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April 27, 1976
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Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001004000041^9?' CONFIDENTIAL NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES INTERNAL USE ONLY This publication contains clippings from the domestic and foreign press for YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use of selected items would rarely be advisable. 30 APRIL 1976 NO. 8 PAGE GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS 1 GENERAL 33 EAST EUROPE 42 WEST EUROPE 43 NEAR EAST 46 AFRICA 47 LATIN AMERICA 48 DESTROY AFTER BACKGROUNDER HAS SERVED ITS PURPOSE OR WITHIN 60 DAYS CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 _ - Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010040000433 7,fif YORN TIMES, TUESDAY, APRIL 27? 1976 d tnt-tr-7t adt / ! ' i) . icz,y A -A(1, Bar rallICHOS If. icctt sactial to The New Yortt WASHINGTON, April 26? The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, conclud- ing its 15-month-long investiga- tion, today urged Congress to adopt a new, omnibus law cov- ering foreign and military intel- iligence? gathering that would ;create charters for the major lagencies and sharply limit the juse of covert action as a tool ot foreign policy. In a report that had few dis- closures, the committee re- vealed that the United States had conducted about 900 major" or sensitive covert operations in the last 15 years. As one check on such actions in the future, it recommended that Congress be informed in ad- vance of proposed covert op- erations. For Central Control In one proposal for structural reform it urged that the Direc- tor of Central Intelligence be given authority over the entire intelligence community to set the overall budget, allocate re- sources, and determine national intelligence requirements for all agencies including the military. The legislative future of its recommendations is far from clear. The committee made "recommendations" for legisla- tion by Congress but will no introduce the bills itself. In- stead when a permanent over- sight committee is created it would take these recommenda- tion as the basis for a legisla- tive package. The new law is needed, the committee said, because "Con- gress has failed to provide the necessary statutory guidelines o ensure that intelligence agencies carry out their mis- sions in accord with coastitu- tional processes." It would, in effect, recast the National Se- curity Act of 1947, which created the modern iinelligence system in this country. The new law, the committee . said, -should set "clearly de- fined prohabitions or limita- tions" on intelligence-pothering -techniques and operations, dc- fine th eroles of each intelli- gkence agency and "set forth ? the basic purposes of national intelligence actiyitiee.." . Itte-dh\ ga'-'73'../7 N cee /1 It jilt/ ; . ? 41 LL-zs, (:(.1 / 'idedad) C1','71173` d'e U12-3 "This revision should be the intelligence oversight com-. given the highest priority .by' mittee of Congress ,acting in, consultation with the Execu- tive branch," the. .committee! . ; . . . . . . . ; , ? Further Report Due The.-proposal is the center- piece of n 474-page 'report ,on, foreign. and militaryintelligence -that culminates an irivestiga- :don begun- in. January 1975. The committee is expected to make public. a report on its domestic intelligence . findings. dater this week. 'Today's report carried 87, , separate recommendations. for , tstatutory. .or . administrativel ; . fact" in ...areas ranging. froml drug tests op covert; At the request of the intel- ligence agencies, the' cOmmittee. withheld three. chapters of its report, on "cover" "espionage" and "budgetary oversight" from the public. and deleted 'sectionS on covert action and intellig- ence operation's of the depart- merit of State. A staff spokesman said this -arnounted to some 200 'pages. Though the 'material is being -withheld from, public viewt, he said, it would be available to be read by the 100 members of, the -Senate. The committee also voted. six to The, in a closed meeting today to ask the full Senate whether it could release the , 'total budget figure for United 'States intelligence. It took this ?atcion after President Ford and George Bush, Director of Celi- a:rat Intelligence, urged that the figure be omitted from the final report on national security t grounds, . . z A blank 'space appeared hr t the printed report where the, a figure should have been, but a other. material in the document: s permitted the reader to com- pute that a gross figure for in, t telligence including the armed c forces components was some ; $10 billion annually and that the aggegate budgets of C.I.A., Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency and the national reconnais- sance program ran about $4.5 billion. W Senatce Rho G. Tower, the d Texas Republican' who was vice A chairman of the committee:and tr Senator Barry Goldwater, Re- 111'1 oubicen of Arieotta, did not sign the report. Tower said lm in a statement that h3 felt the lc recommendations "if enacted iv into law, could endanger Amer- 10 ice's seen ri t y." Sereitar Flowarci Baker Jr.. ico Repuhliceo Ten'o eaid to that teotigh lian eleme2 the ice reocrt ahem. 'i-:era al.-, eras ,rec- I I ( 4 ommendations be disagreed wtih. . Attorney Genera", Edward H. Levi also appeared roefore to- day's meeting in La effort, ac- ording to a COM177".:2Z source; o get the commieme to relax stringent elecronie: etroailance recommendations _tee : has t made in the upcoffe, domestic report. it.Fo, `,"? d'2 .Oe . lo er I '1 el 'a 611 o1.'1-4,1. President Ford's recent :Execu- tive order where it upgraded the powers of the Director a Central Intelligence and rnacie him, more nearly in command of the entire intelligence cora- ! munity. The Senate committee, however, would gc fuother ann give the director the power to actually formulate e- reeional ntelligence budget and allocate the resources of the agencies covered by the budget. It 'At the same time, howeveo, n the committee would, renico ; the director from direct cone al over covert operations en the 'clandestine collection of intele d ligence mainly to reduce ;116; f "conflict of interest" problem 0- as, the principal adviser to the - l'resident on foreign itnel- igence matters. o gThe Senate committee wan axe- less harsh than its House I' Representatives counterpart n the quality of the intel- igence estimates .made by the ornmunity. It said it had f mole': he estimates were "adequate" hou,gh "major. improvement is both desirable and possible." It. rged that the, function of gath- ring and analyzing the Intel; gence be the highest priority f the intelligence agencies. IgIrf several areas the corn. itteets - ? mom/menden-ens rged ? that traditional cheeks and' balances of the Executive branch be restored to decision making on intelligence matters.. . It recommended that the secre-. tarj of State be informed of all clandestine collection tenerz-? tions and covert actions in ad- vance so that he would be in 4 a position to explain them and so that he could ? raise objec- dons if he felt they :harmed foreign policy. The committee called for faster implementa- tion of a law that required the United States Ambassador abroad be in command of ali 'foreign policy ectivitiem in the country in whicn he is statiood. kliThe committee urged that the counterintelligence ?pert,- dens', aimed at con-tbatting hos- e foreign intelligence, servi- ces, be better coordinated. It found widespread evidence over the years of poor coopera- tion between the C.I.A. and the Federal Bureau of Investiga- tion, the two agencies who have the main responsibility in this field. The Senate panel re- commended that a special corn-, mittee of the National Security Council be formed, headed by the Attorney General, to direct counterintelligence activities. Despite its length and retail, the report was largely devoid , of new information. Though the ;committee. according to its ;own account, bad (tend ..:ted thundreds of interviews ant; aol- lected 110,000 haagres of 4o- ? Areas Stnonor, The portion of edeO repo made ? public eor...n.fInted 6 the following are.ane 'qThe. committee 4.eund .tha "Presidents .and tatimirlistra tions- have made emeasive ? an. at tunes, self-defeemag use o covert action" and titat its us is now. so routine (''-t00 se,oa rate operations beeneeen. 1961- 1, 1975) it had -"buremetmatic moe tnentuc of its. own.' . f Though the cor-.thee- gave 0 "serious consideradhat" to re- 0 commending a "time: ban" onl covert activity it concluded; id that the United letates must1 rt have such a capatdtnnet for "ed:-. t traordinary ? circueneances in- volving grave threnent to United ed States national security." However, it recommended that "ail political assannamistions, of- forts 0 forts to subvert democratic ? overnrnents and :rapport .for m police or other intenati seem-nee' u forces which engene in syste- matic violation of human rights" be bannedlea law. gThe committee found thatl many covert actines clandes- tine intelligence-gring tech- niques and countereentelligence operations had ben iaunche without any memo" approve. mechanism at were and little or no record of who; approved hem. It has called for formali- odor: of decision making in hese areaS. that :mold leave "paper trail" on :at: decisions nd end the practite of "plau- ible deniability." gThe committee ''atirid that he Central Intelliemeee Agency ircuroventecl the le'87 Pres- dential ban agaiom covertly supporting and nategaring edu-? til icational and e'elanthropir Igroups, bv moving etetain oper-; ations abroad or ?feealing with individuals,? cit found In eceither area idespreau unethical or illegal rug tests being one-formed on mericana and sceatential infil- 'ation of the menet media and e hook ou'oliel-eezr indgstry. se latter two nett- 7 the com- ittee said, reste,e. in Ameri- ans" being Ofteon e?eugh Math ertently, fed; the oeopaganda utput toe allot_ ie the shar- it langeane of e ieenort. the nominee reconee eeded laws halt or control 'so preen- eiThe commuter on.zelaudecl Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 aliments, It made public little time had not already been re- ported in the press or dealt With in earlier reports. There seemed to many on Ca- pitol Hill, a willingness by the committee to delete material at the request of the intelligence agencies eel a decided unwil- lingness to try to force material from secret vaults of the Exe, cutive branch. Scholarly Tone In tone and presentation, to - days report was scholarly and descriptive, designed more as a resource document for those who will frame the new intelie gepce law than an indictment of abuse or misbehavior by the intelligence community. The' recommendation are Mainly based upon the prem- ise that Congress . will ap- prove permanent joint or sepa- rate oversight committees with the power to authorize expend- itures by the intelligence com- munity and investigate agency Operations. Earlier this year, the commit- tee recommended that such an oversight panel be approved by the Senate. But in the ensuing weeks the oversight plan has encountered hard political going. Many committee mem- bers hope the final reports will improve the atmosphere for its adoption. The report covered the com- mittee's views on the entire foreign intelligence apparatus including the National. Security Council, the C.I.A., the Defense Department and its military in- telligence components, as well as, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Secur- ity Agency. Analysis of the Law It said its analysis of the Na- tional Security Act of 1974 had fohnd no explicit authority for espionage, convert action- or paramilitary warfare. ? "Nonetheless, . these have come to be major activities conducted by the Central Intel- ligence Agency . . . in contrast the 1947 act's specific charge, to the Director of Central Intel- ligence to coordinate national! intelligence has not been effec- tively realized," the report said.; The report describes how, be- cause of the immediate and continued belief that the Soviet Union and international Com- munism plotted this country's destruction, the agencies 'mounted increasingly numerous covert actions and espionage 'rnisions to meet the perceived! Communist challenge. I The ?report details in the drug ;programs, for instance, how the iC.I.A. began testing LSD "de- fensively" because it learned the Soviet Union was exper- imenting with it. But, according to evidence in Ithe report, by mid-1953, Rich- ard Helms, then assistant chief lof the clandestine service, al- ready contemplated its use ag- gressively in interrogations of foreign agents. The report traces the gen- esis of covert action, from ear- ly efforts to helo democratic parties in the Italian elections in 1948 to the major paramilita- ry operations such as the abort- ed invasion at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba and those in Laos. Of covert actions in genera?) the committee found that they were often inefficient and some were "inconsistent with our [United States] basic traditions' and values." The committee had even harsher words for paramilitary covert operations, noting that they do not remain covert very long and "have often failed 'to achieve their intended objec- tive." Moreover, the committee said, "covert U.S. paramilitary combat operations frequently amount to making war, but do not come under the War Pow- ers Act, since they do not in- valve uniformed U.S. military IP ? ? ? . The committee recommended that the proposed law require the intelligence budget proposal to list each covert operation and require Congress to author- ize any paramilitary 'operation lasting longer than 60 days. Part of the problem with all clandestine activities, the com- mittee report said, was that the executive, branch of Govern- ment under Presidents from Harry, S. Truman through Rich- ard M. Nixon failed to exert sufficient control or demand sufficient accountability. The report -said that the 40 Commit- tee, a part of the N.S.C. assigned to 'authorize clandestine activi- ties, "also served generally to insulate the President from of- ficial involvement and account- ability in the approval process until 1974." - Approval of Operations Moreover,- the committee notes, N.S.C. -level approval was sought. only on airly major clandestine . operations and it found numerous instances *here small, risky intelligence gathering and covert actions were taken withut approval.' Even the new "upgraded" 40 Committee, renamed by President Ford the Operations Advisory Group, may not be adequate if not given sufficient staff and support, the report said. In these areas, including counterintelligence matters, the committee recommended that each level "sign off" on his ap- proval or disapproval for a giv- en project and that individuals are made "accountable" in the chain of the, command to en- courage their knowing About what goes on. One of the most important elements in the shroud of secre- cy surrounding the intelligence agencies, the report said, was the 1949 law that permitted the expenditure of funds by C.I.A. without a public accounting. From this germ sprung' a massive, intricate, but closed- door, financial empire that is the intelligence community. The C.I.A., for instance, deve- loped the spy-in-the-sky satel- lites, the U-2 intelligence air- craft, owned several major air- lines; capitalized an insurance company at $30 million.; and fi- nanced two major and several minor wars (including uprisings in the Congo and Guatemala, Laos and the Bay of Pigs) with an undisclosed budget, the re- port pointed out. "The committee finds that a full understanding of the budg- et of the intelligence communi- ty is required for effective ?pversight,". the report said. "The secrecy surotinding the budget, however, makes it im- possible for Congress as a whole to make use of this val- uable oversight tool." The committee said that in effect "neither Congress as 4 whole nor the public can deter- mine whether the amount spent on intelligence, or by the intele, ligence agencies individually is' - appropriate given the priori., ties.' ? The committee, "believes! there is a serious question as. to whether the present systerri of complete secrecy violates the Constitution." It rejected the arguments made by Mr. Bush today. "The committee believes," the report said, "that the overall figure for national intelligence activities can be made public annually without endangering national security or revealing sensitive programs." The committee expressed some of- its deepest concern on the impact of techniques of in- tellignce upon American cul- ture and democracy. It found that the C.I.A. was using "sev-' eral hundred" American aced* ethics, located in over 100 American coleges, 'universities' and related institutions for such things as making contacts with: potential agents or writing books and articles for propa- ganda purposes. In a number of instances, the report said, .the educational institutions .were not aware of the relation- ship. The committee found the' C.I.A. had a network of "sever-- al hundred" foreign persons in. the world news media to pro- vide intelligence or put out propaganda. ? Of these, some 50 are ' dual American journalists or? employees of U.S. media orga- nizations," the report said: It: also found significant infiltra-: tion of religious groups. - The committee recommended: laws to barring the C.I.A. from ublishing books or circulating. other propaganda in this corm-- try firm up by law the', recruiting of journalists along the lines of the new C.I.A. guid- elines. The cOmmIttee would bar re. ? cruiting persons receiving Unita Jed States educational grants and programs. ' It also urged that C.I.A. regu- lations be changed to require. 'that if an academic person de- Ivelops a relationship with IC.I.A. the president of chief ex- ecutive officer of the education- al institution be notified. lThe committee wanted laws' 'to buttress President Ford's or- ders that the C.I.A.'s inspector 'general system by strengthened and wanted a law to clarify the 'responsibility of C.I.A. em- ployees to report crimes to their superiors so that these ?crimes would, in turn, be re- ported to the Department of Justice for prosecution. The committee rejected the notion that the C.I.A. or its employees were above the law. The clear pattern of many of the recommendations was to 'bring Congress deeper and 'deeper into the oversight ? of 'agency expenditures and opera- -The /committee found that rCongress failed in 1947 to tell the intelligence agencies what it wanted them to do; failed to carry out proper budgetary oversight and on many of the unpleasant or highly sensitive ,secret operations took an "I don't want to now" stance in its contact with the intelligence agencies. ' -The report was by no means harsh on Congress. certainly" not so harsh as external Con- gressional critics have become on these isues, but for a corn- ? mittee of Congress it was can- ?-? klid in its view of its own insti- . ,tution. The recommendations are , shaped not only to require the intelligence agencies to report ? to Congress periodically- - numerous aspects of their oper- ations, but also require Con- gress to make response of deci- sion which will reduce the 'chance for lethargic oversight.. NEW YORK TIMES 27 April 1976 Security Check by 'LR Apeefal to The 17.1e York Times WASHINGTON, April 26?In the mid4950's, the Cen- tral Intelligence ?Agency decided to test the security ar- rangements of Air America, a charter airline service that was secretly a wholly owned operation of the agency. The agency asked that an unwitting agent of the Internal Revenue Service be sent to conduct a norma; audit of the operation. The agent would, the C.I.A. said, be told at the proper time that he was dealing with a Government agency. Lawrence R. Houston, now retired, was their general counsel to the C.I.A. and he recounted the. experiment to the Senate Select Committee on Intel- ligence Activities this way: "They put a very bright young fellow on. and he went into it. They came up with discrepancies and things that would be settled in the normal tax argument, corpo- rate-I.R.S. argument, and all of these were worked out eventually, and then we went to this fellow and said. 'Now, this was owned and backed by the C.I.A. The U.S. Government. What was your guess as to what was hap- pening?' . "And he said, "Well, I knew there was. something .there, and I thought, what a wonclerfte asset it would be for the Russians to have, but I came to the conclusion ,that it was Rockefeller money." i2 ' Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 "kr.,7w Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77--00-432-1k000100400004r-9".. THE NEW meg TIMES, TUESDAt. APRIL 27, 1976 XCERPTS FROM REPORT INTELLIGENCEDF UNIT Spedat to The New York Times ? WASHINGTON, April 26?Following !are- excerpts from the Report on the Foreign and Military Intelligence Ac- tvities of the United States, the final eeport of the Senate Select Committee .inn Intelligence Activities. Passages "- that were -changed by the committee t- the request of executive agencies 'appear in italics. INTRODUCTION ? The Senate Select Committee on In- lalligence Activities has conducted a *5-month-long inquiry, the first major inquiry into intelligence since World -War H. The inquiry arose out of alle- gations of substantial, even massive eyrongdoing within the "national intelli- gence" system. This final report pro- vides a history of the evolution of in- telligence, an evaluation of the intelli- gence- system of the United States, a t critique : of its problems, recommends- ;lions for legislative action and recom- mendations to the executive branch. -1The committee believes that its recom- mendations will provide a sound frame- vork for conducting the vital intelli- gence activities of the United States in ? manner which meets the nation's rifttelligence requirements and protects tfie liberties of American citizens and .1.he freedom's Which our Constitution -r-- , ,guarantees. The shortcomings of the Intelligente r:- - ?system, the adverse effects of secrecy- ad the failure of Congressional over- sight to assure adequate accountability ,for executive branch decisions concern- set-ig intelligence activities were major ;Sabjects of the committee's inquiry. ;Equally important to the obligation to tinvestigate. allegations of abuse was tho duty .to review systematically the ; intelligence community's overall active ? tiles since 1915,- and to evaluate its ipresent- structure -and performance. ff_F An extensive national intelligence esy.,stem has been a vital part of the .'United States Government since 1944. Intelligence information has had an :f#mortant influence on the direction Ind development of American foreign riablicy and has been essential to the 'Maintenance of our national security. e- committee is convinced that the pined States requires an intelligence Vstem which will provide policy-makers ,F,!ith. accurate intelligence and analysis. :igye must have an early warning system to monitor potential military threats by .oeuntries hostile to United States in- . teeests. We need a strong intelligence system to verify that treaties concern- ing arms limitation are being honored. 4r:formation derived from the intelli- ,gence agencies is a necessary ingre- :client in making national defense and foreign policy decisions. Such informa- tion is also necessary :n countering the :efforts of hostile intelligence services and in halting terrorists, international drug traffickers and other international criminal activities. Within this country certain carefully controlled intelligence activities are essential for effective law enforcement. _ The United States has ,Jevoted enore mous resources to the creation of a national intelligence system, and today ahem Is text-awareness on the part of many citizens that a nation I in li- gence system is a permanent and nec- essary component of our Government. The system's value to the country has been proven, and it will he needed for the foreseeable future. But a major conclusion of this inquiry is that Con- gressional oversight is necessary to as- sure that in the future our intelligence community functions effectively, within the framework of the Constitution. The committee is of the view that many of the unlawful actions taken by officials of the intelligence agencies were rationalized as their public duty. It was necessary for the committee to ' understand how the pursuit of the public good could have the opposite effect. As Justice Brandeis observed: "Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect lib- erty when the Government's purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom- are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in in- sidious encroachment by men of zeal, ; well-meaning but without -understand- ing. Olmstead v.? United States, 277 ; U.S. 438,-4i9 41928), - The Mandate. Of-the. --- - Conun- ittee's Tnq?iry On Jan. 17, 1975, Senate Resolu- tion established a select committee "to conduct an tihatestigation:and study; of governmental operations with. respect ; to inteligence activities and- of the ex- tent, if any, to which illegal, improper or unethical activitiea were 'engaged in by any agency of the Federal Govern- merit." Senate Resolution 21 lists spe- cific areas of inquiry and study:: (1) Whether the Central. Intelligence ;Agency has conducted an illegal domes- tic intelligence operation in the United ;States. - s (2) The conduct of domestic- intelli- gence or counterintelligence operations ; against United States citizens by the Federal Bureau of Investigation or any other Federal agency. ?? : ? - (3) The origin and disposition of the so-called Huston Plan to apply United States intelligence agency capabilities ! against individuals or organizations within the United States. (4) The extent to which the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central In- : telligence Agency and other Federal law enforcement or intelligence agen- cies coordinate their respective activi- ties, any agreements which govern that coordination and the extent to which a lack of coordination has contributed to activities or actions which are illegal, improper, inefficient, unethical or con- trary to the intent of Congress. ? (5) The extent to which the opera- tion of domestic intelligence or counter- intelligence activities and the operation of any other activities within the United States by the Central Intelligence :Agency conforms to the legislative i charter of that agency and the intent of the Congress. (6) The past and present Interpretee lion by the Director of Central Intelli- gence of the responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods as it relates to that provision of the National ' Security Act of 1947 which provides ; that ". . . that the agency shall have ' no police, subpoena, law enforcement powers or internal security lune- . tons. . . ." (7) The nature and extent of exec- utive branch oversight of all United States intelligence activities. (8) The need for specific legislative authority to govern the operations of artet intelligence agencies of the Federal Government now existing without that !explicit statutory authority, including but.not limited to agencies such as the ;Defense Intelligence Agency and .the iNational Security Agency. - (9) The nature and extent to which Federal agencies cooperate and ex- change intelligence information and the adequacy of any regulations or statutes which govern such cooperation and ex- change of intelligence information. (10) The extent to which United States intelligence agencies are gay- erned by executive orders, rules or regulations, either published or secret, and the extent to which those executive orders, rules or regulations interpret, ,expand or are in conflict with specific i legislative authority. (11) The violation or suspected vio- lation ? of any state or Federal statute by any intelligence agency or by any person .by or on behalf of any intelli- gence agency of the Federal Govern- silent, including but not limited to surreptitious entries, surveillance, wire- taps or eavesdropping, illegal opening of the United States mail or the moni- toring of the United States mail. . (12) The need for improved, strength- ened, or consolidated oversight of Unit- ed States intelligence activities by the 4-Congress. . ? (13) Whether any of the existing laws . of- the United States are inadequate, either in their provisions or manner of enforcement, to safeguard the rights of American citizens, to improve ex- ecutive and legislative control of intelli- gence and related activities and to 'resolve uncertainties as to the authority ; of United States intelligence and re- lated .agendes. - (14) Whether there is unnecessary duplication of expenditure and effort in the collection and processing of intelli- gence information by United States agencies. (15) The extent and necessity of overt and covert intelligence activities in the United States and abroad. - In addressing these mandated areas of inquiry, the committee has focused on three broad ?questions: (1) Whether intelligence activities have functioned in accordance with the Constitution and the laws of the United States. ' (2) Whether the structure, programs, past history and present policies of the American intelligence system have servedthe national Interests in a man- .ner consistent with declared national policies and purposes. (3) Whether the process through which the intelligence agenices have been directed and controlled have been adequate to assure conformity with Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 policy and the law, ?? Over the past year, the committee and its staff have carefully examined the tntelligence structure of the United States. Considerable time and effort have been devoted in order to under- stand what has been done by the United States Government in secrecy during the 30-year period since the end of World War II. It is clear to the com- mittee that there are many necessary and proper governmental activities that must be conducted in secrecy. Some of these activities affect the security and the very existence of the nation. It is also clear from the committee's inquiry that intelligence activities con- ducted outside the framework of the Constitution and statutes can under- mine the treasured values guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. Further, if the intelligence agencies act in ways ini- mical to declared national purposes, they damage the reputation, power and influence of the United States abroad. The committee's investigation has documented that a number of actions committed in the name of "national security" were inconsistent with de- clared policy and the law. Hearings have been held and the committee has issued reports on alleged assassination plots, covert action in Chile and the interception of domestic communica- tions by the National Security Agency. Regrettably, some of these abuses can- - not be regarded as aberrations. The Purpose of the Committee's Findings and Recommendations ? It is. clear that , a primary task for -any successor- oversight committee and the Congress as a whole will be to frame bs sic statutes necessary under the Constitution within which the Intel- ligence agerities of the: United States can function efficiently under, clear guidelines,: -Charters- delineating the . missions, authorities and limitations for some of the United States most im- portant intelligence agencies do not - 'exist. For exempla, there is no stet- ntory authority for the .N.S.A.'s in- telligence activities. Where statutes do exist, as with the C.I.A.,, they are vague and have failed to provide the necessary guidelines defining? Missions and limit- 'ations. ? The committee's investigation has ? demonstrated, moreover, that the lack ? of legislation has had the effect of limiting public debate upon some im- portant national issues. The C.1.A.'s broad statutory charter,, the 1947 Naticnal Security Act, makes no specific mention of covert action: The C.I.A.'s former general counsel, Lawrence Houston, who was deeply in- volved in drafting the 1947 act, wrote In September 1947, "we do not be- lieve there was any thought in the' 'minds of Congress that the act con- templated covert action." Yet, a few n- oaths after enactment of the 1947 legislation, the National Security Cowl; cil authorized the C.I.A. to engage in covert action programs. The provision of the Act often cited as .authorizing C.I.A. covert activities for the agency ,!'. ... to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affect- ing the national security as the Na- tional Security Council may front time to time direct." Secret Executive Orden issued by the R.S.C. to carry out covert action pro- lirrarris were nor subject to Congrei; sionat review. Indeed, until recent ;years, except for a few members, Con- gress was not fully aware of the ex- istence of the so-called "secret charter for intelligence activities." Those mem- bers who did know 'had no institutional means for discussing their knowledge of secret intelligence activities With their colleagues. The problem of how, ' the Congress can effectively use secret knowledge in its legislative process remains to be resolved. It is the com- mittee's view that a strong and effective oversight committee is an essential first step that must be taken to resolve this % fundamental issue. The Dilemma of Secrecy and Open Constitutional Government ? Since World War- II, with steadily. escalating consequences, many decisions of national importance have been made in secrecy, often by'. the executive branch alone. These decisions are fre- quently based on information obtained by clandestine means and available only to the executive branch. Recent Presidents have justified this secrecy on the basis of "national security," "the requirements of national defense" or "the confidentiality required by sensitive, ongoing negotiations or ' operations." These justifications were generally accepted at face value. The Bay of Pigs fiasco, the secret war in Laos, the secret bombing of Cambodia, the anti-Allende activities in Chile, the Watergate affair, were all instances' of ? the use of power cloaked in secrecy which when revealed provoked wide- spread popular disapproval. This series of events has ended, for the time being at least, passive and uncritical accept- ance by the Congress of executive de- cisions in the areas of foreign policy, national security and intelligence activi- ties. If Congress had met its oversight responsibilities some of these activities might have been averted. An examination of the scope of secret intelligence activities undertaken in the last three decades reveals that they ranged from war to conventional es- pionage. It appears that some United States intelligence activities may have -violated treaty and covenant oblige- ' tions, but more importantly the rights of United States citizens have been infringed upon. Despite citizen and Con- gressional concern about these pro- grams, no processes or procedures have been developed by either the Congress ? or the executive branch which would assure Congress of access to secret in- formation which it must have to carry out its constitutional responsibilities in authorizing and giving its advice and consent. The hindsight of history sug- gests that many secret operations were ill-advised or might have been more beneficial to United States interests bad they been conducted openly, rather than secretly. The committees stresses that these questions remain to be decided by the Congress and the executive jointly: . What should be regarded as a na- tional secret? Who determines what is to be kept secret? How can decisions made in secret or programs secretly 'approved be re- viewed? Two great problems have confronted the committee in carrying out Its charge 4 :to address these issues. ? The first is how our open democratic society, which has endured and flour- ished for 200 years, can be adapted to ,overcome the threats to liberty posed by Abe continuation of secret Government activities. The leaders of the United States must devise ways to meet their -respective intelligence responsibilities, including informed and effective Con- gressional oversight, in a manner which brings secrecy and the power that secrecy affords within constitutional bounds. For the executive branch, the specific problem concerns instituting effective control and accountability systems and ,improving efficiency. Many aspects of .these two problem areas which have ,been examined during the committee's inquiry of intelligence agencies are ad- dressed in the recommendations. It is our hope that intelligence oversight , committees working with the executive ,branch will develop legislation to rem- : edy the problems exposed by our inquiry and described in this report. The corn- ; ? mittee has already recommended the . creation of an oversight committee with the necessary powers to exercise legisla- tive authority over the intelligence activities of the United States. It is clear that the Congress must exert its will and devise procedures that will enable it to play its full constitu- tional role in. making policy decisions concerning intelligence activities. Failure to do so would permit further erosion or constitutional government. In a meeting with President 'Ford at the outset of our inquiry in February 1975, the committee agreed not to dis- close any classified information provided by. the executive branch without first consulting the appropriate agencies, of- fices and departments. In the case of objections, the committee agreed to carefully consider the executive's rea- sons for maintaining secrecy, but the committee determined that final deci- sions on any disclosure would be up to the committee. ' The select committee has scrupulously adhered to this agreement. The Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots _Involving Foreign Leaders, the report on 'C.I.A. activities in Chile, the report on 'illegal N.S.A. surveillance, and the dis- closures of illegal activities on the part of F.B.I. Cointelpro, the F.B.I. harass- ment of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and other matters revealed in the commit- tee's public hearings, were all carefully considered by the committee and the ,executive branch working together to _determine what information could be -declassified and revealed without dam- . aging national security. In those 'reports ? and hearings, virtually all differences between the committee and the execu- tive were resolved. The only significant. exception concerned the release to the public of the Assassination Report, which the executive branch believed Would harm national security. The com- mittee decided otherwise. , Some criteria for defining a valid national secret have been agreed to over the last year. Both the committee and the executive branch now agree that the names of intelligence sources and the details of sensitive methods used by the intelligence services should remain secret. Wherever possible, the right of privacy of individuals and groups should also be preserved. It was agreed, how- ever, that the details of illegal acts should be disclosed and that the broad scope of United States intelligence ac- tivities should be sufficiently described to give public reassurance that the in- telligence agencies are operating con- sistent with the law and declared national policy. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 ? WPM? Approved ForReleate200-1108/08 ClA4RDP7700432R0001004001304-9--i'-- SUMMARY- FINDINGS AND RECOM- MENDATIONS General Findings The committee finds that rnited States fereign and militnry intelligence anencies have made important con- tributions to the nation's security, end generally have perfermed their missions with dedication and distinction. The committee further finds that the in- dividual men and women serving America in difficult and dangerous in- telligence assignments deserve the re- spect and gratitude of the nation. The committee finds that there is a continuing need for an effective system -of foreign and military intelligence. United States interests and responsibil- ities in the world will be challenged, for the foreseeable future, by streng and potentially hostile powers. This requires the maintenance of an effective Ameri- can intelligence system. The committee has found that the Soviet KGB and other hostile intelligence services main- tain extensive foreign intelligence op- erations, for both intelligence collection .and covert operational purposes. These activities pose a threat to the intelli- gence activities and interests of the United States and. its allies. The committee finds that Congress has failed to provide the necessary stet- ? uary guidelines to insure that intelli- gence agencies carry out their missions in accord with constitutional processes. Mechanisms for and the practice of . Congressional oversight have not been adequate. Further, Congress has not devised appropriate means to effective- ly use the valuable information devel- oped by the intelligence agencies. Intelligence information and analysis that exist within the executive branch clearly would contribute to sound judg- ments and more effective legislation in the areas of foreign policy and national security. The committee finds that covert ac- tion operations have not been an excel), tional instrument used only in rare instances when the vital interests of the United States have been at stake. On the contrary, Presidents and Ad- ministrations have made excessive, and at times self-defeating, use of covert action. In addition, covert action has become a routine program with a bu- reaucratic momentum of its own. The long-term impact, at home and abroad, of repeated disclosure of U. S. covert action never appears to have been assessed. The cumulative effect of co- vert actions has been increasingly costly to America's interests and repu- tation. The committee believes that covert action must be employed only in the most extraordinary circum- stances; Although there is a question concern- ing the extent to which the Constitu- tion requires publication of intelligence expenditures information, the commit- tee finds that the Constitution at least tequires public disclosure and public authorization of an annual aggregate figure for United States national intelli- gence activities. Congress' failure as a ' whole to monitor the intelligence agencies' expenditures has been a major element in the ineffective legislative oversight of the intelligence community. The permanent intelligence oversight committee(s) of Congress should give further consideration to the question of :the extent to which further public die- closure of Intelligence budget informs- ton is prudent and constitutionally necessary. At the same time, the committee finds that the operation of an extensive ,and necessarily secret intelligence sys- tem places severe strains on the na- tion's constitutional government. The committee is convinced, however, that the competing demands of secrecy and the requirements of the democratic process?our Constitution and our laws ?can be reconciled. The need to protect secrets must be balanced with the assuran'ce that secrecy is not used as a means to hide the abuse of power or the failures and, mistakes of policy. Means must and can be provided fOr lawful disclosure of unneeded or un- lawful secrets. The committee finds that intelligence activities should net be regarded as ends in themselves. Rather, the nation's intelligence functions should be organ- .zed and directed to assure tire thee serve the needs of those in the execu- tive end legislative branches who have responsibility for formulating oe carry- ing out foreion and national security . The ocenznittee finds that Congress has failed M nrevide the necessary stetutoter guidelines ti insure that in- tellieence ngenciee earns nnt their neer' m'esiore in accord with Con- ceit:if:Irma! nroeess.. in order te nrovi-T.e fhen dirent;en fer the hltelligenee eeene;es. t!?e cm-nein-se finds thet nen, stetutorv chertere fo- .'"ere neeneies must he written. e-hich telee eccount o.7 the exnerience e 11- i'asti three and a hele decades. Further. '!le committee finds that the relation- Cele among the various intellieerice neencies and between them and the Di- rector of Central !atellieence should be . restructured in order to achieve better aceountability,. coordination and more efficient use of., resources. . These aaeles are urgent_ They should ,h iindertaken by the Corgrees in? con- sult:lean: with the executive branch in the cereing year. The recent propeeals and executive actions by the Presider.: are most welcome. However, further actin by Congress is necessary. Reconnnendatiohs I. The National Security Act should be recast by omnibus legislation which would set forth the basic purposes of. national intelligence activities, and de- fine the relationship between the 017- gress and the intelligence agencies of the executive branch. This revision should be given the highest priority by the intelligence oversight committee of Congress, acting in consultation With the executive branch. 2. The new leeislation should define the charter of the organizations and entities in the United States intelligence communitv. It should establish charters for the Ne:ional Security Council, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, the nation- al intelligence components of the De- pertment of Defense, including the Na- tional Security Agency and the Defense intell:gcnce Agency, and all other ele- men:s of the intelligence community, iecluiline joint oriainizations of two or inere :nencice "e This leeleietion should set forth the gererel reniettiee and preccduree of the intellience community and the relee and re ee, isileFtice of the nee:vies- ,:eeeetse 4 Tie, iseeti n hoela contain hpc- cifi.-. ci:i.arl? dcfin&q,1 oroas or Iimitritiens on vntons carrIM ;.s.f ;kis '''' :1;?? .,f the in:elligepit? eorcrAtini'..y, The National Security Council and the Office of the President The Nationel Security Council is 11 .instrument of the President and no* corpornee entity with authority or its own. The committee found that in ren- eral the President has had, through the National Security Council, effective means for exerting broad policy control over at least two major clandestine ac- tivities ? covert action and sensitive technical collection. The covert Ameri- can involvement in Angola and the op- erations of the Glomar Explorer are examples of that control in quite tiff- ? ferent circumstances, whatever conclu- sions one draws about the merits of the activities. The Central Intelligence Agency, in broad terms, is not "out of control." The committee found, however, that 'there were significant limits to this ,control. ? Clandestine Activities ? 4111The degree of control and account- ability regarding covert action and sen- sitive collection has been a function of each particular President's willingness to use these techniques. ?illThe principal N.S.C. vehicle for dealing with clandestine activities, the 40 Committee and its predecessors, was the mechanism for reviewing and mak- ing recommendations regarding the ap- proval of major covert action projects However, this body also served gen- erally to insulate the President from official involvement and accountability in the approval process until 1974. clAs high-level Government officials., 40 Committee members have had nei- ? ther time nor inclination to adequately review and pass judgment on all of the literally hundreds of covert action , projects. Indeed, only a small fraction of such projects (those which the C.I.A. regards as major or sensitive) are so approved and/or reviewed. This prob- lem is aggravated by the fact that the 40 Committee has had virtually no staff, with only a single officer from the clan- destine services acting as executive secretary. , ilThe process of review and approval has been, at times, only general in , nature. It sometimes has become pro forma conducted over the telephone , by subordinates. gThe President, without consulting any N. S.C. mechanism, can exercise personal direction of clandestine ac- tivities as he did in the case of Chile in 1970. 4jThere is no systematic White House. level review of either sensitive foreign espionage or counterintelligence activ- ities. Yet these operations may also have a potential for embarrassing the United States and sometimes may be difficult to distinguish from covert ac- tion operations. For example, a propos.; al to recruit a high foreign government official as an intelligence "asset" would not necessarily he previewed outside the Central Intelligence Agency, at thd N.S.C. level, despite the implications that recruitment might pose in conduct, lug American foreign relations. Similar- ? ly,. foreign counterintelligence opera ,- dens might be conducted without awe prior review at the highest Gal/eminent: levels. The committee found instances hi the case of Chliie when counteriniel, ligencn operations were related t,s end, even hrrd to distinguish from, the pro- of covert action. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 ilThe Presideene ertereeseN te ?rade the Al) :riff) the . dons Advisory Groun rd tn !nee recoenitien tn It- rrne in advising the President on eoeen etitaties are desirable. 'Inlet terred'ere however, will etrein further the Cretin's rbility tn condten. a intsternatic rwiew of sen- sitive elendeettn oteeretions Under. the new s'rueture, the h'e oite mem. Ives are cabiret &Teem who h?.ve even lest: nine than the*r erirslpel .denuties, who ereviotzsle conducted the 40 Commit- tee's worir. The ti:roup's procedures must be carefuny structured, so that the persnestive e" Cehinet officers can in fact be brought to beer. Counterintelligence There is no N.S.C.-level mechanism for coordinating, reviewing or approving covnterintelligence activities in the United States, even those directed at United States citizens, despite the dem- onstrated eeetential for abuse. Coordination and Resource?, Allocation The Dirr..ct:T of Central Intelllgence has be.n assigned the function of co- o7tinatinz ti-ie activities of the intel- Iigt,r_ce co7:1-aunqy, ensuring its re- seer:se:teens te the requirements -fOr national intelligence and for assembling a consolidetea, nctionot intoilii7ence budget Until the recent establishment of the Committee on Foreien fetal- -ligence, there was no effective N.S.C.-, level mechanism for any of these pur- poses. Executive Oversight The committee finds that Presidents have not established specific instru- ments of oversight to prevent abuses by the intelligence community. In .essence, Presidents have not exercised effective oversight. Recommendations ? 5. By statute, the National Security -Council should be explicitly empowered to direct and provide policy guidance for the intelligence activities of the United States, including intelligence col- lection, counterintelligence, and the t-conduct of covert action. . 6. By statute, the Attorney General should be made an adviser to the Na- tional Security Council in order to fa- cilitate discharging his responsibility to insure that actions taken to protect American national security in the field of intelligence are also consistent with the Constitution and the laws -of the United States. ' 7. By statute, the existing power of the Director of Central Intelligence to coordinate the activities of the intel- ligence community should be reaffirmed. At the same time, the N.S.C. should establish an appropriate committee, such as the new Committee on Foreign Intelligence, with responsibility for al- locating intelligence resources to insure efficient and effective operation of the national intelligence community. This committee should be chaired by the D.C.I. and should include representa- tives of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. 8. By statute, an N.S.C. committee (like the Operations Advisory Group) should be established to advise the Pres- ident on covert action. It would also be empowered, at the President's discre- tion, to approve all types of sensitive intelligence collection activities. If an O.A.G. member dissented from an 41- prove!, the particular collection activity would be referred to the President for deCision. The group should consist of' the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Assistant to the President for National - Security Affairs, the Di- rector of Central Intelligence, the At- torney General, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of 0.M.B., as an observer. The Presi- dent would designate a chairman from among the group's-members. 9. The chairman of the group would be confirmed by the Senate for that position, if he were an official ? not .already subject to confirmation. ? In the execution of covert action and sensitive intelligence collection activ'i- 'ties specifically approved by the Presi- dent, -the chairman would enter the chain of command below the President. , 10. The group should be -provided with adequate staff to assist in con- ducting thorough reviews of covert ac- tion and sensitive collection projects. That staff should not be drawn ex- clusively from the Clandestine Service of the C.I.A., , 11. Each covert action project should be reviewed and passed on by the group. In addition; the group would review all ongoing projects at least once a year. 12. By statute, the-Secretary of State , should be designated as the principal , Administration spokesman to the Con- gress on the policy and purpose under- lying covert action projects. 13. By statute, the Director of Central Intelligence should be required to fully inform the intelligence oversight .com- mittee(s) of Congress of each covert action prior to its initiation. No funds should be expended on any covert ac- tion. unless -and until the President certifies and provides to the Congres- sional intelligence oversight commit- tee(s) the reasons that a covert action is required by extraordinary circum- stances to deal with grave threats to : the national security of the United States, The Congressional intelligence oversight committee(s) should be kept fully and currently informed on all - covert action projects, and the D.C.I. should submit a semiannual report on all such projects to the committee(s). 14. The committee recommends that when the Senate establishes an intel- ligence oversight committee with authority to authorize the national in- telligence budget, the Hughes-Ryan Amendment (22 U.S.C., 2422) should be amended so that the foregoing notifica- tions. and Presidential certifications to the Senate are provided only to that committee. 