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May 12, 1976
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25X1A Ap.rirOv-e-ij For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 CONFIDENTIAL INTERNAL USE ONLY This publication contains clippings from the domestic and foreign press for YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use of selected items would rarely be advisable. NO. 9 GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS GENERAL EASTERN EUROPE WEST EUROPE NEAR EAST AFRICA EAST ASIA LATIN AMERICA 14 MAY 1976 PAGE 1 27 32 33 36 38 40 DESTROY AFTER BACKGROUNDER HAS SERVED ITS PURPOSE OR WITHIN 60 DAYS CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 Aptoroved Far Release- 2001408/08 : CIA-RDP77-.00432R00010.400pp37p , THE NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, MAY 12, 1976 Spy inquiries Begun Amid Public Outrage ? ? .By LESUE If. GELB Special to'fbe New York TIrrl.?.3 , WASHINGTON, May 11?The iCongressional and Presidential 'investigations into domestic ;spying and political assassina- tion plots by the intelligence ;community began. 16 months ,age amid ...public outrage but lam now ending amid public iindifference and Congressional ttancertainty over whether there Will eventually be adequate 'itaforms. ! "It all lasted too long, and :the media, the Congress and .the people lost interest," com- mented Representative Otis G. Pike, who headed the House , Select Committee on Intelli- gence. The House voted against publishing his cornm?ittee's re- port and :ignored its proposals for a basic structural overhaul ? of the intelligence community. Administration officials take the position that President Ford has 'already done enough o reinforce and streamline policy control of intelligence activities .and catch abuses, but mostly through changes that are being kept secret, even from Congress. ? ? Senator Frank Church, chair- , man of the Senate Select Corn- rnittee on Intelligence, has ar- gued that it is not, enough for the President to put the Admin- istration's own house in order. The Church committee has pushed for a new Congressional Oversight committee on intelli- gence, to consolidate .. and strengthen the current system, ? which . is fragmented among veral committees. ? ? What began with sensational publicity accompanying 'disclo- sures of the intelligence inqui- ? ries is. ending now in comprom- ises. Why this happened and. how it happened is a case study ? in the subtle ways in which the .politics of this city werk. Perhaps most important, the political climate has changed since the start of the investiga- tions. Congress, once on the Of- fensive, was thrown back somewhat on the defensive by disputes over disclosures of classified information given :to Congressional committees and over responsibility for the as- sassination in Greece of the chief of the Central Intelligence Agency operations there. Then, as the details of covert operations, illegal wiretappings and mail openings became old news, public interest waned, and Congressional committees and executive agencies turned inward, settling their disputes along the. usual lines of com- mittee turf, bureaucratic tactics and access to information. : Equally In the personalities and strategies of the two Congressional investi- gating coin mitt ees diverged sharply, and thus Congress was unable to face the Administra- tion with a solid front. Mr. Pike tried to operate 'in the open and to confront the White House, and he lost sup-, , port in the House. Mr. Church' and his Senate committee made ? compromises, doing some things in the open and other things in private, and generally' tried to get along with the Ad- ? ministration. Support Is Sought ? Now, he must shepherd sup- port among?and sometimes against ? the Senate leaders whose committees have long handled intelligence matters and who are reiuctant to sur- render these prerogatives to the .new oversight committee he proposes. . Throughout, the Congression- al investigators have been hob- hied by the difficulties of ob- taining information on the in- ner workings of the intelligence community. . 7! Some officials, noting the re- luctance of .the Administration to share: information -;.--: and through' it, 'power?Witli. Con- gress, recalled,' that former Sc-' cretary of . Defense Runes R:, Schlesinger .once told..a White House meeting. that sensitive information should not be given to the Pike committee *becanse, the committee contained un-, friendly foreign operatives. According *to these seurcesa William E. Colby, then the Di- rector of Central Intelligence,' ironically commented that this was a good ?idea, and. he. was' sure that Mr. Schlesinger had evidence to support his allega- tion and shouid turn it over to House Speaker -Carl . Albert.. No. more was said. . Even, within ? the: executive breech, rivalries and sensitivi- . ties affected the flow of infor- mation. Vice President Rocke- feller reportedly 'lectured Mr.. Colby once for having given too much information to the com- mission set, up within the exe- cutive branch do investigate C.I.A., activities.. Mr. Rockefel- ler headed that commission, :himself. . " ?? - ? More common apparently, was the frustration of the exe- cutive branch investigators at the refusal of intelligence agen-, cies to disclose enough about their past methods of: opeia-1 tion. "There were times when' we wiehed we hart 'subpoena power here in the White :House," one official said. . ' Another said that ultimately! the executive branch investigasl don- succeeded; because the' . White House WaS able to play off the intelligence agencies against one another, The White Illouse, he said, "was . able to I pry information out. of the I agencies, because each. agency I;didn't know what the White House was getting from the 0Mthers, and they wereR afraid 'of getting caught in a lie.': Confirmation that this tactic was . effective came from a C.I.A. official, "The biggest fear here,". 'he said', "was the rest of the executive branch more than Congress." - Officials from other agencies inecte the same points. Each was concerned about! opening . up its secret! 1 sources and methods to the' -others. Providing sensitiveinforma- . teen to Congressional com- mittees was a separate prob- lem. Early meetings of an inter- agency committee headed by John O. Marsh Jr., the Pres- ident's counselor, were punc- tuated by a lot -of speech-mak- ing on the need for being rough with the committees. Attorney General Edward H. Levi would often interrupt to say some- thing like: "This is a fin:?. :speech for Broadway, but how will it sound when they throw you in a cell :for violating the. law?"' The general view among offi- cials in the Administration and on Capitol Hill who have been involved with the various in- vestigations :is that the Main obstacles to turning over infor- Mation came from those con- cerned with policy at the State and Defense Departments, from the National Security Council :staff and from the beads of operational staff. Generally, on the other side :were the White House staff, 'which believed that President :Ford had nothing to hide, a:ndl the leaders of the C.I.A., who' :believed that :their agency. 'Could be saved 'only by being candid. The President decided early to be more forthcoming with. the Church.- committee 'than' with., the Pike committee. This was a reflectionof the very dif- ferent ways in which the corn- ,mittees sought to get informa- tion. ? Mr. Pike was made chairman :of the House committee largely because of the majority's cone viction that representative Lu- cien Nedzi, the chairman of the; House Armed '.Services Comm i tee tee, had not been tough onough.1 in. hie overaight? Mr. Pike hiredi e young staff with few Wash:, ington ties, and together they! confronted the Administration' at each step. :Committee unityi fell apart When Mr.' Pike recom-i? mended citing Mr. Kissinger for', contempt when he did not turn! over certain policy papers: . Mr. Church, on the other. hand, gave high priority to ,holding his committee 'together'.' He built a ?staff of experienced. Congressional aides, and their ? approach was to cajole and: . cooperate with the Administrag ?. Senator Howard H. Baker Jr., Republican of Tennessee, who was a member of the commit- tee, said that its unity had been! threatened only briefly during the investigation of assassina-I lions. ?Mere was a predisposition! on the part of some to. protect! the Kennedys or. not to sully1 the reputation of an Eisenhow- er" he said, "In the early sta- ges of the assassination investi- gation, the committee gave the impression of a carnival atmose phere." Although unity was restored', when tee committer"s proceed- ings bee,true lc-ss public. einfor-? matiop - gat boring ? tgehniques, End in Indifference Were alivvays ? a double-edged: sword. 3 , For the Church committee, getting all the' assassination material set an important pre- cedent for obtaining additional documents. But the very vol- ume of the ' assassination material' forced diversion and delay, Months were spent pre- paring that report before the bulk of the committee got down ? to its assigned business. ? For the Pike committee, the problem was that it could 'ob- tain no information without a confrontation, but unity and House support were eroded by confrontation. . Mr, Pike's being "out .on the point," as one Senate staff member put it, made it easier for the Church committee to obtain information and helped the Senate group . to . "look more reasonable" in the short run. . But in the long run, the Pike committee's confrontation tac- tics may have hurt, leaving the Senate commit'tee's campaign for stronger Congressional ? oversight of intelligence activi- ties without a corresponding ef- fort in the House. The tactics also changed the focus of de- bate in Washington from howl much Congressional oversight is necessary to whether Con- gress can keep a secret. Mr. Pike sees sonic advantage to his tough stance, however. "I think. Church paid a price for cooperation," the Repre- sentative says. "Less inforrna- don was made public," In this respect, there was a! dovetailing of strategies be- tween the WhiteHouse and the? Church committee. "The Pres- ident's attitude was that there was no' reason to keep inforrna- tio:n respecting mistakes and abuses from Congress," one White House official explained. "but at the same time, the Pres- ident felt he had the responsi- bility that it not be made public if, it would damage :the coun- try."* Most Administration officials maintained that the President had no grand strategy for deal-, log with .Congress, except 'to avoid any appearante. of a. cov- er-up and to conclude the in- 'vestigationa as quickly as pos- sible. "The longer It went on, the more rocks would 'he turned over:, the more. worms would be found," one key participant said. : Delay was inherent ? in the !practical steps taken by the Ad-I ministration to insure its con- cepts of secrecy. One who took I part in the process of ileac...hi- ' ton said: "If the committee asked for 'information, we'd brief them. If they demanded the .doeu- "merits. we'd give them a s;tni- ?tized 'version. If this ..t.Tsn't .entlitgli, we'd eitas thetn the rest on the condition thev would toot publish without tini,.ent," Others in the Administration! Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 !sought delay, one official said, !"much the same way a lawyer tplays for time, hoping some- thing will come up to save his client." Things did come up. . 'Pike, Welch and Schorr, those were the three names that caused us to pull back, not because our constituents said you're going too far, but be- cause those names came to have important symbolic im-? portance in the currency of. Washington," said a senator .who did not want to be identi- fied. . Richard S. Welch was the head of the C.I.A. office in Greece. He was murdered shortly after a magazine' identi- fied him. Daniel Schorr was a reporter for CBS -who obtained and 'arranged for publication of the still-classified Pike commit- tee .report. ? Senator Walter F. Mondale, Democrat of Minnesota, who was a. Member of the Church committee said: "There was a sense of anarchy over, in the House. Then came 'the, Welch murder and what I believe to be 'the careful orchestration of. the Welch funeral to tie the 'murder, to the CongressiOnal in- vestigations.''" Administration officials de- nied any orchestration, main- taining that all of the funeral 'arrangements were made by the Welch family. "The Schorr matter," Mr. Mondale said, "further under- mined confidence in Congress to deal With Secret 'matters." As the public became "numb!' with bad news, 7 in Mr. Mon- dale's phrase, some members of the Pike committee- apparently sought to revive public atten- tion through unauthorized, dis- closures of information. Mean- while, the Church committee continued to keep to show that Congress can do so and that Congressional oversight can work. , ? From the start, the Church committee's pals, according to committee members, was to generate support for standing Congressional oversight com- mittees, with full legislative and budgetary authority and new . laws governing intel- ligence activities. To some members'of the Pike committee, his goals, in some respects, went much deeper? to a basic restructuring of the intelligence community ? and much 'beyond what the House and the Administration seemed prepared to support. ? The Pike committee 'wanted to know how much intelligence costs the ? taxpayer and wheth- er the results were worth the costs. and the risks. The' com- mittee's report, which has been criticized by many people, came to the conclusion that the taxpayer was not getting his money's worth. The national intellieence budget is estimated at $4.5 billion. ? The Senate is now 'about to' !consider the Church com- mittee's plan for a standing !oversight committee that would !supersede the three existing cornmittees ? Armed Services, Appropriationq and Foreign Re- ions?with authority over in- telligence agencie;4. THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, MAY 14, 1976 Is Oversight Enough? By Tom Wicker , The Senate has reached agreement on an independent committee to over- see the budget and operations of the , Central Intelligence Agency, and to share such power over the Federal ; Bureau of Investigation and other security agencies. That's better than , doing nothing about the documented abuses of the C.I.A., the F.B.I. and , others, but skepticism about the new committee still is in order. For one thing, it's a compromise between those who supported the Church committee's recommendation for an independent committee to over- see all the security agencies, and those who wanted oversight to remain es- sentially in the hands or the Judiciary and Armed Services Committees. That such a compromise was necessary, despite the proven inability 'or unwill- ingness of these committees to exer- cise control In the past, shows how' little real determination there is in the Senate to prevent security and intelli- gence abuses in the future. The likely reason is the decline in public 'Interest in such abuses?at least the decline in Congressional per- ception of public interest?and the success of the Administration, the security agencies and their supporters in shifting the burden of guilt. Now it is not the agencies that are under fire for abusing their powers, but members of Congress and the press for airing "secrets" and supposedly endangering national security. That climate does not augur well for Congressional oversight, no matter by which committee conducted; and in any case, the history of oversight suggests that those responsible for it have almost invariably been co-opted . by those supposed' to be overseen. The ?watchdog has become the agency pet and, so far from protecting the public against the agency, ended by protect- ing the agency from the public. , The compromise committee agreed upon by the Senate, moreover, will have to share its authority?save in ? the case of the C.I.A.?with Armed Forces and Judiciary, those toothless tigers who saw no evil, heard no evil and certainly spoke no evil while car- rying out their myopic "oversight" in the past. , Establishment of the new committees , will force the Administration to sub- mit an annual intelligence budget for , Congressional review. But it is doubt- ful that any oversight arrangement, no matter how diligently pursued, could prevent all the myriad forms of abuse and violations of rights recently documented. An oversight committee, NEW YOI3K DAILY NEWS 10 MAY 1976 huses Over :Rush ? San Antonio: Tex., May 9 CIA Director GeorLre Bush says atok:es committrq by the in agency have been cleared up aml will not occur in the future. 2 at best, is not much more than a use- ful first step in controlling the opera- tions of security and intelligence agencies. Another needed step is passage of a perfected version of a bill by Sena- tors Edward Kennedy, Charles Mathias, Robert Byrd, Gaylord Nelson and others, to require a Federal court order to authorize electronic surveil- lance for purposes of obtaining foreign intelligence. The bill would require also that such surveillance be limited to "foreign powers," or to those for whom there is "probable cause" to believe that they are "agents of a foreign power." This measure is aimed at closing the last loophole by which security agencies can wiretap and bug American citizens on their own authority, under the guise of seeking "foreign intelligence." Gerald Schneider, a political scien- tist on leave from the University of Delaware for study at the Brookings Institution, has proposed two further steps to several members of the Sen- ate. Since many Senators and others are genuinely concerned that security IN THE NATION agencies not be hamstrung In com- bating terrorism and subversion, he I would not flatly ban certain activities I but would require that any "intrusion" 1, by them on the constitutional rights of American citizens be authorized, if at all, by a Federal court order, on a , showing of evidence that a crime was ! about to be committed. . In the fnrther belief that heads of agencies and high officials will ustr- ally be able to protect themselves against criminal responsibility, Mr. Schneider has proposed that lower- level employees of the security agen- cies be made subject to stiff manda- tory penalties for committing any act that would be a 'felony if a private citizea committed it, and that there be no statute of limitations on such offenses for at least 25 years. Put in that kind of jeopardy, Federal employ- ees would be far more likely to refuse to carry out illegal acts that might be ordered by their superiors. On that point, for example, the Department of Justice has decided that it will not defend two F.B.I. agents accused in a civil suit of carry- ing out burglaries at the New York offices of the Socialist Workers Party. Like some of Richard Nixon's "plumb- ers," those who carried out the F.B.I.'s burglaries might not have fol- lowed orders had they known they would not have the fall protection of the Government if caught in the act. ? "I will not condone the things that were wrong in the past," Bush said in a news conference on his first trip bark to Texas 'After taking ever as head of the CIA: "In my view those abnses'. have been cleared up," he sold, "and I'm determined that they remain cleared up." Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 1 Approved-For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP7T-00432R000100400-003-0 ItmS angtIrl Tittlf% Sun.. May 2, 1976 ithik thy. on CIA Abuses:Criticized ? Reform May Be Doomed by Complacency, Senators Fear BY JACK NELSON Times Washington Bureau Chief WASHINGTON?The head of a university professors' association worries about the academic commu- nity's indifferent reaction to the Sen- ate Intelligence Committee's finding that the CIA continues to have covert relationships with hundreds of academics at more than 100 Ameri- can universities and institutions. _ ? A member of the Intelligence Com- mittee wonders whether the public can be convinced that the lawless- ness of the FBI and the CIA that is documented by the committee in two voluminous reports actually occurred. Two other senators. say that the lessons of Watergate and other dis- closures of domestic political spying have been forgotten?or never learned?and that no significant re-_ _ 'forms have been adopted: ' All of this raises the question of .whether America has become so. in- sured to disclosures of government wrongdoing that public. opinion--:-?a .vital element necessary for reform in .a democracy?is paralyzed. Despite the Intelligence Commit- tee's recent report disclosing a 40- year pattern of political spying and deceptive practices by the FBI, with The knowledge and sometimes - the encoUragemeritmf Presidents and at- torneys general,' there has been little public reactions This apathy has led some commit- tee members to wonder whether the recommendations for reform the -committee made as part of its repott are doomed. . ? ? 7 I A deeper and perhaps more signifi- cant -question? is ? whether principles ? Americans have assumed were part of a free society will be sacrificed by the public's passive acceptance of practices heretofore ? considered an- athema. Will America tolerate covert ar- rangements between intelligence agents and academics, authors, jour- nalists and publishers? Although these questions are being .asked in some quarters, there has been little public debate: Some see ,this as a reflection not so much. of .public*apathy but of the feeling of . helplessness on the part of a people bombarded with so many disclosures of wrongdoing. Dr. Joseph D. Duffey, general sec- etary of the 85,000 member Ameri- can Assn. of University Professors, has been astonished by the lack of outrage or even concern by most of .the academic community to the dis- 'closures about the covert relation- ships on campus. "I find a bland acquicscmce to what's really a total change in what we always assumed were the ground rules of a free society." he said. Duffey was with a group of college presidents when he first read of the committee's finding about covert CIA relationships on campuses. "No one expressed any alarm," he said. "Nothing shocks them any more. We've had a change in our level of consciousness. If 10 years ago one had described these kind of acti- vities going on he probably would have been dismissed as an alarmist or paranoid." . : Duffey said he was sending infor- illation from the committee's reports to members of the association's executive committee in the hope that it would take some action demanding an end to covert CIA relationships on campuses. . The association, he said, also may consider using the Freedom of Infor- mation Act as a means of exposing the names of academic institutions at which such relationships exist. , In documenting covert relation- ships, the Senate committee decided against identifying any individuals or institutions in the media, publishing 'or academic fields. The committee found that hun- dreds of foreign journalists and more than 25 American journalists were working covertly with the CIA in a worldwide propaganda network. The FBI, it found, had covertly in- fluenced the public's perception of persons and organizations by disse- minating derogatory information to the press through contacts in Ameri- can journalism. It found that intelligence agencies had influenced both domestic and ? foreign policy through such covert relationships. At the time the committee was re- leasing its reports of such find!ngs, however, the Senate Rules Commit- tee, by a 5-4 vote, was crippling the key recommendation for preventing future abuses by intelligence agen- cies?the creation of a permanent congressional oversight committee. The Senate Intelligence Committee. has received no reaction from acade- micians or any other groups either supporting the committee reports or protesting the action by the Rules Committee, according to a spokes- man for the Intelligence Committee. Despite the lack of public support, the spokesman said, committee offi- cials believe they may ? be able to muster enough support on the Senate floor to override the Rules Commit- tee and provide for an oversight committee. ? However, Senate majority leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.), who spon- sored the legislation creating the In- telligence Committee, expressed con- ;cern that opponents of he corwriittec; may have the power on the floor to defeat legislation creating an over- sight committee. "Frankly, it's in for a lot of trou- ble," Mansfield said. "Other commit- tees with vested interests in the in- telligence community will fight to maintain their interest and may have the votes on the floor to do it. If they do, what we have been trying to do will have been wasted and more than a year's work will have been for naught." At least one member of the Intel- ligence Committee, Sen. Philip A. ;Hart (D-Mich.), believes that before' .public opinion can be marshaled, the public must first be convinced that the intelligence abuses actually oc- curred. In its report on domestic intel- ligence activities, the committee not- ed an unwillingness on the part of most persons in the past to believe allegations from victims of intel- ligence acitivity abuses. It Said the following commments by Hart to a 'witness during committee hearings "aptly described this phenomenon": AS I am sure others have, I have been told for years by, among others, some of my own, that this is exactly what the (FBI) was doing all the time, and in my great wisdom and high office, I assured them that they were wrong?it just wasn't true, it couldn't happen," Hart said, "What you have described is a se- ries of illegal actions intended squarely to deny First Amendment rights to some Americans. This is: what my children have told me was going on. Now, I did not believe it. ' The trick. . . is for this committee to be able to figure out how to persuade the people of this country that in- deed it did go on. And how shall we ensure that it will never happen again? But it will happen repeatedly unless we can bring ourselves to un- derstand and accept that it did go on." Looking back over Watergate, the Nixon impeachment inquiry, whole- sale bribery and illegal campaign contributions, intelligence abuses and other disclosures, Sen. Lowell P. Weicker Jr. (R-Conn.) sald no sub- stantial reform had been accom- plished despite "three years of fact upon fact upon fact." "The media, the public and most of our leaders are all too willing to say that sensational revelations and suc- cessful prosecutions are enough," Weicker said. "I know they are not. The real work of reform in the sense . of procedures that protect our insti- tutions And Constitution has yet to advance one iota." . President Ford's staunch defense of the intelligence agencies and his pro- gram of reorganizing the intelligence community and protecting govern- ment secrets through executive or- ders also have been cited as factors militating against reform by Congress. Sen. Gaylord Nelson tD-Wis.) said emphasis in Washington was shifting 3 .? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 from the defense of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms to protection of the intelligence community and maintenance of government secrets. "After Vietnam, Cambodia, Angola and Watergate, we are again told? and are apparently willing to believe ?that the crucial issue is maintain- ing secrecy in government," Nelson said. "It is unclear whether the les- sons of the past five years have been' forgotten already or whether they were never learned." . Congress' failure to exercise over- sight also is viewed as a factor in the desensitizing of the public to ?disclo- sures of wrongdoing. "The public has a certain numbing. reaction or feeling of helplessness about such disclosures," Norman Birnbaum, an author and sociologist. WAShaNGTON POST 4 MAY 1276 Charles B. Seib at Amherst University, said. ."And the behavior of certain peo- ple in Congress encourages that," he said. "Certain centers have represent- ed the CIA to the people instead of the people to the CIA. ,?!'EVen the Intelligence Committee couldn't bring itself to release intel- ligence budget figures or to, release the names of people and institutions involved in covert relationships," Birnbaum said. "All of this represents a very grave danger to a free society. It is disrup- tive of that fabric of trust that is in- dispensable to academic freedom." The Intelligence .Committee's re- port that "well over 1,000. books" have been written or published at Spies Under MedLt. Cover The American press treasures its freedom, and is quite willing to use Its muscle when it perceives a threat to that freedom. A current example of such a reaction has been the mas- sive media battle against the so-called Ne- braska gag order, which is now before the Supreme Court: : Yet the news business has been strangely undisturbed by a threat to the whole idea of a free press posed by some of its own in -ca- hoots with the CIA. The attitude seems to be: If we pretend that this little internal scandal doesn't exist, maybe it will go away. But it keeps coming back. Its latest manifesta- tion was in a report of the Senate intelli- gence committee. The report, issued April 27, revealed that until 'early this year the CIA had undercover "rela- tionships" with about 50 American journal- ists or employees of American media organi- zations, and that more than half of those rela- tionships still existed when the report was written. The report also noted that more than a dozen U.S. news organizations and publish- ing houses have provided cover for CIA agents abroad, most of them knowingly. These disclosures came on the heels of ear- lier ones with different figures but the same message. In January a leak from the report of the House intelligence committee revealed that the CIA had 11 full-time secret agents work- ing as journalists overseas last. year. It re- vealed also that 12 television, radio, newspa- per and magazine companies provided cover for these agents. And back in 1973, William Colby, then the CIA director, let it be known that the CIA had three dozen American journalists work- ing abroad, some of them as fulltime agents. Each disclosure has brought an almost- promise from the CIA that it would mend its ways. The most recent one came last Febru- ary from the present CIA director, George Bush. He said his agency would not "enter into any paid or contractual relationship with any full-time or part-time news corre- spondent accredited by any United States news service, newspaper, periodical, radio or television network or station." That seems fairly definite, although there may be some sleepers in it?that word "ac- credited," perhaps. The Senate committee, which noted that it received only limited information and no names on the CIA's use of the media, says that covert use of staff members of general circulation U.S. news organizations "appears The News Business to be virtually phased? out." But, assuming that appearances can be? trusted, there is plenty of room for relationships with freelan- cers and stringers and with staffers of other than general circulation organizations. In the face of the disclosures, the press has shown little of the investigative zeal so in fashion these days. After the leak from the House report, there was an effort to shake the names loose, but the CIA stonewalled and the effort soon died. And the cloud of suspi- cion continued to hover over the heads of all American journalists overseas. I have seen just one specific result of the Senate report: The executive board of the National Conference of Editorial Writers passed a resolution opposing the clandestine CIA employment of any journalists, Ameri- can or foreign, and noting the polluting ef- fect of CIA material planted in the media anywhere in the world. It also called on the CIA to release the names of American journalists employed by it now or in the past. So what should be done? The editorial writers are right. The names of the journel- ists and the news organizations that have en- gaged in covert operations with and for the 4 the instigation of the CIA has met with little reaction from the book publishing industry. ' Townsend W. Hootes, president of the Assn.. of American Publishers,' whose members account for? about' 85% or more of the nation's book market, said, "I, haven't seen any reaction yet, but it may be prema- ture." Hootes said he had, asked for a copy of the report and wanted to "study it carefully." "I share the disappointment ex- pressed by a number of people that Congress has muffed a unique oppor- tunity to establish serious and mean- ingful oversight," said Hootes, a for- mer deputy assistant secretary of de- fense for international security af- fairs.. CIA should be disclosed. I am referring to the journalists.who have accepted payment from the agency and the organizations that have permitted CIA operatives to use them for cover or who have permitted their own peo- ple to work for the agency. It Should be noted that many journalists have contact with the CIA, as they do with all the other agencies of government. These con- tacts, and even the occasional trading of in- formation such as constantly goes on be tween reporters and sources, are not what we're talking about here. We are talking about the deliberate subversion of the news business for the CIA's espionage and propa- ganda purposes. Publication of names would solve part Of the problem, but not all of it. The CIA appar- ently views the use of foreign media for propaganda and other purposes as a proper agency function. But this corruption of the foreign press has a fallout effect in this coun- try. Inevitably some of the material CIA plants overseas trickles back to Americans in the form of wire service dispatches, special articles, reprints from foreign publications and the like. So in addition to publicizing the names of American journalists and news organizations involved covertly with CIA, consideration should be given to ending the agency's use of foreign media as well. A presidential order would do the trick. Even without the fallout problem. we should reject the idea that all will be well if the taint of CIA can be removed from Ameri- can journalism. The concept of a free press is not the spe- cial property of Americans. In the perfect world that lies too far beyond the horizon, all people will enjoy its benefits. That millenium is a long, long way of f. But is it right for an agency of the American gov- ernment, of all governnients, to work against It by subverting the foreign press? And is it right for the American news business to fail to oppose such activities tooth slid nail? Tr, ask such questions is to answer thf.u.n. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-6-- WASHINGTON POST 14 MAY 1976 Motives Sought in JFK Ieath By George Lardner Jr. Washinaton Por Slat( Writer . The Senate i n t elligence - committee voted yesterday to recommend a congression- al investigation of the mo- tives behind the assassina- tion of President John F. ? Kennedy. . The committee took the action at a closed meeting called to discuss the results of its special inquiry into the shortcomings of the FBI, the Central Intelligence Agency and other govern- ment agencies that helped investigate the murder. ' As chairman of a two; member subcommittee that took up the controversial is- sue, Sen. Gary W. Hart (D- Colo.) told reporters that he had seen no evidence to in- validate the Warren Com- mission's finding that Lee Harvey Oswald was Kenne- dy's lone assassin. .? But he added that "the re: , maining question, which the Warren Commission ?did not answer, was 'why?' " "It's in that area," Hart. said, "that I think the lin- gering.doubts remain." The 'other subcommittee member, 'Sen. Richard S.- SchWeiker (R-Pa.), predicted that the committee would- release a fairly detailed and; he hinted, troubling report' later this month on failures: of the original investigation- of the President's death and: nagging issues that need to be pursued. Schweiker indicated that he was not persuaded that ? Oswald acted alone or even that Oswald fired any of the. bullets that clay in Dallas. have always 'questioned the. Warren Commission finding . abput who did it and how it. was done," he told reporters. "My six months on this sub- committee reinforce and strengthen those doubts." The committee, which is about to go out of business, recommended that the new inquiry be undertaken by the permanent Senate intel- ligence oversight committee' the Senate is considering es- tablishing. Meanwhile, documents just made public by the CIA In response to a -freedom-of; information lawsuit Showed that CIA officials were talk- ing of assassinating Cuban Premier Fidel. Castro and his closest ads kers in early March of 1960, apparently 'jiist a few days before se- cret planning for a Cuban invasion was approved by the Eisenhower administra- tion. ? Some critics of the. War- ren Commission's work have suggested that Kennedy's ? 