communist fac- tion, since it dares not, risk a Western Communist party moving towards "bourgeois collaborationism" for fear of 'creating' deep disquiet among the uneasy Communist regimes in* Eastern 'Europe. . Still, even without the fear of their own left wing or of mischief from Mos- cow, Berlinguer and his company would not play a role of moderation very long. They are by no means mere "agrarian reformers" and the party has made its long-term objectives clear. It is committed, according to the party weekly Rinaacita, to bring about a radi- cal liquidation of the Christian Demo- cratic power structure, impose "pene- trating controls on the use of profits and investments" and employ a "new use of representative democracy" to bring about a "profound social trans- formation" leading to a "new social hi- erarchy" and the "hegemony_ of the working class." If retrograde groups. prove too "recalcitrant," Berlinguer has made clear that "we Communists will never be afraid to resort to the scalpel when needed." Thus, in spite -of all the fine talk of "the many roads to socialism" and of "humanist Marxism" ? which rejects the domination of the Party in favor of 32 "social self-aianagement" or "pluralist socialism" and would tolerate free de- bate and 'free access to information ? there is no reason to think that the Ital- ian COmmunist Party, once in power, would adopt such heresies. Berlinguer's professions of liberalism are clearly a tactic by. which power is to be gained; once it is achieved, they would be promptly jettisoned.' One has only to read the party's liter- ature carefully to note that every _ avowal of democratic purity has been regularly countered. by a reassuring message to the faithful that interprets or qualifies what has been said' to bring it into accord with Leninist orthodoxy. All such statements must, therefore, be understood for what they are intended to achieve. They are tactical moves to advance a relentlessly pursued' objec- tive; the dictatorship of the Italian state ' by the party which, as in the Soviet Un- ion and other Communist countries, is a totalitarian structure organized on. the principle of "democratic central- ism." There is no room for dissent in party procedures, no tolerance of oppo- sition -voices. Once the hierarchy has made a decision, further debate is ruled out and anyone who tries to or- ganize a dissident faction risks expul- sion. Nonetheless, public opinion is unpre- dictable, whether in America or Italy, and it would be a mistake to take it for granted that the forthcoming elections will necessarily show an increase in the Communist vote or that Communist participation in government is inevita- ble. Though some Italians may vote Communist in the conviction that the Communists are the wave of the future, some of my Italian friends who voted Communist in last June's regional elec- tions will, so they tell me, "hold their noses and vote for the Christian Demo- crats" when control of their country is at stake. It is, of course, possible that, if the Communists do pile up the largest vote, the Christian Democratic Party might split, with the party's left wing agree- ing to join the Communists and most of the Socialists and Social Democrats in a watered-down version of the "historic compromise." If, on the other hand, the Communist vote should be less than ex- pected, Berlinguer might prefer to stay out of the government, continuing to exercise a veto by private treaty with the Christian Democrats. In a situation with so many varia- bles, American policy should be subtle, flexible and realistic. Instead, our ap- proach to the problem so far has been distressingly haphazard. To be sure, the secretary of state has announced that we would regard the entry of Commun- ists into the Italian government as "un- acceptable," but that sounds as though* America were Queen Victoria rebuking the lower classes. To reject as "unac- ceptable" an event we can only margin- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 Apkoved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 Talliaffect is -a kind of diploniacy of the absurd we have tended to practice all -too'frequently in recent months. Nor was Kissinger any, better advised ? when he said ominously; "If Commun- ists should 'enter European govern- ments, the political 'solidarity of the .West, and thus NATO, would he Inevit- ably weakened, if not underinined . . . And in this Country, the commitment , of the American- people to maintaiathe ? balance of power in Europe'. . . would lack. the ? moral base on which it has stood for .30 years." , Earlier, in his. . speech to American, ambassadors, he- had slated that "it is Inconceivable that . ' the ..United States could maintain , ground forces In Europe if there is.mcv: ; jor Communist participation in West- ? . 'ern governments." .(-- - , ? Preiumably, Kissinger hoped that, by pointing to America's anxieties, he ,would deter some Italians wha_might otherwise vote for the Communists, but ? on balance the effect of these messages was probably adverse. Some Europeans - have interpreted the secretary's state- ments as further evidence of the unre- liability of American, security commit- ? ments. Others resented them as an ef- fort to meddle in European internal af- fairs. To_Communist, leaders, Kissinger's Concern about the ?diiiiiiegration ? NATO and the. _dimMished American role-in Europe could only be taken as a - spur to action, since the removal of the United States from Europe has long been a central" objective of .Kremlin strategy. Thus, by assuring the Com- munists that their entry into European' ? governments would do the trick, we showed them the way to their heart's desire. ? ? However, though warnings based on threats to Europe's Security probably did. more harm than- good, the Italian people should still be put on notice that Communist entry into government would jeopardize their- economic well- being. To be effective, such a warning should come -from Italy's European neighbors rather than , the United States, though it should be part of a co- ordinated strategy. Unfortunately, the habit of coordination has largely atro- phied during recent years of American unilateralism. And in this case ? ap- parently with no transtAtlantic consult- . ation ? the secretary of state has by. his solemn finger-shaking elicited an angryriposte from German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. Thus, instead of a Con- certed strategy, as a'result of our go-it- ' alone policy we have produced bicker- ing among Italy's friends that could t only encourage the Communists. . Today the member nations of the Eu- ropean- EcOnomic Community are in a t position to send theirsiellow member, a Italy, a clear, forceful message. Al? c though the member states of the Corn- ? t munity cannot tell the Italian people how to cast their votes, they can, and C should, make clear what would happen s if the inclusion of Communists in the r government were to lead to anti-deni cratk political measures or to some- . thing approaching' a centralized, regi- mented economy. ? After all, the treaty of Rome -explic itly states that the Community is dedi- cated' to strengthening the ."safeguards ? of ,.peace. and liberty" aiid-,the whole ??:fiinction of. the Common Market as- sumes the free _movement Of the fac- tors of production. -, . -` . Action to head off a Communist take- over should not, however, be confined tO 'threats of economic sanctions. Within the structure. of the Community a complex network of relationships transcends national line& ? -relations among, members. of. different profes- - slow; relations among political parties . and politicians, relations among scien- tists, farmers and industralists. Now is the time for the Community to use its Influence and resources to help rebuild an effective counterforce to the Italian 'Communists. Certainly, the Community'. has much to offer ? such as a more liberal treat- ment of Italy's agricultural produCts, .development funds for the underdevel- oped south and credits through the _ Community's newly developed special lending 'authority. But, most of , all, there must be an urgent dialogue be- tween the center parties of the Com- munity nations and the Christian Dem- ocrats to provide advice and encour- agement and help heal the parochial di- visions that prevent common action.. ? The French and German govern- ments showed their effectiveness within a European framework by bols- tering Mario Soares and the Portuguese Socialists; now,, by Concerted action within the framework of the EEC, they might well slow the drift in Italy, par- ' ticulany if the effort took the form of affirmative help as well as negative threat ? This is dearly a case where America Should do everything possible to de- velop a concerted strategy with its Western allies; while contenting itself, for once, with a silent supporting role. Clearly, the EEC has the capability of' reducing the level of economic activity` In Italy seriously by a whole range of devices ? from imposing restrictions on agricultural imports to stopping the flow of' regional assistance funds. As the ultimate sanction, the other mem- bers could expel Italy from the Corn- munity. The extent, if any, to which measures of this kind should be taken presents serious- philosophical and moral ques- ions. Few would argue that the mere inclusion of Communists in the Italian oy_or_nment_ should, by itself, he occasion for economic actions gainst Italy, but the EEC member ountries should ,make it known that hey are holding a watching brief. If it hould once become clear that the ommunists were systematically de- troying democratic institutions and egimenting the Italian economy in vio- RitIon ofthe Orinciples orlhe Ceinimon.: Market, the question would assume a different. aspect' 'It would not be \ whether the EEC countries should pen- - alize 'a Member nation that elected 'Communist leaders. by- its .own demo- cratic.processes, but rather whether sanctiona-should be used? to prevent, the destruction of democracy by the tradi- tional nietliodslof communism ? sub- version, intimidation and conspiracy. , The secretary of state made a tactical blunder ,when, without, consultation with our Principal allies.who are much closer to 'the situation than ,We, he an- nounced that the entry of Communists into a European' :government &mid ? jeopardize the Whole structure of At- lantic"security arrangement. Hei also ignored both logic and experience when he contended that such an event ? in one country will "be likely to pro- duce a sequence of events in which ,other Etiropean countries will also be -tempted to move in the same direc- tion." No Dominoes HAT,.IN FACT, would happen-if ? the Communists should join -an Italian coalition government? Even the - prospect of that event has already trig- gered a mass capital flight; its actual oc- '.curience would mean the exodus not only of Capital but of many of Italy's leading financial and industrial figures. Investment would dry up; multina- tional 'companies Would try to extricate themselves from their Italian commit- ments, even at the cost of closing plants and increasing unemployment. The Italian government would be forced to impose tight defensive controls. If the EEC were to? take no action under the , "mutual - help" provisions of the Rome Treaty,- and if the EEC nations, to- gether with the United States, failed to support a rescue operation through the International Mbnetary Fund, Italy could quickly find herself in a severe financial panic, with mounting infla- tion, labor strife and increased unem- ployment. Faced with a financial panic, the Communists in government would almost certainly opt for repressive mea7 sures, that would unequivocally disClose their antidemocratic instincts. Far from inducing other European states to follow Italy's lead, the result- ing uproar might rather be expected to induce a sense of fear and revulsion. If . it were clear that Italy was on the way' to isolating itself from the rest of Eu- rope, communism for other European countries could rapidly lose its appeal. Certainly, one might expect such a reaction in France, where the situation sharply differs from that of Italy. In France the economy is basically healthy; the government, while experi- encing troubles, is still strongly in com- mand, and the Communists are a mi- nority of only one-fifth kept in check by a rapidly growing Socialist Party that commands 27 per cent of the vote and is strongly led by Francois Mitter- 33 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 rand, an ambitious and effective politi- cian. By 'contrast, Georges Marchals, the French Communist leader, is an unpo- pular party wheelhorse, an, ex-Stalinist now engaged in. a political. St. Vitus dance, recanting traditional Commun- ist principles and loudly shouting halle- lujah as he totters down the sawdust trail toward democratic redemption. Repudiating the dictatorship of the proletariat, he expresses shock at inter- nal repression in the Soviet Union. An- nouncing his devotion to "pluralism," to "alternation" and to all the civil rights of a free society, he is. more a - comic figure than .a persuasive convert to democratic principles. Nor are events phased favorably for the French Commimists, since they will probably have no chance to join a French government 'prior to the parlia- mentary elections of 1978. By then, with any luck, the French economy will be ticking over. more rapidly, anent-. ployment . will have , declined and the Italian experience may have been ab- sorbed for good or evil.. To be ' sure, unexpected develop- ments could radically change the sequ- ence of events. The most disturbing might well be the passing of the Tito re- , girlie in Yugoslavia or some serious out- ' break of violence in Spain. Of these two,' the Kremlin's meddling in a post- -Tito Yugoslavia could have the most di- rect and, explosive- consequences, and it - is an imponderable that cannot be over- looked in charting the evolution of Eu- ropean politics. 'Although the Red Ar- my's entry irito Yugoslavia without a , fight is improbable ? no matter how THE NEW YORK TIMES, SATURDAY MAY 29, 1976 is Losing the Edge national support, habits and dogmas of the major contributing partners.' We worry immensely about the quan- titative superiority of Warsaw Pact' tank forces yet there are 30 different types -of antitank missiles in NATO- when five suffice; (2) seven types' of inventories.: .. ? . ? , aircraft, Six types of recoilless. rifles, The restating proliferation* of cow 1 'four types Of wire-guided antitank . fusion, duplicated research and financ- mortars'.., weapons, three types each of ? ' :ng, overburdened :support systems: rifles and machine guns in the small and -doctrinal assumptions on how to use which weapons greatly hampers . development of a -rational . defense force. And, Dr. Tucker says: "W. ,411??????011, ems, . . 1 .d.hur PARIS?The North Atlantic alliance,. whose ministers 'nave just l'i-isheci meeting in Oslo, is not only in a con- dition of political anxiety but its milltary forces increasingly reflect the failure of any sensible arms standardi- zation to evolve. As a result, the im- pressive economic-industrial base and qualitative technological -advantages of ,the coalition over the Soviet- dominated Warsaw Pact have to a d extent faded away. Becauae ;of nationalistic rivalries among the Western `allies, comp.etitiort in developing their individual ordnance industries to seek. export markets causes needless overlain. And a fail- ure by NATO itself. to ,agree on basic requirements for such things as air- craft missions, antitanIZ and anti- aircraft defense, needs, leaves the alliance with a costly hodgepOdge of far too many types of equipment. The political Will needed 'to harmo nize this situation is latking: Yet almost every partner agrees that hunk dreds of millions" of dollars could be. saved with proper .rationalization of the Atlantic arms industries and that more and better equipment could thus . be made available for less money., A comprehensive draft study of this situation has been prepared for the Atlantic Institute by Dr. :Gardiner Tucker, former Assistant Secretary :General of- NATO. In the .study's pre- liminary version, Dr: Tucker deplores "extreme duplication of effort with different countries performing similar research, carrying out parallel devel- opments of, essentially equivalent weapon systems." The resulting waste -of. resources, he says,. has allowed the Soviet bloc to close the qualitative, gap' in many weapons and. pull ahead of the West in others. Moreover, 'proliferatiOn has seriously degraded the capability of our forces to operate together or to - supply one another." ? As examples of this he cites: (1) 31 different types of antitank weapons well contrived the pretense of an invi- tation by some dissident group ? the 'possibility of a dominant Kremlin influ- ence in Yugoslav- affairs is a haunting nightmare for the West. Given the geo- graphic factor, Yugoslavia's continued independence of the Kremlin is of par- ticular concern to all Italians ? Com-' munist and non-Communist alike. It is well that Kissinger has taken note of -this possibility and warned the Soviets that America would regard any interference in Yugoslavia with great concern. But here again a strong case could be made for a concerted warning to be given through NATO itself. For, though technically' outside the NATO defense area, a Yugoslavia independent of the Kremlin is a significant factor in the European power balance. It is one the West dare not neglect. FOREIGN AFFAIRS By C. L. Sulzberger ? (5,000-man),Ace Mobile Force -(A.M.F.) Sreated for deployment t?ci crisis 'areas. . ? ? ? - ? The latter profusion means each of' .A,Ael.F.'s seven national units must i ? - "As modern weapons systems may., maintain its own, logistic services and. more' require a decade. or fthm the' it takes more then twice the necessary initiation of development to full de- ? einefgency time to deploy. Likewise. ployment, and as weapons once intro- NATO's standing naval force in ? the -duced. may remain in the 'active, Channel and Atlantic lacks common inventories for one to three decades,.. . frequencies for data transmiasion and standardization can only come slowly' standard systems of identification of eyen when the objective is fully sup- friend and foe. Half the "so-called "friendly" planes shot down in a re- ported." cent :maneuver were "destroyed" by their own side's weapons. - - - The evidence assembled by Dr. Although the alliance has at last Tucker is deeply disturbing. Al.- standardized fuel for its tactical air- though the population of the North -craft, the nozzles which inject it are Atlantic partners, their wealth and still different. NATO navies possess _their industrial capacity considerably. 100 :-varying types of ships from ? exceed those of ,Waraa* Pact. mem ? destroyer-size up,. 