STATEMENT BY THE HONORABLE EDWARD H. LEVI ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS & CONSTITU

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77M00144R000300080041-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 2009
• Sequence Number: 41
• Publication Date: February 27, 1975
• Content Type: TRANS

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FOR RELEASE AT 10:00 A.M., EDT
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 1975
BY
THE HONORABLE EDWARD H. LEVI
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS & CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
of the
HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
FBI OPERATIONS
FBI Review Completed
10:00 A.M.
-
.THURSDAY., FEBRUARY 27 , 1975
IfASHINGTON, D. C.
DOJ Review
Completed.
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Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: -
I have been asked to appear here today to discuss
the information-gathering practices and the files of-the-
Federal Bureau of Investigation with respect-to public
officials, members.of Congress, and citizens generally
I realize that some time ago the Committee invited
the Deputy Attorney-G-eneral and the Director of the Bureau
to testify on these subjects. With your agreement, their-
.appearance was deferred until today so that- I might join .
them in presenting the description of past practices, the
present situation, and our thoughts for the future. What-
I have to say is to a considerable extent the result of a
collaborative effort The Director will present a statement
to supplement my testimony and both the Deputy Attorney
General and the Director will assist in responding to
questions.
After but three weeks of being Attorney General,?I
do not have the depth of knowledge possessed by the Deputy.
Attorney General and the Director.. The Deputy Attorney
General has'personally reviewed many-of the files which
will be mentioned in this testimony, as has the Bureau's
Office of Inspection. There has obviously not been sufficient
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time for me to do this, but I have personally examined some
o_ the .il s c,-.side?_ed most relevant in the e -font to
consider future guidelines or controls.
I should like to emphasize most strongly at the
outset both my personal and official concern for the issues
which are involved. These issues are close to the basic
duties of the Attorney General to protect the society and
the safety of our fellow citizens.
During the hearings on my confirmation I made a
commitment to examine the practices of the Bureau in
collecting.- info .mation on ind.iv?idual s, including Congressmen..
I assumed the obligation to develop guidelines, after
appropriate consultation, on the acquisition, retention, and
use of this information. While I have been Attorney
General for only a brief period and the important issues
with which I have been confronted have been many, I have
given the highest priority of my time and effort to the
subject matter-of these hearings and to the development of
standards or rules which may minimize the possibilities
for abuse. -My testimony today is in the nature of a report
on the beginning steps in this endeavor.
The.testimony is divided into three parts. F'lrst,
I will set forth briefly the jurisdictional bases for the.
authority of the Bureau to engage in investigative activity.
Second, I will endeavor to describe the practices of the
Bureau in acquiring information about public officials,
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Congressmen, and other citizens. In this connection,
I will also describe in categories the "Official and
Confidential" files that were .retained by. Director Hoover .:in
his office suite. I am giving this emphasis to a discussion
of these "Official and Confidential".files because I -know
-there have been rumors and concern about them as being
"dossiers," having a potential chilling effect on civil-
liberties and the political process.
Third, I want-to share with you the results of our
:review.of the practices of the Bureau and to give vou.my,
present judgment as to the types of-abuses which-past
incidents suggest may require further safeguards.
I. Investigative Jurisdiction of the FBI.
The basic authority of the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation drawn from section 533 of Title 28 of the United
States Code.- Under that statute, the Bureau-is assig.ried the
responsibility to "detect . crimes against.the United States."
It is pursuant to this provision of the statute that the FBI
performs most of its work
--'namely,.investigating persons-
crime has'.been or is likely to-be committed so that-the
violators-cari be prosecuted or the crime prevented.- While
this provision of the statute vests in the Bureau general
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authority over criminal violations, ti`iere are
investigative a.,t
Other statutes, such as the Congressional Assassination, Kidnapping
and Assault Act (18 U.S.C- 351), which vest in the Bureau specific
responsibilities to investigate violations.