1963 murder may have been in retaliation for the CIA's reported sponsorship of plots to kill Castro, Others 'have contended that the assassination could be traced to anti-Castro Cu- ban exiles bitter at Kennedy for the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion and for his secret gestures toward rap- prochement with the Cuban premier just before he was killed. In a 1975 memo drafted for the Rockefeller commis- . sion, a presidentially ap- pointed panel that looked into CIA abuses, and made public last month. CIA coun- terintelligence officials said they still felt, as they did in 1964, that the Warren Com- mission report should have given more credence to the possibility of a foreign con- spiracy in light of promisins, leads that were not pursued. , The Senate intelligence committee's investigation of CIA-sponsored assassination plots showed that the scheming against Castro continued after Kennedy's death. Even on Nov. 22, 1963, the ? day Kennedy was shot in Dallas, 'a high-ranking CIA official was meeting in Paris with a secret agent who was a Castro intimate to ..offer him 'a Peri rigged "With?a son hypodermic . needle for use on the Cuban premier. s The heavily censored CIA. assassination .documents, made public yesterday touched not only on Castro, but also on other foreign leaders killed in coups or at- tempted coups with various, degrees of U.S. backing., The documents were re- leased by Robert Borosage. of the non-profit Center for National Security Studies as part of a freedom-of-infor- mation project jointly spon- sored with the American Civil Liberties Union. The records were all made available last year to the Rockefeller Commission and then to the Senate commit- tee, presumably with fewer deletions. One six-page document,. dated May 13, 1961, titled. "CIA Covert Activities, Dos ? minican Republic." had ev- erything excisad from it ex- cept part of one paragraph. It pointed out that tile CIA . had supplied "internal oppo- sition leaders" with three .38 cal. revolvers, three car- bines and accompanying am- munition as "personal de- fense weapons attendant to their projected efforts to neutralize Trujillo." According to authoritative sources, the CIA told the White House in that same May 13, 1961, report that it also. had some submachine. guns and. grenades in Ciu-, dad Trujillo which could be provided to the anti-Trujillo group if the go-ahead were given. The spy agency, however, deleted this from the docu-: ?ment it gave Borosage. ACLU national stall coun- sel John H. F. Shattuck said.. yesterday that he would con- ? tinue pressing in court for. more details. He said he would "suspend judgment" as to whether the Rockefeller Commission got still more documents that have yet to be acknowledged in any fashion. According to the records released yesterday, Castro's assassination was mentioned as. early as March 9, 1960, during a meeting of the CIA's "Branch 4 Task Force." Presiding was Col. J. C. King, the chief of the Western Hemisphesre 'Divi- sion within the CIA's Direc- torate of Plans. He told the meeting that' then-CIA Director Alan :Dulles was "presenting a, special policy paper to the National Security Council's - '5412 Committee, which su- pervised covert operations. The heavily censored memorandum for the record added: "Col. King stated that (deleted) unless Fidel and Raul Castro and Che Guevara could lie - elimi- nated in one package? which is highly unlikely? this operation can be a long, drawn-out affair and the _present government will only be overthrown by the use of force." , Following the 111 deba- 5 cle at the Bay of Pigs, Presi- dent Kennedy approved an all-out secret war of sabo- tage and propaganda against ? the Castro regime under the code name "Operation Mon- goose," whose de facto boss was Attorney General Rob- ert F. Kennedy: . Reporting on a "Mongoose meeting" on Oct. 4, 1962, shortly before the Cuban missile crisis, then-CIA Di- rector John McConp noted that Robert Kennedy, as chairman,. made plain his - and .:? :? the. . President's "dissatisfaction with lack of action in the sabotage field." ? " The documents showed that the legacy Of assassina- stionsinvolvement confirmed to pursue the CIA even af- ter last year's investigations were starting to bring them to the surface. - In early April of 1975, a few weeks before the final U.S. evacuation of South Vi- .etnam, for 'instance, CIA ;headquarters here was evi- dently told of a "potential coup" being planned against South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu in hopes that the change would bring :continued American support .for the beleaguered country. The CIA reacted with -deep alarm, fueled by mem- ories of the 1963 coup that resulted in the death of President Ngo Dinh Diem. "With Diem precedent and current allegations against our agency," then-CIA Di- rector William E. Colby ca- bled Saigon on April 4, 1975, "it would be both institu- tional and national disaster if there. were any remote connection between us and ssuch an event . . . If things get .complicated at all, ad- vise and .I will recommend strongest effort. to facilitate ?Thieu and family safe pas- sage' and .haven." NEW YORK TIMES 4 MAY 1976 Not 'Deep Throat' To the Editor: - ? . - ? On Ian. 29 .you published on your Op-Ed page a piece by J. Anthony Lukas, "The Bennett Mystery," which? contained a - number of . inaceuracies.- After an early, unsuccesSfutseffort to have a letter in response published, I. decida. to let the matter die., Yesterday, however,, another publi-. cation picked up much the same-, themes indicating that. Mr.. Lukas' era rors are.. now assumed as truth, and , that ay "silence" has been. accepted., as praaf.. Shealy put, 1 am not, Mr. Wood-1 ward's "Deep Throat," I have never,' been a C.I.A. operative, and I have:. never dorre the, things, that uninformed journalists like Mr. Lukas are telling, the general public I did, And I wish., all these "experts" would read the Rockeieller Commission Report before.. they. rush into print with things ? they've heard but really know nothing about. Roamer F. BENNiar Wocsala' nd Hills, Calif., April 21, 197E Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010040000-3-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 BALTIMORE SUN 30 April 1976 Castro Kennedy lots tied Mathias tells of possible Paris contact ? By JIM MANN ? Washington Bureau of The Sun ? Washington ? Senator Charles McC. Mathias, Jr. (R., Md.) disclosed yesterday the Senate intelligence committee will soon publicly report on the ."strong likelihood" of connec- tions between American plots . to kill Cuban Premier Fidel !Castro and the assassination of : John F. Kennedy. If such a report were issued, it would become the first time that any branch of the federal government ever linked the. Kennedy assassination to the Central Intelligence Agency's designs on 'Mr. Castro's life, which were first confirmed by the Senate intelligence commit- tee last year.. .. ? . ? The senator, a member of the intelligence committee, said there are now "indica- tions" that a Cuban official and CIA operative code-named Am- Lash?who was in Paris No- vember 22, 1963,- secretly 're- ceiving from the CIA a poison pen directed at Mr. Castro? was an "insecure" contact; Mr. Mathias suggested the man might have been a double-agent reporting back to the Cubans. For the first time- in his career, Mr. Mathias, in a lunch- eon address, publicly expressed strong doubts about the Warren ? Commission report, which con- cluded that Lee Harvey. Oswald ; acted alone in killing former President Kennedy. The sena- tor said he thought the commis- sion members "were simply de- nied information that might have had a bearing on their judgment." He later said both ? the CIA and the FBI held back information from the commis- sion. ? ? . . "If the Warren Commission had known that Am-Lash was in Paris receiving a poison pen the day Kennedy was assassinated, we would have had a 24th [additional] volume to their re- port," the senator said. In addi- tion, he said, Americans would have been "alerted" at that time to CIA activities. ? ? At the time of the CIA plots against Mr. Castro, Mr. Ma- thias, said, "There is reason to think Cuban intelligence was aware spaiettutel was going on .The degree they were will- ing to retaliate is unclear." But he pointed out that in 1963, Mr. Castro publicly threatened to retaliate if there were plots against him. Mr. Mathias also told a re- porter the subject of the Kenne- dy assassination came up brief- ly during the recent trip he and Senator James G. Abourezk (D., S.D.) made to the Middle East. He said Syria's president, Hafez el Assad, asked them when the American people were going to be told the truth about the as- sassination. But, he said, the ' conversation quickly returned to affairs of the Middle East. Though Mr. Mathias has not previously questioned the War- ren Commission report, another member of the intelligence committee, Senator Richard S. Schweiker (R., Pa.) did so last year. Since that time, Mr. Schweiker and Senator Gary Hart (D., Colo.) have been con- ducting their own investigation of the assassination for the in- telligence committee. A spokesman for Mr. Schweiker said yesterday that five staff members have been working full-time on the Kenne- dy assassination and that they may receive help soon from other members of the intelli- gence committee who have now finished the major portions of the committee's report. The report was released this week, but the addendum to it, ' concerning the Kennedy assas- sination, will not be released until the end of May, Senate staff members said. The intelligence committee reported in November that Am- Lash, a Cuban agent, on the day of the Kennedy assassination was meeting in Paris with a high-ranking CIA official, Des-fl Fitzgerald, who offered him a poison pen rigged with a hypodermic neddle for use against Mr. Castro. According to the report, Am-Lash rejected the offer, telling the CIA he thought they "could come up with something more sophisti- cated than that." It was only one of a long se- ries of CIA plots against Mr. Castro, according to the report. Mr. Castro himself, in an inter- view with an Associated Press correspondent in Havana on September 7, 1963, warned, "United States leaders should think that if they are aiding ter- rorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders, they themselves will not be safe." The final report of the War- ren Commission said the mem- bers had investigated "literally dozens of allegations of a con- spiratorial contact between Lee Harvey Oswald and the Cubai government" but was unable to find any substantial evidence of contact. Mr. Castro both in a televi- i ? ! sion interview and reportedly in a meeting with Senator Abourezk, has denied any in- volvement in the Kennedy as- sassination. In the television in- terview he said he was "under the impression that Kennedy's assassination was organized by reactionaries in the United States...." Levi finds no FBI tie to slaying of King Washington Bureau of The Sun Washington?Edward H. Levi, the Attorney General, an- nounced yesterday that a pre- liminary inquiry by his depart- ment turned up no evidence of any connection between the FBI and the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., but he ordered another, more thor- ough review by another branch of the Justice Department. The King assassination was studied for several months by an assistant attorney general, J. Stanley Pottinger, of the Jus- tice Department's Civil Rights Division. Mr. Pottinger said yesterday he reviewed the FBI's "core files" regarding Dr. King and found no evidence of FBI involvement in his assassi- nation, although he said there was considerable evidence the FBI had sought to discredit the civil rights leader. Mr. Pottinger originally had recommended that an inde- pendent commission be estab- lished to review the King assas- sination more thoroughly. But the attorney general instead as- signed that task to the Justice Department's office of profes- sional responsibility. The full review of the King files requires so much work. Mr. Pottinger said, that he could not "do his job" as assis- tant attorney general for civil rights and complete the inquiry , at the same time. ? He said Mr. Levi felt the in- tegrity of the Justice Depart- ment was strong enough so that it could itself investigate the King assassination and the FBI without assigning the task to an independent commission. NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, MAY 14, 1976 .125 Questioned by Investigators On Intelligence Study Disclosure By RICHARD D. LYONS rpects.1 to The is:m York Times WASHINGTON, May I3?The the investigation, gave a two- hour progress report to the? ethics committee today in a closed session.. - ? . . . When questioned by news- men after the meeting, Mr. Flynt said "I am not going to get into a numbers game" when - asked how many suspects had been turned up. He also de- detectives hired by the House ethics committee.- to investigate . . the unauthorized 'disclosure, of the report of the House Select Committee .on Intelligence, have questioned 125 . persons hut have yet to identify the source, the chairm.an of the inquiry said today. Representative John J. Flynt, the Georgia Dorkierat: who heads. the ethics committee, said it would probably be a month before his force of 12 retired ? agents of the Federal .Bureau of Investigation com- pleted their inquiries. ? Flynt said it was possible that, once the investigation was over, the ethics committee, for- mally named .the House Com- mittee of Standards of Official Conduct, would hold. public .hearings en- the matter. ? - At issue is who transmitted a copies of the report to news; men including Daniel Schoor, a correspondent here for ,CBS News, . For six weeks, the former F.B.I. agents have been ques- tioning representatives who. served on the select committee, headed by Representative Otis G. Pike; Democrat of Suffolk, their staff aides and personnel who served on the Committee, now disbanded. - David Rowers, the former F.B.I. inspector who is directing 6 dined to say whether Mr. iSchorr.had been questioned. '''Tbe release of the progress report would compromise the remainder of the investigation," the chairman said, adding that he expected the investigation to be completed "well within six weeks."' The intelligence committee prepared a report highly criti- cal of the Central Intelligence Agency and other Federal intel- ligence-gathering groups after a long- investigation. Reports of the document's contents ap- peared In The New York Times and -on CBS News. Last Jan. 29, the House voted not to mite. the. report public. But in February, Mr. Schorr made 'a copy of the report avai- 1 'able .. to The -Village Vice, R weekly newspaper in New York 'City. The -breach of secrecy en- raged many ? representatives, and the House voted for the investigation that is now being carried out by the ethics com- mittee. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 Approirecl -For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 THE NATIMAT, OBSERVER 15 MAY 1976 Our Passive, Timid CIA Needs ? By Greg-c:ry. G. Rtis. hford ?;? HE CLASSIC intelligence failure . Pearl Harbor, when U.S. intercepts?o the Japanese attack plans remained untranslated In a low-priority . "Incoming' basket, sparked the creation Of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) after World War H. Because the Japanese attack hinged on complete surprise, an intelligence warning would have made a difference. That knowl- edge remains the driving force behind the billions devoted to foreign analysis by the CIA and Its sister agencies in the Defense and State departments: ? Gregory G. Itushford was an investt? Leadership gator for the House Intelligence Com- mittee in its recent investigation of the , CM. Despite the billians spent, the United States has been caught unprepared time and time again because?there is no kinder way to put it?our intelligence has failed. Even if we assume the CIA would be able to detect a nuclear attack on the United States in, ad- vance, which I do not, continued failures to anticipate important foreign developments make the conduct of a sound foreign .policy increasingly .difficult. To ignore our intelli- gence system's flaws?continuing flaws that stem from an uncertain leadershipeTis.to risk our very security: -. ? To examine the record, the House Intent- gence-Committee? selected six major foreign- policy turning ?points at random: the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the 1068 Tet offensive in South Vietnam, the 1973 Mid- dle East war, the 1974 coups in Cyprus and Portugal, and India's 1974 nuclear explosion. (Because the House has voted not to release the committee's findings, this article is de- rived from the public record.) Intelligence Failures We knew that Czechoslovakia had dashed the Johnson Administration's hopes for nu- clear-arms talks with the Russians; that Tet cost thousands of lives; that the Middle East war resulted in the Arab oil embargo, a high cost to the U.S. in terms Of military assisz tame to Israel, and risked U.S.-Soviet con- flict. We knew that the coups in Portugal and Cyprus had raised the possibility of Com- munist influence in a NATO ally and hurt our relationships with Greece and Turkey. We knew that India's nuclear explosion threatened the spread of nuclear .weapons. . We did not know Intelligence failures had contributed to each unfortunate situation. But we know it now. U.S. intelligence agencies, we found, had collected a considerable Indy of excellent information, often at great cost and risk. But the 'information was not always made avail- able to those who needed it. Written esti- mates lacked perspective. A few courageous analysts who sounded alarms were not fully supported by their more cautious superiors. Technical breakdowns prevented valuable in- formation from reaching Washington until after the event had passed. Policy officials In the State Department, the White House, and Pentagon who were emotionally com- mitted to their particular policies, regardless of facts, hindered analysis. Post mortems of intelligence failures tended to 'chime mid- level analysts, yet the real problems were caused by the leadership. And the intelli- gence leadership lacks the stature to with- stand political pressures that threaten to cor- rupt the entire system. After the 1073 Middle East intelligence failure, the CIA acknowledged that the "ma- chinery" of which the imolyst was a part had not always cased an exceedingly difficult task. The two most visible parts of that. ma- chinery, or bureaucracy, are current-intelli- gence publications and national intelligence estimates. Neither runs well. Our intelligence agencies cannot report timely and accurate information consistently. The initial and most obvious sign shows tip in what the current-intelligence publications said at the time of key foreign events. The morning that Archbishop Makarios Of Cyprus was overthrown by Greek strong man Dimi- trios Ioannidis, the cm wrote that "General Ioannidis takes moderate line while playing .for time in dispute with Makarios." The intelligence agencies had observed signs of Arab military mobilization for more than a week prior to Oct. 6, 1973, when Egypt and Syria attacked Israel. But current-intel- ligence reporting provided reassurances that neither ? Egypt nor Syria would go to war. ? ? In the months prior to the April 1974 coup . in Portugal, at least four signs of serious political discontent--including an abortive military coup?surfaced in the press. Yet current-intelligence writings followed the sound and fury, not significance, of each "hard news" development. As the director of State Department intelligence, William Hyland, told our committee, "There was enough information to suggest trouble, but it wasn't really subjected to a detailed analysis and a projection of where the trends might. be going." ? Too ? Many Pressures . Current-intelligence publications suffer from lack Of depth not because those who 'write them are unimpressive. Most mid-level ' analysts who write Current intelligence are knowledgeable individuals. But they are vic- timized by the pressures imposed on able people by the bureaucracy. There are too many intelligence, publica- tions: spot-reports, instant summaries, daily reports, morning and afternodn reports for the Secretary of State, Presidential briefs, memoranda, communications-intelligence summaries, national-intelligence dailies, weekly summaries. Analysts have meetings to attend, superiors to please (often by soft- ening bold judgments), "positions" of their office to "co-ordinate" with other offices RN agencies, deadlines to meet. There is pre- cious little time left to think and write well. Those who read current intelligence often complain about its redundancy, duplication, and poor analysis. During Cyprus alone there were 86 messages classified "CRITIC," or critically important, yet "the significance of.. many . . . was obscure," the CIA found. The National Security Agency (NSA), which intercepts and decodes foreign corn- MUnications, preduccs raw reports that are nearly incomprehensible to the lay reader; the written summaries are understandable to few. The NSA collects so much data that it must shred or burn more than 30 tons of paper each day; it is literally burying itself An classified information. NSA spews forth so much data that the analyst Is burdened with hundreds Of NSA reports per week, the CIA complains. During the Cyprus crisis, readers complained about "an excess of cryptic raw reports from NSA which *could not be translated by lay readers," as the CIA puts It. The few who can comprehend NSA reports often have no (line left to compare them with other intelligence. So Intelligence puzzles are left half-assembled. U.S. Intelligence cannot follow trends much better than It follows day-to-day events because of weaknesses in the estima- 7 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 ' Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000109400003-0 live system. Before Tet, U.S. officials had anticipated *attacks in Vietnam's highlands and northernmost provinces, but not simul- taneous strikes at nearly every urban center. Our intelligence estimates had?in the CIA's words?so "degraded our image of the en- emy" that we were unaware the Communists were capable of such attacks. The CIA's post mortem of the 1974 Cyprus crisis reports that analytical performance "fell quite short of the ?mark," particularly. because Of the "failure in July to estimate the likelihood Of a Greek-sponsored coup against Archbishop. Makarlos." ? After the Middle East war in October 1973, ? the CIA realized there had been no National Intelligence Estimate--.report prepared from time to time?on the likelihood of war since May?and that estimate had only addressed the next few weeks. A brilliant analysis pre- pared by the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, also in May, told then Secretary of State William Rogers that the Arabs mightr well resort to war by au- tumn. That "wisdom," as the CIA rightly called It, was forgotten in October. The latest National Intelligence Estimate prior to Portugal's 1974 coup was prepared in 1994. The National Intelligence Officer (NIO) system at the top of the analytical hierarchy Is weak and is responsible for the poor quali- ty of estimates preceding the Portugal, Cyp- rus, and Middle East crises. NIOs work un- der the director of the CIA, in his capacity as head of the entire intelligence community. Their influence varies with the CIA direc- tor's influence. If he's powerful., their voice Is strong. If he's 'weak, their Influence Is too. The NIO for Western Europe, an able man, has more than 20 countries to cover. But he has just one staff assistant. Instead of command authority over the time of an- alysts in the CIA and other agencies, the NIO must "cajole and plead" for assistance, as one close observer told me. When Turkey was preparing to invade Cyprus, an NIO memorandum that predicted the invasion was never disseminated: The NIO was busy preparing a briefing before the U.S. Intelli- gence Board on a National InteWgence Esti- mate for Italy. Most NIOs have regional responsibilities, yet some crucial issues, such as nuclear proliferation, cannot be covered in regional terms. There has been no NIO for Africa. The value of the NIO system is consider- able to busy policy officials who need quick answers, say before a Kissinger shuttle to the Middle East. But the very closeness of NIQs to policy makes the system vulnerable to pressures that can destroy the Indepen- dence of their analyses. This is a far cry front the expectations of some of its founders that the CIA would provide independent analysis of long-term trends. When the Germans began losing World War II, Hitler began disregarding accurate Intelligence evaluations that conflicted with the Nazi line. This lesson (fortunately for us) J s worth remembering always, especially when thinking of the Vietnam War. Just as Vietnam tore our society, it caused great pressures inside U.S. intelli- gence agencies. The basic problem was ac- curate intelligence that cast doubt on -the wisdom Of Vietnam policy. That doubt be- came heresy when the policy stakes rose. The. first National Intelligence Estimate that I'm positive was "shaded" to reflect policy officials' optimism was published in early 1963. That estimate was first weakened during the drafting' process to reflect the Kennedy Administration's hopeful views. The draft estimate had forecast lona-range prob- lems with our South Vietnamese allies with- out Increased U.S. support. Instead Of heed- ing such sound advice, the Administration Influenced the CIA to weaken it. The CIA uncovered evidence in 1965 and 1967 indicating the U.S. military command had understated Communist strength, that there probably were more than 500,000 en- emy personnel, not the prevailing?and pub- lic?estimate of fewer than 300,000. The CIA's efforts to provide honest intel- ligence ran directly into the overriding pub- lic-relations concerns of military and civilian policy makers. Like used-car salesmen, mili- tary officials tried strenuously to set the mileage back. If the higher figures became known to those who had an "incorrect view" of the war, the Saigon command cabled to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the command's "image of success" would be undermined: The military fought so fiercely with the CIA's figures in Saigon in Septem- ber 1967 that two categories of irregular Communist forces were dropped from the official order of battle: Immediately thereafter the Saigon command pre- pared press briefings on the war's prog- ress that one CIA official labeled "one :of. the greatest snow jobs since Po- temkin constructed his village." ? An- other CIA analyst termed the military numbers "contrived," "phony," and !`controlled by the desire to stay be- low" the 300,000 public estimate. . After the Tet offensive began, the Defense Intelligence Agency agreed there were at least 500,000 Communist .forces in Vietnam, and the Joint Chiefs asked for more American soldiers to ? fight them. A Rancorous Uebate A good example of policy abuse of ? Intelligence in the State Department is shown in a memorandum State Intelli- gence was asked ,to send to Assistant ; Secretary William Bundy in September ; 1967. "Unclassified" findings that could ? be made public said 'enemy morale and recruitment were declining and Viet ; Cong defections .were increasing. But ' facts directly contradicting each Of '-these points, and more, were classified secret on "national security" grounds: ? Enemy morale problems were Of no great military import; defections were Increasing less than In the previous year; and enemy recruitment statistics Were Unreliable. , American intelligence still suffers because officials who could not hide their disgust at such tactics found their careers threatened. Those who kept quiet' were promoted. By 1973 the Vietnam debate had be- tome so rancerous? it helped destroy the respected Board of National Estimates. The board, an interagency body of intel- ligence experts responsible for esti- ,mates, had. become moribund in the :eyes of some. Moribund or not, the board fought for the integrity of its Vietnam estimates to the bitter end. ; Three persons close to the board have told me they knew the battles were nearly finished when one of President. , Nixon's favorite press leaks wrote that 'It,was unlikely 'Nixon's sharp eye had escaped the "gloomy" CIA estimates on Vietnam and that changes in the es- timative hierarchy were needed. Shortly thereafter a new CIA director? a Nixon "team player" and a Vietnam- policy supporter?abolished the board for the weaker NIO system. The lesson of Pearl Harbor has not been absorbed by the CIA leadership. The "watch committee" that met, to as- sess the outbreak of war in the Middle East on Oct. 6, 1973?after hostilities had begun?could not discuss certain 8 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 ApProved-For Release 200110&108-: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 ? classified information because not everyone present was cleared to re-.. ceive it. Other classified information that would have been helpful to an- alysis was not disseminated until the war had begun. Similar problems plagued the Cyprus and other crises. The lack of dissemination of intelli gence controlled by Secretary of State Kissinger is disturbing .because it re- veals the CIA leadership's lack of sta. ure. nigh Intelligence .and policy offi- cials.recognize the intelligence value in diplomatic discussions. To study the nuances of these conversations for their hidden meanings, and to compare this Information with other findings, Is es- sential for accurate intelligence: Prior to the 1973 Middle East war, Kissinger was engaged in intensive dis- cussions with Soviet, Arab, and Israeli officials. According to The Secret Conversciti.,3ns of Henry Kissinger by Israeli journalist Matti Golan, .Kis. singer later told Israeli Premier Golcia Meir that an Egyptian official had hinted at pcssible war, but he dis- missed this as an empty threat. U.S. intelligence was denied access to the discussions which might have assisted analysis. During the Cuban missile crisis .of 19132?a notable intelligence success? President Kennedy and his staff worked intimately with senior intelligence offi- cials. Yet Secretary Kissinger did not even consult his intelligence arm in the .THE MINNEAPOLIS TRII3UNE 27 April 1976 ? State Department prior to the U.S. troop alert of Oct. 24, 1973, which alleg- edly r!arne in response to Soviet threats to intervene with military force against , Israel, Testimony before the House In- telligence Committee that "'certainly the technical intelligence available in INR [State Department intelligeneel did not support such a Soviet intention" raises the question: Did the United States risk war without. justification? Embarrassed Officials The CIA ?complained after the Cy- prus crisis that "analysis . . May also have suffered as the result of the nona- vailability of certain key categories of Information, specifically those asso- ciated with private conversations be- . tween U.S. policy makers and certain principals in the dispute." The CIA added: "Because ignorance of such matters could substantially damage the ability to analyze events as they unfolct, In this or in any future crisis, the prob- lem is serious and one which should be addressed by the [intelligence] corn- 'rrtunity and by policy makers as well." ? Yet CIA officials were so embar- rassed when I esked them which policy .makers they had in mind that the name of one of Kissinger's principal aides was excised from the House InteiH- gence Committee copy of the Cyprus pest mortem. The phrase "key U.S. of- ficial" was typed in its place. Such in- formation is still "nonavailable" to the . CIA on such important issues as U,S.- Most approve U.S. intelligence work- but not covert activities copv? 1976 Minneapolis Tribune Minnesota Poll ? Minnesotans approve of the cloak but not the dagger in United States : espionage operations,. the Minne- apolis Tribune's Minnesot a.Poll ? finds. . Nearly six out of every 10 State residents interviewed in an opinion survey last month (59 percent) said they generally approve of spying to gather intelligence information. Thirty-two percent said they dis- approve and 9 percent are not sure. The figures are the reverse when it comes to the United States con- : ducting secret operations ;n other countries. Thirty-two percent ap- prove and 59 percent disapprove. .Middle-aged men with Republican jeenings who attended college are 'more likely to approve of U.S. in- telligence activities, if the survey data are used as a guide. Minnesota women who did not go to college, who are young adults or of senior-citizen age and Nvho. are DELers or independent .voters are a good bet to be critics of U.S. es- pionage efforts. U.S. undercover operations abroad, normally a subject left to the im- agination, have had ii n cornon public exposure as Congress has scrutinized the work of the Central ? Intelligence Agency and other in- telligence units.. A balanced sampling of 593 Minne- sota men and women first was asked in telephone interviews tak, en March 11-14: ? "Some people say that gathering intelligence . information a b o ut other countries through espionage is necessary to protect our na- tional security. Others say that such aLtivities violate the rights of other countries and should not be a part of our foreign policy. In general, do you approve or disap- prove of United States espionage activities?" Men approve by more than a ;1-1 margin, while nearly as many wom- en..disapprove as approve: Approve Disapprove .Not sure All whirrs Man Women' rig% 72% 47% 32 22. 41 . 9 6 12 4---- 100% 100% 100% -The ?findings in a carefully con- ducted survey simply are estimates of the results that would be ob- tained if all men and women in the state had been interviewed. 9 China relations. ' Third-Level, Assistant In 1973 some intelligence officials were greatly concerned that Kissinger might be suppressing intelligence re- lated to alleged Soviet violations of the SALT agreement. Two of them recom- mended that acting CIA Director Ver- non Walters (who has announced he plans to retire soon) approach the Pres- ident to ensure that Kissinger's condect. was authorized. Walters, following the pattern he established when Nixon's aides had tried to abuse the CIA in the Watergate affair, never approached the President. CIA Director Colby later got. in the habit of writing to Kissing.n's aides for permission to disseminate cer- tain Intelligence concerning Soviet nuclear-arms matters. Thus the Presi- dent's statutory intellieence adviser was reduced to a thirdeceel assistant. Kissinger' aides justify this by citing numerous leaks that seemed desined to undercut SALT policy., ? Such timidity does nct, encourage one to believe the CIA is ecluiPPed to re- sist the inevitable encroachments from dominating Presidential ti.ssistants... The CIA has become not the "roetue ele- phant," some fear, but a eassive circus pray, ridden at will by Peeskiential as- sistants. Newly appointed CIA Director George Bush wouldeke well-advieed to attract new leadership. ....- The next question was: ? "Some people say that our gov- ernment should engage in secret activities to, influence events in other countries, so as to rnaintain our national security. Others say that such secret activities are a violation of the internal affairs of foreign countries. In general, do you approve or disapprove-of sec- ret efforts by the United States to influence events in foreign coun- tries?" The replies: ? All adults Men Women Approve 40% 25% Disapprove 59 53 63 Not sure .........9 7 12 100% 100% 100% Again, more women held negative views than do men, but the differ- - ence is not as pronounced as on the earlier question. Opinions also fluctuated by age, political party affiliation and education. The fol- lowing table shows t hose differ- ences for both questions with the ? "not sure" count not shown. ? United States Espionage Goan:Ana Secret intelligence A?-. D,OVO DiSOP. P,OVO Di10{/??? Alt 59% 32% 32% 59% DFLers 57 35 30 61 . Ind.-Republicans 68 27 37 64 ? Independents... 58 32 31 60 Less than high. school grad . 47 Digit school 34. -31 ' 50 ' graduate .... 59 . 34 36 ? 53 Some college .. 65 29 * 28 66 35-49 years 75 - 617, 37 ? 60 .. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, MAY 12, 1976 Senate Chiefs Back Single Panel To Watch C .1 . A. and Its Budget By DAVID E. ROSENBAUM Spedal to The New YL,rk Times WASHINGTON, May 11 which voted to give the new .Senate leaders reached a corn- committee no law-making or b promise agreement today on audgetary authority. Senator plan to create a permanent new committee with exclusive au- thority to monitor the Central Intelligence Agency and author- ize funds for the agency's op- erations. Despite the continued oppo- Byrd led the effort in the Rules Committee to strip the new committee of real power. Sources privy to the negotia- tions that led to the comprom- ise said that Senator Byrd had become convinced that his ad- vocacy of a weak intelligence oversight committee would da- sition of some conservative sen- mage his prospects of becoming ators of both parties, the plan majority leader next year upon is expected to be approved this ,Senator Mansfield's retirement. week by a large margin in the His candidacy is supported full Senate, by older, conservative Demo- crats such as. John C. Stennis The adoption of the compro- of Mississippi and John L. Mc- mise by four key Senators ap- Clellan of Arkansas, who would parently averted a ? full scale have to give up to the new floor fight between members of committee some of their long- the Senate's old guard and held jurisdiction- over intel- younger, more reform-minded ligence inatters senators. However, the sources said, Such a fight might have had Mr. Byrd feared that by appear- major implications for the con- ing to carry the spear for the test for On Senate majority old Guard Senators he would leadership next year. lose considerable support The compromise was devised amonerb w younger senators, ho wantto keep tighter Congres- sional reins on the intelligence agencies. Senator Byrd was a home in West Virginia today. He is a ;ovorite son candidate for Pres- ident in today's Democratic presidential primary there. . , For a time, since Senator Mansfield announced he would by Mike Mansfield of Montana, the majority leader; Robert C: Byrd of West Virginia, . the majority whip; Abraham A. Ribicoff. of Connecticut, chair- man of the Government Opera- tions Committee, and Howard W. Cannon of Nevada, chair- man of the Committee on Rules retire, the race to become ma- and Administration. All are fority leader appeared to be be- Democrats. Senator Hugh Scott of Penn- sylvania, the Republican leader,, was consulted and agreed to accept the plan. . The critical element Of the agreement was the concession by Mr. Byrd and Mr. Cannon that the new committee could have the power to limit the Central Intelligence Agency's budget and restrict its opera- tions. For his part, Senator Ribicoff agreed that the new committee would have to share jurisdiction over other intelligence agencies with existing committees. Au- thority over the budget for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, for instance, would be shared with the Judiciary Committee, and authority over the Defense Intelligence Agency Would he shared with the Armed Serv- ices Committee. The central finding of the Senate Select Committee on In- power,... Senator Humphrey, telligence Activities in its re- would take an active role on port last month was that Con- the other side in the expected gross had exercised far too little floor fight. control over the intelligence If the compromise is acceptdd agencies. The committee recommended ? by the full Senate, as expected, the creation of a new Senate' . it will mean that Congress Will committee with broad power to: vote each year on the money regulate the work and expendi-i ' to run intelligence agencies, something it has not done: be- fore. . ...; Persons experienced in chtt ment Operations Committee ing le.g,islaiion said. that j.fin.; I voted to create Such a commit-1 could not comprehend ? 410/+7 tee. But. its work was overt urn- Congress could /mad: such an. ed two weeks ago by Senator authoriiation hitt without tmk- ing public the amount of turids Cannon's Rules Committee, authorized. t2... tween Mr. tyrd and Senator Edmund S. Muskie of Maine' With-Mr. Byrd the odds on . fa- vorite. However the picture has be- come complicated by the deci- ,sion of Senator Hubert H.'Hum. phrey not to seek the Presiden- cy and to run for re-election to the Senate from Minnesota. Senator Humphrey is poSsibly the most popuar Democrat in the Senate. Many Senate Demo- rats are now predicting that .Mr. Humphrey will run for ma- jority leader, that Mr. Muskie will drop out of the race and ;that Mr. Humphrey will have an excellent chance to defeat Mr. Byrd. The gossip around the Senate last week was that, if Mr. Byrd pressed his effort to strip the new intelligence committee tif law-making and budgetary tures of all intelligence agen- cies. Senator Rihicoff's Govern- OREGONIAN, Portland 24 April 1976 CIA in new hands \ The unexpected resignation of Lt. Gen. Ver- non Walters as deputy director of the Centrall Intelligence Agency and the nomination of El Henry Knoche as .his replacement indicate that the White House intends that the CIA concen- trate on its original mission ? intelligence gath- ering and analysis ? rather than on clandestine operations. : President Ford's choice of diplomat-politician George Bush as CIA director pointed in that direction. Bush's two predecessors, Richard Helms and William E. Colby, both rose to the directorship through CIA ranks in the Plans Division, which was identified in congressional hearings as the source of such questionable oper- ations as domestic spying and incipient plots to assassinate foreign officials. Knoche has been in the CIA for 23 years, but his service has been chiefly in intelligence analy- sis, with no hint of involvement in "dirty tricks," in the United.States or abroad. It may also be significant that, if the Senate confirms the Knoche nomination, as is necessary under the law, it will be the first time since the founding of the CIA in 1947 that a military man has not filled at least one of the two top positions in the agency. The CIA grew out of the World War II Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and inherited much of the personnel and the point of vieW developed in confrontation_with wartime enemies. If the trend suggested by the Bush-Knoche team engulfs the CIA, it will be a very good thing. In the world as it is today, the United States must have an effective organization for the gathering and evaluation of intelligence to aid in the nation's defense. But it does not need an agency that is the source of the kinds of "dirty tricks" that discredit the essential func- tion of intelligence. ? President Ford's reorganization Of the CIA, announced a few weeks ago, suggested that this is his view of the issue. His latest switch in CIA leadership appears to confirm it. 10 PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER . 6 MAY 1 976 News focus. Sen. Howard Baker (R., Tenn.) de- clares he'Os satisfied at last that the CIA was pot ? involved in. Watergate. i As an early?Watergate..investigator, Baker deieloped. a concern that the . agency. raity have had-more. than-a pellpherah role in the affair, so he had investigators work for?months on all angle*/ the matter, lie is .still disturbed some "nap,girig.. ques- tions" onvhich no evidence is avail- able. But pe. declared that in fairness it was tinte:to.exculpate the CIA... ? 0 0 ? When George Bush became direc- tor .of thcCIA, the agency's de-bug- Ting expErs gave his home a thor- ough going-over to insure that no terring dayices had been planted. They found no electronic bugs but they did ;And termites, a nuisance which they Were .not ? equipped to combat. O.Bush had to call the ter- mite manlike any citizen, .? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 Approlied For Release-2001108/08 : CIA=RDP77-00432R0001004000034,------- ? - ? WdElhington Post 2 May 1976 Was the CIA's Mau in Havana a Double Agent? By George Crile HI 434 LASH is the cryptonym the CIA as- -.tisigned to the senior Cuban Official it had recruited in 1961 to kill Fidel Castro. The Agency's dealings with AM LASH, which con- tinued up to a disastrous end in 1965, encom- passed the longest-standing anti, on the sur- face, the most likely to succeed of its numer- ous plots on Castro's life. It therefore seems a remarkable suspension of curiosity that the Senate Intelligence Committee, in its investi- gation of the CIA's assassination activities, passed so lightly over this critical chapter. To begin with, any examination of AM LASH's history would suggest that he had for many years been far too close to insanity to be relied on in any sensitive operation. And from this a larger question presents itself. Was AM LASH actually a conscious double agent for Castro, or was he perhaps so trans- parent and emotionally exploitable that he unwittingly provided, an equivalent service? And if so, and if Castro had become con- ? vinced that the United States would Stop at nothing to kill him, could Castro have felt compelled to strike first? AM LASH has never been publicly named. ? But his history is well known among Cuban exiles in Miami. He was a Cuban doctor, a for- mer comandante of the rebel army, a hero of athe revolution: Rolando Cubela, an intimate of Castro. The CIA persuaded the Senate In- telligence Committee not to identify Cubela, who is now in jail in Cuba. It maintains that alerting the Cubans to his role in early CIA plots would expose him to reprisals. But this argument is specious. The Cuban government is filled with men who know Cu- bela and his history and who must have read the Church. Committee's report. It is difficult to believe that Cubela now has any secrets from his captors. The only people who stand to gain from continued secrecy are those all too eager conspirators at the CIA. For the rest of .us this story is essential if we are to- begin to make sense of the events surround- ing the secret but deadly struggle that was being fought in the autumn of 1963. The Tortured Assassin ()UNDERSTAND Cubela fully. it is nec- essary at once to introduce a Cuban ex- ile in Miami, Jesse Aleman, whose assertions are sufficiently important to make it worth' reviewing his rceord for reliabditN',. Aleman was educated in the United States at 'Worcester Academy and then at the Uni- versity of Miami. During the 1940s. his .father At as .perhaps the most powerful man in Cuba. Nominally minister of education, he was a heavily guarded boodler and boss, whose, most rewarding coup was to back a truck?lip to the Cuban treasury and make off with the Republic's foreign reserves. in Miami, he CHI(' is WdshingiOn editOr of Ito rper'a "trawl Zin o nd Iii?rr Imo eubou OpetOhOns., beak on lac 'a b? ought up most of Key Biscayne, retained Sen. George Smathers as his lawyer and in- vested as heavily in American politicians as in American real estate. ss them. Cubela had always been suspicious of Castro. But now he was one of the towering figures of the revolution, with an independ- ent following. Castro needed his support. and Cubela responded to his advances by accept- ing an offer to become head of the politically powerful federation of students at the Uni- versity. , 1 -acubela exalted in. his new-found sta- Ws as a triumphant revolutionary. .1t :drove about. Havana in a gigantic tour- ng scar, drinking and womanizing. He avgs?blissful in his dissipation until he ,)all.jed a woman in a car accident, and akairr began hearing Rico at night. As before, he took to calling Aleman . - . vahenever he heard the voice. 'Aleman. now convinced that Castro as a Communist, had decided that Fi- de t had to be eliminaned. He says that went v. ith another revolutionary friend to convince Cubela to :take on the assienment. "He was very upset ? ? when we came to him." says Alernan. :Ile said, 'I'm a nervous wreck. I'm just .. - getting better, and now you want me to lilt Castro. I don't see the Communists, ,but if I recover, maybe I will ? I won't say yes, I won't say nci." Aleman was then paying for a psychiatrist for Cube- -la, and he persuaded the analyst, who -shared his political views, to try to con- ? bvince Cubela that the only way to exor- cise.Rico was by assassinating Castro. The man who accompanied Aleman -Was Jose (Pepin) Naranjo, an old revolu- tionary colleague who shared Alernan's - antstrua.t of Castro. But not long after the meeting Castro invited Naranjo to join his government as minister of into- -nor (director of all the nation's police forces). It was a move on Castro's part no win support among the rival factions Of the revolution. Understandably, Ale- man was alarmed; he expected to be ar- _rested. But nothing happened. It was a time of political paranoia .and Aleman assumed that Naranjo had decided to keep quiet so as not to arouse Castro's 'suspicion. a-. a, :When considering the possibility that stile Cubans were aware of Cubela's Jaters CIA plotting, it is worth bearing .Naranjo's subsequent story in mind. By 1960 he had risen meteorically tc a posi- tion of total trust with Fidel: it was he - 'who tasted Castro's food to make sure it Wasn't poisoned. Today he is constantly at Fidel's side. In a CBS documentary narrated by Dan Rather last year, Nar- anjo was seen taking Castro's gun and bandalero from him when Fidel settled hack to relax.: Somewhere along the line he proved his loyalty and managed to maintain Castro's trust --a a not in- His son chose a different path. A young, handsome idealist, he became, like Castro, a revolutionary ?against the Batista regime. While Castro was in the mountains, Aleman was helping to direct the most active and dangerous part of the 'revolution in Havana. Ile and four other young men ? including Eugenio Rolando Martinez, the Watergate burglar ? formed an underground cell that provided the arms for the almost. successful attack on the Presidential Palace in 1957. Cu- bela was then one of the leaders of the stu- dent revolutionaries at the University of Ha- vana, and he began to work closely with Mar- tinez and Aleman. ? "There were many nasty things we had to. do to bring on the revolution," Aletnan re-.. fleets. The most difficult was the decision to kill Blanco RICO, Batista's chief of military in- telligence. The revolutionary logic of that day called' for sparing sadistic officials be- cause of the hatred they aroused.. "Rico treated everyone like a gentleman. He wouldn't even torture people," Aleman ex- plains. So he had to be done away with. "Ro- lando Martinez] and I participated in the de- cision to get rid of him," and the man whom they assigned to kill him was Culiela. In October, 1956, Cubela shot Rico through the head in the fashionable Montmartre night club. As he died, Rico caught Cubela'S eyes and? Cubela believed, smiled under- standingly at him. Cubela escaped to Miami where. he moved into the TradeWinds one of the properties (including also the Mi- ami Stadium) which Aleman owned there. a A large number of revolutionaries had been forced. to flee Cuba at that time and many ended up staying at Aleman's expense at, the Tradewinds. Cubela was now a hero among these exiles, but he was tortured by the memory of Rico's dying smile. He was convinced that Rico was talking to him at night and he had a nervous breakdown. Mar- tinez, who had also gone into exile, shared a room with him and .served as his confessor, and analyst. After a few months Cubela ap- neared to have recovered and returned to? Cuba to join Castro's second front in the Es- cambray mountains. Castro made him a coma andante, then the highest rank in the Army, and when Batista fled Cuba on New Year's Day 1959, he swept into Havana several days, before Castro and led the force that seized the Presidential Palace, The Plottino. Be,rins z!, T Is HARD to imagine the confusion that marked the first year of revolutionary government. Not all the revolutionaries sup- ported Castro. Many, and particularly those who had worked in Havana, mistrusted Fidel deeply but not more than he mistrusted 11 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 considerable feat given the fact that Cubela was his number two man in the Interior Ministry at the time of his re- cruitment by the CIA. It is of some im- portance that Aleman told me about his meeting with Cubela and Naranjo a full six months before the Senate assassina- tion. report made the first public refer- ence to AM LASH. ? In iC0. several months after talking to Cubela. Aleman went into exile in Miami. He was to play no further role Cebela's life. But Cubela himself had by then bacome a MarIchurian candi- date,. at least Vulnerable to the surges- tin of killing Castro, hut also a colossal -seurity risk to whoever tried to tap his serylces, as he was being tapped by the - CIA at the time of Kennedy's assassina- tions; 1 111mi,, Risks . ? . 1. PERATION MONGOOSE, the se- cret war that the United States waged against Cuba after the Bay of Pigs, was not a CIA initiative. It was the product of the Kennedys and soon re- sulted in the establishment in Miami of the largest CIA station in the world ? with an estimated 400 American case officers and about 2,000 Cuban agents. charged with the sole task. of de- strOying Castro. But by 1963 Mongoose was a demonstrable failure. It was at this point that AM LASH emerged as the Agency's last hope to accomplish, With a single blow, the goal that had so stubbornly eluded them. . Cubela's relationship with the Agency had begun at his initiative in 1951 when he contacted both the CIA and the FBI, expressing a desire to de- fect. But Cubela was the rarest of assets ? an agent in the very heart of the en- emy system ? and the CIA did not want him to leave. His case officer's as- signment was to ensure that AM LASH "stay in place and report to us." At the beginning of September, 1963, Cubela finally agreed to stay if he "could do something really significant for the creation of a new Cuba." Ile told his case officer he would like to plan Castro's "execution." It was very shortly after this, on Sept. 7, 1063, that Castro summoned an Asso- ciated Press reporter, Daniel Harker, to issue an extraordinary threat: "United States leaders should think that if they are aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders, they themselves will not be safe." "There can be no question," observed Raymond Rocca, the CIA's liaison offi-. cer with the Warren Commission, "that this represented a more than ordinary, attempt by [Castro] to get a message on record in the United States." Indeed, it was impreceneeted ? even for Castro, who was in the habit of realeng all kinds of accusations and threats m the course of his seven and eight-hour-long .speeches. One possible explanation for the warning was the CIA's recent paramili- tary activities in Cuba. After the Cuban missile crisis of October, 1e.32. Kenne- dy, living up to the spirit as well as the letter of his non-invasion agreement with librushchev, had suspended /he: massive secret war the CIA had been waging against Cuba. But then in Au- gust, 1933, he suddenly reversed tits position and authorized 15 new com- mando raids; by the end of the month. the Agency had hit two major ind- ustrial targets. But however infuriating such strikes might have been, they hardly endan- gered Cuban leaders. Could Castro somehow have learned of the CIA's..A.M. LASH plotting? Cubela was not exactly a good security risk; even his case offi- cers were aware of their agent's inga- bility. One described /0.1 LeaSH's "mer- curial" temperament, telling how Ole bela had proposed Castro's "execution: only to become deeply disturbed when the case officer used the word "assazis nation." "It was not the act that he che jected to," the case officer wrote, akt. merely the choice of \cords used to de- scribe it. 'Eliminate' was acceptable." To the frustrated CIA men running the Cuban secret war it must hase seemed an .acceptable risk to put tip with Cubent's disturbed state of It was certainly worth giving him the assurances he demanded as a precondis tion to carrying out his plan. Accorclitg to his case officer, he requested Mili- tary supplies, a device with which tee protect himself if his plots against Ces- tro.were discovered and a meeting with Attorney General Robert Kennedy. ? The meeting was-set for Oct. 29. Ken- nedy did not attend, but Desmond ?Fitz- Gerald, a social friend bf the Kennedys, and the CIA roan in charge of the Cue ban task force, did; he presented him- self as Kennedy's personal representa- tive. Cubela was apparently satisfied with FitzGerald's credentials, for the two arranged to meet in Paris again en Nov. 22, when FitzGerald was to glen him an assassination device and to fine alize plans. ? ? At the meeting that day. FitzGerald gave AM LASH a ballpoint pen rigged with a hypodermic needle the pointat which was so firea that its victim would not notice the injection. According toa later CIA inspector general's repo:telt is likely that at the very moment Pr- dent Kennedy was shot, a CIA officer was meeting with a Cuban agent... and giving him an assassination device for use against Castro." ? "This fellow was nothing but a doa- ble agent," concluded Sen. Robert Mar- gan (D.N.C.1e a member of the Intellig- ence Committee who was briefed ty 'William E. Colby, then CIA director, en the AM LASH plot but was told nothing of Cubela's Carlier history. "When Colby told us we'd been meeting with AM LASH in Geneva, Paris and Madrid, it occurred to me, how could the guy get out of a little country like this au 12 easily? Colby said he could do it be- cause he was a high official. I asked Colby Who he [Cubela] was really work- ing for and Colby said, 'Senator, that's always a problem.' I was struck by how naive these people at the CIA seemed to have been." But perhaps a more reasonable ?con- elusion, based on Cubela's instability, is that, even if he were not a double agent, the Cubans were at least able to find out what he was conspiring to do. ?'or one thing, the Cuban intelligence the DGI ? and the Soviet KGB are Cose working partners, and it is un- :ely that one or the other organize- tit a would have left 50 senior and pe- en jar an official as Cubela unsurveyed on nis frequent trips abroad, ubela's ultimate fate seems to sup- pot : this theory. According to. the Cie: instector general's report, FitzGeraie left he meeting "to, discover that Pees', dent Kennedy had .been assassinated. Beca se of this fact, plans with At LASH changed and it was decided tnet we wo have no part in the assana- tion of a government leader ? includ- ing Cas rt. ? and would not aid AM LASH in tl is attempt." But the did continue to plot with AM LAS:: or another year. Incredibly. the Agen ?y apparently did not try to find out it there was something beyond coincident in the simultaneous events in Paris an 1 Dallas. A case officer con- tinued to n-. 'et with Cubela until a few months Ian e when a decision was made to ret ;e all direct contact be- tween Cubela and American case offi- cers, choosing instead to work through exile agents as cutouts." "AM LASH w. s told and fully under- stands that the United States Govern- ment cannot be (:)me involved to any degree in the 'fit t step' of his plan," Cubela's case offk :s.r wrote after Ken- nedy's death. "FYI " he added, "this is where B-1. could fit in nicely in Fiving any support he woul request." In the Senate Intelligence Commit- tee's report, B-1 is sin ply described as ? the leader of an anti-C:tstro group. Inc real life he is Manuel Arlene, the politi- cal chief of the CIA's Brigade 2.e.%at - the Bay of Pigs and after that Keene- dy's designated Cuban leader to organ- ize and direct the large CIA-sronsared commando operations run from bases in Nicaragua and Costa Rica. (Arti;ile is also the godfather of Howard Hunt's son and was actively involved in Hunt's activities at the time of 'Watergate.) ? Up until 1955 Artime's Central Amer- ican efforts had little if any success. It had taken hint months to get organized, partly because of the Agency's esoteric method of doing business. There were 'meetings in foreign countries, Swiss bank accounts, arms to be purchased through intermediaries in Luxembourg: and through cover corporations. seller" the Inn (Revolutionary Recovery Movement) finally got under way in MI, it was a week rained and ewe pped - Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 ',..444446404,4*.alig..10,10m8SSOMerkager aF?Aw:: Approved For Release-2001108/08 :CIA-RDP77-00-432R000100400003-0 force. Artime says that Robert Ken- nedy sent his 'congtatitlations via Ar. time's case officer after the first com- mando raid. But subsequent operations were not successful. Things always seemed to go wrong now that the exiles were left without American case officers to di- rect them. The Agency provided Ar- time with up-to-date intelligence, but the raiding parties inevitably would land in the wrong spot, run into bad . weather or meet some other obstacle. Morale was low at the cnin pa am there were rumors of smuqeling activities and embezzlement of funds. As before, the Cubela plot offered a last hope for a . touchdown pass . when the game seemed all but lost. Planned liendevous ? A RTIME openly? aclinowIedges his PI. part in the final- Cela plot. His descriptions of the arra nge.ments made with Cubela, which he related months before the Senate assassination investj-. gation, coincide with all of the senaters' findings. Ironically, neither Cubela nor .Artime knew that their initial contact had been se.cret.;y arranged by the CIA. An inspector general's report ex- plained that the Agency "contrived to put B-1 and AM LASH together in such a way that neither of them knew that the contact had been engineered by . CIA. The thought was that 13-1 needed a Man inside and AM LASH wanted a sil- enced weapon, which CIA was unwill- ing to furnish to him directly. By put- ting the two together, B-1 might get its . man inside Cuba and AM LASH might get his silenced weapon from B-1." ? Artime, who faithfully reported all of. his plans to his case officer, provided Cubela with a silencer and some "small, highly concentrated explosives." The two men worked out elaborate arrange- ments for Cubela's rate in the new Cu- ban government after the revolution and for the logistics of his escape. Ar- time was to land with his commandos as soon as Cubela struck. The assassina- tion itself was to be carried out at Vet-- ? adero Beach, where Castro was plan- ning to spend the Easter holidays at a house once owned by the DuPonts. Cu- bela stayed at a house close by; from there he planned to use the high pow- . ered rifle. -I had the U-2 photo of the beach," Artirne remembers. "At that moment we had 300 boys [his commandosj and I put them auTh the mother ships and in the communication ship with the two PT boats ready for the attack. Cubela was supposed to Call somebody in New York and say something like 'Look, the tobacco that they smoke now in Miami is not good. The good ,bacco is now in . Spain because it's the Cuban tobacco.' That would mean Fidel was in the house and the plot was on." The call was to be relayed to the CIA communi- cations benk in Miami and immediately to Artime's commandos at sea, -But the call never came." The circumstances surrounding the latter Cubela plot were suspicious from the start. By the time the final arrange- ments were made in 1935, they had be. 'come ludicrous. "I think Cubela's real Motive was a desire. to continue his playboy life," says ?Artinae. "I met hirn once in Rome, twice in Spain, and he was always drinking and having a good time. I gave him a lot of money and he spent it like mad." Several of the exiles involved in the plot turned out to be ev- ery bit as unreliable. They began to boast about the plan; it became an open secret in Miami. In June, 1965, the CIA finally termi- nated all contact with AM LASH and his associates. The explanation cited by the Church Committee report was "for reasons related to security." 'What ap- parently alerted the Agency to the questionable nature of the whole enter- prise was a strong indication that the Cuban exile agent it had used to put Ar- time and Cubela together was actually working for Castro. It was not until the beginning of 1966 that the Cuban authorities got around to arresting Cubela. He was charged with treason, including the attempted assassination of Fidel Castro.. At his trial in 1966 no one condemned Cubela more harshly than Cubela him- self. He ,called for the maximum sent- ence for himself ? to be shot against the wall ? and he seemed to confess to everything. But he did not mention ? nor did the prosecutors ask him about ?his earlier CIA plots. There appeared to be a studied attempt to avoid any public mention of Cubela's plotting be- fore 1964. Finally, Castro himself inter- vened on Cubela's behalf to ask for clemency. The would-be assassin was sentenced to 25 years in prison but is now reported to be at a state rehabilita- tion farm. The Central Question 41here strongly suggest that Ken- . ',THOUGH the events presented P. here and Castro;were loeked in a fierce secret struggIF until the end, there is another, often cited body of thought which believes the two men were seek- ing a mutual understanding. , For one thing, in the fall of 1953, Cas- tro had intermediaries approach Amer- ica's .deputy U.N. Ambassador .William. Attwood with an offer to open talks. Kennedy had authorize Attwood to tat:'e. Castro up on the offer and thc-y had agreed to a secret meeting in Cuba. Kennedy had even sent an' unofficial peace feeler through Jean Daniel, a French journalist who left Washingtol in mid-November to. interview Castro .. NATION 8 MAY 1916 more than raischieg . New York City ' ' . Re your editorial, "Night Work" Web. 141: Why do you, and others, persist in referring to CIA clandestine agents as "profes- sional mischief makers"? This "sweet," "lovable." "benign" description of operatives whose function is death and destruction is in other countries defuses your positive purpose of exposing these "night workers"' for what they are. Leonard Zimmerman '77 Daniel, who was lunching with Ca STri at the moment of Kennedy's death later portrayed the Cuban as being gen ninety shocked and bereaved by flu news. )3ut U.S. Cuban policy since the Ea; of 'Pigs had been boldly and consist ently, duplicitous, and no man knec . this better than Fidel Castro. One nee( only listen to his fury in October aftert hurricane had ravaged Cuba and hit .CIA had followed with a major cora rnando strike: "What does the: Unitet States do as we are mobilizing to recu perate from the hurricane?" he a5ket rhetorically. "They send saboteurs arms and pirate ships and explosives.. These were not the ordinary counter revolutionary. bands . The import ance is that it is an action carried otr by an, organism of the United State . government." Later in the month Castro capturec two of the Agency's Cuban comman dos,. but he waited a full- week befort forcing them to go on television to con fess to their assignments. Coincidental ly, this was two days after .AM LASH': meeting with FitzGeraid ? the meet. ing at which AM LASH appears to havt become convinced that the Kennedy: were backing his plot. The cemmandot ? gave a surprisingly full account of tiledt mission; they even gave the names 91 their case officers and the location ol their bases in Miami. Castro was infuri ated by the glib U.S. denials of involve ment and by the refusal of the Ameni can press to report the .attacks ever when confronted with evidence the} could easily substantiate. "You car see," he railed," that in this free. press they boast of, the press, the wire serv ices, the. CIA, everyone acts in unison elaborating and developing the same lie in order to disguise the truth."' Perhaps the central question here is whether Castro knew of Cubela's plot- ting and thus knew that the CIA and probably much higher authority was still trying to kill him. To Sen. Morgan, there is little doubt of Ibis. He thinks Castro, after learning of Cubeia's plot- ting, first tried to deter the CIA with his Public warning and that he then re- taliated when he learned of Cubela's subsequent meeting with FitzGerald ? now believing the Kennedys them- selves were responsible. "Just exactly how it happened I don't know and l? don't know if we'll ever know," but "there is no doubt in my mind that John Fitzgerald Kennedy. was assassi- nated by Fidel Castro or someone un- der his influence in retaliation for our efforts to assassinate him." ? C1275GeorgaCrils111 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 NEW YORK TIMES 9 May 1976 Criminal `Superpatriots' To the Editor: I am adding, I hope, to a flood of protest occasioned by your recent news article about C.I.A. agents who gavc LSD to people they picked up in bars. If your readers don't get angry at this sort of grotesque activity, I guess they will swallow anything, in- cluding, perhaps, drugs pressed on them by strangers who turn out to be representatives of the Government. _In the recent past I have learned to live with the fact that our Govern- ment can kill hundreds of thousands of people in-Vietnam for reasons which become harder and harder to under- stand. The Government can plan the murder of foreign leaders and can be remarkably friendly with members of the Mafia. In view of all this, there should be no reason why I am shocked to find that "employees of the Central Intelligence Agency randomly picked up unsuspecting patrons in bars in the .United States and slipped LSD into their food and drink." Still, I find it hard to get used to this new knowledge. Are the agents still hanging around bars with their deadly sugar cubes? If they have given Up this practice, are they sorry about the people they sickened or killed? Or does being a C.I.A. agent mean never having to say you're sorry? ' I am convinced that most C.I.A., people are sure that they are super- patriots. As a plain citizen, I must confess that I believe that people who lead the United States into criminal, activities are doing their best to weaken our beloved, country. I think that such people should be punished, like any other criminals. Are the _agents who gave LSD to unsuspecting people in bars going to be brought to justice, along with their leaders, or are they going to be conveniently forgotten, or retired on rich pensions, like the perpetrators of so many of the disasters of the recent past? ? LOAN WILSON Ticonderoga, N. Y., April 27, 1976 NEW YORK TIMES 9 May 1976 Domestic Spying.? Is Barred by Biash?.p, HOUSTON, May 8 (AP)-- George Bush the director of' Central Intelligence, says the intelligence agency is not in the' domestic surveillance business and says he is "determined tO? see that we don't get into that business. Mr. Bush said at a news coif.' ference yesterday that there` had been some proved allege:- tions of surveillance of Amerie, cans in the past, but it was net happening now. "We do have some [current': domestic operations," he said 'but they are very open. People, come back from business trips-' are debriefed and I hope they will continue to cooperate with he C.I.A." He added: "I believe the buses of the past are indeed in the past. I think the American. people support the concept ate strong Central intelligence, Agency, and if they don't, they'd better because we are' living in an extremely troubled: world." ? r, THE WASIIINGTON POST Clayton Fritchey CI Saturday, May 8, 1976 'The President's rivate Army' Despite all the findings and recom- mendations of the Senate and House in- vestigations of the CIA, it is a good bet that it will continue to be the Presi- dent's private army. The congressional committees suc- ceeded in uncovering almost unbelieva- ble abuses in the covert operations of the entire intelligence community, and they have made a number of construc- tive recommendations for reform, but the question of how to rein in a willful President remains unresolved. Perhaps there is no sure-fire way of resolving it or, if there is, Congress hasn't the nerve to impose it. The multimillion-word record of the congressional inquiries disclosed plenty of prereading by the agency, but most of the major violations and most of the major extralegal activities have now been traced back to White House pressure of one kind or another over the last two decades, regardless of , whether the Democrats or 'Republicans were in power. The CIA has often been denounced for its "black" operations, including overthrowing or trying to subvert gov- ernments we didn't approve of in Iran, Guatemala, Chile, Greece, Laos, South Vietnam and Cuba, among others. The CIA did the planning for the initial Bay of Pigs invasion, but it was John F. Ken- nedy who put it into effect. All the other operations were also ordered by the White House. William Colby, the former director of the CIA, had the candor to tell Con- gress how the CIA used millions of dol- 'Jars in efforts to undermine the duly elected Chilean government several ' years ago. At the same time, however, be revealed he was carrying out a for- mal decision of the White House for the Forty Committee. - The White House has consistently gone to great pains to conceal its pres- sures on the CIA, the chief reasons being that the pressures were often mo- ? tivated more by political than security considerations, as in former President Nixon's efforts to subvert the agency in the Watergate coverup. The full story of the CIA's assassination activities is still clouded, but all the evidence indi- cates these initiatives were essentially White House specials. It is not easy even for the most coura- geous CIA directors to resist the deter- mined President when, in the name of alleged national security, he wants something done that may seem impro- per, reckless or possibly illegal. Who is the director to challenge the Com- mander-in-Chief? In any case, as. Richard Helms, the former head of the CIA, discovered, un- 14 cooperative directors can readily be re- placed. Helms, who ended up as U.S. ambassador to Turkey, informed the Church committee that in his opinion "there is no way to insulate the director of Central Intelligence from unpopular- ity at the hands of Presidents or policy- makers if he is making assessments which run counter to administration policy. ...." So much attention has been focused on the agency's sensational covert oper- ations that little notice has been taken of how the White House can also influ- ence and subvert the CIA's important function of providing intelligence esti- mates on which critical decisions are supposedly made. The evidence shows that a number of key CIA estimates, ranging from Soviet missile capability to the effect of U.S. bombing on Cam- bodia, were either doctored or sup- pressed to accommodate White House policy. John Guzenga, former chairman of the board of estimates, told the Church committee that a CIA director "who does his job will, more often than not, be the bearer of bad news. When intel- ligence people are told, as happened in recent years, that they were expected to get on the team, then a sound intel- ligence policy relationship has in effect broken down." But Mr. Ford has made it clear that he is going to resist every effort by Congress to tie his hands. In that re- spect, he is no different than other Presidents. Mr. Ford tried to beat Con- gress to the punch by appointing his own tame intelligence investigating commission. So did Lyndon Johnson al- most 10 years ago when there was an earlier demand for curbing the CIA. ' The 1967 Johnson study, headed by then Undersecretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach, was really intended not to . study the nation's intelligence com- munity but to shield it, according to a finding of the Church committee, which said the, White House "carefully limited the mandate of the Katzenbach committee's investigation." ' Katzenbach himsolf told the Church panel "that his committee was designed by President Johnson. . . to head off a full-scaie congressional investigation. All covert relationships were to be ex- cluded from the investigation." For most of its 290 years, the United States got along all right without any- thing resembling the CIA. But Presi- dents love the agency. As long as they have their multibillion-dollar private army, they can always throw their weight around covertly, should Con- gress forbid them to do it openly. I C 1V76, Lee Anscien Tinto Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 APproved For Release 2001108108: CIA-RD1,77L00432R0001-00400003L0 CAPITAL, Annapolis 22 April 1976 Speaktng at foreign affairs conference ? By DAVID HUGHES Staff Writer CIA Director George H. W. Bush said he won't release a single name of a CIA agent or a person cooperating with the agency as long as he heads the intelligence agency. It was the only comment during his speech that drew applause from about 300 midshipmen and guests here Wednesday night. But Bush got a standing ovation at the end of the talk. Bush got onto the topic of the CIA .following his speech on Sino-American relations. He delivered the talks as the keynote of the 16th annual foreign affairs conference at the Naval Academy. One student asked if the CIA is going to be divided into two branches: one for over in- telligence collection and one for covert operations. "I don't believe it should . happen. I don't believe it will," Bush said. "What is needed is not the dismantling of covert capability." The director added that the nation should have an alternative to sending in the Marines or doing nothing. He challenged the students to enumerate more than a handful of CIA abuses which he as CIA director would agree are fac- tual. Even so, the procedures in 'effect now at the agency are different from those used at the MANCHESTER GUARDIAN 23 April 1976 iplomats 'working for CIA' Dar es Salaam, April 22 Two US diplomats and ,one American employed by the Tan- zanian Government were today named in letters from the American-based "Committee to Expose *Agents" as CIA agents The letters, posted in Phila- delphia,. were 'received by reporters and government officials here three days before Dr Kissinger was scheduled to arrive as part of his first.Afri- can tour. The letters said the exposure of the government employee was "particularly important" because he is a "deep cover" agent who " has been quite suc- cessful in his work and has remained undiscovered during eight years of work In Tan- zania." The alleged " deep cover" agent has just completed his contract in Tanzania and planned to return to Iowa tomorrow. UPI. THE WfiLTON STAR P l.ky 3 time the abuses occurred, Bush said. "The sins of the past not withstanding, you can'tcunduct an intelligence business in the open," he said. The CIA will work -closely with whatever oversight procedure Congress prescribes, said Bush, who predicted a new era of openness between the agency and Capital Hill. Another student asked him to explain China's ream for inviting former President Richard Nixon to visit during the presidential primary rote in New Hampshire. "I don't think they were trying to influence the New Hampshire primary. They are HOUSTON CHRONICLE 8 MAY 1976 Bush Says CA Disclosures not trying ,to meddle in U.S. internal politics," said Bush. The Chinese could care less about the primaries or the Watergate scandal, and invited Nixon to commemorate the fourth anniversary of an accord between our two nations, the Shanghai Communique, said Bush, who headed the U.S. delegation to Peking before his appointment to the CIA. The former head of the American delegation in Peking said the Chinese Communists .are more interested in reaf- firming the ties established between the two nations during the Nixon administration.. At the end of the presen- tation, the CIA director received a standing ovation. Have Damaged Foreign ? BY .1kNET SANDERS Chronicle Staff ? - ? . Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) .Director George Bush said here Friday that recent disclosures about U.S. intelli- gence operations have damaged his agen- c y ' s friendly relationship with intelli- gence services in other countries. Secret agents in Latin America. AfriCa. the Mideast and Eastern Europe "are holding back intelligence information they used to give us because of the risk Viey will be exposed to in the Crated States." said Bush. "They simply don't trust us anymore." Bush spoke at the 90th annualnieeting of the Greater Houston Area YMCA Friday night at ? the Rice Rittenhouse Hotel. About 5C0 members of 20 local YMCA branches honored the top volun- teers of 1975. Bush said. that "the CIA has taken a tremendous battering" in the oast year that has hurt. its image both at 'how/ and abroad. -People are frightened- bout what we do,*" he said. "But we're just plain citizens that: go about life i\vithout always sneaking around spying on peo- ple." Bush said recent reports of past CIA activities singled out "peculiar?? aherra- CIA Reported Funding Dewey SAN FRANCISCO ? The CIA pumped more than $1 million into the 1948 presidential campaign of Thomas E. Dewey and provided crucial evidence used by Rich- ard M. Nixon against Alger Hiss, according to Rolling Stone magazine. In a copyright article in its issue dated May 20, the magazine says the CIA was twice instrumental in securing evidence used by Nixon against Hiss, the State Department official accused of being a member of the Communist party. 15 Ties lions" and "sensationalized" them. He agreed that foreign operations-, such as The attempted sabotage of Fidel- Castro's beard and CIA domestic spying were wrong. but said that those "mistakes" have been corrected. ? "There are some grubby things we have to do but not many." said. Bush. ? And the public never hears, about- our successes." Bush said the public ? is slowly begin- ning to realize the importance of the CIA despite the -recent Congressional criti- cism of his agency. -The pendulum is starting to swing back in favor of us,"-be said. -? . A Senate-Select Committee headed by Sen. Frank Church handed down a i:om- prehensive study of the. CIA last ??eek ? illustrating certain past covert operations that the committee said violated constitu- tional rkihts a n d wasted hxnavers' money. The committee also outlined recommendations for changing the CIA and suggested that a special Senate panel oversee CIA operations in the future. Bush. said Friday that he agrees with some of the committee's recommended changes but does not favor creation of the oversight panel. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 NEWS & OBSERVER, Raleigh 14 April 1976 The Case Against Cove One of the problems with covert actions abroad by the Central In- telligence Agency is illustrated in the Sam Giancana articles by Ni- cholas Gage of The New York Times. That problem: the sorry company sometimes kept by our spooks. . Gage recounts how the Cl/Lea:. listed Mafia hoods in plotting fruit- less attempts on the life of Cuba's Fidel Castro. Once in bed with the underworld, the agency found it hard to get out, and later got? caught in the absurd position of shielding hoodlums from prosecu- tion by other arms of U.S. govern- ment. ? Such an embarrassing embhce of criminality wouldn't be quite so offensive if it were clear that co- vert CIA operations were essential or productive. But that isn't at all clear. In fact, the latest issue of Foreign Affairs magazine offers a strong, pointed argument by an ex- pert 'against any covert? CIA actions, defined as "operations to rt Activities secretly influence foreign govern- ments, groups or individuals, often by illegal means." 'Herbert Scoville Jr. served the CIA for eight years in scientific intelligence and research. In his article, he expresses little faith in secret. spy activities for any CIA purposes except limited counterin- telligence work. Other, modern methods of gathering information, including satellite photography, are more honorable and accurate and have just- about rendered cloaks and daggers obsolete, Sco- ville argues. Nowhere is he more emphatic than on the futility of outright CIA meddling as notoriously practiced in Cuba and Chile, where instead of collecting data the agency was trying to wreck governments. Sco- ville thinks the CIA should get out of that sort of covert-action busi- ness ? period. It's possible to score limited, local successes at the game, he says, but ultimately there's no way to win. BALTIMORE SUN 5 May 1976 Garry Wills CIA Makes Mafia Look Like Jaycees Spokesmen on the right have for a long time been say- ing our government is soft on crime. Now we have proof that they are right. We can read, put down in black and white, the lenient sentence given to the largest crime syndicate in our history. Imagine a super-Mafia financed by untraceable raids on the United States Treasury, one that teaches men to mur- der and cheat systematically. But this organization does not steal money. It steals govern- ments. It takes and gives gov- ernments, .apart from the knowledge or will of those being ruled by the govern- ments. It does not put out con- tracts on rivals or police authorities. Its "hits," accom- plisLed with LSD and other debilitating drugs, were ran- dom?people in bars or at parties, people of all sorts. This organization was a fair employment pusher and kill- er; it did not distinguish Americans from foreigners or blacks from whites, In movie mythology, crusading newspapers fought organized crime, rallying pub' lie opinion to the cause. But this organization took over much of the press, writing its own reviews, hiring newsmen all over again and not letting their first employers know about it. The funniest thing of all is that the organization has been been asked, repeatedly, to in- vestigate itself and turn itself in if it finds it has committed any crime. When was the last time you heard a judge send a convicted felon out of court with the request that he come back if he decides he has com- mitted any new crimes? I am talking, of course, about the Central Intelligence Agency. It is hard to imagine any crime, public or private, it has not committed, and on a scale brand new to history. Yet Senator Frank Church's pussy-cat committee meekly let the criminals say what crimes could be reported, and asked the CIA to co-operate with Congress after doc- umenting that it systematic- ally deceived Congress and the public and even the Presi- dent for decades, The commit- tee writes a dreary history, Scoville's practical objection is that secret operations nowadays stand little chance of staying se- cret for long, and so they just aren't very feasible. But even if they were, they ought to be banned. Over the long haul, he con- tends, the nation's reputation and security would be better served if it fought "hostile influences by using the good qualities of our democratic society, not by copying the reprehensible tactics of those we are opposing!! He might have added: And not by consorting with some of the worst elements in our own society. In the push for a CIA cleanup, the Ford administration is stress- ing closer supervision of the agen- cy, without significant curtailment of its activities. Scoville makes a (Tod- case for going further that. Congress, -which has yet to wrestle with intelligence reform, could profit by studying Seoville's comments. then re-enacts that dreariness, as if it were composing a script for itself, not an investi- gation of the agency. The report tells us that President Johnson issued guidelines in 1967 meant to keep the CIA from suborning academicians to agent work under the guise of independ- ent research. The report also tells us that the CIA just used the President's guidelines to speed up a program it had al- ready launched for making the subornation less obvious, dealing with individuals in- ,stead of institutions, making its influence less traceable. ? There is no reason to think the Senate's report will he used any other way. It just gives the agency clearer rules for deceiving us. The commit- tee's submission to CIA direc- tion led to the cutting of mat- erial that was in no way dan- gerous to national security? what criminal would not like to rewrite the judge's sent- ence on him? Even the blatantly unconstitutional suppression of budget inform- ation was acceded to by the committee. The committee found im basis in law for CIA covert ac- 16 tivities, yet discovered 900 "major or sensitive" covert projects, despite CIA noncoop- eration and destruction of records. As a result, the com- mittee asked the agency not to undertake such activities unless it considers them nec- essary?yet the agency ob- viously felt all its "major or sensitive" projects were nec- essary, and there is no reason to think it has changed its own norms. The committee was ob- viously unable to face up to the fact that covert activities are the real reason for the CIA's existence?as opposed to more conventional intellig- ence work carried on by other agencies, which are larger and better financed than the CIA. The fight to save the CIA is not a fight to save good intel- ligence work, which is per- formed by at least a dozen other parts of our govern- ment. It is a fight to save just those activities the committee has called illegal, inefficient and dangerous to ourselves. And in that fight, the cops have formally joined the rob- hers. The ju-ig,es are mere tools of our official crooks. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 READER ' S DIGEST MAY 1976 ,et's Stop Undermining the CIA If the United States is to continue as a flag-bearer against totalitarianism, says this former Secretary of Defense, it must protect and preserve our international intelligence network ishe-d, often without a scintilla of substantiation. For example: Allegation: The CIA jeopardized public health by conducting bio- 'logical-warfare experiments in New York City subways. Fact: The Army, to assess vulnerability of the transit system to sabotage, placed some innocuous powder in a sub- way, then measured how far it was wafted down the tunnel. The test menaced nobody. The CIA had no BY MELVIN R. LAIRD E AMERICANS are on the verge of doing ourselves what our worst enemies have been unable to do: destroy our intelligence services. Last year, Senate and House com- mittees began searching investiga- tions of the Central Intelligence Agency. The investigators' intent was honorable, and they have brought to light malpractices- that part in it. must be curbed. According to Con- Allegation: The CIA placed secret gressional findings and CIA admis- informants on the White House staff sions, during the 29 years the CIA has existed-194 to 1976?agency to spy on the Presidency. Its chief 7 White House "contact man" for a personnel perpetrated the f llowing while was Alexander P. Butterfield, They illegally entered four questionable acts of domestic espio- nage:later director of the Federal Aviation Administration. Fact: Butterfield homes or offices,lapped the phones never had any connection with the of 27 people, placed five U.S. citizens CIA. For the past 20 years, like other under surveillance and infiltrated . agencies, the CIA, at White House ten agents into the anti-war move- ,' ,.., request, has routinely assigned spe- ment. ror over two decades, they cialists to the Presidential staff. ? , opened private mail received by ? Allegation: The CIA has assassi- : Americans from communist coun- nated foreign leaders and perhaps ? tries. Additionally, in examining , possible foreign influence on the ; even some Americans. Fact: More than a decade ago, when a de facto anti-war movement, the CIA ac- , : state of war existed between the cumulated files on approximately United States and Cuba, the CIA to,000 American citizens. The side effects of these investi- involved itself in unsuccessful plots to kill Fidel Castro. It also con- gations, however, have proved ' sidered poisoning Patrice Lumumba much more harmful to the country r, than the ills that Congress sought to of the Republic of the Congo. But remedy. As CBS commentator Eric the prosaic truth, as established by Sevareid recently declared: "We've the skeptical Senate investigators, is that the CIA never assassinated any- had Congressmen breaking solemn ' agreements with the Executive by one anywhere. leaking classified information in the Hemorrhage of Secrets. As the . name of higher laws of their sclec- CIA's legitimate secret operations tion. We have had journalists break- are exposed and its sensitive intelli- gence-gathering methods irresponsi- ing their word on information bly illuminated, our first line of received off the record by leaking it defense against attack?and. our to other journalists, which is morally the same as publishing it themselves, only defense against covert attack ----is And, Nvorse, we've had zealots pub- becoming increasingly para- fishing the names of American in- ?lyzed. In foreign parliaments and telligence personnel?which, in this press, the feasibility of confidential time of terrorists everywhere, in- collaboration with America has been creases the risk of kidnapping d publicly questioned. Some countries an have stopped confiding in us almost murder. 'lb do this is to conitnit the moral equivalent of treason." entirely for fear their confidences will be broken by Congress or the The dubious acts committed by press. Individual foreigners who the CIA have been distorted and phave risked their lives to secretly magnified, while lurid charges flour- 17 serve the United States?including agents well placed in the Soviet bloc and the Third World?have quit out of fear of identification. The difficulty of enlisting reliable new. foreign sources has increased greatly. Meanwhile, scores of gifted American men and women in the CIA possessing priceless expertise and experience have been disgusted at the pillory with which their patriotism has been rewarded, and many have even left. Important in- telligence undertakings, approved by Congressional committees and the President as. essential to the na- tional interest, have collapsed in the glare of publicity. For instance, dis- closures that ;the United States has used submarines in Soviet territorial waters to monitor Russian weapons tests have greatly diminished the flow of? this vital intelligence. Th hemorrhageof secrets is also destroying the CIA's capacity to act covertly in Western interes:s. Some- times the discreet provision of money, information, advice and other requested help affords the only practical means of countering sub- version abroad.'Repeatedly? the So- vier Union has sought to subvert other nations by buying control of politicians, bureaucrats, journalists and trade-union leaders, by sur- reptitiously supplying vast SUMS to build the local communist party into the dominant political force. Plans to combat such subversion lose all effectiveness if announced. if identi- fied, recipients of our assistance for- feit credibility and become instant targets of venomous attack by com- munists and others. . Record of Success. In an ideal world, we would need neither intel- ligence services nor armed forces. But we must have both if we are to survive in the real world of 1976, which has become very .unsafe for democracy and the United States. Of the earth's 158 nations, only 39 presently maintain democratic,. representative governments and open 'societies. Many of the totali- tarian nations are fanatic in their hostility to freedom and to Ameri- ca. Our access to many indispensable natural resources depends upon fragile regimes. The complex daily functioning of our society is threat- ened by the phenomenon of inter- national terrorism. Meanwhile, the Russians?besides their worldwide subversion, fomenting of revolution and support of terrorism?persist in an enormous, costly effort to attain undisputed military supremacy with which they hope to intimidate the West into further retreat. To cope with all these threats and Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 uncertainties, we must keep our- selves continuously and accurately informed as to what is happening, especially in those areas shrouded in totalitarian secrecy. To repel covert aggression, we must resort at times to covert methods. President Harry Truman and Congress recognized this when they created the CIA in 1947. And this unchanged reality has been recognized by every subse- quent President?and Congress, except the present one. ? Having served first on one of the Congressional committees that oversee our intelligence apparatus, and later as Secretary of Defense, I am familiar with some of the accom- plishments of our intelligence serv- ices. Consider: During the past 25 years, the So- viet Union has not developed a single major new weapon without our knowing it well in advance. Without such knowledge, we un- doubtedly would have wasted un- told billions preparing to counter threats which did not actually exist. Current efforts to negotiate curtail. ment of the nuclear-arms race are possible only because our precise in- telligence enables us to count every Soviet missile, submarine and bomb- er, and to monitor Soviet compliance. with the treaties achieved. If we destroy the effectiveness of the CIA, we will destroy with it whatever hope there is of negotiating any significant disarmament. Timely intelligence has helped avert war. During the 1973 Arab- Israeli conflicts, U.S. intelligence? live agents and technical surveillance ?detected Soviet preparations to dispatch troops to the Middle East. Thus alerted, we were able to initiate urgent diplomatic and other actions that persuaded the Russians to forgo military intervention. A few years ago, our agents?or spies, if you will?ascertained that one non-communist country was about to attack another. Details can- not yet be made public. But we quickly and privately brought the countries together, laid out the facts, induced them to negotiate. CIA espionage thus prevented a war. Since late 1973, U.S. intelligence has given both Israel and Egypt con- siderable sense of security by con- tinuously showing each what the other is doing militarily. Given proof that neither is about to pounce on the other, the Arabs and Israelis have been willing at least to try to devise. a formula for Middle East harmony. Our intelligence has bought the necessary time. Through ingtration of various iertorist 1130VeMents, the CIA has aborted numerous plots. On at least two occasions, the CIA has fore- stalled assassins bound for the United States with orders to kill elected public officials. It has also thwarted plans to kill prominent Arrierican Jews with letter bombs. While Israel's premier GoIda Meir was visiting New York City on March 4, 1973, police rushed to busy midtown intersections and hauled away two cars with enough Soviet- made explosives to kill everybody within a too-yard radius. The ter- rorist explosives were timed to deto- nate at noon, when streets would be most crowded. The disaster was pre- vented because we had advance warning of it. Shortly before Christmas, 1973, the CIA learned that six small, hand- carried Soviet SA-7 missiles?ex- tremely accurate against low-flying aircraft?were being smuggled in Libyan diplomatic pouches to Black? September terrorists in Europe. The terrorists planned to shoot down a 747 landing in Rome. However, act- ing on CIA intelligence, European governments disrupted the operation 'and spared the lives of hundreds of holiday travelers. The CIA has Pustrated commu- nist subversion of other nations. After World War II, the Soviet Un- ion sponsored a massive clandestine effort to impose communist dicta- torships on a weakened Western Europe. Communist operatives, dis- pensing millions of dollars, organ- ized strikes to block Marshall Plan aid and engender chaos. They in- filtrated the press, tried to: buy elec- tions. By providing intelligence, money and counsel, the CIA gave anti-totalitarian factions a fighting chance to resist. Given this chance, the Europeans proceeded to build healthy democracies, indispensable to our own Nvelfare. During the 196os, with Soviet backing, Cuba tried to ignite guer- rilla warfare and violent revolution in Latin America. While quietly urging needed social reforms, the CIA offered Latin Americans the FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW'; APRIL 16, 1976 intelligence and training they needed to repel Cuban aggression. The communists were defeated .in Bo- livia, Venezuela, Brazil, Uruguay, Guatemala and the Dominican Re- public. Much the same pattern' was repeated in sections of Africa where the Russians sought to establish new colonies for themselves. In the Mid- dle East, too, the CIA has repeatedly aborted Soviet plots to seize control of Arab nations. In retroipect, it is obvious that not all of the covert actions undertaken by the United States in the past zo years have been wise or justified. I strongly believe that we never again should attempt to use military force covertly. Military action can succeed only if understood and endorsed by the public as '?veIl as Congress. How- ever, if we abandon our capacity to discreetly help those who wish to resist externally inspired subversion ?totalitarianism of either the left or right?we will reduce ourselves to a choice of abandoning them entirely or sending in the Marines. IN SUM: If we allow our intelli- gence" services to be rendered impo- tent, we will signal friend and foe alike that we lack both the will and the means to compete with totalitar- ianism. Unable to protect ourselves, .or our friends abroad, America will shrink into isolationism, and our economy, denied essential for- eign resources, will shrivel. Then we, and certainly our children, will discover too late that there is no place to hide from totalitarianism. As a former Secretary of Defense, I believe that we should maintain armed forces stronger than those of any potential enemy. But without an equally strong intelligence service, our nation can never be secure. I know that. So do our friends and antagonists throughout the world. MELVIN R. LAIRD was a U.S. Congressman from Wisconsin for ttS years, before serving- as Secretary of Defense from 1969 to 1973. He is now Reader's Digest's senior counsellor for national and international affairs, THE CIA IN TOKYO: Claims by fanner US State Department official Roger Hillsman that the American CIA has interfered in Japan's domestic politics. confirmed long-standing Japanese suspicions. The CIA is thought to have been infiltrating the country's top political, business and cultural circles since the end of World War II. American intelligence agents reportedly relied on Japanese officials to help them keep tabs on leftist movements in Japan, as well as to monitor military and political developments in China and the Soviet Union, and passed on anti-communist funds to conservative groups in. the country via various US foundations set up in Japan after the war. According to one source in Tokyo, a section in the US Embassy called the Regional Programme Analysis Office is the current base for CIA, operations. 18 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 _Approved For Release 2001/08/08 CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0" THE TULSA TRIBUNE 16 April 1976 The Congressional investigations of the Central Intelligence Agency- un- covered some juicy stuff ? assas- sination plots. unauthorized snoop- ing in private mail ? but there was 3ittle balance to the probes. The result has been a weakened .intelligence .community at a- time when it should be at its strongest. While most people obey humane in- stincts, there is still a strong under-' current of savagery threatening tt undercut the foundations of civiliz- e & society: Thus, former Defense Secretary MelVin-Laird's- article written for ? the Reader's Digest-. in ? 'defense of the CIA, is needed, if belated, testi- mony. Laird writes of terrorist plots ' to kill masses of people with bombs and assassinate political leaders and of the ?CIA's successful efforts in heading off disaster A -crucial' point worth .noting in ' Washington Post 7 May 1976 Cuba Plans Fiesta ? To Honor Its Spies MEXICO CITY, ,May 6 ,(AP)?The Cuban govern- ment is planning a fiesta June 6 in Havana to hon- or Cuba's secret agents and counterspies. The Cuban news ae,ency Prensa.Latina said yester- day that the fiesta will be one of several commernoe rating the 15th anniver? sary of the Interior Minis- try. "The efficient work of the ministry has permitted the Cuban revolution and their top leaders to sur- vive over the years." it ? said. It listed among the Min- istry's achievements the foiling of several plans by the Central Inteili- gence Agency to assusi- nate Prime Minister IFflel Castro and overthrow his government. It did not say if any of the spies would attend the festivities. NEW YORK TIMES 7 MAY 1976 C.I.A.: The 534 Confidants To the Editor: The Church Committee's recom- mendation to have future covert CAA.' operations cleared in advance by Congress (news story April 27) must. come ,as a great relief to our under- cover agents abroad. If put into law, only 534 persons (all Senators and Representatives) will have advantc. knowledge of their dangerous missions., IlEarmar Lor.nEt, Sherrnan, Conn., April 29, 197G ther side his account is that the terrorists were prepared to kill hundreds of innocent ? people to get their twisted messages across. This is savagery in its finest form. Yet, in the face of this kind of threat. politicians who should know better. have been arguing that the CIA be put- on a short leash. It is as if being gentle- manly were more important than being successful in dealing with terrorism. There should be limits; of course. to the kinds of intelligence activi- ties the CIA can undertake. But at the same time those limits should be 'placed with the understanding that the other side .won't bother with degrees of propriety. While the debate on limits con- tinues. so does political violence. As New York Times columnist C. L. Sulzberger noted on this page 19 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 THE DALLAS TIMES HERALD 28 April 1976 Thursday, West Germany. France and Britain have become so con- cerned about it that they arc forget- ting their differences to cooperate more closely. They may not be able Id unite economically, but. on the issue of terrorism they are one. Even so. they know that any ef- fort to combat the waves of violence will be more successful if the United States' intelligence resources are brought to bear. That is why they express amazement at the attacks -On the American intelligence com- munity. The CIA has made mistakes. some of them serious. But it has also per- formed well in its missions. And it is one -of the hazards of the game that all' of its successes may never become known. Laird's disclosure:: of a few of them should suggest that there have been more. reats to securN THE ISSUE: The Senate intelli- ? gence committee's recommendation for reforming intelligence agencies. THE DEMOCRATIC majority of the Select Senate Committee on :Intelligence is ready to endanger the security of the United States to prove a point ? that intelligence gathering agencies, and especially the CIA, have gone to extremes and committed abuses which go far 'beyond the intent of their creation. This majority would prove the point by passing detailed restrictive legislation for monitoring and con- trolling the operations of the agencies, again especially the CIA. The intent of the committee re- garding hamstringing of U. S. intel- ligence is apparent from. recom- mendations in its report covering investigation of the spy agencies' foreign activities. Certainly, t It e committee per- formed a service in- revealing ex- cesses, abuses and waste in the the operations of the nation's intelli- gence apparatus. These lapses should be corrected. But in its welter of recommenda- tions ? 86 of them ? the cornm;t- tee would not merely impose needed reforms, it would so straitjacket the agencies as to strip them of their effectiveness. The core recommendation, in particular, is untenable on this ground. It proposes the creation of a single congressional committee with virutally unlimited powers in the monitoring and control of the intel- ligence agencies. This oversight super committee would be kept informed in detail on the activities and operation of the CIA and other spy agencies and would be authorized to release this information to the public if it elects to do so. T h e experience wit Ii congres- sional committees foretells clearly what would happen if that recom- mendation becomes law. What information the committee did not formally release ? and that no doubt would be considerable ? it would leak. The result would be to keep the whole world informed on U. S. intelligence activites and the knowl- edge this nation possesses about adversaries' plans an d intents. Also, the committee would be informed in advance of foreign cov- ert operations which would just about nullify the possibility of such operations. Efficient, effective foreign intel- ligence is vital to the security of this country. The Senate commit- tee's proposals, if enacted into law, would effectively guarantee the ab- sence of anything more than a token U. S. intelligence program. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 WASI-il NOM) STAR 27 April 1976 Lots of Life Left Yet In 'Rogue Elephant' Just before the Senate Select Com- mittee presented, amid conspicuous self-congratulation, Volume I of its report on the intelligence community,' the CIA scored yet another coup. Director George Bush hurried up to the Caucus Room for a secret session with the senators and implored them to keep the intelligence budget a se- cret. The committee voted a typical compromise: They would pass the buck to the full Senate. So on page 270 of the report, where -the numbers ought to be, there are blank spaces. Considering that last week the Supreme Court ruled that it's okay for the Feds to look at your bank account, you have to say that government secrecy is, in this Biceff- tennial of our liberty, gaining over ? individual privacy. The Senate could, ot course, gather up its courage and assert that people who can't keep their own bank records a secret have the right to 'know how money, they give to the, government is being spent by the' spooks. One of the arguments made by some who voted against immediate disclosure was that it might make it easier to persuade the Senate to create an oversight committee. The fact that there is any question at all about such a committee ? one which might include a soul or two who? would not melt at the mention of '"national security" ? suggests how splendidly the CIA has weathered the LONDON TIMES 29 April 1976 The storm of congressional investigation. FIFTEEN MONTHS AGO, when the "rogue elephant" was dragged into public view for examination of its ugliness, some people said there was nothing to do with the beast but 'shoot it. But as the revelations mounted about its domestic spying, its consumption of banks, newspaper and airlines, its habits of buying foreign elections and foreign officials, a Watergate conditioned citizenry turned away. People didn't want to 'war about it. Now there is no doubt about the beast's survival. The committee did not even recommend an outright ban on covert activities, although it did suggest less promiscuous use. Nobody has been punished, either, for what was done, or for failing to tell the truth about it. The secretary of state and the for- mer director of the CIA, Richard Helms, who is our ambassador to Iran, made contradictory ? to say the least ? statements about Chile and domestic spying to congressional committees. Chairman Frank Church, who is running for the presidency, has not made a federal case of it. The record, he said was sent to the Justice De- partment. Nothing has happaned. , Atty. Gen. Edward Levi went be- fore the committee just before Bush. He was trying to censor some lan- guage in Volume H relative to illegal domestic spying. That suggests whose side he is on. No prosecutions, particularly in an election year, seem likely. THE COMMITTEE wants the' attorney general to be added to the, National Security Council. He would presumably warn the plotters when they were about to break the law. Neither of two previous attorneys general, Robert Kennedy and John Mitchell, seemed particularly sensi- tive on this point. Kenndy was involv- ed in Cuban plots. Mitchell. appears tines 11151fiZWEA? alga lary ..L.4,4 ? CIA settle a heated argument? One of the revelations in the latest report on the Central Intelligence Agency settles an old dispute. The CIA did, indeed, fabricate the "Penkov- sky Papers". These Were the alleged memoires of Oleg Pen- kovsky, a senior Russian official who spied for the West, was caught and shot. The report says: Another CIA book, The Penkovskp Papers, was published in the United States in I96S .