15. By statute, a new N.S.C. counter- intelligence committee should be es- tablished, consisting of the Attorney General as chairman, the Deputy Sec- retary of Defense, the Director of Cen- tral Intelligence, the Director of the F.B.I. and the Assistant to the Presi- dent for National Security Affairs. Its purpose would be to coordinate and review foreign counterintelligence ac- tivities conducted within the United States and the clandestine collection of foreign intelligence within the United States, by both the F.B.I. and the*C.I.A. The goal would be to insure strict con- formity with statutory and constitu- tional reqirements and to enhance co- ordination between the C.I.A. and F.B.I. This committee should review the stand- ards and guidelines for all recruitments of agents within the United States for either counterintelligence or positive foreign intelligence purposes, as well as for the recruitment , of -U.S. citizens abroad. This committee would consider differences between the agencies con- cerning the recruitment of agents, the handling of foreign assets that come to the United States, and the establishment 6 of the bona fides of defectors. It should also treat any other foreign intelligence or Counterintelligence activity of the F.B.I. and C.I.A. which either agency brings to that forum for Presidential level consideration. The Director of Central Intelligence The 1947 National Security Act gave the D.C.I. responsibility for "coordinat- ing the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national se- , curity." ?In addition, the D.C.I. as the President's principal foreign intelligence adviser was given responsibility for coordinating and producing national in- telligence for senior policymakers. How- ever, the committee found that these D.C.h responsibilities have often con- flicted with the particular interests and prerogatives of the other intelligence community departments and agencies. They have not given up control over their own intelligence operations, and in particular the Department of Defense and the military services, which allocate SO percent of the direct costs for na- tional intelligence, have insisted that they must exercise direct control over peacetime intelligence activities to pre- pare for war. Thus, while the D.C.I. was given responsibility under the 1947 act for intelligence community activi- ties, he was not authorized to centrally coordinate or manage the overall opera- tions of the community. Because the D.C.L only provides guidance for intelligence collection and production and does not establish re- quirements, he is not in a position to command the intelligence community to respond to the intelligence needs of national policymakers. Where the D.C.I. has been able to define priorities, he has lacked authority to allocate intelli- gence resources?either among different systems of intelligence collection or among intelligence collection, analysis and finished intelligence production. In the area of providing finished in- telligence, the committee discovered that the D.C.L., in his role as intelli- gence judgments are objective artd in- dependent of department and agency biases. The committee has been par- ticularly concerned with pressures from both the White House and the Defense Department on the D.C.I. to alter his intelligence judgments. One example of such pressure investigated by the com- mittee occurred in the fall of 1969, when the D.C.I. modified his judgment on the capability of the Soviet SS-9 system when it conflicted with the public position of Secretary of Defense Laird. After a meeting with Staff of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Director Helms deleted a paragraph from the draft of the National Intelli- gence Estimate orr Soviet strategic forces which stated that within the next five years it was "highly unlikely" that the Soviets would attempt to achieve "a first strike capability, i.e., a capability to launch a surprise attack against the United States with assur- ance that the U.S.S.R. would not itself receive damage it would regard as unacceptable." The committee believes that over the past five years the D.C.I.'s ability to produce objective national intelligence and resist outside pressure has been reduced with the dissolution of the in- dependent Board of National Estimates and the subsequent delegation of its staff to the departments with resporrsi- bility for drafting national in- telligence judgments. The committee believes that the Can- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-,RDP77-004-32R000100400004-9 4 - green, in carrying out its responsibilities In the area of national security policy, should have access to the full range of intelligence produced by the United States intelligence community. The com- mittee further believes that it should be possible to work out a means .of in- siring that the D.C.I.'s national intel- ligence judgments are available to the appropriate Congressional committees on a regular basis without -compro- mising the D.C.I.'s role as personal ad- viser to the President. Finally, the committee has found con- cern that the function of the D.C.I. in his role as intelligence community lead- er and principal intelligence adviser to the President is inconsistent with his responsibilitiy to manage one of the intelligence community agencies?the C.I.A. Potential problems exist in a num- ber of areas. Because the D.C.I. as head of the C.I.A. is responsible for human clandestine collection overseas, inter- ception of signals communication over- seas, the development and interception of technical collection systems, there is concern that the D.C.I. as community leader is in " a conflict of interest" situation when ruling on the activities of the over-all intelligence community. The committee is also concerned that. the D.C.I.'s new span of control?both the entire intelligence community and the entire C.I.A.?may be too great for him to exercise effective detailed super- vision of calendestine activities. Recommendations - 16. By statute, the D.C.I. should be established as the President's principal foreign intelligence adviser, with exclu- sive responsibility for producing nation- al intelligence for the President and the Congress. For this purpose, the D.C.I. ? should be empowered to establish a staff directly responsible to him to help prepare his national intelligence judg- .ments and to coordinate the views of the other members of the intelligence community. The committee recommends that the director establish a board ta include senior outside advisers to re- view intelligence products as necessary, thus helping to insulate the D.C.I. from pressures to alter or modify his national intelligence judgments. To advise and assist the D.C.I. in producing national intelligence, the D.C.I. would also be empowered to draw on other elements of the intelligence community. 17. By statute, the D.C.L should be given responsibility and authority for establishing national intelligence re- quirements, preparing the national in- telligence budget and providing gui- dance for United States national intelligence program operations. In this capacity he should be designated as chairman of the appropriate N.S.C. committee, such as the 'C.F.I. and should have the following powers and responsibilities: a. The D.C.I. should establish national intelligence requirements for the entire Intelligence community. He should be empowered to draw on intelligence com- munity representatives and others whom he rsay designate to assist him in es- tablishing national intelligence require- ments and determining the success of the various agencies in fulfilling them. The D.C.I. should provide general gui- dance to the various intelligence agency directors for the management of intelt ligence operations. b. The D.C.I. should have responsibil- ity for preparing the national intelli- gence program budget for presentation to the President and the Congress. The definition of what is to be included. 'within that national intelligence pro-1 gram should be established by Congress( in consultation with the executive. In this capacity, the Director of Central Intelligence should be involved early in, the budget cycle in preparing the buclk- ets of the respective intelligence com- munity agencies. The director should have specific responsibility for choosing among the programs of the different collection and production agencies and departments and to insure against waste -and unnecessary duplication. The D.C.I. should also have responsibility for is- suing fiscal guidance for the allocation of all national intelligence resources.. The authority of the D.C.I. to reprogram funds within the intelligence budget should be defined by statute. ? c. In order to carry out his national intelligence' responsibilities the D.C.I. should have the authority to review all foreign and military intelligence activi- ties and intelligence resource alloca- tions, including tactical military intel- ligence which is the responsibility of the armed forces. d. The D.C.I. should be authorized to establish an intelligence community- staff to support him in carrying out his managerial responsibilties. This staff should be drawn from the best available talent within and outside the intelli- gence community. e. In addition to these provisions concerning D.C.I. control over national intelligence operations in peacetime, the statute should require establishment of a procedure to insure that in time of war the relevant national intelli- gence operations come under the con- trol of the Secreary of Defense. 18. By statute, the position of Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for the intelligence community should be es- tablished as recommended in Executive Order No. 11905. This Deputy Director should be subject to Senate conforma- tion and would assume the DCI's intel- ligence community functions in the ? D.C.I.'s absence. Current provisions 're- garding the status of the D.C.I. and his single deputy should be extended' to cover the D.C.!. and both deputies, Civilian control of the nation's intelli- gence is important; only one of the three could be a career military officer, active or retired. ? 19. The committee recommends that , the intelligence oversight committee (s) of Congress consider whether the Con- gress should appropriate the funds for ' the national intelligence budget to the D.C.!., rather than to the directors of ? the various intelligence agencies and departments. , 20. By statute; the Director of Cen- tral Intelligence should serve at the pleasure of the President but for. no. more than 10 years. , 21. The committee also recommends consideration of separating the D.C.I. from . direct responsibility over the C.I.A. The Central Intelligence Agency The Charter for Intelligence Activities: Espionage, Counterintelligence and Covert Action The committee finds that the C.I.A.' present charter, embodied in the N a- tional Security Act of 1947, the C.I.A. Act of 1949, and the 1974 Hughes-Ryan amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act, is inadequate in a number of re- spects. 7 While -the legislative history of the 1947 act makes clear that the C.1.A.'s mandate would be limited to "foreign intelligence," the act itself does not so specify. Covert action, in the past a major C.I.A. activity, is not mentioned in the 1947 act, although the act con- tains a vague and open-ended authoriza- tion for the National Security Council to direct the C.I.A. to undertake "such other functions and duties related to the intelligence affecting the national se- curity as tthe N.S.C. may from time to time direct." No explicit authority even to collect intelligence is provided the agency. The restrictions on domestic activi- ties in the 1947 act were not clearly defined, nor was the potential conflict between these limits and the director's authority to protect "sources and meth- ods" of intelligence gathering resolved. Neither did the 1947 act set forth the agency's role in conducting counterin- telligence and. in collecting of foreign intelligence. . . The Congress's confusing and ill-de- fined charge to the agency in these areas rsulted in conflicts of jurisdiction with other governmental agencies. The ? lack of - legislative specificity also opened the way to domestic activities such as Operation Chaos, which clearly went beyond Congress's intent in en- acting and amending the Naional Se- curity Act. In sum, the committee finds that a clear statutory basis is needed for the agency's conduct abroad of covert action, espionage, counterintel- ligence and foreign intelligence collec- tion and for such counterespionage operations within the Uniited States as the agency may have to undertake as a result of tthe activities abroad. Foreign Espionage Espionage on behalf of the United States Government is primarily' the re- , sponsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency's Clandestine Service which operates on a worldwide basis. The .Clandestine Service ? officially, the Directorate of Operations ? is respon- sible for C.I.A. clandestine human col- lection, espionage; covert action, para- military operations and counterintel- ligence. The C.I.A. also has speciial re- sponsibilities for coordinating the military services' limited espionage ac- tivities abroad. The committee believes that the Unit- ed States cannot forgo clandestine hu- man collection and expect to maintain the same quality of intelligence on mat- ters of the highest importance to our . national security. Technical collection systems do not eliminate the usefulness of espionage in denied areas (essentially the Communist countries). Agent intel- ligence can help provide valuable insight concerning the motivations for activities or policies of potential adver- saries, as well as their future intentions. Nevertheless, the committee found that there are certain inherent limita- tions to the value of clandestine sources. Espionage information tends tp be frag- mentary, and there is always some question as to the trustworthiness and reliability of the source. The committee found that over the last decade, the size of the Clandestine Service has been reduced significantly, particularly in the field. However, there ; remains the question of whether the complements abroad and at headquar- ters have been reduced sufficiently. The committee found that the C.I.A.'s clandesteine collection effort has been ;reoriented towards denied areas and 'away from internal political and secur- ity developments in the third world. The committee believes that this changed emphasis is desirable and welcomes it. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 7areign Intelligence Collec- tion in the United States The C.I.A. engages in both overt and clandestine activity within the United States for the purpose of foreign intel- ligence collection. The agency's Domes- tic Collection Division is responsible primarily for overt collection, while the Foreign Resources Division manages clandestine collection of foreign intel- ligence. Both divisions are currently within the Directorate of Operations. Formerly run and staffed by the Direc- torate of Intelligence, the D.C.O. was moved to Operations in 1973 and now, has many clandestine services officers assigned to it. The Domestic Collection Division openly collects foreign intelligence in- formation from American ciitizens on a wide variety of subjects, primarily of an economic and technological nature. The Domestic Collection Division currently maintains contact with tens of thou- sands of American citizens who, on a confidentiial basis, volunteer informa- tion of intelligence value to the United States. The committee notes that the Central Intelligence Agency is overtly in contact with many members of the American academic community to con- sult with them on 'the subjects of their expertise. On occasion, at the request of the academic concerned, these con- tacts are confidential. The committee believes there are significant benefits to both the Govern- ment and the universities in such con- tacts and that they should not be dis- couraged. The committee sees no danger to the integrity of American academic institutions in continuing such overt contacts. The Domestic Collection - Division operates from 38 offices around the United States and lists itself in local telephone directories, although it con- ducts its business as discreetly as possible. The committee notes that due to the recent revelations about C.I.A. activi- ties, some foreign intelligence sources are shying away from cooperation with the Domestic Collection Division, thus impeding this division's most important function, namely, the overt collection of foreign intelligence. The committee also questions the re- cruiting, for foreign espionage purposes, of immigrants desiring American citizen- ship because it might be construed as ? coercive. ? Foreign Counterintelligence . Counterintelligence is defined quite broadly by the C.I.A. It includes ?the knowledge needed for the protection and preservation of the military, eco, nornic and productive strength of the United States, as well as the Govern-' ment's security in domestic and foreign affairs, ? against or from espionage, sabotage and subversion ,designed to weaken or destroy the United States. Counterintelligence is a special form of intelligence activity, aimed at dis- covering hostile foreign intelligence operations and destroying their effec- tiveness. It involves protecting the United States Government against in- filtration by foreign agents, as well as controlling and manipulating adversary intelligence operations. An effort is made to discern the plans and intentions of enemy intelligence services and to deceive them about our own. The committee finds that the threat from hostile intelligence services is real: In the United States alone, well over a thousand Soviet officials are on per-, rnanent assignment. Among these, over 40 percent have been identified as mem- bers of the KGB or GRU, the Soviet civilian and military intelligence units, ? respectively. Estimates for the number of unidentified Soviet Intelligence of- ficers raise this figure to over 60 per- cent and some defector sources have; estimated that 70 percent to 80 perceni, of Soviet officials in the United States have some intelligence connection. Furthermore, the number of Soviets? with access to the United States has' tripled ?since 1960, and is still increas- ing. In 1974. for example, over 200 Soviet ships with a total crew comple- ment of 13,000 officers and men visited this country. Some 4,000 Soviets entered the United States as commercial or ex- change visitors in 1974. In 1972-1973, for example, approximately one-third of the Soviet exchange students here for the academic year under the East-West 'Student Exchange Program were co- operating with the KGB, according to. the Central Intelligence Agency. Other areas of counterintelligence concern include the sharp increase in the number of Soviet immigrants to the United States (4,000 in 1974 compared to fewer than 500 in 1972): the rise in East-West commercial exchange visitors. (from 641 in 1972 to 1,500 in 1974); and the growing number of officials in this country from other Communist block nations (from 416 in 1960 to 798 in 1975). Coordination between C.I.A. and F.B.I. counterintelligence units is especially critical. The history of C.I.A.-F.B.I. liaison has been turbulent, though a strong undercurrent of cooperation 'las usually existed at the staff level since 1952 when the bureau began sending a liaison person to the C.I.A. on 'a regular basis. The sources of friction between the C.I.A. and F.B.I. in the early days. revolved around such matters as the frequent unwillingness of the bureau to collect positive intelligence for the C.I.A. within the United States or to help recruit foreign officials in this country. The committee believes that counter- intelligence requires the direct attention of Congress and the executive for three reasons: (1) two distinct and partly incompatible approaches to counterin- telligence have emerged and demand reconciliation; (2) recent evidence sug- gests that F.B.I. counterespionage results have been less than satisfactory; and (3) counterintelligence has infringed on . the rights and liberties of Americans. Recommendations 22. By statute, a charter should be established for the Central Intelligence Agency which makes clear that its activities must be related to foreign intelligence. The agency should be given the following missions: ? - ? qThe collection of denied or pro- tected foreign intelligence information. qThe conduct of foreign counter- intelligence. ? qThe conduct of foreign covert action operations. qThe production of finished national intelligence. 23. The C.I.A., in carrying out foreign intelligence mission I, would be permit- ted to engage in relevant activities within the United States so long as these activities do not violate the Con- stItution nor any Federal, state or local laws within the United States. The- committee has set forth in its domestic recommendations proposed restrictions on such activities to supplement restric- tions already contained in the 1947 National Security Act. In addition, the committee recommends that by statute the intelligence oversight committee(s) of Congress and the proposed counter- intelligence committee of the National Security Council be required to review, = at least annually, C.I.A. foreign intel- 8 ligence activities conducted within the United States. 24. By statute, the Attorney General should be required to report to the -President and to the intelligence over- sight committee(s) of Congress any in- telligence activities which, in his opin- ion, violate the constitutional rights of American citizens or any other provi- sion of law and the actions he has taken in response. Pursuant to the coin- Mittee's domestic recommendations, the Attorney General should be made re- sponsible for ensuring that intelligence activities do not violate the Constitu- tion or any other provision of law. 25. The committee recommends the establishment of a special committee of the Committee on Foreign Intelligence to review all foreign human intelligence collection activities. It would make rec- ommendations to the C.F.I. with regard to the scope, policies, and priorities of U.S. clandestine human collection oper- ations' and choices between overt and clandestine human collection. This com- mittee would be composed of a repre- sentative of the Secretary of State as chairman, the other statutory members of the C.F.I., and others whom the ? President may designate. 26. The intelligence oversight com- mittee(s) of Congress should carefully *examine intelligence collection activities of the Clandestine Service to assure that clandestine means are used only When the information is sufficiently important and when such means are necessary to obtain such information. 27. The intelligence oversight corn- mitte(s) should consider whether: ? qthe Domestic Collection Division (overt collection operations) should be removed from the Directorate of Opera- 'tions (the Clandestine Service), and re- turned to the Directorate of Intelligence; qthe C.I.A.'s regulations should re- quire that the D.C.D.'s overt contacts be informed when they are to be used for operational support of clandestine activities; qthe C.I.A.'s regulations should pro- hibit recruiting as agents immigrants who have applied for American citizen- ship. 28. The President of the United States, in consultation with the intelligence oversight 'committee(s) of Congress. should undertake a classified review of current issues regarding counterintel- ligence; This review should form the basis for a classified Presidential state- ment on national counterintelligence` policy and objectives, and should closely examine the following issues: compart. mentation, operations, security, r. search, accountability, training, internai review, deception, liaison and coordina- tion, and manpower. C.I...4. Production of Finished. Intelligence Intelligence production refers to the process (coordination, collation, evalua- tion, analysis, research and writing) by which "raw" intelligence is transformed into "finished" intelligence for senior policymakers. The finished intelligence product includes a daily report .and summaries, as well as longer analytical studies and monographs on particular topics of policy interest. In the C.I.A., finished intelligence is produced by the Directornte of Intelligence and Dire's- tcrate of Science and Technology. Certain problems and issues in the area of the production of intelligence in the C.I.A. have come to the commit- tee's attention. The committee believes, these problems deserve immediate at- tention by both the executive branch. and future Congressional intelligence oversight bodies. These problems hear directly on the res?aurces. allocated. Id Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 ;Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CFA-RDP77-00432R000100400004t9 the prOchiction of finished intelligenge the personnel systein and the organizaci 'Venal structure Of intelligence prodase tion. ? The committee recognizes that it 14. not the primary purpose of intelligende to predict every world event. Rather, the principal function of intelligence is to anticipate major foreign develope ments and changes in policies which bear on United States interests. Intel-, ligence should also provide a deepen understanding of the behavior, proce esses, and long-term trends which may: underlie sudden military and political developments. The committee wishes to emphasizes that there is an important difference,: between an intelligence failure and-a policy failure. The United States had: intelligence on the possibility of a Turk- ish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. Thet problem of taking effective action 'toi prevent such aninvasion was a policy, question and not an intelligence failure., The committee has received evidence' that on some subjects, such as the cur- rent capability of the strategic atu:V conventional forces of potential adveen saries, U.S. intelligence is considered, excellent. But in other areas, U.S. ished intelligence is viewed by policy- makers as far from satisfactory in light of. the total resources devoted to intel- ligence. On balance, the committee' found that the quality, timeliness, and.. utility of our finished intelligence is generally considered adequate, but that major improvement is both desirable-, and possible. One issue examined by the commits: tee is whether intelligence corrununitaif elements responsible for producing fulef. ished intelligence receive adequate at tention and support. Production is; hi. the words of one observer, "the step- child of the intelligence community!" Since finished intelligence is a principaP 'purpose of all United States intelligence activities, the committee finds that Mil neglect of finished intelligence is uni; acceptable for the future. Intelligence resources are overwhelmingly devoted to intelligence collection: The system is inundated with raw Ines telligence. The individual analyst re-? sponsible for producing finished intele, ligence have difficulty dealing with the, sheer volume of information. Policy- - maker's want the latest reports, and' producers of finished intelligence oftenz have to compete with the producers ot raw intelligence for policymakers' ?ate. tention. In a crisis situation, analyst& tend to focus on the latest piece.. ?is evidence at the expense of a longer and? broader view. Intelligence community; staff saw this tendency as one reason; why the Cyprus coup in July 1974 -wee,: not foreseen. The intelligence community staff -Irii its post-mortem on the 1974 Cyprus crisis noted another general analytiettli, problem which was involved in the faiee ure to anticipate the Cyprus coup and. the Arab attack on Israeli forces October of 1973: "the perhaps subcon? scious conviction (and hope) that, inn., mately, reason and rationality will pre- vail, that apparently irrational moves (the Arab attack, the Greek sponsored. coup) will not be made by essentially.. rational men." An additional area of the commite tee's concern is that analysts are often not informed in a timely way of nae: tional policies and programs which af- fect their analyses and estimates. In.. its examination of cases involving Camei bodia and Chile in the I970's, the, committee encountered evidence than, the analysts were so deprived. A final issue raled by the committee's, Investigation of intelligence production: is whether the new organizational strucee ture proposed by the Pesident will as,. sure the appropriate stature for the Di.." rectorate of Intelligence to help over- come existing problems in the producie; tion of finished intelligence. Instead of reporting directly to the D.C.!. (who' is still to be the President's chief intel- ligence adviser), C.I.A. analysts may,, well report through the Deputy for the C.I.A. Experience indicates that the newe deputy will need to devote the bulk of, his time to managing the Clandestine, Services and the Directorate for Science, and Technology. At the same time, the-, D.C.I. may be preoccupied with greater communitywide management responshe bilities. Without some further restrucei turing, the committee believes that the production of finished intelligence may, be lost in the shuffle. Recommendations 29. By statute, the Director of thef. Directorate of Intelligence should bey authorized to continue to report die: rectly to the Director of Central Intel.'i ligence. ?-- 30. The committee recommends nail' a system be devised to insure that intel'ai. ligence analysts are better and mote - promptly informed about United States; policies and programs affecting their' respective areas of responsibility. 31. The Central Intelligence Agencyd ainhe intelligence oversight commit- , - - - tee(s) of Congress should re-examine' the personnel system of the Directorate of Intelligence with a view to providing eincire flexible, less hierarchical per- snrinel system. Super-grade positions should be available on the basis of anal- ytical capabilities.. ? 32. The Directorate for Intelligence should seek to bring more analysts into the- CIA. atimiddle and upper grade levels for both career positions and tem- pprary assignments. ,-33, Greater emphasis should be placed on stimulating development of new tools and ,metheds- of analysis. "24. :Agency policy should continue to encourage intelligence analysts to as- , . surge substantive tours of duty -on an open' basis in other agencies (State, De- fense, NSC staff) or in academic insti- t.aiions to broaden both their analytical outleok and their appreciation for the reidiance of their analysis to policy. makers and operators within the Gov- erfunent. ? - ? - - ? Covert Action and Paramilitary - Operations !Covert action is the attempt to influ- encei?the internal affairs of other na- tions in support of United States for- plot- policy in a manner that cpnceals the.: participation of the United States Government. Covert action includes po- litical and economic action, propaganda and paramilitary activities. The basic unit of covert action is the. project. Covert action "projects" can range from single assets, such as a journalist placing propaganda, through a network of assets working in the me- diae to snajor covert and military inter- vention such as in Laos. The agency also maintains what it terms an "oper- ational infrastructure" of "standy" aa- sets ( agents of influence or media assets) who cart be used in major oper- ationsa-eauch as in Chile. These "stand- 9 b'ed'I'assets are part of ongoing, most often. routine, projects. There are no inactive assets. ? Cert Action The committee has found that the C.I.A. has conducted some 900 major or sensitive covert action projects plus several thousand smaller projects since 1961: The need to maintain secrecy shields covert action projects from the rigorous public scrutiny and debate necessary to determine their compati- bility with etablished American foreign policy goals. Recently, a large-scale covert paramilitary operation in Angola was initiated without any effort on the' part of the executive branch to articu- late and win public support for, its over- all. Policy in Africa. Only public dis- closure has allowed the nation to apply its standards of success or failure to covert action projects and then only in retrospect, often without the benefit of tho ...details prompting the original choice of covert rather than overt ? action. , The, secrecy covert action requires means that the public cannot determine whether- such actions are consistent with- established foreign policy goals. This secrecy also has allowed covert ac- tions to take place which are incon- sistent with -our basic traditions and values, Some covert operations have passed retrospect public judgments, such as. the support. given Western European ? ? democratic parties facing strong Corn- ' munist opposition in the late 1940's and 1950's. Others have not. In the view-of the committee, the covert hare assment of the democratically elected government of Salvador Allende in Chile did not command U. S. public approval. Pa:rarnilitary Operations Covert paramilitary operations are a special, extreme form of covert action. These operations most 'often consist of covert military assistance and training, but' occasionally have involved actual conibat activities by American advisers._ Because military assistance involves foreign policy commitments, it is, with one exception, authorized by the Con- gress. That exception is covert military assistance which is channeled through the:C:1.A. without being authorized or approved by the Congress as a whole. Cievert U.S. paramilitary combat op-- era:1.1ms frequently amount to making es:di:Abut do not .come under the War Pofveirs Act since they usually do not inideve uniformed U. S. military officers. American military officers engaged ih C.hkesponsored paramilitary operations are' ,"sheep-dipped" for paramilitary duty?.that is, they appear to resign from. the military yet preserve their place for reactivation once their tour as -civilians in paramilitary operations has-- ended. the committee finds that major para- military operations have often failed to achieve their intended objective. Most have eventually -been exposed. Opera- tions, as in Angola. recently, and Indo- nesia in the late 1950's are examples of such paramilitary failures. Others, such as 'Laos, are judged successes by the CFA. and officials within the executive branch. The "success" in Laos, how- ever, must be seen against the larger American involvement in Indochina which failed. Paramilitary operations often have evolved into large-scale programs with a high risk of exposure (and thus em- barrassment and/or failure). In some cases, the C.I.A. has been used to under- take parsmilitary operations simply be- cause the agency is less accountable to the public for highly visible ''secret" Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 military operations. In all cases con- sidered by the committee, command and.control within the executive branch was.eigorous. However, all such opera- tions- have been conducted without di- rect.Congressional authority or public debate. In recent years, some have been continued in the face of strong Con- gressional disapproval. . Recently, however?apart from An- gola?United States paramilitary activi- ties have been at a very low level. The capability for these actions, residing jointly in the C.I.A. and the Department of Defense, consists of a cadre of trained officers, stockpiles of military equipment, logistic networks and small Collections of air and maritime assets. Recommendations 35. The legislation establishing the charter for the, Central Intelligence Agency should specify that the C.I.A. is the only U.S. Government agency authorized to conduct covert actions. The purpose of covert actions should be to deal with grave threats to Ameri- can security. Covert actions should be consistent with publicly defined United States foreign policy goals, and should be reserved for extraordinary circum- stances when no other means will suf- fic.e. The legislation 'governing covert action should require executive branch procedures which will insure careful and thorough consideration of both the general policies governing covert action and particular covert action projects; such procedures should require the pasticipation and accountability ? of highest level policymakers. ' 36. The committee has already rec. =mended, following its investigation of alleged assassination attempts di- rected at foreign leaders, a statute to forbid such activities. The committee' reaffirms its support for such a statute and further recommends prohibiting the. following covert activities by statute: tlAll political 'assassinations. flEfforts to subvert democratic 'goy.-- ernments. AlSupport for police or other internal. security forces which engage in the systematic violation of human rights. 37. By statute, the appropriate N.S.C. committee (e.g., the Operations Ad- visory Group) should review every cov- ert action proposal. The Committee recommends tha't' the Operations Advisory Group review Include: . gA careful and systematic analysis of the political premises underlying the recommended actions, as well as the nature, extent, purpose, risks, likeli- hood of success and costs of the opera- tion. Reasons explaining why the ob- jective can not be achieved by overt means should also be considered. gEach covert action project should be formally considered at a meeting of the OAG, and if approved, forwarded to the President for final decision. The views and positions of the participants would be fully recorded. For the pur- pose of OAG, Presidential, and Con- gressional considerations, all so-called non-sensitive projects should be ag- gregated according to the extraordinary circustances or contingency against which the project is directed. 38. By statute, the intelligence over. sight committee(s) of Congress should require that the annual budget submis- sion for covert, action programs be specified and detailed as to the activity recommended. Unforeseen covert ac- tion projects should be funded from the Contingency Reserve Fund which could be replenished only after the CO* currence of the oversight and any other appropriate congressional committees. The congressional intelligence over- sight committee should be notified prior to any withdrawal from the Con- tingen'cy Reserve Fund. 30. By statute, any covert use by the U.S. Government of American citizens as combatants should be preceded by the notification required for all covert ? actions. The statute should provide that within 60 days of such notifica- tion such use shall be terminated unless the Congress has specifically au- thorized such use. The Congress should be empowered to terminate such use at any time. 40. By statute, the Executive branch should be prevented from conducting any covert military assistance program (including the indirect or direct provi- sion of military material, military or logistics advice and training, and funds for mercenaries) without the explicit prior consent of the intelligence over- sight committee(s) of Congress. Reorganization of C.I.A. The Position of the D.C.I. The committee recommendations re- garding the Director of Central Intelli- gence would, if implemented, increase his authority over the entire intelli- gence community. Given such increased authority, the committee .believes that both the executive branch and the in- telligence oversight committee(s) of- Congress should give careful consider- ation to removing the D.C.I. from di- rect management responsibility for the Central Intelligence Agency. This would free the D.C.I. to concentrate on his responsibilities with regard to the entire intelligence community and , would remove him from any -conflict of interest in performing that task. It might also increase the accountability of the Central Intelligence Agency by establishing a new and separate senior position?a Director of the Central In- telligence Agency?responsible for only the C.I.A. The Structure of .the The committee believes that several important problems uncovered in the course of this inquiry suggest that serious consideration also be given to major structural change in the C.I.A.? in particular, separating national intel- ligence production and analysis from the clandestine service and other col- lection functions. Intelligence produc- tion could be placed directly under the D.C.T., while clandestine collection of foreign intelligence from human and techrrical sources and covert operations would remain in the C.I.A. Recommendations 41. The intelligence oversight com- mittee(s) of Congress in the course of developing a new charter for the in- telligence community should give con- sideration to separating the functions of the D.C.I. and the Director of the C.I.A. and to dividing the intelligence analysis and production functions from the clandestine collection and covert action functions of the present C.I.A. Relations With United States Institutions and Private Citizens In the immediate .postwar period, as the Communits pressed to influence and to. control international organiza- tions and movements, mass communi- cations, and cultural institutions. the United States responded by involving American private institutions and in- dividuals in the secret struggle over minds, institutions, and ideals. In the process, the C.I.A. subsidized, and even helped develop "private" or nongovern- meat organizations that were designed to compete with Communists around the world. The C.I.A. supported not only foreign organizations, but also the international activities of United States student, labor, cultural, and philan- thropic organizations. - . These covert relationships have at- tracted public concern and this com- mittee's attention because of the im- portance that Americans attach to the independence of these institutions. The committe found that in the past the scale and diversity of these covert actions has been extensive. For opera- tional purposes, the C.I.A. has: ciFunded a special program of a major American business association. 'Collaborated with - an American trade union federation. ? ? Helped to establish a research cen- ter at a major United States university. Supported an international ex- change program sponsored by a group of ? United States universities. cadade widespread use of philan- thropic organizations to fund such co- vert action programs. I. Covert Use of the U.S. Academic Community The Central Intelligence Agency is now using several hundred American academies, who in addition to provid- ing leads and, sometimes making in- troductions for intelligence purposes, occasionally write books and other ma- terial to be used for propaganda pur- poses abroad. Beyond these, an addi- tional few score are used in an unwit- ting manner for minor activities. These academies are located in over 100 American colleges, universities and related institutes. At the majority of institutions, no one other than the in- dividual academic concerned is aware of the C.I.A. link. At the others, at least one university official is aware of the operational use made of academies. on his campus. In addition, there are sev- eral American academies abroad who serve operational purposes, primarily' the collection of intelligence. - ? The C.I.A. gives a high priority to obtaining leads on potential foreign in- telligence sources especially those from Communist countries. This agency's emphasis reflects the fact that many foreign nationals in the United States are in this category. The committee notes that American academies provide valuable assistance in this activity. The committee is concerned, how- ever, that American academies involved in such activities may undermine pub- lic confidence that those that train our youth are upholding the ideals, in- dependence and integrity of American universities. Government Grantees C.I.A. regulations adopted in 1967 prohibit the "operational" use of cer- tain narrow categories of individuals. The C.I.A. is prohibited from using ceiving grants from the Board of For- eign Fellowships under the Fulhright- , Hayes Act. There ir no prohibition on the use of individuals participating in any other federally funded exchange programs. For example, the C.I.A. rimy use those greettes--ertists, specialists. athletes, leade,..s, doitot ri- my ceive their gnints from the Bourd of Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 ' Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-06432R0001004000041-9 Foreign Scholarships.' .The Committee Is concerned that there is no prohibi- tion against exploiting such open Fed-. eral programs. for clandestine purposes. 2. The Covert Use of Books and Publishing Houses The committee has found that the - Central Intelligence Agency attaches a' particular importance to book publish- ing activities as a form of covert prop.. agenda. A former officer in the Clan- destine Service stated that books are? "the most important weapon of stra- tegic (longrange) propaganda." Prior to. 1967, the Central Intelligence Agency sponsored, subsidized or produced over 1,000 books: approvimately 25 percent of them in English. In 1967 alone, the C.I.A. published or subsidized over 200 books, ranging from books on African safaris and wildlief to. translations of Machiavelli's "The Prince" into Swa- hili and works. of T. S. Eliot into Rus- sian, to a competitor to Mao's little red book, which was entitled "Quotations from Chairman Liu." The committee found that an impor- tant number of the books actually pro- duced,by the Central Intelligence Agency were reviewed and marketed in the' United States. 3. Domestic "Fallout" ? The committee finds that covert media operations can result in manipu- lating or incidentally misleading the American public. Despite efforts to minimize it, C.I.A. employees, past and present; have conceded that there is no way to shield the American public completely from "fallout" in the United States from agency propaganda or placements overseas. Indeed, following the Katzenbach inquiry, the Deputy Director for Operations issued a direc- tive stating: "Fallout in the United States from a foreign publication which, we support is inevitable and conse- quently permissible." The domestic fallout of covert propa- ganda comes from many sources: books intended primarily for an English-speak- ing foreign audience, C.I.A. press place- ments that are picked up by an interna- tional wire service, and publications resulting from direct C.I.A. .funding of foreign institutes.- For example, a book written for an English-speaking foreign audience by one C.I.A. operative was reviewed . favorably by another C.I.A. agent in The New York Times. 4. Covert Use of American Religious Personnel - The committee has found that over the years the C.I.A. has used very few. religious personnel for operational pur- poses. The C.I.A. informed the com- mittee that only 21 such individuals have ever participated in either covert action projects or the clandestine col- lection of intelligence. On Feb, 10, 1976, the C.I.A. announced: "C.I.A.. has no secret paid or contractual relationships with any American clergyman or mis- siona-y. This practice will be continued as a matter of policy." - The committee welcomes this policy with the understanding that the prohi- bition against all "paid or contractual relationships" is in fact -a prohibition' against any operational use of all Americans following a religious vocation. Recommendations In its consideration of the recom." mendations that follow, the committee' noted the Central Intelligence Agency'a concern that further restrictionon the use of Americans for operational pur- poses will constrain current operating programs. The committee recognizes that there may be at least some short- term operational losses if the commit- tee recommendations are effected, At the same time, the committee believes that there are certain American institu- tions whose integrity is critical to the maintenance of a free society and which should therefore be free of any un- witting role in the -clandestine service of the United States Government. 42. The committee is concerned about the integrity of American academic institutions and the use of individuals ? affiliated with such institutions for clandestine purposes. Accordingly, the committee recommends that the C.I.A. amend its internal directives to require that individual academics used for op- erational purposes by the C.I.A., to- gether with the 'President or equivalent official of the relevant academic in- stitutions, be informed of the clan- destine C.I.A. relationship. 43. The committee furtherrecom- mends that, as soon as possible, the permanent intelligence oversight corn-; mittee(s) of Congress examine whether' further steps are needed to insure the integrity of American academic insti- tutions. 44. By statute, the C.I.A. should be *prohibited front the operational use of grantees who are receiving funds through educational and/or cultural programs which are sponsored by the United States Government. 45. By statute. the C.I.A. should be prohibited from subsidizing the writing, or production for distribution within the United States or its territories, of any .book, magazine, article, publication, film, or video or audio tape unless publicly attributed to the C.I.A. Nor should the C.I.A. be permitted to under- take any activity to accomplish indi- rectly such distribution within the United States or its territories: ? 46. The committee supports the re-' cently adopted C.I.A. prohibitions against any paid or contractual rela- tionship between the agency and US. 'and foreign journalists accredited tcr U.S. media organizations. The C.I.A.' prohibitions should, however, be estab- lished in law. ? ? ? ? 47. The committee recommends that. the C.I.A. prohibitions be extended by ;Jaw, to include the operational use of any person who regularly contributes material to, or is regularly involved directly or indirectly in the editing of: material, or regularly acts to set policy. or provide direction to the activities of -U.S. media organizations. 48. The committee recommends that the agency's recent prohibition on ? covert paid or contractual relationship between the agency and any American clergyman or missionary should be es- tablished by law. Proprietaries and Cover Proprietary Organizations C.I.A. proprietaries are business en- tities wholly owned by the agency which do business, or only appear to. do business, under commercial guise. They are part of the "arsenal of tools" of the C.I.A.'s Clandestine Services: They have been used for espionage as well as covert action. Most of the" larger proprietaries have been used for paramilitary purposes. The committee finds that too often large proprietaries 11 have created unwarranted risks of un- fair competition with private business and of compromising their cover as clandestine operations. For example, Air America, which at one time had as many as 8,000 employees, ran into both difficulties. While internal C.I.A. financial con- trols have been regular and systematic, the committee found a need for even greater accountability both internally and externally. Generally, those auditing of the -C.I.A. have been denied access to operational information, making management-oriented audits impossible. Instead, audits have been concerned only with financial security and in- tegrity. The committee found that the C.I.A.'s Inspector General has, on occasion, been denied access to certain informa- tion regarding proprietaries. This has sometimes inhibited the ability of the inspector office to serve the function for which it was established. Moreover, the General Accounting Office has not audited these operations. The lack of ,review, by either the G.A.O. or the C.I.A. Inspector General's office, means that, in essence, there has been no out- side review of proprietaries. One of the largest current proPrie- taries is an insurance-investment com- plex established in 1962 to provide pen- sion annuities, insurance and escrow management for those who, for security reasons, could not receive them directly from U.S. Government The committee determined that the Congress was not ' informed of the existence of this propri- ' etary until "sometime" after it had been made operational and had invested heavily in the domestic steck markets?, a practice the , C.I.A.. has discontinued. Moreover, once this proprietary was re- -moved frem . the Domestic Operations Division and placed under the General Counsel's office it received- no annual C.I.A. project review. The record establishes that on occa- sion the insurance-investment complex ?had been used 'to provide operational support to various covert 'action pro- jects. The Inspector General, in 1970, criticized this use of the complex. be- cause it threatened to compromise the security of the complex's primary in- surance objectives. ? Cover The committee examined cover . be- cause it is an important aspect of all C.I.A. clandestine activities. Its im- portance is underscored, by the tragic ,murder of . a C.I.A. station chief in Greece, coupled with continuing dis- closures of C.I.A. agents' names. The ;committee sought to determine what, if 'anything, has been done in the past to strengthen cover, and what should be done in the future. ? -The committee found conflicting views about what constitutes cover; , what it can do, and what should be done to improve it. A 1970 C.I.A. in- spector general report termed the. agency's concept and use of cover to be lax, arbitrary, uneven, confused, and loose. The present cover staff in the C.I.A. considered the 1970 asses- meat to be simplistic and overly harsh. There is no question, however, that . some improvements and changes, are needed. The committee finds that there is a' basic tension between maintaining' adequate cover and effectively engaging in overseas intelligence' activities. Al- Most every operational act by a C.I.A. officer under cover in the field?from working with local inteiligence and- poliCe to attempting to recruit agents: Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 ?reveals his true purpose and chips away at his cover. Some forms of cover do not provide concealment hut offer a certain degree of deniability. Others are se siaborate that they limit the amount of work an officer can do for the C.I.A: In carrying out their responsibilities. C.I.A. officers generally regard the maintenance of cover as a "nuisance." The situation of the Athens station chief, Richard Welch, illustrates the. problem* of striking the right balance between cover and operations, and also the transparency of cover. Ase the chief of the C.I.A.'s cover staff stated, by the time a person becomes chief of station; "there is not a great deal Of cover left. The chief of the cover staff iden- tified terrorism as a further security problem for officers overseas, one that is aggravated by the erosion of cover. Recommendations 49;By statute, the C.I.A. should be permitted to use proprietaries subject to . external and internal controls. , 50. The committee recommends that the intelligence oversight committee(s) of Congress require at least an annual report on all proprietaries. The report should include a statement of each proprietary's nature and function, the results of internal annual C.I.A. audits, a list of all C.I.A. intercessions on be- half of its proprietaries with any other United States Government departments, agencies or bureaus, and such other information as the oversight committee deems appropriate. 