Under 28 U.S.C. 533, the Bureau is also authorized to
investigate matters where no prosecution is contemplated. Paragraph
(3) of that section authorizes the Bureau-"to conduct such other
investigations regarding official matters under the control of the
Department of Justice and the Department of State as may be
directed by the Attorney General." It is pursuant to this
paragraph and the constitutional authority of the President that-
particular non-criminal investigative: responsibilities have been
assigned to the Bureau. For example, under several Executive Orders,
the FBI is vested with the responsibility to conduct background
security checks prior to appointment of individuals to -
sensitive positions. The Bureau has also been directed or
authorized by Presidential statements or directives to gather
information about -activities that jeopardize the security of
this Nation. Thus, as reported in United States v. United
States District Court,.444 F.2d 651 at 659, on May"21, 1940,
:President Roosevelt sent a confidential memorandum to the
Attorney General authorizing investigative-agents "to secure
information by listening devices directed to the conversation
or other communications of persons suspected of subversive
,activities against the Government of the United States
including suspected spies." The President further directed
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the Attorney General "to limit these investigations so
conducted to a minimum and to limit them insofar as possible
.to aliens." Such Presidential statements or directives, of
course, have to be considered as conditioned by the developing
constitutional law on the powers of the President, and also
have to be seen in the setting of legislative enactments and
Executive order 10450 approved April 27, 19531and
since amended, requires investigation by the FBI of employees
and applicants in the Executive Branch of the Federal Government
on loyalty'`grounds as did Executive order 9835, which it.-
replaced. Under Executive Order 10450,, the Bureau is also
assigned the duty to disseminate to the heads of other
departments and agencies and to the Civil.serv ice Commission
on the appropriate procedures for investigation-.
t:;,,r which has been received by the Bureau that
fo
order-is specific on a variety of items deemed relevant. Thus,
if a civil servant in the Department of Agriculture comports
himself in a--fashion that falls within the scope of the
criteria-of Executive Order 10450, and the FBI becomes aware
bears on an employee's loyalty, cnaracceL, %.J-L
of it, t e Bureau is required to advi.sc the proper, official-
at the Department of Agriculture and the Civil Service Commission.
I should point out the Executive Order applies only to employees
of the Executive Branch.
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If information received involves a question of loyalty
on the pare of an ee.mp Lo-iee of an of the i xecutive Branch
of the Government, the FBI would them conduct the investigation.
If information received by the FBI pertains only to the employee's
suitability, the Bureau conducts no investigation. However, the
unsolicited data received by the Bureau is forwarded to the employing
agency and the Civil Service Commission. In addition, the
Bureau also conducts investigations under Executive Order 10450 at
the request of the employing agency when such agency has developed
information bearing on the loyalty of the employee.
During the fiscal year of 1974, 367,655. security forms
were received by the FBI for processing under Executive Order 10450
and 935 investigations were conducted by the FBI under Executive
Order 10450. At the present time, we do not'have statistics.
on the total number of reports on government employees passed
,by the FBI to other agencies of the Executive Branch under. -
Executive Order 10450.
In brief summary, then, the Bureau's investigative
authority gives it responsibility to investigate violations of
Federal law, to conduct background investigations for government
employment, and to gather information bearing on our-Nation's
security.
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II. Files Compiled by the FBI on Public Officials, Congressmen,
and Private Individuals
The Bureau currently maintains a total of approximately --
six and one-half million files and 55 million index cards
that cross-reference these files. (These numbers do_not
include what is commonly referred to'as identification records
-which consist of arrest, conviction and fingerprint records.----
They are maintained in a separate system.) Ordinarily each
file is contained in one file jacket which can vary in volume
from one page to hundreds of pages. Each file t'pically
involves a single subject matter. For example, if.a Senator is
the victim of seven separate assassination threats, seven
separate files are opened.
The FBI maintains the same kinds of files on members
of Congress as it does on other American citizens. "We'have
prepared 'for the Subcommittee's informatio n~ an appendix entitled
"FBI Information-Gathering Practices with Respect to-members
of Congress." The following-discussion of the types of FBI
files on members of Congress would apply equally to any public
official; or indeed to any citizen.
--The files.maintained by the Bureau on-members of
Congress fall into five categories.