` for operational reasons", but actu- ally became commercially viable. The book was prepared and written, by witting (sir) agency ;ts,ets (sic) N., ho drew on actual case materials. "Publication rights were sold to a publisher through a trust fund which was established for that purpose. The publisher was unaware cf any US Govern. ment interest." The Penkovskp Papers were serialized by The Observer when the book came out and many reviewers hod doubts about their authenticity. Not so Robert Conquest, who devoted an article lost August, in his news-sheet Soviet Analyst, to a defence of the authtmicity of the papers and an attack on our Washington correspondent, Patrick Brogan, who had ore n. tinned them in an article as a palpable fake. never to have read the Constitution. "We are trying to deepen account- ability," says Sen. Walter F. Mon- dale, D-Minn. A Accountability was a word un- known at CIA headquarters. Things . were set in train on one man's orders to a chosen few. He did not tell his as- sociates or the inspector general. . When things went sant.; the papers were destroyed and all kept mum. Nothing quite illuminates the ice- cold arrogrance of the agency better than a memo written by Richard Helms during the period when the CIA was conducting experiments with LSD on unwitting subjects. "While I share your uneasiness and distaste for any program which tends to intrude upon an individual's pri- vate and legal prerogatives. I believe it is necessary that the agency main- tain a central role in this activity, keep current on enemy capabilities on the manipulation of human behav- ior and maintain an offensive capa- bility." SO DR. FRANK OLSON, unbe- knownst to himself, was given a glass of Cointreau with 70 micrograms of LSD in it on Nov. 19, 1953. Eight days later, he threw himself out of a New York hotel room window. Nobody was responsible. The indi- viduals involved were shown a repri- mand for "bad judgment," one which they were assured would not be made part of their official personnel file. George Bush says they don't do things like that any more. He says the, beast has been housebroken. Many members of Congress want to believe him, just as they preferred not to know what was going on at the time. There ought to be a law, and Con- gress may get around to writing one. But as the vote on the money showed, it's not a sure thing. ? . LONDON TIMES 29 April 1976 y activities 'undermlned constitutional rights' From Our Own Correspondent Washington, April 28 The second volume of the Senate intelligence committees report, issued today, says that " intelligence activities have undermined the constitutional rights of citizens'. It adds that this is because "checks and balmtces designed by the framers of the constitu- tion to assure accountability have not been applied": The report contains very little that is new. Earlier reports, notably that prepared by the Rockefeller counnissien last year, gave roost of the details of the use by various govern- _ 20 . ments of the Central Intelli- gence Agency, the Federal Bureau of investiga:ion and other instruments of govern- ment, to spy on Americans. Like the first volume, pub- lished on Monday, which dealt with foreign intelligence, it gives a detailed account of the workings of the most secret branches of the American Gov- ernment. We now know for more about the CIA and the FBI and about how decisions in intelligence matters are made in Washington titan we do about any other secret service in the world. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 ApproVed For Release 2001/08/08-: C1A-RDP77-4)0432R000100400003-0- WASIIINGTON STAR 28 April 1976 Charles Bartlett _ That's no `rogue ele The rogue elephant turns out to be a. harness horse under slack rein in the final chapter of Sen. Frank ? Church's epic investigation of the CIA. To Church's credit, he swallows his metaphor, ele- phant and all, to erase the picture he drew last year of a wild agency on the loose. The CIA is "not out of con- trol," he concedes. It is a tractable agency that has been loosely supervised by a series of presidents and Congresses as it carried out a difficult mandate under a loosely-worded charter. After spending $3 million and 185 man-years, the Church committee has made no substantial addi- tions to the abuses cited 10 months ago by the Rocke- feller Commission. Since President Ford has already imposed strenuous precau- tions against repetition of those abuses, the report will merely serve to stir more ? ,dust unless it persuades the Senate to organize its sur- veillance of intelligence under a single oversight ,committee. This does not . Washington Post 7 May 1976 7 .ttawel s As 7 Of :Soy Grouns I seem likely to happen. By sober handling of a mass of sensitive material and by negotiating respon- sibly with the executive branch at every turn, the Church committee has demonstrated that a perma- nent committee would be valuable in bridging the gap between the secrecy requir- ed by intelligence opera- tions and the Congress's need to know. The committee went off the track only once, in bloodhounding the leads of its chief counsel, Frederick Schwarz, on the assassina- tion issue. This diversion protracted the inquiry by six months, introduced partisan concerns, and fed an impression that Church was bent on drawing atten- tion to his presidential bid. To force the nation to exam- ine its conscience on using assassination as a tool of foreign policy, the commit- tee paid the price of feeding the Soviets some rich propaganda. A new dust storm will arise from the report's dis- closure that the CIA deals HERALD, Miami 24 April 1976 Reflto Nm< servic,. . PHILADELPHIA -- A na- tional Quaker orqzmizinion has called for the a;:c,litioa of the Central Ag:mcy and the Inter: :11 Se- curity Division of the lr- at of Irvesti.: eoin. The, board of direc:ors of ? the American Priencis Serv? ice Commit' .11."SC? calle:1 on Con.:ress hibit an2.7 Sltixesz:or trom :.zurLeii-. lance and in:rassineat i.f ,citizen's groups that have not taken, par: UI LI lIla s* ul activities. ? ."The repeated violations of thcse alencies man- dates." it said.. "havo so uomisalkahly compromised ? these two bodies Coat it is ecftai:i they arc beyond sal- va4e ta. a,4encies in which Americans . corn idently P!ace their trust:" It aildi..t1 that -the prat,. which brouiI. iht two bodies nito Iir(' Mite. roust be unequivocally co4. ed, for the s:inie commit: v(1 by bo ev,11,!:- as if tli?v %,?i?ri? under- takcii bN' the (AA or toe lift" 'lane after all with several hundred "aca- demics" from over 10G American colleges in its pursuit of intelligerce. It disturbs the committee-that professors who take srbbat- keels to ipteresting places are invited to share their observations with the gov- ernment. Sometimes they are paid; often they am not They do not perform as agents, merely as patriotic citizens who have been trained as specialists. To most people, this will appear a very normal, harmless kind of coolvra- tion. But to the Church com- mittee,.it is a transgression of the moral purity 'which the nation must reflect. The senators want the comtry? to be a model of virtue and self-restraint, not a st-tkied back-alley scrapper- As Church says, "The'United States must acquire a long- er view of history." Happily, the committee checked its impulse to translate this sentiment into a ban on all the dirty covert actions. The senators react- ed to a toughening of tle na- tional mood and to intgna- tion over the CIA circus in the House by pulling back from their inclination to proscribe all the activities which may muddy the na- tional reputation. But this is really the crux of the post- Vietnam divergence on for- eign policy and it deserves to be debated until a con- sensus develops. This is the kind of issue with which the committee and Congress should con- cern themselves instead of focusing on the details of intelligence management. With Congress so badly organized and unable even to arrange for efficient supervision of intelligence activities, the committee will not be taken seriously when it attempts to shift around the CIA's organiza- tional chart. The committee has tried to behave respon- sibly, however, and time alone will tell whether its disclosures helped more than they hurt. But a swift test of the Senate's reaction to all it has learned will come on the May 6 vote to create a single oversight committee. ? enate Report on Intelligence Needs to Name Some Names ? ON Monday the Senate Select Com-; mittee on Intelligence will issue A re- port on the domestic activities of such ? agencies as the FBI and the CIA which tells all. Well, some of alli?:fht--.-Teport, ? we are told, names no names. Among the nameless are an uncount- ed number of newspaper reporters who acted as informants for the FBI. It is not clear whether they were paid off in money; which would be a conflict of professional interest, or whether .they were paid off in news tips, which is the same as money in the bank for any en- terprising journalist.. Anyone who knows anything about the criminal justice system understands perfectly well that many crimes cannot be solved without the use of infor- mants. Most police agencies maintain funds for this purpose, and it is regard- ed as legitimate. Further, any citizeu who sees a crime committed or has in- ...formation about a breach of the law should feel obligated to.report it to 1113 FBI or any other official investigative agency. The systematic ,use of journalists as 21 formers, then cloaking them in ano- nymity, is quite another matter. Until a halt supposedly was called around 1973, certain intelligence .services were used for political purposes and the informers were not criminal informers - but persons reacting to someone's prej- udice or pique. ? So a whole profession is left under a cloud when only a few unnamed mem- bers of it are guilty, as the Senate select committee evidently thinks. in bringing the matter .up at all, of improper con- duct. . Investigations of wrongdOing are less than honest ? or worse than that less than useful?when they name no names and nail down no responsibility. -Sen. Frank Church, the select com- mittee's chairman, has won himself a lot of linage, though not much mileage, in weeks of sensational hearings. If these are to be followed by a report which fails- to identify the bodies, then It will be, as wanting in credibility as it excels in blind damaging accusati)n. ? We'll just have to see.? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 rilijE DESTRI1 NEWS, Salt Lake City, Utah ? 28 April 1976 rag) r be, Ili like hero than vil ff The remarkable thing about the CIA is not the number of abuses for which it -is responsible but the fact the agency t'didn't make considerably more blunders '?-flian it did. ? . e? If that point in the Central Intellig- ence Agency's favor wasn't ,apparent :before, it should be now with the release .this week of the results of the exhaustive 'investigation by the Senate intelligence ,committee. -- The inyestigation found there is no e.systematic review by the White HOuse of 'either sensitive, foreign espionage or counterintelligence activities. For Congress' part, the lawmakers 'have failed to provide the 'necessary guidelines to ensure that intelligence 'agencies Icarry out their work in accor- 41ance. with constitutional processes. , ,...Moreover, the FBI rather , than .being paranoid' about -foreign spies vithin.the as ,some of its critics eli.arged not given enough atten- tion to this problem, partly because of ? insufficient manpower for counterintel- 1 t,e rice . ? . The.. -Senate.: committee's report i'Aiould be read, then, as not so much a ? le.riticKrn of the- intelligence community qtseif asit is a criticism of those-elected Officials in, both . the executive and legislative branches..who bear ultimate responsibility .for controlling intellig- ,enee operations. , ? 'Keep in. mind, too, that when the Senate intelligence committee began its investigation 15 months ago, the inves- tigators were anything but friendly and sympathetic toward the CIA. When, even the CIA's toughest critics' find the agency was given insufficient supervision, it seems clear the CIA could easily' hia've, committed many more. "dirty tricks" abroad had it been of a ? mind to do so. The very fact the CIA was, -in-Abe words of the Senate report, "not .,out -.of control" is something of - a -Itestiinony to the agency's self-discipline "and internal controls. The report contains no sensations or "surprises. "Its'- major; recommendations ?..,-L:particularly establishment of a per- in'anent intelligence oversight commit- tee in Congress ? have been thoroughly discussed .and analyzed before. Most of them represent an objective effort to prevent blunders by .making sure the intelligence community gets outside input, and to pinpoint responsibiIity, which often lies outside the intelligence .agencies. One recommendation which seems highly inadvisable, however, is that the .overall budget for intelligence activities be made public. It's hard to imagine any useful purpose being served by this suggestion. The comparison of intelligence spending during one particular year to that of another year is, in. itself, largely mean- ingless. Figures on intelligence sperairing can't be evaluated in any meaningful way without also disclosing the specific .. intelligence programs involved. And those specifics can't be disclosed without impairing the effectiveness of the CIA.If anyone thinks the disclosure of an overall spending figure will help prevent waste in the CIA, such disclosure unfortunately hasn't prevented waste in other federal agencies. As Congress and the public read the Senate corrfrnittee's report. the recom- mendations for tightening control over ?the CIA should not be allowed to overshadow a little-noticed facet of the study ? ' Intense attempts by the Soviet Union to get at American secrets require a bigger and more sophisticated U.S. counterintelligence effort than ever before. The opening of American deepArater ? ports to. Russian ships in 1972, w? the committee note, has given Soviet ag- ents easy access to all of the 'United ?States. Frequent attempts have been. made- by Moscow to infiltrate federal government and congressional offices. An estimated 40% to 60% or the? personnel in Soviet embassies are in- volved in intelligence-gathering .ac- tivities. Since 1960, Soviet access to the U.S. has tripled and is still increasing. Clearly; there is 3 continuing need for the U.S. to maintain a strong:. and effective foreign and military .intellig- .ence apparatus.: ? 22 MANCHESTER GUARDIAN 19 April 1976 From DAVID TONGE Athens, April 18 ? Efforts over a long period to build up -.the Lebanese Phalangists. from Athens, now reportedly the CIA's command post in the Eastern Mediter- ranean, are alleged in an inter- view with a former American intelligence officer, Winslow Peck, publi5hed here this weekend. ? One of the main tasks of Richard Welch, the head of the Athens CIA station who was murdered on December 23, had : been to activate the Phalangists and right-wing Palestinian groups. Mr Peck claims in the magazine Anti, adding that his task, "in other words had been to kindle the war." He 'says that the CIA now uses American banks in Athens to finance the Phalangists and that the majority of the CIA command here is now working .on the stituation in Lebanon. The US Embassy refuses to make any comment on these claims. , Mr Peck had been an analyst with America's main informa- 'tion gathering organisation, the National Security Agency (NSA), working for it in Istan- bul, Vietnam, and at the Paris peace talks, as well as in the United States. He has now "defected " to the anti-CIA lobby and cooperates closely with the Washington rnagane Count er-spy. argues that the only - guarantee of safety for a' former agent is to publish what he knows but that he himself 'only discloses what he thinks people need to kmow. He cri- ticises the Cypriot Nikos Samp- son for threatening to " reveal all" saying that threats before publication make one a "dead man.". The NSA, in Mr Peck's view, is probably the "most effectlye espionage organisation in the world," with communications posts- including installations at "Checksey," in England ? pes- sibly a misprint for Chertsey ?at Diego Garcia, on Malta, and in one British base on Cyprus also used by the CIA. But the CIA he describes as' a ? " secret criminal police force." Ile attributes to it 25 coups carried out between 064 and 1973,. but says that its various failures have meant that since 1970 the Penatagon has begun to compete with it in this field. ' lie argues that developments In ,the Middle .1.lo!it 111Ciirl that the Athens CIA iitation, he elaims now has .1 170. has taken over the re-it' earlier by the ,tati.ils in Cyprus, 1;i?init and T. The CIA faces no danger /ram Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 Approved For Release" 2001/08/08 :'CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 the present Greek Government, he comments. The police ser- vices in Greece "were always controlled by the CUP. ? 'Mr Peck argues that the CIA was involved in the 1967 Coup, ? one US official has told me privately that it had known the exact plans for the coup six weeks before it happened.. Mr Peck also stresses the links bdtween the CIA and the Colonels while, separately, tin an.interview with a representa- tive of the Pike committee on intelligence, the former US Ambassador, Henry Tasea, was specific about these and in par- ticular about the regular con- tacts between the former dic- tator, Ieannides and the then head of the CIA station, Stacy Hulse. The history of Cyprus : he describes as a typical example of CIA intervention" in . a foreign country. The CIA was behind the intercommunal vio- lence Which came to a. head in 1964, he claims, since it was apparently concerned lest Makariot establish too strong L. ? positi'on. Mr Peck describes later meet- ing Mr Welch, who had 'then been serving for the CIA in :Cyprus. He says Mr Welch asked him proudly: "You saw What .I did in Cyprus in 1964?" ' The accusation that the CIA and Dr Kissinger had planned the overthrow of Makarios ? a charge which was being made ? angrily by Mr Papandreou in .the Greek Parliament yesterday ?? is also made by ,Mr Peek,' though he says they had not ? foreseen the T,urhish landing. "A Government of Sampson in Cyprus and the Colonels in Greece would have completely served US interests in this part of the world," he says, claiming that Sampson had long been a man ? of the CIA and EOKA had been financed by it through . the junta. ? Police investigations into the murder of, Welch have failed to throw up any leads so far., The death occurred after his naming in the Greek press by a "committee of Greeks and Greek Americans concerned to ?prevent their fatherland being perverted to the -uses of the CIA" and this - committee appears to have no connection. whatsoever with the Counter- spy magazine. NE'..ISWEEK ? 17 MAY 1976 TERROR IN TEHERAN ? Iran's revolutionary under- ground has been getting guid- ance from the Marxist Popular Front for the Liberation of Pal- estine led by George Habash (top photo). One band of Iran-- ians that had marked Shah Mo- hammed Reza Pahlavi and U.S. Ambassador Richard Helms (bottom photo) for death was trained by PFLP Arab terrorists. The CIA moved in after the Helms plot was uncovered (and three U.S. colonels were mur- dered) and helped local securi- ty forces round up the terrorists. Nine were executed in January and the organization, Teheran says, has been broken up! WASHINGTON STAR 3 MAY 1976 Charles Bartlett Portugal and covert In days when covert 'ac- tion is condemned as a re- sort not worthy of the ? United States, it is interest- ing to examine the re-emer- gence of Portugal as a democratic state. The elections in Portugal have given the Portuguese assurance they will not be ; swept into the iron embrace , of Communists or oligarchs. ; They have a shattered economy and a weak tradi- tion of parliamentary rule. But they have at least won a chance to gratify their taste for freedom and democracy. In a two-year revolution, Portugal barely escaped the steely reach of the , Communists and the oppor- tunism of military officers , riding the emotions releas- ed by the: end of the Salazar-Caetano regime. In smashing the oligarchic control, the Portuguese gave vent to an orgy of self- indulgence that left them badly exposed. Having won 40 per cent of the seats in the new assem- bly, the Socialists intend to 'try to rule without coalesc- ing to the left or right. They will not join the Commu- nists, who have 15 per cent of the seats, because they do not trust. their commit- ment to free government. They will not join the parties of the right because ?they do not share their en- thusiasm for restoring the. capitalist past. BALTIMORE SUN 10 May 1976 The Socialists will be toe- ing a narrow line. They need to keep faith with "the revolution" while they build confidence among investors ? at home and abroad. 'They must lure the elite with tal- ent and capital back from ;Brazil while they keep the masses satisfied that the ? game is being played in their name. They will need to placate and propitiate the military, who will be lurking in the background as the ultimate guarantors of the new constitution. The balancing act will be hazardous for the minority of Socialists, unavoidably hobbled by the intrigues and frictions for which Por-. tuguese politicians are especially notorious. The elections gave a majority to the parties of the left but economic recovery will re- quire significant deference to sentiment on the right. The politicians will gain some discipline from their awareness that the nation will land back in an authori- tarian basket if they fail to negotiate their differences. ; Delicate as it seems, the evolving situation is an im- pressive tribute to all who struggled through dramatic , days to keep the country out of Communist control. And to the extent that outside help was furnished them, it. is to the CIA's great credit that the helping hand was agile and light enough to es- cape detection. - The Killing of Joh The assassination of President Kennedy more than a dozen years ago still haunts and troubles the nation. The Warren Commission re- port, with its conclusion that Lee Harvey Os- veld acted alone, has withstood the tests of time better than the instant attacks on it. But suspicions of a Cuba connection will not vanish. On the contrary, they thrive. When such a non- conspiratorially-minded, responsible lnd in- formed official as Senator Mathias speaks of a "strong likelihood" of such a connection, that likelihood must be investigated. What Senator Mathias did, however, was throw out a teaser, not add to knowledge. The Warren Commission knew that Oswald had been to Cuba. A year ago, the nation understood that President Kennedy, using the CIA, had been trying to assassinate Premier Castro. That was 23 aid The probings of the Church committee on intel- ligence have left some Democratic senators highly critical of covert action by the CIA. Noting that the CIA has executed some 900 covert actions since 1961, they complain that these ef- forts too often bring oppro- brium on the United States or weaken the will and self- reliance of the anti-Commu- nists being helped. They suggest these efforts are not worth their costs to the ethics and morality of American leadership. But it seems reasonable to assume that American intelligence found ways to strengthen the forces en- gaged against the Commu- nists during Portugal's or- deal. The help that came was unobtrusive, no swash- buckling effort to preserve the status quo or discourage the reformers. The results show that the help was not ? corruptive or disruptive. It was essentially nourish- ment for the cause of free- dom. A congressional determi-- nation that American foreign policy must not be tainted by the undercover arts could have ruled this help out. The Communists would have been denied their chance to talk of "im- perialist intrigues." But the Portuguese might also have been denied their chance to ? elect a government. Kennedy motive enough, if the Cuban dictator chose to reciprocate, and was withheld from the Warren Commission. What Senator Mathias has added is a lurid spy tale of a contact in Paris in the CIA plot to kill Castro on the day Kennedy died, with "indications" that the Cuban, "Am-Lash," was a double agent who would have told all to Havana. The Senate intelligence committee, accord- ing to Senator Mathias, a member, will soon re- port on the strong likelihood of which he spoke. If it is more convincing than what he has re- vealed, and is as convincing as he implies, then a new presidential commission to investigate the first Kennedy assassination will be needed. Its reference must be the Cuban activities of the CIA as withheld from the Warren Commission. That is, of course, a big if. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 Christian Science Monitor 20 April 1976 Charge denied CV?I NSA accises of ii1V0hie e t hi Leban By John K. Cooley Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor Athens The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and National Security Agency (NSA) are now using Athens as a main Mideast headquarters and are aiding the rightist Phalange Party in Lebanon's civil war. So charges a former NSA staffer. Winslow Peck, interviewed in Paris by the Athens biweekly maga/me Anti, is with the Washington magazine Counterspy which sin- gled out Richard Welch as a CIA agent. Mr_ Welch was assigned as CIA station chief in Athens and murdered last Dec. 23. His murder- ers were not apprehended. Greek judicial au- thorities forbid discussion of the case in news- papers here. Mr. Peck says he was assigned to the CIA station here with the mission to keep the fires burning in the Lebanese civil war by moving aid to the Phalange and rightist Palestinians through Athens banks. (Top U.S. sources in Washington have firmly denied to this reporter that there is CIA help for any Lebanese faction. Christian Lebanese refugees interviewed here said they believe the CIA has made it easier for the Phalange to ob- tain funds to buy arms. Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Yasser Arafat has produced no evidence for his frequent charge that the CIA assists Lebanese right- ists.) Mr. Peck, who says he worked at the Istan- bul NSA station from 1966 to 1968 and later in Indo-China on communications intelligence, claims that Mr. Welch bragged to him that during his (Mr. Welch's) 1964 Cyprus duty, Mr.. - Welch had helped instigate Greek-Turkish trou- bles. Mr. Peck further charges that Mr. Welch was a CIA case 'officer for Nikos Sampson, briefly president of the Greek Cypriot adminis- tration set up by the Athens military junta af- ter its coup against President Makarios in THE CHICP30 TRIBUNE 2 May 1.97E, Reporting the' new , Even superspies are proper sources July, 1974. Mr. Peck calls Cyprus a classic example of a CIA-sponsored coup, with overall supervision by U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger. He says the 1967 Greek military coup also had CIA involvement, but that after 1970 responsi- bility for overseas coup operations passed largely to the Pentagon. He calls Mr. Sampson ? soon due for trial in Nicosia ? a paid CIA agent. He says the CIA also channeled funds through Athens to the anti-Makarios EOKA-B underground in Cyprus. (Washington congressional hearings last fall disclosed a CIA-EOKA-B connection. Former U.S. Ambassador to Greece Henry Tasca's de- position indicated Secretary Kissinger did not inform Mr. Tasca of the two-way junta-CIA in- formation flow. (Prime Minister Caramanlis's government has indefinitely postponed trials of Greek offi- cers implicated in the Cyprus coup. Some of them threatened to disclose CIA links. Sources close to Greek police officials believe the Welch murder probe indicated EOKA-type Cypriot involvement. But like inquiries into the murder of U.S. Ambassador to Cyprus Rodger Davies during an attack on the U.S. Embassy in Nicosia in August, 1974, they never reached the point of pressing charges.) Mr. Peck says that during his own Istanbul Service, Greeks and Turks often requested and obtained information on each other developed by the NSA. By David Halvors'en Assistant to the editor ? Last week's reports of the Senate Se- lect Committee on Intelligence activities, .may have given the . impression. that . ? scores of editors and reporters were dupes of our nation's superspies. In fact, s there are some newspeople who believe e this Is the case and are quite voluble on, the subject. We have 'always believed that the . highest calling in journalism is report- ing and that the best reporters are the shrewd, .street-wise ? men and women ,1 'who develop solid news sources. A phone call, late at night,: a tip passed along over a couple of beers, or ' secret meetings in some obscure place have resulted in numberless stories that have sent criminals to jails and saved the taxpayers millions of dollars. To me, there was never any doubt that .this was what news work was all about. , Furthermore, any reporter with ()Elsie skills vil1 promptly ask himself why he is. getting tips like those. He will check , them out. If the information is correct and he offers the story. to his' editors, they?will challenge his?accuracy. But there there is an emerging countervie?: Proponents of this view seem to be say- ing that sources pass on only informa- tion which is self-serving. Therefore, such sources cannot be ?trusted,' partic- ularly , if they are in government, and more particularly if they are in law enforcement. or intelligence. The' holders of this view reason that any reporter friendly to the Federal I3u- reau of Investigation, the Central Litchi- gence. Agency, or state or local police, must be a lackey of the government. Friendly reporters get stories- that are planted in the newspapers, it is held. This argument seems to .suggest that there exists a lever propaganda appa- ratus set up by furtive agents, in the. 'abandoned coal bins of gray government buildings. ?A reporter picks up his tele- phone to hear Agent Q tell him in con- spiratorial tones that all left-handed golfers who drive pink station wagons are Communists. Then, this view holds ? that through some journalistic mystique the reporter is able to get the story into the paper without the scrutiny of editors. We are dubious of such an idea. Such a view, seems to say that a re- porter should have ,no sources at . all. Bather, he best serves the public inter.... est by sitting in the 'newsroom and pon- tificating on how things should be. At the very least, the viewpoint suggests that antiestablishment sources should be heard and official sources, ignored'. The Senate committee's reports con- elude fairly that United States foreign and domestic intelligence agencies have tried to manipulate the press. There can be no question that some reporters and editors have been used and that some stories unfavorable to the FBI or CIA have been killed. But the critics of the traditional news- gathering processes are suggestinat' radi- cal surgery, lopping off the hezid. ? 'rho Senate report includes what ap- parently is a reference to a story written by Ronald Koziol, a Tribune investiga- tive reporter, about factionalism in the Students for a Democratic Society in if they are ri 1968.. It said the story was planted by the FBI with. a friendly reporter to stir ,up trouble. ? Some may think this column self-serv- ing in that it defends a Tribune associ- ate. Koziol needs no 'defense from this quarter. Subsequent stories bear out the fact that his story was substantially ac- curate. Furthermore, his informa;:ipn. 'came from non-FBI sources outside of Chicago. Last year, .Koziol wrote stories that were critical of the FBI search for Pa- tricia Hearst. He described missed op- portu?nities to find her. The FBI let The Tribune know it did not like the Koziol stories, .but it could not challenge their ? accuracy. In total, Mr. Koziol's stories were hardly the 'work of a friendly re- porter. Several years ago The Tribune pub- lished a series of articles about police brutality in ?Chicago. Some of the 'best work was done by reporters. who have close friends in the Chicago Police De- partment. If by any measure the so-called estab- lishment has been successful in planting contrived stories in the newspapers, its victories have been few. The Senate report said the FBI re- peatedly and covertly attempted to ma- nipulate the news media. It did not say it succeeded, though assuredly it did in some cases. seems that some fellow newspcople are suffering from paranoia. The te.M. is Whether the story Is accurate and fairly reported, not whether it came f;:ora your friendly FBI agent. , Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 24 Approvdd For Release goovosms : CIA,RDP77-00.432R090100409003-0- POST, New York 28 Apiil 1976 ) r,i % rT? Harriet Van Van Horne - `lea 47e27 IV?:=11,Ta THE SPY REPORT If you could combine Grand Guignol horror, comic opera, science fiction and the more brutish tactics of a Fascist police state you would have a generally fair picture of what the CIA has been up to?with our tax dollars?since 1947. - After a 15-month investigation, the Senate Select Com- mittee on Intelligence has reached the sensible conclusion that new laws are needed to control the superagency that has become a secret state within the state. In one 14-year period, the report says, this agency, set up to protect us from foreign devils, has broken the law at home, plotted to assassinate heads of 'state and con- ducted small, secret wars entirely on its own. .* * ?*- While noting that the agency had performed some mis- sion S "with dedication and security," an average citizen gets the feeling, as he pores over this report, that many CIA operations were carried out with the idealism of Dr. Strange- love and the finesse of Bugs Bunny., ? Some of the incidents described would be hilarious were they not so sinister. Others Make you wonder how so many depraved minds could have functioned undetected for so many years in a U.S. government agency. Perhaps the most monstrous operation disclosed in the Senate report concerned the dr u g gin g of unsuspecting drunks in bars on the East and West Coasts. It's the sort of story that brings back memories of those insane Nazi scientists who performed unspeakable experiments on preg- nant women and newborn infants. For nine years, beginning in 1954, CIA agents randomly picked up bar patrons and slipped LSD into their food and drink. Great sport! Heroic work in behalf of national security. At least two deaths resulted from this great drug experiment. No follow-up studies were made of the innocent victims. Some, says the report, "may. still be suffering from residual effects." There was no medical supervision. In the late 1950s the Inspector General of the CIA?who must have been regarded by his super-spy colleagues as a Nervous Nellie?wrote that precautions had to be taken not only to protect these drug experiments from exposure to enemy forces but also to conceal their existence from ?the American public. This, noted the Inspector General, "would RECORD, Hackensack 18 April 1976 be detrimental" to the agency's mission. ? The political and Moral cost of the CIA's deceit has been high. We haVe tended, In recent years, to disbelieve the government even when it has been telling the truth; The old excuse for these 30 years of lies is still cited by the super- ' patriots, the CIA lackeys in the Congress. It goes: We must mislead the American people in order to continue'misleading the enemy. Rubbish! The enemy?presumably the Soviet spy apparatus?often Arrows what is going on when we, the 'American people, do not. Viewed from any side, it's a rotten game. . - .If the CIA ever opens a Dept. of Fuller Explanation-- and that will be the day!?rd love to know how our national security was served by having Machiavelli translated into Swahili. And did the translator tarry a moment over the passage that says if you leave a man's honor (and property) alone, he will be reasonably content? It's easy, of course, to dwell on the wilder aspects of the CIA misadventure. By now we all know about the efforts to - kill Castro with explo' ding cigars and the cheap ruse of send- ing ,"wired" call girls into foreign agents' beds. Will our dignity as a great nation ever recover from the CIA's merry pranks? ? What troubles me, by hindsight, Is how many CIA stories reached the ears of reporters years ago. How shame- ful that they were not investigated and printed, then and there! In 1961, for example, our CIA operatives were training .