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April 2, 1976
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25X1A Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400006=7? CONFIDENTIAL NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES INTERNAL USE ONLY This publication contains clippings from the domestic and foreign press for YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use of selected items would rarely be advisable. 2 APRIL 1976 NO. 6 PAGE GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS 1 WEST EUROPE 28 AFRICA 33 Destroy after backgrounder has served its purpose?or within 60 days. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400006-7 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400006-7 ntal Affairs I THE WASHINGTON POST Ini,ellige By Walter Pincus Washington Post Staff Writer The powerful Democratic whip, Sen. Robert C. Byrd (W.Va.), declared yesterday that there is "no way" the? resolution to establish a new Senate committee on intel- ligence activities could pass "as now written." Saying the "political cli- mate indicates a necessity for some kind of commit- tee," Byrd offered a com- promise plan to solve a ju- risdiction fight that has en- tangled the present pro- posal. Under the Byrd plan, a new, permanent Senate in- telligence oversight commit- tee would be set up with subpoena power but with- out budgetary control over intelligence agencies. Byrd's suggestion came during Senate Rules Com- mittee questioning of Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho), chairman of the Senate in- telligence committee and an architect of the proposal ,un- Friday, iipri2, 7976 Oversight ompromise Offered der attack. Under- the resolution ap- proved March 2 by the Sen- ate Government Operations Committee, the new intelli- gence committee would have taken jurisdiction over intelligence agencies' budg ets from three powerful Senate committees?Armed Services, Judiciary and For- eign Relations. All three committees have raised objections to the pro- posal. Byrd told Church: "That road is so formidable, and difficult to travel." Instead he suggested that, "we may achieve the desired objec- tive" by giving subpoena power to the new committee and "leaving the rest where it lies." Otherwise, Byrd said, ap- proval might be endangered because "the resolution will be subjected to unlimited debate." In his initial statement, Church said overlapping or concurrent jurisdiction be- tween the new committee and the old ones was the "traditional" Senate slain- tion "where the interest !of two committees... is strong." After Byrd offered bis compromise, Church argued "the power of the purse is the ultimate authority" and he "couldn't see effective oversight without" it. A letter from. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, introduced at the hearing ,yesterday, supported the pa- sition that it is impost:Ate to separate cleanly the De- fense Department's intelli- gence budget from its over- all spending since many pro- grams are intermixed. Rumsfeld echoed the Byrd suggestion that the new , committe undertake only in- telligence oversight. Other senators raised with Church the proposal that the new committee be an- thorized to disclose demi- fied information over a President's objection. Church responded, saying "the greatest breach of seen- NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, APRIL 2,1976 C.I.A. Said to Have Known he has had- a long-staniring ilationship with American -'Embassy officials in Japan. In In 50 s of Lackheedilribe s !addition, Mr. Kodama was the ;recipient of American funds ;for covert projects on several 'occasions, according to termer C.I.A. officials. ,* ?The. C.I.A. headquarters in Washington was inforined of the Lockheed payoffs through C.I.A. channels from the em- bassy in Tokyo in the late 1950's. A Japanese citizen who worked for Lockheed in 1958, when certain bribes were known .to have been made?as said he told an American Em- bassy officer of these payoffs. He has denied having takent part in the payments himself and has said that he was un- aware that the officer was a C.I.A. agent. Former senior intelligence officials have confirmed that the Embassy official was in- deed a C.I.A. staff officer assigned to the Tokyo station. One former official who was In a position to see the reverts said that the stathea in Tokyo "was checking with headquarters every stey of the way when the Lockheed thing came up." "Every move made was, ap- proved by Washington,- he added, asserting that details 9f Data on Japanese Reportedly Were Not Passed on to State Dept. or Grumman, Whose Fighter Lost Out to F-104 . By ANN CRITTENDEN Many of the details of the nations of the payments by bribery of Japanese politicians . Lockheed and other American by the Lockheed Aircraft Cor- companies to various parties in poration in the late .1950's, in Europe, Japan and the Middle East to win lucrative multimil- lion-dollar sales contracts for various products ranging from aircraft to pharmaceuticals. The Lockheed payoffs in -ington, according to a former Japan, involving $12.6 million CIA. official and Japanese over a period of 20 years, ; sources. I were made to top officials of Although the C.I.A. was the Government, primarily aware of the bribery, public through Yoshio Kodama, an disclosure of the payoffs did influential power . broker in not come until last Feb. 4 in Japan Who has already been bearings of the Senate suboom- identified as the most MI- mittee on multinational corpo- portant behind-the-scenes rep- rations. ? ? resentative of Lockeed at that The scandal has created in- tinw. ?term tional tensions anal ; Mr. Xodarna has not been touched off worldwide investi% ! identified as a C.I.A. agent, but connection with the sale of the F-104 fighter plane to Japan, evere reported at that time to the headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency in Wash- 1 ? rity" he had ever seen was the recent disclosure by the CIA that the Israeli govern- ment possesses 10 or more nuclear weapons. "I have never even heard anyone was reprimanded," Church said. To emphasize his point that the resolution as now written was vulnerable to attack, Byrd spent 20 min- utes listing more than a dozen Senate rules that would have to be revised in major or minor ways to con- form to the resolution's lan- guage, Sett Abraham A. Ribicoff (D-Conn.), chairman of the Government Operations ,Pommittee that drafted the resolution, told Byrd "not a single point there can't be reconciled" by redrafting the resolution. Ribicoff proposed a staff , meeting to iron out differ- ences but !Rules Committee Chairman Howard W. Can- non (D-Nev.) said that was "premature" since "we don't know ourselves" ? what is needed. 'the Lochheed affair were known -in high levels within the agency. .' The Central Intelligence ;Agency failed to pass this in- formation on to the State Der partment or to the Grumman Aircraft Corporation, whose Fl1F-1F Super Tiger jet fighter was first selected for Purchase by the Japanese Government irt-1958 and then lit 1959 re- jected in fe.vor of the Lockheed plane . Lockheed is estimated to have spent some $1.5 million to win the Japanese jet fighter contract ? away ffonn Grumman in the late 1950's: In all, Lockheed paid fees, commissions and bribes totaling $12.6 million to sell $700 million worth of air- craft to Japan between 1956 and 1975. - Kodama Earned $750,000 Of that total, some $7 million went to Mr. Kodama. who earned an estimated $750,000 If the information concern- ing the Lockheed bribes was passed on to the Justice De- partment, the Securities- and Exchange Commission or the Internal Revenue Service, no action was taken to investigate the irregularities. Foreign bribes are not in themselves illegal under Feder-. al law. However, the bribes are: not 'tax-deductible and the i large foreign- payoffs raise the possibility -that Lockheed and other cot-aphides might have ii. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400006-7 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 CIA-RDF'77-00432R000100400006-7 legally reduced their taxable corporate income by deducting the bribe payments as business experrea: I It is also possible that false statements, punishable by Fed- ' eral law, were made to such Government agencies as the ? Department of Defense, which ? monitors foreign arms sales. One Justice Department offi- cial( told of the allegations of ? C.I.A. awareness of early Lock- heed payoffs: said that al- though it might not have been legally incumbent upon the agency to report what it knew to the Justice Department, the agency's apparent failure to do so was "certainly a matter of concern from a policy point of view." Part In Payoffs Denied When informed of the alle- gation, Mitchell Rogovin, the special counsel to the Director. of Central Intelligence George Bush, said that "the only thing we can say is we have no rec- ords of any agency involve- ment with Lockheed or the bribes." He denied that the agency as an institution had participated in the payoffs. Mr. Rogovin said that he could say nothing either con- firming or denying any agency knowledge of the payments to Japanese officials, or any in- volvement in them by C.I.A. agents. ? A spokesman for Lockheed denied that the company had had any dealings with individu- als in Japan that it knew to be C.I.A. agents. According to knowledgeable sources, Mr. Kodama, a power- ful ultrarightist who for years exerted a significant behind- the-scenes influence on politi- cians of Japan's ruling Liberal- Democratic Party, also had a long-standing relationship with American Embassy officials in Japan. In the early 1950's, he is said to have received some $150,000 from the American Embassy to smuggle a hoard of tungsten out of mainland China on Na- tionalist warships and deliver it to United States authorities in Tokyo. . According to a former C.I.A. official and to Robert H. Booth, an American said to have acted as Mr. Kodama's agent in the arrangement, the Americans never received the tungsten. 1 Mr. Kodama let it be known that the ship had sunk, and ap- parently kept the commission. One former agent noted that there were some sentiment at C.I.A. headqueraters in Wash- ington that Mr. Kodama, who alho had close ties to the Tokyo underworld, was untrustworthy and was using the Americans and their financing for his own ends. , In this man's opinion, Amer- lican authorities were spending 'vast amounts of money sub- Isidizing extreme rightists to fight a Communism never real. ly a serious threat in Japan. Other experts disagree, arg- uing that, particularly in the late 1940's. there was a real possibility of a left-wing regime m Japan. According to Ivan Morris, 1r A 1 T YORK T r76ES HOUSE PANEL SAYS1 SCHORR CASE LAGS Leader of Inquiry Says Trial :Showing How Press Got C.I.A. Report Is 'Cold' : By RICHARD D. LYONS Special to The New York TimeS ? WASHINGTON, March .31? The Federal and Congressional investigations into the unau- thorized . disclosures to the press of. the report of the report of the House Select Committee on -Intelligence, are bogging down, and persons active in the investigation are expressing doubts that they will be com- pleted, much less support legal actions against anyone. , Representative John J. Flynt, the Georgia Democrat who is in charge of the House investi- gation, said after a meeting today of his Committee on ? Standards of Official Conduct that "the trail is getting cold." Mr. Flynt said that his com- mittee:s staff was having prob- lems drawing up a list of ques- tions to be posed to People who Might know howsubstan- tial portions of the report about Central Intelligence Agency operations reached the Village Voice and other publications. Representative Otis G. Pike. Democrat of Suffolk, headed the House select committee that made the report. "If we had had subpoena power a month ago we could have wrapped up the case by now," Mr. Flynt said, adding that the memories of some per- sons familiar with the case Were being "dimmed" by, time. ? Senior Justice Department officials are increasingly pessi- mistic that grounds for criminal Ijprofessor of Japanese at Co- lumbia University and an auth- ority on the extreme right-f wing in postwar Japan, the "enormous" American financail jsupport for conservative ele- !meats in the country was cru- cial in 1947 and 1948. In those years, Japanese pol- itics could have turned in a dif- ferent direction, Professor Mor- ris maintained. "A lot was done to prevent that," he said, "and successfully." Among other things. Ameri- can occupation authorities in the late 1940's and the 1950's used extreme right-wing for- mer military officers to pro- vide information on and to dis- rupt left-wing groups. In November 1951, for ex- ample, one of these officers, -Col. Takushiro Hatted, a for- mer secretary of General Tojo, allegedly. provided American authorities with information on leftist novelist Kaji Wataru, who was subsequently kid- napped by Occupation forces -and held incommunicado by 1 C.I.A. agents for a year, ac. 1 cording to sources inside and outside of the Government. 