The first category covers instances in which individual
Congressmen or Senators are the victims of criminal activity.
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The most common examples of this type of material are files
on extortion demands and assassination threats. These extortion
demands and assassination threats files represent fully 79
per cent of the files relating to Senators (700 files) and 30
per cent of those relating to Congressmen (219 files)-; In
addition, less than one per cent of the files on Senators (six.
files) and House Members (four files) contain "Victim ---Security"
designations. Only when a member of Congress is threatened by
an.extremist group is the file designated "Victim - Security."
Second, the Bureau maintains files on Congressmen or
Senators who are the target of a Federal criminal investigation.
These criminal investigative files comprise about three per
cent of the files on Senators (30 files) and about eight per-
cent of the files.relating to House members (55 files). - In
addition,, about one per cent of the Senate files (seven files)
lend slightly over two per cent of the files relating to House
members (17 files) carry "Subject -- Security" designations, and
include investigations relating to possible violations of the
security laws, the laws prohibiting disclosure of classified
information, and Foreign Agents Registration Act, and so forth.
The third category e.n.compa.e:s files relating to background
investigations -- commonly known as "full field investigations"
-- on those Congressmen or Senators who have been appointed to
considered for Executive Branch positions or other positions
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for which a background check is required. These files represent
almost two per cent of those relating to Senators (18 files)
and slightly more than seven per cent of those relating to members
of the House (53 files).
Fourth, the Bureau maintains files carrying the
designation "Laboratory Cases" -- covering'requests for FBI
laboratory work in cases received from other law enforcement
agencies in which individual Senators or Congressmen are the
victims. For example, a Chief of Police requested an examination
of certain materials found on the exterior of a Senator's home
which had been vandalized. These files represent two per cent
of the files relating to Senators (14 files) and House Members
(16 files).
Finally, the Bureau maintains files involving correspondence
with or about the Congressman. These files represent approximately
12 per cent of the files relating to Senators (108 files) and.
approximately 50 per cent of those relating to House Members
(358 files). Typically, the files include correspondence with
individual Congressmen or Senators relating to matters which.
are of interest to them. For example, a Congressman will write to
the Bureau requesting crime statistics or the Director's views on
capital punishment, juvenile delinquency, or legalized gambling.
The correspondence files also contain information volunteered by
American citizens in the nature of "allegations" against individual
members of Congress. In some cases, these "allegations" may
involve the member's personal life such as morals or drinking habits.
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If one totals all the files on current members of Congress
in the five categories which I have mentioned, the number of
files is 1,605 -- 883 relating to members of the Senate, and
722 pertaining to members of the House of Representatives. It
may be important to clarify that the files are cross-referenced
by index cards. Thus, if a Congressmen's name appears in one
file, the FBI's Files and Communications Division may prepare an
index card so the information in this file can be retrieved
expeditiously.
I should add that the legislative Iiai.sorn section of the
FBI maintains a record of its contacts with members of Congress
and other information of the sort typically held by legislative
liaison offices of other government agencies. This information
is recorded on index cards. The cards are not themselves
regular FBI files, nor does the regular FBI file index refer to
them. They ordinarily contain biographical material of the same
sort that is listed in a "Who's Who" entry or indeed in the
congressional Directory. In addition, the cards generally record
the liaison section's correspondence with or concerning members
,of Congress, notations of informal FBI contacts with members of
(''onaress, and public record material such as statements members
have made concerning their positions on issues in which the
Bureau has an interest. I should also point out that some
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cards contain information retrieved from the Bureau's regular
files. Information, of that sort is retrieved and recorded when.,
for example, a member of Congress has inquired about an
investigation or is a victim of a crime. A partial.review of
the cards kept by the legislative liaison section indicated
that they generally do not contain derogatory information
concerning the personal life or morals of members of Congress.
The partial review did, however, turn up one instance in which
a derogatory allegation received by the Bureau in official
correspondence concerning an individual who is no longer in the
Congress was listed on a card: In this instance, the information
was identified as being unsolicited and unsubstantiated.