5L The intelligence oversight Corn- mittee(s) of Congress shOuld require' that' the fiscal impact of proprietaries' on the C.I.A.'s budget be made clear in the D.C.I.'s annual report to the oversight committee. The committee should also establish guidelines for creating large proprietaries, should these become necessary.. . 52. By statute, all returns' of funds from proprietaries not needed for its operational purposes or because of liquidation or termination of a pro7. prietary, should be remitted to the United. States Treasury as Miscellaneous Receipts. . . The Department of Justice should be consulted during the .process of the sale or disposition of any C.I.A. pro- prietary. 53. By statute, former senior gov- ernment officials should. be prohibited from negotiating with the CIA: or any other agency regarding the disposal of proprietaries. The intelligence oversight' committees of Congress should con- sider whether other activities among agencies of the intelligence community, the C.I.A. and former officials and em- ployees, such as selling to or negotiat- ing contracts with the C.I.A., should also be prohibited as is the case re- garding military officials under 18 U.S.C. 207, Intelligence Liaison Throughout the entire period of the C.I.A.'s history, the agency has en- tered into liaison agreements with the intelligence services of foreign powers. Such arangemeros are an extremely im- portant and delicate source of intel- ligence and operational support.. Intel- ligence channels can also be used to negotiate agreement outside the field of intelligence. The committee notes that all treaties require the advice and consent of the Senate, and executive agreements must be reported to the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate. Because of the importance of intelligence liaison agreements to na- tional security, the committee is con- cerned that Such' 'agreements have 'not been systematically reviewed by' the Congress in any fashion. .Recommendations 54. By statute, the C.I.A. should be prohibited from causing, funding, or encouraging actions by liaison services which are forbidden to the C.I.A. Furthermore, the fact that a particular project, action, or activity of the C.I.A. is carried out through or by a foreign liaison service should not relieve the agency of its responsibilities for clear- ance within-the agency, within the ex-. ecutive branch, or with the Congress. 55. The intelligence oversight corn- mittees of Congress should be kept fully informed of agreements negotiated with other governments through intel- ligence channels. The General Counsel and Inspector General The general counsel,- as ,chief legal officer of' the Central Intelligence Agen- cy, has a special role in insuring that C.I.A. activities are consistent ''with the Constitution and laws of the.United States. The committee found that, in the past, the -participatien of the general counsel in determining. the 'legality or propriety of C.I.A. activities was limited; in many instances the.general counsel was not consulted- aboutsensitive projects. In some cases the 'director's investigative arm, the' inspectorgeneral; discovered questionable activities often were not referred to the general counsel for a legal .opinion. Moreover, the 'gen- eral counsel never had general investi- gatory authority.. , ., . The committee believes that the in: telligence oversight committee(s). - of Congress should examine the internal review mechanisms of foreign.- and military intelligence agencies' and con-; skier' the feasibility' ofapplying recom-i mendations such as those suggested fot ? the C.I.A. , ,Recommendations - 56. Any ',C.I.A. employee having 144. formation about activities which appear: illegal, improper, outside the agency's, legislative charter, or in violation oil. agency regulations, should be required_ to inform, the director, the general-, counsel, or the inspector general of the agency. If .the general counsel is not: informed,. he should be notified by the other officials of such' reports. The general counsel-and the -inspector gen- eral shall, except where they deem'it: inappropriate; be required* to provideo.-- such information to the head of the agency. . 57: The D.C.I.'sheuld be required ?tri report any information regarding ent!-' ployee violations of law related to their' duties and the results of any internal agency investigation to the Attorney' General. . ' 58. By statute, the director of the: C.I.A. should be required to notify the'. appropriate committee of the. Congress. of any referrals made to the Attorney General pursuant to the previous recd ommendation. 59. The director of the: C.I.A. shOuld'I periodically require employees having any information on past, current, or". proposed agency activities which op-, pear illegal, improper, outside ilia, agency's legislative charter, or in vie-4 lation of the agency's regulations, to! report such information., 12 6b. By statute, the general counsel_ and the inspector general should have' unrestricted access to all agency ine' formation and should have the aulhori--' ty to review all of the agency activitieS:; 61. All significant proposed C.I.A. ae- tivities should be: reviewed by the' general counsel for legality and consti- tutionality. 62.. The program of-component in-.. spections conducted by the inspector, general should be increased, as should. the program of surveys of sensitive; programs and issues which. cut .across' component lines, in the Agency. . 63. The director shall, at least an-;. nually, report to the appropriate come. mittees of the Congress on the activities' of the office of the general counsel: and' the office of the inspector general. . 64. By statute, the general counsel 'should be nominated by .the President- and confirmed by the Senate. ? 65. The agency's efforts to expand: and. strengthen the staffs' of the gen- eral. counsel and inspector _ general- should be continued. ' 66. The general counsel should he promoted to, and the inspector general. should continue to hold executive rank. equal to that of the deputy. directors: of the C.I.A. ? . The Department of Defense General Findings nd Conclusions , The.committee finds that despite the; 'Magnitude of the tasks. and the .com-. -plexity of the relationships, most of. the important .collection con. ducted by the Defense Department (the:. reconnaissance and SIGINT- systems) are managed 'relatively- efficiently and 'are generally responsive to the needs of the military services- as well as to, the policy makers on the national leveLg Defense intelligence .must respond to a range of consumers?policymakers Washington, defense and technical ana? lysts, and operational commanders the field?yet, the primary mission of, defense intelligence is .-to supply the r armed services with the intelligence. . necessary for their operations. This overriding departmental requirement creates a major problem in the over-all, allocation of intelligence resources' throughout the intelligence community. In promulgating Executive order 11905, the Administration has decided on a greater centralization. of authority in, the Director of Central Intelligence. The committee notes that this will require some changes in the Secretary of De? ,fense's authority over allocating defense ? intelligence resources. With regard to' :intelligence resources management within the Department of Defense, the icommittee found that the establishment '.:of a Deputy Secretary of Defense for .Intelligence should enable more effec- tive management of defense intelligence ..resources and help the Defense Depart- :ment play an appropriate role in the knew 'centralized interagency structure :,under the Director of Central Inteili- v..en,igIncreasingly, technological intelli- gence systems have grown capable of -serving both the interest of national Zpolicymakers and planners and of field ; commanders. Thus, it is often difficult to distinguish between "national" and 7"tactical" intelligence assets, collection ;Or prodUction. It is the committee's 'view that while the effect of the Presi- :dent's Executive order giving the D.C.1. More authority will be to bring national intelligence assets and budgets under the D.C.1.'s 'control and guidance, the Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 4efense intelligence prograins which are %tectical in nature and integral to the 'military's operational cOmmands should remain under the control of the Secre- tary of Defense. The precise line drawn between the tactical and military intelli- gence at any given time will have a 'significant impact on the definition of 'xiational intelligence and on the pur- 'view of any oversight committee of angress. :The Defense .Intelligence ? Agency Historically, DOD has managed the bulk of all technical intelligence collec- tion systems, but the C.I.A. has man- ged many important national technical collection systems and has been in charge of much of the analytic function ? and is the primary producer of national Intelligence. The largest proportion of intelligence needed by the military es- tablishment, however, is tactical. There- fore, national intelligence is a second- ary mission of D.I.A. Much of D.I.A.'s .:effort is directed toward producing Tintelligence needed by the J.C.S., the 'United and Specified Commands, and ?force planners and technical analysts in the-services. The Secretary of Defense, on the other hand, is equally or more 'Concerned with national intelligence. In th? is context, it is not surprising that 'DOD's civilian leadership has comple- thiented D.I.A.'s product with analyses from sources in other agencies. 'he National Security ? -Agency ".z The National Security Agency is one ?of the largest and most technically ori- -ented components of the United States ?intelligence community. Its basic' func- ation is collecting and processing foreign 'communications and signals for intelli- ?gence purposes. N.S.A. is also respon- sible for creating and supervising the 'cryptography of all United States Gov- ;Trtiment agencies, and has a special 'responsibility for supervising thn mili- lary services' cryptologic anncies. ..Another major responsibility is pro- "tecting the security of American coin- Immications. ,The. committee regards these func- ,tions as vital to American security. capability to perform these 4unctions must be preserved. The com- mittee notes that despite the fact that N.S.A. has been 'in existence for several ,decades, N.S.A. still lacks a legislative :pharter. Moreover, in its extensive in- vestigation, the committee has identi- ,fted intelligence community abuses in -levying requirements on N.S.A. and -abuses by N.S.A. itself in carrying out ,its functions. The committee finds that .there is a compelling need for an N.S.A. Acharter to spell out limitations which will protect individual constitutional -tights without impairing N.S.A.'s neces- sary foreign intelligence mission. .1: .`.Recommendations '67. In order to implement the corn- enittee's and the President's recom- , mendations for expanding the D.C.I.'s -resource allocation responsibility, ap- propriate adjustments should be made ? the Secretary of Defense's general authority regarding defense intelligence -activities and in the department's inter- -nal budgeting procedures. At the same :lime, there should be provision for the 'transfer to the Secretary of Defense of responsibilities, particularly tasking in- etelligence agencies, in the event of war. ivs 6R. By statute, the intelligence over- sight committee (s) of Congress. in con- tultation with the executive, should es- tablish a charter for the Defense Intel- ligence Agency which would clearly de- -fine its mission and relationship to other 'intelligence agencies. The committee recommends that the charter include ithe following provisions: A. In order to encourage close coor- dination between consumers and pro- ducers of national intelligence, D.I.A. should be a part of the office of the 5Secretary of Defense and should report directly to the Deputy Secretary of De- fense for Intelligence. A small J-2 staff should be constituted to provide intel- 4igence support, primarily of an opera- tional nature, to the Joint Chiefs of -Staff. The Secretary of Defense should insure full coordination and free access to information between the two groups. ? B. The Director of the D.I.A. should be appointed by the President and sub- ject to Senate confirmation. Either the director or deputy director of the agency :should be a civilian. C. The Congress must relieve D.I.A. from certain civil service regulations in 'order to enable the quality of D.I.A. personnel to be upgraded. In addition, lnore supergrade positions must be pro- vided for civilians in D.I.A. : 69. By statute, a charter for the National Security Agency should be es- lablished which, in addition to setting limitations on the agency's operations, would provide that the Director of ?N.S.A. would be nominated by the -'President and subject to confirmation elly the Senate. The director should 'serve at the pleasure of the President, abut for uot more than 10 years. Either ethe director or the deputy director should be a civilian. " 70. The Department of Defense -Should centralize the service counterin- telligence and investigative activities within the United States in the Defense Investigative Service in order to reduce wasteful duplication. The Department of State and Ambassadors .. The Department of State and the Foreign Service have an important role in the intelligence operations of the United States Government. Because of ? its responsibilities in formulating and conducting U.S. foreign policy, the State Department is a principal cus- tomer for intelligence. Abroad, the For- eign Service, operating overtly, is the principal collector of political intelli- gence and is a major collector of eco- nomic intelligence. ? Because of its foreign policy responsi- bilities and its worldwide complex of diplomatic and consular installations, the Department of State is the only Washington agency potentially able to oversee other U.S. Government activi- ties abroad ? including those of the C.I.A. In the field, this responsibility clearly falls on the ambassador by law. Indeed, ambassadors are the sole Mechanism available outside of the C.I.A. itself to assure that N.S.C. deci- sionr are appropriately carried out by the Clandestine Service. The committee found that the role of the Department of State and the ambassadors consti- tute a central element in the control and improvement in America's intelli- gence operations overseas. However, the committee also found that ambassa- dors are often reluctant to exercise their authority in intelligence matters. The department has not encouraged them to do so, and the Administration has not issued directives to implement 13 .existing law covering the authority of ambassadors. In contrast to covert action, the com- mittee found that neither the State De- ? partment nor U.S. ambassadors are substantially informed about espionage or counterintelligence activities di- rected at foreign governments. Such co- ordination as exists in this respect is at the initiative of the Central Intelligence Agency and is infrequent. The commit- tee found that there is no systematic assessment ?outside the C.I.A. of the risks of foreign espionage and counter- espionage operations and the extent to which those operations conform with overall foreign policy. In general, ambassadors in the field are uninformed about specific espionage activities within their countries of as- signment. Unlike the case of covert ac- tion, ambassadors are not asked to ap- praise the risks of espionage activities, nor to assess their benefits. Often am- bassadors do not want to know the specifics of such operations, and what coordination as exists in their cases is based on a general injunction from them to the station chiefs that they not be confronted with any "surprises.? That is not always enough if an am- bassador wishes to participate in policy decisions. For example, a shift of re- sources toward recruitment of internal targets in a Western country was under consideration between Washington and the field, and the U.S. ambassador had not been informed. In this connection, the committee believes it would be un- realistic to use clandestine recruitment to try to establish the kind of intimate relationship with political elites in friendly countries which we have en- joyed as a result of the shared experi- ente of WWII and its aftermath. The committee finds that more than a year after enactment of a statute making ambassadors responsible for di- recting, coordinating and supervising all U. S. Government employees within their country of assignment, instruc- tions implementing this law have still not been issued by any quarter of the executive branch. A former Under Sec- retary of State told the Committee that the law, in effect, had been "suspended" in- view of Presidential inaction, More- over, the C.I.A. has not modified its practices pursuant to this law. The com- mittee finds this thwarting of the Unit- ed States law unacceptable. The committee finds that ambas- sadors cannot effectively exercise their legal responsibilities for a wide variety of intelligence activities within their jurisdiction without State Department assistance on the Washington aspects of the activities. Such support is partic- ? ularly important in the case of intel- ligence operations aimed at a third country. An ambassador may be able to judge the local risks of an espio- nage effort, but if it is directed toward a third country the ambassador may not be able to assess the importance or value of the effort without Washing- -ton support. At present, the C.I.A. handles both State Department and its own commu- nications with overseas posts. Under this arrangement, the ambassador's ac- cess to C.I.A. communications is at the discretion of the C.I.A. The committee finds that this is not compatible with the role assigned to the ambassador by law: the ambassador cannot be sure that he knows the full extent and na- ture of C.I.A. operations for which he may be held accountable. The committee finds that amhassa- dors'- policies governing intelligence ac- tivities have sometimes been interpreted in a manner which vitiated their intent. For exampe, one ambassador prohibited any electronic surveillance by his em- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 bassy's C.I.A. component. * The head of the C.I.A. component interpreted this to proscribe ony C.I.A. electronic sur- veillance and beieved that such surveil- lance?could be conducted in cooperation. with local security services. The committee found evidence that C.I.A. station chiefs abroad do not al- ways reerdinate their intelligence re- porting on local developments with their ambassadors. The committee does not believe that ambassadors should be able to block C.I.A. field reports. How- ever, it found that there was no stand- ard practice for ambassadors to review and comment on intelligence reporting from the field. The committee finds that the Foreign Setwice is the foremost producer in the United States Government of intelli- gence on foreign political and economic matters. The committee believes, how- ever, that the State Department does , not adequately train Foreign Service personnel, particularly in political re- porting. Nor does the department fund their collection operations, nor manage their activities so as to take full advan- tage of this extremely important intel- ligence capability. In effect, the depart- ment, despite being a major source of intelligence, considers this function sec- ondary to its principal task of diplo- matic representation and negotiations. ? From discussions in nearly a dozen Foreign Service posts, the committee established that there is inadequate funding for Foreign Service reporting officers to carry out their responsibili- ties. The funds available are considered "representation funds" and must be shared with the administration and con- sular sections of most embassies. Such representation funds have been a favor- ite target for Congressional cuts in the? State Department budget. Recommendations 71. The National Security Council, the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency should promptly issue instructions implementing Public Law 93-475 (22 U.S.C. 2680a). These instructions should make clear that ambassadors are authorized recipients of sources and methods information concerning all intelligence activities, including espionage and counterintelli- gence. operations. Parallel instructions from other components of the intelli- gence community should .be issued to their respective field organizations and 'operatives. Copies of all these instruc- tions should be made available to the intelligence oversight committee(s) of Congress. 72. In the exercise of their statutory responsibilities, ambassadors should have the personal right, which may not be delegated, of access to the operation- al communications of the C.I.A.'s Clan- destine Service in the country to which they are assigned. Any exceptions should have Presidential approval and should be brought to the attention of the intelligence oversight committees of Congress. . 73. By statute, the Department of State should be authorized to take the necessary steps to assure its ability to provide effective guidance and support to ambassadors in the execution of their responsibilities under Public Law 93-475 (22 U.S.C. Sect. 2680a). 74. Consideration should be given to increasing and earmarking funds for Foreign Service overt collection of for, eign political and economic information. These funds might be administered jointly by the State Department's Bu- reau of Intelligence and Research and the Bureau of Economic Affairs. 75. The N.S.C. should review the question of which U.S. Government agency should control and operate coin munications with overseas diplomatic and consular posts, including the C.I.A. and other civilian agencies operating abroad. 76. The Department of State should establish specific training programs for political reporting within the Foreign Service Institute, and place greater emphasis on economic reporting. Oversight and the Intelligence Budget The cqmmitte finds that a full under- standing of the budget of the intelli- gence community is required for effec- tive oversight. The secrecy surrounding the budget, however, makes it impos- sible for Congress as a whole to make use -4 this valuable oversight tool. Congress as a body has never ex- plicitly voted on a "budget" for national intelligence activities. Congress has never voted funds specifically for C.I.A., N.S.A., and other national intelligence instrumentalities of the Department of Defense. The funding levels for these intelli- gence agencielare fixed by subcommit- tees of the ArMed Services and Appro- priations Committees of both houses. Funds for these agencies are then con- cealed in the budget of the Department of Defense. Since this departmental is the budget is the one Congress ap- proves, Congress as a whole, and the public, have never known how much the intelligence agencies are spending or how much is spent on itifelligelice activities generally. Neither Congress as a whole nor the public can determine whether the amount spent on intelli- gence, or by the intelligence agencies individually, is appropriate given the priorities. 'Because the funds for intelligence are concealed in defense appropriations those appropriations are thereby in- flated..Most members of Congress and the public can neither determine which categories are inflated nor the extent to which funds in the inflated catego- ries are being used for purposes for which they are approved. Finally, the committee believes there is serious question as to whether the present system of complete secrecy vio- lates the constitutional provision that:. "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in Consequence of Appro- priations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time." The committee believes that the over- all figure for national intelligence ac- tivities can ? be. made public annually without endangering national security or revealing sensitive programs. The committee carefully examined the pos- sible impact of such disclosure on the sources and methods of intelligence gathering and believes it to be minimal. The committee found that the primary concern about this level of disclosure was that it would lead to pressure for even more detailed revelation which would compromise vital intelligence programs. The committee believes that disclo- sure of an aggregate figure for national intelligence is as far as it is prudent to go at this stage in reconciling the nation's constitutional and national se.. curity requirements. Public speculation about overall intelligence costs would be eliminated, the public would be as- sured that funds appropriated to par- ticular goveinment agencies were In fact intended for those agencies, and both Congress and the public would be 14 able to assess overall priorities in gov- ernmental spending. Recommendations 77. The intelligence oversight com- mittee(s) of Congress should authorize on an annual basis a "National Intelli- gence Budget," the total amount of which would be made public. The com- mittee recommends that the oversight committee consider whether it is nec- essary, given the constitutional require- ment and the national security de- mands, to publish more detailed budgets. ? 78. The intelligence oversight com- mittee(s) of Congress should monitoi the tactical and indirect support ac- counts as well as the national activities of intelligence agencies in order to assure that they are kept in proper per- spective and balance, 79. At the request of the intelligence oversight committee(s) of Congress and as its agent., staff members of the Gen- eral Accounting Office should conduct full audits, both for compliance and for management of all components of the? intelligence community. The G.A.O. shoud establish such procedures, coin- partmentation and clearances as are necessary in order to conduct these au- dits on a secure basis. In conducting such audits, the G.A.O. should be au- thorized to have all access to all nec- essary files and records of the intelli- gence community. Chemical and Biological Agents and the Intelligence Community The committee investigated the test- ing .and use of chemical and biological agents by agencies within the intelli- gence community. The testing programs originated in response to fears that countries hostile to the United States would use chemical and biological agents against Americans or our allies. Initially, this fear led to defensive pro- grams. Soon this defensive orientation became secondary as the possibility of using these chemical and biological agents to obtain information from, or to gain control of, enemy agents be- came apparent. The committee found that United States intelligence agencies engaged in research and development programs to discover materials which could be used to alter human behavior. As part of this. effort, testing programs were instituted, first involving witting human subjects. Later, drugs were surreptitiously admin- istered to unwitting human subjects. The agency considered the testing programs highly sensitive. The commit- tee found that few people within the agencies knew about them: There is no evidence that Congress was informed about them. These programs were kept from the American public because, as the inspector general of the C.I.A. wrote, "the knowledge that the agency is engagink in unethical and illicit activ- ities would have serious repercussions in political and diplomatic circles and would be detrimental to the accomplish- ment of its [C. J. A.'s] mission." ? The research and development pro- gram and particularly the testing pro- gram involving unwitting human sub- jects involved massive abridgements of the rights of individuals, sometimes with tragic consequences. The deaths of two Americans resulted from these pro- grams; other participants in the leting programs still suffer residual effects. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 AppeoVecLFor Releate 2001108/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9- While some' controlled testing for de- fensive purposes might be defended, the nature of the tests, their scale, and the fact that they were continued for years after it was known that the surrepti- tious administration of LSD to unwitting subjects was dangerous, indicate a dis- regard for human life and liberty. - The committee also found that with- in the intelligence community there were destructive jurisdictional conflicts over drug testing. Military testers with. held information from the C.I.A., ignor- ing their superiors' suggestions for co- ordination. The C.I.A. similarly failed to provide information on its programs to the military. In one case the military attempted to conceal their overseas op- erational testing of LSD from the C.I.A. and the C.I.A. attempted surreptitiously to discover the details of the military's program. Recommendations 80. The C.I.A. and other foreign and foreign military intelligence agencies should not engage in experimentation on human subjects utilizing any drug, device or procedure which is designed, intended, or is reasonably likely to harm the physical or mental health of the human subject, except with the informed consent in writing, witnessed by a disinterested third party, of each human subject, and in accordance With the guidelines issued by the National Commission for the Protection of Hu- man Subjects for Biomedical and Be- havioral Research. Further, the juris- diction of the commission should be amended to include the Central Intel- ligence Agency and the other intelli- gence agencies of. the United States Government. 81. The Director of the Central In- telligence Agency and the Secretary of Defense should continue to make de- termined efforts to locate those in- dividuals involved in human testing of chemical and biological agents and to provide follow-up examinations and treatment, if necessary. General Recommendations 82. Internal Regulations ? Internal C.I.A. directives or regulations regard- ing significant agency policies and pro- cedures should be waived only with the explicit written approval of the Director of Central Intelligence. Waiver of .any such regulation or directive should in no way violate .any law or infringe on the constitutional right and freedom of any citizen. If the D.C.I. ap- proves the waiver or amendment of any significant regulation or directive, the N.S.C. and the appropriate Congres- sional oversight committee(s) should be notified immediately. Such notifica- tion should be accompanied by a state- ment explaining the reasons for the waiver or amendment. 83. Security Clearances?In the course of its investigation, the come mittee found that because of the many intelligence agencies participating in security clearance investigations, cur- rent security clearance procedures in- volve, duplication of effort, waste of money and inconsistent patterns of in- vestigation and standards. The intelli- gence oversight committee(s) of Con- gress, in consultation with the intelli- gence community, should consider framing standard security clearance procedures for all civilian intelligence agencies and background checks for Congressional committees when secur- ity clearances are required. 84. Personnel Practices?The corn. mittei found that intelligence agency, training programs fail to instruct per- sonnel adequately on the legal limita- tions and. prohibitions applicable to in- telligence activities The committee recommends that theee training pro- grams should he expanded to include.. review of constitutional, statutory, and regulatory provisions in an effort, to heighten awareness among all intelli- gence personnel concerning the poten- tial effects intelligence activities may have on citizens' legal rights. ? ; . . 85. Security Functions of the Intelli- gence Agencies?The committee found that the security components of intelli- gence agencies sometimes :engaged ;,,in law enforcement activities. Some of these activities may have been unlawe fut. Intelligence agencies' Accurity functions should be limited toTrotect- 'big the agencies personnel and facili- ties, and lawful activities and to as- suring that intelligence personnel fol- low, proper security practices. 86. Secrecy and Authorized Disclos- ure?The committee has received vari- ous Administration proposals that would require persons having access to classified and sensitive informatitin to maintain the secrecy of that infor- mation. The committee recommends that the issues raised by these pro- posals be considered by the new legis- lative intelligence oversight committees of Congress and that, in recasting the 1947 National Security Act and in con- sultation with the executive branch, the overhight committees - consider the wisdom of new secrecy and disclosure legislation. In the view of the commit- tee any such consideration should in- clude carefully defining the following terms: national secrets; sources and methods; lawful and unlawful classifi- cation; lawful and unlawful disclosure. The new legislation should provide civil and/or criminal Penalties for un- lawful classification and unlawful'dis- closure. The statute should also pro- vide for internal departmental?ap4 NEW YORK TIMES 27 April 1976 3 SENATORS SCORE C.I.A. OVER REPORT Some Security Objections Are Called Outlandish WASHINGTON, April 26 (AP) ?The Central Intelligence Agency used national security arguments to strip the final re- port of the Senate Intelligence Committee of any data that might embarrass or inconve- nience it, three members of the committee said today. "Some of the so-called secur- ity objections of the C.I.A. were so outlandish they were dis- missed out of hand," the'three Senators said. They said that the agency vented to eiiminate any refer- ence :to the Bay of Pigs as a paramilitary operation, and to delete any reference to C.I.A. 'activities in Laos "and they , wanted the committee to excise itestimony given in public be- fore the television cameras." They said that in some cases 15 agency procedures for employees who believe that classification and/or dis- closure procedures are being improp- erly or illegally used to report such he- -lief. There should also be a statutery procedure whereby an employee who has used the agency channel to no avail can report such belief without im- punity to an "authorized" institutional group outside the agency. The telligence Oversight Board is one such group. The intelligence oversight com- mittee(s) of Congress would be an; other. The statute should specify ,that revealing classified information inethe course .of reporting information to an authorized group would not constitute unlawful disclosure of classified jam- mation. i.e., 87. Federal Register for Classified Executive Orders?In the course of its investigation, the committee often' he'd difficulty locating classified orders, di- rectives, instructions, and regulations issued by various elements of the ex- ecutive branch. Access to these order's by the intelligence oversight commit- tee(s) of Congress is essential to in- formed oversight of the intelligence community. The committee recommends' that a Federal Register for classified execu- tive orders be established, by' statute. The statute should require the registry, under appropriate security procedures, of all executive orders?however they are labeled--concerning the intelligence activities of the United States. Among the documents for which registry in 'the Classified Federal Register should be required are all National Security Council Intelligence Directives and all Director of Central Intelligence Dime-. tives. Provision should he made for ac- cess to classified executive orders by the intelligence oversight committee(s) of Congress. Classified executive orders would not be lawful until filed with the registry, although there should- be pro- vision for immediate implementation. in emergency situations with prompt sale- sequent registry required. other -requested deletions mere clearly justified on securijy grounds. They said that in some cases other requested deletions were clearly justified on security grounds. "But in other cases, the C.I.A. in our view used 'the classifica- tion stamp not for security, but to censor material that would be embarrassing, inconvenient or likely to provoke an adverse: public reaction to C.I.A. activi- ties." the Senators said. The three Senators are Philip A. Hart of Michigan, Walter F. Mondale of Minnesota andl Gary Hart of Colorado, all De- mocrats. They said that in preparing' the report the committee "benti over backwards" to insure thati no intelligence sources, -met- hods or other classifid matte ials were disclosed. But they said that in a num- bet of complicated areas the committee's concern "enabled the C.I.A. to use the clearance process to alter the report to the point where some of its most important implications are either lost or obscured in i vague language." ,e Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 THE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY APRIL 29 1976 CERPTS FROM SENATE'S INTELLIGENCE ?REPORT Seeetal be 'Me New York Tletes ? WASHINGTON, April 28?Following are excerpts from "Intelligence .Activities and the Rights of Americans," the final report of the Senate Select committee on Intelligence Activities. I., ? The constitutional system of checks and balances has not adequately Con- trolled intelligence activities. Until re- cently the executive branch has neither delineated the scope of permissible ac- tivities nor established procedures for supervising intelligence agencies, Con- gress has failed to exercise sufficient Oversight, seldom questioning the use rto which its appropriations were being pt. Most domestic Intelligence issues ;hive not reached the courts, and in ?,those cases when they have reached Yhe courts, the judiciary has been re- Atuctant to grapple with them. Each of these points is briefly. illus- trated below. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 1. The Number of .., People Affected by. Domestic Intelligence. :...; Activity - ti-? . '.United States intelligence agencies have investigated a vast number of American citizens and domestic organi- zations: F.B.I. headquarters alone has developed over 500,000 domestic intel- ligence files, and 'these have been aug- mented by additional files at F.B.I. field Offices. The F.B.I. opened 65,000 of These domestic intelligence files in 1972 alone. In fact, substantially more indi- iidnals and groups are subject to Intelligence scrutiny than the number f files would appear to indicate since, typically, each domestic intelligence file c,ontains information on more than one individual or group, and this informa- tion is readily retrievable through. the F.B.I. General Name Index. The number . of Americans and 'dainestic groups caught in the domes- tic intelligence net is further illustrated by the following statistics: e Nearly a. quarter of a million first class letters were opened and photo- graphed in the United States by the q.I.A. between 1953-1973. producing a q.LA. computerized index of nearly one and one-half million names. 1 At least 300,000 individuals were in- ikexed in a C.I.A. computer system and Oparate files were created on approxi- rptely 7,200 Americans and over 100 domestic groups during the course of c.I.A.'s Operation CHAOS (1967-1973). from, of private telegrams sent to or through the United States were obtained by the National Security 4gency front 1947 to 1975 under a siecret arrangement with three United ates telegraph companies, , An estimated 100,000 Americans were the subjects of United States t e ym.idntie,1116ircenfdilelsuctreated between.. 1' Intelligence files on more than 11,000 tIdividuals and groups were created by e Internal Revenue Service between 1969 and 1973. and tax investigations. were started on the basis of political rather than tax criteria. . At least 26,000 individuals were at ,one point catalogued on an F.B.I. list' of persons to be rounded up in the event of a "national emergency." 2. Too Much F Information , Is Collected for i Too Long ?Intelligence agencies 'have ' collected vaSt, amounts of information. about the intimate details of citizens' lives and about their participation in legal and peeceful political activities. The targets of, intelligence activity have included pcilitical adherents of the right and the left, ranging froth: activist to casual s4pporters. Investigations have been directed against proponents of racial Ulises. and women's rights, otitsPoken atiostles of nonviolence and rracial liar- mpny; establishment politicians; relig- ious groups, and advocates of new. life sqrles. The 'widespread targeting of citizens and domestic groups and the excessive scope of the collection of information is illustrated by the follow- ing examples: (a) The women's liberation move- ment was infiltrated by informants who collected material about the move- ment's policies, leaders and individual ,members. One report included the name. of every woman who attended, meet- ings, and another stated that each woman at . a meeting had described "how she felt oppressed, sexually or otherwise." Another report concluded that the movement's purpose was to "free women from the humdrum existence of being only a wife and ? mother," but still recommended that the intelligence investigation should be continued. (b) A prominent civil rights leader land adviser to Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. was investigated on the sus- picion that he might be a Communist "sympathizer." The F.B.I. field office concluded he was not. Bureau head- quarters directed that the investigation continue using a theory of "guilty until proven innocent": , "The bureau does not agree with the expressed belief of the field office that? is not sympathetic to the party cause. While there may not be any evidence that is a. Com- munist, neither is there any subetantial evidence that is anti-Communist." (c) F.B.I. sources reported on the formation of the Conservative American Christian Action Council in 1971. in the 1950's, the bureau collected infor- mation about the John Birch Society. and passed it to the White House be- cause of the society's "scurillnus at- tack" on President Eisenhower and ether high Government ofticiais. (d) Some investigations of the lawful activities. of peaceful groups have con- tinued for decades. For example. the N.A.A.C.P.- was investigated to deter- mine whether it "had connections with" the Communist Party. The investigation lasted for over 25 years, although noth- ing was found to rebut a report during the first year of the investigation that the N.A.A.C.P. had a "strong tendency" to "steer clear of Communist activities." Similarly, the F.B.I. has admitted that the Socialist Workers Party has com- mitted no criminal acts. Yet the bureau has investigated the Socialist Workers :Party for more than three decades on ' the basis of its revolutionary rhetoric ' ?which the F.B.I. concedes falls short of incitement to violence?and . its claimed international links. The bureau is currently using its informants to , collect information about S.W.P. mem- bers' political views, including those on , "U.S. involvement in Angola," "food prices," "racial matters," the "Vietnam War" and about any of their efforts to support non-S.W.P. candidates for polit- ical office. (e) National political leaders fell within the broad reach of intelligence investigations. For example, Army In- telligence maintained files on Senator Adlai Stevenson and Congressman Ab- ner Mikva because of their participation in peaceful political meetings under sur- veillance by Army agents. A letter to Richard Nixon, while he was a candi- date for President in 1968, was inter- cepted under C.I.A.'s mail opening program. In the 1960's President John- son asked the F.B.I. to compare various senators' statements on Vietnam with the Communist Party line and to con- duct name checks on leading antiwar senators. (f) As part of their effort to collect information which "related even re- motely" to people or groups "active" in communities which had "the potential" for civil disorder, Army intelligence agencies took such steps as: sending agents to a Halloween party for ele- mentary school children in Washington, .D.C., because they suspected a local "dissident" might be present; monitor- ing protests of welfare mothers' organ- izations in Milwaukee; infiltrating a coalition of church youth groups in Colorado, and sending agents to a priests' conference in Washington, D.C., held to discuss birth control measures. (g) In the late 1960's and early 1970's, student groups were subjected to in- tense scrutiny. In 1970 the F.B.I. or- dered investigations of every member of the' Students for a Democratic So- ciety and of "every black student union and similar group regardless of their past or present involvement in disor- ders." Files were opened on thousands of young men and women so that, as the former head of F.B.I. intelligence explained, the information could be used if they ever applied for a Govern- ment job. In the 1960's bureau agents were instructed to increase their, efforts to discredit "New Left" student demon- strators by tactics including publishing photographs ("naturally the most ob- noxious picture should be used"), using "misinformation" to falsely notify mem- hers events had been canceled, and writing "tell-tale" letters to students' parents. (h) The F.B.I. Intelligence Division 16 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 7Approved For Release 2001108/08-: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9- comileonly investigated any indication nat. "subversive" groups already under investigation were seeking to influence or control other groups. One example of the extreme breadth of this "infiltra- tion" theory was an F.B.I. instruction in the mid-1960's to all field offices to investigate every "free university" be- cause eome of them had come under "subversive influence." (i) Each administration from Franklin D. Roosevelt's to Richard Nixon's per- mitted and sometimes encouraged Gov- ernment agencies to handle essentially political intelligence. For example: cPresident Roosevelt asked the F.B.I. ,to put in its files the names of citizens sending. telegrams to the White House opposing his "national defense" policy and supporting Col. Charles Lindbergh. qPresident Truman received inside Information on a former Roosevelt aide's efforts to influence his appointments, labor union negotiating plans and the publishing plans of journalists. qPresident Eisenhower received re- ports on purely political and social con- tacts with foreign officials by Bernard Baruch, Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt and Su- preme Court Justice William 0. Douglas. qThe Kennedy Administration had the F.B.I. wiretap a Congressional staff member, three executive officials, a lobbyist and a Washington law firm. Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy received the fruits of a F.B.I. "tap" on Martin Luther King Jr. and a "bug" on a Congressman, both of which yielded information of a political nature. President Johnson asked the F.B.I. to conduct "name checks" of his critics and of members of the staff of his 1964 opponent, Senator Barry Goldwater. He also requested purely political intelli- gence on his critics in the Senate, and received extensive intelligence reports on political activity at the 1964 Demo- cratic Convention from F.B.I. electronic surveillance. President Nixon authorized a program of wiretaps which produced for the White House purely political or personal information unrelated to natioual secu- rity, including information about a Su- preme Court justice. Se Covert Action and the Use of Illegal or Improper Means () c veil Action Apart from uncovering excesses in the collection of intelligence, our inves- tigation has disclosed covert actions di- rected against Americans, and the use of illegal and improper surveillance techniques to gather information. For example: (i) The F.B.I.'s Cointelpro?counter- intelligence program?was designed to "disrupt" groups and "neutralize" indi- viduals deemed to be threats to domes- tic security. The F.B.I. resorted to coun- terinteligence tactics in part because Its chief officials believed that the exist- ing law could not control the activities of certain dissident groups and that court decisions had tied the hands of the intelligence community. ?Whatever opinion one bolds about the policies of the targeted groups, many of the tactics employed by the F.B.I. were indisput- ably degrading to a free society. Coin- telpro tactics included: gAnonymously attacking the political beliefs of targets in order to induce their employers to fire them; cAnonymouely mailing letters tn the spouses of intelligence targets for the purpose of destroying their marriages; qObtaining from I.R.S. the tax re- turns of a target and then attempting to provoke an I.R.S. investigation for the express purpose of deterring a protest leader from attending the Democratic National Convention; qFalsely and anonymously labeling as Government? informants members of groups known to be violent, thereby ex- posing the falsely labelled member to expulsion or physical attack; ? qPursuant to instructions to use "mis- information" to disrupt demonstrations, employing such means as broadcasting fake orders on the same citizens band radio frequency used by demOnstration marshals to attempt to control demon- strations and duplicating and falsely filling out forms soliciting housing for persons coming to a demonstration, thereby causing "long and useless jour- neys to locate these adresses." Sending an anonymous letter to the leader of a Chicago street gang (de- scribed as "violence-prone") stating that the Black Panthers were supposed to have "a hit for you." The letter was suggested because it "may intensify... animosity" and cause the street gang leader to "take retaliatory action." From "late 1963" until his death in 1968, Martin Luther King Jr. was the target of an intensive campaign by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to "neu- tralize" him as an effective civil rights leader. In the words of the man in charge of the F.B.I.'s "war" against Dr. King, "No holds were barred." The F.B.I. gathered information about Dr. King's plans and activities through an extensive surveillance pro- gram, employing nearly every intelli- gence-gathering technique at the bu- reau's disposal in order to obtain information about the "private activi- ties of Dr. King and his advisers" to use to "completely discredit" them. -. The program to destroy Dr. King as the leader of the civil rights movement included efforts to discredit him with executive branch officials, Congres- sional leaders, foreign heads of state, American ambassadors, churches, uni- versities and the press. The F.B.I. mailed Dr. King a tape recording made from microphones hid- den in his hotel rooms which one agent testified was an attempt to destroy Dr. King's marriage. The tape recording was accompanied by a note which Dr. King and his advisors interpreted as threatening to release the tape record- ing unless Dr. King committed suicide. The extraordinary nature of the cam- paign to discredit Dr. Xing is evident from two documents. At the August 1963 march on Wash- ington, Dr. King told the country of his "dream" that: "All of God's children, black men and white men, Jews and Gentiles, Protest- ant and Catholics, will be able to join hands and sing in the words of the old Negro spiritual, 'Free at last, free at last, thank God Almighty, I'm free at last.'" The bureau's Domestic Intelligence Division coacluded that this "demagogic speech" established Dr. King as the "most dangerous and effective Negro leader in the country." Shortly after- wards, and within days after Dr. King was named "Man of the Year" by Time magazine, the F.B.I. decided to "take him off his pedestal, reduce him com- pletely in influence," and select and promote its own candidate to "assume the role of the leadership of the Negro people." In early 1968, bureau headquarters explained to the field that Dr. King must be destroyed because he was seen as a potential "messiah" who could "unify and electrify" the "black nation- alist movement." Indeed to the F.B.I. he was a potential threat because he might "abandon his supposed 'obedi- ence' to white liberal doctrines (non- violence)." In short, a nonviolent man was to be secretly attacked and de- stroyed as insurance against his aband- oning nonviolenee. . .? (b) Illegal or Improper Means The surveillance which we investi- gated was not only vastly excessive in breadth and a basis for degrading eounterintelligence actions, but was also often conducted by illegal or im- proper means.. For example: (1)For approximately 20 years the C.I.A. carried out a program of in- discriminately opening citizens first class mail. The bureau also had a mail opening program, but canceled it in 1966. The bureau continued, however, to receive the, illegal fruits of C.I.A.'s program. In 1970, the heads of both agencies signed a document for Presi- dent Nixon, which correctly stated that mail opening was illegal, falsely stated that it had been discontinued and pro- posed that the illegal opening of mail should be resumed because it would provide useful results. The- President approved the program, but withdrew his approval five days later. The illegal opening continued nonetheless. Through- out this period C.I.A. officials knew that mail opening was illegal but ex- pressed concern about the "flap poten- tial" of exposure, not about the illegality of their activity. (2)From 1947 until May 1975, N.S.A. received from international cable com- panies millions of ?cables which had been sent by American citizens in the reasonable expectation that they would be kept private, (3) Since the early 1930's, intelligence agencies have frequently wiretapped and bugged American citizens without the benefit. of judicial warrant. Recent court decisions have curtailed the use of these techniques against domestic targets. But past subjects of these sur- veillances have included a United States Congressman. a Congressional staff member, journalists and ?newsmen, and numerous individuals and groups who engaged in no criminal activity and who posed no genuine threat to the na- tional security, such as two White House domestic affairs advisers and an anti-Vietnam War protest group. While the prior written approval of the Attor- ney General has been required for all warrantless wiretaps since 1940, the record is replete with instances where this requirement was ignored and the Attorney General gave only after-the- fact authorization. Until 1965, microphone surveillance by intelligence agencies was wholly un- regulated in certain classes of cases. Within weeks after a 1954 Supreme Court decision denouncing the F.B.I.'s installation of a microphone in a de- fendant's bedroom, the Attorney Gen- eral informed the bureau that he did not believe the decision applied to national security cases and permitted the F.B.I. to continue to install microphones sub- ject only to its own "intelligent re- straint." (4) In several cases, purely political information (such as the reaction of Congress to an Administration's legis- lative proposal) and purely personal information (such as coverage of the extramarital social activities of a high- level executive official under survetl- lance) was obtained from electronic sur- 17 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 ? Approved For Release 1:21-01/08/08 : CIA*-RDP7-7-00432-R00010-040000419 veillance and disseminated to the highest levels of the Federal Government. (5) Warrantless break-ins have been conducted by intelligence agencies since World War II. During the 1960's alone, the F.B.I. and C.I.A. conducted hundreds of break-ins, many against American citizens .and domestic organizations. In some cases, these break-ins were to install microphones; in other cases, they were to steal such items as membership lists from organizations considered "sub- versive" by the bureau. (6) The most pervasive surveillance technique has been the informant. In a random sample of domestic intelligence cases, 83 percent involved informants and 5 percent involved electronic sur- veillance. Informants have been used against peaceful, law-abiding groups': they have collected information about personal and political views and activi- ties. To maintain their credentials in violence-prone groups, informants have involved themselves in violent activity. This phenomenon is well illustrated, by an informant in the Klan. He was present at the murder of a civil rights worker in Mississippi and subsequently helped to solve the crime and convict the per- petrators. Earlier, however, while per- forming duties paid for by the Govern- ment, he had previously "beaten people severely, had boarded buses and kicked people, had [gone] into restaurants and beaten them [blacks] with blackjacks, chains, pistols." Although the F.B.I. re- quires agents to instruct informants that they cannot be involved in violence. it was understood that in the Klan, "he couldn't be an angel and be a good in- formant," 4. Ignoring the Law. Officials of the intelligence agencies ,occasionally-recognized that certain ac- tivities were illegal, but expressed con- cern only for "flap potential." Even more disturbing was the frequent testi- mony that the law and the Constitution were simply ignored. For example, the author of the so-called Huston plan tes- tified: . Question: Was there any person who stated that the activity recom- mended, which you have previously ? identified as being illegal opening' of the mail and breaking and entry or burglary?was there any single person who stated that such ac- tivity should- not be done because it was unconstitutional? Answer: No. Question: Was there any single person who said such activity should not be done because it was illegal? Answer: No. Similarly, the man who for 10 years headed F.B.I.'s Intelligence Division testified that: . . never once did I hear anybody, including myself, raise the question: is this course of action which we have agreed upon lawful, is it legal,- is it ethical or moral. We never gave' any thought to this line of reasoning, be- cause we were ' just naturally prag- ,triatic." Although the statutory law and the Constitution were often not "[given] a thought." there was a general- attitude that intelligence needs were responsive to a higher law. Thus, as one witness testified in justifying the F.B.I.'s mail, opening program: "It was my assumption that what we were doing was justified by what we ,had to do . . . the greater good, the national security.' 