7. Pleosecution will be' found in the case because most, if not all, of the so-called classified material involved seems to have been made public in one form or 'another before it ap- peared in The Village Voice last month. - ? ? ? - . For the last six weeks law- yers in the criminal division! a the Justice Department have sought to determine if material originally classified as secret that was contained in the Pike .report had in fact been in the public domain. ? One Federal attorney in- volved in the departmental in-I quiry said it was apparent from the start that "99 percent" of the material in the report of the Pike committee already ha been in the public domain. . The case boils down to the remaining 1 percent, he said, adding that it is thought that even this material was pre- viously divulged. - ? If the justice department in- vestigation collapses, as it seems to be on the verge of dbing, it would be almost im- possible to bring charges that the Espionage Act had been violated by either Daniel Schorr or any other newsman who had reported details of the con- tents of the Pike report. Mr. Schorr is the CBS News corre- spondent here who has admit- ted providing a copy of the report to The Voice. -- ? - ' On Jan. .20, The New York Tunes published articles giving the substance of the documents, which severely criticized the C.I.A. and other Federal intel- ligence gathering organizations. In the days that followed, The Times and other news organiza- tions published additional arti- BALTIMORE SUN 15 March 1976 23 ass cies concerning the report. On Jan. 29, the House voted ; not to make the report public. I Tviea weeks later, The Village! Yoice started publishing sub-i stantial excerpts from it.. I. ?-, The disclosures angered many' eongressmen, and, on Feb. Me the House voted to have Mr.I Flynt's committee undertake an; inquiry. But for the past six! Weeks there has been disagree-p ment within the House, firsti over increased subpoena. pow-I ers for the committee, then for investigative funds. ?Both! Were eventually approved. ?? "Information we could have! gotten under oath five weeksi ago will be more difficult to; :Obtain noW,'.' Mn Flynt said! today, His committee met in closed session for half an hour. today, then adjourned without setting a future meeting date and without having settled de-. tails of how the inquiry should proceed. The committee still has not fbrmally .hired a staff to con- duct the investigation. Investi- gators, mainly, former agents of the Federal Bureau of Inves- tigapon, and attorneys have ;been selected but their con- tracts 'with the committee have not been ? approved by the House. Administration Commit- tee and may not be for several: days: About a dozen contracts ! have been submitted. - ? Additionally, friction has de-I .veloped within the special staff! over who among them is inI -charge of the inquiry. Davidl Bowers, a former F.B.I. inspec- tor, appears to have won a! jurisdictional disputewith C. B.' Rogers, an Atlanta lawyer who had been picked to be the spe-i pial chief counsel. ussians liste ies in the .S. Lantana, Fla. (AP)?The The National Enquirer re- names of 23 Soviet espionage ported that the information for agents said to be operating its story came from American openly in the United States intelligence sources, including have been learned by the Na- James Angleton, former chief tional Enquirer, the weekly of counter-intelligence for the? newspaper said yesterday. Central Intelligence Agency. One of the espionage agents and David Phillips, a former. Is Jacob A. Malik. the Soviet CIA official who is now the ' ambassador to the United Na- president Of the Association of tions, the publication said. Retired Intelligence Officers. In New York, a spokesman at the Soviet Union's United Nations mission said there would be no comment on the re- port. Those named by the weekly newspaper were described as diplomats. Several of them are based in Washington and pay frequent visits to officials in the White House, the Pentagon, Congress and various federal "I refused. The rationale for agencies, the National En. this is that our association he- quirer said. lieves the identification of intel- It described Mr. Malik as the ligence officers leads not to re- I highest-ranking Soviet intelli- taliation from other intelli- I gence agent in the United genee services but from the States. The paper said four So- crazieS of the world, and rouse- . viet abzons serving on the quently the statement that I United Nations administrative identified these gentlemen is in-' staff are intelligence agents. correct." In Washington, Mr. Phillips denied that he had given the newspaper any information. "I was contacted, by some- one from the Enquirer about the story, asking assistance from my Association of Retired Intelligence Officers in identi- fying Soviet intelligence offi- cers in this country," he said. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400006-7 ? 4 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400006-7 -Wednesday, March 24, 1976 The Washington Star e gang Intel By Henry S. Bradsher Washington Star Stall Writer One source calls it "keyhole ques- tioning." The way a number of present and former government officials describe it, questions are framed by the administration so narrowly as to elicit responses from the U.S. intelli- gence community that will support predetermined policies. There are other techniques for the selective use of intelligence, too. Sometimes a branch of the adminis- tration rejects intelligence findings, insisting that some factors have been. ignored, until finally a useful finding is made. What several officials call "play- ing the intelligence game" is an old bureaucratic art. They say it was brought to a new peak of refinement and a new fre- quency of use when Dr. Henry A. }Kissinger was the presidential advis- er on national security, and it contin- ues with Kissinger as secretary of state in charge of arms control ne- gotiations with Moscow. Other parts of the bureaucracy also play the game. A senior administration official in- volved in the reorganization of the U.S. intelligence community under President Ford's Feb. 18 executive order says the changes now being made will not prevent such abuses of intelligence. MATERIAL STILL can be ordered from the CIA, the Pentagon's De- fense Intelligence Agency, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and other parts of the community in ways that will fit it into top policymakers' preconcep- tions. One senior official involved in major policy decisions, who de- scribes himself as "an avid consum- er of intelligence," says he is. una- ware of leading questions being submitted to the intelligence com- munity. "These charges fit into the category of insinuations that make the rounds," he comments. Several other officials and con- gressional sources point in the direc- tion of that senior official's opera- tions, if not at him personally, as one of the major areas of the selective intelligence use that he denies. General policies are framed on the basis of overall intelligence evalua- tions. Decisions are made on what is generally desirable for the United States, like a cease-fire in Vietnam, a strategic armaments limitations treaty (SALT) with the Soviet Union, an interim Sinai settlement in the Middle East, or a new weapons sys- tem. But then new developments, newly received information on old situa- tions, or fresh analyses of problems can sometimes poke holes in policies. OW US Art gf once Fit the'ohclif Awkward facts that argue against decisions can appear. If the decision was a controversial one in the first place, as many major policies are, then new facts can reopen and threaten to change it. The tendency, therefore, some- times is to try to adapt the intelli- gence to the policy, rather than the other way around, some officials say. The "keyhole questioning" method is putting very tightly defined re- quests for specific answers to .the intelligence community ? primarily to the CIA ? without giving the con-- text in which the answer is going to be used or allowing any surrounding circumstances to be considered. These amount to loaded questions. IF THE FIRST question draws an answer that does not seem to justify the policy course already decided upon, then another one is framed, "just three degrees to one side, enough to force another study, in hopes of getting a different answer," one official explained. This can go on for some time, until finally the in- quirer hits upon a formula that yields an answer that then can be used in bureau- cratic debates to . support the policy. Earlier ques- tions and answers are quietly forgotten. A current case in point involves a Soviet supersonic bomber with the Western code name of Backfire. When Kissinger arranged the preliminary agreement for a second SALT treaty with the Soviet Union in November 1974, Backfire was not included within the limitations. The Pentagon objected that the plane has the capability at striking the United States from Soviet territory, and there- fore had to be counted. Moscow denied that it was an intercontinental bomber, arguing that it was proper- ly excluded from the agree- ment. This objection has been a major stumbling block in turning the agreement into the treaty that Kissinger and his top advisers seek for overall policy reasons. They have argued in the National Security Council that Backfire did not de- serve to be counted. Backfire alse has been a problem within the Penta- gon, since it affects arms programs of the United States. Eight intelligence studies of the Backfire's range potential have been made. Each one showed that it could reach the United States. According to one source who reflects suspicion of Kissinger's approach on SALT II, CIA technical ex- ?;peek confirmed in one steet.0,1ast autumn that Baaire had an interconti- nental capability. But then other CIA officials tried to? overrule the technicians by 'saying they had determined that the Soviets had no intention of using Backfire in a long-range tole. THE OTHER officials "buckled under pressure" from Kissinger,' this source asserted. But the then- director of CIA, William E. Colby, overruled the finding ? based on intentiont, insist- ing that his agency had to I stick to proveabie data rather than supplying poli- cymakers with the inter- ? pretations they sought. A senior State Depart- ment official insists, however, that such prob- lems arose more from .Pentagon rivalry over countering Backfire than from pressure by Kissing- iees SALT negotiating team. Finally, another source reported, after the eight studies, the CIA was in- structed to commission a new ?study by engineers of the McDonnell-Douglas Corp., a major military air- craft manufacturer. The engineers were given intel- ligence data on the Back- lire's wing shape and other factors that were certain to show greater aeronautic drag than earlier studies had found, hence less range. But their study only re- duced the range by about 20 miles. It still was enough to reach the United States. The CIA reportedly was also used to help justify the 1972 SALT I agreement. Its ? "best estimate" of what Soviet strength in intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and other strategic weapons would become without that treaty V72S only marginally above the treaty limitations. That did not provide a good argument for U.S. Senate approval of the treaty, which was