36 types of radar bers, they lag, far behind in the for fire-control, 40 'different types of quantitative forces, maintained by the :gun larger than-30-catiber, Therefore two. bloca,., especially in the size of nearly 40 types of ammunition must conventional armies and numbers of. be manufactured for and distributed to an allied flotilla. In no sense are the. alliance's tanks and artillerY:pieces. But time and again Western Poily- annas have soothed worriers with the forces today interoperable. Each de- assurance that the Atlantic altianCe's ' pends to an unhealthy degree on 'the' smallei. armies; based 'either on volun- teers or short-term conscripts, are better-trained and motivated than 'Proliferation has those of the sullen reluctant- East; also that our well-known tochr.c::4,-!::.,. ? superiority gives us an immense quali- seriously degraded the capability of our forces to operate together.' 34 tative edge. The, first assumption is at best dubious. The second is rapidly becom- ing untrue. And the Western partners have no one .but themselves to blame. All they must do is demonstrate the political sense to use their talents more 4.1-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 _Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 piaim June11, 1976 THE TASITINGTON POST-- -- ":),? . .: ..., -. ? : . .. . .,----..Ply- Robin Wright ..-- ' . I spent 'four &tie with. the. Ian," the war name of CY- avecla to The Wosklington Post . mercenaries in, Sari AntOsno rus-born Costes Georghiou. IfISBON, June 16.?"The ' do -Zaire in early February. One MPLA . official even Americans, they are- nothing. One Of them,'.Derek Barker ' congratulated' me on the We are not .out to get of Aldershot, , . England, is story 'shortly after my ar. , them, only the people who, among the _13 going on trial rival June 1: sent thenvin." ? , i . Fric!Ay?''' ' ' 'i - - -, ', - There was never any at ' In saying this Ruf Mon- ' 'It gives special, credibil- ' tempt to harm me bodily. I teiro, Angolan 'prosecutor' ity to.. the -evidence tit, hear' was allowed a meal from the for the trial of 13 foreign from:-..a. ,Western journalist- ? Tropic? Hotel, for which I mercenaries in Luanda, ze- who. Sew them ,in action,"*?:? had to pay. I was even al- red in on- the government -the statd prosecutor ex.! lowed to call my parents in purpose in holding the Arial; plained during .ene of threeci' Michigan when I expressed ' which' has become a media interviews. when he. de- concern about how the news event in Angola, even over- mended my testimony. ?.; of my detention would at- shadowing coverage? of the': ...lerefused,.pn grounds that fect thy father's heart condi- new nation's first 'election' I-Went to, Angola as a jour- ? tion,' I was expelled early two weeks from now. , nalist, not as a participant, this morning. The real "verdict" at the and that it would break the The best explanation for end of the tribunal is ex- 'journalists' code of profes- the action may have come pected to be a strong warn- sional ethics to get involved from the MPLA army com- ing to Western powers?is- in an event I was covering. L mander who escorted me to sued in the hame of all-new added- that all the informa-- the airport?and who led - and ; Vrogrestlivel!.' goy:ern:7', titer t".had was ? published the attack on San Antonio meritp?that. they ban no , and on- public record. do Zaire. , longer expect-to be: able - en Tuesday, four days af. . This trial is very- itapor- .:?.,ter thethird interView I Was ,__ tent to. us and our progr sympathizers- through Mill- . ,arrested and detained for 28 restive "iillies,!' 'he- said, '4At Promete tb4iir .,,eyetents , or , tary involVenynt and merce; hours by the ecret police;._ the, Mose' ,irespOrtant time,. nary :troops. - ? , ? :-...- -..,., or DISA, who tried to intim- , ? whinbig we are trying, that theY to tell .. , ., The 13 'mercenaries, ' iii: ..: idate me into. giiing ..,_ testi-, .,. , ea : . the poWers ' .'. eluding. three. 'Americank_i pony. rough Joni- .._ - .. - . -, ..- unit foret new nations i..their ways on were captured in the last--:=_4.--- The DISA -official Who in-% ?th , taryt.aid to: our enemies nr 'm i -days of the Angolan civit;'' "terrogated e for ,', four mereonaries _ to war Which-pitted the pro-So. hours yesterday.-used sex, ou. refuseek i 'viet:-PoPular Movement for . - aril tattles- tO Oen* weakens our -ease agree. . to help verify the faeti." ? - ....- ?,, ' s.,: - , the Liberation of: , Angola reent.--At first, h,i- said i- rt -- . the -''iii the trying eyeett the ""e we "" 'unlit 't. ., against" . two pro-Western government was stiii gonsid'...?,. -, re groups.. As to the Amer- . ening pressing - charges- . a; help us tell te-sentA message i cans, Monteiro _said, -"They ,. against me frit being with - . lryta.Won't -j the, truth, we :ean't let you -i were there-only- a few days the mercenaries and that ..., .., . . :. an committed no atrocities. theybelieved ,T .Was ? an _, :r ka m centering -tfr O messagessage was dear: - - star One is it baby." Technieally Ather-ican intelligence agent. Far" all are ;.threatened with I could -bargain . Nile c r im f n al. charges ori spe-- - - He stlid death sentences. _ ? .... for my freedom only by tea; ; : against 13 -individuals, the- ' Perhaps the most ominous_ tifying. I- refused: r ,: trial will pointedly focus on sign of the tone of the event - He also said-! would be"mercenarismforeign in- is the :official attitude _to,-., -released if I agreed to-' pro...L.- tervention. It will be a poli- ward the foreign press-, videregnlar intelligence re- tical trial, Almeida admitted' , London: Deily ;Telegraph porta to his office pa devel- this week, "with a message, i reporter Gerald Kemp was opments in' the United '; your people should listen' ..ri . officially reprimanded ' by States and the southern At- to". -'- ' . '. 1 Angolan Director ef Infor- rican countries I Over. I re- IOW agencies reported 'melon Luis . de Almeidai fused. ' ? `, , - these other, deeettirtents: Yesterday, for an editorial.- .; The official,. who would- - ? Cuban Prime Minister Fi- his paper ran on the trial. . not divulge his name, then- ' del CaStro, welcomed a unit - -; The authorities reeent eaY Said he would let Me see the of about 100 Cubans return- charges that the tribunal ? entire seven Yoh:Ones of, eVi-- .?ing.from Angola, the "Yugo- will be a "show" affair.. - a ...ence if I. agreed to verify slay" news agency tanjug re- They have struggled to give :.the material with - which I- ported. Castro said Sunday it legitimacy by' inviting the ,...: :...was familiar. I refused: agairit:, " eight that Cuba was gracitt- foreign press to attend, --al.; : At that .poirit he abruptly-- ally withdrawing its forces 'lowing an American lawyer _. left the room without telling from 'Angola. .to defend two of the merce- me my status or how much ?. In Brussels, 'U.S.' Defense ? naries and British official longer i would be detained.Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to Witness the trial, and by Before my return to said at a meeting at NATO establishing an international Luanda, officials of the vic- defense ministers that there . eomniission of inquiry to ob- torious Popular lgovenient was no concrete evidence serve. the event and after- for the Liberation were ? yet of any significant Cuban ward Write a report on the aware that I had reported withdrawals ;from Angola. "Mercenary phencimenon." from the north en the al- Five other ministers, citing The government asked me leged execution of 14 British' their own intelligence re- to testify at the trial about mercenaries ' by thercenary ports, concurred in Rums- information I obtained when commander "Colonel Cal- feid's assessment. ; - Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 East Asia FOREIGN POLICY Number 23 Summer 1976 ?MESE POLlTiCS AND A\11-4,RIC4:\ POLICY: A NEW LOOK AT THE TRIANGLE by Roger Glenn Brown The triangular relationship between the United States, the Soviet Union, and China remains at the very heart of the foreign pot-- icy calculations of each country. But at least in the case of China, according to the fol- lowing article, that relationship also plays a critical role in the internal power struggle. The author, a senior analyst at the CIA who is presenting his own views and not an official position of his organization, traces the complex interrelationship between do- mestic politics and foreign policy in the formative period between 1968 and 1972 when the contours of the Sino-Soviet-U.S. triangle began to emerge. His analysis focus- es on two major turning points which are still only dimly understood: the 1969 bor- der crisis with the Soviet Union, and the fall of Defense Minister Lin Piao and most of China's top military leaders in 1971. He uses the insight gained to offer perspective on the unexpected eclipse of Teng Hsiao- ping earlier this year and to forecast in gen- eral terms the direction China's foreign pol- icy will now take. The author's conclusions carry major im- plications for American foreign policy. They suggest that our present relationship with Peking may not be stable enough to survive the intensified power struggle which is like- ly to follow Mao's death. Time becomes more important, and hard chokes on the status of Taiwan and relations with the So- viet Union become more urgent. Even if this presidential election year sees no move- ment in Sino-U.S. relations, 1977 is almost certain to become a year of decision. ?The Editors. On March 2. 