5. Deficiencies in Accountability and Control The overwhelming nuMber of excesses continuing over a prolonged period of time were due in large measure to the fact that the system of checks and bal- ances?created in our Constitution :to limit abuse of governmentalnower?was seldom applied to the intelligence com- munity. Guidance and regulation from outside the intelligence agencies?where it has been imposed at all?has been .vague. Presidents and other senior. ex- ecutive officials, particularly the At- torneys General, have virtually abdicated ' their consitutional responsibility to over- see and set standards fors intelligence activity. Senior Government officials generally 'gave the agencies broad, gen- eral mandates or pressed for immediate result's on pressing problems. In neither case did they provide guidance to pre- vent excesses and their broad mandates and pressures themselves often resulted 'in 'excessive or improper intelligence activity. .. Congress has often declined to exer- cise meaningful oversight, and on oc- casion has passed laws or made state- ments which were taken by intelligence agencies as supporting overly broad investigations. On the other hand, the record reveals instances when intelligence agencies have concealed improper activities from .their superiors in the executive branch and from the Congress, or have elected to disclose only the less questionable aspects of their activities. There has been, in short, a clear and sustained failure by those responsible to control the intelligence community and to 'insure its accountability. There has been an equally clear and sustained failure by intelligence agencies to fully inform the proper authorities 'of their activities and to comply with directives from those authorities. 6. The Adverse Impact of Improper Intelligence Activity Many of the illegal or improper dis- - ? ruptive efforts directed against Ameri- can citizens and domestic organizations succeeded in injuring their targets. Al- though it is sometimes difficult to prove' that a target's, misfortunes were caused by a counterintelligence program di- rected against him, the possibility that an arm of the United States Govern- ... ment intended to cause the harm and might have been responsible is itself, abhorrent. The committee has observed numerous, examples of the impact of intelligence: operations. Sometimes the harm was readily apparent?destruction of mars; sieges, loss of friends or jobs. Some-. times the attitudes of the public and of. Government officials responsible for formulating policy and resolving vital: ;issues were influenced by distorted ins" telligence. But the most basic harm was- to the values of privacy and freedom.' which our Constitution seeks to protect and which intelligence activity infringed, on a broad scale. (a) General Efforts to Discredit Several efforts against indlviduali 18 :and groups appear to have achievest their stated aims. For example: 9A bureau field office reported that; the anonymous letter it had sent to an- activist's husband accusing his wife of infidelity "contributed very strongly" to the subsequent breakup of the mars. siege. gAnother field office reported that a' draft. counsellor, deliberately and falsely' accused of being an F.B.I. informant,. was "ostracized" by his friends and as- sociates. 9Two instructors were reportedly put on probation after the bureau sent an anonymous letter to a university ad.: ministrator about their funding of an anti-Administration student newspaper. 41The bureau evaluated its attempts to "put a stop" to a contribution to the Southern Christian Leadership Confer- ence as "quite successful." 41An F.B.I. document boasted that a. "pretext" 'phone call to Stokely Car- michael's mother telling her that mem- bers of the Black Panther Party in- -tended to kill her son left her "shocked." The memorandum intimated that the bureau believed it had been responsible for Carmichael's flight to Africa the following day. (b) Media Manipulation The F.B.I. has attempted covertly to influence the public's perception of per- sons and .organizations by disseminat- ing derogatory information to the press, either anonymously or through "friend- ly" news contacts. The impact of those articles is generally difficult to meas- 'use, although in some cases there are fairly direct connections to injury to the target. The bureau also attempted to influence media reporting which would have an impact on the public image of the F.B.I. Examples include: 41Planning a series of derogatory 'articles about Martin Luther King Jr., and the poor people's campaign. For example, in anticipation of the -1968 "poor people's march on Wash- ington, D. C.," bureau headquarters granted authority to furnish "coopera- tive news media sources" an article "designed to curtail success of Martin Luther King's fund raising." Another memorandum illustrated how "photo- graphs of demonstrators" could be used in discrediting the civil . rights move- ment. Six photographs of participants in the poorneople's campaign in Cleve- land accompanied the memorandum with the following note attached: "These [photographs] show the . militant ag- gressive appearance of the participants and might be of interest to? a coopera- tive news source." Information on the "poor people's campaign was provided by the F.B.I. to friendly reporters on the condition that "the Bureau must not be revealed as the source." qSoliciting information from field of- fices "on a continuing basis" for "prompt . . . dissemination to the new; ,media . . . to discredit the New Left movement and its adherents." The head- quarters directive requested, among other things, that: "Specific data should be furnished depicting the scurrilous and depraved nature of many of the characters, activ- ities, habits and living conditions sepses sentative of New Left adherents." Field Offices were to be exhorted that ."every avenue of possible embarrass- ment must be vigorously and enthusis astically explored." gOrdering field offices to gather in- formation which would disprove allega- tions by the "liberal press, the bleedmg hearts and the forces on the left" that the Chicago police used undue force in dealing with demonstrators at the 1968 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77:00432R000100400004-9 - Democratic convention. liTaking advantage of a close relation. ship with the chairman of the board? described in an F.B.I. memorandum as "our good friend"? of a Magazine with ? national circulation to influence articles ? which related to the F.B.I. For example. through this relationship the bureau "squelched" an "unfavorable article against the bureau" written .by a 'free- lance writer about an F.B.I. investiga- tion; "postponed publication" of -an article on another F.B.I. case; "fore- stalled publication" of an article by Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., and received information about proposed editing of King's articles. (c) Distorting Data to Influence Government Policy and Public Perceptions Accusate intelligence is a prerequisite to sound Government policy. However:: as the past head of the F.B.I.'s Dom'estiqei Intelligence Division reminded the corn-, mittee: "The facts. by themselves are not too meaningful. They are something like stones cast into a heap." On certain crucial subjects the doi mestic intelligence agencies reported the "facts" in ways that gave rise to misleading impressions. For example, the F.B.I.'s Domestic Intelligence Division initially discounted as. an "obvious failure" the alleged attempts of Communsts to influence the civil rights movement. Without any sig- nificant change in the factual situation, the bureau moved from the division's conclusion to Director Hoover's public Congressional testimony characterizing 'Communist influence on the civil rights movement as "vitally important." F.B.I. reporting on protests against the Vietnam War provides ancther ?example of the manner in which the in- formation provided to decision-makers can be skewed. In acquiescense with a ? judgment already expressed by Presi- dent Johnson, the bureau's reports on 'demonstrations against the war in Viet-, _nem emphasized Communist efforts to influence the antiwar movement and underplayed the fact that the vast ma- jority of demonstrators were not Com- munist controlled. -(d) "Chilling" First Amendment Rights The First Amendment protects the rights of American citizens to engage in free and open discussions and to associate with persons of their choos- ing. Intelligence agencies have, on occa- sion, expressly attempted tO interfere with those rights. For example, one internal F.B.I. memorandum called for ,"more interviews" with New Left sub- :jects "to enhance the paranoia endemic in these circles" and "get the point ,across there is an F.B.I. agent behind every mailbox." More importantly. the Government's surveillance activities in the aggregate .?whether or not expressly intended to do so?tend, as the committee con- cludes. to deter the exercise of First Amendment rights by American citizens ' who become aware of the Government's domestic intelligence program. (e) Preventing the Free Exchange of Ideas Speakers, teachers, writers and pub- lications themselves were targets of the ;.F.13.1.'s counterintelligence program. The F.B.I.'s efforts to interfere with the free exchange of ideas included: 19Anonymously attempting to prevent an alleged "Communist-front" group from holding a forum on a Midwest campus and then investigating the 'judge who ordered that the meeting be allowed to proceed. 41Using another "confidential source" in a foundation which contributed to a local college to apply pressure on the school to fire an activist professor. tiAnonymously contacting a univer- sity official to urge him to "persuade" two professors to stop funding a stu- dent newspaper in order to "eliminate what voice the New Left has" in the area CITargeting the New Mexico Free Uni- 'versity for teaching "confrontation poli- tics" and "draft counseling training." 7. Cost and Value , Domestic intelligence is expensive. We have already indicated the cost of illegal and improper intelligence activities in .terms of the harm to victims, the injury ,to constitutional values and the damage ?to the democratic process itself. The cost in dollars is also significant. For ex- ample, the F.B.I. has budgeted for fiscal year 1976 over $7 million for its domes- tic security informant program, more tthan twice the amount it spends on .informants against organized crime. The aggregate budget for F.B.I. dornes- .tic security intelligence and foreign -counterintelligence is at least $80 mil- lion. In the late 1960's and early 1970's, when the bureau was joined by the C.I.A., the military and N.S.A. in collect- ing information about the antiwar move- ment and black activists, the cost was . substantially greater. ? Apart from the excesses described above, the usefulness of many domestic '..intelligence -activities in serving the legitimate goal of protecting society 'has been questionable. Properly-directed -intelligence investigations concentrating 'upon hostile foreign agents and violent terrorists can produce valuable results. The committee has examined cases where the F.B.I. uncovered "illegal" ? agents of a foreign power engaged in clandestine intelligence activities in violation of Federal law. Information 'leading to the prevention of serious vio- lence has been acquired by the F.B.I. 'through its informant penetration of ter- -rorist groups and through the inclusion in bureau files of the names of persons 'actively involved with such . groups. ? Nevertheless, the most sweeping domes-- tic intelligence surveillance programs have produced surprisingly few useful returns in view of their extent. For ? example: ilBetween 1960 and 1974, the F.B.I. ? conducted over 500,000 separate invee- tigations of persons and groups under ,the "subversive" category, predicated on the possibility that they might be likely to overthrow the Government of the United States. Yet not a single indi- vidual or group has been prosecuted 'since 1957 under the laws which pro- hibit planning or advocating action to overthrow the Government and lerhich. are the main alleged statutory basis for such F.B.I. investigations. 41A recent study by the General Ac- counting Office has estimated that of some 17,528 F.B.I. domestic intelligence investigations of individuals in 1974, only 1.3 percent resulted in prosecution and conviction, and in only "about 2 percent" of the cases was advanee knowledge of any activity?legal or il- legal?obtained. 19 ' 410ne of the main reasons advanced for expanded collection of intelligem e about urban unrest and antiwar pro- ? test was to help responsible offic:s1, cope with possible violence. Howe?er, a former White House official with ma- jor duties in this area under the John- son Administration has concluded, in retrospect, that "in none of these situa- tions . . . would advance intelligence about dissident groups [have] been of much help," that what was needed was "physical intelligence" about the geog- raphy of major cities, and that the at- tempt to "predict violence" was not a ? "successful undertaking." cDomestic intelligence reports have Sometimes even been counterproductive. A. local police thief, for example, de- scribed F.B.I. reports which led to the positioning of Federal troops near his 'city as: ". . . Almost completely composed of , unsorted and unevaluated stories, threats and rumors that had crossed my desk in New Haven. Many of these had long before been discounted by our in- telligence division. But they had made their way from New Haven to Washing- ton, had gained completely unwarranted credibility and had been submitted by ? the Director of the F.B.I. to the Presi- dent of the United States. They seemed to present a convincing picture of im- pending holocaust." In considering ,its recommendations, the committee undertook an evaluation of the F.B.I.'s claims that domestic in- ? telligence was necessary to combat ter- rorism, civil disorders. "subversion" and hostile foreign intelligence activity. The 'committee reviewed voluminous mate- rials bearing on this issue and ques- ? tioned bureau officials and former Fed- eral executive officials. ? We have found that we are in funda- ? mental agreement with the wisdom of Attorney General Stone's initial warn- ing that intelligence agencies must not be "concerned with political or other opinions of individuals" and must be limited to investigating essentially only "such conduct as is forbidden by the laws of the United States." The com- mittee's record demonstrates that do- mestic intelligence which departs from this standard raises grave risks of un- dermining the democratic process and harming the interests of individual citi- zens. This danger weighs heavily against the speculative or negligible benefits of the ill-defined and overbroad investigations authorized in the past. Thus, the basic purpose of the recont- mendations in this report is to limit the F.B.I. to investigating conduct rather than ideas or associations. The excesses of the past do not, how- ever, justify depriving the United Staiee of a clearly defined and effectively con- trolled domestic intelligence capability. The intelligence services of this nation's international adversaries continue to at- tempt to conduct clandestine espionage operations within the United States. Our recommendations provide for in- telligence investigations of hostile for. eign intelligence activity. Moreover, terrorists have engaged in serious acts of violence which have brought death and injury to Americans and threaten further such acts. These acts, not the politics or beliefs of those who would commit them, are the proper focus for investigations to anticipate terrorist violence. Accordingly, the com- mittee would permit properly .:ontrolled intelligence investigations in those nar- row circumstances. Concentration on imminent violence Approved For Release 2001/08/08': CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 can ovoid the wasteful dispersion of re- sources which has characterized the sweeping (and fruitless) domestic intel- ligence investigations of the past. But the most important reason for the fun- damental change in the domestic intel- ligence operations which our recom- mendations propose is the need to pro- tect the constitutional rights of Amer- icans. In light of the record of abuse re- vd'aled by our inquiry, the committee is not satisfied with the position that mere exposure of what has occurred in the past will prevent its recurrenr.e. Clear legal standards and effective oversight and controls are necessary to insure that domestic intelligence activity dces not itself undermine the democratic sys- tem it is intended to protect. RECOMMENDATIONS Recommendation 1?There is no in- herent constitutional authority for the President or any intelligence agency to violate the law. ? Recommendation 2?It is the intent of the committee that statutes. imple- menting these recommendations provide the exclusive legal authority for Federal domestic security activities. (a) No intelligence agency may en- gage in such activities unless authorized by statute, nor may it permit its em- ployees, informants or other covert hu- man sources to engage in such activities on its behalf. (b) No executive directive or order May be issued which would conflict with such statutes. 1 Recommendation 3?In authorizing -intelligence agencies to engage in cer- tain activities, it is not intended that such authority empower agencies, their -informants or covert h,uman sources to violate any prohibition enacted oursuant to these recommendations or conta:ned in the Constitution or in any other law. Recommendation 4?To supplement -the prohibitions in the 1947 National Security Act against the C.I.A. exercis- ing "police, subpoena, law enforcement 'powers or internal security functions," .the C.I.A. should be prohibited from .Conducting domestic security activities within the United States, except as spe- Cifically permitted by these recom- .mendations. Recommendation 5?The Director of ' Central Intelligence should be made re- sponsible for "coordinating" the protec- tion of sources and methods of the in- telligence community. As head of the C.I.A., the Director should also be re- sponsible in the first instance for .the security of C.I.A. facilities, personnel, operations and information. Neither function, however, authorizes the Direc- tor of Central Intelligence to violate any Federal or state law or to take any ac- tion which is otherwise inconsistent with statutes implementing these recom- mendations. 7tecommendation 6?The C.I.A. should not conduct electronic surveillance, un- authorized entry or mail openings with- in the United States for any purpose. Recommendation 7?The C.I.A. should not employ physical surveillance, infil- tration of groups or any other covert techniques against Americans within the United States except: (a) Physical surveillance of persons on the grounds of C.I.A. installations: (h) Physical surveillance during a pre- liminary investigation of allegations an employee is a security risk for a limited period outside of C.I.A. installations. Such surveillance should be conducted only upon written authorization of the Director of Central Intelligence and should he limited to the subject of the investigation and, only to the extent necessary to identify them, to persons with whom the subject has contact; (c) Confidential inquiries, during a preliminary investigation of allegations an employee is a security risk, of out; side sources conderning medical or fi- nancial information about the subject which is relevant to those allegations; (d) The use of identification which does not reveal C.I.A. or Government affiliation, in background and other security investigations permitted the C.I.A. by these recommendations and the conduct of checks which, do not re- veal C.I.A. or Government affiliation tor the purpose of judging the effectiveness of cover operations upon the written au- thorization of the Director- of Central Intelligence; (e) In exceptional? cases, the place- ment or recruitment of agents within an 'unwitting domestic group solely for the purpose of preparing them for assign- ments abroad and only for as long as is necessary to accomplish that pur- pose. This should take place only if the Director of Central Intelligence makes a. written finding that it is essential for foreign intelligence collection of vital importance to the United States, and the Attorney General makes a written finding that the operation will be con- ducted under procedures designed to prevent misuse of the undisclosed par- ticipation or of any information ob- tained therefrom. In the case of any such action, no information received by C.I.A. from the agent as a result of his ? position in the group should be dissemi- nated outside the C.I.A. unless it indi- ?cates felonious criminal conduct or threat of death or serious bodily harm, in which case dissemination should be permitted to an appropriate official agency if approved by the Attorney General. Recommendation 8 ? The C.I.A. should not collect information within the United States concerning Ameri- cans except: (a) Information concerning C.I.A. em- ployees, C.I.A. contractors - and their employees or applicants for such em- ployment or contracting; (b) Information concerning individ- uals or organizations providing or offer- ing to provide assistance to the C.I.A.; (c) Information concerning individ- uals or organizations being considered by the C.I.A. as potential sources of information or assistance; (d) Visitors to C.I.A. facilities; (e) Persons otherwise in the immedi- ate vicinity of sensitive C.I.A. sites; or (f) Persons who give their informed written consent to such collection. In (a), (b) and (c) above, information should be collected only if necessary for the purpose of determining the per- scn's fitness for employment or assist- ance. If, in the course of such collec- tion. information is obtained which in- dicates criminal activity, it should be transmtted to the F.B.I. or other ap- propriate agency. When an American's .relationship with the C.I.A. is prospec- tive, information should only be col- lected if there is a bona fide expecte,- tiort the person might be used by the C.I.A. ' 20 RecommendatiOn 9?The C.I.A. should not collect information abroad concern- ing Americans except: (a) Information concerning Ameri- cans which it is permitted to collect within the United States; (b) At the request of the Justice De- partment as part of criminal investiga- tions or an investigation of an American for suspected terrorist or hostile foreign intelligence activities or security leak or security risk investigations which the F.B.I. has opened. Recommendation ? 10?The C.I.A. should be able to transmit to the F.B.I. or- other appropriate agencies informa- tion concerning Americans acquired as the incidental byproduct of otherwise- permissible foreign intelligence and counterintelligence operaticns when- ever such information indicates any activity in violation of American-law. Recommendation 11?The C.I.A. may employ covert techniques abroad against Americans: (a) Under circumstances in which the C.I.A. could use such covert techniques against Americans within the United States, or . (b) When collecting information as part of Justice Department investiga- tion, in which case the C.I.A. may use a particular covert technique under the standards and procedures and ap- provals applicable to its use against Americans within the United States by the F.B.I.' (c) To the extent necessary to iden- tify persons known or suspected to be Americans who come in contact with foreigners the C.I.A. is investigating. CIA. Human Experiments ? and Drug Use Recommendation 12?The C.I.A. should not use in experimentation on human subjects any drug, device or procedure which is designed or intended to harm, or is reasonably likely to harm, the physical or mental health of the human subject, except with the in- formed written consent, witnessed by a disinterested third party, of each human subject, and in accordance with the guidelines issued by the. National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects for Biomedical and Be- havioral Research. The jurisdiction of the commission should be amended to include the Central Intelligence Agency and other intelligence agencies of the United States Government. Recommendation 13?Any C.I.A. activity engaged in pursuant to Recom- mendations 7, 8, 9, 10 or 11 should he subject to periodic review and certifi- cation of compliance with the Constitu- tion, applicable statutes, agency regula- tions and executive orders by: (a) The Inspector General of the C.I.A.: (b) The General Counsel of the C.I.A. in coordination with the Director of Central Intelligence: (c) The Attorney General, and (d) The oversight committee recom- mended [below]. All such certificationc should he; available for review by Congressional oversight committees. Recommendation 14?N.S.A. should not engage in domestic security activi- ties. Its functions should he limited in a precisely drawn legislative charter to the collection of foreign intelligence from foreign communications. Recommendation 15?N.S.A. should take all practicable measures consistent with its foreign intelligence mission to eliminate or minimize the interception, Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 Approved Fsc:Cr Release 200'11081O8 CIA-RDP77:00432R0001.00400004-9 eselection and monitoring of communi- cations of Americans from the foreign 'communications. Recommendation 16?N.S.A. should not be permitted to select for monitoring :any communication to, from or about.* . an American without his consent, ex- cept for the purpose of obtaining in- ' formation about hostile foreign intelli- gence or terrorist activities, and then only if a warrant approving, such moni- toring is obtained in accordance with procedures similar to those contained t in Title HI of the Omnibus Crime Con- trot and Safe Streets Act of 1968. Recommendation 17? Any personally identifiable information about an Amen- A can which N.S.A. incidentally acquires, A other than pursuant to a warrant, should a not be disseminated without the consent of the American, but should be destroyed as promptly as possible unless it indi- a cates: (a) Hostile foreign intelligence or terrorist activities, or. Control of Civil Disturbance Intelligence Recommendation 23?The Department of Defense should not be permitted to conduct investigations of Americans on the theory that the information derived therefrom might he useful in potential civil disorders. The Army should be per- mitted to gather information about geo- graphy, logistical matters or the ident- ty of local officials which is necessary' o the 'positioning, support and use of roans in an area where troops are likely o be deployed by the President in con- ection with a civil disturbance. The rmy should be 'permitted to investigate mericans involved in such disturbance's fter troops have been deployed to he site of a civil disorder* to the extent ecessary to fulfill the military mission nd to the extent the information can- oe be obtained from the F.B.I. Recommendation 24 ? Appropriate agencies of the Department of Defense (b) Felonious criminal conduct for which a warrant might be obtained pun- or suant to Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, or s . (c) A threat of death or serious bod- m e should be permitted to collect back- --mind information on their present or ospective employees or contractors. ith respect to security risks or the curity of its installations, the Depart- e.nt of Defense should be permitted If dissemination is permitted, by (a), te .?fly harm. to (b) and (c) above, it must only be made C. to an appropriate official and after ap- sts proval by the Attorney General. tio Recommendation 18 ? N.S.A. should not request from any commercial car- vi tier any communication which it could De not otherwise obtain pursuant to these te recommendation's. inf conduct physical surveillance consis- nt with such surveillances as the LA. is permitted to conduct, in similar ctunstances, by these recommends- Recommendation 25?Except as pro- ded in 27 below, the Department of fense should not direct any covert chnique (e:g., electronic surveilance, ormants, etc.) at American civilians.' Recommendation 26?The Department of Defense should be permitted to con- duct abroad preventive intelligence in- vestigations of unaffiliated Americans, provided such *investigations are first approved by the F.B.I. Such investiga- tions by the Department of Defense' in- . dote , the ? use of covert techniques, uld ordinarily be conducted in a man- consistent with the recommends- s pertaining to the F.B.I.; however o verseas locatigns where U.S. milita- orces constitute the governing power where U.S. military forces are en- ed in hostilities circumstances may uire greater latitude to conduct. such estigations. ecommendation 27 ? The I.R.S. uld not, on behalf of any intelligence ncy or for its own use, collect any mation about' the activities of ricans except *for the, purposes of roing the tax laws. ? ecommendation 28?I.R.S. ? should select any person or group for tax Ligation on the basis of political vity or for any other reason not rela- t to enforcement fo the tax laws. ecommendation 29?Any program of !licence investigation relating to estic 'security in which targets are cted by both 'tax and nontax criteria Id only be initiated: ) Upon the written request of .the rney General or the Secretary of Treasury, specifying the nature of requested program and the need efore, and ) After the written certification by Ccmunisssoner of the I.R.S., that edures have been developed which sufficient to prevent the infringe- of the constitutional rights of ricans. and Recommendation 19?The Office of Security at N.S.A. should be permitted to. collect background information on present or prospective employees Or contractors for N.S.A. solely for the purpose of determining their fitness for employment. With respect to security risks or the security of its installations, CIU N.S.A: -should be permitted to conduct sho physical surveillances consistent with ner 'such surveillances as 'the C.I.A. is per- tion raitted to conduct, in similar circum- in - stances, by these recommendations. ? ry f '''Recommendation 20?Except as spe- or cifically provided herein, the Depart- gag ment of Defense should not engage in req domestic security activities. Its func- inv tions, as they relate to the activities of the foreign intelligence community, sho should be limited in a precisely drawn age legislative charter to the conduct of infor foreign intelligence and foreign counter- Ame intelligence activities and tactical mili- enfo tary intelligence activities abroad ? and production, analysis and dissemination of departmental intelligence. not inves - Recommendation 2I?In addition to its foreign intelligence responsibility, acti the Department of Defense has .a re- van sponsibility to investigate its personnel '' R in order to protect the security of its inte installations and property, to ensure or- .dom der and discipline within its ranks and to conduct other limited investigations sele once dispatched by the President to sup- shou press a civil disorder. A legislative char- ? (a -Ger should define precisely?in a manner Atto which is not inconsistent with these rec- the csnmendations? the authorized scope 'the and purpose of any investigations un- ther dertaken by the Department of Defense* (b to satisfy these responsibilities. ' the Recommendation 22?No agency of proc the Department of Defense should -con- are duct investigations of violations of crim- meritinal law or otherwise. perform any la' Ame enforcement or domestic security func- (c) tions within the' United States, except mitte en military bases or concerning military of th personnel, to erCorce the Uniform Code gram of Military Justice. With Congressional oversight, com- es being kept continually advised e nature and extent a such pro- s. ? 21 Disclosures Procedures Recommendation 30?No intelligence ?agency should request from the Internal Revenue Service tax returns or tax-re- lated information except under the sta- tutes and regulations controlling such disclosures. In addition, the existing procedures under which tax returns and tax-related information are released by the I.R.S. should be strengthened, as suggested in the following five recom- mendations. Recommendation 31 ? All requests from an intelligence agency to the I.R.S. for tax returns and tax-related informa- tion should be in writing and signed by the head of the intelligence agency makiIng the requst or. his. designee. Copies of such requests should be filed 'With the Attorney General. Each request should include a clear statement of: (a) The purpose for which disclosure is sought; (b) Facts sufficient to establish that the requested information is needed by the requesting agency for the perform- ance of an authorized and lawful func- tion; ? ? .? ? ?? ? (c) The uses .which the requesting 'agency intends to make of the informa- tion; ? ? (d) The extent of the disclosures Sought; , (e) Agreement by the requesting agen- cy not to use the documents or infor- mation fo any purpose other than that stated in the request, and -(f) Agreement by the reouestine agen- ?cy that the information will not be dis- closed to any other agency or person . except in accordance with the law. ? Reemmendation 32?I.R.S. should nOt release tax 'returns or tax-related information to any intelligence agency unless it has received a request satisfy- ? ing the requirements -of Recommenda- tion' 31 and the Commissioner of Inter- nal Revenue has approved 'the request inwriting. Recommendation 33?I.R.S. should 'maintain' a record of .all such requests and responses 'thereto for a period of 20 years. . ? Recommendation 34?No, intelligence agency should use the information sup: .piied to it by the I.R.S. pursuant to a request of the agency except as stated 'in a proper request for disclosure. Recommendation 35?All requests for :information sought by the F.B.I. should be filed by the Department of Justice' Such requests should be signed by the Attorney General or his designee, fol- lowing a determination by the depart- merit that the request 'is proper under the applicable statutes and regulations. Post Office Recommendation 36?The Post Office 'should not permit the F.B.I. or any intel- ligence agency to inspect markings or addresses on first class mail, nor should the Post Office itself inspect markings Or addresses on behalf of the F.B.I. or any, intelligence agency on 'first class mail, except' upon the written approval of the Attorney Genral or his designee. Where one of the correspondents is an American, the Attorney General or his designee should only approve such in- spection for domestic security purposes 'upon a written finding that it is necessa- ry to a criminal investigation or a pre- ventive intelligence investigation of ter- rorist activity or hostile foreign intel- ligence activity.: Upon such a request, the Post Office may temporarily remove from circula- tion such correspondnee for the put- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-R0P77-00432R000100400004-9 nese of such inspection of its exterior as is related to the investigation. . Recommendation 37?The Post Office should not transfer the custody cif any first class mail to any agency exceed the Department of Justice. Such til should not be transferred or opened ex-'. cent upon a judicial search warrant. (a) In the case of mail where one of the correspondents is an American, the judge mut find tha there is prob- able.cause to believe that the mail con- tains evidence of a crime. ? (b) In the case of mail where both parties are foreigners: ? (1) The judge must find that there is probable cause to believe that both parties to such correspondence are foreigners and or one of the correspon- dents is an official employer or con- scious agent of a foreign power, and (2) The Attorney General must certify that the mail opening is likely to reveal information necessary either to the protection of the nation against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of force of a foreign power; to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States, or to protect national security information against hostile foreign intel- ligence activity. :Recommendation domestic security investigative activity, including the use of covert techniques, hhould be centralized within the Federal Bureau of Investigation, except those investiga- ticns by the Secret Service designed to protect the life of the President or other Secret Service protectees. Such investi- gations and the use of covert techniques in those investigations should be central- ized within the Secret_ Service. Recommendation 39?All domestic Security activities of ? the Federal Government and all other intelligence agency activities covered by the domes- tic intelligence reeommendations should be subject to Justice Department over- sight, to assure compliance with the Constitution and laws ,of the linked States. Recommendation 40 ? The F.B.I. -should be Prohibited from engaging on 'own or through informants or others in any of the following activities direct- ed at Americans: (a) Disseminating any information to the White House, any other Federal offi- cial, the news media or any other person for a political or other improper pur- 'prise, such as discrediting an opponent of the Administration or a critic of an Intelligence or investigative agency. ? (b) Interfering with lawful speech, publication, assembly, organizational activity or association of Americans. (c) Harassing individuals through un- necessary overt investigative techniques such as interviews of obvious physical surveillance for the purpose of intimida- tion. Recommendation 41 ? The bureau should he prohibited from maintaining information on the political beliefs, polit- ical associations or private lives of Ariericans except that which is clearly necessary for domestic security investt- gations is described [below]. Investigations of Committed or Imminent Offenses Recommendation 42?The F.B.I. should be permitted to investigate a commited act which may violate a Fed- eral criminal statute pertaining to the domestic security to determine the iden- tity of the perpetrator or to determine .whether the act violates such a statute. Recommendation 43 ? The F.B.I. should be permitted to investigate an American or foreigner to obtain evidence of criminal , activity where there is "reasonable suspicion" that the American or foreigner has committed, is committing or is about to commit a specific act which violates a Federal statute pertaining to the domestic secu- rity. Recommendation 44 ? The F.B.I. ? should be permitted to conduct a pre- ' liminary preventive intelligence investi- gation of an American or foreigner where it has a specific allegation or spe- cific or substantiated information that the American or foreigner will soon en- gage in terrorist activity or hostile foreign intelligence activity. Such a pre- liminary investigation should not con- tinue longer than 30 days from receipt of the information unless the Attorney General or his designee finds that the. information and any corroboration which .has been obtained warrants in- vestigation for an additional period which may not exceed 60 days. If, at the outset, or at any time during the course. of. a preliminary investigation, the bureau establishes "reasonable sus- picion" that .an American or foreigner will soon engage in terrorist activity, or hostile foreign intelligence activity, it may conduct a full preventive intel- ligence investigation. Such full investi- gation should not continue longer than one year except upon a finding of com- pelling circumstances by the Attorney General or his designee. In no event should the F.B.I. open a preliminary or 'full preventive intel- ligence investigation based upon infor- mation that an American is advocating poitical ideas or engaging in lawful po- litical activities or is associating with others for the purpose of petitioning the Government ' for redress of grievances or other such constitutionally protected purpose.' Recommendation 45 ? The F.B.I. should be permitted to collect informa- tion to assist Federal, state and local officials in connection with a civil disor- der either? (i) After the Attorney General finds in writing that there is a- clear and im- mediate threat of domestic violence or rioting which is likely to require imple- mentation of 10 U.S.C. 332 or 333 (the use of Federal troops for the enforce- ment of Federal, law or Federal court orders), or likely to result in a request by the governor or legislature of a state pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 331 for the use of Federal militia or other Federal armed forces as a countermeasure, or . (ii) After such troops have been intro- duced. Recommendation 46--F.B.I. assistance to Federal, state and local officials in connection with a civil disorder should bee limited to collecting information necessary for (1) The President in making decisions concerning the introduction of Federal troops; (2) Military officials in positioning and supporting such troops, and (3) State and local officials in coor- dinating their activities with such mili- tary. officials. Background Invetigations Recommendation 47?The F.B.I. should. be permitted to participate in the Federal Government's program of background investigations of Federal employees or employees of Federal con- tractors. The authority to conduct such Investigations should not, however, he used as the basis for conducting investi- "gations of other persons. In addition, Congress should examine the standards of Executive Order 10450, which serves as the current authority for F.B.I. background investigations, to de- termine 'Whether additional legislation is necessary to: (a) Modify criteria based on political beliefs and associations unrelated to Suitability for employment; such modi- fication should make those criteria con- sistent with judicial decisions regarding privacy of political association, and (b) Restrict . the dissemination of in- formation from name checks of infor- mation related to suitability for employ- ment. . Recommendation 48?Under regula- tiOns to be formulated by the Attorney General, the F.B.I. should be permitted to investigate a specific allegation that an individual within the executive branch with access to classified informa- tion is a security risk as described in Executive Order 10450. Such investiga- tion should not continue longer than 30 days except upon written approval of the Attorney General or his designee. Recommendation 49?Under regula- r ' tions to be formulated by the Attorney :General, the F.B.I. should, be permitted 'investigate a specific allegation of -the improper disclosure of, classified in-. .'formatioh. by employees or contractors of the executive branch. ,,Such investi- gation should not continue longer than 30 -days except upon written approval ? of the Attorney General or his designee:. Recommendation 50?Overt tech- niques and name, checks should be per- littitted in all of the authorized domes- tic security ,investigations, described' .? above, including preliminary and full_ ',preventive intelligence investigations. ? Recommendation , 51?All nonconsen- sual electronic surveillance, mail-open- ing and unauthorized entries should be 'conducted 'only upon authority of A 'judicial 'warrant. Recommendation 52?All nonconsen- sual electronic surveillance should be 'conducted pursuant to judicial warrants Issued under authority of Title III of 'the Omnibus Crime Control ,and Safe Streets Act of 1968. ? , - The 'act, should be amended to ,pro- ..e vide, with electronic surveil- lance of foreigners in the United States, ,,that a warrant may issue if: (a) There is probable cause that the target is an officer, employee or con-. :.;.scious agent of a foreign power. 9j. (b) The Attorney General has certified ::Ithat the surveillance is likely to reveal information 'necessary to the protection ? the?riation against actual or poten- -tial attack or other hostile acts of ?'-force of a foreign power, to obtain iforeign intelligence information-deemed essential to the security of the United ..States, or to protect national security '.information against hostile foreign in-. ?-telligence activity. -? (c) With respect to any such elec. *ironic surveillance, the judge. should, "'Adopt procedure's to minimize the ac- qutsi.ton and retention of nonforeign intelligence information about Ameri- CanL (d) Such electronic surveillance should " he exempt ft-mil the disclosure require- Ments of Title III of the 1968 Act as to 'foreigners generally and a3 to Ameri- cans if they are 'involved in hostile ::foreign intelligence activity. ? As noted earlier, the committee be- lieves that the espionage laws 51-wald ,be amended to include marArial (sp:o- ,Aage and other modern farms of espio- 22 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 'Approved For Re-leaSe.2001/08/08:-CIA-kbP77:00432R000100400004i-9 nage not presently covered and Title III ,should incorporate any such amend- ment. ? Recommendation 53?Mail ? opening should be conducted only pursuant to a judicial warrant issued upon probable ?cause of criminal activity as described .in Recommendation 37. ? 72- Recommendation 54 ? Unauthorized . !entry should be conducted only upon* ',judicial warrant issued on probable 'cause to believe that the place to be searched contains evidence of a crime, except unauthorized entry, including surreptitious entry, against foreigners Who are officers, employees or conscious agents of a foreign 'power should be ,permitted upon judicial warrant under the standards which apply to electronic 'Surveillance described in Recommenda- tion 52, Adininistrative Procedures ? . ;Recommendation 55?Covert human scurces? may not. be &meted at an American except: (1) in the course of a criminal investi- gation if necessary to the -investigation, :Provided - that covert human sources .ahould net be directed at an American as a part of an investigation, of a committed act ;unless there is reasonable inspicicin, to believe that the American Is responsibte, for the act, and then 7enly ,for the' purpose of identifying :ith'e perpetrators of the act. . If. the American is the target of a full preventive intelligence investi- evation . and the Attorney General or is designee. makes a written -.finding ,that he has ? considered and rejected ...less Intrusive techniques and he believes 'that covert human 'sources are necessa- to obtain information for the investi- ', gation. .Recommendation 56--Covert, human - sources which have been directed-at -an 'investigation in a full preventive intelligence oneestigation should not be used tie-col- lect information on the activities of the ,.American for more than 90 days after ,ilie source is in place and capable of re- Porting unless the Attorney General or ,his designee finds in writing either that there are "compelling -circumstances,". which case they may be -used for an - 'additional. 60 days,, or that there is probable cause that the American will soon engage in terrorist activities or hostile foreign intelligence activities. Recommendation 57?All .covert. hu- :than sources used by the F.B.I. should be reviewed by the. Attorney General ier his designee as soon as practicable *rid 'should be terminated unless. the Covert human source could be !directed ? \against an American in a criminal inves- ligation or a full preventive intelligence liniestileation under these recontmenda- tions. ? ? ' 'Recommendation .58?Mail . surveil- :lance and the review of tax returns d tax-related information should- be Conducted consistently with the. rectitm- inendations '[above], In addition to re- strictions [above], the review of, tax teturns and tax-related 'information, as well ' as' review' of medical or social iiittory records, 'confidential records of private institutions and confidential rec- eords?of Federal, state and local govern- ment agencies other than intelligence or law enforteinent agencies may not be used against an American except: (1) In the course of a criminal 'investi- gation, if necessary to the investigation; e. (2) If the American is' the' target ot a full preventive intelligence investi- gation and the Attorney General or 'lis designee makes a written finding that he has considered and rejected ? less intrusive techniques and he believes that the covert technique requested by the bureau is necessary to obtain information necessary to the investiga- tion. Recommendation 59--The use of phys- ical surveillance and review, of credit and telephone records and any records of governmental or private institutions other than those covered in Recommen- -dation 58 should be permitted to be used against an American, if necessary, in the. course of either a criminal inves- tigation or a preliminary or full preven- tive intelligence investigation. ? Recommendation 60?Covert tech- niques should be permitted at the scene of a' potential ,civil disorder ? in the coulee of preventive "criminal intel- ligence and criminal investigations as 'described' above. Nortwarrant ',covert techniques may also be ? directed at an -American during a civil disorder in which extensive acts of violence are occurring and Federal troops have been introduced. This additional author- ity to direct such covert techniques at 'Americans during a civil disorder sheuld be limited to circumstances where Federal troops are actually in use and the technique is used ? only for the purpose or preventing further violence. ? Recommendation 61--Covert tech- niques should not be directed at an American in the course of a background investigation without the informed writ- ten consent of the American. . _ "Recommendation 62?If Congress en- acts a statute 'attaching criminal Same tions to security leaks, covert tech- niques- should be directed at Americans iff the course of security leak investigao tont onlyif such techniques are consist- ent tvith Recommendation 55(1) 58(1) or 59. With respect to security risks, Congress might consider authorizing. 