viewed with doubt by some senators. The CIA suddenly came do with a "farce four" esti- mate, which put the poten- t:a Soviet strength without Vee treaty limitations much higher, thus making the Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400006-7 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400006-7 treaty look more desirable and more worthy of Senate approval. ThE, NEW ESTIMATE apparently was a result of a "keyhole question" asking what Moscow might achieve if it launched an all-out strategic weapons building program. Intelli- gence analysts did not ex- pect an all-out program, but their terms of reference were too limited to permit them to give the _perspec- tive that they felt the situa- tion should have had. Such uses ? or, in the views of concerned offi- cials, misuses ? of intelli- gence have extended into several other fields, ac- cording to various sources. One civilian source said that last summer the NSC, then still directed by Kis- singer, flatly told the CIA the result that it wanted from an intelligence study on a non-SALT subject. The well qualified source de- clined to have the subject identified. When last year's interim Middle East truce agree- ment was being arranged, the CIA was asked for a specific judgment on whether there would be a war without such an agree- ment. Hemmed in, the CIA said yes, thus appearing to support Kissinger's efforts to bring full U.S. govern- mental pressure to bear on the settlement. "But, of course, the agency could just as well have answered that there might be a war even with an agreement, if it had been allowed enough lati- tude to exercise its profes- sional judgment," a former official said. OTHER OFFICIALS re- TheVlashingt, Dn Star Monday, March 22, 1976 George Beveridge called that CIA estimates of Soviet and Chinese aid to, North Vietnam were jug- gled to suit Kissinger's ef- forts to negotiate a Vietnam ceasefire duing 1972. "Those estimates never were any good, but they got quoted as if they were important," a former CIA official said. There has also been intensive pressure on the CIA to do things that it is simply incapable of doMg. The preliminary apee- ment for SALT II &Ain- guishes between IC3Ms with single and with multi- ple warheads. KissMger leaned hard on the CIA to find ways of telling trhich Soviet missiles ready in launching silos had multi- ple warheads. The agency could not tell. Reconnaissance satellites could not see inside the missiles. Finally, an exter- nal trait of dubious validity was seized upon as indica- tive, in order to try to satis- fy the demand and relieve the pressure. Later evi- dence showed it to be invalid, however. All of this frustrates the CIA, according to former and current officials of the agency as well as outsiders with contact there. Official- ly, the CIA will not discuss the subject. "We can't do a proper job if we don't know the context in which a question has to be considered," one official said. Another commented that there was always the danger of leakage if too many persons knew what policy decisions were being studied, and therefore some justification for keeping questions narrow, but that the NSC and State Depart- ment have carried it too far. The CIA tarnishes the innocent The only thing wrong with the CIA's pledge to stop using news correspond- ents as paid sources of .intelligence overseas is that .the practice should have been halted long ago. This is an alliance in which a free press has no rightful place. And the agency's refusal to identify news peo- ple who have served as the CIA's eyes and ears in the past ? or are still doing so ? leaves some unsettling questions. One result, as The Star has seen in recent weeks, is that the professional integ- rity of a host of innocent foreign correspondents now seems destined to remain indefinitely under of suspicion, On Feb. 9, in the wake of the latest disclosures on CIA-news ties abroad, CIA Chief George Bush an- nounced two decisions: 0 Effective immediately, he said, the CIA "will not enter any paid or contractu- al relationships with any full-time or part-time news correspondents" accredited by news outlets in the United States. 0 In a tacit admission of what's been going on, Bush said, the CIA also will move to "bring existing relation- - ships with individuals in these groups into conform- ity with the new policy." The "existing relation- ships," it appears, involve largely, if not entirely, part- time correspondents, or "stringers." tNewspaper. stringers, as dist iintmished from full-time, salaried em- ployes, are reporters who are paid for individual arti- cles; often, they service several publications at the same time.) But the efforts of The Star and other newspapers to check out their "stringer lists" with the CIA hit a stone wall. So The Star, thwarted on that front, last month shot off to more than 20 of its regular stringers a letter which read, in part, as follows: "As you may know, it has been acknowledged here by the CIA that some stringers for unidentified U.S. news agencies have been involv- ed with the CIA in ways that go beyond the normal give-and-take of ordinary journalistic activity. This obviously is contrary to our policy. "Therefore, if you have or in the past have had such a connection ? or have been part of any program involving U.S. government agencies, reimbursed or not ? we would like to know about it." George Beveridge is The Star's ombudsman. Well, that letter did not call for a response in the absence of such involve- ments. But voluntary disa- vowals (10 to date) have been rolling in anyway. And most of the comments reach substantially beyond (Ilse- ? vowels. Stringer Tony Avirgan, 4 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400006-7 writing from Tanzania, for example, strongly urged The Star to continue to "push the CIA to reveal the names of all the journalists who have worked for U.S. intelligence agencies." "Only when this is done," he said, "will those of us who are engaged in honest journalism be able to par- tially remove the cloak of suspicion and get on with our work." From Tehran, stringer Ralph Joseph wnte that such involvements "foul up the entire profession and cast suspicion on all mem- bers of the press," to their detriment in dealing with foreign officials. From Munich, "categori- cally" denying relation- ships with the CIA or any other government agency, stringer John Dernberg wrote that the CIA asper- sions "were of such a blan- ket nature" that ?I am sufficiently inceresed to examine the possit;iities of a slander or defamation of character suit." There is more of the same ? and the anger, it seems to me, is justified. If those views are shared by the press as a whole, however, it is not readily apparent. For the rust part the pressures on the CIA for disclosure have sinvly gone away. Indeed, on two occa- sions, the newspar.e-,- trade journal, Editor & .1-Vatisher, has opposed it. "We believe the release of such informatiea," LCIP said in its Feb. 2: issue, "would accomplish little ex- cept harm the reputations of the persons named and organizations for which they worked. It may be charitable, but we be- lieve it is accurate, to say that most of those who help- ed the CIA and other gov- ernment agencies in the past,: whether journalists or not, did so for patriotic rea- sons. Times have changed, and patriotism of this kind is misunderstood today." ? Well, times have changed, and the E&P-at- tributed motives of patrio- tism, I suspect, are in the vast majority of cases tight. But there is little consola- tion in that for the vast majority of news corre- spondents around the world who, in those earlier times, refrained from such in- volvements and got on with their jobs of covering the news. For whatever motives, newsmen who have doubled as CIA agents bear a bur- den of Culpability as heavy as, if not heavier than, that of the intelligence agency which recruited them. And it occurs to me that the over-all response of the press in that regard is just a mite out of kilter with its zeal in exposing the partici- pation of all manner of other people in intelligence activities. Charity is surely a cardi- nal virtue. For newspapers, especially, even-handcii- ness is, too. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010040000-7 BALTIMORE SUN 1 April 1976_ A Case for Prior Restraint of Publication Two thousand years ago, the life of a gladiator in the Colosseum depended on whether the Roman Mob induced the emper- or to turn one thumb up or down. Until re- cently our version of such a verdict has been a public titillated by trial by newspaper. Three methods of securing conviction were available to the prosecutor bent upon achieving a record of constant success. A confession might be published after being procured by the police with a rubber hose. Leakage to the press of a criminal record has been far from uncommon?a person liv- ing close to the scene of a crime would be charged solely because of that record, and jurors who read about it might be persuaded of guilt on that record alone. Or a prosecutor could feed newspapers bits of inflammatory evidence until jurors were convinced that the community expected a conviction. Events in 1963 slowed such practices. President Kennedy was assassinated by Lee Harvey Oswald, who was stood by the police on a table and grilled by reporters about the crime. Later, the police notified the press of the time when Oswald would move to anoth- er prison, enabling Jack Ruby to lynch him. There followed a realization that a fair trial for the accused demanded a measure of restraint: by police, prosecutor, lawyers and the press. The press fought to establish that under the Constitution it has an absolute right to publish what it chooses and never to be subjected to prior restraint. No one questions the mandate of the First Amendment, but never in recorded history have newspapers had the right to publish with impunity anything they might choose. Publication of a libel used to mean imprison- ment, and today, payment of damages. Some, but not all, indecencies are subject to print. The government has been permitted to interfere with 'advertising by the media. Se- dition and subversion are subject to restraint when they may cause a clear and present danger of government overthrow. The press defenders carry unyieldingly the banner of no prior restraint. In the con- frontation with the Sixth Amendment fair trial guarantee, they insist that every other device be resorted to: change of trial site, questioning of jurors for bias, admonitions to disregard media coverage, sequestration of jury and postponement of trial. They insist that irresponsible reporting can be punished by imposing a payment of damages. Christian Science Monitor 1 April 1976 Senate committee mum on secret CIA probes? Washington The Senate Intelligence Com- mittee has decided to keep secret its investigations of controversial Central Intelligence Agency oper- ations, according to committee sources. The committee intends to re- lease its report in mid-April in the form of general recommendations to curb some questionable CIA activities, but the operations them- selves will not be mentioned, the sources said. By THEODORE VOORHEES Five justices of the Supreme Court in the Pentagon Papers case pointed out that the press may be subject to criminal sanctions in an appropriate case. Yet the press be- comes apoplectic when faced with a court restriction on publication of evidence that might prevent a fair trial. If the Court sus- tains Justice Blackmun's "gag order" in the current Nebraska Press Association case, we are told, we will see "the erosion of one of the most basic rights of a free people." Why should this be so? Liberty of the indi- vidual is surely as basic as the right of free press. Yet the Constitution has not crumbled nor has liberty been dangerously eroded by judicial exercise of prior restraint in every aspect of the life of the individual. A person can be enjoined from commit- ting a nuisance which would injure his neigh- bors, from engaging in strikes, from causing damage to the environment, and from irre- parable injury to another by breach of a con- tract. Such restraints have survived charges of deprivation of property under the Four- teenth Amendment and involuntary servi- tude under