I should now like to go back to the question, which..
know has been a major concern, of how the Bureau ought to
handle the unsolicited allegations concerning the members of
Congress received by the Bureau. I have heard recommendations
that the Bureau should be prohibited from retaining any unsolicited
allegations if the allegations do.not relate to conduct or
activities within the FBI's criminal investigative. jurisdiction.
As Director Kelley has indicated in his public statement on
this matter, if an unsolicited allegation received by the Bureau
does not come within its investigative jurisdiction over criminal
violations, a letter stating this is sent to the individual who
made the allegation. But under current procedure, both the letter
containing the allegation and the FBI's response are then
retained and filed by the Bureau.
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I realize there are policy considerations which argue in
favor of retention of the unsolicited. material allegations which
on their face do not come within the Bureau's jurisdiction at
the time they are received but which may come within the
-jurisdiction at a later time because of additional facts or
circumstances. A vitriolic allegation concerning a Congressman
can become of importance later on if the Bureau subsequently
receives an anonymous extortion or assassination threat against
the Congressman. There are other examples not difficult to
imagine in which the allegation, as part of a developing later
picture, becomes relevant and significant. If an investigative
agency destroys material it has received and later it is claimed
that the material should have alerted the agency to all kinds of
serious problems, that criticism may be impossible to evaluate.
The criticism indeed may be justified; the destruction of the
information may have been improperly motivated. Nevertheless,
: suggest a procedure could be devised and authenticated to
screen materials to be retained, or to periodically review
materials from this standpoint.
But whatever the ultimate decision on this is, I-believe
overridinq issue not retention or return or destruction,
++sii
but rather what the FBI does with respect to allegations either
inside or outside of its jurisdiction. These allegations are
unsubstantiated charges. Are they kept secure by the Bureau
from improper use or dissemination? :I realize this question will
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not arise if the information is destroyed, but this seems to me
to be too easy a circumvention -,of -the: :central and broader
inevitable question as to which the quality of the Bureau and
appropriate guidelines and protective rules should give a
reassuring answer.
It is at this point that I believe I must refer to a
past practice of the Bureau with respect to certain files, not
with reference to their subject matter, but to their location.
The review of FBI files on individual Congressmen disclosed
certain files -- marked "Official. and Confidentialor simply
"OC" -- that were retained by Director Hoover in his office
suite. These files were removed from Mr. Hoover's office suite
following his death and. taken to an adjoining office occupied by
the then Associate Director of the FBI.
The "OC" files dated, back to the 1920's. In late 1941,
Mr. Hoover reorganized the confidential files maintained in his
office suite; he described them as including "various and sundry
items believed inadvisable to be included in the general :files
of the Bureau." He directed that many of the materials then in
his office suite be transferred either to the office of the then
Assistant FBI Director in charge of the Administrative Division
(who had responsibility for files and other crime records generally) ,
or to what was then known as the National Defense Division. The
material transferred to the. National Defense Division included
confidential memoranda on undercover employees, including those
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working on the war effort; confidential informants, national
security surveillances; and similar items.
Mr. Hoover directed that the materials to be retained in
his office suite following these transfers "be restricted to
confidential items of a more or less personal nature of the
Director's and items which (Director Hoover) might have occasion
to call for from time to time, such as memoranda to the Department
on the Dies Committee, etc." The official and confidential
files maintained in Mr. Hoover's office suite represented 164
9
file jackets or folders. They cover a period from the 1920's
to shortly before Mr. Hoover's death in 1972. Of the 164 files,
one had no date, and 131 contained entries limited to one decade that is, all of the material in the folder was entered in a
single decade. Most of the files were compiled between 1940
and 1960. A breakdown of the reslationship of these files to
various time periods is as follows: in the 1920's -- 1; in the
1930's -- 5; in the 1940'.s -- 55; in the. 1950' s -- 25; in the
1960's -- 28; in the 1970's -- 17.
Some of the files covered two decades. There were four
tiles covering the two decades of the! 1930's and 1940's; seven
in the 1940's to the 1950's; eight in the.1950's to the 1960's;
and three in the 1960's to the 1970's..