'covert techniques, other than 'those re- quiring a judicial warrant, to be directed at Americans in the course of security? risk investigations, but Only upon a Written finding of the Attorney General that there is reasonable suspicion to, believe that the'indiVidual is' a security risk, he has .considered .atel rejected less intrusive techniques and he believes the technique requested is necessary , to the investigation.,, ? .t ? ,110,1dellta1 Overhears, y, ? lecommendatton 63?Except as Iiinit- ed elsewhere in these recommendations or in Title III oP the' Omnibus Crime ?Contred and Safe Streets Act of 1968, information obtained incidentally through an authorized covert technique about an American or a foreigner who ,isnot the target of the covert technique Con' be used as the basis for any author- :ized_domestic security investigation. Recommendation 64, ? Information should not he maintained except where relevant to the purpose of -an investiga- tion. Recommendation 65 ? Personally identifiable information on . Americans obtained in the following kinds of inves- tigations should be, sealed or purged as follows (unless it appears- on its face to be necessary for another author- "ized investigation): .(a) Preventive intelligence investiga- tions of terrorist or hostile foreign intelligence activities?as soon as the investigation ie terminated by the Attor- ney General ? or Ids designee -pursuant to Recommendation 45 or 69. '(13).Civil disorder assistance...etre soon. as the ,assistance is termineted by the Attorney. -General or his designee 'put- 23 suant to. Recommendatien 69, provided that Where troops have-been intmduced such information need .be sealed or purged Only within, a reasonable period after their withdrawal.',, Recommendation es Information previously gained by the F.B.I. or any other intelligence agency through illegal .techniques should be sealed -or purged ? as soon as practicable. ? - Recommendation 67 Personally identifiable information on Americans from domestic security investigations may be disseminated Outside the De- partment of Justice as follow; (a) preventive ?intelligence investiga- tions of terrorist activities?Tersoually?? identifiable information On Americans from preventive criminal intelligence , investigations of terrorist activities may be disseminated only to:. . (I) A foreign Or domestic law enforce- ment agency which has jurisdiction over the criminal activity to which the infor- mation relates, or ? ? .(2) To a foreign intelligence or Milita- ey. agency of the United States, if necessary for: an attivity :permitted' by , these irecommendations, or ' (3) To an appropriate Federal. official ?with authority tcrmake?personnel deci- sions about the -subject of the infoltna- .. lop, or t ? ? ? -(4) To 'a foreign intelligence or niilita- ey agency of' ceopeeating foreign :power if? necessary for an. artivity per- mitted by these recommendations to ? similar 'the . of %e -.United States, ;or. ? '(5). Where necessary to warn state or local officials' of -terrorist activity :likely to occur within their jurisdiction, (6) Where necessary to warn any 'person ofe a threat toiif or property ? from terrorist activity. (b). Preventive intelligence investiga- tions of hostile foreign 'Intelligence ac- -tivities?personally identifiable informa- tion on Americans from preventive -criminal 'intelligence investigations of hostile 'intelligence activities may be disseminated only: , ? ' (1) To an appropriate Federal official with authority to make personnel deci- - sions about the subject of the informa- tion, or . (2) To the National.-- Security Council ? or the Department of state upon request or where appropriate to their adminis- tration of U.S, foreign policy; or - (3) To a foreign 'intelligence or mill- itary 'agency of the -United States, if relevant ? to an activity permitted by these recommendations. or (4) To a foreign intelligence or milita- ry agency of a - cooperating foreign power if relevant to an -activity permit- ted by these recommendations to similar .(c) Civil disorders assistance?person- ally:identifiable information on. Amer- icans Involved in an actual or potential disorder, collected in the . course of .civil disorders assistance, should not ,be disseminated outside the Department of Justice , except . to military officials and appropriate state and local officials at the scene of a civil diserder where Federal. treops are present. (d) Background investigations?to the maximum extent feasible, the results of background investigations 'should be segregated within the F.B.I. and only disseminated to officials. outside the Department of Justice authorized to make personnel decisions with respect _ to the subject. (e) Al) other authorized domestic security investigations--to governmen- tal officials who are authorized to take Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77,00432R000100400004-9 ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 action consistent with the purpose of an investigation or who have statutory duties which require the ,information. ? Recommendation 68?Officers of executive branch who are made respon- sible by these recommendations for overseeing intelligence activities and? appropriate Congressional committees should have access to all information necessary for their functions. The com- mittees should adopt procedures to protect the privacy of, subjects of files maintained by the F.B.I. and other?agen- des affected by the domestic intel- ligence recommendations. . - Attorney General Oversight of. the F.B.I. ? Recommendation 69?The Attorney ,Geteral should: (a) Establish a program of routine and periodic review of F.B.I. domestic security investigations to ensure that, the F.B.I. is complying with all of the foregoing recommendations, and (b) Assure, with respect to the follow- ing investigations of Americans, that: ? (1) Preventive intelligence investiga- tions of terrorist activity or hostile foreign intelligence activity are termi- nated within one year, except, that the Attorney General or his designee may granf extensions upon a written finding of "compelling circumstances"; (2) Covert techniques are used, in ? preventive intelligence investigations of terrorist activity or hostile foreign intel- ligence activity only so long as necessa- ry and not beyond - tinie lintits estab- lished- by the Attorney General, except ' that the Attorney General or his desig- nee may -grant extensions upon a writ- .:ten finding- of "compelling Cirdita- stances." - ' ' ? ??:.'(3) Civil disbrd:ers assistance as ter- minated mien) withdrawal of Federal troops or, if troops were not introduced, within e reasonable time after the find- ing by the. Attorney General that troops are likely to be requested, except that thel'Attorney. General of his designee may', grant extensioris upon a Written finding of "compelling circumstances." ? Reconiinendatioo 70?The Attorney 'General shOeld review the internal regu-7 lations of the F.B.I.-and other, intel- ligence agen,cies engaging in domestic 'security activities to ensure that such internal regulations are proper, and ade- quate to protect the, constitutional rights efAmeritaes. . . Recommenation 71?The Attorney General or his designee (such as the Office of Legal Counsel of the Depart- ment of Justice) should advise the gen- eral counsels of intelligence agencies on interpretations of statutes and regu- lations adopted pursuant to these rec- Ommendations and on such other legal questions is are described below. , : Recommendation 72?The Attorney :General should have ultimate responsi- bility for, the investigation of alleged Violations ef law relating to the domes- tie intelligence recommendations. ? Recommendations 73?The Attorney 'General should be notified of possible alleged violations of law ,through the Office of Professional Responsibility by agency heads, general counsel or inspec- tors general of intelligence agencies. - Recommendation 74?The heads of all intelligence agencies affected by these recommendations are ? responsible for the prevention and detection of alleged violations of the law by' or on behalf of their respective agencies and for the reporting to the ?Attorney General of all such alleged violations. Each such agency head should arsO assure his agency's cooperation with the AttOrney General in investigation of alleged 4? ? ,, ' Recommendation -75?The F.B..t. and each other intelligence agency' should have a general counsel, nominated by the President and confirmed by the Sen- ate, and an inSpentor 'general appointed by. the agency head. ? Recommendation 76-7-Any individual having informatipn on past, current, or , proposed activities which appear Are be illegal, improper or in Violation of age,n- ?cy. policy should be ?required to report ?.,the matterimmediately to the agency head; general counsel or inspector gen- eral. If the matter is not initially re-. ported .to the. general counsel he. should ' be notified. by the agency head or in- spector general. Each Agency should reg- *.ularly remind employees: of their -obli- gation to report such information.. . Recemmendation 77?As provided in Recommendation 74, the heads . of the F.B.I.' and of other intelligence agencies are responsible for reporting to the At- torney General alleged violations of law. When such reports are made the ap- ,propriate Congressional committees should be notified. . . ? e. Recommendation 78 ?? The general counsel and inspector general of the F.B.I. , and of each other , intelligence agency, should have unrestricted access to all information in the possession. of ' the agency and should have the authori- ty, to review all,, of the agency's, activi- ties. The Attorney, General of the Office of Professional Responsibility; on, his be- half, 'Should have access to ill leforma- tie in 'the possession Of 'an agency Which, in the 'opinion of the Attorney General, is 'necessary' for an investiga- tion of Illegal activity.,' Recommendation. 79, ? The general counsel of the, F.B.I... and of each other 'intelligence agency should review all Significant proposed:agency activities to determine their .,legalitY and- constitu- , fionality. . , -Recommendation 80?The director of ? the F.B.I. and the heads of each other (intelligence agency should . be required to report at least annually. to the appro- priate committee of the Congress on. the ',activities of the. general counsel and the Off ice of theInspectoe General. -Recommendation 81?The director of the F.B.I. and the heads of each other intelligence agency should 'be required report, at least annually, to. the Attor- ney General on 011, reports of activities. which appear illegal, improper, outside, the legislative charter or in Violation of 'agency regulations. Such reports should include , the general counsel's findings concerning these activities, a summary of the inspector general's in vestigations of these activities and the practice and procedures developed to discover activities that raise questions' of legality or propriety. Office of Professional Responsibility ? Recommendation 82?The Office of. Professional Responsibility created by Attorney General Levi should be recog- nized in statute. The director of the of- fice, appointed by the Attorney General, should report directly to the Attorney General or the Deputy Attorney General!, The functions of the office should, in- dude: ? ? Attorney General, should report directly to the Attorney General or the Deputy Attorney General, The functions of the office should include: , (a) Serving as a 'central repository of reports and notifications provided the Attorney General, and 24 (b) Investigation, if requested by the Attorney General, of alleged violations by intelligence agencies of statutes en- acted or regulations promulgated pur- suant to these recommendations. Recommendation 83?The Attorney General is responsible for all of the ac- tivities of the F.B.I., and the director of the F.B.I. is responsible to, and should be under the supervision and control of, the Attorney General. , Recommendation 84?The director of the F.B.I. should be nominated by the ? President and confirmed by the Senate . to serve at the pleasure of the President for a single term of not more than eight ? Recommendation 85?The Attorney General should consider exercising his power to appoint assistant directors of ? the F.B.I. should be nominated by the should be imeoseeI,on the tenure of the assistant director for the Intelligence Di- vision. . Recommendation 86?The Attorney General should approve all administra- tive regulations required to ?implement statutes created pursuant to these rec- ommendations. ? ? Recommendation 87?Such regula- - tons, except for regulations concerning investigations of hostile foreign intel- ligence activity or other matters which are properly classified should be issued' pursuant 'to the Administrative Proce- dures Act and should be subject to the approval of the Attorney General. Recommendation 88?The effective date of regulations pertaining to the following matters should be delayed 90 days, dering which time' Congress would have the opportunity to review such regulations: . (a) Any C.I.A. activities against Amer- icans, as permitted above; (b) Military activities at the time ?of a civil disorder; ? (c) The authorized scope of domestic security investigations, authorized in- vestigative techniques, maintenance and dissemination of information ? by the FBL and ? ? ? (d) The termination of investigations and covert techniques -as described .,[above].. . . ,?? ? Recommendation 89?Each, year the F.B.I. and other intelligence agencies -affected by these recommendations should be required to seek annual statu- tory authorization for their programs. Recommendation 90?The Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552 (b) ) and the Federal Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. 552 (a) ) provide important mechan- isms by which individuals can gain access to information on intelligence activity directed against them. The domestic intelligence recommendations assume that these statutes will continue to be vigorously enforced. In addition, the Department of Justice should notify all readily identifiable targets of past illegal surveillance techniques and all Cointelpro victims and third parties who had received anonymous Cointelpro communications of the nature of the activities directed against them or the source of the anonymous communica- tion to?thein. Recommendation 91?Congress should enact a comprehensive civil remedies statute which would' accomplish the following: (a) Any American with a substantial ' and specific claim to an actual or threatened injury by a violation of the Constitution by Federal intelligence officers or agents 'acting under coiar of law should have a Federal cause of action against the Government and the individual Federal intelligence offi- cer or agent responsible for the viola- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 . _A.PPrP_Ked Fctr Re Ipa?,e.,001/08/9.8_; PIA-IRDP77,790432Rq001.9940909479 tion, without regard to the monetary amount in controversy. If actual injury is proven in court, the committee be- lieves that the Injured person should be entitled to equitable relief, actual, general and punitive damages and re- covery of the costs of litigation. If threatened injury is proven in court, the committee believes that equitable relief and recovery of the costs of litigation should be available. ? (b) Any American with a substantial and specific claim to actual or threatened Injury by violation of the statutory char- ter for intelligence activity (as proposed by these domestic intelligence recom- mendations) should have a cause of ac- tion for relief as in (a) above. (c) Because of the secrecy that sur- counds intelligence programs, the tom- -rnittee believes that a plaintiff should have two years from the date upon which he discovers or reasonably should have discovered the facts which give rise to a cause of action for relief from a constitutional or statutory viola- tion. (d) Whatever statutory provision may be made to permit an individual defend- ant to raise an affirmative defense that the acted within the scope of his official duties, in good faith and with ? a? reasonable belief that the action be took was lawful, the committee believes that to insure relief to persons injured by governmental intelligence activity this defense should be available solely to individual defendants and should not extend to the- Government. Moreover, the defense should not be available to bar injunctions against indi- vidtral defendants. Criminal Penalties Should Be ;Enacted ? . Recommendation 92?The committee believes that criminal penalties should apply, where appropriate,, to. willful . and knowing violations of statutes en- acted pursuant to the domestic intel- ligence recominendations. ? Recommendation 93?Congress should , either repeal the Smith Act (18 U.S.C. 2385) and the Voorhis Act (18 U.S.C. .2386), which on their face appear to authorize investigation of "mere advo- cacy" of a political ideology, or amend those statutes so that domestic security investigations are only directed at conduct which might serve as the basis fora constitutional criminal prosecution tinder supreme Court decisions inter- preting these and related statutes. Recommendation 94?The appropriate committees of the Congress should re- view the Espionage Act of 1917 to determine whether it should be amended to cover modem forms of foreign espionage, including industrial, techno- logical or economic espionage. .. Recommendation 95?The appropriate .Congressional oversight committees of the Congress should, from time to time, request the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct audits and reviews of the intelligence activities of any department or agency of the United States affected by the Domestic Intelligence Recommendations. For such pu:pose, the Comptroller General or any of his duly authorized representa- tives should have access to, and the right to examine, all necessary materials of any such department or agency. Recommendation 98?The committee re-endorses the concept of vigorous Senate oversight to review the conduct of domestic security activities through a new permanent intelligence oversight committee. Definitions For the purposes of these recommen- dations: A. "Americans" means U.S. citizens, resident aliens and unincorporated associations, composed primarily of U.S. citizens or resident aliens; and corporations, incorporated or having their principal place of business in the United States or having majority ownership by U.S. citizens, or resi- dent aliens, including foreign sub- sidiaries of such corporations, pro- vided, however, "Americans" does not include corporations directed- by, foreign governments or organi- ? zations. ,B4 "Collect" means to gather or initiate the acquisition of information or to request it from another agency. C. A "covert human source" means undercover agents or informants who are paid or otherwise con- trolled by art agency. D. "Covert techniques" means the col- lection of information, including col- lection from record sources not readily available to a private person (except state or local law enforce- ment files), in such a manner as?n'ot to be detected by the subject. , E. "Domestic security activities" means governmental activities against Amer- icans or conducted within the United States or its territories, including enforcement of the criminal laws, intended to: 1. Protect the United States from hostile foreign intelligence activity including espionage; 2. Protect the Federal, state and local governments from domestic 'violence or rioting, anti 3. Protect Americans and their Government from terrorists. 4 F. "Foreign communications" refers to a communication between or among two or more parties in which at least one party is outside the United States or a communication trans- mitted between 'points within the United States if transmitted over a facility which. is under the control of or exclusively used by a foreign government. ? . G. "Foreigners" means persons and or- ? gartizations who are not Americans as defined above. IL "Hostile foreign Intelligence' tivities" means acts or conspiracies by Americans or foreigners who are NEW YORK TIMES 27 April 1976 Articles in 1974 Spurred Inquiry Special to The New York Times WASHINGTON. April 26?The report of the Senate Select Committee on In- telligence Activities, part of which was released today, is the result of the most intensive investigation ever conducted - into America's foreign and domestic in- telligence system. The study grew out of articles that appeared in The New York Times late in 1974. On Dec. 22, 1974, Seymour M. Hersh reported in the Times on a wide- spread program of spying on American citizens conducted without legal au- thority by the Central Intelligence Agency. As a result of that article and earlier accounts of covert United States in- 25 officers, employees or conscious agents of a foreign power or who, pursuant to the direction of a for- eign power, engage irr clandestine intelligence activity or engage in espionage, sabotage or similar con- ? duct in violation of Federal criminal statutes. , I. "Name checks" means the retrieval ?by an agency of information already in the possession of the Federal Gov- ernment or in the possession of state or local law enforcement agencies. J. "Overt investigative techniques" . means the collection-of information readily available from public sources or available to a private person, in. eluding interviews of the subject or his friends or associates. K. "Purged" means to destroy or trans- fer to the National Archives all ? personally identifiable information (including references in any general name index). L. "Sealed" means to retain personally identifiable information and to retain . entries in a general name index but ? to restrict access to the information arid entries to circumstances .of "compelling necessity." M. "Reasonable suspicion" is based upon the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Terry V. Ohio, 392 ? U.S. 1 (1968), and means specific and articulable facts which, taken' together'. with rational inferences from those facts, give rise to a retta sonable suspicion that 'specified ac- tivity has occurred, is occurring or is about to occur. ? N. "Terrorist activities"' means acts, or conspiracies which: (a) are violent 'or dangerous to human life; and (b) violate Federal. or state criminal statutes concerning assassination, murder, arson, bombing, hijacking or kidnapping; and (c) appear in- tended to or are likely -to have the effect of: ? ? (1) Substantially disrupting Fed- eral, state or local government, or (2) Substantially disrupting inter- state or foreign commerce between the United States and another coun- try, or (3) Directly interfering with the exercise by Americans of constitu- ? tional rights protected by the Civil Rights Act of 1968, or by foreigners of their rights under the laws or ? treaties of the United States. - O. "Unauthorized entry" means entry ? unauthorized by the target. volvenient in 'the overthrow of the Gov- ernment of President Salvador Allende Gossens in Chile, the Senate voted on Jan. 26, 1975, to organize the select committee. On Feb. 18, the House estab- lished a counterpart committee. The House committee's report has yet to be made public, largely ljecause of a,, controversy that arose wben The Times and Daniel Schorr, a CBS News cor- respondent, obtained and reported on the final results of the House study be- fore its official release. The congressional investigations , follow one conducted within the C.I.A. by the former Director of Central Intel- ligence, William .E. Colby, and another by a Presidential commission headed by Vice President Rockefeller. All of the reports supported the original disclosures in The Times about covert activities by the C.I.A. in Chile ? and illegal intelligence work , in the United States. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 WASKENGTON POST 27 APR 19(5 Uses Academ-ics, Reporters Covert Roles Trolthle Panel By Stephen Isaac's Washingt1 Poit. writer The Central Intelligence 771 Some detail how the-CIA_ Aeency continues to use 'e.'heti iir;zed in .1%7 by a American academics and s-1..eoial pregden(ial ' study journalists, according to the 44minission it) end its covert Senate intelligence commit- tist . of Ainerica,n institu-Y tee's report. The report ticeis. simply switched its, withheld the names of in- 4cus instead to the indiviW dividuals and institutions rats in the instialtion?- -?4'; that cooperate with the 1967 st tidy cOnun'1.1 ee CIA, , las:headed My then Xiider: ?1..C..eretary. of State. NiCholOS: de13.?kafzenbach. Inc Katzenbach commit- tee, the new report, says was really .intended not to study the. 1, nation's gence- comMunity,:. bit ? to Shield it. ? ? .' ;The administratio ? . of Pfesident Johnson Italy; and consciousl.. .mandate 3f:r.thb Kotzenbach committc.2's, veStigation." the repol t says. Katzenliach. now ? ail attor: ney ,prate prar in New York, testified ' .hat his committee was de.sig7ied...'by: President- -Johnson . . to In a section dealing with the 'domestic impact of for- eign clandestine opera- tions," the report states that the CIA has covert relation- ships with more than 25 American journalists or em- ployees of U.S. media and uses "several hundred" aca- demics. The report asserts that the CIA is in contact with "many thousands" of Ameri- can academics, but that most of these contacts are not dangerous because they consist principally of "asking an academic about his travels abroad." The committee is more worried about the opera- tional use of academics. "The committee sees no danger to the integrity of. American private institu- tions" in informal consulta- tions between 'academics and the CIA, the report says. "Indeed," it states, "there are benefits to both the government and the universities in such con- tacts, funding mechanistr i." . time serve an operational "... The operational use ...One device the ;IA' used' purpose -? directed .by the of academics is another mat- to get .arotind the 967 com-. Central intelligence Agen; ter. It raises troubling ques- Mitte:e.'s ban On?- frther in- tions as to preservation of stitutional. fund ag was The -committee also the integrity integrity of American '.surge funding.' ? academic institutions." gests that all contacts with In. this. the CIL advanced acacleiniei be open.- ' According to the commit- large.sums. of moit-w. to cert "... If the CIA is to tee, several hundred Ameri- tam. organizations "before serve the Intelligence- needs can academics. "in addition the December- tleadlinc," of the nation." the report to providing leads and, on thus giving the:A enough says; "it must -have unfet- occasion, making introdue- money. to operat; for sev- tered access to the best ad- tions for intelligence pur- teal \'CarS I vice and judgment .our .uni? poses, occasionally write Radio Free !'uriitie and versities can produce. Blif books and other material to Radio. 'Liberty were se- t is . advice and expertise be used for propaganda pur- turided;" the rem t says.. ? ? and should be openly' poses abroad. Beyond these, -.-,The Senate r, oort states can sought ?and, openly given." an additional few score are that appearance rather In its section on the me: used in an unwitting man- than specific re.: dations ? ner for minor activities. determined WI- h itistitu- dia, the .report notes that' the CIA has "a network of several hundred foreign. in: . divicluals around the Worlct. who provide intelligence for the CIA and at times at- tempt to influence .foreign opinion through the use. of covert propaganda. These individuals provide' theCIA With direct access to a large number of newspapers and periodicals. Scores 'ofpress services and news agencies, radio and television stations commercial book publishers, and other foreign media out- lets.-"-'? The CIA had covert rein... tionshlps with "about ;30 American journalists or em-, or. -.enaeted as a statute. Thus, it has no firm legal st ? ? : - ? - - As a result. the Senate study notes. the CIA. pontin- tiCrl to f . ? ".A Publications a n d institute that.. main- tained a -worldwide. network of stringers and correspond- ents." _ '?"-Several international tratI6 union organizations." ? ?'!A foreign based news feature service." ? "A foreign -based re-- -search and publishing insti- tute." ? .% One orthe things the CIA did, the- .Senate committee' says, was to "surge-fund" a "large project in the ? Far I East" so that it could con- . tine into-fiscal year i969 The' committee recon mends that the CIA be for- bidden by law. to convert those' who go abroad under government-sponsored pro- grams into witting or unwit- ting operatiyes.. ? ? . The' CIA now has a paliCY of avoiding use of Fulbright luaad!--'ott.:a full-Seqe scholars and those who re-: celye grants from the. Carrie.: senate report 535.;"'4.11, gie; Ford ' or Rockefeller eovert relationships were. tt,i, foundations. The committee fexeluded , from t. c ia feels that, ban should be ex- ? ? ?,4;' tended. , Z.4-urt11,er,, -aeeordin 14 th ..e -It is -unacceptable."' the. 'Zenate- ;.r.e.pdrt -1 ? e CIA report says, "that Ameri- trbved?:-.- rapidly ?-tr Shelter cans Would go overseas un- diertaln-- high-prioritV opera-1,. der ,a cultural or academic Mobs from the K:,,-,zenbach exchange' program funded. (committee's) prcitibitions openly by the United States. and .to devise mo; ?.! secure Congress and 'at the same' "These academies are lo- tions the ? CIA ?out(' con- cated in over 100 American tinue to fund- r '1 which it colleges, universities and re- WOuld cutoff. lated institutes. At the ma- ,0"Many Of- the restrictions- Jority of institutions, no one developed- hi' tin CIA in re-? 7:trher than the ludividnal sponse to the ex1nts of 1967 ,mieerned is aware or? the appear to he sr ,trity .meas- ?-I\ link. At the others, at eves aimed rt loreventing 'least one university official hod her disclosures ? could je )3111iZe Sl`11- 1 aware of the operational :itse made of academies on sitivr (41A op ations" the Ifis campus, hi addition.' report says. " tor' did not :there are several 'American rep res en t s;mificant re, academics abroad who serve thinking of v ere bound- tperational purposes. 1)11. :ivies ought to drawn in a, marily the collection of in free society. ?""ver' ee?ce." ? , though Presit l'rit Johnson , , a.dopted the l?-,:tzenbarli re- The Aninnmittee putiines Port as a it was not issued as an es litiVC order 26 ployees.0L.U.S. media organ- izat ions" until rehru.zry, .1976, and continues to have relationships with more than halt of those, :he re- port says. ? The report dwells at some length ? 'on Cl ,-sponsored books, and notes that 4,ne? CIA &Tidal had written that books can lw -the most important weapon of strate- gic '(long.-range) propa- ganda." - In Ode year-1967?the re- port says, the CIA "published or subsidized well over 200 books." Those books ? ranged. ?ac- ('ording to the report, from "books on Wildlife and sa- faris to' translations of Ma- chiavelli's "The Prince" into Swahili and works of LS. Eliot into Russian. -to a par. odY. of. the' famouS little red book of quotations- from Mae -entitled 'Quotations from Chairman Liu." Among the pre-1967 books -the CIA had a hand Were-the famed Pen- kovskY. PaPers, which were' serialized in $0111e 'American newspapers. including The Washington Post, in 1965. Atthe,:.tilne,?when the So- viet",-Unitut said -the hook. was, ? 6.,? fraud, investigat:orit by ,rnoft ',American media callect..the book legitimate. , . The!. Senate - '.'-eoranittee's repo.qtlestribes. the Papers as a:"CIA,book.". "The' be*, was prepared and . ? Written; by witting agency aSsefs'Icho drew on- actual-ease materials," the S e n.a te.. committee --says, "Publication rights JO the manuscript were sold- to -a publisher through a trust fundc?which:' was,esrablisited for. the.: PurPose.. The-pub. lisher- was' unaware of ank U.S. .government. iii Wrest," The;.report adds that the book:iVoSfereated "for opera- tional . reasons" by the -clA and 'almost 'accidentally had a commercial success. Another book the CIA de- veloped was one "abow" a student'..from a developing count*" who had studied in a COtmmenist-country."- Tivo"major -American 'rag.: azin'es ? -published digested versions of-the book, the re- port says, and "Eric Sevar- eid,. the. -CBS political com- mentator, ill' t?eviewin.: this book, spoke a larger truti. than he knew when he sug- gestyd. that 'our propazanda seryjces tould do worse than, to flood:,(foreign) universty towns with this volume.' " Yet another 'CIA book. on the Vietnam. wer, was p:?o- duced by the CIA :v. 1.`154 and was "distributed to tor- ? crobassic:s :he :_linted States. ard I,, ?,t? levied new?spapen, 1:,te- azitte editors both in Ine United States and abroad.' s i e I h.; -:1 committee *report the! Senate committee saj's Approved For Relase 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 Approved ForRelease 200148/08 : CIA-RDP7-7:00432R0001-60400004-8 t 6.k it ? been devoted -almost totally to "books and other mated-. als published abroad."' Since 1969, the report says. the CIA has produced about 250 hooks abroad, most of them in foreign Ian- guages. The report notes that "more than a dozen United ? States news organizations ? and commercial publishing houses ? -formally provided cover for CIA agents abroad. A few of these or- ? lanizations. Were . unaware that 'they ? provided this cover."? . Most new organizations that were found to be using ?CIA operatives abroad were unaware that they were buy; ing stories from people with CIA connections, the report says.- in noting that most CIA -relationships with American ? Media people abroad involve free-lance journalists. The Senate committee's report discusses the "isn't it a Small world" situation that in communications have created. In previous centuries, for- eign propaganda w 0 u 1 cl likely never 'rebound heine. But' with the kind of .elec:? tronic togetherness that binds today's- World,- the re- port says; I.:propaganda des tined for one Part- 'Of the world often has fallout back home. - ? -.s":.? :Further:,-; the. cOmmittee saYs, ?HoWard Hunt (Of- White- *.:Ifouse. "pluMbers" finite) Was: in'. charge' of the CIA's "contact. with book publishers in the late 1960s, and testified befOre the Seri- ate COmthittee 'that :such. propaganda "fallout the United States) may not have been -nnintentional." view of thatAhe coin; inittee-:?says that. the CIA may have "helped shape . American attitudes toward, Atie.eteerging China" in the 1960s, and "engaged in prop, agandizing t. h e American- public, inclusinns its Con-. -gress, on the- con;.:oyersial. Assile of U.S. involvemeet in. yietnam." the latter case, the re-- Poresays the CIA funded a, Vietnamese institution,'t whose magazine was distribs- uted in the 'United States . by the. South , Vietnamese.' einbassyhere. ? .. . The funding was secret. and the organization, the Vi" etnamese Council on For- eign Relations. was not named in the ropers> The CIA provided 5170.000 . per ? year in 1974 and 1975' -for support of the institu- tion's publications, the re, port says. , , , Intelligence sources said the CIA had founded the- council as a covert opera-, tion. designed to promote. ,support for the Vietnam war' -among foreign influence - 'molding, groups. The report said that -in at' _least' 'one .InStatiee ?CIA,?:= supported Vietnam publica- tion was used to propagan- dize the -American public and the members and staff of both houses of Congress. So effective was this propa ganda that some members quoted from the publication in debating the controver- sial question of United States involvement in Viet- nam." The report also says that "tile institution on at least .one occasion invited a group 'of, American congressmen to Vietnam and Sponsored their' acitivities on at least part of their trip"- - In another instance of American fallout from an overseas propaganda, sys- tem, the report mentions that the CIA maintains "two proprietary news services"- inEurope. "The larger of the two? was'subscribed to by over 30 U:S; newspapers," thereport says. "In au' effort JO reduce: the problem of fallout. the' CIA made a senior official. at ...the major U.S. dailies aware- that the CIA con trolled these two 'press serv- ices." 2. The committee notes that sometimes "fallout in the United States May 'be a nec- essary part -nf.- the. propa' ganda procesii" to .create an-' aura of "credibility, as with serious:he-6k reviews. :00 -at least- one occasion,' the report Says, ,CI A-s p o sored book was reviewed in The New York Tittles "by a CIA writer *under contract." Yet another kind of U.S.- foreign rebound is described in the report of a relation- shin _between an American newspaper executive and, the CIA. , .In view of, this' malt's " information of in- 'telligence and operational interests," "the CIA con- tacted the man, who "served .as witting. unpaid collabh- rotor for intelligence collec- tion and received 'briefings from :CIA which 'were of professional benefit' to him. The CIA Materials state ? that:. .? ? ? . was ' visualized that. propaganda ? ? (if agreeable to -him) might be initially inserted :1h his pa- per ,and then* be available for ? reprinting by Latin American news outlets . . . 'There is no indication in the file that Subject agreed . . or that he did place *propa- ganda in his newspaper'." Finally, the committee re- port On qornestic fallout dis- cusses the danger of using ;religious 'organizations as CIA fronts. ? "Making operational use of U.S. religious groups for national purposes both vio- lates their nature and un- dermines their bonds with kindred groups around the world," the committee says. Since 1967, the report says, the CIA has had strict rules against using religious NEW YORK TIMES 27 April 1976 .- ? war PanelsUrgedtoMonitor Covert Actions Abroad Rpeesial to The New Y?sek WASHINGTON, April 26-1 i'The United States has underta-' !ken thousands of covert actions 'abroad since 1947, including 900 major or sensitive projects in the last 15 years alone, with' only partial success and in Isome instances, severe damage to the nation's foreign policy. laccording to a report today by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence activities. , The 11-member committee iconsidered at one point recom- mending a ban against all !covert actions, the report said, but later concluded that the United States must have some covert capability. Only Senator Frank Church, the Idaho Demo- crat who headedsthe panel, end- ed up calling for a ban. . Limits on Covert Actions "The committee has conclud- ed, however, that the United States should maintain the ca- pability to react through covert action when no other means will suffice to meet extraordi- nary circumstances involving grave threats to U.S. national security," the report said. "Nevertheless, covert action should' be considered as an ex- ception to the normal process of Government action abroad, rather than a parallel but invis- ible system in which covert operations are routine." The report mentioned by name no covert operations that had not been previously public ly known. It urged that "the intelligence oversight commit- tees of Congress should require that the annual budget submis- sion for covert action programs ,be specified and detailed as to organizations without ap- erovat. from: high-level CIA ,:ificials and "the CIA has assured the committee that the 'prohibition against 'all paid -or contractural rela- tionships' is -in fact a prohi- bition. against any opera- tional use Of Americans fol- lowing 'a religious vocation." ? The Senate committee says the CIA- has used few American clergy or mission- aries, Adding that only four such 'relationships- existed by, last August. Of the recent cases, "the most damaging would ap- pear to, he that of a U.S. priest serving the CIA as an informant on student and religious dissidence," the re- port says., Of the earlier cases, the report notes' that the CIA "used the pastor of a church in a Third World country as a 'principal agent' to. carry out covert action projects, and as a.' spotter; assesspr, asset , developer, a recruit- er." This man, who the report says reflected political infor- mation and passed CIA propaganda I o the local press, was paid by the Cl.? for more than ten years. 27 the activity recommended." The recommendation left the door open, however, for "un- foreseen" covert action projects to be financed from the intel- ligence agency's "contingency reserve fund' and accounted for later. The report defined covert ac- tions as those sub-rosa efforts; ?from buying-candidates in anl election to waging a secret wail in Laos?that the United States i tried to carry out without beingj identified with as a nation. The committee said that there i was no legal authorization fori covert action in the 1947 Na.! tional Security Act or subse- quent laws pertaining to intel- ligence, but that internal execu- tive orders had increased th powers to conduct covert oper-1 ations 'abroad. .The .committee investigated I covert actions frein the crea- tion of the modern intelligencel system in 1947 through the, present. Part of its findings andi descriptions, the report said.! would be circulated only to senators and not made public,, at the request of the Central Intelligence Agency. Covert Actions Traced , The report traced covert ac- itions from a State Department- C I A hybrid in the late 1940's ,called the Office of Policy Coor- dination through the formation of a clandestine services sec-I tion at the C.I.A. in 1952. then called the Deputy .Directorate for Plans. The early covert *actions .run by the Office of Policy Coordin- ation mainly involved giving fi- nancial support and encourace-, ment to labor unions, poltical parties and other groups in- Western Europe in the late. 1940's as they tried to resist; a Communist takeover, ,the re- port said. - . It was during the Korean' War, the' report said, that para-1 military covert operations camel to the fore. After the Korean War, according to the report, a directive of The National Se-' curity Council broadened oper- ations to the entire globe. Prviously such . actions were confined to areas contiguous to- the Soviet Union or China. ? ' This resulted in widespread 1secret operations in Latin America, Africa and the Far East, the report said. Though ?the committee. studied several actions, it publicly discussed only a 10-year effort to stop Salvador Allende Gossens. a Marxist, from becoming Pres- ident in Chile, efforts to under- mine General Sukarno in In- donesia and various political assassination plots, includig operation Mongoose, which sought to kill Fidel Castro, Prime Minister of Cuba. The? committee leveled- its strongest criticism at the para- military covert -actions. "The committee's findings on para- military activities suggest that these operations are an anoma- ly, if not an aberration, of covert action," the report said. The committee said that tins Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 WASHINGTON POST 27 APR 1916 Dealing Intelligently with Intelligence 11-1HE SENATE INTELLIGENCE .committee'S. fina ? teport is a serious comprehensive summary? surely' the best in the public domain?of American 'foreign) intelligence activities. It 'extends beyond 'an accounting' ofselected past abuses into an an,alysisef the: eduntry's intelligence requirements and a-set of detailed proposals on how these requirements canbe met ma way that at once served national security and respects the rule of law.' ? :The report is a mainstream document Its premise Is that intelligence remains a national necessity, that all..intelligence activities must- be managed more carefully, that some must be conducted secretly. Yet past abuses are not whitewashed and the genuine dif- ficulties of future control are not glossed over. The House may 'have been unable,- to deal intelligently with intelligence. The Senate? by this report, has earneci.the publiCs,confidence in: its capacity to join *the shaping of national intelligence policy., ???:: ?The special virtue of this report lies in the method of 'congressional.?executive interaction by was' produced. Avoiding do-or-die confrontations of the. sort-that destroyed the House inquiry, :::?the Church 'committee bargained out differences with the-executive over access to, and. disclosure of,H.Ccin tested information. This meant that some material ?was..withheld. But the, public ended up getting. muCh pore than it otherwise would. It is-t,essible, of course, to be too sympathetic toex-' etutive .pleadings for secrecy. The case for limiting covert operations to the "most extraordinary eft.- cuinstanceS," for 'inStance, as the committee' reCoin- Mends; would have been stronger .if it had been able to publish more detail on *hat three members called the "high political costs and generally meager bene- fits" of past covert actions. Yet We doubt that the Church panel yielded too much. Realistically speak- ing, this is the only spirit in which Congress can 'hope to win the requisite executive, congressional and public support for a continuing intelligence role.' Congress is unlikely to 'win a shootout on the barri- cades; the likelier outcome is stiffened intransigence I :? ?. bithe executive which OnlireinforceS the Old Status quo.. At some .point, of course, Congress could "win" 'by resorting to budgetary reprisals,. but this resolu- tion of a shootout hardly serves the purpose of read- ing a reasonable and effective accommodation on the conduct of intelligence activities.. The problems. associated-with the Conduct and con- :. trol..of covert operations have received most of the publicity' attending the- CIA in -the 'last two years. :. Over, the long term, however, the problems of collect- ' ing tend producing intelligence?both "national' in- ? ? telligence. for: policy makers and "tactical" intelli- gence for military men?ares though duller, of much greater* consequence.- The 'committee's ? substantive -treatment. Of the Political, bureaucratic and psycho- logical aspects of intelligence is probably its most val- uable work. The -question of . whether the country is getting the intelligence it needs, not to. speak of the intelligence it pays for, must be relentlessly pursued. 'The Church committee took the position that the intelligence reforms already put in place by the Ford :4administratiOn 'should be -accepted and built On, not ,.junked. Again, no useful purpose Would be served by gratuitous confrontation. Whether all of the commit- tee's own structural and policy recommendations are equally sound, however, remains to be debated. We. Intend to return to the More important of .these in time: At the least; the cominittee's proposals give the . public-abetter basis for judging the worth.of admin, ? ?? istration reforms. r- ? 1 ? '? ? ? ? ? ?, ? ? was b'ecatise they were almOR7 impossible to conceit and thus .very quickly became overt operations. ? ' "Of the five paramilitary ac- tivities studied by the commit- tee, only one appears to have athieved its objectives," the re-;' port said. The report did not list those studied, but the coni?-: mittee is known to have exam.: ined the Bay of Pigs invasion' in .Cuba, operations in Laos,- South Vietnam and Korea, and, earlier operations in Greece. , The, committee said that Con' gress had failed, until the pas;-:. 'sage of the Hughes. Ryan, 'amendment, which required. the President to report covert activities to Congress. to COtt-, !duct adequate oversight or covert actions and it also fault;.! ed the mechanism for approv- ing such projects by the exeCli-F'. tive branch. _ It urged 'that covert actions' be approved only in the most. dire circumstances, after full: consideration by the National.: Security Council and after each. person in the chain of corn-, mind had put his views in writ; ing and signed them: This sy,s' tem, in general terms, was called for by President Ford'si executive order earlier ? this year but the committee wanted- the Order buttressed by law. ? ' The. next step' ought to he the establishment of a -. standing Senate intelligence oversight committee. Only by this step can the process of reform, as well as continuing oversight, be carried forward. This will ? require the President to share power in intelligence, ' as he routinely does in every other area of public p01- icy. But it will require Congress to share responsibili- ? ty. Ultimately, the effectiveness of this working rela- tionship?and not the contents of reports?will be the standard by which the Vow-concluded Senate in- , telligence inquiry must be judged. ? WASHDIGTON POST 28 April 1976 William Nelson Resigns As CIA Operations Aide ? William Nelson, the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency's deputy director for opera- tions, resigned yesterday. An ? agency spokesman said CIA Director George Bush had tried to convince the 30-year veteran to stay on. Asked if Nelson's depar- ture had any relation to the Senate intelligence commit- tee report, which criticized CIA's covert and counterin- telligence operations, the spokesman said: "No, it was a 30-year retirement." Nelson assumed control over CIA counterintelli- gence operations in Decem- 28 her, 1974, when James An- gleton resigned. The Senate committee re- port referred to Angleton's retirement and traced it to "differences of opinion with Director William Colby on the proper approach to the practice of counterintelli- gence." Angleton believed in tight compartmentalization of counterintelligence opera- tions and often not even the, CIA director knew what op- erations he had under way. Under Nelson, counterin- telligence responsibilities were diffused throughout the CIA operations director- ate. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 - Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 NEW YORK TIMES 2 8 APR 1976 Reporters As US. Agents ' By James Reston , WASHINGTON, April 27?In its censored report on the overseas opera- tions .of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities confirms that the C.I.A. has been using United States reporters, academics, ? and even reli- gious leaders as paid spies, but re- fuses to disclose the names of those involved. Moreover, according to the com- mittee,' this practice is still going on, and all efforts by officials of the universities, churches and the media to get the facts so that the practice an be stopped have been evaded by Ote C.I.A. for years. 