the Thirteenth. Freedom of the press is of such import- ance as to warrant a Supreme Court pro- nouncement that prior restraint carries a presumption of illegality. Yet the presump- tion should be deemed overcome when publi- cation of prejudicial evidence will jeopar- dize the fairness of the trial of an accused. U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT 22 March 1976 Congressional investigators trying to track down the person who leaked to the press the House Intelligence Com- mittee's final report on CIA operations are finding the task bigger than expect- ed. They believe at-least 3,000 copies of the report, many made on duplicat- ing machines outside Congress, are floating about among federal officials. ? Justification for a newspaper to publish a confession in advance of trial can seldom ar- ise. Even if he confesses before a hundred ? witnesses, the accused has the right at trial to have the court rule, in the absence of the jury, whether he confessed voluntarily. If the media broadcasts the confession, the appearance of a fair trial and perhaps the fact are irreparably lost. The excuse of- fered for the disclosure of the confession or other damaging evidence is the "the people's right to know." This claim of the press has a hollow ring, however, in the light of its own refusal to disclose the name of its inform- ants when that would prove to its disadvan- tage. Furthermore, the informing of the pub- lic is not permanently restrained but only temporarily postponed. The confession, the past record and in- flammatory evidence can be aired to high heaven once the verdict is in. True, by that time, the press has lost the opportunity to af- fect the outcome, but under our system of constitutionally mandated justice, the con- trol of a trial is for the court alone. The Founding Fathers made no provision for the press to play a part in the conduct of a trial. Where publication threatens irreparable injury to an individual, the public or the na- tion, prior restraint of publication should be just as valid as an injunction in any case of similarly serious injury. A person denied a fair trial by the press may languish in prison for the rest of his life. That would be, by any- one's measure, an irreparable injury. When publication of a new version of the Pentagon Papers might endanger the securi- ty of the nation, prior restraint might readi- ly be called for until the danger could be weighed by the court. We have much to learn from the CIA debacle. With advance knowl- edge of an intention by Counter Spy to re- lease the story that blew the cover of Mr. Welch, a court might have restrained that action, and he might be alive today. It is difficult to believe that responsible elements of the press or electronic media really want to play God in the lives of other people. They, more than most, should reject the contention that the Constitution places anyone beyond the reach of the law. Our so- ciety cannot exist with anyone having that much power, not even the press. ? Mr. Voorhees is assistant deo o of the Catholic University law school. DETROIT FREE PRESS 22 March 1976 Support CIA, FBI FEEL MORE strongly today than ever tha,. thc? FBI and the CIA offer me more security than the ? US. Supreme Court and the Congress. ? . ? I wonder If the proloers could witlistktrol ih 54111C scrutiny that has been ariplitNi to thec ds. Most of the probing is doing the courary great harm. It most dangerous sithation exists in OW, the judges. especially in the federal court!., are eivra ter too much power. IRWIN MILLER SR. Westland Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400006-7 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400006-7 BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, Febrilary 1976 ;e7-7,Pv":, rfricT swampland of merican foreign !icy The Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee finds in the excesses of the CIA the ? symptoms of an ! illusion of American omnipotence which has entrapped ..and enthralled the nation's presidents Frank Church Two hundred years ago, at the founding of this nation, Thomas Paine observed that "Not a place ? upon earth might be so happy as America. Her situation is remote from all the wrangling world." I still believe America remains the best place on Earth, but it has long since ceased to be "remote from all the wrangling work!." On the contrary, even our internal economy now depends on events far beyond our shores. The energy cri- sis, which exposed our yulnerable dependence upon foreign oil, made the point vividly. It is also tragic but true that our own people can no longer be made safe from savage destruction hurled down upon them from the most hidden and remote regions on Earth. Soviet submarines silently traverse the ocean floors carrying transcon- tinental missiles with the capacity to strike at our heartland. The nuclear arms race threatens to continue its deadly spiral toward Armageddon. In this dangerous setting, it is im- perative for the United States to maintain a strong and elle( tive intel- ligence service. On this proposition we can ill-afford to he of two minds: We have no choice .other than to gather, analyze, and assess?to the best of our abilities?vital infortna- Approved tion on the intent and prowess of foreign adversaries, present or po- tential. . Without an adequate intelligence- gathering apparatus, we would be ? unable to gauge with confidence our defense requirements; unable to :conduct an informed foreign policy; unable to control, through satellite : surveillance, a runaway nuclear arms race. "The winds and waves are always on the side of the ablest navigators," wrote Gibbon.. Those nations without a skillful intelli- gence service must navigate beneath a clouded sky. With this truth in mind, the United States established, by the National Security Act of 1947, a Central Intel- ligence Agency to collect and evalu- ate intelligence, and provide for its proper dissemination within the government. The CIA was to be a , clearing house for other U.S. intelli- gence agencies, including those of the State Department and the vari- ous military services. It was to be an independent, civilian intelligence agency whose duty it was, in the words of Allen Dulles, CIA Director from 1953-1961: ? To weigh facts, and to ciraw conclusions from those facts, without having either the facts or the conclusions warped by the inevitable and even proper prejudic- es of the men whose duty it is to deter- !mine poliCy and who, having once de- termined a policy, are too likely to be blind to any facts which might tend to prove the policy to be faulty. "The Central Intelligence Agency," 'concluded Dulles, "should have. nothing to do with policy." in this way, neither the President nor the Congress would be left with any of the frequently self-interested intelli- gence assessments afforded by the Pentagon and the State Department, to rely upon.. In its efforts to get at the. hard facts, the CIA has performed unevenly. It has had its successes and its failures. The CIA has detected the important new Soviet weapons systems early on; but it has often over-estimated the growth of the Russian ICBM For Release 2001/08/08 forces. The CIA has successfully monitored Soviet adherence to arms control agreements, and given us the , confidence to take steps toward fur- ther limitations; but it has been. un- able to predict the imminence of several international conflicts,. such as the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. In a . word, though it deserves passing marks for its intelligence work, the ? CIA has certainly not been infallible. While one may debate the quality . of the agency's performance, there has never been any question about ? the propriety and necessity of its evolvement in the process of !-_,,at her- ing and evaluating foreign inteUi- gence. Nor have serious questions ' been raised about the means used to acquire such information, whether - from overt sources, technical devic- es, or by clandestine methods. What has become controversial is quite unrelated to intelligence, but has to do instead with the so-called covert operations of the CIA, those secret &I-6ns to manipulate events within foreign countries in ways pre- sumed to serve the interests of the United States. Nowhere are such activities vouchsafed in the statutory language which created the Agency in 1947. "No indication was given in the statute that the CIA would become a vehicle for foreign politi- cal action or clandestine political warfare," notes Harry Howe Ran- som, a scholar who has written widely and thought deeply about the problems of intelligence in modern society. Rarlsont concludes that "probably nO other organization of the federal government has taken such liberties in interpreting its le- gally assigned functions as has the CIA." The legal basis for this political action arm of the CIA is very much Open to question. Certainly the leg- islative history of the 1947 Act fails to indicate that Congress anticipated the CIA would ever engage in covert political warfare abroad. The CIA points to a catch-all phrase contained in the 1947 Act as a rationalization 'for its operational prerogatives. A clause in the statute permits the Agency "to perform such other functions and duties re- lated to intelligence .affeeting the national security as the National Se- curity Council may, from time to time, direct." These vague ano seemingly innocuous words have been seized upon as the green light for CIA intervention around the world. , Moreover; these interventions into the political, affairs or foreign court- tries soon came to overshado,.v the Agency's original purpose of gall ler- ing and evaluating information. Just 6 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400006-7 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400008-7 ? consider how far afield we strayed. 1For example: ? We deposed the government of Guatemala when its leftist 'leanings displeased us; . ? We attempted to ignite a civil war against Sukarno in Indonesia; ? We intervened to restore the . Shah to his throne in Iran, after Mossaclegh broke the monopoly grip of British Petroleum over Iranian oil; i ? We attempted to launch a counter-revolution in ?Cuba through the .abortive landing of an army of , exiles at the Bay of Pigs; 0 We even conducted a secret war in Laos, paying. Meo 'tribesmen and Thai mercenaries to do our .lighting there. All these engagements were initi- ated without the knowledge or con- sent or Congress. No country was too small, no foreign 'leader too tri- fling, to escape our attention. ? We sent a deadly toxin to the Congo with the purpose of injecting Lumumba with a fatal disease; ? We armed local dissidents in , the Dominican Republic, knowing their purpose to be the assassination of Trujillo; ? We participated in a military Icoup overturning the very govern- ment we were pledged to defend in South Vietnam; and when .Premier t Diem, resisted, he and his brother were murdered by the very generals to whom we gave money and ?sup- port; ? We attempted for years to as- sassinate Fidel Castro and other Cuban leaders. The various plots spanned three. Administrations, and ! involved an extended collaboration between the CIA and the Mafia. Whatever led the United States to such extremes? Assassination is nothing less than. an act of war, and our targets were leaders of small, weak countries that could not possi- bly threaten the United States. Only once did Castro become an accesso- ry to a threat, by permitting the Soviets to install missiles on Cuban soil within range of the United States. And this was the one time when the CIA called off all attempts against his life. The roots of these malignant plots grew out of the obsessions of the Cold War. When the CIA succeeded the Office of Strategic Services of World War II, Stalin replaced Hitler as the Devil Incarnate. Wartime methods were routinely adopted for peacetime use. In those myopic years, the world. was seen as up for grabs between the United States and the Soviet Union. Castro's Cuba raised the. specter of a Soviet outpost at Ameri- ca's doorstep. Events in the Domini- can Republic appeared to offer an additional opportun4 for the Sovi- ets and thtir allies. The Congo, treed from Belgian rule, occupied the