1969 an unusual incident occurred on the frozen Ussuri river near the desolate island which the Chinese call Chen- pao and the Soviets call Damansky. On nu- merous occasions since the early 1960s. there had been periodic nonshooting skirmishes in this and other areas along the disputed 40 Sino-Soviet border. On March 2, 1969, for the first time, Chinese soldiers opened fire on a Soviet patrol, killing 7 soldiers and wounding 23. On March 15, the Soviets retaliated with a full-scale military engage- ment in the same area during which hun- dreds of troops on both sides were killed and injured. Following these conventional military exchanges, Soviet spokesmen hint- ed in a number of forums that a nuclear at- tack on China might become necessary. By August 1969, the situation had deteriorated so badly that some Western observers were convinced that war was inevitable in the near term. In short, the events of 1969 marked the most serious crisis in the entire history of Sino-Soviet relations. The Role of Internal Politics The 1969 crisis has always been difficult to explain. On the face of it, the Chinese at- tack at Chen-pao seemed irrational. Why should Peking risk even local hostilities with the Soviets to assert an historical claim to a useless island? And if Peking's goal was to demonstrate that China could not be pushed around, then why was an area chosen where Soviet troops were heavily concentrated and, as the March 15 clash showed, quite capa- ble of humiliating the Chinese in pitched local battles? Most critically, why would China's leaders want to plunge into a foreign policy crisis when they were in fact prepar- ing for a major domestic political event: the Ninth Parry Congress which opened in early April?' Perhaps no completely satisfying explana- tion of the origins of the crisis will ever emerge, but a good case can be made that the initial Chinese attack on the Soviets was the outcome of intense political infighting with- in China. bcith over who would set Chinese policy and whether Peking should execute a major departure in its foi ergo policy by lin- pi-ovin; relations with the United States. l'or sorrh: years prior to the crisis, radical elements in the Chinese Communist party had been dominant in China, and foreign policy had been characterized by a xenopho- bia which had left Peking isolated interna- tionally. During 1968. however, a number of events, including the opening of the Paris peace talks on Vietnam, the Soviet: in- vasion of Czechoslovakia and the election of a new American president. gave more pragmatic Chinese leaders a chance to argue Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1' for a shift in Chinese policy toward an opening to the United States. prolonged stagnation in Sino- U.S. relations could well contrib- ute to undermining the political power of those individuals and groups within China which are fa- vorably disposed toward. Washing- ton. . ? ." In the fall of 1965, Premier Chou, En-I4 convinced Chairman Mao Tse-tung to move in this direction, but this decision was ap- parently reversed in February 1969 because of intense opposition from Chines mili- tary establishment and radical leaders like Chiang Ching and Yao Wen-yuan who had gained prominence during the Cultural Rev- olution.' The radicals opposed the opening for ideological reasons: Defense Minister Lin Piao and the military opposed it because it would have been a triumph for Lin's princi- pal rival. Chou. and because they wanted to leave the door open for improved relations with Moscow. In retrospect, it appears that Mao and Chou were reversed on an initia- tive in which they had invested considerable prestige, and, given the advances made by Lin just two months later at the Ninth Party Congress at the expense of pragma- tists and radicals, one can make a case that both Mao and Chou were in a precarious political position in early 1969. Under these circumstances, a clash with the Soviets would serve the interests of Mao and Chou in a number of areas. Most impor- tant, it would be a strong reassertion of Mao's personal authority following the Feb- ruary setback on U.S. policy and the trend toward greater power for Lin and the mili- tary. Second, it would be a setback for those within China, like Lin and his supporters, who were arguing that Sino-Soviet relations should be improved. Third, the resultant increase in Sino-Soviet tension would pro- vide dramatic justification for a future open- ing to the United States. In short, it would serve both the foreign policy and domestic political purposes of these key Chinese deci- sion-makers. This line of explanation, however, raises some very difficult questions. If Lin and his supporters on the politburo had been strong enough to reverse Mao and Chou on the question of the first steps toward the open- ing to the United States, why would they not have had enough clout to prevent mili- tary action which was not in their best in- For details or) this period and a similar argument. see Rnbert W. Sutter. -Toward Sino-Americare Reconcilia- tio:1- (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Harvard Uni- versi(y, 1975). . 41 terests? Moreover, since Lin was in charge of the defense bureaucracy, how could a de- cision requiring a military action be taken without his approval? While it is possible that Mao and Chou confronted Lin directly on this decision and simply ordered him to take steps to imple- ment it, it seems more likely, given the inter- nal political situation, that they pursued their goals by circumventing the normal chain of command and directly ordered Chen Hsi-lien, commander of the Shenyang mili- tary region, to attack. the Soviets. Because Chen.'s own personal ambitions were well served by an increase in tension on the Sino- Soviet border, it is likely that he would have obeyed an order from Mao, even at the risk of involving himself directly in the internal power struggle in Peking." In retrospect, it appears that the attack was not carefully planned by China's central defense establish- ment, but, instead, was arranged on short notice and executed without the knowledge of higher military authorities in Peking. CC. . . Washington should consider recognizing Peking before the aged chairman leaves the scene in the hope that this might influence . . . the succession struggle. . This interpretation of the March 2 clash, in short, has Mao and Chou acting hastily for highly political reasons rather than mak- ing a rational and detached determination of what China's national interests required. That they were prepared to risk the death of hundreds of Chinese soldiers. and even war with the Soviet Union, is thus a measure not only of bow high they calculated the stakes in the internal power struggle. but also of how badly they wanted to discredit those within China who opposed the opening to the United States. Certainly the message that Mao could count on the loyalty of China's second most powerful military regional com- mander would not be lost on Lin in the continuing power struggle. While there were ups and downs in Chi- nese propaganda throughout the remainder of 1969. tension in Sino-Soviet relations re- mained high. Nationwide demonstrations began the day after the clash, and by March 7 over 200 million Chinese had participat- ed in mass rallies denouncing Soviet revision- ism and vowing vigilance along the border. The intended impact on the domestic rivals of Mao and Chou was unmistakable. Anti- Soviet sentiment was strong among the Chi- ? Chen Hsi-lien was sabsequently made a commander of the crucial Peking rn:litary region. was named a vice premier in 1975, and is a key figure in the succession struggle now underway. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 nese people and an) one favoring lessened tension with Moscow was treading on very unpopular gro,.incl. Nloreover. the Chinese continued. aggressive border patrolling until August when the Soviets responded by drop- ping veiled hints about a possible nuclear strike. The crisis atmosphere reinforced the position of the Chinese pragmatists who were receptive to the overtures for improved Sino-U.S. relations which were coming out of Washington. In what was almost certainly a compro- mise between the pragmatists and their op- ponents, the Chinese agreed in October to open negotiations on the border dispute with Moscow, and then in January 1970 an- nounced they would be willing to resched- ule the aborted February 1969 Warsaw talks with the United States. While it quickly be- came apparent that they were not taking the Sino-Soviet border talks seriously, the Chi- nese tried to keep up momentum in relations with the United States by meeting in War-. saw in February 1970 and then scheduling another session of the bilateral talks for May 1970. Thus, the policy of an opening to the United States wcis well served by the March 2 crisis: though, as discussed below, Lin's drive to expand his power and influ- ence in party affairs was not derailed but only slowed. In this context, the Sino-So- viet clash of March 1969 was a prelude to the decisive confrontation between the prag- matists and the military which came to a crisis two years later. Watershed: The Fall of Lin Piao By almost all surface criteria, Lin won a stunning victory at the Ninth Parry Con- gress, primarily at the expense of Chou. Chou's power base was in the governmental bureaucracies, and of the six men drawn from this sector on the politburo in 1968, all but two, Chou and Li I-Isien-nien, lost their positions at the Congress. Eleven mili- tary men were added to the politburo, a majority