'This "raises troubling questions," the 'Senate committee observes, "as to preservation of the integrity of Anierican academic institutions." It ckies more than that: It casts doubt oh,the operations of all media, religious and 'academic representatives abroad, without giving their institutions the opportunity of defending themselves against the corruption of their work. ,Several observations about this: ...ger years, leading American news- papers have requested and received ftom? the C.I.A. assurances that none of their staff members were being used by-the C.I.A. as paid informers. ?Z' The answer- usually given by, the C:LA. was that this practice was corn- zn6n some time ago but had been dis- sentinued, at least so far as "staff Manners" of the newspapers were. NEW NEW YORK TIMES 28 APR 1976 Intelligence Report ? The Senate Select Committee on Activities correctly perceived that the. basic issue it faced was to strike an, appropriate balance between the precepts of American' democracy and the secrecy requirements of twentieth- century power 'politics. The committee's recommenda- tions tilt away from secrecy and toward controls over. intelligence activities which, if enacted, would bring this country's secret foreign policy machinations somewhat more into line with what Americans want to believe about their country and themselves. The committee duly reported the fundamental fact that both the executive and the legislative branches of Government have mishandled the job of controlling the intelligence community. Whether in gross numbers (there have been 900 major covert actions since 1961), or in ugly specifics (C.I.A. researchers dropped LSD into the food and drink of unsuspecting citizens) the record supports that assertion. The Church committee's recommendations are on the whole constructive and intelligent. The committee's. suggestion that formal written authorization be required for clandestine activities would in itself insure a decline, in the number and modification in the nature of such programs. The notion of limiting severely the circum- stances in which covert activities can be undertaken centerned. Maybe some "stringers" or part-time space-rate reporters for American papers were used, but even this' Was not common C.I.A. practice. ? gWhen detailed investigations by the House and Senate Intelligence Committees disclosed that this was not true and that the practice still cbntinued, again the C.I.A. refused to cooperate with the papers when the .':WASHINGTON 4 li,tier asked for a private list so they could clean house. Still, the Senate committee report says. that the C.I.A. had covert rela- tionships with "about 50 American journalists or employes of U.S. media organizations" until February of 1976, and continues to have relationships with more than half of these. It adds that "more than a dozen United States news organizations and commercial publishing houses formally prqvided cover for C.I.A. agents abroad: A few of these organizations were; unaware that they provided this cover." :.This, invites the inference that most these "news organizations" and "commercial publishing houses'''know- iftly.provided cover for spies and still del,so, thus leaving the reader without a:; clue as to which "news organize- tipOs" are innocent and which are 'guilty, of misleading the public. -eA. distinction should probably be .nincle here between normal contacts by. reporters with C.LA. agents, and using reporters as paid C.I.A. agents. American reporters assigned abroad often, seek information from C.I.A.. officials and have usually found their information to be accurate if not ? always complete. ...This practice, particularly during the Vietnam War, often led to exchanging of :information between the reporter and. the agent, to the benefit of both, but 'reporters serving as paid agents' of the Government is a - different 29 matter. Most reporters in Washington. for example, will not accept pay for going on "talk shows" for the official Voice of America, lest they seem to be putting out the official U.S. propaganda. What is troubling about this is that President Ford does not simply issue an order to the C.I.A. to stop the prac- tice. Some of us have talked to him privately about it and he does not condone it, nor does he deny the intelligence committee's report that the practice continues. The dilemma is that he does not stop it himself or make available, in private if necessary, tie information the media, the uni- versities and the churches need to abolish the practice themselves. -It is common practice, of course, for Communist governments to use what they call "reporters" as spies, and vice versa. Even some of the Western European governments have used journalists as "cover" for their agents, but not until the last World War with tlie'creation of the O.S.S. did the U.S. Government consciously subvert its Oivri reporters and academics. "The: Senate Intelligence Committee report will now go to the Congress ; for remedial action, and no doubt there will be close, r control by the Congress over the finances and covert opera- Wins of the C.I.A. But this will take ? :the C.I.A. itself has been complain- ing, Often with good cause, that the press was interfering with its legiti- mate intelligence-gathering functions particularly in the publishing of the names of its spies. Here the reporters and others have some responsibility' net to subvert their own professions ,or the essential work of the C.I.A., hit this does not justify the C.I.A. in , trying to subvert the press. -Nor. does it absolve the President. The ,C.I.A. is his intelligence agency, and. all he has to do is call George Bush. on the phone to clear up the , ? and requiring that' Congress be notified in advance would also be effective steps toward a more responsible and controlled intelligence program. Unfortunately, however, the committee's analysis was superior, to its ',Office savvy. Legislative momentum began to dwindle weeks ago and this' report did 'little to revive it. It contains few disclosures that were not already in the'. public, domain. Thus, the committee did little to enrich the foundation of fact and public under- standing required to achieve the legislative remedies which it found necessary and desirable. Some way must soon be found to improve the legis lative climate because the key to reform is currently locked away in the recesses of the" Senate Rules' Com- mittee. The intelligence committee's recommendations are founded on the assumption that a neW Senate com- 1 mitue with legislative authorization and oversight power would be formed. That concept was embodied in Senate Resolution 400, but the old barons of. the Senate'?particularly Senators Eastland and Stennis of Mississippi whose Judiciary and Armed Services Com- mittees would lose. power under this measure?are undermining it. Unless the months of work and hundreds of thousands of dollars spent in this investigation are to he essentially wasted, members of the lnIclligence Committee and '.other members of the Senate who ere concerned about; exercising some democratic control over intelligence operations must find a way to rescue S. Res. .100 and 'to pass it quickly., Approved For Release 2001/08/08. : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, APRIL 27,1976 Wider Congress Role Committee Goes Further Than Ford In Moving Toward Tighter Oversight By LESLIE IL GELB awe' to The New Vnrk Tint,1 WASHINGTON, April 26?The covert operations; under highe recommendations of the Sene policy review and under ate Select Committee on Intel.: I the law. Mr. Ford did not deal ligence Activities, like the: with the overlapping character actions taken by President Ford several months ago, seek to. strengthen the role of the President and the Director of Central Intelli- gence in control- ling covert opera- tions and the hands of enforce- ment authorities in dealing with violations of the law. In the committee report re- eased . today, however, the senators go much further than the President in pinpointing re- ? sponsibility for covert, actions and broadening Congressional oversight powers. The philosophy behind the President's executive orders, was to make the existing sysi tern of policy-making and re-s view more efficient, not to change it. The attitudes under- News . Analysis of these operations. cRequiring prior Congres- ' sional approval of covert opera- tions. Mr. Ford would continue to inform Congress, as now re- quired by law, "in a timely fashion," which has always proved to mean after the fact. 4Prohibiting by law political; assassinations, in peacetime the overthrow of .democratic governments, and ehe use of, newsmen and. clergy es agents.' Continued use of business cov- ers would be permitted but un- der close review. Mr. Ford, 'again, desires policy flexibility. crMaking public the aggregate budget-of the intelligence com- munity for Congressional ap- proval as required by the Con- stitution., Mr, . Tord has -stated! that even' publication of the ag- gregate figure would help foreign powers counter Ameri- can intelligence programs. The Senate Budget Committee re- jected today making the budget cGive the State Department, lying the committee's recom- and the ambassadors in partic- mendations are that funda- ular, control over field opera- mental changes are necessary tions. Mr. Ford did not address l in the laws, within the execu- the problem of field control. I tive branch, and in Congress; Several principal findings un-i derpinned these proposals, andi to insure that the secret acti- in some instances, these! vities of the intelligence coin-, findings paralleled those of thei munity are brought into greater President. harmony with the requirements of democracy. "The fundamental issue faced by the committee in its investi- gation was how the require- ments of American democracy of the some 900 covert actions can be properly balanced in in- conducted since 1961 did not go through a formal policy re- telligence matters against the view, and that the Director of Central Intelligence had real 'authority only over his own central intelligence agency and her of recommendations that not the rest of the intelligence . community. . Mr. Ford has flatly said he The report called "desirable" would oppose. These proposals the President's upgrading of the would have the effect of mak- 40 Committee, the sub-Cabinet- level group that advised the !President on covert actions in the past, to a Cabinet-level !operations advisory group. !While such advice should be ;made more formal, the report 'warned that Cabinet officials might not have the time to do this job properly. The report 'urged the President to make, charters and regulations govern- ,in explicit fashion, the National ing all the intelligence agencies Security Council his principal such as the National Security Agency and the Defense Intel- ligence Agency, and all the . Like the President, the corn-i mittee came to the conclusions *that there had been inadequate oversight of intelligence opera- tions within the executive branch; that the vast majority need for secrecy," the report stated. The committee made a num- ing Congress a virtual coequal with the President in deciding upon covert operations and in drastically reducing the in- cidence of such secret paramili- tary and money-passing opera- tions. Among them were: ()Putting into statutes the adviser. The repott also commended the President for enhancing the powers of the various inspec- practices of the Central Intel- tors general to police internally ligence Agency that have. been the intelligence community, going on without benefit . or particularly in giving them in- Congressional authorization. vestigative powers and imme- Mr. Ford wants to retain exist- diate access to legal redress. ing informality and Presidential The committee went further, flexibility. ! however, in detailing how the r.Bringing counterintelligence 'inspectors general could en- and e..pionage activities, which force the laws without waiting often have the same effects as for abuses. IAlso supported was the Pres- ident's intent to increase the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence, a post now held by George Bush. After documenting a history of con- siderable duplication and even triplication of effort, the report urged making the "D.C.I." the head of the intelligence commu- nity in fact as well as in name, by giving him the power of con- ' trolling the over-all .intelligence 'budget. ' The report stated that the President's new committee on foreign intelligence with the Di- rector of Central Intelligence at its head is "a step in the right direction." It cautioned, howev- er, that the words of the Pres- ident's order to the director to . "manage" and "coordinate" are I too general. The committee said i that the director was to have ? clear authority to determine priorities and to control all in- telligence resources. The report found the Pres- ident's new intelligence over- sight board "to be long overdue," but maintained that it should not be considered as a substitute for greater Con- gressional oversight. Contrary to Mr. Ford, the committee found that Congress does have the constitutional au- thority to regulate intelligence programs. The President's only recom- mendation to Congress in this regard was to form a joint House-Senate intelligence over- sight committee with no real additional powers. The Senate report called for separate Sen- ate and House oversight com- mittees with considerably en- larged powers to approve, to , know and to investigate. . The report did not specify how the proposed Senate over- sight committee would work. because the senators chose to leave the matter for subsequent negotiations among the inter- ested committees. Nevertheless, the members of the proposed committee would be drawn from the existing oversight committees?Armed Services, Appropriations and Foreign Relations?and would serve as a focal point to receive all information and to dissem- inate to other interested com- mittees. The oversight commit- tee would be empowered to au- thorize the budget for the whole intelligence community. On the right to know and make information public, the report drew a distinction be- tween protection of valid se- crets and valid disclosure. The Administration's approach .has centered almoct entirely on le- gal penalties for unlawful dis- closure. 30 . The committee's studies also left a number of issues for fu- ture consideration: Whether the analytical and information gath- ering arm of the Central Intel- ligence Agency should be sepa- rated from its operational arms, and whether the director should remain .as head of the C.I.A. as well as head of the whole intelligence community. A strand of thought running throughout the committee's recommendations and find:7gs was the need for a trail of ac.- countability, as several com- mittee staff members explai-ted,, in more detailed laws, execu- tive procedures and record. keeping. ? The House Select Committee ? on Intelligence, which com- pleted its work in February, went further than the Senate panel in proposing some basic b restructurina of the intellie5nce community. Among its stigges- dons were: Abolishing the De- fense Intelligence Agency and dividing its functions between the C.I.A. and civilian defense agencies, and separating the Na- tional Security Agency from the Pentagon and reorienting ? its communications-monitoring ac- tivities toward econcmic and political concerns. While the House voted against the publication of the full report of its committee, the panel's recommendations were officially published. The House panel's recommen- dations paralleled those of the Senate committee's in a num- ber of respects. Both proposed beefing-up the policy-review process for covert operations and the powers of the Director of Central Intelligence, al- though the Senate's proposals were more detailed. Both sought to increase Con- gressional oversight by estab- lishing separate watchdog com- mittees. But, whereas the proposed Senate oversight corn-' mittee would have the power of prior approval of covert ac- tions, the proposed House counterpart would only be em- powered to receive notification within 48 hours of Presidential approval. . The committee did not find that the C.I.A. had been "ont of control," as some critics have said, although it some- times was, but that Presidents had made "execessive, and at times self-defeating, use - of covert action." The committee's recommen- dation ? was: "Covert actions should be consistent with pub- licly defined United States for- eign policy goals, and should be reserved for extraordiwzrv circumstances when no otnee means will suffice." WALL STREET JOURNAL 16 APRIL 1976 0 CIA Director George Iiir4h said he has re- cently made.a secret trip to three countries In Europe .and is encouraged by whal he learned. Bush. speaking to an editors' con- vention In Washington, said the agency will never identify reporters who once collabo- rated with the CIA. lie also said agents' mo- rale is high despite recent investigations and criticism of intelligence agencies. ydr-7".--sft Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 .-Appi-Oed-Flit -IR-Meat-6 2001/08/08 ":r'CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004,9 NEW YORK TIMES 30 APR 1976 -The Meaning (if Any) of the Intelligence Investigation NICHOLAS M. HORROCK spftic to The New York Times WASHINGTON, April 29? 'The curtain has fallen on an ,,Other Congressional investiga-1 -tion. The television lights in. ahe old Senate Caucus Room 'are gone, the witness chairs are empty, the micro- phones are silent. News This week, the ? - Analysis Senate Select Com- mittee on Intelli- gence, which con- ducted half of a coordinated House and Senate investigation :pi the United States intelli- gence agencies, isued its final .'report, two fat green volumes containing 183 recommenda- tions for reform or reorganiza- tion. . What is perplexing many to- day in Washington, as it must be perplexing many around the -country, is what, if anything, 3t. all meant. e On the very day that the committee was publishing part of its findings, another Senate -committee, the Committee on Rules, was dismantling the key aegislative proposal to cpme .from the whole investigation, a till that called for a single powerful Senate oversight com- mittee for intelligence. Since most of the select committee's recommendations rely for their implementation km the creation of an over- sight committee, the future of the entire legislative package ?seems in doubt. ,.. In addition to possible legis- lative failure, the intelligence investigation was never good . box office. If Congressional. in- quires were ranked as New 'York theater, the intelligence investigation would fall well ,behind Watergate and the Army-McCarthy hearings and Somewhere between Senator Estes Kefauver's organized crime inquiry in the 1950's and enator Edward V. Long's 1966 inquiry into Government inva- sion of privacy. ' Nor did the -intelligence in- vestigation create heroes. Sena- tor Frank Church, the Idaho Democrat ? who was chairman of the committee, has found the investigation a poor plat- alorm for his Presidential race -and a nonissue on the campaign trail. - The public image of the 10 other members of his commit- tee is no better now than it was before, and a couple have wondered if their image is worse. This also holds true for the members of the investi- gating House committee. The two main staff figures on the Senate committee, F. A. 0. Schwarz 3d, the counsel, and William Miller, the chief of staff, had no national reputa- tions when they started this investigation, and they have none now. Many people in Washington. came over the last decade to believe that a repressive, se- cret-police atmosphere was a part of the atomic age. They held outlittle hope that anyone or anything could change that. Those with this view argued that Watergate provided a for- tuitous wedge into the secret workings of government, like an opening in an overcast sky, and that the reformers would :have a limited time in which to hammer into place protec- tions against repression and a police state before, as one Congressional aide put it, "the sky closed again." These people believe that the sky began to close when the public no longer appeared con-' cerned about the Central Intel- ligence Agency's assassination plots, the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Cointelpro'andl the National Security Agency's1 electronic snooping. Since no new laws in 'these areas are in effect today, these .critics mark the investigation as a failure. There is another kind of critic in this city who suggests that the investigation did more harm than good by exposing national security secrets for no better reason than curiosity or publicity, and that the na- tional defense may have been irreparably harmed as a result This contention gets little ge- neral support, and even profes- sional intelligence officers ge- nerally reject it. Yet a third view of this year's investigation may be closer ? than the others to what has really happened. As one mem- ber of the Senate committee put it privately, "The Senate lcommittee may have failed in its objectives, but the investiga- tion as a whole was a partial success." Soon After Watergate 'It is his opinion that the ? investigation was broader than the Senate committee and broader than its House counter- part. It was touched off in December 1974 by an article in The New York Times report- ing sources who said that the C.I.A. had conducted illegal domestic surveillance. The article came a ?few months after Watergate and was the catalyst for several forces ?that saw evidence that widespread illegal intelligence activities were being carried out by several Government agencies. Three investigations followed. the two on Capitol Hill and another by a Presidential com- mission headed by Vice Pres-' ident Rockefeller. The pressure of these investi- gations has brought some inter- nal changes by the executiv branch of the Government President Ford earlier this year issued an executive order that appears to bar some improper practices and to make changes in the mechanics of how the intelligence community operates. The President's efforts have been soundly criticized by some, but pragmatists on Capi- tol Hill like to point out that his reforms are all that there Is right now. Attorney General Edward H. Levi has issued the first internal guidelines for the conduct of domestic intel- ligence investigations by the F.B.I. and has got some Con- gressional support for a new electronic surveillance law. ' It is widely agreed that the Administration would not have made these moves if it had not been for the pressure of , the investigations. . Power of Exposure There is also antoher remedy at work here, less easy to de- tect: the power of exposure. The atmosphere of secrecy I that surrounded the intelligence agencies for three decades lulled the men and women who worked in those agencies into the belief that their actions took place in a vacuum and would never be. made public; that what they did and who decided to do it would never be held up to scrutiny against the general standards of socie- ty. It is highly likely that the men who conspired to prepare and send to Mrs. Martin Luther King Jr. a tape recording of sex activities picked up by an electronic room bug to force bar husband from public life never thought at that moment that their actions would be described at a public Congres- sional hearing. Their successors at the F.B.I. and their colleagues at the C.I.A. the N.S.A., the Defense Intelligence Agency and the other segments of the intel- ligence community can no lon- ger rely on that secrecy. They must now consider that any act they take in their official duties may well end up in public view before a Congres- sional committee or in the news media. The problem is that these 'de facto reforms are temporary. They rely upon men's memories and upon the willingness of successors to President Ford and Mr. Levi to carry them out. It was for this reason, in the view of many, that legisla- tion, particularly a law calling for strong Congressional over- sight, was so clearly necessary for long-term change. Many ? Congressional political strate- gists believed that there was support for a strong oversight committee in Congress last spring. If that support was there, why has it been so seriously eroded? , 31 ' Mr. Miller and 'Mr. Schwarz suggest that the publicity stem- ming from the murder of Moll- ard Welch. the C.I.A. intel- ligence officer, in Athens and the publicity from the unau- thorized publications of the House Intelligence Committee's report were major factors in dissipating public and political ? support for intelligence reform. Never Caught The Several committee members have said in interviews that from the beginning of the in- vestigation the issues of C.I.A. political assassinations or F.B.I. Cointelpro harassment of vari- ous groups have never caught fire among their constituents. Without pressure from con- stituents, they suggest, Con- gress has little impetus to act. , If the 'ingredient for success of reform legislation is pressure from the public, the Senate Select Committee may well share in the blame for squan- dering it. ? The committee was unwilling from the beginning to operate in public or to confront and do battle with intelligence .agencies that were reluctant to supply full and complete information. From January un- til August last year, the com- mittee conducted the investiga- tion of assassinations behind closed doors. Meanwhile, in the hallways of Congress millions of dollars worth of free exposure in the news media was available. Instead of news about testi- mony, witnesses and graphics of an open hearing, the public received occasional newsgrams from Senator Church or Sena- tor John G. Tower, Republican of Texas, who was the com- mittee's vice chairman. The committee said that the assassination matters were too sensitive for public hearings. And it later bowed to Adminis- tration wishes not to disclose matters on ? covert operations. The committee, particulary toward the end of its inquiry, .seemed intent on proving that Congress was as responsible in keeping secrets as was the .executive branch. Thus, the committee went from November last year until this week with no.attempts to keep public attention on the problems of intelligence abuse. Strong reform legislation may well be a casualty of these tactical decisions. vriNT YOR.K TINES 25 April 1976 Cuba Accuses C.I.A. in Bombing I HAVANA, April 24 (Reuters) ?The official Cuban daily Granma today blamed the' bomb attack this week on the Cuban Embassy in Lisbon on Portuguese "Fascist" groups and on the Central Intelligence Agency. The bodies of two Cuban members of the staff killed in the blast were to be flown here later today. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Tuesday. April 27, 1976 OA Doesn't Require-Strong New Reins, Senate Panel Says; Mild Ones Face Fight By ARLNN J. LARGE; Stall Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL WASHINGTON?The Central Intelligence Agency's . cloak-and-dagger operatives , aren't as active abroad as they used to be and don't need any severe statutory reins, a Senate panel has decided. The conclusion of the 11-member Senate committee that has been investigating the CIA for the past 15 months is essentially bland, reflecting the continued reluctance of Congress to contemplate a major overhaul of the spy agency. Bland or not, there will be an enormous fight over the committee's list of proposals for closer congressional monitoring of what the CIA does. .... Thore proposals mightn't get far. The special panel chaired by Sen. Frank Church (D., Idaho) wants the Senate to establish a new committee with centralized authority over the budgets of U.S. intelligence agen- cies. The CIA also would have to give the new committee prior notice of any major plans for "covert" operations abroad, such as fomenting coups against foreign govern- ments. The proposed new committee already is In trouble. Senior members of the existing Armed Services and Judiciary Committees don't want to give up jurisdiction over such. agenciesas the CIA and FBI and plan to wage a sharp Senate floor fight against the proposed rival. Moreover, the proposal lhelped cause the defection of the Church committee's two most conservative mem- bers, Sens. John Tower (R., Texas) and Barry Goldwater (R., Ariz.), who refused to al sign the fin report. ? Intelligence Budget , . And there will be another Senate floor fight over a proposed disclosure of the na- tion's total intelligence budget. The Church committee decided it is unconstitutional to keep this account a secret and originally voted to disclose it as part of the final report released last evening. President Ford, how- ever, urged the committee not to do it, and a last-minute appeal for secrecy was made In person yesterday by-CIA Director George Bush. So the committee voted six to five ,to leave the question up to the full Senate. This vote split the committee's liberals. Chair- man Church wanted to go ahead and put the figure in the report. But the next ranking Ilunocrat, Philip Hart of Michigan, argued that the committee's unilateral release. of ? the figure would anger other Senators and i hurt chances for establishment of the per- manent new committee to ride herd on in- telligence agencies. What the full Senate will decide is uncer- tain. The House last year defeated a pro- posal to disclose the budget figure. The section of the Church committee's 651apage report that discusses CIA finances is riddled with blanks and deletions. There is a graph, however, that traces the trend of the annual budgets of several intelligence agencies. The budget total is shown snaking upward since 1962 to an unspecified height in the current fiscal veer, but these are in inflated dollars. A budget line corrected for inflation snakes downward over the years, so that intelligence financing for the current year is "about equal in buying power to the budgets of the late 1950s." the report said. Covert Actions Taper Off This is consistent with other findings in the report that the CIA's covert operations have tapered off lately. In the mid-1960s, ac- cording to the report, the CIA was financing and co.tching "paramilitary" wars in Indo- china, plotting to overthrow the Castro re- gime in Cuba and engaging in other political activities outside the sphere of just gather- ing intelligence. "The period 196a to the present has registered declines in every functional and geographic category of cov- ert action," the report said. As reasons, the report cited the end of the Indochina war, a cutback in CIA Opera- tions involving labor, students and media af- ter these operations were disclosed in 1967 and a reduction in agency personnel over- seas made in 1973. , The report said that despite this decline in activity the committee "gave serious con- sideration" to a flat ban on covert activities by the CIA. "Presidents and administrations have made excessive, and at times self-de- feating, use of covert action," the report said, addition, covert action has become a routine program with a bureaucratic mo- mentum of its own." Nevertheless, the com- mittee decided the U.S. "should maintain the option of reacting in the future to a grave, uriforseen threat" by using covert operations. . Chairman Church, a candidate for Presi- dent, wanted to go further and assign the CIA's covert-action responsibilities to the State Department, to be used "only in the most extreme unavoidable situations.- This would have produced a sharper Senate fight than the committee had stomach for, and the proposal was dropped. Journalist Network The committee found that until last Feb- ruary, the CIA "maintained covert relation- ships" with about 50 American journalists or employes of U.S. media organizations. These people, .said the report in a section worded with CIA guidance, were part of a network of "several hundred" foreign mdi- vluals around the. world who spy for the agency "and at times attempt to influence foreign opinion through the use of covert propaganda." ._ In February the CIA said it wouldn't . have a money or contractual relationship : with any correspondents accredited by U.S.. newspapers or broadcasters. The Church , committee report said fewer than half the 50 journalists will be -terminated" by the new guidelines and recommended that the rules 32 THE NEW YORK DAILY MIS 28 April 1976 be broadened. The committee said it could find nothing wrong with the CIA's use of secret buziiness operations to aid its activities. One of these is -a complex of insurance companies" op- erated mainly abroad by the CIA to provide Insurance benefits for its spies. The commit- tee said it didn't find any evidence that the insurance companies buy sell securities for the purpose of influencing foreign stock , markets or foreign currencies. The insur- ance complex at one time had invested I "heavily" in domestic stock markets. but I the committee said this has been stopped. The report included a discussion, based on Information from the FBI, of Soviet spying in the U.S. In February of last year there were 1,079 Soviet officials on perma- nent ? assignment in this country. -Among these, over 40% have been positively identi- fied as members of the KGB or GPU. the Soviet civilian and military intelligence units,- the report said. It added that the number of Soviet officials here having "some intelligence connection- may be as high as 70% to 80%. The Church committee last year issued exposes of CIA attempts to assassinate for- eign political figures and the use of mail- 'openings and other domestic spying tech- niques to seek a connection between foreign governments and U.S. opponents of the Viet- nam war. In its final report the committee said it found "duplication and waste, inertia and ineffectiveness in the intelligence com- munity." However, the report's tone wasn't all hos- tile. The committee said' it "wishes to em- phasize that it has found much that was good and proper in America's intelligence efforts." The less-than-drastic list of recom- mendations also reflects a considerable change in last year's congressional alarm. over the CIA's activities, due in part to a skilled defense of the agency by President Ford. A major turning point came last De- cember with the assassination in Athens of Richard 'Welch, the CIA station chief in Greece. Sen. Church and other congressional in- vestigators of the CIA insisted they didn't. expose Mr. Welch as a CIA rnan, but his death and elaborate funeral in Washington put them on the defensive. A parallel CIA Investigation in the House ended more or less in disarray. with its final report still of- ficially unpublished in a dispute over leaks. Ck W tcdg Unit Suffers Bria.Setback ? ? By JOSEPH VOLZ - ? - :Washington, April 27 (News Bureau?A move -to set tup a powerful permanent Senate Intelligence Committee suffered a possibly fatal setback today when the Senate Rules Committee voted 5 to 4 to parcel out the responsi- bility. ? Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho, W. Cannon (D-Nev.), committee chairmman of the Senate Select chairman, to conduct another Intelligence Committee, which qudy of what kind of intelli- goes out of business May 30, had - proposed the permanent panel gence panel is needed: with jurisdiction over all intelli- The committee postrioned ac gence activities. But Senate tion on the study, which would elders who head committees have been made by yet another which now have jurisdiction committee established solely that launched a successful fight to purpose. The chairmen of the strip the new committee. Armed Services, Juilicairy and The vote today means that Foreign Relations Committees, four committees would share the who who would lose some no- job. Sen. Dick Clark (D-Iowa); a thority to the new Intelligence Rules Committee member, so the Committee, would have, made the vote "greatly weakesn" intern- study. gence reform. The next stop is the Senate But Clark was able to beat floor, where Church hopes to re- back a proposal by Sen. Howard verse the Rules Committee vote. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 . . Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 - 'GENERAL THE NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY; APRIL 21, 1976 Bold Steps Urged to Overcome LI . Disarray in . ? ? al Assembly received Iasir Ara-1 ! fat, leader of the Palestine' Liberation Organization, with honors usually reserved for head of state, an act that was1 widely attacked in this country; and further diminished Ameri-i can confidence in the United! States. USN. Commission?Morris B. Abram, Rita Hauser and Philip E. Hoff- man?and John Carey, the al- ternate American representa- tive on the commission's sub- commission against discrimina- tion. Also in the group were Prof. Thomas M. Frank of New York University, Prof. Hans Morgen- thau of the City University, I and Prof. Thomas Buergenthal of the University of Texas. Others were Charles William Maynas, secretary of the Carne- gie Endowment for Internation- al Peace; Nathan Pelcovits, a former policy planner of the State Department; Norman Cousins, publieher and writer; Leo Nevas of the United States Association for the United Na- tions; Jerome Shestack, pres- ident of the International League for the Rights of Man, and Sidney Liskofsky and Ber- tram M. Gold, both of the American Jewish Committee. Mr. Gardner said that the participants, had begun their project in 1974 after-the Gener- By KATHLEEN TELTSCH spftiai to The Nev., York Times UNITED - NATIONS, N.Y.,' April 20?A group of scholars and Americans associated with the United Nations has con- cluded that American policy in the world organization is ? in a ''state of unprecedented disarray" and called?for a bold corrective strategy. In a report presented today to William W. Scranton, chief United States delegate, the group advocated measures to restore American influence in the world organization. Increa- singly in recent years the Unit- ed States has been on the losing -end of votes in the General Assembly piled up by a majori- ty of Communist and third- world countries. Among ,its .specific recom- mendations, the group said that the United States should boy- cottor with hold funds from rnoxiou's" United Nations pro- grams. It advised the United States to take a "tough" diplo- matic line, demonstrating that it will listen to honest economic grievances but that "it would not be pushed." The United States was urged also to take the lead in fashion- ing a new "world order coali- tion" of like-minded states be. ginning with Western European allies, Japan and some of the developing countries to consult together and frame joint strate- gy. The group reporting to Mr. Scranton was made .up of 16 participants with Richard N. Gardner, professor of interna- tional law at Columbia Univer- sity and a former Deputy Assis- tant Secretary of State for In- ternational Organizations act- , ing as spokesman. It included Seymour M. Finger, a former United States delegate to the United Nations, three former members of the Human Rights THE ECONOMIST APRIL 17,1976 0, my America Three-quarters of the abuse that is now flying about Mr Henry Kissinger's ears is unjustified and undeserved. The belatedly published official summary of those famous "remarks" Mr Kissinger addressed to a group of Ameri- can ambassadors in London last December?which he must now wish he had made public long ago?shows that clearly enough. The starting point of Mr Kissinger's policy towards the Soviet Union is entirely sensible. The Russians have now moved into the superpower stage of Soviet history, and there is very little the United States could have done to prevent that happening; so the aim of American policy is to find the best way of containing this growing Soviet power. The three- quarters of the criticism aimed at Mr. Kissinger which really consists of baffled American fury about the expan- sion of Soviet strength is pointed at the wrong target. It is the other quarter of the criticism which is starting to tell. This is the part which says that Mr Kissinger has not managed the containment of Soviet power as well as he claims to have done, and that he is now sunk ? in a global gloom which makes it unlikely that he can lead the necessary containment operation of the future. The penalties that never penalised This serious quarter of the attack on Mr Kissinger con- sists of three specific charges. The first is against his belief that it was going to be possible to bind the Soviet Union into a network of agreements with the west which would discourage it from throwing its weight about: ? Mr Kissinger's "Gulliverisation" theory, as The Econo- mist has called it. The obvious weakness of this theory was that it always seemed unlikely that any such net- work of agreements between Russia and the west could ever be tight enough to have much effect on the Russians. After all, the immensely coMplicated spider's web of trade, investment and culture that linked Germany to its western neighbours in 1914 and 1939 was not enough The report, entitled "A New' United States Policy Towardj the United Nations," was of-1 fered to Mr. Scranton as guid: ance- fel. the State Department: at a time when its policies are-. under review, Mr. Gardnef, sad e One of its major criticiirri; -was' that the Government tendsto conduct United Nations poli- cy a separa,e I'box unrelated to direct reia-, tions between Washington and! !other capitals. This has led: Ito', harmful inconsistencies, the! treport said. I Implied here was a criticism: of Secretary of State Henry' A. Kissinger for having nego-., dated. a new agreement with Brazil m February. ? : and?it is hard to imagine the communist superpower ever letting itself become as entangled with the capitalist world as the various capitalist countries were with each other in 1914 and 1939. On top of this, it now emerges that Mr Kissinger and , his colleagues had never quite worked out what to do if this network of "incentives and penalties" failed to make the Russians behave. Would the Americans then I cancel their agreements with Russia? When the Russians intervened in Angola, President Ford declined to cancel his grain deal with them; the "penalty" for Angola turns out to be nothing more frightening than the postpone- ment of the next Russian-American chat about three very minor items of business. Or was the hope that in the long run the Russians would start to enjoy their co-operation with America so much that they would stop doing things like Angola? The trouble is that in the long run there can be a lot of Angolas; and if none of them causes the Russians to lose any of their deals with America, they may reasonably conclude that they can have their "detente" and their Angolas too. This is the central flaw in the Gulliverisation theory. It is why, in the end, it does not matter much whether Russia or America is getting more out of any particular exchange of information about agriculture, or space research, or whatever. Mr Arthur Hartman, Mr Kissin- ger's assistant for European affairs, recently made a speech gallantly arguing that the 150 different projects of this kind between America and Russia are of con- siderable benefit to the United States. No doubt some of them are. It is difficult to believe the majority are, because on the whole The American economy and American technology are more efficient than Russia's, and expertise is going to flow, like water, from the higher level to the lower. In any event, even if the balance of advantage were exact (which is improbable), this net- work of kigrcemen ts would not be doing its main intended to stop the Germans throwing their weight about then; - job unless it was having a calming effect on .the general i3 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 course of Soviet policy. The first complaint against Mr Kissinger is that it isn't, and was never likely to. The second complaint is that Mr Kissinger's detente policy never seems to have included an attempt to make the Russians agree about the rules of the balance of power in Europe. Mr Kissinger is alarmed at the prospect of the Communist party entering the government of Italy; anyone inclined to suspect him of being "soft on communism" should read his remarks on the subject to those ambassadors last December. He is worried that a Communist success in Italy may encourage a Communist success in France; that American public opinion will not understand why it should help to defend a partly Communist Italy and France; and that the Italian and French Communists' claim to be good demo- crats now is by no means as foolproof as the optimists think (in which he may well be right, see page 14). But the new respectability of the Communists in western Europe is partly a by-product of detente, which made the Soviet Union itself seem more respectable: The detente policy should therefore have included a clear understanding with Russia about the east-west political competition in the two halves of Europe. ? Change in neither?or both Such an understanding would have had to take one of two forms. There might, in very hypothetical theory, have been an agreement by the west to regard eastern Europe as permanently communist in return for a Russian agreement to regard western Europe as permanently non-communist. But the Russians would certainly have said that they cannot control western Europe's Com- munist parties nowadays, which may or may not be true but is hard to disprove. Anyway, the west's own belief in pluralism requires it to accept that Communists can legitimately be elected to power if they claim to have accepted the rules of democracy. That was probably a non- starter. The alternative was therefore to tell the Russians that if they were looking forward to radical political changes in western Europe they would have to accept the possibility of change in eastern Europe too. The competition Would have to be a two-way process. This is where Mr Helmut Sonnenfeldt, the counsellor at Mr Kissinger's state department, comes into the argument. Now that the summary of Mr Sonnenfeldt's own talk to those American ambassadors last December has been published, it is clear that he was not washing America's hands of all interest in the future of eastern Europe. On the contrary, he said that the Americans should respond to the east Europeans' hopes of a "more 1 autonomous existence"; which is the polite way of say- ing more independence from Russia. The trouble is that the American policy-makers still seem to be telling the east Europeans that their best hope of more independence is the relaxing effect detente ought to be having on Russia (but detente does not in fact seem to be making Russia relax at all); and that they should be careful not to stare Russia too boldly in the eye (but why advise them to keep their eyes down?). The west could and should be urging a different course on the Russian-dominated countries of eastern Europe. This would not amount to an invitation to them to revolt. If the west was not prepared to help Hungary in 1956, nor to help Czechoslovakia in 1968, it is unlikely to intervene on behalf of a democratic rebellion now, when Russia is militarily stronger than it was then. But the west could be saying to thefl Communist governments of eastern Europe that, if they want more independence from Russia, they should look at what Hungary has done to make its economy rather different from Russia's, and Rumania its foreign policy, and Poland its treatment of intellectuals. And then add them up. . If an east European country tried to marry for its own purposes the combined independence of, say, Hun% gary and Rumania, would Russia really send its army in to stop the nonsense?and risk a plummeting of Com- munist votes in Italy and France? It seems unlikely: the Communist governments in eastern Europe can risk being a bit more assertive. The west should also be saying to the. people who live under those governments that it does not regard monolithic single-party Commu- nist rule as their permanent and inevitable lot. Most east Europeans would like a wider range of choice, as the Czechoslovaks showed in 1968; and the west should be encouraging them to press their rulers to give them rather more choice?at first, for instance, by allowing different factions' to compete within the Communist parties. It is Mr Kissinger's failure to urge the need for change in eastern Europe vigorously enough that is the second count against him. : The third is that he no longer seems to have the old Kissinger bounce. To be sure, he has every reason to be tired and dispirited. For seven long years he has been running the most centralised foreign policy opera tion since John Foster Dulles's. For the past two years the American congress's attempt to get in on the act has produced one confusion after another?Soviet emigration, the arms ban on Turkey, the Angola mess ?which ? congress has then left Mr Kissinger to try to clear up. The old idea that the government's men might occasionally have things they would like to chat about in private has virtually collapsed under the enthusiasm of American journalists for publishing any document a piqued official gives to them. Mr Kissinger's Middle East policy has run into a sand dune; his Soviet policy has gone skidding on the icy surface of the Russian will to power. It is enough to make any secretary of state feel depressed. But Mr Kissinger's dispiritedness seems? to go deeper than this. He sometimes sounds as if he no longer believed that congress and administration can co-operate enough to run a coherent foreign policy, or that American public opinion is prepared to carry the weight of Ameri- ca's position in the world. He has been accused of being resigned to accepting second place for America, behind Russia; it is probably truer to say that he fears America is resigned to it. . The resilience is there If he does, he is almost certainly wrong. The main lesson so far from this year's presidential campaign is the groundswell of support for a more vigorous assertion of the American role in the world. There is no reason why the American people, with all their economic and technological power and vitality, cannot insist on military equality with Russia, and recover some of the ground lost in the past few years. There is no reason, on this year's evidence, why. American opinion cannot be rallied to support an intelligent defence of western interests. But the effort will have to be led by a man resilient enough to understand America's own capacity for resilience. Perhaps this German-born secretary of state could ' escape from his apparent Weltschmerz if he remembered that he is, after all, an American now. 34 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 NEW YORK TIMES 2 3 APR 1976 ROCKEFELLER GIVES 'A REPORT ON TRIP Notes.Wide Concern About U.S. Foreign Policy By PHILIP SHABECOFF Special to The New Yoric Times IWASHINGTON, April 22? :Vice President Rockefeller, re- cently returned front a seven- nation, four-continent official journey, says that America's friends are gravely concerned about the thereliability and con- cerned about the reliability and consistency of United States foreign policy. :In an interview yesterday, Mr. Rockefeller said that after 2.2 period of "drawing back" him the United States because ot Vietnam and other factors, the countries he visited were again "reaching out" to the ited States for support. Most of the leaders with whom he talke dtold him they counted on a stronger American military presence in their area, it. Rockefeller said, adding: s`A. subject of major concern around the world is: 'Is the United States withdrawing into isolationism? Is America foreign policy going to be coordinated between its legislative and ex- ec.:dive branches. Can we count on you?" .also said he found that leaders of the countries he vi- sited "appalled" that the -Unit- ed States did not take decisive action in Angola. ' Mr. Rockefeller, at the re- quest of President Ford, visited Tunisia, France, Iran, Malaysia, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand in March and April. Yesterday he -sat in an easy chair in his cavernous office In the old Executive Office Building next to the White house and discussed his trip. In Tunisia, Mr. Rockefeller said, he had found considerable uneasiness about the future, particularly about future ac- tions of its neighbors, Libya and Algeria. ?? _ There was particular concern about Algeria, which had been receiving large amounts of arms from the Soviet Union and which had been visited by the Vietnamese military strategist, Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, and also by Prime Minis- ter Fidel Castro of Cuba. The Shah of Iran, whom Mr. Rockefeller met on the islan- reat f Kish, expressed the hope that the United States wouid retntain a strong pre. sence in the Indian Ocean. He also said that he was working to improve relations between India and Pakistan. In New Zealand and Australia Mr. Rockefeller found that the Governments desired a United States naval presence In the South Pacific. In fact, Mr. Rockefeller said, requests that the United States naval capaci- ty be maintained and streng- thened were encountered con. stantly on his journey. Mr. Rockefeller said that he WASHINGTON STAR 22 APRIL 1976 William F. Buckley Jr. The Finlandization of :the American will The lesson for today is the 'lead essay in the April issue of Commenrarymaga- zine, written by its editor, Mr. Norman Podhoretz. It is entitled, "Making the World Safe for Commu- nism," and is an agonized documentary of what has happened to the American will during the past few years. Picking up the term from a European intellectu- al, Mr. Podhoretz terms it: ? "Finlandization from with- . It was a long time ago that the fate of Finland crystallized in the public . mind as something of an ar- chetype. What does Finlan- , dization of the spirit mean? - That more and more Americans, more and more ? often act on the assumption that the Soviet Union is, ? when you come right down to it, the supreme power in this planet, and that the only sensible thing you do about it is: accommodate. When 'the Soviet Union de- cides that it will massively support a conclusion of the ? war in Indochina with a ? victory by North Vietnam, you permit it to happen, though it is appropriate to come up with a little fustian rhetoric, as when, fleeing the bully to the safety of yotir front porch, you shout out your defiance of him. When the Soviet Union de- cides to intervene decisive- ? ly in Angola, you find it that ? ' . found throughout his travels "the appreciation, of the need for a strong, determined" Unit- ed States foreign policy and "a much more open desire to cooperate" with the United States than in the recent past. One reason for this, he said, was that many of the countries have been moving politically "toward the center," just as, he asserted, the United States is. But he said that this country must persuade its friends that it can conduct a steady, consis- tent foreign policy, not a policy that is fragmented between the President and Congress. "We have to discern as a people what our goals and ob- jectives are at home and how those goals relate to the -T-r-t or the world," Mr. Rockefeller said. much easier to yield, the Vietnam experience having permanently ruled as out of consideration any direct military. intervention. It is Mr. Podhoretz's melancholy conclusion that the pervasiveness of our new isolation has reached such a point as to all but in- capacitate us from effective resistance. The ? liberals (and many conservatives) are blunt on the matter of military intervention, one of their objectives in their as- sault against the "imperial presidency. They are also, as witness their assaults on the .CIA, opposed to extra- military intervention. The CIA's. role in helping the anti-Communist fraternity everywhere in the world during the postwar years is all but neutralized. When it was suggested that CIA money might go to help the democratic parties of Italy, the protests were very ,nearly universal. Any sug- gestion of aid to the anti- Communists in Portugal was, quite simply, ex- cluded. .? . Why all of this? In part, .? Mr. Podhoretz correctly concludes, because of the ? creeping military superior- ity of the Soviet Union. ("When the "Chamberlain' side of Kissinger asks American critics of the SALT agreements, 'What in the name of God is strategic superiority? What do you do r77- , with it?' he might better ad- dress the question to the Russians, who seem to know very well both what it is and what you do with it, and who could easily enough give him the an- swer. What you do with it is intimidate other nuclear powers who might wish to stand in your way when you start to move ahead.") But also because, among the, elite in particular, there is a marked diminution in any concern for freedom, or in- deed appreciation even for freedom at home ? the best evidence of which is the dizzy enthusiasm American intellectuals have shown for life in Mao's China. Thus the strides of the Communists abroad coin- cide ? indeed, are made possible by ? the general demoralization at home: . "If it should turn out that the new isolationism has in- deed triumphed among the people as completely as it has among the elites, then the United States will cele- brate its 200th birthday by betraying the heritage of liberty which has earned it the wonder and envy of the world from the moment of its founding to this, and by helping to make that world safe for the most deter- mined and ferocious and. barbarous enemies of liber- ty ever to have appeared on the earth." , . Tuesday, April 20, 1976 The Washington Star Crosby. S. Noyes Maybe they DO listen to Henry's 35 No one has mentioned one possible explanation for some of the things Henry Kissinger has been saying about Africa and Europe. He could believe the people involved may take his warnings seriously. - It may not be quite as loony as it seunds to some of his listeners in Washing- ton. Many of them seem to believe the secretary of stzite is men* huffing and puffing aboutsuch things as the Soviet-Cuban presence' in southern Africa and the Italian elections. When he says that the United States "will not tolerate" any more Ango- las, orthat the participation of the Communists in a fu- ture Italian goverrunent is -unacceptable" to the United States, the reaction in this country is that he is Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 bluffing, which is futile or counter-productive. The as- sumption is that the secre- tary is essentially power- less to control ? or even influence ? events in other parts of the world. may be mistaken. It is unlikely that the Russians expect the Marines to land in Angola. It is also quite possible that the Italian Communists may win some votes by complaining about American interference in their internal affairs. But there is at least some evi- dence that neither the Rus- sians nor the Italians are entirely insensitive to the political trends here, or to, Mr. Kissinger's expression of them. Indeed, recent reports from Moscow suggest that the Soviet government is showing signs of anxiety about the fading of the mood of detente in this country and its effect on the whole spectrum of Russian- American relations. Ac- cording to the New York Times, "some Soviet insid- ers, concerned by President Ford's responsiveness to criticism from the right, are predicting a new restraint in Moscow's foreign mili- tary involvement during the coming months, particular- ly in southern Africa." The same may be true of Mr. Kissinger's warnings about a possible role for the Communists in a future Ital- ian government. A good many Americans, apparent- ly, reject as fanciful the secretary's fears of a new kind of "domino theory"ef- feet in which the advent of communism in a country like Italy could involve other Western European countries as well. Some critics, including former Undersecretary of State George Ball, seem almost to favor participation of the Italian Communists as an antidote to the "corrupt" and "flabby" political parties that have governed Italy since the war. Yet the Europeans in general and the Italians in particular are a good deal less enthusiastic about the prospects of sharing power with the Communists. There is considerable skepticism about the new independence from Moscow proclaimed by the Western European Communist parties and their devotion to liberal Western democratic pro- cesses. Mr. Kissinger's forebodings of the political consequences of govern- ments in which Communists hold power are widely shared. In Italy, for example, two out of three votes cast in the national elections are still anti-Communist votes. Ac- cording to a recent poll, nearly half the population of the country believes that once the Comnmunists come to power, they will stay. Even the Italian Commmunists themselves have obvious reservations about pressing their present ascendancy too far or too fast. Can it be that Mr. Kiss- inger's cautionary words are taken more seriously abroad than here? "As secretary of state," he says, "I have the obligation to make clear what I feel the consequences of certain events are, even if we can- not control them." Such warnings may have been more effective than many of us realize. DAILY TELEGRAPH, London 14 April 1976 In Easter Week: thoughts on the border between religion and politics SOME observers,' have supposed that the willingness of Christianity to 'associate itself with international socialist causes is the result of careful calculation ?that Church leaders have read the signs of the times, concluded-- tire that socialism is suceeecl ? everywhere, and have judged it prudent, for the Church's survival, to be on the winning side. B EDWARD NORMAN OW LF How much one wishes that was the case. It would at least show a degree of political realism within Christian leadership and a proper sense of employing the guile of the world in the promotion of. the Divine scheme. But unhappily the rush to embrace international Left- wing thinking is not -the result' of calculation, but of belief. ? The mechanics of its appeal are only too clear. Radical Christiana throughout the world are not, in general, horny sons of the soil, striving against corrupt social -systems in order to bring the simplest necessities to 'their wretched dependents. They are members of the bourgeois radical elite, emotionally attached to the fashionable idealism ,. of social -change. e Their espousal of socialism is a class characteristic, an -indication of their moralism. . Their moral' seriousness has become secula- -rised, and politics is now the tex- -tore in which it is wrapped.' It is, from this atmosphere of the ' possibility of secular redemption that sd many Christians are. now prepared to acquire their own , sense of social righteousness ? rather ? than from faith in eternal ; .priorities. They rationalise the emotional , investments that have already been made by others, in the selec- tion of particular issues for con- centrated propaganda. They make a simple, and generally innocent, conflation of Christian, love of neighbour and the most' hard-line international Marxist devices to attract liberal and humanitarian consciences to the side of world revolution. They reason away the rhetoric arid Style of the propa- ganda as merely'. a succinct man- ner of expressing agreed Moral, truths about :human society. "-This'' last feature ? can be very baffling for?the less zealous, who correetlY:. detect the true ideological affinie:? ties of all- the moralistic rhetoric;-i- but who do not have' adequate ? countermodels against Which to set,: their reservations: ? ' ?. Furthermore, ? Church leaders usually deny that their- moralism -; has any affinities with the propa-- ganda assumptions, of -tem inter-' national Left at all: And within the 'hothouse ? atmosphere -; of central Church 'administrative thinkinge that can' seem a reasonable claim,- There the sums have all been done., The breathless steps have all ,been lakere Yes:I, Christian concern,. with human needs does require a , political dimension. Yes: it can he ? i,dentified : withe; 'movements to overthrow " oppressive " regimes. Church leaders whose progres- sion -has been. along these.. familiar lines have lone ago lost touch with the ordinary aseuropa tions of ordinary Christians. Ileum,. the hurt surprise of the men in - the ,pews?of, the huge. majority - The- arithnt It Dean of Peferlionee, Cambridge. 