stra- tegic center of the African continent, and the prospect of Soviet penetra- tion there was viewed as a threat to U.S. interests in emerging Africa. There was a great concern that a communist takeover in Indochina would have a "domino effect" throughout . Asia. Even the lawful election in 1970 of a Marxist presi- dent in Chile was still seen by some as the equivalent of Castro's con- quest of Cuba. In the words of a former Secretary' of State, "A desperate struggle_lwasJ going on in the bad: alleys of world politics." Every upheaval, wherever it occurred, was likened to a pawn - on a global chessboard, to be moved this way or that, by the two principal players. This led the CIA to plunge into a ?full range of covert activities designed to counteract the competi- tive efforts of the Soviet KGB. ? Thus, the United States came to adopt the methods. and accept the ? value system of the "enemy." In the secret world of covert action, we threw ofi all restraints. Not content merely to discreetly subsidize for- eign political parties, labor unions, and newspapers, the Central Intelli- -gence Agency soon began to direct- ly manipulate the internal politics of other countries. Spending Many mil- lions of dollars annually, the CIA filled its bag with dirty tricks, rang- ing from bribery and false propagan- da to schemes to "alter the health" .of unfriendly foreign leaders and undermine their regimes. ? No where is this imitation of KGB tactiCs better demonstrated than in the directives sent to CIA agents in the Congo in 1960. Instructions to kill the African leader Lumumba , were sent via diplomatic pouch, ;along with rubber gloves, a mask, ; syringe, and a lethal biological ma- terial. The poison was to be injected into some substance that Lumumba ; would ingest, whether food or tooth- paste. Before this plan was imple- imented, Lumumba was killed by Congolese rivals. Nevertheless, our actions had fulfilled the prophesy of George Williams, an eminent theo- logian at the Harvard Divinity School, who once warned, "Be cau- tious when you choose your enemy, ? for yoti will grow more like him." The imperial view from the White House reached its arrogant summits during the Administration of Richard Nixon. On September 15, 1970, fol- lowing the election of Allende to be President of Chile, Richard Nixon summoned Henry Kissinger, Richard Helms, and John Mitchell to the White House. The topic was Chile. Allende, Nixon stated, was 1111i1C- ceptable to the President of the Unit- ed States. In his handwritten notes for this meeting, Nixon indicated that he was "not concerned" with the risks involved. As CIA Director Helms recalled in testimony' before the Sen- ate Committee, "The President came. down very hard that he want- ed something done, and he didn't . care how." To Helms, the order had ' been all-inclusive. "If -I ever carried. a marshal's baton in my knapsack out of the Oval Office," he recalled, ? "it was that day." ,Thus, the Presi- dent of the United States had given orders to the CIA to prevent the popu lady-elected President. of Chile from entering office. ? . To bar Allende from the Presiclen- ?cy, a military coup was organized, with the CIA playing a direct role in the planning. One of the major ob- stacles to the Success of the mission was the strong opposition to a coup by the Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean kmy, General Rene Schneider, who insisted that Chile's constitution be upheld. As a result of his stand, the removal of General Schneider became a necessary in- gredient in die coup plans. Unable to get Geberal Schneider to resign, conspirators in Chile decided to kid- nap him. MaChine guns and ammu- .nition were passed by the CIA to a . group of kidnappers on October 22, 1970. That same clay General .Schneiderwas mortally wounded on his way to work in an attempted kidnap, apparently by a group affili- ated with the one provided weapons by the CIA. The plot to kidnap General . Schneider was but one of many ef- forts to subvert the Allende regime. ? The United G States sought also to bring the Chilean economy under Allende to its knees. In a 'situation -report to Dr. Kissinger, our Ambas- sador wrote that: Not a nut or bol; v.-ill be atIov,.ed to reach Chile under Allende. Once A:- lende comes to power we shall do all - within our power to condemn Chile and the Chileans to utmost deprivation and poverty, a policy designed for a long time to come to accelerate the hard features of a Communist society in Chile. The ultimate outcome, as you know, of .these and other efforts to destroy the Allende government was bloodbath ? which included the death of Allende and the installa- tion, in his place, of a :repressive military dictatorship. Why Chile? What can possibly explain or justify such an intrusion , upon the right of the Chilean people .to sea-determination? The country itself was no threat to us. It has been aptly characterized as a "dagger , pointed straight at the heart of Ant- arctica." Was it to protect American- owned big business? We now know that I.T.T. offered the CIA a million 7 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400006-7 Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400006-7 dollars to prevent the ratification of Allende's election by the Chilean Congress. Quite properly,- this offer was rejected. But the CIA then spent much more on its own, in an effort , to accomplish the same general ob- jective. Yet, if our purpose was to save the properties of large U.S. corpora- tions, that cause had already been lost. The nationalization of the mines was decided well before Al- lende's election; and the question of compensation was tempered by in- surance against confiscatory losses issued to the companies by the U.S. government No, the only plausible explana- tion for our intervention in Chile is the persistence of the myth that communism is a single, hydra- headed serpent, and that it remains ? our duty to cut off each ugly head, wherever- and however it may ap- pear. Ever since the end of World War 11. we have justified our mindless meddling in the affairs of others on the ground that since the Soviets do it, we must do it, too. The time is at hand to re-examine that thesis. Before Chile, we insisted that communism had never been freely chosen by any people, but forced upon them against their will. The communists countered that they re- sorted to revolution because the United States would never permit the establishment of a communist ? regime by peaceful means. In Chile, President Nixon con- firmed the communist thesis. Like Caesar peering into the colonies from distant Rome, Nixon said the choice of government by the Chile- ans was unacceptable to the Presi- dent of the United States: The attitude in the White House seemed to be: If?in the wake of Vietnam?I can no longer send the Marines, then I will send in the CIA. WASIIIIIGTON STAR 3.4 MARCH 1976 PAIDADVERTISEME.HT PLEASE IP/RI 'IF: YOUR CON- GREssmAN f?r:uest..m 0*-..6 ar- it,CIS On the (?ot. nf Siosiar and Ilrrvi,IReprt, wnicn 3S ' hires, major seCtions. (This AVO;ieS Only to Ine unctasSified materiel which hoe Cs:0k ne.eds to Snow 11. Saviet finaociny or otner election aid Is house or swtate earnoaiims. as lobbyin9 to' Soviet WiCY ? 2- Soviet G.R U. iateihri,e penetration et COncress in 5 sc,c' WaYS and tne Oa, to I 311 1)1111w G R.U. officers on Capitol Hill. 3. reistionship the ITT/ Watergate affiir. Inn CuSon the Soviet EmOass, in Cuo.s. The Presidium Coinamnd and Ire riots SCheCuted in Wash.. D.C. thk sum- mer. Most terrorism, IAn hilt of La. GuarTea Airport in In:. United States. the ionticy maitioq control of the Cuban OGI hy Soviet C1.04 P.11ti? hey Command. and tne need ci tolaCic and white parents 1.3 intensiw-e effort to determine what and whO is coin's to exploit their Cniti,en to harm The ;i?rsnn invOlv..?e, in rntik:nn 11,1 1,11.1{.T the III InanS tee St.. ?11 he,. insr the courade to attn.* this ad. . Sinwes Ch.srles Bersnek Jr, ? But what have we gained by our . policy of consummate intervention, compared to what we have lost? ? .A "friendly" Iran and lhdone- sia, members of the OPEC cartel, !which imposes extortionate prices on the Western World for indispen- sable oil? * A hostile Laos that preferred the indigenous forces of communism to control imposed by Westerners, which smacked of the hated colo- nialisrn, against which they had fought so long to overthrow? ? A fascist Chile, with thousands :of political prisoners languishing in ; their jails, mocking the professed ;ideals of the United States through- out the hemisphere? If we have gained little, what then have we lost? I suggest we have lost?or grievously impaired?the " good name and- reputation of the United States from which we once ;drew a unique capacity to exercise i matchless moral leadership. Where I once we were admired, now we are resented. Where once we were wel- come, now we are tolerated, at best. In the eyes of millions of once ; friendly foreign people, the United JStates is today regarded with grave l suspicion and distrust. What else can account for the startling decline in American pres- tige? Certainly not. the collapse of our military strength, for our fire- power has grown immensely since the end of World War II. I must lay the blame, in large measure, to the fantasy that it lay within our power to control other countries through the covert manip- ulation of their affairs. It formed part of a greater illusion that entrapped and enthralled our Presidents: the illusion of American omnipotence. Nevertheless, I do not draw the conclusion of those who now argue that all U.S. covert operations must be banned in the future. I can con- ceive of a dire emergency when WASENGTOU POST 30 MAR 1976 timely clandestine action on our part might avert a nuclear holocaust and save an entire civilization.- can also conceive of circum- stances, such as those existing in I Portugal today, where our discreet help to democratic political parties might avert a forcible take-over by a communist minority, heavily subsi- dized by the Soviets. In Portugal, " such a bitterly-unwanted, Marxist regime is being resisted courageous- ly by a people who earlier voted 84 ? percent against it. But these are covert operations. consistent either with the imperative of national survival or with our tradi- tional belief in free government. If our hand were exposed helping a ? foreign people in their struggle to be 'free, we ,could scorn the cynical doctrine of "plausible denial," and say openly, "Yes, we were there? and Proud of it." We were there in Western Europe, helping to rdstore democratic gov- ernments in the aftermath of World . War 11. was only after our faith gave way to fear that we began to act as a self-appointed sentinel of the status quo. Then it was that all the dark arts of secret intervention?bribery, ? black- mail, abduction, assassination? were put to the service of reaction- ary and repressive regimes that can never, for long, escape or withstand the volcanic forces of change. And the United States, as a result, became ever more identified with the claims of the old order, instead of the aspirations of the new. The remedy is clear. American foreign policy; whether openly or secretly pursued, must be made to conform once more to our historic ideals, the same fundamental belief in freedom and popular government that once made us a beacon of hope for the downtrodden and oppressed throughout the world. 