The remaining 10 folders covered the time periods of three
or more decades: five covered three decades, four spanned
four decades, and one file covered five decades. Of the 164 OC
files, 106 pertain to individuals, three to organizations, and
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55 to miscellaneous matters. The three pertaining to organizations
all relate to the Communist Party.
We have also broken down the OC files by subject matter
into the following areas: policy matters; administrative matters
materials pertaining to Mr. Hoover or the FBI; reference material;
internal personnel matters; protection of sources or sensitive
information; public figures or prominent persons; and matters
which appeared to be of particular personal interest to Mr. Hoover..
Details concerning these categories are as follows :
(1) Policy Matters
There were 21 folders that pertain to policy mattersr
covering such broad areas as an agreement with the
Secret Service concerning Presidential Protection;
Presidential directives regarding the role of the FBI
in the security field; conversations between Mr_._Hoover
and a President-elect regarding the role of the FBI in'
his forthcoming Administration; letters to and from the
White House regarding expansion of FBI legal. attache
posts abroad; and a statement outlining FBI policies
regarding civil'rights and domestic violence prepared.
in 1947 for Mr. Hoover's use in addressing the
President's Committee on Civil Rights.
(2) Administrative Matters
There were 40 folders considered to fall within the
category of administrative matters. Some examples are
as follows: memoranda regarding an Attorney General-'s
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decision with respect to supervision of the FBI by
an Assistant Attorney General, the Bureau's recommendations
for improved security measures at the Capitol; letters
to Mr. Hoover from an individual. declining employment in
the FBI; memoranda between the Bureau and the Department
concerning reimbursement for funds expended for Department
of Justice applicant investigations; and a memorandum
concerning the briefing of the President by Mr. Hoover
and the Attorney General with respect to certain
intelligence activities by hostile nations within the
United States.
(3) Matters Pertaining to Mr. Hoover or the FBI
Encompassed within this category are thirteen folders
that include such things as memoranda regarding efforts
on the part of various people to have Mr. Hoover
replaced as Director; information concerning an alleged
smear campaign against Mr. Hoover; derogatory remarks
about him; and so forth.
(4) Reference Material
There were four folders in this category containing
information concerning materials developed indicating
foreign influence in certain domestic extremist movemc tc;
a compilation of data concerning the 1964 riots; organized
crime matters; and a report of incidents involving
explosives and incendiary devices.
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(5) Internal Personnel Matters
There were four folders considered to fall within the
category of internal personnel matters. They deal with
such things as the poor attitude of an FBI employee;
handwritten letters from former FBI agents concerning
internal matters within the Bureatf; and so forth.
(6) Protection of Sources or Sensitive Information
Fifteen folders comprise this category. Specific examples
of this type of information include: the possible
defection and redefection of an individual; material on
FBI counterintelligence activities; technical devices and
techniques; and telephone surveillances involving sensitive
coverage in the national security area. .
(7) Public Figures or Prominent Persons
There were 48 folders considered to fall within this category.
By and large, the material in these folders contained
derogatory information concerning individuals. It does
not necessarily follow that the derogatory information
pertained to the individual named on the caption-of the
folder; in some instances a folder would contain only a
record of a contact between Mr. Hoover and a public figure
during which derogatory information concerning another
individual was discussed. Some of the derogatory material
was developed. as a result of official investigations by the
Bureau; some was furnished by another government agency;
and some was furnished by informants. Included in the
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public figures or prominent persons category'were
Presidents, Executive Branch officers and 17 individuals
who were members of Congress. In the latter category,
two of the individuals are still in the Congress. Fifteen
of the folders relating to Congressmen were in Director
Hoover"s OC files; and the other two were in confidential
files which as mentioned above were maintained by the then
Assistant Director in charge of the Administrative Division.
Some of the OC files relating to
congressmen contain
summaries of materials in the regular FBI investigative
files specially prepared for meetings which Mr. Hoover had
with those Congressmen. Some of the Congressional OC
files contain indications of how the material was used.