36 irens at 'Christians' in England saday? when they are -offered rationalised political, . rhetoric, dressed up as Clatistian "concern,"answer to ;their :puzzled .queries about the propriety. of ? identifying the de- emands of God, with the ephemeral. 'enthusiasm' s of :contemporary poli-,,tical moralism,. ,For all, their, belief in 'their own reasonableness,, however, Church : leaders in, fact, hold their political ,opinions, with, good deal of passion.' I .had. occasion to notice this myself in' February. During the 'week, in which the General Synod: of the .'Church of England - -discussed, ,.a,, highly contentious : paPer abotit..Chile, produced by its ? own Board for Social Respon- sibility,efewasi asked by this news- paper and' ? by,,the B B C to offer some views on the matter. I suggested that, appalling though' aspect's of the Chilean re. gime are, there was a danger that the Church., in seeking a .1.wmarli- tarian vieW of world eve,hts',;?would 'innocently absorb .the, Propaganda promoted by agencies of inter- national Marxism. To my surprise my, opinions evere extravagantly caricatured, .arid then denounced r for their patent', absurdity, during the Synod. debate and apparently 'amid a good* deal of derisive hilarity; L ? ... ei I An tyranny I Christians today are victims of theireewn, mor-alism. ;They a- ti, Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 4iip i.'Refead-2001/q8/08 CIALIRDP7701:1432R0001:004.9.41004-,0,...- . easily 'prepared., to t WOrst of . supposedial reactionary opinion, and far tdo gullible about the general picture Of "exploita- tion" and " oppressioin "? which in- : ,ternattorial Left-wing thinking 'seeks to . establish a4. self-evident truth.' " The &Sire io have ;Christian at- titudes to. :" worldi problems" comes at a time when Christian ieaderS are -notable for their lack s? Of professionalism in political 'judgment.. They are easily bagged by anybne whd epre$ents his poll- , :tical objettives in the compulsive moral. rhetoric whichi is so attrac- tive ?to bourgeols-radinalism. !.Those who remain as unbelievers are ,owritten off as "extreme Right --ithough they are more likely to be genuine liberals?or as s;yictinat .of conspiraey theories," voyeurs. ? of' redS under: the I bed.!'.. A:new`' tyranniy of opinion , isi descending'' upon !the Church. ,Aricl,beeause Church leaders today , are such amateurs in the very - pro- fessional business of political pro- 7paganda, -and. because they really are so dedicated to primer humanie`:- trian ideals, they are permanently. . open. .to- uncritical acceptance of - seeminey:Any account of World co-nditions which exploits their generosity. Because their much-proclaimed ? " Christian " concern for humanity usually turns out to be just ordin- ,ary humanism, they are easily swept up by secular enthusiasm for humanity, lacking, as they so often seem to do, distinctly spiritual in- sights into men and their social behaviour. So the Marxists' liturgy of propaganda is reproduced in the world views of Christianity: a ? Government or social- system ? marked down for "liberation " is first described in isolation, without reference to the conditions general among mankind (and especially the . conditions in socialist countries) in order to show how miserable is the condition of people under "capital- ism ". ' Then come the atrocity stories. The Government is denounced for brutality and torture. Then the forces of oppression are depicted as "the bourgeoisie ", whereas it is the bourgeoisie in most countries (and as in Chile) who are most noticeable for their socialism. Next, distinguished Western liberals ex- plain in what ways the conditions complained of are offensive to their consciences. Finally, the World Council of Churches weighs in, and international' Christianity conse- crates the polemicism of the inter- national Left. ?This is not to say, of course, that Christians Who' -become- Marxists are wrong. Christianity is a univer- sal religion, and it would be lamentable if it was not rendered in all the experiences which men THE WASHINGTOi POST sunder. April le..1976 hen, Two By Peter L Berger Berger is professor of sociology at Rutgers Univer. sity. His "Pyramids of .Sacrifice," published last year, was nominated for a National Book Award. This article is excerpted from the March issue of Commentary . magazine. ? 1VITL THE LATE 1960s, the great inalarfty of Amer- ican intellectuals accepted the essential legitimacy of. American power, even if they had objections to this or that manifestation of it. Equally important, the eco- nomic elite operated on the notion that the maintenance of American power in the world was in their interest (in .that respect, at any rate, being in full accord with the Marxists). Vietnam changed all this. Most American intellectuals have since Vietnam come to believe that the exercise of American power is immo- ral. But what has been less noticed is that Vietnam has also changed the mind of a substantial segment of the economic elite as to the economic advantages of world power: it has given rise to the idea that the maintenance of American world power is unprofitable. The antagonism between the two elites is confined al- most entfrely to domestic issues. On international issues there is a remarkable convergence of perceptions and have of righteousness. But the troolale. with the present willing1?= to 'accept Marxist ;definitions of World affairs IS precisely that the Churchmen who lead opin- ion do not become Marxists. They are merely deceived into becoming the helpful allies of Matxist move- mentss far change: They are just not well enough acquainted with ? the harsh realities of political manipulation ? supposing, indeed, that such vile devices are the brutal monopoly. of " oppressive " ri..eimes of the Right, or possibly of the Soviet system in its unhappy lapses?but not as something that could conceivably stain the pristine political purity of the liberation politics of the "Third World ". What we are seeing today is the demoralisation of Western society; the dismantling of the values of the Western way of life. It is a terrible irony that Christianity which ought to have been a guardian ?of those values, is now so often drawn into assisting their destruction. If freedom survives in the world, men , will look upon this period as one of incredible un- reality. Christianity was once the vehicle of the moral-seriousness of the intelligentsia. Today. through- out the world, that role is increas- ' fulfilled 'by Marxism. It is strange to find Christianity so sym- pathetic to its own replacement. interests, and as this convergence becomes established, a ,new phenomenon will increasingly become evident ? ?tthe influence of what might well be calletha new intel- ? lectual-industrial complex on American foreign policy. s The term "intellectual-industrial complex" was once 'Used to describe the situation in the early 1960s, when in- tellectuals in- America related much more positively s both to government and to the economic elite. My con- ? tention is that a quite different convergence is emerging now around an altogether different ? and indeed op- _? posite ? objective: the dismantling of American power 'ithroughout the world. ? - Let me hasten to say that I am in no way suggesting a ?-.conspiracy. The idea of a convergence between the two ,:'elites is not at all dependent on the assumption (though it may be a correct one, for all I know) that top execu- stives of multinational corporations regularly engage in earnest dialogue with editorial writers of The New York ? ',Times. Current fashion to,the contrary notwithstanding, ?--history rarely moves through conspiracies: Nor is it my .assumption that the convergence is based on some sort of agreement on matters of theory. Rather, perceptions and interests-converge in an Unintended way, possibly even in a way that contradicts the theories held by the two parties. Few members of the American intellectual elite rec- ommend the -abolition of the military establishment: rather, it is to be cut down as much as possible ? and, very importantly, not to be relied upon as a means of in- fluence and persuasion. ?Needless to say, there is even ? stronger antagonism to covert operations of any kind. In ? all .of this, there is hardly any sympathy for the major foreign adversary of the United States. The group under discussion here is certainly not pro- Soviet (though it has a pronounced tendency to underes- timate Soviet power and overestimate the reasonable ? character of Soviet intentions). When it comes to adrnir- ?-ing foreign regimes, the propensity is to 'choose regimes that 'call themselves "socialist" and that are (or are thought to bet different from the Soviet type of "social- Ism"? China, North Vietnam, Cuba have at one time or Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 Approved For Release2001108/08,: CIA-RDP77-00432R000-100400004-9 another been the major beneficiaries of this quest for new forms of socialism to admire. But the main point of the program of this group in for- eign affairs is that the United States is no longer to use its power to contain the spread of communism, or to in- tervene militarily to defend other democratic countrieS, or to foster the spread of free institutions anywhere else in the world. These American intellectuals do, of cour believe in such classical democratic values as freedom Speech, freedom of worship, iedividual protectio against arbitrary arrest, due process and the like. B they are against any effort to "impose" such values other countries ? or,at any rate, on other countries c Ing themselves "socialist." Bud for Business UNTIL VERY recently such ideas were in sharp op- ?,..) position to those prevailing among the economic elite in this country. If the latter was seen by the former as caught in a "Cold War mentality" or an ideology of "imperialism," the reverse perception was one of "uto anism," "idealism" and "softness on communism." P simply: intellectuals were losing faith in the benev ence of American world power while businessmen we still holding on to it. I believe .that this has been chan ing since the debacle of the American intervention in I dochina. While businessmen have not exactly becom latter-day converts to McGovernism, the perceived se interest of the economic elite is leading it to a posture the area of foreign policy which is highly congruent with the posture of the intellectuals. Again, this is not to suggest that businessmen are ex- clusively motivated by material interests, any more than (conversely) intellectuals are exclusively motivated by ideological or moral considerations. Intellectuals have material interests as well as idological commitments, \and businessmen have beliefs, values and moral and cog- nitive prejudices as well as material interests. Indeed, when businessmen are compared with intellectuals, it is . hard to say who has the edge in the matter of ideology. - ? ' However, the economic elite operates in a context where the penalties for false perceptions are more swiftly and more tangibly experienced than in the .con- text of the intellectual elite. This means that ideological ? tendencies among businessmen are more rigorously con- trolled by a. "reality principle" ? to wit, the principle of perceived economic interest. t ? It is on the basis of this principle that the American economic elite has been changing its position on the American role in world affairs. The maintenance of American power in the world, previously perceived as an economic asset, is now coming to be seen as an eco- nomic liability. It is inflationary (Vietnam was not "good for Wall Street"); it is an insufficient guarantee for the .safety of foreign investments; it unnecessarily antago nizes an important sector of the foreign market fo American goods. This shift may not pertain to all part of the world equally; an exception may be at least some areas of Latin America. But it pertains, I think, to mos of the rest of the Third World. Most importantly, it ha .affected the perception of American economic interests vis-a-vis the Communist countries. From the standpoint ?laity economic elite, political stability is a prime desideratum: It must be, since only in a politically stable situation can long-range economic strategies pay off. The modern corporation is compelled, most of the time, to think in long-range terms; that is, it can only rarely afford quick in-and-out economic adven- tures. This concern with political stability has led over and over again to a readiness to do business with all sorts of morally distasteful regimes, as lung as those re- gimes had a control over their respective countries that seemed reasonably long-range. In fact, as intellectual critics have pointed out repeatedly, American business abroad had tended to prefer stable dictatorships to unst- able democracies. ? The one big exception to this general tendency has been Communist regimes. These did, of course, provide political stability; indeed, it could be argued that in the contemporary world they provide the politically stable situations par excellence. But they were also viewed (and viewed correctlY) as being inimical to American economic enterprise. SC, It is precisely this perception that is now changing. of Communist regimes, and particularly those within the ns Soviet orbit, have shown themselves increasingly to be ut on all- reliable trade and investment partners; in the exact measure in which this is taken to be the case, the politi- cal stability of these regimes comes to appear an asset. In the past few years, the Soviets and their European satellites have demonstrated that they are very much in- terested in economic relations with American business. Empirically, they have turned out to be hard bargainers, but once, they make an agreement, they keep it. Ameri- can investments in these countries- have , been limited. But they are invariably safe, or so it seems thus far. pi- ut There is no reason to think that this would change if ol- the investments grew. In the Communist countries, as contrasted with those of the Third World, there are no re problems with anti-American intellectuals and political n- movements; with coups or terrorism, with aggressive la- bor unions. Inflation is controlled and tax regulations If- are simple. Once it can , be assumed that Communist in countries. are interested in long-range economic rela-. ;ions with American business, all these qualities become very attractive indeed. And, even better, no .exercises in American "imperialism" are necessary to maintain such favorable conditions. In sum: it has become possible to do very good business with the Communists. Admittedly, all these. perceptions are based on the slim evidence of the last few years. The new view in the ascendant among the business elite makes some assump- tions that cannot be en-wide:ally validated ? particu- larly the assumption that the economic needs of the So- viets will continue to be what they are now, and the fur- ther assumption that a new generation of Soviet leaders will continue the present precarious balancing act be- tween economic and ideological interests. Nobody (least of all the Sovietologists) can say how likely it is that the assumptions will hold. Can the So- viet economy, and especially its agrarian sector, finally overcome its chronic inefficiencies? Can Soviet technol- 'ogy catch up with the West? Is an ideologically or mili- tarily more aggressive leadership waiting in the wings? Who knows? The assumptions on which the new view is based, however, are about as reliable as any others held in connection with foreign economic undertakings ?1 and they are almost certainly better than any assump- tions about the future of that explosive area of erstwhile American -imperialism" known as the Third World. Righteous Realism BUT IT IS NOT in the Third World, it is in Europe that this shift in perception may have the rnost far- reaching consequences. It is Europe that has been the major focus of American economic and political-military interests. It has been axiomatic since World War II that Europe was essential to these interests; indeed, the very existence of what we now know as Western Europe is a product of this axiom. Now, it is not at all necessary to conclude- that this axiom is about to be rejected in tow by the American economic elite. There will continue to be very important American economic interests in West- ern Europe. But increasingly there wilt also be impor- tant American economic interests in Eastern Europe. Sooner or later, the difference between the two Europes will become a little fuzzy in this perspective. One may pinpoint the change by saying that until now, a Sovieti- zation of Western Europe, whether by direct Soviet ac- tions or by means of internal Communist movements, was deemed to be fundamentally contrary to Nmerican 38 z'ol Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 Approved For Release 2001768/08 : CIK-RDP77700432R600100400004-9 economic interests. What I believe is happening no is? that such a Sovietization of Western Europe is becoming.. less unthinkable to the American business elite. That is to say, it is becoming less self-evident to the economic elite that American economic interests necessitate the preservation of democracy in Western Europe and the .expensive deployment of American military power to that end. ? If one wanted Lobe ironic, one could say that Ameri- can businessmen are beginning to get rid or their Marx- ist presuppositions. It is Marxism, of course, that has ins- isted on the inevitable linkage of American capitalism and American world power. But what if Marxism has been wrong all along? What if American world power comes to be seen as an economic disadvantage by the ."ruling circles" of the American economy? The rudest shock would be experienced by those Eu- ? ropean intellectuals (probably the majority) whose anti- Americanism has been. coupled all along with the serene assurance that American power will continue to protect Ahem from the will be interesting to observe the reaction on the day when Western Europe wakes up to the fact that American "imperialism" has, indeed, gone home ? leaving the Europeans, armed only_with' France's force de frappe and a lot of Swedish rhetoric, alone with the Russians at last: How powerful is the new intellectual-industrial com- plex? It is difficult to tell. Certainly there are forces on :the other side. There continue to be people in the eco- nomic elite who view things differently. be It for ideo; ? logical reasons (one can still say "free world" in business circles in this country without immediatly losing the en- ? tire audience) or because of a different notion of eco- ? nomic interests. There still are intellectuals, in a rather beleaguered state, who perceive a connection between American power and freedom. There is, of course, the ?'military. There is the present leadership of American la- 'bor. .- All these groupings function in a context of demo- cratic politics and public opinion which, at the present ? moment, are in a state of considerable flux. Thus,it is ? very hard to assess which viewpoint "has the troops" in terms of American politics. There continues to be a large. ? segment of the American people that is highly suscepti- ? ble to the old Wilsonian appeals to liberty and democra- cy. The popular response to Daniel P. Moynihan's speeches at the United Nations may be cited as-evidence. 'Undoubtedly, though, there is also a widespread weari- ness with foreign commitments, a fear of Vietnam-like episodes in the future and considerable disillusionment with patriotic rhetoric about America's mission in the world. The new intellectual-industrial complex is in a posi- tion to respond to this mood in a peculiar way. If the '- proposition is to diminish American world power, the in- tellectuals make it seem morally right and the business- SUNDAY TIMES, London 28 March 1976 any 39 n cle trigg r? LAST week the world shivered briefly at the spectre of ? Col. Gadaffi, by leave of France sending his people scurrying about the world not with the usual pistols and machine guns in their diplomatic bags, but with small and inefficient .atomic bombs. The deal now under discussion between Fi'il nee and Libva--denouneed by the United States?does no men make it appear realistic. A combination of self- ? righteousness and hard-nosed realism is hard to beat in ? American politics. Tianetary Barfft,ain' TT1 0 SUM UP THE argument: this new intellectual-in- dustrial complex is a curious symbiosis of percep- tions which is beginning to have an influence on Ameri- can fbreign policy. It is often called isolationist, but this is a misleading epithet, since neither of its two compo- nent groups envisages the withdrawal of the United States from the world. Rather, to use Harlan Cleveland's provocative phrase, America is to be. a partner in an emerging "planetary bargain." The coinage to be used in this bargain is largely moral for one group, largely economic for the other; both- would deemphasize the coinage of military and political power. If one were to adopt the terrninology of Vilfredo ?Pareto, one could say that the methods of "foxes" are to be substituted for those of "lions." Or, if one were to adopt a terminology of more recent vintage, one could speak of a "greening" of American foreign policy. The symbiosis, is fragile. In this alliance between puta: tive morality and alleged realism, either side could fall apart. One can imagine various eventualities raising questions among the intellectuals about their nio?ai as- sumptions: new threats to the survival of Israel must., alas, rank high on the list. The businessmen might come to doubt the realism of some of their own perceptions: what, for instance, if an economically irrational Bona- partism were to arise in the post-Brezhnev Soviet leader- ship? Needless to say, neither American intellectuals ,Tior American businessmen have much control over .the processes that might lead to. such eventualities. The sym- biosis, then, may not be permanent.,All the same, I be- . neve that its emergence at this very important moment in world affairs is a fact to be taken account of, a fact with potentially far-reaching consequences even if it should turn out to be transitory. - American power since World War H has been an often uneasy mixture of two purposes ?the pursuit of Ameri- can self-interest, as variously perceived, and the defense of the shrinking number of democratic societies. And whatever else American power may have been (all too often it was very depressing indeed, from any moral point Of view), it was also the only significant.shield of free societies in different parts of the world. What is being suggested here is that the two purposes may now eome to be 'dissociated altogether ? with ominous re- sults for the future of freedom everywhere. Despite all the talk about multilateral centers of power, the only im- mediately visible beneficiary of a contraction of Ameri- can power would be the Soviet Union. In that case, the main hope f6r the survival of free societies is that the So- viet empire would turn out to 6e as efficient as Soviet agriculture. It is a tenuous hope. By WAYLAND KENNET and ELIZABETH YOUNG in fact include anything which would enable him to do that. but the very spectre forces u?; to think again about the; plutonium revolution. What is I really happening! Let us start with generali- ties. Nuclear energy is seen as a good way of generating electric power; it saves oil imports and it is, so far, safe. At the end of the line lies the hope of fusion power, which will be safer, cleaner, and in time cheaper. But until that becomes economic, governments must either risk the exhaustion of oil, trust to new untried sources of energy?tides, waves, winds?or build more and more fission ? plants. There ? are already a few hundred fission plants round the world. To run the Com- munist types, you proceed in five stages. (1) You feed it with enriched uranium. ? (2) You let it run. -(3) You extract the worn out elements, vhicli now contain a lot of plutonium. (4) You " re-process " or " separate " the plutonium: (5)You either put the pinto. Mum back into the reactor system and run it some more, Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 -r"."7 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 or you make it into an explo- sive device to use as a bomb or for earth-shifting. So for controlling prolifera- tion, stage four, re-processing, is the most sensitive. It re- quires highly specialised plant and historically this work has been done for all countries by the original "nuclear sup- pliers "?United States, Soviet Union, the UK ens' France. Recently, however, there have been a spate of cases where a supplier country has contracted to sell not just a reactor or so, but also repro- cessing plants. The Americans are hotly opposed to this, because even if the first such plant is under good safe- guards, the country concerned will be able to build another ? plant under no safeguards at all. Moreover, they say it makes no eeonomic sense to maintain a ,;!--4e-ocessing plant unless you i4e`e handling the used elements from whole nuclear industries. If a small country seeks its own plant, that means only one thing: a desire to make bombs. A country may, however. want a reprocessing plant so that it is in no danger of being . without fuel if its processor suddenly wants to subject it to political pressure. ? The world is laced in all directions by agreements and half-agreements, conventions. and half-conventions, working or partly working. In spite of this network, France has agreed to sell. Pakistan and Germany has agreed to sell -Brazil nuclear generating systems including re-proces- sing plants. Neither Pakistan nor Brazil has signed the Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In both these cases, despite US complaints, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vierirta,. which exists to make sure that plutonium, etc.. is used in reactors and not in bombs, has now approved both deals. France also went a long way towards selling.a re-processing spoken in moments of stress or isa!ation about getting. nuclear weapons? Turkey, Indonesia, Tahean, Libya. Yet others move steadily towards the technology that permits nuclear weapons: South Africa, Australia, Iran, Japan .and Argentina. Offers to help with nuclear programmes, some of them more irresponsible than others, coma from most of the supplier states?France. West Germany, the Soviet Union, Canada, India: But not from Britain: we stitk to the opposite approach. The main example is the re- cent deal by which we will re-pioeess Japan's spent fuel elements here. The agree- ment is a showpiece. If such a large advanced industrial country as Japan finds it ? economic to include a journey to England and back in the nuclear power ? generation cycle, then all these little ! South Koreas and Pakistans stand convicted of militarism. HOW CAN WE control all this? The principal tool ought to be the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968. This had been privately agreed in advance between the Americans and Russians, and, since anything agreed between America and Russia starts 10% up in British eyes, it was enthu- siastically (and uncritically) endorsed by this country: and. for the same reason, decried by France and China. It was unenthusiastically endorsed by most of the rest of the world, after they had forced the nuclear powers to agree to include an article in the Treaty binding there to work for disarmament among themselves. A great majority of countries in the world igned (and a smaller majority -atified). .The non-nuclear weapon EEC states ratified nly last year; Japan has not et done so. Others have -ejected it as one would reject sermon on abstinence by a lrunken pastor. While the Treaty was being tegotiated, it was pointed out y Egypt and others that it ; ontained many loopholes, the videst being that non-nuclear veapons countries (for itstance Germany, Czechoslo- akia, Canada, Iran) are not revented from helping non- ignatoriee to get nuclear. ?eapons (for instance, Paki- tan, Israel, South Africa, ndia). Nor are private rms prevented from doing nvthing whatever. In May last year an NPT eview conference was to take lace in Geneva. The month efore, the Americans, instead f trying to get the loopholes lugged with the agreement of he Treaty parties, convened complete secrecy a first iceting of "The Nuclear Ex- orters Consultative Group," emetimes called " The Secret even." (France only agreed plant to South Korea, another t. country whose government I explicitly reserves the right to make nuclear weapons ? b despite having signed and c ratified the NPT (from which % everybody does have a right ' to withdraw). But the Americans impressed on v the South Koreans that they e could continue to enjoy American nuclear protection w only if they made no move s towards nuclear weapons of I their own. For tha moment fi the deal with France is off. a The Indian " explosive device " was made with the r. hep of systems imported from p Canada !Deg ago under b evidently inadequate safe- a guards. Aed the same is tree p of France's nuclear help which t. set Israal on the road to the ii (untested) nuciear weapons n the CIA now says she pos- p sesses. Neither India nor s Israel is an NPT signatory. S Other countries have 40 to join if it was secret.) They are USA, the Soviet Union, Britain, France, West Ger- nianye Canada, Japan. Last month an American official, Mr George Vest, gave to Congress what 'is still almost the only hard news of the consensus of this elite group. First, it wants other countries to join (Belgium, Sweden, East Germany, etc). Second, America has decided (and we may assume these "decisions " resemble more or less the "guidelines" accepted by the Secret Seven as a whole) to demand " assur- ances" that their nuclear exports will not be used to produce explosives, and that if re-exported, the same " assurances" will be passed up the line. Third, America favours " multilateral regional facilities for re-processing and enrichment," so as to have it done -in fewer places and under international control. A system of " assurances " is unlikely to bring control over these processes even up to the level now exercised by IAEA over the fissionable materials themselves. But as the reactors and the trade in fuel spreads, so will the abso- lute amount of "Material Un- accounted For" (or MUF) which means the margin of error in any conceivable system of control. In time this margin can only become so big that people could be making bombs within it. Nuclear power is bombs just as much as it is electricity, and the Soviet Union's deci- sion to use nuclear explosives in its "Transformation of Nature" programme has pro- vided a plausible alibi for bomb makers. The real answer, as usual in human affairs, must hi. poli;.1- val. The developed world mus: really now ask itself: wl-rs should Pakistan, Brazil, ot? even Libya not have nuclear weapons? There is no answer in common polities; what is so special about Pakistan or Brazil? Why do they have to be denied the rights we enjoy? The only way forward, therefore, still lies where it always did?in the cessation and reversal of the centrai arms race between Russia and America. Haltingly, in the lae five years, .the super-powees have begun to talk. But out ef the world's hearing; and the published agreements are lee- able only for ambiguity z insufficiency. And a new generation of weapon.s--creiae missiles, an updated V-bomb ? threatens to "reduce lo nothing all that has been achieved so far." The words are from Russia hut Dr Kissinger is saying the same. But " what has been achieved so far" has been negotiated in airless secrecy which has fed the apprehen- sions- of outsiders and made "nuclear independence " seem merely prudent. What the Shah said about the "Secret Seven." in ail liter- view in Le Monde las:: Deem- her is true of the whole nuclear affair: "One wonders if the real purposes of the group do not go beyond the advertised aims. If it is ready the case that they are only concerned with non-proiifera- tion, why are they doimz it behind locked doors?" Why indeed? NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, APRIL 18, 1976 Bonn's Atom Offer to Iran Stirs a Debate on Sharing By CRAIG R. WHITNEY Special to The New York T.loes ? BONN; April 16?Early next. gy, not' iust'one or' two atomic month, a negotiating team of reactors to generate electricity.' West German and Iranian ibut the whole range of equio-1 atomic-energy specialists will meet in Teheran to discuss a question that is likely to be a point of conflict between the United States, its European ment, scientific techniques andi nuclear knowledge needed toi realize Shah Mohammed Pizal Pahlevi's ',labs to make hfs; country a major modern indus-i allies, and the developing coun- trial power. tries for decades. The full .technology includes! The question is whether in- "'sensitive" processes for ext..; dustrialized countries like West :riching uranium' and' reprocess-i Germany should share with ing the fuel elements of a nu-I third-world countries like Iran clear reactor, removing pieta- the nuclear science and tech- nium and other byproducts of niques that could, be used for atomic reaction. This technolo- nuclear weapons. gy could be used to make atom. The United States has in ic bombs, effect a ban on -sensitive" ex- Although Iran signed the nu- ;ports. But the West Germans clear nonproliferation treaty twill discuss this arca. with Iran. and is committed not to (levet- and actually made a compre-nioP nuclear explosives, the S:? hensive nuclear export agree. could not get "sensitive" rr.:-! mvnt with Brazil last year, clear technology from Inc tat-, Iran wants nuclear technolo-; ed States. As a matter of Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 - ? - 'Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77700432R000100400004-9 ? Icy, the Administration does not permit the export of equip ment and techniques that could be used to make bombs no matter what the buyer prom- ises. But the West Germans say they are willing to discuss any area of technology, placing their faith in tight controls and international supervision of the "sensitive" installations they export to the developing world. no area of technolo?giiai hee - excluded from the discussions including reprocessing." Earlie nf sured Washington in advanc that Bonn did not plan to se ri any nuclear reactors to Egyp Exports are the heart of the West German economy, and the Germans feel they simply cannot afford to be cut out of the high-technology export field. "They missed out on aero- space and computer technolo- gy," an American businessman here commented, "and they see nuclear technology as the big area of the.future?they're just not willing to lose this one." The French are engaged in an equally vigorous nuclear ex- port drive, reportedly involving the sale of plutonium - re- processing plants to such coun- tries as South Korean and Paki- stan. Under American pressure, South Korea decided not to go through with the deal, but the French are as eager as the West Germans not to lose a share of the nuclear technolo- gy market. A Huge Stake Billions of dollars and tens of thousands of jobs?even the economic future of Western Eu- rope?are at stake, they feel. And as an official of Kraft- werk Union, the seven-year-old West German manufacturer of nuclear power plants, ex- plained, "Wherever we look? in Italy, Spain, Sweden, Thai- -land, South Korea?the Ameri- cans have already been there. The third world is the only open market left." The United States will Meet with six other nuclear-supplier countries' in London in June, and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger said the central issue would be that of export- ing reprocessing plants. The United States believes that they should be under multinational control; West German experts say this would be unrealistic in the case of countries like Iran that are in politically un- stable regions. What the West German nego- tiators will agree on in Teheran next month is unclear. It is certain, the West Germans say, that if any comprehensive nu- clear agreement is reached with Iran it would be tightly con- trolled. "There is nothing concrete yet," said Dr. Wolf-J. Schmidt- Kilster of the Ministry of Re- search and Technology, "but this year, West Germany an Iran reached tentative agree ment on an outline for a nuclear-cooperation agreement but did not make it public. Sensitivity about the risk o an uncontrollable spread of nu clear weapons is running so ? high in the United States that Washington and Bonn nearly clashed openly last June when West Germany signed the world's first complete nuclear- technology export agreement, with Brazil. The weekly news magazine Der Spiegel attacked the Government last month with a long article that said in part: "The responsible politicians seem to worry little, if at all, about the danger that states with a highly doubtful reputa- tion are being helped to effort- less acquisition of nuclear-weap- :ons technology." But after the Brazilian expe- rience, according to Government and industry officials inter- viewed for this article, the West Germans have become not only sensitive but also acutely defensive about the issue. el really all -we have." ll d 'Brazil was signed here 13.3t t The controversial treaty with di until the United States di - According to the expert however, reactors are not th , main problem?the "sensitiv 'technology" used in enrichin f the uranium fuel and recover . ing plutonium and uranium-23 from spent fuel cells poses th danger. Plutonium has no pres- ent practical use, America experts say, except in bormbs But American efforts withi the group of nuclear-supplier nations have failed so far to get the Germans and the French to agree not to expor enrichment and reprocessing devices. , There is an enormous amount of suspicion here that behind the U.S. drive for tighter con- trols is a desire to corner the vast world nuclear-technol- ogy market for American com- panies like Westinghouse and General Electric. Joachim Hospe, an official of Kraftwerk Union, said in Frankfurt: "To fully exploit our nuclear power plant capacity, we have to land at least three contracts a year for delivery abroad. The market here is about saturated and the United States has cornered most of the rest of Europe, so we have to concentrate on the third world." Operating within the frame- wor of the nuclear-coopera- tion agreements West Germany has with Brazil, Canada, Ruma- nia, Pakistan, India, Iran and Chile (the last one dormant since the military coup there) Kraftwerk Union now has 27 power-plant orders on its books. It is big business: the !average 'price for a 1,200-mega- lwatt nuclear plant is about 6600 million. Kraftwerk Union also bid to build two? nuclear plants in South Africa, where it is in competition with both 'Ameri- can and French concerns. But according to some West Ger- man officials Chancellor Hel- mut Schmidt may veto any deal with South Africa because the white minority Government there is politically 'offensiveto many members of his Social Democratic Party. Another proposal, a three- ear-old plan to build a nu- lear-power plant at Kalinin- grad ?.for the Soviet Union, fell through last month after the Russians refused to let the elec- tric - transmission lines . run through East Germany to sup- ply West Berlin. "It's too bad," Mr. Hospe id, "Russia could have been market. You see that the e veloping countries e..: ;June 27, and Karl-Heinz Schol-1 e Ityssek, an official of the t e 'Foreign Ministry, described it; g in an interview as "a model."; - The agreement provides for 5 exploration for uranium ore in e ,Brazil to supply \Vest Germa- ny's needs, now met largely n! by supplies from the United ? States and the Soviet Union. n In return, the West Germans will give Brazil access to the t, here, and build a pilot ree 1 separation-nozzle uranium-en- richment process developed , processing plant in Brazil. The; installation is capable of sepa- rating and extracting weapons- grade plutonium from used reactor fuel elements?a "com- plete nuclear fuel cycle," in other words. I "The Brazilians want to buy I as many as eight large pressurH iized-water power-plant reac- tors from us," Mr. Schmidt: Mister said, "and i: they have! ,that many, by 1990, they will ineed their own facilities for 'enriching and reprocessing the; !fuel. Otherwise they'd have to, ibe transporting this dangerousj 'material thousands of miles: across the ocean, to Germany4 and there are objections alli the time to doing that sorti of thing here." ? I Mr. Scholtyssek pointed outi that the Brazilians pledged ini the treaty not to use either; the equipment or the technolo-1 gy they get from West Germa-{ ny ? for: any kind of nuclear explosive device even a "peace- I 'ful' one.. And, he pointed cut,i an integral part of the agreeH ment was that Brazil had to, submit to supervision and con-! trol by the International Atom- ic Energy Agency. The agencf. ? and the Governments of Zrazi. and West Germany sigriled a treaty insuring these control: on Feb. 26. "The technology, in additior to the equipment, is explicit13 included in the controls.'-" Mr Scholtyssek said, "and the tri lateral agreement cermet- be unilaterally abrogated. It -last as long as the equipment does.' Critics like Der Spiegel ' asser that equipment the Brazilian: develop later, with Germar technology 'can not be trt o trolled, an assertion Mr. Schol? tyssek denies. . , The American Government': attitude' is that avoiding the export of sensitive technolog! like reprocessing and enrich- ment is better than controls as Mr. Kissinger said in a 'Sere late bearing on March 9. The issue is one that will not be dismissed by the con- trols, safeguards and interna- tional supervision that the West Germans tied into the agreement with Brazil and will tie into any other nuclear co- operation treaty, as Dr. Schmidt- Mister emphasized. Kissinger Unhappy Despite the controls, to be carried out by the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency, Secretary Kissinger was known to be unhappy about West Germany's agree- ment with Brazil. On Capitol Hill there were calls for the 'United States and the Soviet Union to agree to cut off France and West -Germany from supplies of enriched ura- nium for their own nuclear- power plants unless they agree not to export to "untrust- worthy" countries. Since Brazil, the West Ger- mans have been more circum- spect. For example, after , Egypt's President, Anwar el-Sa- dat, ended his visit here April 1 he toured the 1,200-megawatt nuclear-power plant at Biblis. Both Iran and Brazil have al- ready each ordered two like it. Mr. Sadat was given a gold- plated hard hat as a souvenir, hut he took little else away from the visit. Even though the Biblis pressurized - water reactors contain little militarily ,y Ic sa useful technology, the West a German Government had as-; d 41. are now Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 THE WASHENGTON POST ? Saturday. April 17.1916 Diplomatic Hostages and Detente trilE PREDICAMENT OF SOVIET and American diplo- -11- mats working in each other's country these days reflects all too accurately the soured state of "detente." Because of continuing stark Soviet restrictions on Soviet Jews, a few American Jews have adopted criminal ter- ror tactics against Soviet diplomats in New York?to the point of firing into apartments occupied by children. The New York police and other authorities have applied extraordinary diligence to the task of safeguarding the diplomats, but with less than total success. As a result, the Kremlin has undertaken a campaign of phone threats, bomb scares and physical intimidation against American- diplomats in Moscow. Daily life for the two diplomatic communities could scarcely be more grim. It goes without saying that diplomats of all nations must be personally immune from all such threats and hostile- acts. No measure of political disagreement justi fee holding diplomats hostage to their governments' policies. That said, there is a glaring difference in lhe two situations. The American government is trying to uphold the law and bring to account the perpetrators- of anti-Soviet crimes in New York. The Soviet govern anent is itself breaking the law and dishonoring its inter. national duty by conducting organized harassment of Americans in Moscow. A month ago, in regard to com- plaints of Americans there that they were being exposed to dangerous radiation from Soviet surveillance equip - anent, the question was raised whether the United States ought to give Soviet diplomats in Washington a similar ?t Eon. The answer, quite properly, was no. Other, legal forms of reciprocal treatment?such as withdrawal by Americans from all but the most format essential con- WASHINGTON POST 26 APR 1976 Screens Found to ? tacts with Soviet diplomats?would be much more ap- propriate. But that only points up the truly ugly nature of the Kremlin's conduct in these affairs. It ought to be widely condemned. No less worthy of condemnation, however, are the assaults by militant Jews-in New York. They are doing a good deal more than breaking the law, undercutting the hospitality the United States owes foreign diplomats. and providing a? pretext for Soviet countermeasures against American diplomats They are also alarming the very people, Soviet Jews, whose cause they profess to espouse. Jews in Moscow have already relayed their criticism of the likes of the "Jewish Armed Resistance." protesting on principle against the use of terror and noting that the Kremlin might use the provocation as grounds for a further crackdown on Soviet Jews. The basic source of this tension remains the Soviet Union's refusal to respect the human rights of its citi- zenry, in this case, the rights of Jews. If anything is clear fiom the recent years of close foreign attention to the matter, however, it is that tactics meant to relieve Soviet citizens must be carefully designed and executed. 'Recent well-intended efforts to use economic leverage to promote Jewish emigration, for instance, ended up con- tributing to a sharp drop in emigration, a stalemate in trade, and a deterioration of atmosphere which played back negatively into still other Soviet-American projects. We are not sure how to.restore the generally more posi- tive circumstances in which emigration, among other things, grew in 1973-74. We are confident, though, that the way not to do it is to fire bullets into the apartments of Soviet diplomats in New York. Block Rays at Moscow Embassy Associated Press A classified State Depart- ment document says that aluminum screening re- cently installed at the U.S. embassy in Moscow is 90 per cent effective in blocking out microwave radiation be- Ing beamed at the embassy by the Soviets. The document, prepared for use in closed briefings of embassy employees, pro- vides the first detailed offi- cial explanation of the mi- crowave situation, which has aroused concern over poten- tial health hazards because of the radiation. Yet many basic questions remain unanswered ? in- cluding why the Soviets are continuing the microwave bombardment. I Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger has called the I issue "a matter of great deli- cacy which has many ramifi- cations," adding that the United States is involved in talks with Soviet officials in an effort to get the radia- tion stopped. A copy of the confidential State Department briefing paper was made available to the Associated Press. The document says that window screens installed at the embassy 2% months ago "reduce the current micro- wave signals to a point well below one microwatt per square centimeter but not to a 'zero' level." By contrast, late last year the microwaves had reached a maximum intensity of 18 microwatts in certainly heavily irradiated areas of the embassy, the briefing paper said. U.S. officials in Washing- ton and Moscow have re-,, fused to give any detailed public explanation about the microwave problem since it broke into headlines in early February. On the purpose of the mi- crowaves, the briefing paper said, "This is something the Soviets are in the best posi- tion to answer." The Soviets, the document noted, "have suggested to some newsmen recently that they are attempting to inter- fere with embassy reception of communications. Others have theorized that the beams were in some way connected with surveillance activities." On the question of possi- ble health hazards, the pa- per said that so far "no cause and effect relation- ship has been established between _disorders con- tracted by those In Moscow and their exposure to the electromagnetic field." - It noted that "a full-scale study of those, who have served in Moscow in the past and those whoe are there now is in the process of being developed." The briefing document also reported that since Oc- tober, 1975, the embassy has been the target of two mi- crowave beams. "Both are highly directional, some- what like searchlight beams, but wider. They are aimed at the upper floors of the central wing of the chancery from different directions," the document said. The upper floors of the 10- story building house the of- fices of the ambassador and other top diplomats, along with sensitive communica- tions and intelligence areas. The State Department ac- count said the two micro- wave beams "are sometimes on the air simultaner.usly for three to four limirs a day." Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 42 Approved For Release-2001108/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9? WASHINGTON POST 20 APR 1976 Today's Example of Chutzpah . yOU REMEMBER the definitive illustration of the word chutzpah: It is the story about the young man who murdered his parents and then pleaded with the judge to take pity on a poor orphan. That word has taken on a meaning that lies well beyond the comparatively pallid English term, unmitigated gall:It connotes an effrontery so outrageous as to command a certain reluctant admiration. Today's ex: ample of chutzpah is the Soviet accusation that the United States is meddling in Western European af- fairs. :The United States, In this Soviet- view, is not living --lip. to the ?Helsinki agreement that Was signed amidst ? much mutual congratulation last August. It required all-the signatories to promise not to meddle in each ,:tiliers' internal affairs. The current Soviet accusation .1.1.-a response to the American admonitions to Italy --Ilmut the prospect of Communists in its government. :Late last year the United States government was "embarrassed by .the disclosure, that it was preparing 16 pour Several million dollars into Italian politics, in, ?"a 'despairing effort to propThp the non-Communist ,parties. The dislosure was, fortunately, enough to kill .the whole idea. The 'Soviets, Meanwhile, have been ,iibsidizing the Italian. Coninurniit party so long and ZOO fined tinut sun, April 111, 19/6 so steadily that they hardly think of it as foreign in- terfezence any longer. It's merely an old Russian cus- tom. Europeans use a double standard in judging these affairs, and they are quite right. They know that it is in the nature of the Soviet government to tamper with the internal affairs of other countries whenever the opportunity presents itself. They understand that . high-minded international agreements do not affect that basic fact of life. They realize that it is foolish to expect the Russians to do otherwise. But Europeans also know that a great many Ameri- cans have grave doubts about this country's occa- sional attempts to mess around covertly in other peo- ple's politics, and Americans persist in debating the issue loudly although their government frequently wishes that they would not. As a result, the United States government currently can do very little more than lecture Italy about the probable results of its present tendency. The Soviets profess to believe that these lectures represent a violation of the Helsinki treaty. Here as always, the Soviet view is that the So- viet government is to be judged publicly only by those things that it chooses to do publicly. THE $ONNENFELDT DOCTRINE' Dualism Marks U.S. Policy ? - BY ZYGMUNT NAGORSKI JR. American policy toward Europe?both East and West?shows a curious dualism. We are dogmatic and inflexible toward the emerging electoral strength of West- , ern European Communist parties. At the lame time, we have moved from the pre- Mous. position of tolerance and tacit -approval of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe to a more explicit and politically suggestive concept recently labeled the- Sonnenfeldt Doctrine. . In a briefing for our European ambassa- dors, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, one of the closest advisors of Secretary of State Hen- ry A. Kissinger. suggested a "more natural and organic" relationship between the So- viet Union and Eastern Europe. ? Is there a link between these varied American positions? There could be. From a historical perspective, a connec- tion can be seen between the present American position and the Yalta Agree- ment concluded between the big powers on Feb. 11, 1945. It was at Yalta that a di- vision of the spoils was sealed. It was there that Eastern Europe was awarded to the Soviet Union as the area of its legiti- mate security concern, and it was there that the Russians were told to keep their 43 hinds off elsewhere. It was also at Yalta that efforts were made by the West to preserve a semblance of self-rule in such countries as Poland and Czechoslovakia. - ? ? Greece, Turkey and Iran were threa- _ tened later by "wars of liberation," and Poland and Czechoslovakia were sub- merged by what Sonnenfeldt aptly termed sheer Soviet power. But 31 years ago it was impossible to foresee the dichotomy of the developments witin the two European halves: prosperity and social convulsions - in the West; uniformity?after a period of desperate unrest?in the East. The Sonnenfeldt Doctrine is our admis- sion of failure. It suggests that the Yalta Agreement did not work out either to our benefit or expectations. It also suggests . that it would be in the interest of the Unit- ed States to see within the Soviet bloc A staff member of the Council on Foreign.' Relations, Zygmunt Nagorski is the author of "Psychology of East-West Trade: Illusions and Opportunities." more cohesive and more politically signifi- ? cant developments permitting the Rus- sians to relax their concern and to begin relying less on power and more on institu- tional and political links. - Such goals can be accomplished only if Eastern Europeans become institutionally and politically closer to the Soviet Union. The new American doctrine, cites the ex- , amples of Poland and Hungary, where ac- commodations to that effect are being made by the ruling Communist parties. In Poland serious attempts have been- made to amend the constitution to fit it more into the mold of the Soviet constitution. t The authorities rammed it through the ? controlled parliament, but a wave of protests swept the country. led by writers, artists and academicians who saw in the official attempt another step toward even- tual incorporation of Poland into the net- work of Soviet socialist republics. The wording of the more drastic amendments was changed. The protesters had scored a few points. Sonnenfeldt's implied theory is that such protestors are simply delaying an inevita- ble process of evolution. It also suggests that Eastern Europe, unless well en- trenched within the Soviet power struc- ture, could be a powder keg and even trig- ger another major war. It is difficult to see the logic of his concern. Should his doc- trine enter the body of American foreign policy, any. repetition of past uprisings in Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 %that part of the world would be left to the Soviet Union alone to deal with. Where, therefore, would be the danger of a West- ern involvement? The link between our Western and East- ern European policies thus emerges. While we are willing to go far beyond the Yalta Agreement by suggesting stronger syste- mic cnonections in the East, we are also telling the Russians that they should keep their part of the bargain concluded in 1945 by keeping their hands off the West. This explains Washington's rigidity toward tern Communists. They have ? ben, and still are natural Soviet al- lies, and thus cannot be permitted to assume a share of power in the West. ince in both France and Italy the Communist parties emerged out of the electoral process,' the U.S. Ad- ministration is using its leverage to bypne% the process and enforce the Continuity of non-Communist majori- " .. ? e ease 200 1/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 ble of tackling such issues as social justicei employment, morality in pub!, lic life and economic recovery. It has also been widely assumed in Europe that the Soviet Union would - view the assumption of power by the Italian Communist Party with mixed feelings. A successful experiment of a trills, democratic Communist partici- pation in power, an experiment ar- rived at through the electoral pro- Cess, would be viewed with uneasi- ness ' by the existing Communist governments in Eastern European countries, for reasons 'easily per- ceived.-. ? ? -There is not a single country with- in the Fastern bloc where commu- nism has sustained .itself: through pluralistic institutions, freedom of speech, assembly and choice. In Yu- .js, where the' Soviet Union is 'absent, government control oyer the . individual reigns supreme. In Roma- - nia, where foreign policy is directed . by a president of clear nationalistic -leanings and where Soviet influence ? is limited, a rigid internal police sys- . tem exists. Elsewhere, governments -rest on a combination of Soviet and ?domestic pollee powers. ? ? - :And the majority of the. people? who go through an electoral process. always returning 99%--of Communist candidates to office?assume that without an element of_ coercion,. no Cemmunist-controlle& regime could survive. The party apparatus adds. credence to that belief, by steadily re.: fusing to permit the exerrnso of na-- tural human-freedom -Italy, a country outside the, reach of direct Soviet power, may suddenly .challengt that eassumption. Should the historical compromise succeed in Rome, without undermining Italian democratic . institutions, ? a tamed Communist-Christian Democrat re- gime could emerge. It would be based on a democratic process of se-. lection; it would not require a heavy police hand. It would reject the no- :Lion of Soviet predominance In . foreign and defense policies. . In short, Eastern Europeans, and Russians as well, would see the - 'This attitude appears distinctly un- icl=ocratic to Europeans. America ifenerges as another superpower in- ?teneested more in overall balance and .tiectrity considerations than in the will of the people concerned. The dif- ? tference between the two?the Soviet ;Union and the United States?begins -itci bit= ? ' -Yet there may be another, differ- ' *nt connection between US. policies Vox East and West. It has been wide- ay assumed in European political cir- icles that the Communist movement is facing a serious crisis. It is no longer (either an ideological or political men-: liti It is a set of ideas, vaguely Inked to its original Moscow source, ,Ibut representing a new set of values, 4..tee-sponding to all kinds of new chal- hnges. The Soviet Union, faced with e schism of its original faith, is - ;gaping. for solutions. It continues to. demand loyalty from its followerseIt- ts it from some, like the French? ettlei spite of their declarations 'to the e outs:ay?but not from all, Jo' In Italy, . the" Communist Party *ceased to be an international branch lof an outside church. Today it rep/e- a-eels to many Italians a party capa- NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, APRIL IS, 1976 he View from uro e Is of a eceding U.S. By FLORA LEWIS PARIS?As they survey what is coming to look like the shambles of their own efforts to unite. European leaders have begun to question America's intentions around the world. The questions are whether United States policy is really changing after 30 years of active intervention in global polities; whether the United States and Russia are heading for a new period cf cold war over the heads of other development of a socialism with a .'human face?a development which caused Moscow to send tanks to Czechoslovakia in 1968. But such use -'of force would be iinpossible in Italy. It is entirely possible, therefore, - . that.. such a major change in Italy . would have a destabilizing effect on the Soviet-controlled part of Europe. The Soviet Union may have to rely more, not less, on its military might. The organic ? links' advocated by Son- : nenfeldt would be even more remote. ?,7Sucli links could be developed only through growing mutual trust mixed ? with the feelings of desperation by ? Poles, Romanians and -others, desper- . ation born out of the reality of stand- ing alone face to face with the Soviet . An Italian experiment in dernacra- _ cy embracing a genuine Communist -Party would open a possible way out ? of such a state-of desperation." All over Eastern Europe, other people e would ask: "Why don't we also try to e adapt our system to both lanmen and - ....national aspirations?" 7 Y% 'Thus emerges the link between our ? two positions regarding Eastern and 'Western Europe. In order to save de- . tente? and to assure our continued di- : alogue with the Soviet Union, we are attempting to defuse tensions all over . Europe:' in :.the East by suggesting . more 'normal' relations with the So- viets; in the West by eliminating a 'a-potential security problem for. our- :elves the same time a politi- -cal and ideological problem; for the '.Russians.. The goal is clear; bilateral t'n American-Soviet relations are more --important . than -other- elements of Power -struggle in the areas wider -the respective Soviet and Arr1Prioan influences. ' ? , But along the way we may find ? ourselves alone and isolate& The Sonnenfeldt theory cuts America off :.from the -continuing aspirations of the people of, Eastern Bin-one. And on the western side of the continent, the process of change is going to con- tinue with or without our blessing; with or without cue perticipation. -:dOuntries that would nonetheless feel the chill; whether the ? world balance is really tilting towards Moscow. These are overlapping and contradictory questions, re- , fleeting the fact that there is no real consensus in Europe on what is happening, only a consensus that something is coming unstuck and old assumptions can no longer be taken for granted. The sharpened quill of headlines and commentators has been warning for some time now of American "withdrawal," . "eclipse," "paralysis," "neo-isolationism," even "abandon- ment of responsibilities." The phrases flow after each new international crisis, such as Lebanon and Angola. and reach back to Vietnam, Watergate. Responsible officials do not make it sound quite so drastic, but they share a sense of uncertainty about what to expect from the United States, and many of them complain of American retrenchment. At a recent meeting of Common Market government heads in ? Luxembourg, the mood was one of helpless and even bitter gloom. France warned that Africa was about to topple into the Soviet orbit, taking perhaps more. seriously than other ob- servers the Ford Administration's warning about what would happen if Congress refused to intervene in Angola. There was a general 'awareness of the growth of Soviet 44 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 pproved-For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001004000134- military power (which the leaders have known about for . years, hut which seems-suddenly to have struck their con- ? sciousness anew) and that the rhetoric of detente might work to demobilize the West and benefit Moscow. Some high officials think there is a sea-change coming in America, as a result of a shift in the power balance between the President and Congress. Some think that is a threat, not yet realized. Some, the veterans, tend more to suppose that election year blues will? lift when the bal- -lots are counted and the United States will show its familiar, eager 'face. The worries are not clearly focused. Nobody influential has suggested that the United States would not go to the defense of Western Europe in case of attack, nor that an ? attack has become any more likely. But there has been ' more talk of the danger of Europe's "Finlandizatiop." The general public has not paid much attention to these politicians' and officials' concerns. Countries are focusing- inwards, on their immediate grievances and troubles, and when they speak to their electorates, the leaders are follow- ing this trend. The result is that they do not speak openly of their fears. Another result of this concentration on the home-front is that judgments about what is happening in the United States and. the world tend to reflect Internal partisan squabbles even more than usual. ? France's influential daily, Le Monde, took the Kissinger-? ? r ? Sonnenfeldt statements on American. policy, -madetri? - group of United States ambassadors last December, as' further proof that Washington is determined to prevent. the rise of an effective power partner in Europe. Others have taken the compressed policy review as an indication ? that the United States is losing the will to contain Soviet influence. The confusion has only compounded itself, as' tha?qUesr thin is put about what the Europeans wish America would do. One sage, retired participant in the highest councils. ..said: "Don't worry. The West has only lost where it was wrong?Indochina, Portuguese Africa, and next will come Rhodesia." He belittled the widespread complaints among . European officials that revelations about the Central Intel-? ? ligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, cor- porate bribery, were undermining America's authority. "There has never been so much American intervention, and clumsy at that,- in European affairs as now, with your leaders shaking their fists about which governments they will and won't. tolerate," he .said. It was a reference to .the ford Administration carnpagn against Communists in France and Italy.- But among .the people who make policy, this calm, even, bemused view is the exception, More common is the fear that somehow America may stop being willing and able to ' shield Europe, not only on its own territory but in areas of the developing world where it has vital interests. In an inchoate way, the fear is beginning to spread to layers of society who feel they can only lose as the un- certainty spreads. A group of French businessmen said that many of their friends were sending money abroad now, to Canada, the United States and Brazil, not to West Germany or Switzerland. It isn't clear whether they are worried about the Russians or the French Communists. But they do say they lack confidence in the future of Western Europe. The fraying fabric of the Common Market, reflected in the failure of the nine government heads to agree on any- thing, even a bland communique, when they met in Luxem- bourg, is an element in the loss of hope and assurance af- flicting European policy-makers. It is generally admitted that there simply is no longer any point in mouthing slogans about a common European defense, either to displace American influence as the Gatrllists always wished, or to buttress and if necessary replace it, as the Atlanticists have sought. It isn't about to happen and that makes the Europeans more conscious of their dependence on America for security. It isn't so much the election-year debate on foreign policy which has upset the Europeans, as their perception cf American unwillingness to undertake major foreign inter- ventions during an election year. But the lack of cohesion and sense of common purpose among Europe's leaders., has gone so far that they can't ?even- reach -a common view-on what -they. wish America ? would do. ? ? Perhaps, by the time of the alliance's spring meeting in Oslo next month, a nucleus of the Europeans will manage to come up with some kind Of suggestion to America. But ,nobody is betting on it in the present m3od. And it seems important that the same people who ex- press this glum view of the West's future are the ones who keep pointing out that fear is . what .the Europeans have most to fear, lest they resign themselves to a gradual into paralyzed acceptance of Soviet demands. Morale is terrible, they say, and that is demoralizing. There are still some who insist that the cold facts in both America and Europe give no justification for this self- defeatism, which would concede to Russia in? the next generation something, like the prime super-power status throughout the world which America held during the postwar generation. Since it is more a matter of mood than reality, these sober voices argue, the situation could be turned around by an injection of encouraging leadership. But the fashion of the moment is to pessimism, the eye of .the powerful is fixed on the shadows. It makes for passivity, regardless of the actual balance of light and dark on the horizon. . ? ? ? .. 45 Flora Lewis' is chief of the Paris bureau of The New York Times. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 Nea East LONDON OBSERVER 4 April 1976 Step-by-step to eath f the Lebanon , LIKE doctors, statesmen have the macabre distinction of counting their errors in human lives; and Dr Henry Kissinger, the most confident physician to treat the ailments of the Middle East for a quarter of a century, ends up having a mountain of Lebanese corpses on his conscience. . ?The destruction of Lebanon and of its unique society can be traced, at least in part, to ,l-wo strategic decisions taken 1 by .Dr- Kissinger in the 1, immediate wake of the October I' Wan of 1973. The first Was to :-seek to take' Egypt- out of the conflict, thus separating her from her battle ally Syria, in ? the,. expectation that, once Egypt was disengaged, peace- making on the other fronts Iwould be far easier?the fatrious Kissinger step-by-step I procedure. . The second decision was a I negative one : a refusal to take .his surgeon's knife to the central cancer in Arab politics, the Palestine question, in the belief that if the Arab States could be persuaded to make disengagement or non-belliger- ? ,ency deals with Israel?even ' short of full-scale peace?the Palestinians would simply have to acquiesce in whatever arrangements were made for them; and if they didn't, the Arab States would deal with them. V, . Both these decisions, which ' ? bear ..the mark of Israeli influence .on Dr Kissinger's ? thinking, already appear as gross misjudgments. ,. Encouraged by Dr Kissinger, the ' defection ' of Egypt from the battlefield at once put intolerable pressure on Syria and aroused immense resent- ment in her. leaders... They were haunted with the pros- pect of a new war with Israel in which they would have to .stand alone: and this fear has dictated their every move. Syria's national ? interest, indeed her survival, demands that she control, neutralise or contain any radical, militant or extremist element in 1 Lebanon which might trigger off an Israeli intervention and drag Syria into a suicidal adventure. , . This need to control events vital to her national security has made Syria the reluctant and embarrassed champion of the old guard Lebanese estab- lishment and has brought her into conflict with the Pales- tinian guerrillas, .with .mili- tant --Arab nationalists and with the Left. V Syria simply cannot afford violent, unpre- dictable revolutionary change in Lebanon.- ? As for the Palestinians, Dr Kissinger's consistent neglect ! of them, his reluctance in deference to Israel to grasp the nettle of their stateless- ness, has brought' to the sun- face in 'Palestinian leaders a neurotic fear of their own: that of seeing their national interests 'sacrificed- On. the altar of __Arab peace - with Israel. ? They recognise that' they have They an embarrass- ment to an Arab world which has embarked on ?;the search for an accommodation with Israel. But they believe Kis- singer's step-by-step pro- cedure means ultimate- stran- gulation for them. So they trust no Arab regime; they. wriggle out of dependence on, any one of them; they fear Syrian overlordship and, hav- ing established squatters' rights in weak, vulnetable and hospitable Lebanon, they now fight tooth and nail to preserve this last haven. ? .This is the political context in which Kamal. Jumblatt, an aristocrat turned populist, a sort of Lebanese Tony Benn, has made his bid for power. He has come closer to success now than at any time in his long maverick career. - Exploiting Syria's fear of ? disorderly change, her un- popular defence of President Franjieh and her heavy- -handed tutelary role, Jum- blatt mobilised under his radi- cal banner not only the Pales- tinians but also every other restless party and sect that felt tinfavoured, insecure or unrepresented under the old regime: Communists, Nasser- ists, Shia Muslims, many Greek Orthodox Christians, his own Druze followers and young nationalist military firebrands such as Lieutenant Khatib, leader of the muti- nous, self-styled Lebanese Arab Army, who scents to have the makings of a Qadhalia These men ? Jumblatt, Khatib and their Palestinian allies, Arafat, Habash, Jibril and so forth?are the new leaders of Muslim Lebanon, I Patrick Seale completely displacing the older moderate Sunni genera- tion of Rashid Karami, Saab Salam and Abdullah- Yali. ,They now physically control three-quarters of the country. ? Jumblatt makes no bones .- about it; he's out to smash the old system ,at whatever cost in human suffering. Hence his frontal and un- remitting -military assault on the Maronite Christians, for- merly the dominant political ,community, now much re- duced by razzias and mas- sacres, but still the only real ;obstacle to his ambitions. ' For-. Jumblatt and his friends to come to power, they must either destroy the 'Maronites militarily?an un- likely outcome in view of the difficulties of the terrain, the stubbornness of the defence ''and' the possibility of foreign intervention?or they must change the constitution with its 'built-in, privileges for Maronites and Sunnis. This now seems Jumblatt's objective in agreeing to a 10-day truce. Having weak- ened the Maronites in war, he hopes by sustained political ' pressure to oust Franjieh at long last, install an interim President and secure elections on a non-sectarian basis for a constituent assembly, charged with the task of dismantling the politico-religious State and building a new secular order in which the Left must dominate. Can the Syrians afford to allow it to happen? Can Jum- blatt keep his alliance to- gether long enough to push it through? The man who can tilt the balance one way or the other is Yasser Arafat, Jumblatt's main military prop and, as such, the real arbiter' of Lebanon's future. Like Dr Kissinger, he, too, has a lot of corpses on his conscience. ? The Lebanese political system was no doubt corrupt, but it was also tolerant, liberal and democratic. Arafat must hear a heavy responsibility for its ruin. To protect what Ire con- ceived as Palestinian inter- ests, Arafat allowed Jumblatt and the Communists to use h is guerri I las against the Maronites, thus contributing to the devastation of the one Arab country which had given his people unlimited if fool- hardy support. His moral position has undoubtedly been weakened by the carn- age. The Palestinians are now desperate for a new strategy: the Arab States, on whose armies they counted to give them statehood, are edging towards peace with Israel. The Lebanese quagmire threatens to swallow them up. At this dark moment in their history, the rumbling, erupting disorders in the occupied West Bank and in Galilee ? culminating after eight or nine weeks of strikes and stone-throwing in last Tuesday's outburst ? have given a tremendous boost to Palestinian morale. In a trice, the Resistance appears to have shifted the focus of its struggle from the Arab States, where the going for it has become rough indeed, to inside Israel itself. This switch from ' outside ' to inside,' from the painful Lebanese imbroglio to the 'glorious ' battlefield of Israel ?has already had a noticeable effect on Arafat. It has rid him of many complexes. The anguished conciliator, seeking to steer ? an independent course between the hammer of Syria and the anvil of jum- Liam has once more donned the mantle of the revolution- ary guerrilla leader. ? Last week .saw the public reconciliation of Arafat and George Habash, the most fero- cious opponent of any compro- mise with Israel. 'We shall continue the march in blood and soul,' Arafat declared, until we establish our demo- cratic State on all the soil of Palestine,' a far cry from the encouraging am bigui ties of his famous UN speech. Paradoxically, this new Palestinian militancy directed against Israel may give hard-pressed Maronites some respite, as Arafat will not wish to fight on two fronts. Jumblatt may yet he thwarted in his hopes. But in the mean- time Lebanon has paid a heavy price for Dr Kissinger's peacenuaing. , Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 46 - Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 Afrita Newsweek, May 3,1976 rs tkiLi fr:71 " r montiniamnanumaammin so' samarzananant& Eldridge Cleaver Fidel Castro's African Gambit W !tile living in Cuba in 1969, I sent a cassette recording back to friends in the U.S. in which I said: "The white racist Castro dictatorship is more insid- ious and dangerous for black people than is the white racist regime of South Africa, because no black person has any illu- sions about the intentions of the Afri- kaners, but many black people consider Fidel Castro to be a right-on white 'brother. Nothing could be further from the truth." ? That remark was actually a distillation of views expressed to me by Captain Toro, a zealous young black Cuban Army officer freshly home on six months' leave . from Guinea-Bissau, where he had been fighting for Amilcar Cabral's rebels against the Portuguese. Captain Toro, a short, wiry, bmwn- skinned man who was so full of energy he could hardly sit still, minced no words in denouncing Castro's policy of ship- ping out to foreign wars the militant *young black officers as a safety valve on the domestic scene. By sending them off to fight in Africa, Toro said, Castro kills two birds with one stone: (1) he gets rid of an explosive element capable of caus- ing him trouble at home; (2) he im- presses black Cubans that he is a fighter for black people's rights, thus quelling opposition to his rule amongst blacks, ,who are still at the bottom of the Cuban? 'pecking order. At first, I was suspicious of Captain Toro. I thought perhaps he was part of a , government plot to test me, or set me up. ifIe was so outspoken in his criticism, even in front of white Cuban Commu- nists, who clearly feared him. In fact, I got the impression that Toro's tone be- came even more scathing when white Cubans were, around. THE LAST WHITE HOPE In Tom's view, Fidel Castro was the t white hope of the traditional Cuban ruling class which, given the choice between a black-led revolution and a white one, had chosen Fidel. This effec- tively sidetracked the historic thrust of the Cuban revolution, which draws its spirit from the great black hero of Cuban independence, Ceti. Antonio Maceo. Since coining to power, Castro's great- est single preoccupation has been getting rid of wave after wave of militant black leaders who constitute an ever-present pressure and danger to his continued rule. "One of the first things Fidel tried to do after coming to power," said Toro, "was to disarm the blacks in Oriente, Cuba's heavily black province, site of sugar cane and slavery, of fort Moncada ? and the Sierra Maestra, the historic home of the Cuban revolution. Of course, he failed to disarm us. His white troops were afraid to try it and the black troops refused. Why should we blacks disarm ourselves? That was the beginning of troublebetween Che Guevara and Fidel. Che refused to go along with a policy of disarming the people but, then, Che was not a white Cuban. The next thing we knew, Fidel started shipping us off to fight in Africa?and to die." When Castro first embarked upon his .?African wars, it was a "safe" thing to do. Nothing could have been more irrele- vant back in the early 1960s than fighting the Portuguese in Guinea-Bissau. The real test of Fidel's sincerity came in the Congo, and he came up shaky. A 'SECRET CODE ? After the death of Patrice Lumumba in 1961 at the hands of Moise Tshombe, the CIA, Joseph Mobutu and Belgium; a Lumumba follower' named Pierre Mu- lele organized an effective guerrilla movement. It had a high potential of taking power in short order against Tshombe's mercenary-led ragtail forces and Mobutu 's army of stooges. Victory was virtually assured when Che Guevara accepted a commission to lead a column charged with opening up a rear supply line stretching from Congo (Brazzaville) to Mulele's forces in the jungles of Katanga Province. On the eve of the successful link-up between Guevara's column and Mulele, Fidel Castro sent a team of Special messengers to pull Cite out of the Congo. They bore a message in a special secret code between Fidel and Che that they had agreed beforehand would only be used in the most urgent circumstances and which was, therefore; to be responded to immediately. On a visit to Congo (Brazzaville) in 1973, I talked to the man who was in charge of Che Guevara's operation? t Ange Diawara, the political commissarof the army of Congo (Brazzaville.) Dia- wara had received Guevara in top se- cret upon his initial arrival in the Congo;. he had supplied him and made all ar- rangements between Guevara and the government in Brazzaville, which se- cretly supported Guevara's mission. "The hopes of the African revolution were riding on the success of the Guevara-Mulele link-up," Diawara said wistfully, somewhat crestfallen. A POLICY OF BETRAYAL "We had a farewell reception for Che in Brazzaville, which I organized," he continued. "It was a very sad occasion. Che had tears in his eyes. In fact, all of us were crying. We knew that the African revolution had been betrayed, by deci- sions taken in Moscow, Washington, Cairo and Havana. Everybody under- stood that Castro was pulling Che out of the Congo because of pressure from the Soviets, who had arranged things with the Americans. This was the fundamen- tal betrayal of the African revolution, When Che arrived in Cuba, he quarreled with Fidel and was placed in seclusion. Soon after, he went on a suicide mission in Bolivia. It was a Sorry affair, very treacherous. My government recalled its ambassador from Havana and all but broke off diplomatic ties over this." Today, the chickens are coming home to roost for Fidel's policy ofexporti lig his fighting men to Africa, a policy that has contributed heavily to his longevity as the white head grafted onto Cuba's black body. As Africa runs out of wars of liberation, Fidel Castro runs out of dumping grounds. He will then have to face the Captain Toros, who have learned much and fOrgotten nothing. Cleaver, a former leader of the Black Panther Party, fled the U.S. in I96S and spent seven years abroad as a fugitive lk voluntarily surrendered to Federal intim:Ines last November and is now in 1 California prison waiting trial on charges stemming from a shoot-out be- ween the Panthers and the Oakland )(dice ha /968 47 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 Lra Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 i iAmeria SATURDAY REVIEW 17 April 1976 I Outlook I Sol M. Linowitz, former U.S. ambassador to the OAS, is chairman of the Commission on United States?Latin American Rela- tions. He was previously chairman of the Xerox Corporation. Reflections on Kissinger's Latin American Foray by Sol M. Linowitz Qecretary Henry Kissinger's recent LY Latin American trip once again fo- cused fleeting attention on the relation- ship between this country and Latin America. For a number of months Latin Americans had been waiting patiently for the long-promised visit by the Ameri- can Secretary of State. When it came, ? its impact was, in a word, underwhelm- ing. For its major features appear to have been a reaffirmation of familiar promises of economic cooperation and the signing of a new consultative agree- ment with Brazil that caused predictable indignation and concern in a number of other Latin American countries. When Secretary Kissinger undertook the trip, he was all too aware of the fact that his November 19, 1974, call for a "New Dialogue" with Latin America had left behind a deep and widespread sense of disappointment. For once again words were not translated into action, and the "New Dialogue" remained a slogan without substance. On this trip Kissinger was clearly determined to avoid overblown expectations, and in this he unquestionably succeeded. One can quarrel with what Kissinger did or did not achieve during the trip, but certainly no one can take issue with his premise that we can no longer take Latin America for granted. The simple fact is that we are in a new ball game with Latin America. No longer can we treat Latin Americans patronizingly. No longer can we threaten to take our bat and ball and go home. For the world has changed, Latin America has changed, and the United States has changed. Today the hard fact is that we need Latin America just as much as Latin America needs us. And what we need is not only Latin Ameri- can oil and raw materials but also?as the vote on the U.N. anti-Zionist resolu- tion clearly demonstrated?their coopera- tion and support in the global arena. This calls for a whole new approach and a drastic change in our perceptions about our relationships in this hemisphere. The first point to be recognized is simply that interdependence has dis- placed security, in its narrow sense, as the raison d'?e for American foreign policy. Today there are a number of other important centers of power in the world besides the superpowers. Trans- national forces, including the multina- tional corporations, have become fea- tured actors on the international scene. The line between domestic and foreign policy has become increasingly blurred, and our interests abroad have become inextricably intertwined with our inter- ests at home. When we talk of security in this kind of a world, we have to think not only of military and political power but also of oil and copper and bauxite. We have to consider what the urgent prospect of world famine resulting from the scarcity of food and fertilizer will mean to our own future. We have to ponder the im- pact that the population problem on this planet will have on us?and the fact that 4 billion people dwell on this Rarth and by the turn of the century there will be 8 billion or more. While these dramatic changes have been taking place in our international system?multipolarity, transnationalism, scarcity of raw materials and foodstuffs, population growth?tremendous changes have also been taking place within the various countries and regions of Latin America. Rapid urbanization and mass communications have produced political awareness among people who do not yet participate in the economic growth of their countries. As a result, governments face increasing demands to provide jobs and services. To meet these internal de- mands, Latin Americans have sought freer access to the markets of the United States and other developed nations for their manufactured and semi-manufac- tured products and their raw-material exports. They have also sought better ac- cess to both capital and technology. In their search for helpful responses to these needs, Latin Americans have become increasingly active participants in the world community beyond the con- fines of our hemisphere. So we have be- gun to hear new voices coming out of Latin America?voices of identity, voices of nationalism, voices of outrage at lin- gering dependency. ? Meanwhile, as we know all too well, we have also been undergoing drastic changes at home. No longer do we domi- nate world economic and military affairs as we once did. No longer is it appro- priate or feasible for the United States to try to be a policeman or tutor every- where in the world. Moreover, in the face of the challenges we have becn confront- ing?unemployment, racial conflict, the long war in Vietnam, the major crisis of 4 8 governmental leadership?we have found our coherence as a nation severely strained and tested by an energy crisis, commodity shortages, and worldwide in- flation. Deeply aware of these changes and concerned about their impact, the Com- mission on U.S.?Latin American Rela- tions?an independent group of 23 pri- vate citizens, some having held high government positions *_recently issued a report based on an analysis of hemi- spheric affairs. In the report that was presented to the President and to the Secretary of State, the commission ar- rived at the following conclusions: ? The premises of past American poli- cies, from the Monroe Doctrine to the Alliance for Progress to Mature Partner- ship, have been seriously undermined by the major changes in the world, in Latin America, and in the United States. ? Our policies in the future must be based on the recognition of the fact that Latin America is not our "sphere of in- fluence" to be insulated from the rest of the world, and that Latin American countries are playing an increasingly ac- tive and important role in a world of growing interdependence. ? U.S. policies must also recognize that there is a diversity among Latin American countries and that our inter- ests do not require ideological conform- ity. We must respect their independence and their capacity to act independently. ? Our mutual concerns today center not on military security but on economic development, on the well-being of our citizens, on the coherence of our socie- ties, and on the protection of individual liberties?all goals that cannot be at- tained in isolation or at the expense of our neighbors. ? Both self-interest and our funda- mental values require that we nurture our common interests and historic ties in *The members of the commission were: W. Michael Blumenthal, G. A. Costanza, Prof. Harrison Brown, Prof. Albert Fish- low, Prof. Samuel B. Huntington, Nicholas de B. Katzenbach, Theodore M. Messer, Charles A. Meyer, Dr. I. George Han-ar, Rita Hauser, Dr. Alexander Heard, Henry J. Heinz 11. Andrew Heiskell, Rev. Theo- dore Hesburgh, Lee Hills, Arturo Morales- Carrion, Peter G. Peterson, Elliot L. Rich- ardson, William D. Rogers, Nathaniel Samuels. Prof. Kalman Silvert, and Dr. Clifton Wharton, Jr. Sol M. Linowitz served as chairman. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 Approved. For Release 2001/08/08 :.CIA-RDF'77.410432R0,001.90400904,9_,,_ the Americas and cooperate in building a more equitable and mutually beneficial 1 structure of international relations. Pursuant to these conclusions, the commission made 33 specific recom- mendations for action by the United States. They included: an end to covert U.S. intervention in the internal affairs of Latin American countries such as took place in Chile; strengthening of efforts to assure protection of human rights in the hemisphere; developing an initiative in seeking to normalize relationships with Cuba; signing and ratification of a new Panama Canal treaty; encouraging arms-limitation agreements in the hemi- sphere; repeal of the Hickenlooper and Gonzalez amendments and avoiding other threats, such as unilateral eco- nomic sanctions; elimination of the U.S. veto power over fund operations of the Inter-American Development Bank; strengthening OAS conciliation and peacekeeping capacities; elimination of travel and migration restrictions to and from Latin America; enactment of a generalized trade preference that would be truly helpful to Latin America; estab- lishment of a regional system for ex- change of commodities supply-and-de- mand projections and exploration of mechanisms to offset wide fluctuations in commodity supply, demand, and price; collaboration between the United States and Latin? America in the development of codes of conduct defining rights and responsibilities of foreign investors and governments as well as the establish- ment of impartial fact-finding mecha- nisms; and U.S. assistance in the de- velopment of scientific and technical capabilities. Little has been done since the issuance of the commission's report and recom- mendations to improve the general cli- mate of relationships in the hemi- sphere. The trend toward divisiveness and indifference is a matter of real concern. Erosion of mutual trust and respect has increased as U.S.?Latin American relations have been clouded by revelations of covert intervention in Chile; by the sharpening differences within the hemisphere over how to re- spond to major violations of fundamen- tal human rights; by the failure to make real progress in the vital area of eco- nomic cooperation; and by the continu- ing uncertainty concerning the strength of the U.S. commitment to the solution of hemispheric problems. ? During his trip Secretary Kissinger did undertake to deal with some of the economic concerns, but more?much ? more?remains to be done: ? The revelations regarding CIA in- volvement in Chile make it imperative that the United States renounce clearly and forthrightly any unilateral inter- vention?overt or covert?in the internal affairs of Latin American countries. An unequivocal Presidential declaration re- ? inforced by a congressional resolution is called for. Any equivocation on this score will be regarded as inconsistent with our professed support of a mutu- ? ally respective world order in which governments are responsible for their own policies and actions. ? The reports of extensive repression in Chile and elsewhere underscore the importance of having the United States take a much firmer stand in implement- ing its proclaimed commitment to the protection of fundamental huinan rights. The United States should press for an in- ternational investigation?by the United Nations or the OAS?of alleged repres- sive practices, and should cease provid- ing aid and support to regimes that sys- tematically violate human rights. At the same time, measures for providing relief to the victims of repression should be made effective. ? Although negotiations with refer- ence to a new treaty with Panama for the Panama Canal are slowly making prog- ress, in an election year there will be great temptation to try to make the canal a political issue. To do so would be to prejudice the negotiations in a manner that might well endanger the possibility of settlement. It is important for the President strongly to reaffirm his sup- port for the new treaty negotiations now under way, and for the administration to begin to build requisite public and con- gressional backing for the treaty. THE ECONOMIST APRIL 17, 1976 Let it go ? New tensions and developments have interrupted progress in the normali- zation of relations with Cuba. Cuba's position with reference to Puerto Rico and its intervention in Angola have im- posed roadblocks to such normalization. Despite these setbacks, the United States must stand ready to explore in the right way and at the right time such measures as lifting the blockade on food and medicine to Cuba in return for an ap- propriate Cuban response. Steps such as these will be helpful as indications of our commitment. But basic problems will remain, and one that is least recognized is the failure of the United States to learn that what we have in common with Latin America is a good deal more than Latin America itself. Secretary Kissinger took this into account in the consultative agree- ment entered into with Brazil. But Latin America consists of much more than Brazil. In international arenas such as the United Nations, we cannot assume an easy or permanent mutuality of inter- est between us and the countries of Latin America. We must expect that the Latin American countries will act in ways which they determine to be best for themselves?whether or not these will be helpful or harmful to the United States. Therefore, it is in our best interest to try to work with the countries of Latin America in developing common approaches to global issues so that the Latin American countries will in turn find it in their own interest to cooperate with us. We will not begin to deal realistically with Latin America until we recognize that in Latin America we are playing for high stakes, much higher than in so many other parts of the world that over the years have absorbed our atten- tion and have been given so much higher priority on our list of concerns. For what we are playing for is a chance to work with our neighbors in shaping our own hemisphere and in trying to bring into being the kind of world we have so long sought?one free from war and want. 0 Sooner or later the United States is going to get out of Panama. Sooner is' better The United States Navy was Theodore Roosevelt's big stick, and the Panama canal was the way to get it from the Atlantic to the Pacific. The canal was a symbol, too, of a newly imperial America. led to expansion at the turn of the century by a sense of mission it called manifest destiny, that curious phrase for what Kipling better called the white man's burden. Since early 1974 the United States has been negotiating a treaty that would hand the canal, and the zone of territory around it, to Panama. Teddy Roosevelt may be revolving in his grave. But with the Panamanian left threatening sabotage and Mr Ellsworth 49 Bunker, the chief American negotiator, talking of a "new Vietnam" if there is ro agreement, it looks as if the time has come for the United States to give up its sovereignty oyer those 559 square miles in the middle of Panama. Although neither side wants to say much about the negotiations until the American election is over in Novem- ber, it is thought that a new treaty could be ready for sign- ing early next year. This would give the Panamanians jurisdiction over the canal zone at once. and let them take over the running of the canal itself before the end of the century. It would probably also let the Americans keep an Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77700432R000100400004-9 armed force there for several years, to make sure the canal is not denied to American ships. The terms have to be finely balanced if they are to be acceptable both to the Panamanians and to the suspicious American senate. Panama's boss, General Omar Torrijos, recently sacked two of his cabinet ministers in an effort to stifle opposition to the scheme from people who say he isn't getting the Americans out quickly enough. He can probably get the treaty through. But it may not pass the American senate; two-thirds of that body's 100 members must approve any new treaty, and more than a third is already on record against giving the canal zone to Panama. There is no question that the United States has legal title to sovereignty over the canal zone. Nor is there any ques- tion about the canal's economic importance to the United States. But its big-stick strategic value is decreasing. In the days when the Americans had only a one-ocean navy, control of the canal was vital. Now it has in effect two navies, one for the Atlantic and one for the Pacific, and most of the capital ships of today?the aircraft carriers? WASBI NGTO 11 PO ST 2 1 APR 1976 cannot squeeze through the canal anyway. Ownership is not enough The United States did not extort the canal from Panama back in 1903. It did encourage dissidents in Colombia to secede, to create Panama, and then to sell the canal zone to America. But the present-day Pana- manians are the beneficiaries of that, not the victims. From direct payments, and the jobs created by the canal. they enjoy one of the highest average incomes in Latin America. For all that, the political realities are, first, that the canal is emotionally as well as geographically smack in the middle of Panama; and, second, that a country like the United States has to exercise influence by means other than the retention of sovereignty over distant places where that sovereignty proves unpopular. The Americans are strong enough, and central America is clearly enough in their sphere of influence, to be able to go on using the canal for their purposes without keeping a strip of Ameri- can soil on either side of it. .S. Envoy to Urugu rotests VIA Story By Joanne Omang Washington Post Foreign Service MONTEVIDEO?U.S. Am- .. basSador to Uruguay Ernest Siracusa has registered "vigorous objections" to a _ Voice of America account .of alleged_ torture in Uru- t,guay, saying the Uruguayan ? government "will. have every right to resent" .the story. ? The story involved a Feb- :: ruary report by the Geneva- based International Corn. mission of Jurists (ICJ), which investigates charges , of human rights violations around the world. The two- minute broadcast by VOA Geneva part-time corre- spondent Richard Kilian ? Feb. 11 contained exaggera- tions and distortions" of the ? Uruguayan situation which "can only be injurious to our friends, to our relations ' and to our efforts to develop ? useful influence on the very . situation commented upon," Siracusa's confidential corn- plaint said. VOA is an agency of the U.S. government that has a charter to report news with- out slant. It has frequently run into criticism from American missions abroad that its newscasts hamper U.S. foreign policy. In one ?case. for example, the U.S. be reached for comment. ambassador in a West Afri Siracusa's five-point ob- can country complained that jection focused on Kilian's VOA reporting of Argentin- statement that the commis- ian guerrilla operations sion's report described mas- should be curtailed because sive arrests of political sus- it could spark similar activi- pects, that few of the sus- ties in the country he was pects survived imprisonment accredited to. and that there was no press In his response to Sire- freedom in Uruguay. The cusa's critique of the VOA story added that the jurists report on Uruguay, U.S. In- ' said church documents had ? formation Agency director been censored, and that the James Keogh agreed that commission had heard a re- the treatment had been "ex- port on alleged torture in. cessive and that [the] report 1 Chile the previous day. should have been handled far more carefully." At the same time, Keogh main- The word "massive," Sira- cusa complained, "grossly exaggerated" t h e situation tamed that "we believe the up until a recent anti-Com- story in question accurate- munist drive in Uruguay. ly reflected the content of "With respect to the Corn- the IJC report" munist drive, one could even Copies of Siracusa's con- question whether the ar- f idential Feb. 13 complaint rests of several hunched per. toAssistant Secretary of sons over a five-month pe- State William D. Rogers and nod could itself :be called to Keogh, and of Keogh's 'massive.'" Feb. 17 response, were ob. To say few of those ar- tained by The IVashington rested survived, he contin- Post. The response was a ued, was untrue and "can milder version of an original only be considered" by the draft submitted to Keogh by Uruguayan government "as VOA officials, according to a calumny and a provoca- sources within the organiza- lion." The question of press Ition. freedom, he added, was "a A spokesman for Keogh relative one," while the al- said the VOA director de- leged 'church censorship c was lined to comment on the "a minor problem . matter. Siracusa could not worked out between the go"- SO ernmerit anif-the fchurchj hierarchy." Mentioning Chile, Siracu- sa concluded, was "a gratui- tous effort on the part of the VOA writer to link Uruguay ?with the already censured case of Chile as to human rights." Three times in the com- plaint Siracusa reiterated support for the VOA's policy of disclosing such news, but said "it should have been handled far more carefully" in order n o t to endanger efforts he was making "through correct diplomatic channels to improve the hu- man rights situation to the extent that there are viola- tions. This effort can only be endangered if the govern- ment interprets the VOA re- port, with broad audience here, as an aggressive ges- ture of the U.S. government inconsistent with the man- ner and integrity of my ap- proach." Siracusa said. Keogh agreed that the VOA story, although an ac- curate description of t h e commission's report. "show- ed insufficient appreciation 10 r sensitivities involved." He added that future re- ports would be "subject to closer review and cross- checking prior to use." Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9