0 Vice Admiral to Get CIA ru'o.LA_ Associated Press Central Intelligence Agen- cy Director George Bush yesterday named a former commander of the Sixth Fleet to be his deputy for relations with other intelli- gence agencies and called ? the appointment an impor- tant step in reorganizing .the intelligence community. Vice Adm. Daniel J...Mur- phy will direct the day-to- day business of the gencej community staff and has particular responsibility for the management of re- sources devoted to U.S. in- telligence activities," Bush said in a statement. ? Murphy, 54, will be Bush's second deputy under President. Ford's executive order to reorganize U.S. in- telligence agencies. The other is Army Lt. Gen. Ver- non A. Walters, ? who has been deputy CIA director for several years. In his statement, Bush said Murphy "has been ap- pointed to the post .of dep- uty to the director of cen- tral intelligence for the in- telligence community. The appointment represents an important step in advancing the President's program icr reorganization of the intelli gence community." In addition to command- ing the Sixth Fleet, Mucliy has been military assIslant to the Secretary of Dcrei17-1, and director of antisubilla- rine warfare and ocean ?;11-? veillance programs in tile of- fice of the chief of naval od? crations. ..Murphy has spent years in the Navy zinci hoid., the Secretary of distinguished service To,t1;,1 and the Lei4inn of Alc.:it with a guld star. 8 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400006-7 Sunday, March 21, 1976 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400006-7 The Washington Star By I. F. Stone One of the first steps in solving a crime is to determine who benefited by it. The chief beneficiaries in the leak of the Pike Committee report on intelligence were the intelligence agencies themselves. The report turned up on the CBS evening news Sunday, Jan. 25, and in the first edi- tions that same evening of the New York Times for Monday, Jan. 26. When the House of Representatives met in Washington at noon next day, the minority on the Pike Committee launched the attack which led three days later to the vote against release of the report. LF. Stone, who long published the influential newsletter I.F. Stone's Weekly, is a contributing editor of the New York Review of Books. This is an abridgment of an arti- cle in the New York Review of Books. Copyright0 1976 by NYREV Inc. Reprinted by permission. All Rights Reserved. Logic, probabilities, and the cir- cumstantial are not proof. Folly can never be excluded. But an examina- tion of the strange circumstances in which the report was suppressed may put newspapermen on their guard and show the public what we are all up against in dealing with se- cret agencies. The Pike Committee voted 9-4 on the afternoon of Friday, Jan. 23, to release its report. Everything was ready for publication after months of hard work and agonizing hassles with the intelligence agencies and the. executive branch. The majority of the committee and the staff were triumphant. The last hurdles to publi- cation seemed to have been safely cleared Yet that very weekend someone leaked a copy of the report to the New York Times and to Daniel Schorr of CBS, giving the intelligence agencies their chance to discredit the committee and block release of the report. This leak was not, repeat not, a leak to thwart censorship. Under the rules of the House and the resolution establishing its Select Committee on Intelligence (the Pike Committee), that 9-4 vote on Friday afternoon, Jan. 23, was all that was needed to release the report. The committee did not have to go to the Rules Com- mittee for permission, nor did it need a vote of the House to make the re- port public. The report would have been released automatically as soon as copies came back from the print- er. It was the leak that did the com- mittee in. At the time of the leak, the Times and CBS were not giving the public information that would otherwise have been suppressed. They were merely getting the report in advance of their competitors. At that point, their news stories were a beat, not a public service. Indeed, as soon be- dame clear, it was a public disservice to jump the gun by a few days on offi- cial release of the report at the cost of giving its enemies ? and the enemies of the press ? just the opportunity they were looking for. ' The leak fit beautifully with a well- synchronized attack by the enemies of the report. On Monday morning, Jan. 26, Daniel Schorr showed his copy of the Pike report on the CBS morning news and the Times arrived in Washington with extensive stories on what the report contained. This coincided ? whether by accident or design ? with plans which seem to ;have been already made for an on- slaught that very day on the floor of the House. The leaks to the Times and CBS, were brought up over and over again by Congressman McClory of Illinois, the ranking Republican on the Pike ? Committee, and by his supporters. :The final speaker, the Republican , minority leader, Rhodes of Arizona, summed it all up by saying that the executive branch "charged with our national security" could not be ex- pected "to confide in a Congress that is a direct conduit to the public press and rushes to the media to divulge every particle of information it re- ceives." In a phrase worthy of the best on Madison Avenue, Rhodes said the public's right to know did not give Congress "the right to blab." Even soap has never been sold more skill- fully. This is the theme song of the counterattack orchestrated by the intelligence agencies ? the new- speak of the CIA and FBI. Congres- sional control is to be stigmatized as a "blabbermouth" operation. Atten- tion is to be focused not on the abuses of secret government but on those who criticize and expose them. And if there isn't enough "blabbing" from Congress we may expect the intelli- gence agencies to do the blabbing themselves and blame it on Congress and the press. The government itself has always ' been the foremost leaker. The chief value of the classification system is the wide leeway it gives the govern- ment for manipulating the public mind by selective declassification. But this is only one of its many uses. One way to undercut a congres- sional investigation is to beat it to the punch by leaking part of the story in advance. It makes the later official revelation sound like old-hat news. It leaves the congressional report, when and if it comes, to be greeted by "ho hum, so what's new?" A lot of the "leaks," as many news- papermen know, have come from the executive branch and the intelligence agencies themselves. One of the big- gest -leaks," which hurt the Pike Committee last November. was the 9 on ar leak to Schorr at CBS and to the Times and the Christian Science Monitor of the tragic story of how the CIA sold the poor Kurds down the river, first giving them secret sup- port against Iraq and then cutting it off when that suited the Shah of Iran's power politics. Pike Commit- tee sources claim that there were hitherto unknown details in the New York Times and the Christian Science Monitor reports of the Kurd story which were new even to its own investigators, details which led them to suspect that the leaks must have come from an intelligence agency. Schorr broke the Kurdish story on CBS news on the Saturday night be- fore it appeared in the Times and the Monitor. Mitchell Rogovin, special counsel to the CIA, phoned a Pike Committee staff official that Satur- day morning and asked him to stop Schorr from telling the story on TV that night. The Pike Committee offi- cial, who had not been aware that the Kurdish story had leaked, asked him- self whether that telephone call was a cute way to divert suspicion from the CIA as the source. That l's the kind of question naturally bred by the CIA's capacity for murky and laby- rinthine manipulations. The CIA was aware that nothing had so angered the Pike Committee as the Kurdish tragedy ? this was a subject on which there was no minority ? and some Pike Committee members be- lieve that the intelligence agencies leaked it in advance to defuse the coming committee report. The Kurdish story leaked the very weekend in November that CIA Director William Colby was fired by Ford. The New York Times in pub- lishing it gave "a senior intelligence official" as its source. While the leak was later used to smear the Pike Committee, the target of the intelli- gence official in leaking it was Kis- singer, who was Nixon's willing accomplice in this tragic bit of "real- politik." ? The executive branch and the intel- ligence agencies had a motive, and the intelligence agencies had ample ? means, to leak the Pike report in ad- vance. There were several versions of the Pike Committee report as it went through repeated and prolonged revision in hassles with the various executive and intelligence agencies involved. There were close to 2,000 copies of various versions circulating in the White House and the federal agencies for the purpose of pinpoint- ing security matters and arguing far various kinds of deletions. Copies were even sent to many embassies abroad. A leak could easily have been arranged in those quarters and been far harder to trace than a leak inside the Pike Committee, where there were only enough copies for each of the 13 members and perhaps tmlf-dozen copies for staff use. 'Vet a stiff leak cannot be excluded. This brings us to a new problem, of, Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400006-7 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R900100400006-7 which the public has not been aware, and that is the problem of "detail- ees." The word "detailee" is a new word I.don't believe anybody ever heard used publicly until the Pike Committee report. The word seems to have been added to the lexicon by the CIA. It is a bureaucratic euphemism for a certain kind of infiltrator, an intelligence agent who is slipped into other branches of the government, sometimes openly, sometimes covert- ly. Sometimes he is semicoyert ? his identity being disclosed only to the head of the department or office to which he has been "detailed." Were there "detailees" operating covertly on the Pike Committee staff, or in the federal agencies that had access to the report, and did they have any part in leaking it? Schorr and the New York Times reporters may well have been unaware of the real affiliation, or hidden loyalties, of their secret "source." I'm sure they would not have lent themselves knowingly to a leak which had been set up by the CIA to undermine the committee and thwart the public in- terest. (It should be noted here that, whatever the origins or motives of those who leaked the report, once the House voted for suppression, Schorr and the Village Voice performed a public service by getting the contents published. They acted to print the text only after the House vote to sup- press, when there was clearly a duty to make the text available.) There are two dangerous prece- dents for newsmen in the Schorr case. The first lies in Schorr's sus- pension by CBS on the ground that he has put himself in an adversary posi- tion with the government. A news- man was intended ? shades of Jefferson! ? to be in an adversary position to government. To let Schorr's suspension go unchallenged is to give corporate media employers an excuse to get rid of reporters who THE ECONOMIST MARCH 20, 1976 Not nuclear?yet For 10 years Israel has doggedly denied possessing nuclear weapons. On Sunday Mr Rabin, the prime minister, was still reiterating the sacred formula: Israel is not a nuclear power and will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons to the Middle East. But this was after Mr Moshe Dayan. the former defence minister, had said in Tel Aviv that Israel had reached the limit of its ability to absorb con- ventional weapons and must now try for a nuclear option. Mr Dayan argued that the Arabs must be made to realise.that if Israel's survival were at stake it could threaten the Arabs with at least equal destruction. On March 11th a CIA official said at a disputedly private briefing that Israel is already estimated to have 10-20 nuclear weapons ready to use. The New York Times published these figures, saying it had been given permission. When tackled about this. Mr George Bush, the CIA's new director, took full responsibility for the disclosure but said that there had been an understanding that it would not be published. A routine Israeli disclaimer followed. The background to Mr Dayan's bombshell is a dispute among Israel's military men over a new defence doctrine. With new Soviet arms coming to Syria, and the prospect or western get in wrong with the powers that be.? I do not understand why the Wash- ington Post and the New York Times (which have attacked Schorr) do not see this: If they had acted like CBS, the former would have suspended. Woodward and Bernstein and the lat- ter Seymour Hersh. Why shouldn't Schorr be able to fight back as a reporter for, and on, CBS and expose the evils of secrecy in government instead of being placed on the defensive and put in isolation as '`controversial"? The other dangerous precedent lies in the sanctions which the House witch-hunters hope to apply. The House does not have a legal leg to stand on if it tries to prosecute Schorr. The power to classify rests on shaky grounds in the executive branch; there are no grounds at all. for classification in Congress. The only way the House can punish Schorr is to take away his credentials as a correspondent and thus his job. This is exactly the punishment sought in the investigation by that ,House Ethics Committee which was originally set up to police congress- men, not newspapermen, and which in almost a decade of existence has never before even bothered to obtain subpoena power or hire a full staff. If covering Congress is a privilege, not a right ? if the price of a news- man's job is acquiescing in arbitrary congressional censorship ? then the Congress and the intelligence agen- cies operating through Congress have another way to draw the press itself into the conspiracy of silence and to intimidate newsmen. There was a time when parliamen- tary proceedings were privileged. Before 1771 reporters and printers could be punished for reporting the proceedings of the House of Com- mons without its permission. In this Bicentennial year it is worth recall- ing that John Wilkes, the best friend ones to Egypt, Israel feels itself hard pressed to keep up even the one-to-three ratio against the Arabs that the United States believes is enough for safety. Last week Mr Shimon Peres, the defence minister, made the first official reference ever to the size of the armed forces, putting them at around the size of the Jewish population on the eve of the country's independence in 1948. This means about 650,000 men and women. or almost one in four Israelis, on active service or in the reserves. Even with American assistance, Israel has neither the money to buy the con- ventional weapons it thinks it needs to ? counterbalance total Arab strength (and the space to store them) nor the man- power to maintain and operate them. Israel's military shopping list is so enormous that the.Amerieans have been asking, only half in jest, what on earth it proposes to do with all the weapons it is getting. Reservists these days do extra time greasing and polishing in the arms depots, and the army keeps on appealing for more volunteers for maintenance. Both the prime minister and the finance minister have been trying to cut defence spending, which consumes more than a third of the country's gross national product. 10 the rebellious American colonists had in the House of Commons, establish- ed the right to cover parliamentary proceedings. As sheriff of London, he successfully prevented the arrest of a printer the House charged with pub- lishing its debates. That "lawlessness" in defense of a free press was one of the great moments of English history. Congressman Stratton of New York says reporters must obey the law. Of course, they must. But there may be times when the public inter- est imposes on them a duty to risk breaking secrecy rules. Stratton kept talking of Rule X of the House. He said that under it "the privileges of the House concern the integrity of our proceedings." The Constitution says Congress shall make no law abridging freedom of the press. Which is to prevail, a rule of the House or the First Amend- ment? If the secrecy miasma is to spread from the executive branch into the legislative, where does the duty of a free press lie? In submit- ting, and letting free government go down the drain? ? The heart of the evil lies in the "dirty tricks" in Which the CIA has specialized and which other intelli- gence agencies, especially the FBI, have also practiced. A government cannot carry on lawless activity in public. If it is going to use assassina- tion, burglary, bribery, corruption of elections, agents provocateurs, cov- ert slander, it can only do so in se- cret. There is no way for Congress to "oversee" such activities without re- vealing them and opposing them. To allow "dirty tricks" is not only to make real oversight impossible but to make Congress an accomplice in law- lessness. That is the rock-bottom issue which has to be faced in the debate over the intelligence agencies, and very few are facing it. So Mr Dayan's argument that Israel should buy fewer -conventional weapons and concentrate on nuclear ones haS considerable appeal. Those who argue that Israel's nuclear alternative should be brought out into the open suggest that. this would provide an exit from the cul-de-sac in which Mr Kissinger's step- by-step approach seems to have vanished. Israel, according to this theory. could offer substantial territorial concessions, In return for some no-war formula, with- out having to rely on international guarantees which it does not trust; the ? crippling tax burden could be eased and a halt called to the arms race. A strong argument against the new nuclear thinking is that it is not new. The superpowers followed this line and it cost them more, not less, and did not crirninish their need for conventional weapons. Their experience in substituting cold wars for hot is not necessarily attributable to nuclear weapons; nor is there any reason to believe that their experience could be transferred to the Middle- East. The Americans might shut off the flow of conventional arim aid if Israel tried out active nuclear diplomacy. The argument is only beginning; a lot more will be heard before Israel decides whether to become a nuclear power openly. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400006-7 'Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400006-7 zog tit lc= Defected Russ Agent Still a Mystery Man Ex-KGB Official Kept in Solitary by Wary CIA for Three Years BY JACK NELSON Times Washington Bureau Chief ? - WASHINGTON--.Somewhere in the -United States, living under an as- sumed .name, is a former. Soviet se- cret police official whom the CIA kept in solitary confinement for ? three years for fear he was a double agent?not a bona fide defector. Yet during that time, the Russian, Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko: ? ?Became an important source of information the Warren Commis- sion's investigation of President John F. Kennedy's assassination. ?Fingered Samuel Adason Jaffe, aan American journalist, as a KGB agent, creating a cloud of suspicion in the American intelligence commu- nity that the former CBS and ABC correspondent has spent seven years trying to dispel. Although the Warren Commission relied heavily on Nosenko's state-- 'inents that Lee Harvey Oswald was not a Soviet agent, the FBI never in- formed the commission of Nosenko's confinement or of the suspicions that he might be a double agent. The Rockefeller commission on CIA abuses reported last year that a Soviet defector, whom it did not identify, had been held "in solitary confinement under spartan living conditions" for. three years. CIA and commission sources told The Times that Nosenko was the defector. Jaffe, now a free-lance- journalist living in Bethesda, Md., first learned of Nosenko's allegations about him when he was interrogated by FBI aeents in Washington in 19(39. The questioning centered on Jaffe's acti- vities whir serving as ABC-TV cor- respondent in aloscow. Jaffe, %rho had been considered a reliable seurce by both CIA and FBI agents with whom he had worked as .a journalist; acknowledged using KGB agents as sources during his work as a correspondent but denied giving them vital or secret informa- tion. Nosenko is a former KGB lieuten- ant colonel who defected in Feb- ruary, 1964, about ? 10 weeks after Kennedy's aesassination. Now, declassified CIA and FBI doe- merits give a rare glimpse into the -world of intelligence as lived by Nosenko; the defector, and Jaffe, the journalist. In the first week of February, 1964, Nosenko was a member of the Soviet delegation to a 17-nation dis- armament conference in Geneva, Switzerland. Then 36, he was husky,- handsome and dark-haired, with hea- vy eyebrows. He spoke badly broken Engiish. At that time Jaffe, having left an earlier post with CBS, was ABC's cor- respondent in Moscow. Then 37, he was a nice-looking, gregarious jour- nalist, with thick red hair. Although Nosenko had supervised KGB operations against foreign visi- ? tors, he and Jaffe had apparently never met. But Nosenko had access to documents that showed Jaffe had met with other KGB officials. On Feb. 4, 1964, about 1-p.m.; Ge- neva time, Nosenko suddenly disap-. peared from the Soviet delegation's headquarters at the Rex Hotel. Six days later, the State Defied- ment announced in Washington that Nosenko had defected and was being granted asylum in the United States. Intelligence sources described the de- fection as one of the most important intelligence triumphs since World War IL Nosenko reportedly left behind in Russia a wife and two children. He was described at the time as an ex- pert on disarmament and as an admi- rer of the Western European way of life, but little else was publicly dis- closed. Recently, however,- it has been learned that Nosenko claimed to have directed the KGB in the sexual entrapment of several foreigners in Moscow in the late 1950s. A heavily. censored CIA document released re- cently under the Freedom of Infor- mation Act said: "In September, 1958, he claimed to. have personally recruited (blank). Itl was also in 1958, he said, that he su- pervised the sexual entrapment of (blank) . . . ?"Beginning in the spring of 1959 he said he directed his agents Yefre- mov and Volkov in a series of suc- cessful entrapments (blanks) . . . "Nosenko stated that he also used these homosexual agents in 1959 in compromising two American guides at the Sokolniki Exhibit. . . "Finally, Nosenko said, he recruit- ed the Moscow representative (blanks) . . . "Nosenko claimed that his opera- tional success during 1959 earned him a commendation from the KGB chairman." Regardless of what other intel- ligence Nosenko might have pos- sessed, his knowledge of the KGB's surveillance of Oswald in Russia was considered vital. It had been only 10 weeks since the Kennedy assassina- tion and the Warren Commission was: in the early stages of its lengthy in- vestigation to try to determine whether there had been a conspiracy. When the Rockefeller commission released its report on CIA abuses in .June, 1975, it gave no clues to Nosenko's identity. But without nam- ing him, it said: "The CIA maintained the long con- finement because of doubts about the -bona fides of the defector. This con- fmament was approved by the Direc- tor of Central Intelligence; and the FBI, attorney general, U.S. Intel- ligence Board and selected members of Congress were aware to some ex- tent of the confinement." The CIA refused to say whether Nosenko was in confinement or un? der any duress when he gave his statements about Oswald and Jaffe. And the Rockefeller commission made no mention of the treatment accorded Nosenko while in confine- ment, although it reported that in an- other case a defector was "physically abused." The CIA's official position is that what it calls Nosenko's "bona fides" (credentials as a defector) had been verified by the time of his release from confinement.. However, some U.S. intelligence officials still express doubts. A for- mer high ranking CIA official recent- ly told The Times that even after three years of "adversary interroga- tion" by the CIA, Nosenko remained under suspicion by sore CIA officials. CIA documents recently released. 