There is a document in one file indicating that derogatory
material was improperly disseminated. In this instance
an FBI agent forwarded derogatory information to Mr. Hoover
concerning a Congressman who had attacked the Director.
The file contains a document which indicates that Mr. Hoover
disseminated the derogatory information to others in the
Executive Branch. We cannot, however, always know what
action, if any, was taken with respect to these files. In
the case of instances of use of the resources of the FB
by Executive officials outside the Bureau -- a subject
which I will discuss in a moment -- the files indicate
that, on several occasions, the Bureau was directed to
maintain no records with respect to the actions they had
b--_ c#- -A 4-.-. +- rta
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(8) Items of Personal Interest to Mr.
There were 19 folders considered to fall within this
category. These files include such things as an internal
memorandum reporting information from a source that a
reporter intended to "expose the Incompetency" of an
official of an intelligence agency in 1941, and other
miscellaneous correspondence to and from individuals.
I do not know why these files were retained in the suite
of offices of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
The range of items in the OC files includes many routine, mundane
and totally innocuous materials. I believe it can be concluded
that the OC files maintained by Director. Hoover do not, except
ae
in very limited instances, warrant the term dossiers" in the
pejorative sense.
Looking toward the future, I would be disturbed at the
thought of an FBI Director maintaining files on specific individuals
in his own personal offices with the unavoidable consequence that.
the files would be generally suspected of being "dossiers," with
various connotations as to purpose or use. Even though the number
of OC files on individuals or organizations is relatively small --?
particularly. since they were gathered over such a long period of
time -- the potential effect of _ l e mere knowledge that such fi1er
were kept in the Director's office is, I think, obvious. Director
Kelley and I both agree that such .files should not be so maintained.
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No such files have been maintained by DIrector Kelley during his
tenure as Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
III. Instances of Misuse of the Resources of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Moving beyond the OC files, our review disclosed a small
number of instances in the past where the resources of the FBI
were misused by the-Executive Branch. The fact that they have
occurred should require us to ensure that measures are taken to
preclude or at least minimize the possibility of repetition.
These few abuses were not unique to any particular
Administration or to any political party. In order to consider
what measures may be appropriate, we have endeavored to characterize
the types of abuses to which the Bureau has been susceptible in the
past.
(1) Use of the Resources of the FBI to Gather Political
Intelligence
Our review disclosed a few documented instances in which
the Bureau at times during the-course of an election campaign,
was requested to provide -- and did indeed provide -- information
which could be used as political intelligence information. In
,one instance, this involved a check of FBI files on the staff of
campaign opponent -
(2) Improper Use of the FBI in Connection with the
Political Process
In a few instances recorded in Bureau files, an incumbent
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President caused the FBI to gather intelligence relating to a
political convention under circumstances that, although cast in
legitimate law enforcement terms, could -- and some would say
should -- have been suspected of being politically motivated.
(3) Use of the FBI to Report on Certain Activities
of Critics of an Admi istration's Policies
The FBI's files document, a few instances in which an incumbent
President caused the Bureau to report on certain activities of
Members of Congress who were opposed to and critical of his policies.
(4) Use of Information in the FBI Files to Respond
to or Discredit Critics
Again, the Bureau files doc=ent a very small number of
instances in which derogatory inforration legitimately obtained. by
disseminated to other members of.the Executive
Branch to enable them to discredit their critics.
(5) Use of the FBI in Connection with Other Legitimate
Law Enforcement Activi-.ies
There was one documented instance where the FBI was used
to conduct an inquiry for what might be described as political purpos>-
.relating to an investigation properly conducted by other Executive
Branch officials.
Our review of the files on these matters indicated three
common threads that occur throughout. First, the initiation of the
improper request was usually from a White House staff member --
purporting to act in the President's name --- to a counterpart
subordinate.official in the FBI. There are relatively few
documented instances of abuse involving the direct participation of
a principal -- either a President or the FBI Director -- although
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the principals in certain cases were probably knowledgeable of the
action. Second, many of the improper requests for information or
activity were cast in terms of "national security" or other
legitimate law enforcement purposes. Finally, the instances in which
the Bureau was improperly used could have been avoided had former
officials of the FBI not been reluctant to utilize available
"safeguards." These safeguards are mainly two: first, the
availability of the Attorney General as a "lightning rod" to
deflect improper requests -- and in some of the instances covered
this would have been an important protection for the Bureau;
and second, the FBI Director's right, in these kinds of. circumstances,
of direct recourse to the President -- the nominal "source" of the
improper request -- to verify (a) his knowledge that-the request
had been made, and (b) his judgment that the request was a
legitimate one which he would wish to authorize.