--you won't believe this?Tibetan parachutists In Colorado. (Supposedly the Tibetans would be dropped somewhere over Red China?someday.) One frosty morning a bus?windows painted black?skidded off a Rocky Mountain trail, and out fell 15 hooded, stunted Tibetans. Witnesses to the accident were held incommunicado by the Amy. But the news leaked out, and the New York Times had an eye-witness accomet, according to David Wise in his book, "The Politics of Lyirw." Then the inevitable telephone call- came from Washington, the magic words !`national security" ? were invoked and the story died, I expect we'll never know what happened to these poor duped Tibetans. * ? ? Similarly, the mess refrained from publishing rumors of the projected Bay of Pigs invasion. What we regarded as patriotism at the time looks now, in retrospect, like stupid cowardice. This Senate committee report may beAncomplete and overcautious, but it is bound to have a cleansing effect. It calls for new laws eying Congress more control over the CIA?a reform President Ford says- he will veto. Many Americans Will take-that as -still another reason?not to vote- for hirrrin'Noveinbers rom gown to trench coat \ 0.4'.Fhe times, they are, a-changin'," Bob bylan sang in the early days of ttei Vietnam war, and thou- sands of college students (C.,hoed his words demand- ing that the American Establishment- change, its ways. But times keep changing, and the unemployment blues have replaced songs of social protest on cam- puses. And this has led to an interesting and ironic phenomenon. . At the height of the antiwar movement, the name of the Central Intelligence Agency produced automat- ic sneers among young idealists. Recruiters for the CIA were not welcome then in academe. Today, there is more reason to distrust the CIA than in the 1960s. Then, we only suspected the agency of misdeeds. Now we know. Yet the CIA might as well have been printing job recruitment posters and taking out 10-second advertising spots on network TV for all the effect that congressional disclosures and press exposes have had on college students. Recent reports show that the number of college Seniors applying for professional jobs with the CIA went up 30 per cent during the Past year, when adverse publicity against the agency reached its peak. . , - More revealing are statistics showing that inter- . est in the agency isnot just a last resort: College stu- dents' applications for government jobs:in general went up only 10 per cent by comparison. Some college officials attribute the renewed in- terest in CIA work precisely to the had publicity. But the change in attitude among students should more properly be laid to a resurgence of pragmatism among job seekers. A student who has spent four years in college and then perhaps another two in graduate school, perfect- ing his skill at higher mathematics or Russian, may find it a lot more palatablelo decipher codes or tran- slate obscure journals for the CIA than to sell insur- ance or collect unemployment insurance. The job market is tight, aril it is squeezing idealism and mor- al considerations out of graduates. Bob Dylan's early songs are now poignant anach- ronisms,from merehopeful years. Better suited to to- day is the wry (lament from Cicero on changing times and morals: 0 temporal 0 mores! .25 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 BANNER, Nashville 27 April 1976 Involve 0 ?( By FRANK VAN DER LINDEN 1Vashington Bureau Chief in the Watergate breakin." Washington?Sen. Howard H. Baker, Baker's stand today is a sharp depar- R-Tenn., virtually gave up today his ture from his statement on Sept. 19, long attempt to prove that the Central 1974: "I believe there is no question that Intelligence_Agency was involvenTM the Central Intelligence Agency was Watergate burglary that led to the involved in Watergate; the question is downfall of President Nixon. . ? rather, on whose order and for what In separate personal views filed with purpose?" . the Senate Intelligence Committee's ! The Tennessee Republican said the final report, Baker said he had been following December that, because of given access to secret CIA files denied the CIA's stubborn refusal to comply to him in 1973 as vice chairman of the: withhis requests for evidence, he could Senate Watergate panel. ? ? : only "guess" that its agents weren't "I wish to state my belief," he said, ? involved in "a sinister plot by the CIA" "that the sum total of the evidence does ;to destroy Nixon. . not substantiate a conclusion that the In January 1975, Baker eagerly ob- CIA per se was involved in the range of tamed a place on the Select Intelligence events . and circumstances known as Committee, hoping that its subpoena Watergate. powers might enable him to pry loose "The investigation of Watergate and secret data that would link the CIA to the possible relationship of the CIA Watergate. thereto, produced a panolply of puzzle- Former White House aide Charles ment," the senator said. . . -...; Colson had told him that convicted "While the available information Watergate conspirator Howard Hunt leaves nagging questions and contains i had often delivered secret information from the White House "plumbers" to the CIA long after the agency claimed it had broken off with Hunt in 1971. Colson had a theory that Nixon was forced to resign the presidency when bits and pieces of intriguing evidence, , fairness dictates that an assessment be rendered on the basis of the present re. ? cord. "An impartial evaluation of that re- cord compels the conclusion that the caught in a web of intrigue secretly spun -CIA, as an institution, was not involved by veteran agents of the CIA. NEW YORK TIMES 8 MAY 1?75 Taming the\136-asts In retrospect, there is a striking similarity in the prob-- lems Senator Frank Church's Select Committee un- covered in its separate inquiries into domestic and for- eign intelligence. Presidents of both parties succumbed, to the temptation to use intelligence agencies, with their capacities to act in secrecy, as instruments to: perform political magic for the Oval Office. In both the domestic and foreign intelligence agencies, Presi- dents found officials all too eager to engage in secret and lawless activities for, as one F.B.I. man put -it, "the greater good" of the citizenry. ? ? The reports show from how many directions the foundations of freedom were being undermined. First, there was the growing tendency to ignore the Constitu- tion and the laws. Second, .over the years, more and more of what is legitimately the public's business was being conducted in secret, depriving the people of in- formation they needed to govern themselves effectively. Finally, there were deep and often personally injurious intrusions into individual rights. ? At the heart of the effort to re-establish the rule of law Is the proposal to create a Senate committee with juris- diction over both domestic and foreign intelligence, empowered to legislate and to appropriate funds, in addition to performing the oversight function of the Congressional watchdog. All other proposed reforine binge on this proposal, rendered all the more crucial because the committees currently charged with this responsibility, principally Armed Services and Judiciary, tewo. EDit oppt, Four of the burglars who broke into ? the Democrats' Watergate head- quarters in June 1972 ? Hunt, James McCord, Rolando Martinez and Ber- nard Barker ? had CIA connections. The Rockefeller Commission last June said the CIA's failure to make "timely disclosure of information and its des- truction of certain tapes has led to suspicions and allegations concerning its involvement in the Watergate ! operation or the subsequent coverup." The Rockefeller panel said Richard ? Helms, then CIA director, had used -! "poor judgment" when in January.1973 he destroyed many CIA tapes and tran- scripts.!Helms' act was one of several events that aroused Baker's suspi- cions. .? The senator said the CIA gave "ex- emplary" cooperation to him in his new role on the Intelligence Committee. He , expressed his appreciation to CIA Director George Bush and his prede- cessor, William Colby, "for cooperating, to the fullest extent." Much information that the CIA had ?withheld from the Senate Watergate Committee "was examined at the CIA's headquarters in raw form and without sanitization deletions," he said. have exercised little or no oversight and seem unwilling to -initiate the changes required to prevent recurrence of past abuses. In the foreign area alone, the committee proposes that the Director of Central Intelligence be given coordinating and budget-making powers designed to improve his con- trol over the whole range of intelligence programs and to make them more responsive to the President. Covert actions would be severely curtailed and, if declared es- sential, made subject to Presidential and Congressional treview of each proposal for such action, followed by written approval of specific programs. In the domestic field, the F.B.I. would be required to :shut down its political intelligence operations. Preven- tive intelligence activities would be permitted only in ' case of a clear threat of foreign spying or terrorism. Domestic intelligence activities would be vested in the F.B.I. and the guidelines recently drawn up by the Attorney General to control the F.B.I. would receive the legislative underpinning required to make them effective. Some critics of the Select Committee's work believe that it should have outlawed covert action and domestic intelligence entirely and that it is naive to believe that the agencies in question can be controlled by law. Such a view seems to us based on the defeatist assumption that the nation has passed the point where it can impose legal controls over its own arms. ,However the com- mittee's work is itself proof that the rule of law still has etrong defenders in Washington. The legislative program recommended by the Church Committee Is a test of the nation's will to be both free and secure. It is up to Congress to meet that test. 26 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 Approved ForRelease 2001108t08-: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-6-- WASHINGTON POST 2 5 APR 1976 For the Record From a statement by the Federation ?of American Scientists: The proposed threshold test ban treaty is worse than nothing. . . . In the first place, it directly reneges on U.S. declaratory policy of more than a decade, which repeatedly emphasized that the only problem in the way of a test ban agreement was verification. The clear implication of this position was that any threshold agreement would be reached at a threshold level no higher than the capabilities of na- tional verification demanded. This .level is now somewhere around 10 kilo- tons or less?not the proposed 150 kilo- tons. . . . In itself this situation does not make the treaty worse than nothing but only reduces its value to nothing. In addi- tion, however, we doubt that this treaty level will ever subsequently be low- ered. The threshold treaty will, if rati- fied, take the test ban treaty off the political agenda. If a dozen years of say- ing we wanted limits bounded by na- tional verification capabilities could not lead to better than this, the present reversal of policy is likely to end the matter for the foreseeable future. The treaty is also worse than nothing in its effect on the treaty's most impor- tant audience: the nuclear-tending powers. No treaty limiting tests would, of course, make much difference to the heavily armed superpowers. But the test ban was supposed to set an exam- ple of restraint to those who might' build nuclear weapons themselves. .? . .? Finally, . . .it advances the notion that peaceful uses are plausible. But our. country believes there are no sensi- ble peaceful uses of nuclear explosions.- Why then enshrine in a treaty elabo- rate methods of verifying them? This can only encourage new nuclear pow- ers to justify bombs. . . . Monday, May 3. 1976 THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR . U.S.: self-defeating prophecies By Walter C. Clemens Jr. Influence in this world is purchased by what people think rather than by objective realities. American spokesmen ? inside as well as out- side the government ? have unnecessarily low- ered the image of the United States by deni- grating its power and upgrading that of its ad- versaries. ? Not only retired officers now running for public office such as Adm. Elmo Zumwalt and candidates of the right wing such as Ronald Reagan are charging that the U.S. is becoming a second-rate power compared to the Soviet Union. The same impression is created by CIA estimates of what it would cost the United States to field a military establishment like that of the U.S.S.R. ? Not only veteran distruster of the "third world" Daniel P. Moynihan but Henry Kis- singer is warning that the United States will rue the day that Congress cut off aid to West- ern-backed forces in Angola. The picture they paint is not only that the Russians and Cubans are "in" but that they will remain influential in Angola for years to come. ? Secretary Kissinger, contrary to the ad- vice of many specialists on Italian and world communism, warns that communist participa- tion in the Italian Cabinet will make Italy unfit for NATO. Each of the above arguments is unfounded and unwise. Though Russia is gaining on the U.S. militarily in some respects, U.S. and NATO forces still maintain a commanding lead in the key indexes of military power, including numbers and accuracy of warheads. The quali- tative advantages rooted in Western tech- nology are overlooked in quantitative assess- ments. The gross numbers that do favor the U.S., such as total tonnage of the U.S. and So- viet navies, are bypassed by the pleaders for panic. Having spent fabulous sums and gigantic ef- 4 forts to build a military force "second to none," Americans are foolhardy to downgrade WASH NGTON POST 13 MAY 1976 it merely to obtain a larger budget for the next years. Such talk ? like the alleged bomber and missile gaps of the '50s ? creates bargaining advantages for the U.S.S.R. not warranted by the military realities. Why should the U.S. Gov- ernment talk so as to exaggerate Soviet power? As to Angola, Soviet advantages there result primarily from Moscow's decision, taken some years ago, to back the national independence movement, while Washington tilted toward Portugal. There is nothing inevitable about a long-term Soviet presence in Angola, though Washington's talk could make it more likely. Rather than hinting that the Angolans are locked in the vise of the Russian bear, Amer- ica might better go about extending the warm hand it should have proffered years ago. What to do about Italy is less clear, but the administration might begin by clearing the decks and halting any remaining covert aid to the Christian Democrats, who have shown themselves so inept at governing their country in a progressive way. After 20 years the U.S. can no longer justify aid to them as an ex- pedient to stave off a communist victory as in the chaos resulting from World War II. Since Italy's Communist Party may some day come to power, why not prepare for the possibility of an accommodation at least as cordial as that which has evolved with Tito? The Russians, also confronted with the possi- bility of a "historic compromise" in Italy. have till now shown the sense not to attempt ex- communicating the heretical Italian party. If the Italian or other West European com- munists want to become independent of Mos- cow, Dr. Kissinger's line makes it more diffi- cult for them to do so. Prophecies can be self-fulfilling and even self-defeating. If U.S. leaders must prophesy: why not put their country's assets on the scales along with its liabilities? Mr. Clemens is professor of political science at Boston University. Paying Iittern tional Ii es ,rin HE UNITED STATES a deadbeat? Embarrassing L but true. This country is in arrears on its dues for the second half of 1975 and for all of 1976 to the International Labor Office, a venerable institution founded by Samuel Gompers in .1919 and a major channel of American influence on trade unions and . . worker-related activities abroad. The sum involved is small--$25 million. But the damage to American in- ? terests ? and prestige, if the Congress does not promptly pay up, could be disproportionately large. ? ? The basis of the trouble is simple. A while back, AFL-CIO president George Meany got fed up---not without some good reasonat ,the way Communist and Third World. countries were undercutting the unique. tripartite worker-employer-government structure of the ILO and manipulating it for anti- American politica! purposes. The. Ford administra- ,? 27 tion reacted, in a damage-limiting mode, by giving a .two-year notice of withdrawal; that threat, it was hoped, would stir the ILO to start making some of the changes necessary to keep the United States in. And in fact some progress has been made. A cabinet-level committee including Mr. Ivleany recently pronounced itself guardedly hopeful of ILO change. An inatten- tive House nonetheless cut out all ILO funds. The Senate put the money in. The matter now hangs in tho hala ;ice of an imminent conference. The ILO funds should be, we believe, restored: Americans cannot expect to gain a fair hearing for their ideas on ILO reform while they are ignoring the ? ILO constitution's requirement to keep up on dues. The United States should not be playing games with 'int!.Arnational organizations, and setting a bad (-Nam-. pie fur other nations. Moreover, valuable ILO activi- " Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 ties are going on right now. Next month in Geneva the ILO will convene another in the United Nations' : series of social/economic conferences. The point of this one is to induce member governments and their bureaucracies and citizens to leaven their pursuit of economic growth with a greater concern for distribu- tion of the benefits to the poor. It would be a particu- lar shame if the American delegation had to slink into that conference by the back door. The larger issue of American participation in the BALTIMORE SUN 11 May 1976 ILO remains. Our own view is that the provocation would have to be very great to justify a decision?at the end of the two-year notice period next year?to drop out. That would leave an important labor field to countries often 'unfriendlyto American values and views. It would convey a signal of international flag- ging. Mr. Meany is quite right in believing, nonethe- less, that it is up to the other nations in the ILO, if they wish the Americans to stay, to meet the United States half way. Finer _Points of Drug Suppression in Bangkok Bangkok. The Drug Enforcement Administration has been operating for more than 10 years in Thailand, the primary trafficking outlet for the world's largest source of illicit opium ? and a land where money and influence make . things run. , DEA agents gather intelligence and uni- laterally pay informers. They work closely 'with their own Thai Police contacts, ex- , changing information, interrogating prison- ers, and making raids. Only Thai police can make arrests. The consensus is that the DEA presence has kept heroin syndicates on the run, with . probably less than 10 per cent of America's heroin coming through Thailand. The Thai Police can point to an impressive record of seizures. On the darker side, not a single narcotics fugitive has ever been caught and not a sin- gle "drug king" has ever been successfully prosecuted. Many cases are mysteriously dropped for "lack of evidence." Trials drag on forever, witnesses vanish, and prisoners ."escape." Corruption and trust are the main prob- lems in running a drug suppression opera- tion in Thailand. A Thai Police rookie makes only $50 a month, a general about $500. The temptations are great, especially if it only involves looking the other way. . Thai society runs on a hierarchial clique system. Members of a clique are "friends" and develop ferocious loyalties, often tran- scending family and institutional barrie:s. , ? By FRANK LOMBARD ? Outsiders are more or less mistrusted. Many a cynical foreigner has been given to remark that "the Thais do not trust each other." With this backdrop, it is easy to under- stand that narcotics intelligence within the Thai Police flows along personal rather than organizational lines. Officials are disinclined to keep records and files for fear that they cannot preserve their confidentiality. They could be misused by jealous subordinates or copied by other government units. . Informers are reluctant to come forward_ The policemen they confide in may not be the ones who arrest them. (The Thai police are national, and any policeman can make 'arrests nationwide.) Police have a tendency to forget about a case after the arrest. They are mainly inter- ested in the "body" and the "dope" and often lack the incentive to follow-up on an investi- gation. " There is also no incentive to chase a fugi- tive unless orders come from "above." A bus driver can flee the scene of an accident in the middle of Bangkok and never get caught. Narcotics police tell about a raid at a drug laboratory in which one of the opera- tors shouted with surprise and indignation: "What are you guys doing here? We just got through paying you $10,000." They had paid a different set of policemen. After the police prepare a case, they turn it over to the public prosecutor, a separate branch of government. Police feel that the prosecutor is not on their side. In any event, they do not coordinate well. At this stage bribes are attempted, usual- ly through defense attorneys. The police or prosecutor may respond by omitting key ele- ments of evidence or by dropping the case altogether. This sometime,s backfires. State witness- es often are not prepared by the prosecutor, and they have been known to volunteer testi- mony on their own, thus surprising the judges. ? . Prosecuting a possession case is fairly ea- sy. Getting at one of the financiers or "drug kings" is difficult, requiring many witnesses and a great deal of preparation. Plea bar- gaining is not allowed, though judges might go easier on a defend.ent who co-operates. The financiers have money for bribes and the best lawyers. Police claim that even ? their competitors in the illicit drug business will help them financially. While awaiting trial, they pay wardens for daytime liberty, returning to their cells ? at night. During the day; they might work some drug .deals .or maybe look up unfavorable witnesses who, according to police, are ? threatened or bribed. Another ploy is to play sick. If a critical viitness is scheduled for trial, . the accused gets sick or his lawyer gets sick. The trial is then postponed for at least another three weeks, because sessions do not run continu- ously. Things can drag on forever, with key prosecution witnesses slowly disappearing from the scene. Mr. Lombard is an American free- lance writer based in Bangkok. THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Friday, May 7, 1976, The Oceans' Use - 'fuming Point May Be Reached Today the UN Effort to raft a Law of the Sea By BARKY NEWMAN Staff Reporter of THIS WALL STREET JOURNAL NEW YORK -Negotiation:4 to write the 1031. 121w to govern use of the world's oceans may he reaching a turning point today as the third st'..2f)11 of the tinned Nations talks volutes to end amid continuing friction be. tween ;old tleveloping countries.. in Iwo y.-ars of elaborate meetingS, first in (1.4t-aeas :1:1.1 then in (leneva, the 149 countries part leipating in the Law of the Sea Cool-creme lilt little more than jostle in the starting gate of what has seemed like an im: im meta dash for the wealth of the oceans. It Ii,, s been the knottiest international bargain- ing over. it has also been, Secretary of State 11..0ry Kissinger 1-',11,1 last month. "one of the In ost sigtlifiema negotiations in diplomatic history." -? ? 1)oring an eight-week New York session jest clo,ung, wan, haxd compromises have finally been strc kat. There now is :weep- ta nee, for 10sbon-,:. of a $2 mile territorial sea irephialhe the tht-ce?milc "cannon shot'' of :Inot her veal, and that hies been coupled with a 200 mite "cottotnio V.M10.' where r41a'0:4i coma: woubl hold sway over commercial activity. ? However, a crucial ,accord that was thmight to be emerging on a way to organize the mining of copper. nickel and manganese on the floor. of the deep sea, beyond, the 2)0- mile zone, ran into trouble yesterday. The s..:alied milling plan ?which would give the international community a share of the ilth ? was offeced as a major concession by the Milted States. The 'U.S. has been $4051. 1(2 for a largt:ly free-enterprise min. 1:1c. system. but iiilyanced the compromise tai'et th?? letirirgic eonfeeence a jolt la?yeloping eountries, which have op- 28 ..,041.,t1 Any private exploitation of the seabed, Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 ApproVed For Release -2001108/08-: CIA-RDP774:10432R000100400008-0-* 'are finding the compromise hard to swallow. lii reaction, many of them have come out against Secretary Kissinger's proposal to re- convene the ; conference with the hope of completing a ireaty only two'or three months from now in Geneva or New York. Pitfalls Remain As of 'late yesterday, the conference was, still trying to decide in closed session whether to call the summer meeting. But even if the meeting is held, the law of the. sea won't be home free. Numerous pitfalls remain, any one of which could trip up the ; conference. There is harsh disagreement over the composition of a council to oversee ocean mining. There is a standoff over the rights of one country to conduct scientific research off the coast of another. And a new coalition has arisen of landlocked and other so-called "geographically disadvantaged' states that are trying mightily to gain some- thing for themselves from the sea. If these 52 countries don't get at least part of what they want, there are enough of them to block a treaty. Moreover, even if every country in the World signs an ocean treaty, there are still substantial doubts that it would be univer- sally ratified. The U.S. delegation, for exam- ple, is already getting adverse domestic re- action to its offer of a seabed.compromise, and delegation members are clearly wor- , Tied. l? One of the more voluble opponents of the ! compromise, a law professor named Gary Knight from Louisiana State University, calls it a "dead giveaway" of seabed min- ing, and he predicts that "34 Senators could easily be brought together to refuse to rat- ify."; A mining-industry representative who : ask$ not to be identified insists the compro- mise has to be a "bottom line proposition;" ? any further movement, he says, would turn ; him against the treaty. In Congress, a bill that would license U.S. companies to mine the deep seabed with or 'without a treaty is expected to be on the Senate floor by June. Last March, Con- gress passed a bill claiming U.S. control over fishing as far as 200 miles to sea. Pres- ident Ford signed the bill despite appeals from his own diplomats. Treaty proponents fear that political considerations in an elec- tion year could similarly encourage unilat- eral action on mining, especially if the con- ference doesn't meet over the summer, and could turn Congress and the public against a ? treaty that doesn't measurably enhance U.S. , interests. Likened to Canal Issue "Joe Six-pack doesn't know anything ; about the law of the sea?he never heard of it," says Sen. Mike Gravel, Democrat of Alaska, who is against unilateral moves. ; "As soon as extreme conservatives realize we're planning to cede sovereignty to an in- ternational body, they'll call it the worst treason. They're doing this right now in re- gard to the Panama Canal.. You'll see the drawing of the line." Hoping to head off legislation, the U.S. and other countries are asking the UN con- ference to give the treaty the force of law when it is signed, instead of waiting for wide ratification?a process that could take eight years. Otherwise, says a U.S. diplomat, "the whole thing could be for naught." A senior UN official, asked what effect U.S. ocean- mining legislation could have on the confer- ence outcome, says, "I don't want to answer that question because I wouldn't want to ; sound gloomy and pessimistic." The balance is delicate. Sonic people fear ? that the conference could explode if pres- sured too forcefully, or atrophy if not pres- sured enough. For this reason, conference I leaders over the last two years have thought It too risky to take a vote ohanything. Sub- 1 stantive bargaining has gone ahead In se- - eret, and all agreements have been reached through consensus. Records aren't even kept. Information about what's happening comes mainly from diplomats willing to talk without being identified. In the last week, conference leaders have gone into seclusion to escape constant dele- gate lobbying and have drafted a tentative treaty that presumably reflects areas of agreement. The text will be revised at least (glee before a final treaty takes shape. The end product will be the result of alliances that have dissolved, and coalesced again, as each nation has struggled to sort out its principles and weigh them against its self- interest. Early in the negotiations, for instance. more than 100 developing countries lined up In favor of total coastal-state control over activity in the 200-mile economic zone. It has since dawned on countries that are land- locked (or have short coastlines or coast- lines .that are close to other nations') that strong coastal states could squeeze them out of the sea for good. So these countries?in- cluding such unlikely couples as Bolivia and Singapore, Sweden and Uganda?have re- belled and erected one of the conference's biggest roadblocks. Their diplomats realize that these states aren't likely to get a crack at oil and miner- als in the coastal waters of other nations. But they are demanding continued freedom of transit for their ships in the 200-mile zone and some sort of access to fish and other liv- ing resources. If those rights are granted, an Asian diplomat says, "then we won't tor- pedo the conference." Among other issues dealing with waters relatively close to land, a few more snags have developed,, but they are considered mi- nor. For example, there are differences over the definition of an archipelago. That may not seem important, but it is very important for archipelagoes. And while there is a good amount of agreement on broad rights of pas- sage through straits (a major military con- cern of the U.S.)? the straits states don't en- tirely like the arrangement. But it is be- lieved they will ultimately come around. A more novel issue?pollution from ships ?has produced surprising unity. (One possi- ble reason is that shipping states and coastal states are often one and the same, and only have to shake hands with them- selves.) "We've come very close to reaching agreement on pollution in all aspects," says a Latin-American diplomat, The plan calls for *establishment of international pollution standards for the economic zone. Coastal states wouldn't be allowed to exceed the standards with their own rules. That pleases maritime states whose ships wouldn't be closed out of areas where the rules are too stringent. In return, coastal states would be granted considerable. powers of enforce-. ment. (The tougher issue of what to do about pollution that starts on land and ends up in the sea was barely grazed by the confer- ence. Environmentalists aren't happy with that, and they also say the accord on ship- ping pollution seems too vague. One pollution expert on the U.S. delegation says reaction from environmental groups to such a pollu- ' lion treaty would probably be "lukewarm to opposed.") The Research Issue Another novel item on the bargaining ta- ble hasn't been so gracefully handled. The same committee that has found a solution to pollution has been sturnaed by the question of scientific research. Advanced countries like the U.S. are asking freedom to do re- search in another country's economic zone_ Coastal states want to control it, not because they don't like scientists but because some scientists could be soldiers in disguise. "Coastal states," a diplomat says, "have 29 felt threatened by certain scientific-research projects that in fact have been all sorts of things." The U.S. has budged a bit on this, but not enough to satisfy coastal states. The posi- tions now seem frozen. Some observers sus- pect the reason for this adamancy is that defense has become a "hidden agenda" at a 1 conference that had expressly excluded mili- tary matters. The suggestion is made that the large U.S. concession on seabed mining was meant to insure that defense interests would get their way on issues they consider vital, such as freedom of "scientific" re- search. Top U.S. diplomats deny it. They say the seabed proposal was intended to ac- celerate talks that seemed doomed. "Nobody can have everything he wants," a ' U.S. negotiator says. "There's no point in a : treaty that's completely one-sided." Whatever the motives, the offer of a seabed compromise has reportedly been in- corporated into the tentative treaty text with the hope that it may lead to a breakthrough. Throughout the talks, developing coun- tries, many of which export minerals, have been digging in against private mining of the deep-sea ;floor. They fear that minerals from the sea could glut the minerals mar- kets, and they favor giving an international enterprise the exclusive rights to mine the seabed. But nobody has said where such an enterprise might find the technology, the ex- pertise and the money to break into the ocean-mining business. (And some develop- ing countries that buy minerals have evi- dently been having second thoughts about a system that would prop up prices for devel- oping countries that produce those miner- als.) The U.S. Proposal Until now, the United States was standing fast for ,a free-enterprise system for mining the seabed. Its compromise proposal offers to put two crucial constraints on private companies. It would create a method for handing over some, but not all, fully explored %nine sites to an international authority, which would exploit them and share the rev- 'enue. In addition, the proposal offers a for- Mule that would tie increases in sea-mineral production to increases in demand for min- erals in general, so that prices wouldn't be eroded. The mining companies, evidently. are amenable to this middle ground. Whether developing countries are willing to drop their ideological opposition to private exploitation remains to be seen. There is another unresolved seabed issue, and it goes to the heart of the law of the sea. ;It. concerns the make-up of the interna- tional council that will operate the deep- seabed authority. The U.S. wants a dispro- portionately strong voice on the council. Its representatives are convinced that develop- ing countries will use a one-country one-vote system to advance their own views. Devel- oping countries are just as distrustful of the U.S. and other industrial countries, and sim- ilar worries abound at the conference about I the fairness of the machinery being con- structed for the settlement of all disputes that arise after a treaty is achieved. The mood confirms a feeling shared by many conference participants: that the orig- inal high-sounding notions about preserving the seas as "the common heritage of man- kind" have long since gone by the boards and been replaced by the hard-nosed pursuit of property and power. "We are convinced that our \common progress requires nations to acknowledge their interdependence and act out of a sense of community." Secretary Kissinger said in this speech about the seas last month. But a !diplomat from an island state is skeptical. "When we are finished," he says, "we will have buried the common heritage of man- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003:0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Tuesday, May 11, 1976 UNCTAD and Beyond Henry Kissinger, who has long Department in a long time." professed to be bored by interna- The IRB, we're told, will kill two tional economics, last September birds with one stone. It will get cap- unveiled before the United Nations ital flowing into vitally needed min- his master plan for dealing with the eral resources and it will virtually ing "Third World." economic demands of the develop- end Third World expropriation of development projects. Private capi- If you'll recall, he proposed crea- tal, you see, isn't going into such tion of enough new international bu- reaucracies that locating them all in New York City would balance Mayor Beame's budget. They in- cluded: A Development Security Facility (DSF); an International Energy Institute (IEI); an Interna- tional Industrialization Institute (III); an International Center for the Exchange of Technological In- formation (ICETI); a World Food Reserve (WFR); Consumer-Pro- ducer Forums (CPFs); an Interna- tional Fund for Agricultural Devel- opment (IFAD); and an interna- tional organization "to coordinate and finance" technological assis- tance in nonfood agriculture and forestry, to which we applied the acronym: IOCFTANAFP. The UN's bureaucrats, of course, were wowed by all these bold and innovative jobs,er, ideas. Never one to quit while 'he's on a winning streak, the Secretary of State last week went before the UN Confer- ence on Trade and Development in Nairobi with something new. Out of his sleeve came the' International Resources Bank (IRB), which Jack Bennett of Exxon?who a year ago was Treasury undersecretary?has mildly described as "one .of the worst ideas to come out of the State WASHINGTON POST . 