of whom were apparently Lin sup- porters. Lin's close ally Chen Po-ta was added to the crucial Standing Committee of :he pc,litburo, and, more importantly, the C:ongrcss formally adopted a nels- constitu- tion designating Lin as Mao's suc.cessor. Lin, it appeared, was well on his v:ay to supreme power within China. Anc! yet, just over two years later, China's most powerful. de- G.nse minister had fallen from office follow- ing an intense and ultimately violent strug- gle within the Chinese leadership." Lin's fall was far more than the purging of a single individual. It was preceded by an elaborate conspiracy against Mao that in- volved a large number of individuals and was followed by a purge of virtually all of China's ranking central military leaders. In 42 retrospect, the Lin Piao affair represented a crisis stage in the struggle for power between the pragmatists and elements of the military that had been under way since the Winding down of the Cultural Revolution in 1968. In relative terms, the radicals played only a marginal role. Many previous explanations of the Lin Piao crisis have played down the role of foreign policy issues.4 In contrast, I believe that these issues and, more specifically, their effect on resource allocation and the bamce of power between the pragmatists and the military, are central to explaining the events that preceded Lin's abortive 1971 coup. In brief. Lin appears to have consisz.-.;:ttly opposed any steps toward rapproclae:nent with the United States throughout 1969 and 1970. He apparently seized on the U.S. invasion of Cambodia in the spring of 1970 to persuade Mao both to cancel the sched- uled Sino-U.S. talks in Warsaw and to make a series of reconciliatory gestures toward Moscow. This shift in China's foreign policy was reversed following the Second Plenum of the Ninth Party Congress in August 1970, when the balance of internal political forces began to tilt against Lin. New and authori- tative anti-Soviet pronouncements were made and an ideological justification for im- proved relations with the United States was endorsed publicly by high foreign ministry officials!' By December 1970, Mao felt strong enough to extend the historic invita- tion to President Nixon. By early 1971, Lin and his military sup- porters were faced not only with rapid prog- ress in Sino-U.S. relations, but also with an- other major foreign policy change: improv- ing relations with Japan, a nation that vir- tually all Chinese military men looked upon as an historic enemy and as a potentially very powerful future enemy. This issue, also, was hotly debated by the Chinese leadership. Policy Issues and Power At a critical point in any policy debate between leaders at the pinnacle of power, differences over issues become so intense that it is not the policy itself which is para- mount, but rather the authority, power, and influence of the leader advocating the policy. And at this juncture, the debate over policy is transformed into a struggle for who will hold the ultimate power to decide the issue. Debates over foreign policy issues occur fre- By far the best analysis of the changing balance of Forces within China at this time may be found in Doak Barnet's outstanding study, Uncertain Passage (Wash- ington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974). See, for example, Philip Bridgham, "The Felt of Lin Pia," China Quarterly, July/September 1973. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 APproved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-I quently in China; but if one opposes a whole series of decisions, one becomes a prime candidate for being stripped of all ;ower and purged from the party and gov- ernment. In this context. the key question is not whether Lin opposed the openings to the United States and to Japan, but tchti he judged these issues important enough to risk strong and repeated opposition to policy that clearly had the approval of Mao him- self. Part of the answer to this question lies in the rivalry between Lin. and Chou. Very early in the protracted debate over policy toward the United States and the Soviet Union. Lin put his prestige on the line and argued that the United States would remain deeply involved militarily in Asia and would therefore remain a principal enemy of China. Chou made a different estimate which even- tually proved correct. Lin also probably ar- gued that in the proper circumstances MOS- cow would be willing to make a significant move to decrease Sino-Soviet tension and that this option should be explored. Chou countered that Moscow would offer only unsatisfactory gestures: and in this, also, events proved him right. So in policy de- bate after policy debate, a certain dynamic propelled both Lin and Chou to attack each other, in order to discredit the policy-maker as well as the policy. The roots of Lin's intransigent position. however. probably lie even deeper: He and his supporters realized that the power they had attained, as well as the even more ex- alted status they were seeking. were jeopar- dized by the implications of the policies ad- vocated by their rivals, the pragmatists. The increased sense of security that would grow out of improved relations with Japan and with a nuclear power like the United States, Lin and his supporters reasoned, would lead to pressures for smaller military expen- ditures, especially in the areas they believed to be critical?nuclear weapons, missiles, and aircraft. Their influence and authority would also decline. Thus, rather than see their power drained away by the pragma- tists' program. Lin and his supporters first A major doctrinal departure was apparent in a No- vember speech by Chou's close associate Chic.? Kuan- hua, now China's foreign minister. Chiao reformulat- ed and expanded the concept of peaceful coexistence by stating that it applied to relations between "all coun- tries whether they had the same or different social sys- tems." This contrasted sharply with the precious au- thoritative statement on the subject made by Lin at the Ninth Party Congress. Lin at that time had made an important distinction between the principles to be applied to capitalist and socialist countries, stating that the former should be dealt with on the basis of peace- ful coexistence while relations with the latter should follow the principle of "proletarian internationalism." Chiao's statement marked a clear and unambiguous shift away from an ideologically based foreign policy to one emphasizing state-to-state relations, and there- by constituted a major victory for the pragmatists. 43 opposed this program at every possible junc- ture. and, when this failed, attempted to seize power. This attempted coup lead to Lin's death when the plane in which he was escaping to the Soviet Union crashed. The Politics of Resource Allocation Discussion of the parameters of China's Fourth Five Year Plan (1971-1975) began in late 1970 and continued after Lin's death in late 1971. Allocation of China's scarce. resources was a subject of much de- bate?a debate which inevitably became en- tangled with the foreign policy issues. Like many policy debates within China, this one found its way into the media, though in slightly disguised form. Through- out the summer of 1971. numerous articles in People's Daily as well as some Radio Peking broadcasts focused attention on the problem of whether "electronics- or -steel and iron- development should be given pri- ority. An article that appeared in People's Daily in June argued that one group of -po- litical swindlers- within China (i.e.. Lin and his group) saw "atomic technology and jet engine technology" (i.e., electronics) as the key to enhancing China's power and status in world affairs. A Radio Peking broadcast on August 20 was even more pointed. It charged that the same group of "swindlers- believed that advanced weap- ons were the "key to victory," and that. once China possessed them, "all imperialists will be finished and overthrown." Significantly, these views were sharply contrasted with those of Mao, who was quoted as condemn- ing any strategy premised on the concept that "weapons decide everything." Recent intelligence studies on expendi- tures for procurement of new military equip- ment bear out this interpretation! Indeed, the rise and fall of the influence of Lin's military coalition is starkly reflected in the statistics presented in these studies. During the period when Lin and the miliary were n an ascendant position?roughly from 1968 until the end of 197 I --rn Rita ry spending on procurement in all fields in- creased dramatically, with a growing pro- portion going to aircraft and missiles com- bined. Following Lin's fall from power in 1971, while amounts expended for procure- ment of land arms and naval forces declined only slightly. expenditures on new aircraft and missiles fell dramatically. In overall terms, the reallocation of resources is shown by the fact that since 1971 military pro- curement has decreased in relation to total industrial production (see chart below). The findings of these studies have been declassified and are available in U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government, Allocation of Resources in the Soviet _ Union and Chi na--1975. Hearings, June 18 and July 21, 1975 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern- ment Printing Office, 1975), pp. 4445. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 250 200 150 100 50 0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 Trends in China's military procurement and industrial production Index 1965=100 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 I do not mean to imply that foreign pol- icy issues were more important than the more general issue of civilian versus military rule in Lin's fall from power. But foreign policy issues were an integral part of the struggle between the pragmatists and Lin's military coalition. Mao and Chou were un- doubtedly engaged in a broadly-based cam- paign to prevent Lin and the military from expanding their power further, and to do so they not only confronted this issue specifi- cally, but .also used the thrust of their for- eign policy program to focus the debate on the concrete issue of resource allocation. Thus the debate over resource allocation and foreign policy was the immediate catalyst for Lin's- fall because it brought the question of the continued predominance of the military 7 in Chinese politics and society to a head. Just as Mao and Chou used a foreign pol- icy crisis to further their domestic goals in 1969, so in 1971 they used their diplomatic program for the same purpose. In the unset- tled period following Lin's abortive coup. Mao and Chou systematically exaggerated the threat of war with the Soviet Union to create a crisis atmosphere conducive to party unity during the purge they conducted of pro-Lin military figures, a tactic similar to the one they used in the 1969 Sino-Soviet border clashes. All of this leads to the view that there is not as wide a division in China as there is in the United States between the worlds of the foreign and domestic policy-maker; indeed, it is reasonable to conclude that the small number of men at the apex of China's po- litical structure do not make any significant distinctions between the spheres of domestic and foreign policy. Implementing the Pragmatists' Program In the aftermath of Lin's fall from pow- er, China's pragmatists, under the skillful leadership of Chou, implemented a wide range of policies designed to enhance China's power and status in world affairs. On the diplomatic level, Chou moved to exchange representatives with the United States fol- lowing Nixon's 1972 visit to Peking and to fully normalize diplomatic relations with key nations such as Japan and West Ger- many. Ideology in foreign affairs was de- emphasized, and China's main preoccupation was the orderly expansion of state-to-state relations. During the Cultural Revolution. China had diplomatic relations with only a handful of states; within two years of Lin's fall. China had normalized relations with virtually every nation in the world. In the economic sphere. Chinese planners projected savings from the cutback in mil- itary spending foll.,.-04-ing Lin.'s fall, antic- ipated earnings from the export of oil, and made a case for major technology imports 7 from the West to contribute to the modern- ization of China's economy.7 This drive began in early 1973 and by the end of 1974 the Chinese had signed contracts with Japanese and Western Eu- ropean businesses and U.S. subsidiaries in Europe for over S2 billion in turnkey manu- facturing plant technology, an amount which (allowing for inflation) comes clos.e to the total of all Soviet plant technology transferred to China in the 1950s. Across the board, China's trade with Japan and the West has expanded dramatically in the 1970s. This expansion of economic tics with the West has significant political implications since it represents a substantial relaxation of , the doctrine of -self reliance,- an ideological code phrase for policies aimed at avoiding long-term economic dependence on external powers. Indeed, the technology transfers in- volved financing through deferred payments and the stationing of between 2,000 and 3,000 foreign technicians in China between now and the end of this decade.8 This em- phasis on economic modernization through expanded ties with Japan and the West is an extremely controversial issue in China, pe- riodically attacked by radical critics of the pragmatists. In terms of foreign policy, ex- panding China's economic ties with Japan and the West is the most concrete symbol of its emergence from the isolationism of the Cultural Revolution period. These ties are ' The political implications of China's petroteum ex- porting capabilities are discussed in the fall 1975 issue of FOREIGN POLICY: See Selig S. Harrison, "Time Bomb in East Asia," and Choon-ho Park and Jerome Alan Cohen, "The Politics of the Oil Weapon." 'An excellent article on this subject is Alexander Eck- stein's "China's Trade Policy and Sino-American Re- lations" in Foreign Affairs, October 1975. 44 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-i extremely significant because as China's economy is geared more and more to reliance on the non-Communist world, moves to- ward expanded economic ties with the Sovi- et Union become more. difficult, decreasing the chances of a Sino-Soviet reconciliation. The Rise and Fall of Teng Ilsiao-ping While these policies were being implement- ed, Chou's health began to fail and Teng Hsiao-ping, an able, flexible, and pragmatic administrator who had been purged during the Cultural Revolution, was groomed to succeed Chou as premier. At the National People's Congress (NPc) in January 1975. Teng was elevated to the Standing Com- mittee of the politburo, named a vice chair- man of the party and the highest ranking vice premier in the government, and given the key post of chief of staff of the People's Liberation Army. The NPC also appeared to place a capstone of legitimacy on the pragmatists' program, both in the domestic and the foreign policy areas. With man- agerial skill and enthusiasm, Teng threw his strength into implementing and expanding this program. As did Lin, following his triumph at the Ninth Party Congress. Teng appeared to be on his way to a position of power in China second only to Mao. And yet when Chou died of cancer in mid- January 1976, Teng dropped abruptly and unexpectedly from public view, and in Feb- ruary Hua Kuo-feng, a relatively junior member of the Chinese hierarchy, was named acting premier. Following two months of intense infighting which included massive public demonstrations, Teng was stripped of all his party and government posts and Hua was named premier as well as vice chair- man of the party. Many of the circumstances preceding Teng's unexpected fall are similar to those which preceded Lin's all in 1971: Just as in 1971, planning for China's Five Year Plan (1976-1980) was underway in 1975, and an intense debate over expenditures for advanced military technology broke into the media. this time complicated by the issue of whet her China should import large ottan- i ies of Wesiern military technology." Just a: in 1971. when policy toward the United States and the Soviet Union was in ques- tion. the debate over resource allocation be- came intertwined with the discussions over foreign and defense. policy which must have preceded President Ford's visit in Novem- ber. the surprise.- release in December of a Soviet helicopter crew previously charged with espionage against China, and the invi- tation to former President Nixon to make a return visit to China_ A full explanation of Teng's unexpected 45 eclipse will have to await further evidence. What appears clear at this juncture is that like Lin. Teng attained a position which, if he had succeeded Chou as planned, would have made him Mao's designated heir appar- ent, an extremely dangerous slot in view of the fact that everyone who has previously at- tained it has been purged. Like Lin. Teng had been rapidly expanding his power base by placing his supporters?most of them re- habilitated after having been disgraced dur- ing the Cultural Revolution?in key party and provincial posts. In short. Teng may 'well have provoked a coalescence of forces against him precisely because he was so rapidly expanding his power and influence. Whatever differences there may have been over issues, these may have been reinforced by the power struggle. seemingly a permanent fixture of the Chi- nese political system. Once a leader appears to be gaining too much power, his oppo- nents gain the powerful support of Mao and move against him.. In 1971. that leader was Lin Piao: in 1976. it was Teng Hsiao-ping. , Hua Kuo-feng Hua Kuo-feng is a relatively unknown quantity in Chinese politics. He appears to be a compromise candidate, acceptable to pragmatists and radicals as well as to key military leaders, who enjoys the trust of Mao himself. After rising in the ranks of the party in Hunan?Mao's own native province?Hua was called to Peking in late 1971, and may well have gained the con- fidence of top officials by playing a role in the investigation and purge of pro-Lin ele- ments in the military establishment. 'While his position between 1971 and 1973 is not known, he became the eleventh ranking member of the politburo at the Tenth Party Congress in 1973, and was named sixth ranking vice premier at the NPC in 1975. , He is in his mid-fifties and far younger than any of China's other senior leaders, a factor which may have been influential in his at- taining his present position. Since January 1975, Hua has also held the key government post of minister of public security, an especially important fact since this has placed him at the center of successful efforts throughout 1975 to main- tain public order by preventing various po- litical campaigns from getting out of hand. Hua presumably either still runs the security ministry personally, or has named one of his close deputies as acting chief of police 'This question is obviousty of major concern to the United Sr:, For a discussion of whether the United States should export military technology to China, see Michael Pillsbury's "U.S.