The development of measures to preclude or minimize the
possibilities for abuse is not an easy task, and I consider that our
work in preparing appropriate guidelines is at its beginning, not
at its end. We will need a great deal.of consultation and
undoubtedly help on measures which might be taken. I am sure, of
course, we all realize that it is the inherent integrity and
quality of the Bureau itself which have been and must be the
most important guarantee. But some abuses have occurred and we
must attempt to find the best remedial steps which'-will protect
the Bureau in its proper mission.
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23
While we are at the beginning of our search for and
consideration of those steps, there is one obvious measure which
I have thought it important to put into effect at once.
I have instructed the Director of the. Bureau to report to
me immediately any requests or practices which in his judgment are
improper or which, considering the contextof the request, he
believes present the appearance of impropriety. The Director
has, in turn, instructed Bureau personnel to report any untoward
requests or behavior to him.
There is one other measure that the Department of Justice
has supported for some time -- legislation that would impose
criminal sanctions on Federal employees who improperly disseminate
information about individuals from FBI files. Similar legislation,
H.R. 61, has been introduced by the Chairman of this Subcommittee.
I believe that legislation in this area is important. This is,
of course, the direction of the new privacy laws but they do not
cover this situation.
Beyond these two measures, there are obviously other
steps that are required and should be considered. We should
consider the possibility of an Executive Order which will limit
the authority in the White House
to make requests directly to the
Bureau to a few highly placed White House officials. This is
because it is characteristic of a significant number of past
abuses that they have involved requests by personnel at the White
House to the Bureau. I believe that a proper Executive Order can
be drafted which will ensure greater accountability. This would
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no means be a panacea, but it would be an added protection
which may be helpful and should be explored.
We shall also give consideration to the scope and
effect of the Executive order which requires the Bureau to report
to heads of Executive departments and the Civil Service Commission
unverified allegations on a variety of items which may be relevant
to the character of a government employee. The meaning of this
order has undoubtedly changed over the course of the years
because of intervening case law. But in addition I think we must
take into account the need to protect against the tendency of
practices in one area becoming contagious in another area.
this sense, the requirement to report in the Executive area has
a relevance to the acceptance, perhaps too easily, of the practice
to retain information sent in on members of the Legislative
Branch.
The preparation of adequate guidelines remains the major
task before us. These guidelines will have to speak to the
appropriate investigatory areas and the scope of the Bureau's
investigating practices in relation to the jurisdiction and authority
which has been conferred upon the Bureau. I tried to set forth
that jurisdiction and authority earlier in this testimony. They
extend to the detection and investigation of crimes against the
United States where there is reason to believe these crimes have
been committed or are likely to be committed, to conduct investigations
for government employment, to gather information important to
national security. This is a broad charter but not an unlimited
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one. I believe we are all in agreement that criteria are
required to further define the appropriate scope of the Bureau`s
work and this relates of course also to the question of retention
and disclosure of information. The Bureau operates under the
supervision of the Department of Justice of which it is a part.
The guidelines therefore must, in addition, speak to the
effectiveness of this supervision.
Mr. Chairman, I assume we all realize that no agency of
government, since-it is a human agency, if looked at with the
critical eye of hindsight and history over many years, can be
totally free of flaw. An examination of these mistakes or
tendencies must be seen in perspective. We have examined them
to provide that vigilance which is always required, and to
safeguard the future. In his nineteen months as Director of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Clarence Kelley has
succeeded in keeping the Bureau out of partisan politics. I
trust the steps we have already taken and those which we must
devise together will be helpful to the proper and important
role of the Bureau.
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