0 MAY 1976 projects as easily as it might be- cause companies fear expropria- tion. The bank would be capitalized at $1 billion, with the United States putting up a fifth, the other indus- trial countries and the oil producers putting up the remainder. The bank would sell up to $10 billion in bonds, lend the money to governments for mining projects and such, with the future output of the ventures pledged as collateral for the bonds. There's a vision of a company buy- ing the IRB bonds, the money going to a Third World government, which then uses it to buy the company's services in developing the project. Because the developing nations really want the industrial nations to put up $3 billion to stockpile com- modities as buffers against price swings, they're not exactly 'en- chanted with the IRB idea. And for some reason Mr. Kissinger's IRB is being portrayed by the United States as a "free-market" alterna- tive to the stockpiling idea, al- though we fail to see how an inter- national bureaucracy that parcels out subsidized loans bears any re- semblance to the free market. And why should U.S. taxpayers reating IS AFRICAN TRIP prOvided Secretary of State Kissinger with two occasions on which to re- spond to the less developed countries' aspirations to reduce the real.economic gap and the felt psychologi- cal gap between the world's rich and poor. This is a concern ever more central to American foreign poli- cy,. Since there in the country a certain sense of guilt about global poverty, reinforced by forebodings of. OPEC-like reprisals by producers of commodities other than oil. Ending too long a period of neglect,' Mr: Kissinger joined the issue last fall in what ? was widely taken as a 'constructive response to ::Third World" demands for major changes in the world economy. But the Third World's ?intemperate attacks on Zionism and on other matters of 'American politi- Cal concern subsequently dissipated much of that in- cipient spirit of accommodation. The result was that Mr. Kissinger 'went to Africa realizing that, whatever the 'foreign policy considerations at stake, he did not have much political room. ?,His first pronouncement, was a dramatic proposal to "roll back the desert" in the sub-Saharan drought- prone region of the Sahel. The price tag given was, $7.5 billion and the impression given was that of a huge American initiative. Actually, the plan, which experts deem a promising one, had long been in the support a bank that lends money to countries that expropriate private investments? If Third World coun- tries want increased capital invest- ment that is in fact discouraged by the threat of expropriation, they can easily work out iron-clad assur- ances not -to expropriate, or simply build a reasonable history of non- expropriation. Mr. Bennett fears now that Mr. Kissinger has put forth his scheme local governments will be tempted to wait for these subsidized loans, halting negotiations with private companies who are now trying to find ways to continue development. But only the most foolish of Third World governments would do this, we think, not only because the sub- sidized loans might never come, but chiefly because they'll always be better off with private direct invest- ment. A state-run development proj- ect will inevitably chew up three, four or 10 times the value of any subsidy, simply through bureau- cratic inefficiencies. There's no reason why Mr. Kis- singer should be making any pro- posals at all in this area, except that it wins cheers from the interna- tional bureaucrats and a few others with day dreams about world gov- ernment. Indeed, the floor of the State Department that is given over to economic affairs could easily be collapsed into a medium-sized val- ise and given over to the folks at Treasury, who will know what to do with it. orld overt 30 international works. The money is to be provided by many sources and.spent ?over a period of 10 years. The American share amounts to the annual $100 mil- lion-plus that the United States had already said it would provide. . -The more important occasion was the Nairobi ses- sion of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the leading forum in which the poor, very poor and -newly- rich members of the Third World (no monolith) have tried to work out their own differences and lean on the developed states. Most countries of this "bloc," finding self-reform difficult. instead seek resources primarily from the -United States: commodity agreements to support the price of ? their main exports: cheap technology unencumbered by patents; debt ?rclief, including relief of the im- mense debts run up to Third World oil states; easier access to Western markets; and Third World power in global economic decision-making. Skipping the touchy matter of self-uplift, Mr. Kis- singer bore down principally on commodities. But where many producers want the assurance of steady and consumer-subsidized markets, he proposed a new "bank" to funnel private capital into resource devel- opment. Few people outside the State Department see much need for a new bank. The idea is not strong- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 - Approved-For Release-2001/08/08-: CIA-RDP77-004-32R0001-00400003-0 ly, supported by other executive departments. The Congress will probably pay more heed than the Sec- retary to corporate. misgivings. The controversial re- -cord of Western corporations, in precisely the extrac- ? live industries that the proposal would most affect, is bound to be revived. All this does not necessarily mean it's a bad idea. It means the United States is en- gaged in a negotiation. The Third World's purpose in initiating the negotiation, with a demand for a "new ? international economic order," is nothing less than to .:refit the.world economy to new political forces them- selves still in a molten stage. It will go on for years. ? There is something more immediate to do. The first ? American installment of $375 million to replenish the World Bank's window for the very poor,' the Interna- NEW YORK TIMES ? 5" MAY 1976 tional Development Association, fell due last Febru; ary. The full amount'has not yet been authorized; the incomplete appropriation was in The aid bill just ve- toed. It is true that some countries seem more inter- ested in exacting fresh psychic revenge from the United States than in seeing real resources trans- ferred through familiar channels like the World Bank. But this does not absolve the United Slates of commitments undertaken in the past; on this particu- lar commitment, moreover, the commitments of ? other donor nations hinge. The international com- munity has good reason to be skeptical about Ameri- can words while this country's obligations to IDA re- main unfulfilled. Why Was the Dragon Slain? . PARIS?Something very unusual is going on in Britain's nuclear program. It is difficult to. conclude from avail- able details on this highly classified subject whether recent developments should be linked to London's strategic planning. They are more probably related to efforts at supporting the economy, to preparations for a "European" atomic weapons pool with France, or even to political fears that United States neo- isolation may curb access to vital materials on which the United King- dom has hitherto depended. ? , Consider the following apparently unrelated facts: (1) London's Ministry of Defense announced it would halt ?iinports of weapons-grade tritium, a radioactive isotope of hydrogen gas, purchased for twenty years from the United States; (2) it became known that .a seven-nation London agree- ment; controlling export of nuclear materials, was running? into trouble with the Common Market's nuclear agency, Euratom; (3) and Britain last Thursday formally interred in the Organization of Economic Coordina- tion and Development (0.E.C.D.) "the Dragon," a unique installation. . Tritium is a component of H-bombs derived from many ores although often associated with aluminum. In the West it is now produced by Amer- ica and France. It is not only costly. but decays rapidly, with a half-life of 12.5 years as compared to millions of years for uranium and thousands of years for plutonium. But fusionable tritium is enormously more explosive than either of the above fissionable elements. It is also far lighter and therefore capable of propulsion by smaller weapons systems. FOREIGN AFFAIRS By C. L. Sulzberger Why were the British giving up their guaranteed American source of tritium and constructing their own facilities at Chapelcross and Galloway in the U.K.? Britain is broke and curb- ing almost every other expenditure including the Dragon?of which more later. Is the change to create jobs, to save money by saving dollars, to make a brand-new secret weapon,, or to safeguard against the fear of a sudden American cut-off? Or is it to free Britain from U.S. restrictions, thus allowing it to go ahead with an oft-mentioned, never- agreed plan to join France in building a "European" nuclear force pooled by the two countries? Fusion warheads like those based on tritium have virtu- ally no fallout, unlike fission weapons based on uranium and plutonium. This is vital in considering the defense of tiny, populated Europe.. As for the Common Market flap: Washington inspired secret meetings last year to work out a secret accord between three Euratom members (Britain, France, West Germany) and four other nations (the U.S.A., Russia, Canada and Japan) restricting exports of specialized nuclear materials. But the other six Common Market partners were told nothing about their three partners' deal, until last week. Why not? Also, why were they' informed last week? Above all, why did London and Paris spurn a Bonn suggestion that reference to Euratom (Common Market nuclear branch) be made in the original pact? 31 Finally there is the strange Dragon case. This is a unique nuclear reactor built in Britain for the benefit of 0.E.C.D. members. It is the world's ? only versatile high-temperature experi- mental nuclear facility and could , attain temperatures of 1,000 degrees centigrade as compared with 300 to ? . 500. achieved by ordinary nuclear ? reactors. With the Dragon's technology it would be possible to produce metals like iron or aluminum directly from their ores by heat itself?like global creation?instead of by indireet elec- trical processes. The Dragon poten- tially could gasify coal or produce hydrogen as a fuel. In the nuclear energy field the - Dragon's demise is compared by scien- ? lists with the kind of faulty judgment which in the political field led to Watergate. The remarkable facility it- self, born in 1959 thanks to an 0.E.C.D. protocol, came into operation five years later in Winfrith Heath, England. It was named for the renowned hot breath of the mythical dragon. Why was it killed? The slaughter was allegedly pushed by Britain's en- ergy minister as a money-saving gim- mick. Is it worth the price to inter- national knowledge? It will delay for years the advance of Some types of beneficial research. Will another Dragon have to be constructed at far greater expense later on? And what has the Dragon's death got to do with other nuclear develop- ments? British manufacture of ?tritium may cost more than is saved by mur- dering the Dragon. And why the argu- ment about excluding Euratom from a secret nuclear agreement, largely at London's request? These events ap- proximately coincide. Something seems Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003--0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 THE ECONOMIST MAY I, 1976 Russia How big will the giant get? fect, and both have been used at various times without qualification, and some- times confused with one another, by advocates on both sides of the spending debate, to prove their own parochial , points. ? So when it became known a few weeks ago that the CIA estimates might have seriously underestimated Soviet spending and were being reworked, some American sceptics got their calcu- lators out. One of them, Congressman Les Aspin of Wisconsin, pointed out that the dollar estimate in particular made the Russian military? budget look bigger than it actually is. This is because of the "market basket" effect, well known to economists: to compare a basket of British groceries with the same products bought in another country usually makes the foreign ones look more expensive. This does not mean Britain lives more cheaply; it means that the foreigners have different tastes and needs, and their marketing system is more efficient at delivering what they want. So to put a cost on the Soviet military establishment as if it were pro- duced by the United States?which is roughly what the CIA does?tends to exaggerate its real cost. Is the Soviet military ogre growing to be 10 feet tall or only nine and a half? Or is it possible that he is not growing at all, and that the recent brouhaha over increased Russian defence spending is nothing more than gross misrepresenta- tion by American militarists who want to get the biggest possible defence budget through congress for next year? The answer to the first question is that nobody really knows accurately just how much Russia spends, or what effect the spending will have on its armed forces a few years hence. The ? answer to the second is that the CIA and several other organisations have produced estimates to serve as a rough guide to what the Russians are spending. They normally do two of these, a "rouble" estimate to measure the burden on. the Russian economy, and a "dollar" estimate that tries to compare Soviet spending with that of the United States, or all of Nato. The problem is that both of these figures are admittedly imper- Christian Science Monitor 13 May 1976 V: VF 'TS ute Strategic Survey: no expansionist policy By Takashi Oka Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor London Does the Soviet Union's continuing military buildup justify assumptions that the Kremlin has embarked on a new era of expansibnism? No, says the International Institute for Strategic Studies, one of the world's most pres- tigious private ? research organizations in the defense field. The institute's annual Strategic Survey thus takes issue with leading American officials such as Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and his assistant, Helmut Son- nenfeldt, who said publicly last June that the Soviet Union was just beginning "its truly im- perial phase." At ,a press conference unveiling the Survey last week, the institute's director, Christoph Bertram, also disputed some Western con- tentions that detente had favored the Soviet Union rather than the West. Soviel exclusion The fall of South Vietnam did not bring ludo- China into the Soviet orbit, Dr. Bertram noted Hanoi might be leaning toward Moscow, but. Cambodia seemed to be favoring Peking. Throughout Asia, the Chinese-Soviet con- frontation has caused difficulties for Moscow.. yo take one example no sooner had Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko paid a visit to Tokyo than Prime Minister Takeo Miki was declaring that Japan would go ahead and sign a friendship treaty with China, including an anti-hegemony (i.e., indirectly anti-Soyiet) clause to which Mr. Gromyko had taken ex- ception. The Soviet, UniOn has been effectively ex- cluded from .Middle East peacemaking: It is not participating in several significant inter- national conferences seeking to rearrange rela- tionships between the advanced industrial countries of the West and the countries of the developing world. The Conference on Eu-, ropean Cooperation and Security has been a disappointment likewise, for the Soviet Union has failed to reap from it the propaganda ad- vantages in the West that it had hoped for. ? On the militsry balance between East and West. the strategic survey, coauthored by Dr. Bertram and his colleagues, finds that while numerical superiority rests with the Soviet Union and its allies, the North Atlantic allies still lead in the quality and sophistication of their. weaponry. However, Dr. Bertram and his colleagues warned that if the NATO allies con- tinue to pinch pennies on defense, the-equilib- rium between Soviet numbers and Western quality could be changed in Moscow's favor. ? Advanced vehicle One institute official pointed out that in cer- But Mr Aspin has found other pro- blems as well, the most important of which is that the Russians seem to be using a lot of their military men to do things civilians do in most western countries?internal security, civil de- fence, research and work on civil con- struction projects. Not only does this tend to skew the dollar estimates even further, but it also makes the recent growth of Soviet military manpower look a lot less menacing than if it were all pumped into the combat forces. Mr Aspin's figures are generally confirmed by estimates released last week by the American Defence Intelligence Agency, which frequently differs from the CIA on fundamental military issues. But there is another issue that is often overlooked in the numbers game. This is that the pay of conscripts in Russia bears almost no relation to the economic burden on the country of having its men in uniform instead of growing wheat or making television sets. Russia is paying an economic cost for its large army that is far greater than can easily be measured by either dollar or rouble comparisons. Sorting out this particular tangle will be one of the major pro- blems the CIA must' face as it produces its revised estimates later this year. lain limited fields ? for instance that of armed vehicles ? the Soviet Union already deployed the world's. most advanced vehicle, the BMP. carrying a 73-millimeter gun and an anti-tank guided-missile launcher. The BMP is better than either the United ,States MI13 or the West German Marder, the official said. However, as production and deployment of Such sophis- ticated weapons proceeds, Soviet defense costs will require a dramatic increase. How will Moscow, already pushed for resources, re- spond to this need? The institute did not an- swer the question, but noted the heaVy eco- nomic burden a Soviet decision to push for - quality as well as numbers would demand. , Whereas the Atrierican defense establish- ment emphasizes the Soviet military buildup and especially Moscow's vast increase in naval strength over the past two decades, institute officials here note that even last year they recorded an American edge over the Soviets in tonnage and number of vessels recently built. In other words, the Soviet Union must face the problem of an increasingly obsolescent and outmoded Navy with large numbers of smaller vessels, while the United States is building a more modern Navy with larger ships. A recent Library of Congress study reaches similar con- clusions. Of course, Dr. Bertram and his colleagues note, there are worrying implications for the future in the Soviet Union's- military buildup. Certainly Moscow will take advantage of any target or opportunity that may present itself. But. so far, the institute judges there is in- sufficient evidence to justify conclusions thal the Soviet Union has already coloarkt-il on *0 0 confrontational policy of expansuinism. 32 Approved For For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 Approved:FOrRelea-se 2001/08108 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001-00400003-4 THE ECONOMIST MAY I, 1976 Eagles at odds The German-American connection which now holds the Atlantic community together is being bent by an argument over weapons that needs to be settled swiftly Germany is much the most important country in western Europe. It has therefore begun to develop a special relationship with the United States: not quite like the- one Britain used to have, with the British-American ties of language and alliance in two world wars; but close enough to reflect Germany's economic strength and military power, and its pre-eminence in both the EEC and Nato Europe. The prospect of a part-Com- munist government in Italy will certainly make the Americans work even more directly with the Germans on defence matters, rather than through the joint insti- tutions of Nato. This American-German relationship is the present linchpin of the Atlantic community. It is also coming under severe strain, at just the wrong moment, because of three arguments now going on between Germany and America. The first is the matter of "offset" arrangements, the purchases Germany makes from the United States (and services it renders to it) to offset what it costs America's balance of payments to keep American forces in Germany. Germany was willing enough to do these things when the United States was running a large trade deficit with Europe and some members of the American congress were campaigning to bring their troops home. But last year America's trade account perked up, and when the most recent offset agreement expired Mr Schmidt, the German chancellor, said he did not plan to? negotiate another one. He then changed his mind, and negotiations started again. One of the main bones of ? contention this time is the cost of housing the new army brigade the Americans brought to Europe last year and want to station in northern Germany, where they also want the Germans to pay for a lot of its barrack rooms. This is an old story. The second argument is not. This is about the airborne early warning system, the radar-stuffed aircraft that Nato badly needs to detect and identify low-flying intruders and send fighters to intercept the suspicious ones. Everybody agrees that the Americans' Boeing E-3A is the only aircraft to do the job. But the Germans are being asked to put up a large share of the money for it. Mr Georg Leber, their defence minister, will ask the Bundestag this month for authority to spend money to buy some early production material. If he gets it, most of the other countries involved will weigh in too. So far, so good, it might seem. But the third argument could undo the whole ball of wool. This is the growing quarrel about whether the Germans or the Americans should provide Nato's next main tank. Are the Americans weaselling? ? The United States is now testing two of its own proto- types of a new heavy tank, and will select the winner . this summer, recording the result of the tests. It will ? then allow a prototype of the Germans' new Leopard 2 tank to show its paces next autumn, and compare the result with the American winner's recorded perfor- mance. The United States originally said it would buy the ultimate victor, even if it is the German tank. But many German officials?and some Americans as well- 33 have begun to have their doubts. They believe the only true way to get a real comparison between the Leopard and the American tank is to test them side by side. The doubters also point out that a project like a new tank tends to develop a life of its own. The Americans make no secret that they will continue to develop their own tank through the summer, and even after the Leopard tests start. This sort of thing, the Germans argue, makes it almost impossible for the Leopard to be chosen. Recent testimixty before congress by Mr Malcolm Currie, the defence department's research director, suggests that the Americans' willingness to buy the Leopard if it beats their own tank is a lot less firm than it first appeared to be. These growing doubts have made the Germans angry. Germany buys much of its military equipment from the United States; now that Germany has a good product of its own, they say, it is time for the United States to come across and prove it is really serious about sharing the arms market more equitably with Europe. Some of them also believe the time has come? for Germany to use its political weight to try to bring this about. Mr Karl Damm, a Bundestag member, said in America recently that Germany will not put up its share of the early-warning aircraft money unless the United States buys the Leopard. That is an extreme view, and will probably not be the Germans' laSt word: they can hardly demand a fairer tank-versus-tank competition and then say the United States must buy the Leopard regardless of its outcome. But Mr Damm's remark has drawn attention to the Germans' new tendency to put all of these military negotiations in the same basket, and their growing readiness to argue toughly with America about them. This is no had thing if it makes the Americans realise that the issues are political as well as military. There is more at stake than a few details of tank con- struction. The United States has to accept that it cannot forever sell weapons to Europe just by demonstrating that they are cheaper and technically superior; the Europeans want to be able to produce good, cheap weapons for the alliance too. This should be both sides' ultimate aim. But the danger of putting politics into military matters is that the wrong military decisions can get made. Separate is best Both Germany and the United States can help to stop this happening. First, the three things should not be allowed to trip each other up. The argument about German offset payments for the new American brigade in north Germany is a basic one: whether Germany should continue to provide some sort of compensation for' the balance-of-payments costs of American pro- tection. The ansi.ver is probably yes, because it can afford it. The early warning aircraft is harder to keep separate, because Germany's final decision about that will not be taken until well after the tank competition is over. But it is probably a mistake to think of this as an Americanp.-kaject that Germany is supporting. It is Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 in reality a project to defend Nato Europe, to which the United States proposes to make a generous contribution both by its direct investment in the aircraft, and by a handsome write-off of its research and development costs. The German part in defusing the dispute would be to accept both of these basic points. But it is reasonable for Germany to ask for, and America to accept, changes in the tank competition. These should certainly include the side-by-side test the Germans want. Each country should then say, publicly that it will buy the winner, or build it under licence: some- T1--E CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR Friday, April 30, 1976 thing the Germans will not do under the present compe- tition rules. It is important not only to get the best tank for a large part of Nato's armies in the 1980s, but for both Germany and the United States to believe that the best tank has been fairly chosen. Side-by-side tests would delay the American tank programme a bit, but that is a small price to pay for persuading everyone that the right decision has been made. That German-American connection is too important, when so much of the rest of western Europe is so weak, to let it be cracked by nationalism over the instruments of the common defence. Possible Italian Communist victory poses problems ouah By Guy Halverson Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor Washington The possibilities of Communist Party victory in the upcoming June Italian general elections presents Pentagon strategists with a number of tough decisions: * Since Italy is the home of the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, and fills a key role in the defense of central Europe, should the U.S. military share NATO defense secrets with an Italian Government ? even a coalition gov- ernment ? including Communists? O Should Defense Department officials be speeding up possible "pull-back" plans to Spain, or U.S. East Coast ports? Because Italy remains a strategic link in NATO's European and Mediterranean defense plans it is not surprising the upcoming elec- toral test between the ruling Christian Demo- crats and the 1.5-million-member Italian Com- munist Party (the largest in Western Europe) has stirred up the U.S. defense and intelligence community. Pentagon consensus , The consensus in Pentagon corridors is that whatever the outcome of the upcoming elec- tions, ways will be found to maintain the large (13,000-man) U.S. military presence in Italy, while shoring up Italian military links within NATO itself. Some defense officers note that Communist Party government participation in Iceland and Portugal, for example, has not meant irrevo- cable military breaks with the U.S. in past years. Nevertheless, the military importance of Italy is not underemphasized here: o It is the home of NATO's southern com- mand and home base for the large U.S. Sixth Fleet, which daily patrols the Mediterranean Sea. O The world's seventlrilargest industrial power, Italy is opposite Yugoslavia, which de- fense intelligence experts believe will face pos- sible Soviet take-over plans after the passing of President Tito: 0 U.S. bases in Italy include Camp Darby at Livorno and Camp Ederle at Vincenza, both Army bases in the north; a Navy base at Sigo- nella in Sicily; the Sixth Fleet home port at Naples, and a Navy support base at La Matti- lena in Sardinia; and Air Force installations at Aviano Air Base below the Austrian border and San Vito facing Albania. If the U.S. were ever 'forced to pull back its military presence in Italy, one likely option would be Spain, says some experts. New base treaty A new, five-year base treaty for Spain, now before the Senate, would allow the United States to maintain its important military links on the Iberian Peninsula. The U.S. currently has two strategic air bases in Spain ? at Tor- rejon and Zaragoza ? and a major submarine base at Rota, on Spain's southwest coast below Portugal. The Sixth Fleet, now rivaled by an equally formidable Soviet Mediterranean fleet, many consists of 45 vessels. Navy officials say that if the fleet were to be moved out of Italian wa-: ters, such as back to the U.S. East Coast. fuel and maintenance costs would rise quickly. It is for that reason, say Defense Depart- ment officials, that it is expected that even with Communist Party inclusion in the govern- ment, ways will be found to maintain the U.S. presence in Italy. - Several other reasons why Italy looms so im- portantly in defense thinking: a major manu- facturer of machinery, Italy has a large and important merchant marine. Moreover, there is the fear that a swing to the Communists in Italy would dramatically accelerate the coming to power of Communists in France ? again ? most likely in a coalition government with French Socialists. 34 in rren,nean NEW YORK TIMES 7 May 1976 CHINESE EXPRESS DOUBTS ABOUT ES. Its Commitment to Europe Is Questioned, Britain Says PEKING, May 6 (Reuters)? iThe British Foreign Secretary, iAnthony Crosland, said tonight that Chinese leaders had ex- pressed ,doubts about the Unit- ed States commitment to West :European defense. After meeting here with :newly appointed Prime Minister .Hua Kuo-feng and Foreign Mi- nister Chiao Kuan-hue, he said at a news ? conference that he had been questioned about the reliability of the American com- mitment to use a nuclear deter- rent. Mr.. Crosland said the Chinese! were under a misapprehension about United States reliability and he had tried to allay their '"unnecessary doubts." Peking's leaders, had ham- mered home their/ concern -about the Soviet military threat .to Europe and need for West 'European unity, Mr. Crosland said: ! He said the two sides had :differed in their interpretation of East-West detente, which China sees as a Soviet plot to 'full the Western affiance. But Mr. Crosland added there was agreement on the need for a strong NATO and for the United States to "remain corn- Imitted and determined.". . The news conference con- cluded Mr. Crosland's three days in Peking?the first visit here by a West Euronean minis- :ter since last month's changes in the Chinese leadership. Tomorrow he leaves on a provincial tour before flying on I to Japan on Sunday. I The Foreign Secretary said it was stressed by every Chi- nese minister he met th the leadership changes would not seriously affect foreign policy or trade: He reported his 75-minitte meeting with Mr. lioa today covered the global balance of power and tfbin.:,e anxiety about detente with Moscow. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 rfrOVidforReldeSe7200//08/013-: CIA-RDP77-D0432RDO0t004:00003--11- The Japan Times Tuesday, April 27, 1976 An Untenable Aspect of Detente There seems to be a firmly Implanted suspicion, rightly or wrongly, in Europe now that American foreign policy under Secretary of State henry Kissinger is based on acquiescence of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe in exchange for political noninterference by Moscow in Western Europe. A furor of speculation erupted after a leak to the press of a speech given by Helmut Sonnenfeldt, U.S. State Department counselor and close confidant of Dr. Kissinger, to U.S. am- bassadors in London last December. The first accounts, later* said to be inaccurate, quoted Mr. Sonnenfeldt as saying "per- manent organic union between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is necessary to avoid 1Vorld War III." In the United States and Europe, charges were made that a new Sonnenfeldt doctrine had been proclaimed that abandoned Eastern Europe to perpetual "Soviet enslavement." Such in- dependent-minded Eastern European nations as Yugoslavia and Romania voiced?their uneasiness if not distress over what was considered a sellout. And the Sonnenfeldt briefing became a campaign issue in U.S. election year politics. Later Mr. Sonnenfeldt explained that what he had said in London was that Soviet domination in Eastern Europe rested on power and that this was dangerous and could lead to an ex- plosion. He said "organic relationship" was used to contrast with a relationship based totally on power, force and repression. He denied that the U.S. was abandoning attempts to influence events in Eastern Europe. He said U.S. policy supports "in- dependence, autonomy and various aspects of sovereign in- dependence" in Eastern Europe while, of course, recognizing the fact of Soviet influence. Some commentators said Mr. Sonnenfeldt was only stating what everyone knew about U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe and no one should have been shocked even by what Mr. Son- nenfeldt said were distorted versions of his speech. Obviously, ? the U.S. has no intention of fomenting revolt in Eastern Europe 'since it would not aid the rebels. This was proved in the uprisings against Soviet domination in Poland, East Berlin, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Then the U.S. did nothing and would do nothing in the future:So in reality, the United States has. been acquiescing to Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe since World War II. And Mr. Sonnenfeldt's p.romise of support for independenee in Eastern Europe convinced no one that the U.S. really would or could do very much to help. However, in the past several years the United States and the Soviet Union have been trying to establish a new relationship. And every time.detente appeared to be working, there .were 35 flickerings of suspicion in Western Europe that the two super- poweis were, if not by diplomatic agreement, then tacitly in accord on dividing up the world. After the Sonnenfeldt explosion Dr. Kissinger emphatically stated that the U.S. recognized no "spheres of influence." However, Dr. Kissinger's almost frantic campaign to beat back the spread of Communism in Western Europe indicates that he considers Western Europe an American preserve. He has approached Socialist parties, warning them not to permit the participation of Communists in government. He is par- ticularly concerned about Italy where Communist participation in the Government of this NATO ally is almost a foregone conclusion. Dr. Kissinger has been criticized for .not recognizing the in- dependent nature of Communist parties in Western Europe. However, the secretary of state apparently believes that no Communist party once it has attained power will ever relinquish it. Dr. Kissinger's activities do not ?prove the point alone. However, many question the strange behavior and attitude of Moscow toward the Communist parties of Western Europe. Last year, Moscow seemed indifferent to the fate of the Communist Party in Portugal when it attempted to seize power. In 1974 during the French presidential election, the Soviet ambassador called on Valery Giscard d'Estaing just before the voting. Many believed this act swung votes away from the Socialist- Communist coalition. At the same time, the Kremlin is actively feuding with the Italian, French and Spanish Communist Parties. This, of ' course, stems from the Russian desire to keep ideological leadership on them. However, many believe that Moscow values detente, shaky as it is, with Washington more than Communist victories in Western Europe, which most certainly would anger the U.S. Even if the United States and the Soviet Union are acting on some tacit understanding, however, it is doubtful if either will really succeed in holding onto their zones of dominance. In the U.S., public opinion against any such deal is too strong. Also, a policy of trying to hold back independent Communist Parties in Western Europe seems doomed to failure. And the changing style of national Communism in the free societies is having its influence in Eastern Europe. It is likely that both the Soviet Union and the United States will have to acquiesce to political changes within their own spheres - of influence eventually , since the trend toward political 'fragmentation appears irreversible. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400603-0 ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Wednesday, May 5, 1976 'U.S. Apparently Favored Building Base Over Eviction of Soviet Troops in Somalia VINI??? I By a WALL STREET JOURNAL Stall Reporter WASHINGTON?The U.S. last year re- jected a chance to get Soviet troops evicted from Somalia because it feared this would ? remove justification for building a contro- versial new military base, testimony before ? a- Senate subcommittee indicated yester- day. ? The U.S. base in question is on Diego Garcia, a remote Indian Ocean island where . a "logistical support" facility is under con- struction. The main reason for building the base, Pentagon officials told Congress last July, is that the Soviet navy has established a major presence in Somalia, an African state facing the Indian Ocean. According to James Akins, former U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia, the Ford ad- ministration had a?chance to get the Rus- sians thrown out of Somalia but declined to try. He said he assumes?but doesn't know for sure--that the reason WRS an administra- tion fear that Congress would then refuse to finance the Navy's Diego Garcia base, ? which already faced strong opposition. "One would have to be pretty dense not ? to get this connection," Mr. Akins told the ? Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations. He also said a State Department official told him later that that was the reason, though Mr. Akins said he couldn't be positive that the official in question knew why the decision was made. Saudi Arabian Offer The offer to get the Russians evicted came from Saudi Arabia, where Mr. Akins was stationed at the time. He said the Sau- dis shared U.S. concern about the Soviet presence, so they discussed the matter with_ Somalia, a poor country just across the Red Sea. The Saudis offered to take over econom- ic-aid projects being financed by Moscow. and to buy U.S. arms for Somalia as substi- tutes for Russian weapons then being deliv- ered, according to Mr. Akins. He said only $15 million of U.S. weapons would have been needed?at Saudi expense?to make the ef- fort. However, the former ambassador said he I couldn't get any Washington response, either positive or negative, to the offer. Nor could he get an official explanation for this official silence. But Mr. Akins testified that the Ford administration may have been afraid that evicting the Soviets would re- move the official rationale for building the Diego Garcia base, so it didn't dare encour- age the Saudis to go ahead. Preferred Soviet Threat If true, this makes it seem that Washing- ton preferred a Soviet threat and the means to counter it, rather than no threat and no ? base. Sen. Frank Church (D., Idaho), sub- committee chairman, called it "disturbing' and Sen. Stuart Symington (D., Mo.) termed it "outrageous." Sen. Church, a presidential 1 aspirant, promised further investigation of the matter. ? Saudi officials told Mr. Akins that So- malia was ready to make such an agree- ment, the former ambassador said. How- ever, he cautioned the subcommittee that the attempt mightn't have worked?it's pos- sible the Somalis couldn't or wouldn't have thrown out the Russians even if Saudi Ara- bia provided economic aid and U.S. weap- ons. However, Mr. Akins testified that he I strongly favored making the effort, and he recommended it to the State Department. It was embarrassing, he said, that he couldn't tell the Saudis why the U.S. didn't respond to their offer. Mr. Akins, one of the more outspoken State Department officials, was fired by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger last De- cember after assorted disagreements. He said yesterday that he never received any explanation for this, but assumes Mr. Kis- singer found him too abrasive. Mr. Akins for years was the department's senior expert on petroleum matters. Although yesterday's testimony didn't say specifically when the Saudi offer about Somalia was made, Mr. Akins and Sen. Church said it occurred about the time the Senate was considering the Diego Garcia , matter. Last July 27 the Senate voted 53 to t 43 to finance construction of the naval base there. THE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, MAY. 6,1976 KISS' GER'S VIEW O SOMALIA ASKED dor to Saudi Arabia, "a serious matter." Mr. Akins told the Senate Multinational subcommittee yesterday, under oath, that the Saudis had offered to give So- malia the amount of economic Senator Calls for Comment aid promised Somalia by the on Reported Saudi Offer Soviet Union if the United States would furnish Somalia with arms also promised it by . By ROBERT M. SMITH Moscow. According to Mr. sIssii to The New York Timed Akins, the Saudis even offered WASHINGTON, May 5?Sen- to pay for the American-sup. ator Dick Clark, chairman of plied arms. the Senate African Affairs sub- The former ambassador said committee, asked in a letter the State Department had sent to Secretary of State Hen- failed to respond to the Saudi ry A. Kissinger today why the offer. State Department reportedly ig- Senator Frank Church, De- nored a Saudi-Arabian proposal mocrat of Idaho, noted yester- day that the Saudi offer came about the time that Congress was considering the Adminis- traton s request for a naval Iowa Democrat, called the alle. base at Diego Garcia in the Isi- Igation made. by James E. Akins, than Ocean. to diminish Soviet influence in Somalia. Mr. Kissinger is now in Africa. ? Senator Smith, who is an linked its case for a Diego Gar- cia base to the Soviet naval presence in Somalia Mr. Clark said that Mr. Akins's allegations were impor- tant "not only because of the way in which the Soviet pre- sence in Somalia was used to justify development of the U.S. base at Diego Garcia, but be- cause an important Opportunity for countering Soviet influence and re-establishing Somali ties may have been missed." The Senator told Mr. Kissin- ger that he had spoken with representatives of the Somali Government on several occa- sions and had come to believe that Somalia "is a government which would prefer genuine no- nalignment." Alluding to the Saudi offer, Mr. Clark said, 'The alleged failure to react to the sugges- tion raises' serious doubts about the genuineness of U.S. concern shout the Soviet jpresence ?Ithe former American ambassa- The Administration had there." At the State Department to-. day, Frederick Z. Brown, direc- tor of the Office of Press Rela-- tions, said inferences drawn from Mr. Akins's testimony; were "misleading." During a news briefing, Mr.i Brown refused to confirm thati the Saudis had made the offerl described by Mr. Akins, and in- sisted that "the Saudi issue has no relationship at all to our de- cision to build up Diego Gar- cia." Mr. Brown said the former ambassador, a 22-year veteran of the Foreign Service and spe- cialist in Arab affairs, was "not aware of all the facts," but he refused to say what the facts were. "The situation is far too com- plex for me to go into in an:,' detail," Mr. Brown declared. In response to another question, he said that he could provide no assurances that he i.vould ever be able to. offer more in- formation on the subject. NEW YORK TIMES 6 MAY 1976 KiSSingerIS Call for Ban on Chrome Ore rom Rhodesia Stirs Congress Debate IV STEVEN RATTNER Last week, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger an- nounced during his swing through Africa that he would seek to end imports of Rhodesian chrome into thr United States. 56 The speech prompted what has become an annual ritual in Washington ? a debate among legislators, ?riith help irom business and sacial.ac- tion groups, over the five- year-old amendment devised by Senator Harry F. Byrd, Jr., Independent. of Virginia, to circumvent the United Na- tions embargo against Rhodesia. - At the heart of the debate is Rhodesia's position with two-thirds of the world's re- serves of highest grado chrome and as one of three Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 Approvbd-For Release 2001408/08-: GIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-6 major suppliers ? Soviet Union and South Africa are the two others. High grades of chrome, a dull black ore in its natural form, put the "stainless" in stainless steel. Chrome is also important in the produc- tion of jet engine parts, cast iron and alloyed steel. Lower grade chromes, such as those used to make automobile bumpers shiny, are available in abundant supply from al- ternative sources. U.S. Is Key Importer But with no domestic sup- ? ply of high-grade chrome, the United States last year was forced to import 570,000 tons of ore and 275.000 tons of ferrochrome, the purified I form. Of this, 17 percent of the ore and 28 percent of the ferrochrome came directly from Rhodesia. The majority of the imports came from the Soviet Union. This has spurred Senator Byrd and his allies to assest that the United States must not become dependent on a Communist country for a raw material essential to national security. Opponents of the measure contend that supporting the United Nations resolution is proper and in the long run would prove fruitful if a black regime came to power. At the same time, they calcu- late that -an import ban is likely to have minimal eco-- , not= cuences. The business community stands solidly behind Senator Byrd 's efforts, at least partly on the argument that a re- turn to the ban that existed between 1966 and 1971 would only exacerbate exist- ing supply and price problem. Price Changes Traced "Whenever the amendment has been up for reconsidera- tion,? the Russians have doubled their price and cut shipments by 35 percent to reduce American invento- SUNDAY.TIMES, London. *2 May 1976 ries," charged E. F. Andrews, a vice president of Allegheny Ludlum Industries, which is I a major user. According to a spokesman ' for Union Carbide, the price of Soviet chrome moved from $27 a ton in 1966 to $56 at . the height of the ban in 1971, then to $38 in 1973. Today the price is $170. Prices for both South African and, Rhodesian chrome have re- mained lower. . Moreover, according to F. Perry Wilson, chairman of Union Carbide, "there are in- dications that the Russian ability to supply is less than in the past." By every esti- mate, the Soviet Union is be- lieved to have less than 5 percent of the world's resour- ces. ? While in the long run, American producers expect to become mote dependent on South African supplies, the ore is not so good as the Rhodesian variety and the QUITE a-case can be made :out :against Henry Kissinger's speech last week in -Lusaka. He, like his compatriots, knows 'very little about black or white,African affairs. For ? years the United -States. - Government has had ? no - identifiable African policy.- Now, humiliated by the Set-back in Angola, and fearful of further 'Soviet and Cuban intervention in African "wars of liberation," Dr Kissinger ? barnstorms his Way round black Africa, ? giving warm encouragement to those- . African countries who oppose the white-. . minority regime in Rhodesia. He may well have - succeeded; the critics could -claim, .in unleashing fresh violence and unrest south of the Zambesi: ' It is undeniable that the American :Government's -awareness of African issues has been sharpened by the Ango- lan experience, and by the wish to pre- vent a repetition of foreign intervention elsewhere in Africa. To this end, Kissinger underwrites the cause of black nationalism, to ensure that that national- ism does not turn to Moscow, Cuba or elsewhere. He is certainly not to be blamed for this. Indeed, allowing for the rhetoric and show-business aspect which is an inseparable part of his travelling diplomacy, it is difficult to know what other speech Kissinger- could have made at this moment if the Ameri- can and Western position in Africa, in general, is to be strengthened. Nothing could exceed the folly of those, in Britain and elsewhere, who think that the white in governments in Southern Africa are the surest bastion sl ht availability of South Africa's high-grade chrome is limited. During the previous ban, however, according to op- ponents of the Byrd measure, few dislocations of conse- quence occurred. They attri- buted the price increase to the general upward trend of commodity prices and con- tended that domestic indus- try was never shut down for lack of chrome. ? Moreover, American stock- piles are high?no one seems to know precisely how high. When combined with grow- ing South African supplies, this suggests to Byrd op- ponents .that the United States could safely withstand air end to Soviet chrome even without Rhodesian supplies. The recession has also meant a sharp drop in the demand for stainless steel and that has in turn reduced the need for chrome. As a result, despite the price in- creases by the Soviet Union, supplies of , chrome on the world market are plentiful. ? - against present -and future Communist threats. - A more pertinent approach to the new American policy is to ask whether it is likely to work. By promising substantial aid to the nations surrounding Rhodesia, as well as to "newly independent Zim- babwe," that policy will presumably encourage and strengthen, politically and financially, the guerrilla forces ranged against the Smith regime. How far and how quickly that will lead to their pressures on Rhodesia reaching a point where the white minority finally ? hauls down the flag; is anyone's guess.- But after years of obdurate refusal by : the SmithiteS to face fads, any new. effort to make them realise that tithe, history, geography and demography are ' not on their side, is to be welcomed. There is one risk to the West in the Kissinger style of diplomacy. For all its" power, the United States does not have a great capacity to influence men or ; events in Africa. The manufactured build-up to a speech formulating- a new policy, which unavoidably is long on ' ends and short on means, may: produce . a dangerous disillusion. It is not even certain that Kissinger's pledge to seek the repeal of the arrangement which enables Rhodesia to export her chrome to the United States, will be honoured by Congress. That would make a practical farce of the initiative. For all that, in its unequivocal expression of support for legitimate African aspirations, the Kissinger speech is a welcome, if be- lated, sign that Washington is reading the African portents aright. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 itrA:-2,. '1976 ?TITE?WA-31111C-GTON- POST ... ith ver ihnor By Peter Costigan ? 5.1-rint to The Washington Post CANBERRA?A bitter dis- pute between Australia and Indonesia over East Timor, the internationally forgotten tail end of Portugal's aban- doned empire, is causing U.S. officials in the area deep concern. ? Both the rightist military government of Indonesia's President Suharto and the rightist democratic govern- ment of Australia's Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser have reluctantly acknowl- edged their dispute. ? But both maintain that ,they will,, not let the argu- ? oncnt?generated by grow- ting anger in Australia over lIndonesia's invasion of East Thnor in November and its tcleterminalion to incorpo- rate the tiny territory into i Indonesia?disturb the basic ifriendship between the two nations. American concern over. f. the dispute has deepened in i -recent weeks with signs of a ?possible long-term split be- tween Australia and Indone- sia. The two nations militar- ily and economically domi- nate the confluence or the , Indian and Pacific &cans. ? With the State " ?Depart- ment and Pentagon watch- ing closely, American diplo- mats in the area have worked overtime 'since early ? April to contain the dispute.- . Indonesian and Australian officials have gone' out of their way to avoid any refer- ence to the American inter- est in their dispute. The ? death of five young journalists from Australia?. three of them Australian cit izens, one British and one a? New Zealander?in October, .has threatened to escalate ',he dispute into confronta- tion. They were killed near East Thnor's.: border. with the portion , of Indonesia that shares the same island. The five television jour- nalists went to East Timor Last September to cover the ' exploding civil war there af- ter the Portuguese adminis- trators left the island. ? -told a Pres conference in Jakarta attended by Austra- lian correspondents, "and we will erect a monument to them." - 'r. Jose Martins, the ? leader 'of one of several small polit- ical parties in East ? Timor that until recently encour- aged the Indonesians to move into the tiny country, .; last week gave a detailed yersion of how the jour- nalists allegedly wer e gunned down by Indonesian troops: Australian Foreign Minis- , ter Andrew Peacock man- :. ? , aged to perstiade...the Indo- nesian government to three Australian officials to ? visit East 'Timor in :an effort . to find Oat 'what happened. But government officials ? in Canberra are pessimistic a fbont how much they will ? ind out. Since the fate. President Sukarno was eased ;out of power beginning 1965, In dctober they disap- peared and. the Indonesian government 1. originally claimed that they acciden- tally burned to death when mortars set. fire' to the house they Were in during cross- fire between warring ?Ti- Morese factions. ? ? At the time, the Labor Party government of Gough ? ?Whitlam was in the middle ? of a constitutional crisis that resulted in Whitlam be ing sacked in November.' ? On Dec. 13, Prime Minis- ter , Fraser's conservative government was elected by a landslide majority. Austra- lians paid little- attention to the fate of the five news- men. . But suddenly ? the mood has changed. Newspapers and: the Australian journal- ists' -,:associatiod generated parliamentary' pressure that ? pushed the government into ordering an inquiry, Australian concern was ? heightened by the realize- tioh . that 7 Indonesian "volunteer" forces had in- staded 'East Timor while Australia was consumed by its December domestic poli- tical crisis and had set up a ? provisional government that planned to supervise the in- corporation of the 600,000 people of East Timor into - Indonesia. ? ? Indonesian Foreign Minis- tet- Adam Malik, added fuel, to the fire of Australian an- ger last week by announcing that President Suharto would have an "important" announcement in August, that there would. be a new national day and that Indonesia would then invite foreign correspondents to visit East Timor. Nobody doubted what he was talking about?the in- corporation of East Timor. Even more in for Australians, Malik proposed a very Asian answer to the problem of the five journal- ists' deaths. "Let us forget them," he Australian-Indonesian ..rela- ? tions had been stable. De- spite cultural and economic contrasts. But Australians . have always been extremely nervous about. events to their immediate north. Australians have regarded Papua-New Guinea, immedi- ately to the north, and In- donesia as buffers, against the more powerful nations of-Asia farther north. During the Sukarno years, Indonesia demanded control ., of the western part Of New Guinea, known as West Irian, and annexed it. This made Australia worry about Indonesia,. and 'later ? it or- dered. American .pdll.:jets, fitted .as strike .,aircraft,,ts a deterrent. ? ;?-:: ? Australians ? iiieb?nniug to believe, that the ..Indone- sian invasion of ,East Timor is part of a, pattern of mili- ? tary expansion .; by their most powerful neighbor, .. The ??' Fraser -:government ' has.ealled for. withdrawal of Indonesian frees-.mm East Timor. and.supports U.N. ini- ? tiatives calling ",f(3T- self-de- termination for the people there. That aggravates 'the jal- karta government, Which be- lieves that Australia gave it the diplornatic ? go-ahead with its invasion of East 'ri- 'nor in the pragmatic inter- ests of maintaining stability and keeping out any leftist rule on .the island?which is only OG miles from the northern Australian coast. Both nations are, allies of the United States, and Aus- tralia is formally linked to it through the ANZUS treaty. ? Both, Australia and the United States have been in- volved in efforts to develop Indonesia's largely . untap- ped resources and' to tackle poverty among its 120 mil- lion people. ?? , The last thing American '.diplomats in the area want is a split between the two ? friends, especially one that ? current Australian emotions could force into a confronta- ,tion in which Washington swi oeu4l.d. ' be asked to choose d TIME, MAY 10, 1976 VIET NAM river 38 ry Two St the PoHs II was, trumpeted North Viet Nam's official daily, Nhan Dan, "a festival of the completion of national reunifica- tion." In Hanoi and Saigon, as well as scores of other cities, towns and ham- lets in between, streets and squares were festooned with banners and painted Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 - -Approved For Release 2001/08/08 -:-CIA-RDP77-00432R0001-00400003-0 maps that showed North and South with all demarcation lines removed?and Hanoi prominently marked as the cap- ital. Called out by Communist ward bosses?and, in Saigon, by the pealing bells of the city's churches?some 11 million Vietnamese trooped to the polls clutching pink voter-registration cards to elect the new, 492-member National , Assembly that will serve as the legis- lature for a formally unified Viet Nam. With characteristic reverence for calendar milestones, the Communists scheduled the election for the eve of the first anniversary of the North Vietnam- ese triumph of April 30, 1975. That was the date on which Hanoi's tanks rum- , bled through the gates of former Pres- ident Nguyen Van Thieu's palace in Sai- gon, completing the military conquest of South Viet Nam that had been the Communists' goal ever since Ho Chi Minh drove the French out of the North in 1954. Also characteristically, the vic- tors took no chances with the outcome of the Assembly election. In Saigon, lo- cal party chiefs lined up families, 20 or so at a time, for roll call, then marched eligible voters off to the polls, where their political choice amounted to strik- ing a few less favored names from a list of preselected candidates. Under such conditions, participation tends to be high: in Saigon, officials proudly an- nounced, the voter turnout was 98%, al- most as praiseworthy as Hanoi's 99.82%. Figurehead President. Reflecting the demographics of the unified coun- try, which will have a population of 44 million people, membership in the As- sembly is weighted slightly in favor of the North; it has 249 representatives v. 243 for the South. Sitting in Hanoi, the Assembly will be mainly a rubber stamp to the ten-man Politburo of North Viet Nam's Lao Dong (Workers' Party). The legislators, warned Politburo Member Pham Hung, who is the party's chief rep- TIME, MAY 10, 1976 resentative in the South, will be expect- ed to carry out Lao Dong policies "most scrupulously." Hung himself is an Assembly mem- ber, as are most of the important North Vietnamese Communists. When the leg- islature convenes for the first time, pos- sibly around May 19, it will choose a figurehead President for the unified country, plus a Premier and a Cabinet. Most likely choice as Premier is North Viet Nam's Premier Pham Van Dong. Others who will probably hold top lead- ership posts include Le Duan. First Sec- retary of the Lao Dong, and Mrs. Nguyen Thi Binh, who was chief ne- gotiator for the Viet Cong in Paris. The Assembly's agenda includes rat- ifying a new constitution and choosing a flag, national anthem and a new name for the unified country. While the leg- islators may also be allowed to consider a new five-year plan, which will set the pace and nature of social and economic reunification, the real work will be done by the Lao Dong chieftains at a party congress, the first in 16 years, scheduled for later this year. So far, the Communists, who remain mildly astonished by the lightning suc- cess of their 1975 spring offensive (see box), have been cautious in their treat- ment of the South. The new government claims that 90% of the officials, civil ser- vants and army members of the Thieu regime who were packed off to country camps for hoc tap (re-education) have since resumed normal lives. But many top officials remain in the camps; one es- timate of the current total, by Italian Journalist Tiziano Terz,a.ni, is 150,000 to 200,000. Saigon itself still retains much of what the puritan Northern Marxists de- cry as its decadence. Prostitution has made a comeback, bars are busy and rock music can still be heard on down- town streets. A curfew exists?which of- The Final Days: Hanoi's Version Two Hanoi newspapers have lately been publishing a serial account of last year's conquest of South Viet Nam. Writ- ten by North Vietnamese Chief of Staff General Van Tien Dung?second in mil- itary command to Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap?the remarkably candid narrative offers an intimate glimpse of North Vietnamese thoughts on the suc- cessful offensive. Some of Dung's main disclosures: b. The planning for the final offen- sive began fully a year before the at- tacks that signaled the end for Saigon. During a series of meetings in the spring of 1974, Hanoi's generals decided that the balance of military power in Viet Nam had swung in favor of the North. Though they were confident of eventu- al victory, the North Vietnamese did not expect the offensive to reach a climax until 1976. The abrupt collapse of Sai- gon's forces surprised Hanoi almost as much as it did everyone else. tp Dung admits that beginning in 1974, Hanoi broke the Paris accords by transporting massive reinforcements to South Viet Nam: "Great quantities of such materiel as tanks, armored cars, missiles, long-range artillery pieces and antiaircraft guns ... were sent to var- ious battlefields." In addition, a 1,000- kilometer all-weather supply road was built to the south, as well as a concealed 5.000-kilometer gasoline pipeline. Ac- companying the supply effort was a re- cruitment drive in the North that fun- neled "tens of thousands" of new troops into Hanoi's army. t? Hanoi recognized the reduction of U.S. aid to the Saigon government as a key factor in the war's outcome. Says Dung: "Nguyen Van Thicu was forced to fight a poor man's war." He adds that Saigon's "firepower had declined by nearly 60% because of bomb and am- munition shortages. Its mobility was re- duced by half, owing to the lack of air- craft, vehicles and fuel." b. A "heated discussion" took place in Hanoi regarding the possibility that the U.S. would reintervene in the South. In the end, however, Hanoi determined 39 ficials lifted for a day-long anniversary celebration "to allow the people to move about freely and make merry." Though there has been little official pressure on them to leave the overcrowded city, about 500,000 people out of Saigon's peak wartime population of 3 million have done so. But there are signs that the regime may become less gentle about effecting its plans for social and polit- ical reforms. Recently, the remaining foreign news organizations in Saigon were told they must close down their of- fices by the end of this month. Bad Shape. Hanoi has been almost as equivocal in its postwar foreign rela- tions as it has been?up to now?in deal- ing with the South. Rhetorically, the re- gime has been truculent, urging more guerrilla activity among its non-Com- munist neighbors. On the other hand, last month a polite Vietnamese delega- tion turned up in Jakarta for a meeting of the Asian Development Bank. The Vietnamese, says one Japanese official, "openly admit that their economy is in bad shape and that they need outside help. They are very interested in joint ventures in which they would guarantee private foreign capital." So are some U.S. corporations, es- pecially banks and oil companies that held concessions in the oil-rich waters off South Viet Nam's coast. But Wash- ington has adamantly opposed congres- sional proposals that the U.S. embargo on Vietnamese trade and aid be lifted experimentally. The Administration has repeatedly requested information from the Communists on the 2,518 Americans still officially listed as missing in action in Indochina. But Hanoi has held out, demanding $3.25 billion in reconstruc- tion aid promised by Richard Nixon ?subject to congressional approval?in conjunction with the 1973 peace talks. Thus the conflict, at least on a level of dollars and diplomacy, still drags on. that the U.S. would probably stay out. One important factor: Watergate. Says Dung: "The Watergate scandal had se- riously affected the entire U.S. and precipitated the resignation of an ex- tremely reactionary, imperialist Presi- dent?Nixon." Hanoi knew the South Vietnam-- .ese expected the first attack of the of- ? fensive to be either in Tay Ninh prov ? ince, near the Cambodian border, or farther north imPleiku. Hence the Com- munists' decision to launch the initial ;. thrust Against the Central Highlands city of Ban Me Thuot. That came as a complete surprise to Saigon and led President Thieu to his hasty decision to withdraw his forces from the Central Highlands. Dung calls Thieu's decision ! a "grave strategic mistake." Thereafter, he says, Hanoi's main problem was mov-. ing fast enough to maintain the ?mili- tary initiative. For example, the Com- munists sent a commander from Hanoi to take charge of the battle for Danang on March 26. Much to Hanoi's aston- ishment, the city fell only three days later?without a fight. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 wp,.sialloTcN POST 2 !'",Y 1976 o Kla ,?or Army Chief E.e I, 110C1 erki, r 69) ' 171-7 0 0 By Greg Chamberlain Manchester Guard In LONDON? A right-wing palace coup in Haiti has wrecked years of careful U.S.-backed efforts to give the 18-year-old Duvalier family dictatorship a less bloodthirety international image as a way ofi keeping the political situation stable in America's Caribbean backyard. Extensive changes this month have brought . to power as interior and de- fense minister Pierre Biam- by, the late Francois Duval?, ier's former private secre- tary, who first gained noto- riety as the Supervisor of a massacre 12 years ago in the southwestern town of Je- remie in which about 100 persons were killed. .Biamby's success ? In -the Jeremie operation led to the -public execution of two anti-Duvalierists in the capi- tal which was watched, on "Papa Doe's" orders, by 2,000 schoolchildren. The date, Nov. 12, 1964, has been an emotional rallying cry amcng the exiled opposition ever rine Biamby, 54, a former, soc- cer star, rose to be a chief- tain of the old dictator's Prime terror army, the Ton- tons Macoutes. His victory ,in the political battles in- side the gleaming white presidential palace in Port- .au-Prince, capital of Latin America's poorest country, :follows the return .to work of some Tontons Macoutes warlords who Were sacked few weeks after Papa Doe died and was succeeded bY his teen-age son,..- Jean- Claude, in 19-71. i" They include the reap- ! ? pointment of Rosalie Adol- phe, a gun-toting woman who was a favorite of Papa ? Doc, as chief of the Fort Di- manche prison, where hun- dreds of political prisoners , have been tortured and ex- Saturday. May 8, 1976 TtlE WASHINGTON POST - rbsA A.adtagn: an Wh_ tteni? Hidden ? ecuted. The Macoutes have also received new weapons over the past year, to the muted annoyance of the reg- ular army. The palace coup appears , to have been organized by secret police chief Luc Desyr, a former 'taxi driver, acting With Papa Doe's eaetesee,.. sheene, end Henri. Sielait', who heads the state agency which handles much of the country's food and staples and controls an un- accounted-for fund of some $20 million annually. The trio comprise the core of the regime's old-guard hard- liners:. They apparently moved out of fear that relative lib- erals in the government might destroy the dictator- ship with even minor re- forms. The coup also follows a reported assassination at- tempt on President-for-life Jean-Claude. Duvalier in January after which he is said to have b eert flown secretly overnight to the nearby U.S. naval base at Guantanamo, Cuba, for treat- ment and a cheek-up. [State Department officials denied the report that Du- valier had been flown to Guantanamo. for :treatment.. They said they had no evi- dence of any assassination attempt against him in Jan- uary.] The purge swept away In- rids for. Unk In defiance oriaoth congress and the United Nations, the Ford administra- tion, has gone behind -the barn to bole- ter the military dictatorship of Chile. ? The United Nations, following up our own reports of repression and torture inside Chile, has condemned the junta for violating human rights. ? And only . last week the respected Inter-American Human Rights Commission denounced the junta for its torture tactics. Congress has reacted by imposing a $90 million limit on economic aid for Chile this fiscal year. It was the intent of Congress, clearly, that the aid should go directly to needy people. Other na- tions have also refused'to extend credit. to the beleaguered dictatorship. Nevertheless, the administration has shaken loose hidden money to bail out the junta. Here are the hush-hush de- velopments: The Overseas Private Investment' Corporation, a quasi-official U.S. insti- tution, has quietly agreed-to begin in- suring cempanies that ineest in Chile. The sne'e Denert went, according to our sou?-es, twisted arms. This shottel ethnulate a Heed of investment capital info the country. Both the State and Treasury Depart- ments have encouraged le U.S. end ea. tership $100 to $125 million. The loan is needed to pay off short-term obliga- tions to other countries. Britain and It- aly have refused to re-schedule Chilean debt payments because of the regime's human rights violations. New York's First National City Bank will put up most of the money roe the junta, with the financial support' of the Bank of America, several New York banks and two Canadian banks. ' U.S. advisers have also brought pres- sure upon the Inter-American Develop- ment Bank's President Antonio Ortiz Mena, who has promised that the bank will lend up to $125 million to ? Chile. The first 620 million already has been approved. The State Department gave Chile a $55 million housing guarantee that a House subcommittee believes excee led the $90 million congressional ceiling. "The administration clearly has sought to evade the spirit, if not the letter, of the congressional aid ceilings to Chile," declared Chairman Donald. M.Fraser, ID-Calif.) We have been chronicling the Chi- lean saga since we reported on March 21, 1972, that the Central Intelligence Agency and international TelephOne and 'relegraph Corp, were conspiring to widian banks to lend the military dicta- underinine the c bile in economy. lawn* 4-0 ntijective was to oust President Salva- tenor and Defense Minister Paul Blanchet, who had pushed a largely unsucess- ful nationalist line against- foreign companies over the past two years; Transport Minister Pierre Petit; and Social Afairs Minister Max Antoine, who had tried to get the dozens of mainly American light assembly in dustries to obey labor laws on pay and working condi- tions. Another victim was Aubelin Jolicoeur, the dimin- utive deputy tourism direct- or, whose role as an eccen- tric socialite' and informer earned him characterization as "Petit Pierre" in Graham ;Greene's novel, "The Co- medians." The role of the 24-year-old president is thought to have been minimal in the face of the resurgence of these who are known in Port-au-Prince as "the dinosaurs." The first, tiny glints of press freedom had begun to appear under Blanchet, who never managed to establish himself as the strongman he had been expected to be. For eign investment con- tinues to increase from the United States and France,- who are competing for in- fluence in the former French colony, but recently the goy; ernment has been hit by ac- cusations from abroad of bribes being paid to officials ter foreign companies. ? dor Allende, an elected Marxist, from t power. , The CIA at. first denied participating in economic sabotage against the Al-. lende regime but, three years later, was forced to confess that our story was true after the Senate intelligence com- mittee published the proof. The Nixon administration, mean- while, phased out economic aid to the Allende regime on the grounds that the Chilean economy was unstable. Under Allende, the inflation rate shot up from 22 per cent in 1971 to 1e3 per cent in 1972, with a 4.4 per cent unemployment 'rate. Since the military junta seized power, the inflation rate was soared to a stratospheric 340 per cent, with a 16'.6 per cent unemployment rate. We have taken pains to point out, by the way, that the military rulers halie oppressed not only the Marxists but the Caristian Democrats. ? Footnote: A spokesman for First Na- tional City Bank confirmed that the bank was studying the Chilean loan. A Bank of America spokesman refused to comment on our story. At the State De- partment. a spokesman acicnowiteleel only that discussions had been held with OPIC. A Treasury official said the department was careful not to tell banks who should get loan: but ac- knowledged: "They may have Neel en- couraged by what our desk people tell them." Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0 _