-Chinese Military Ties?" in FOREIGN POLICY 20. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 and security operations. Given this back- ground and responsibility, it is highly un- likely that Hua was chosen to preside over a return to the disorder of the Cultural Rev- olution, though he may well preside over the purge of those who have become too closely aligned with Teng. Hua's pronouncements to date on foreign policy issues suggest that, at least for the immediate future, he plans no major depar- tures. In his banquet remarks during Nix- on's visit in February, Hua stated unequiv- ocally that the Soviet Union was the main threat to world peace, and that Peking want- ed to see the implementation of the Shang- hai Communiqu?nd further improvement in Sino-U.S. relations. In his remarks at the close of the Nixon visit. Hua was care- ful to toast Ford, an apparent effort to reverse the negative reaction in Washington to the timing of the Nixon visit. Hua's views on the key question of continued im- portation of 'Western technology are not clear. and any statements or actions he may take in this regard will be a key indicator of the future course of Chinese policy. Implications for U.S. Policy While predictions on Chinese politics and policy are extremely risky, the evidence avail- able to date indicates that the pragmatist's foreign policy program will not be seriously impaired by recent events. The United States can expect to deal with leaders like Hua who are basically favorably disposed toward maintaining and expanding ties with Wash- ington and the \Vest. At the same time, it is reasonable to presume that Hua's admin- istration, lacking the prestige of the Chou- Teng administration, will be more vulner- able to pressures from its domestic oppo- nents. These pressures are likely to inten- sify further when Mao passes from the scene, an event certain to usher in yet another? and even more intense--seruggle for pow- er in China. With these observations in mind, it is possible to offer some comments on the im- plications of U.S. action?or inaction? with regard to China. Since a premise of U.S. policy since 1969 has been that rela- tions between Peking and Moscow are like- ly to remain hostile, these comments must begin with a discussion of the level of Sino- Soviet tension. Overall, tension in Sino-Soviet relations between 1970 and late 1975 remained rel- atively low compared to the crisis atmos- phere following the border clashes in 1969. This reflected the extension of the prag- matists' control, the fact that the domestic situation was fairly stable, and the greater recognition China received from the inter- national community. Since the jockeying for power that preceded and followed Chou's death in Janua-ry, hOwever, anti-Soviet prop- aganda has intensified, and at some point during the protracted and delicate succes- sion process now under way, it is not in- conceivable that a group that would judge its interests served by a provocation such as the 1969 border clash could become pre- dominant in China?perhaps led by Hua himself. 'Whether or not such a situation evolves depends, in part, on events outside China, particularly on the actions of the Soviet Union and the United States. U.S. moves to establish full diplomat- ic relations with China would probably strengthen the pragmatists' position and Peking's commitment to expanding ties with non-Communist countries. Paradoxically, such developments would probably also lessen the tendency toward periodic crises with the Soviet Union. Not only would there be less need for China's leaders to play up the Soviet threat in order to deflect at- tacks from domestic critics, but?with in- creased self-confidence in the international arena?these leaders would probably be more willing to enter into serious negotia- tions with the Soviets over the border issue. If Moscow were careful to take Chinese sen- sitivities into consideration by making a sub- stantial conciliatory gesture (such as a siz- able drawdown of its forces in the border area), some form of mutually acceptable border arrangement could conceivably be worked out. A Sino-Soviet border agreement should , not, in the long run, he counter to U.S. in- terests. In fact, it would be of some benefit. The primary effect would be to decrease sub- stantially the chances of some future border incident?a development which is obvious- ly in Washington's interests. In any case, China's own interests are at odds with those of the Soviet Union throughout Asia, and a border agreement would not end the Sino- ; Soviet struggle for influence and power there I or in the rest of the world. I Furthermore, even-if there were some im- provement in Sino-Soviet relations, the United States would still have leverage for maintaining competition between the two :wers. The Chinese. pragmatists, having iieen strengthened by normalization of re- : Izions with the United States, would prob- .11,1y pursue even further their search for pow- ,: and prestige through conventional di- plomacy and economic development_ Indeed. given the right circumstances, a pragmatic C:hinese government might in the future be amenable to expanding substantially its cul- rural, economic, and perhaps even military i ties with non-Communist countries in gen- eral and with the United States in partic- ular. The recently completed purchase of ---- 46 Rolls Royce fighter aircraft engines and \ . Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001004090024 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 manufacturing technology from Great Brit- ain is a clear indication of .Pekines strong interest in purchasing Western military tech- nology. Should the Sino-U.S. relationship advance along these lines, there is little doubt that there would be serious Soviet concern and that this would express itself in in- creased Sino-Soviet tension, thus inhibiting any moves toward Sino-Soviet reconcilia- tion. At the same time, expanded ties with the United States would directly or indirectly provide greater resources for meeting the military coalition's goal of strengthening China's military capabilities. An ameliora- tion of internal antagonisms on this issue would be likely to increase support for the pragmatists among at least some el,-:nents of the military, a development w1-.1-a in turn would contribute to the strength and stability of a Chinese leadership with vested interests in maintaining good relations with the United States. Alternatively. prolonged stagnation in. Sino-U.S. relations could well contribute to undermining the political power of those in- dividuals and groups within. China which are favorably disposed toward Washington, and lead to an increase in rhe relative pow- er of either pro-Soviet elements in the mil- itary, the radicals, or some coalition of both groups If this happens. China might well revert to a self-imposed isolationism similar to that of the Cultural Revolution or seek a general accommodation with Moscow. While these developments are unlikely as long as Mao lives, once he dies they could emerge as the consequence of a post-Mao power struggle. Since these eventualities are clearly not in the best interests of the United States, I be- lieve that Washington should consider rec- ognizing Peking before the aged chairman leaves the scene in the hope that this might influence the present configuration of po- litical power within China and thereby the succession struggle certain to intensify fol- lowing Mao's death. Obviously, in formulating U.S. policy toward China, a number of complicated problems other than the internal political balance in Peking must be taken into con- sideration. With respect to the difficult issue of Taiwan, the United States could follow the "Japanese model," formally recognizing Peking while maintaining a close economic relationship with Taiwan. The Soviets have almost certainly resigned themselves to U.S. recognition of Peking at some point, and their opposition is likely to amount to little more than pro forma objections and a mi- nor propaganda blitz. Indeed, some policy- makers within Moscow might even welcome Sino-U.S. diplomatic tics, especially if they believed this would reduce the chances of Chi- nese adventures like the 1969 border clash. Finally, recognition of Peking would be applauded by Japan as well as the major powers of Western Europe, all of which have - long since established formal diplomatic ties with China. In short, the negative reper- cussions of breaking diplomatic ties with Taiwan could be mitigated and in any case would be more than offset by positive re- sponses from our most important allies in Asia and Europe. Writing in 1970, the noted French schol- ar Michel Tatu argued that "there will have to be a Washington-Peking dialogue, even at the risk of ... offending the Soviet Union. When this takes place the triangular setup _ will have become fully operative, and the Sz.-s will probably be in the most r:ssition of the three powers. L'ss f:!ttered by ideological prejudice :h.ln the having no need for perma- nent as,lvcrsaric and seeking none. the Amer- 1,e in a better position to react the hostility of each of the other two and hring about the world equilibrium which is their main obiective.