'under the Freedom of Information Act raised questions about some of Nosenko's statements to the FBI and concluded that Nosenko's ignorance of Cswald's communications with the Soviet Embassy in Washington "dis- -credits his claim to complete knowl- edge of all aspects of the KGB rela- tionship with Oswald." Nosenko never testified before the Warren Commission and was not list- ? ed in the commission's published re- port. The commission relied on leng- thy statements given to the FBI by Nosenko, who told of the KGB's sur- veillance of Oswald When he was liv- ing M Russia before the Kennedy as- sassination. Nor did Nosenko testify before the Rockefeller commission. The commis- sion depended upon information from Nosenko supplied by the CIA. Neither the Senate Intelligence Committee nor its House counterpart called Nosenko as a witness. ? -Jaffe, described in one CIA memo as "persistent and energetic," has tried to persuade congressional inves- tigators to get to the bottom of his entanglement with intelligence agen- des. But his case has received scant attention from either committee. . The former correspondent, who ?tv.: interrogated at length by the FBI in 1969, recently prevailed upon the CIA to write a letter which, in ef- fect, says it has no evidence he was ever a foreign intelligence agent. And after repeated inquiries by Jaffe and The Times about whether the FBI had such evidence, FBI Di- rector Clarence M. Kelley has writ- ten a similar letter to Jaffe. ? Utilizing the Freedom of Informa? boa Act, *Jai fe obtained voluminous CIA. and FBI documents detailing how: he cooperated extensively with bot t intelligence agencies during the. 19r4 and 1960s -in providing .infor- me:eon about his contacts -as a jour- 11 na;e4. with Russian and ChilleSe Coni. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400006-7 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400006-7 _ munists. "rve been suspected of being ev- erything?CIA, FBI. KGB?you. name it," Jaffe says. "And I've done nothing except what many other journalists have done." ? The records also show how Jaffe, in his journalistic endeavors, dealt, with the KGB while stationed in Moscow and how he immediately in- formed the American Embasiy after a KGB official had tried to' recruit him as a secret agent. The documents detail a KGB effort in October, 1962, to blackmail Jaffe after he and a Russian woman he was dating were involved in a car ac- cident. . . And they show how Jaffe's KGB contact warned the correspondent that Nosenko had defected and would probably finger him as a KGB agent. And indeed Nosenko did. Nosenko said that when he defect.' ed he was deputy chief of the Tourist Department, second chief directorate of the Committee for State Security, which is concerned with internal se- curity. Nosenko told the Ffaif that he had supervised the handling of the KGB file on Oswald in the Tourist Depart- ment and could provide information on Oswald's stay in the Soviet Union between 1959 and 1962. The gist of Nosenko's statements was that the KGB never even consid- ered using Oswald as an agent. On the contrary, he said, it considered him mentally unstable and not very bright. ? Nosenko told of a suicide attempt by Oswald after his request to re- main in Russia was rejected by So- viet authorities. "Oswald had locked himself in his room and when entry was made to his room Oswald was found bleeding from self-inflicted wounds to his wrists" an FBI memo to the Warren . Commission said. "Nosenko stated Os- wald was rushed to a hospital, and ? Nosenko exPressed the opinion that ? if Oswald had not received immedi- ate medical assistance he would have ? . After Oswald's release from the. hospital, he threatened suicide again upon being told that. he could not re- main permanently ?in the Soviet Union, Nosenko said. At this point, Nosenko said, the second directorate a of the KGB "washed its hands of Os- wald." Nosenko said that although Oswald was permitted to remain temporarily; in the Soviet Union, KGB agents were instructed "to maintain a dis- creet check" on his activities in Minsk, where he lived ,with his Rus- sian wife, Marina. "Nosenko commented that the pos- sibility that Oswald might be a 'sleep- er agent' for American intelligence had been considered by the KGB but at ? this time the interest of KGB headquarters in Oswald was practi- cally nil," according to the FBI memo. Nosenko said he did not know who had granted Oswald permission to re- side temporarily in Russia, but said he was sure it had not been a KGB decision. . He went on to say that, after Os- wald and his wife left the Soviet Union for the United States in June, 1962, he had not heard of Oswald again until receiving word in Sep- tember, 1963, that he had applied for a reentry visa at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. ?? ? .? ? e, . "Nosenko's department had no in- terest in Oswald," the statement con- dinued, "and recommended that Os- wald's request . be denied." The request was denied. s Although Nosenko said he did not know whom Oswald contacted at the embassy in Mexico City, the CIA, in a recently declassified document, re- ported it had learned from indepen- dent sources that the contact, was "a KGB officer under 'consular cover." Nosenko said Oswald's name did not come up again until the KGB was notified that he had been arrested in the Nov. 22, 1963, assassination of President Kennedy. On orders of Gen. Oleg M. Griban. ov, chief of the KGB's second Chief directorate, Nosenko said, ? he tele- phoned the KGB office in Minsk to get a, summary of the Oswald file. . The summary concluded with a statement that the KGB at Minsk had endeavored "to influence Oswald in the right direction." ? . . ' That "greatly disturbed" Gribanov, according to .Nosenko, because the KGB had been under orders to take no action except to "passively. ob- serve" Oswald's activities. On Gribanov's orders; Oswald's. complete file, together with an ex- planation of the concluding state- ment, was flown by military aircraft from. Minsk to Moscow. Nosenko said he reviewed the entire file before giving it to Gribanov, who forwarded it through channels to Premier S. Ni- kita S. Kluuslichev. The explanation, Nosenko said, was that an uncle of Marina Oswald voluntarily approached Oswald and suggested that he "not be too critical of the Soviet Union when he re- turned to the United States." ? The FBI memo noted: ? "Nosenko commented that when the KGB at Minsk was first requested to furnish a summary of the Oswald file it was unaware of the interna- tional significance of Oswald's activi- ties and had included the statement reporting their endeavors to in- fluence Oswald as a self-serving ef- fort to impress the KGB Center." Nosenkb also told the FBI that Ma- rina Oswald had not been employed as an agent of the KGB., He said she had been a member of the Komsomol 12 (Communist Party, Youth Oeganiza- tion) but had been dropped from the rolls on .an unknown date for non- payment of dues over a long period of time. - Although Nosenko never appeared before the Warren Commission, he expressed a willingness to. testify, the FBI. said, as long as it would be "in secret and absolutely no publicity is given either to his appearance before. the commission or to the information itself." ? .- ? , ? ? ? : ? ? Neither the CIA nor the FBI will discuss Nosenko's confinement. But a former CIA official told The Times' that Nosenko .was not put in confine- ment until four or five months after his defection. For at least three years thereafter, Nosenko was intereegated periodically. . ;.? d At least as late as Jan. 5, 1968, the CIA was still subjecting Nosenko to interrogation about his knowledge of Oswald's stay in the Soviet Union and the KGB's relationship with him. On that day he was required to an- swer some questions in his ? own handwriting.' ? - Since: hist defection in 1964, :Nosenko is known to have surfaced in a public way only once?in May, 11970, when . he :walked into a Read- er's Digest offide in Washington and ,offered to assist John Barron with his :book, "KGB the Secret Work of So- viet Secret Agents." 17 forget the date," Barron said in an interview' "but one morning a rather handsome, distinguished-ap- pearing man who spoke in a Slavic accent arrived in my office here and said; 'I am from the center.' In KGB jargon that means headquarters." Barron said Nosenko told him he had read in Reader's Digest that Bar- ron was writing'a book on the KGB and he wanted to offer his assistance. . "I had asked the CIA earlier if we could -be provided with Nosenko's ad- dress so we could communicate with him, but had been told he didn't wish to cemmunicate with a journalist," Barron said. ? Barron, who interviewed Nosenko several times in subsequent months, .considered Nosenko a "goal mine' of :information and quoted him several. .times in the book, "tie was very straightforward in telling me there were certain areas 'that he was not free to get into, hut was good in making distinctions be- tween what he knew as a result of his own experiences and observations as oppossed to what he heard," Bei.. ron said. - ? Noscnko is believed to live in the Washington area. . THE NEW YORK TIMES 20 March 1976 Bush Backs Colby on Funds! WASHINGTON, March 191 (UPO?George Bush, Director of Central Intelligence, hacked his predecessor, William E. Colby, today in refusing to divulge the- agency's- budget because "I don't want to help" j Soviet intelligence. Mr. Bush told the National Newspaper Association, Our budget fig- ures are not made public.", Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400006-7 ARGOSY April 1976 ;?'????? -,--, : ? ,-:....,..... , ? .," ,.:: 1 .1 P .1 i . ? ? V rl..,.4 ., _?. j ,,. . "7.'17.'4'5 ?'--t4''''%-::7-."7-f;14',1?.--f ./47 , 1 o ri 4 ( 0 ??-e1::' !"._. ...... pr-. , . i,' , e.w.t*.b,:or,-.4,17.?440.4.17:44.1??? -..! 'Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400006-7 :???:;:.? .1 : :4 j 13)- (-Z-4 1:. i' 7 0.1-0--L-:-''---';'? ? ---.. ? .., ."1 . 3 .:e . are?the ones. who financed the Dallas job --t -on Kennedy ? . . 1 ARGOSY: Were offers to assassinate ! Kennedy actually made to you and your i group? . ? . ? . . - . i HEMMING: Rather frequently.. i ARGOSY: How many? ? HEMMING: .More than two dozen, by .1 organized elements that had financial I backing within the United States. 1 ARGOSY: What kind of elements? The right wing? Minutemen types? .. HEMMING: There might be a retired , armed forces type, a guy from the Klan: i These would only be.casual conversations. 1i When it came time to open up the lattachet case with the money in it, it was ! usually a mixed group. ; ARGOSY: You actually saw money. on ! the line? ' ? ' HEMMING: Oh yeah, more than once.. Some of the cheapos talked about S100,000; one said they'd pay a million. . ARGOSY: So what did you do? HEMMING: About that point, we would gracefully back out .of it. Then we would later find out that. they were trying ?to recruitIour Cuban contacts for the same purpose. . ARG.OSY: Do you think it's possible i that the Kennedy killing involved some of - the Cuban exile community? HEMMING: Yes, very possible. It wasn't that hard a job. I've seen and been . on the scene ? for harder jobs :than what happened in Dealey Plaza. You had a hard core of characters in the Dallas l'olice and County Sheriff's Department that would blow somebody's head off at a whisper_ When you've got people running around .who have friendships with organized ? crime, Federal agencies", and have been in bed with so Many people?well, when the assassination goes down, everybody's covering their tracks. ARGOSY: Can you be Specific about the ? offers you. received to kill Kennedy? HEMMING: Look, there are people who didn't have a goddamn thing to do with it, but they think they did because they were conned by other people. If they think somebody's gonna point the finger .at them, they're gonna get 'em: And I'd ? like to stay alive. ARGOSY: You told the Senate in- vestigators that you believed in 1963 that Loran [Lorenzo) Hall was somehow involved. (Hall, an ex-CIA contract employee, right-wing politico and trainer ? of Cuban exiles fora Cuban invasion, was named by the Warren Commission as one . of three men who may have .been in Dallas with Lee Harvey Oswald in Sep- tember 1963.) HEMMING.: Yes, the day of the assassination, I made a call to Texas from Miami. And 1 pointedly asked, is Lorenzo Hall in Dallas? I made the call about i :30 or 2:00 in the afternoon. He was there. My ? i?--"bli,'`'ee'"..???? ?? , ? %....71 ? o frc) ?iv 44e-e.k ; ewicyr4:4 ??=1..A1P 0;19 1...A.-. ? I :1 (z-i .7.1 i?-.?,;.?411"ir?tri?? 9.11teli ? !, ,t, t t 0"; 1,?'.-. 1,0-''' ? ...p.....v..,,,,gi, 4: ,,....: ,..._..-7.,?,..c...e.....7. r ..p.:c ....;_....,,,-, ....,.....,.- - ,_.;7::- 1,, Lti YC,:::. 4 f ...,- . , 1 '.11.-r- -.*.";??..V-41 - .? ?..44. '7''''),.J)' _,../. - t . :?-.:.?TriTZE...' ? ? . ?;, n'-.;',,- ,?- /f7-;7',' ..' ,:::. -... Xizi-IT'T CV'. ' d 4, '..' V.,......,....,0- -. ..,,...,41,7..,...,.... ,....., ..S.rirTC? 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