-10. Tatu's observations and the gradual im- provement in Sino-U.S. relations since 1972 suggest that at some point the very logic of the triangular relationship will lead to a U.S. decision to follow through on the Shanghai Communique and formally rec- ognize Peking as the sole government of China. The only serious question is wheth- er or not the United States will continue to (ielay this decision until the balance of in- ternal forces within China alters and Peking embarks on a policy of isolationism or ac- commodation with the Soviets, which in ef- fect would undermine the logical underpin- nings of the entire triangular equation. " Michel Tau. The Great Power Trgle: Wash- ington-Mcsz:vw-Peking (Paris: The Atlantic Institute For Inter-rational Affairs, 1970), p. 26. ?47 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 WASHINGTON POST 3 I v?N?r Saigon's Secrets Seized Thieu and U.S. Didn't Destroy ClaSified Files. 'By Don Oberdorfer . Washington Post Staff Writer North Vietnamese in- vading Saigon took over virtually complete files, of the South Vietnamese arm ed forces, national police and intelli- gence agency, including highly classified data which had been furnished, by the United States, 'ac- cording to the last chief CIA analyst of Commu- nist strategy at the U.S. Embassy there. Frank W. Snepp, who left Saigon on the final day of U.S. evacuation last year and resigned from the CIA this January, said the secret files of former Smith Viet- namese President Nguyen Van Thieu were also left' be- hind. Calling these unintended legacies "a tragedy," Snepp said they may reveal to Communist authorities a great deal about U.S. intelli- gence operations and permit them- to identify well-placed U.S. agents behind Commu- nist lines as well as "anyone who helped us in the slight- est degree." , Snepp's statements in an interview confirmed por- tions of an extraordinary book-length memoir, re- cently published and broad- cast in Vietnam, by the North Vietnamese Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Van Tien Dung. Dung was Com- munist field commander for the final campaign of the war: At South Vietnamese po- lice headquarters and mili- tary general staff headquar- ter g "we found that top-se- cret files and documents of the puppet commanders were intact," Dung wrote. "A modern enemy computer containing the records of each officer and enlisted man of the puppet armed forces of more than a mil- lion was still operating." ? "Giai Phone', a recent book on the fall of Saigon by Tiziano Terzani, an Ital- ian journalist who remained in the capital after the take- over, reported that double agents' inside''South Viet:1 nam's Central Intelligence; Organization - were able to save "all the dossiers that ? hid been compiled over the' years by the secret police in collaboration with the , American CIA." Snepp, who is writing ai ? book of his own on the col- lapse of South Vietnam, 'at- tributed the failure to de- stroy vital documents and , other records to mistaken belief by senior ' U.S. Em- bassy officials in "smoke screens" and "ambiguous,' signals" which suggested that a negotiated settlement was possible This "wishful' thinking," shared in Wash; ington, put off the destruc- tion of files and evacuation of- key intelligence agents , untili was oo late, Snepp. said. ? Snepp said the CIA's chief in Saigon, Thomas Polgar, as well as Ambassador Gra- ham Martin were deceived by hints of a negotiated deal ? in April 1975 and we-e err: couraged in their belief by, high officials in Washington." At the same time, however, "consistent intelligence from the ground was- that there would be no negoti- ated settlement, and this was from the most reliable sources," Snepp said. . The North Vietnamese', general's ? account 'of deci- sion-making in the Commu- nist command gives no indi- cation that a negotiated deal was considered during the final Saigon drive, and ev- ery, indication to the con- trafy. Dung relates that the order for quick 'liberation cf Saigon came from the North Vietnamese Politburo in the third week of March, 1975. He reoorts successive orders after that for the Saig.on at- tack with no sign of letup. Dung refers contemptu- ously to "perfidious diplo- matic maneuvers to check ? our troops' ' advance, and avoid total defeat." He attacks the "U.S, CIA clique in' Saigon" for condticting what he claims were -"many . . plots." CIA station chief Polgar, who is of Hun- garian: extraction, was a key, , figure in Saigon contacts about a negotiated deal with Hungarian and Polish dele- gates of the Intefnational Control Commission. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger evidently placed credence in the possi- bility of a negotiated deal to forestall the attack on Sai- gon.- Kissinger has said pub- licly that North Vietnam "changed their signals" and "appeared to shift suddenly . to a military option" on Aoril 27, three days before the fall of the capital. But the Dung account?and the intelligence reports cited by Snepp?indicate there was no possibility ok negotiations and thus ?there _WEIS no shift in signals. Snepp said several, key points in the recent detailed memoir by the North ' namese general have con? vinced him that the Commu- nist side ha-d a spy with . ac- cess to the most important information of the South Vi- etnamese government. At the same time, he added, the United States had accurate Intelligence within days about Communist strategic decisions cited in Dung's ac- count. The crucial difference, Snepp- suggested, was that,' the, _ Communists believed the intelligence they were I getting, but the ? United States chose to ignore 'its ac. ? curate intelligence data in a concentration on "smoke screens" and "wishftll think- ing" about negotiations. According to Snepp, the account by Dung gives these indications of Communist intelligence powers: ' ? Dung reports receiving a "flash cable" at his field \command postS March_ 13 from Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap in Hanoi say- ing ,that the Politburo and high command believed South Vietnam might aban- don the Central Highlands in a "strategic retreat." Dung . was instructed to quickly encircle Phubon, a key area in a retreat path. ' According to Snepp, Thieu had been seriously considering such a retreat in great secrecy for only a few days before that, and se- cretly informed his cabinet and the JOint General Staff -March 13 that he had de- cided to exe,cute the with- drawal Plan. The South Viet- namese general in charge of the withdrawal was in- formed March 14. The pull- ont began March 15. The United States knew nothing of Thieu's order un- -til March 15, Snepp said. By then, Dung's troop's were al- ready moving to- cut off the-' retreat at Phubon. The quick North Vietnamese ma- neuver led to the" destruc- tion of nearly the entire force being withdrawn from the highlands?the equaiva- , lent of two division. This was to -,be Thieu's strategic reserve. "That loss spelled the end of South Vietnam," - Snepp said. ? Dung quotes "our intelli- gence reports' on a tnajor assessment session held by Thieu on the fourth floor of the presidential palace in Saigon Dec. 9-10, 1974. This assessment, which predicted only moderately big Com- munist attacks during 1975, was quoted by Dung in his . memoir. Snepp said the quo- tation was a remarkably ac- curate summary of a U.S. CTA estimate?which he him- self drafted?supplied ,:for ? Thieu's.use in the year-end assessment. -After learning of the Sai-. gon assessment, the Hanoi Politburo amended its plan for a two-year- campalIgn to liberate the South. While still- pl..ning for a 1;975-76 . campaign, the Politburo added a guideline for libera- tion in 1975 "if opportunities presented themselves," ac- cording to Dung. 7 This was done in Hanoi on Jan. 9, 1975. According to . Snepp, the United States ob- tained an accurate gence report within 10 days of. this decision. ? Dung quotes a secret re- port, sent by Ambassador Martin to Washington on April 19, 1975, "on the true situation" in the South. Ac- curately summarized by Dung, this repOrt was drafted by Snepp for Martin- to use in persuading Thieu to resign the presidency and thus -make way for the ru- mored "negotiations." According to Snepp, Mar- tin took a copy of the report to Thieu at the presidential palace on April 20, while Ca- ? bling another copy to Wash- ington. The report was a de- cisive factor in Thieu's de- cision to resign, which he announced Apri 21.. Snepp said he helped pre- ; pare?but does not Stand by I ?another classified U.S. re- port which was quoted in the North Vietnamese gen- eral's account of the final days of the war. This esti- mate, cited as evidence that Thieu was "forced to fight a poor man's war," said that South Vietnamese firepowe had decreased by nearly 60 per cent due to bomb and ammunition shortages, and that South Vietnamese mo- bility was cut in half, by shortages of aircraft, vehi- cles and fuel. Snepp said these esti- mates were prepared by U.S. officials in Saigon early in 1975 in an effort to sel Congress on the need to ap- propriate additional aid to South Vietnam. Snepp said 'the phfase, "a poor man's war," was originated by the United States for this pur- p6se. The former CIA official said these estimates were -billingsgate" ? numbers pulled out of the air for U.S. political reasons. He said he did not know whether or not North Vietnam believed these numbers when its spies obtained them in Sai- gon.. 48 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1