PORTUGAL: THE CUBAN CONNECTION
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP77M00144R000300090053-5
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
2
Document Creation Date:
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date:
December 28, 2001
Sequence Number:
53
Case Number:
Publication Date:
August 10, 1975
Content Type:
NSPR
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP77M00144R000300090053-5.pdf | 207.28 KB |
Body:
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300090053-5
Sue,
A copy of this article is to be
attached to the 12 August 1975
journal.
Cathy
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300090053-5
THE AS ill
8gItase 2002/01/10: C1431543PA 90EINWE
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VT ATRErif (15
jack Anderson
Portugal's ruling generals have a
secret adviser who has been teaching
them how to impose a Communist dic-
tatorship on an unwilling populace.
He is none other than Cuban Pre-
mier Fidel Castro, a pre-eminent ex-
pert at subverting the will of the
people.
. On April 25, the Portuguese people
voted overwhelmingly in favor of the
moderate political parties which sup-
port democracy. A scant 12.5 per cent
of the voters backed the Communist
party.
But the military triumvirate re-
ceived an urgent recommendation
from Castro, according to intelligence
reports, that they ' ignore the 'April
' elections, suppress the press and over-
power the opposition.
_ The Cuban leader cited the experi-
ence of the late Salvador Allende, the
martyred Marxist president of Chile,
as evidence that a successful revolu-
tion cannot be consummated in the
' framework of a demoeracy.
The advice from Havana was echoed
in Lisbon by party boss Alvaro Cunhal
. who acknowledged with uncharacter-
istic candor: "We .Communists do' not
accept the game of elections."
Cunhal began plotting with Castro
. two months before the Portuguese
coup. The secret intelligence reports
reveal that Cunhal made a secret trip
to Havana in February, 1974.
Two months later, the Portuguese
.-Communists in cahoots with leftist
military officers oyerthrevv the right-
wing dictatorship of Marcella Cae-
tano. ?
_ ? The triumphant military junta, ac-
cording to the intelligence reports,
- began listening to Castro from the
first. A close working relationship
was developed through Cuba's Gen-
eral Intelligence Directorate, which
maintains a large Portugese-speak-
ing Brazilian section. This made it
possible for the Cubans to communi-
cate easily with the Portuguese left-
ists.
Already, the Cubans have helped
the Portuguese organize an internal
security apparatus, which could
evolve quietly into a secret police
force. Cuban-style "defense councils"
are also blossoming all over Portugal...
These are little more than armed ,
.commando units, which the Commun:
ists use to intimidate the moderate
majority. The disciplined rowdies,
break up dA1AratiTla au 0 beat
their oppon FifeteS116i(*.KalfigIS,e
hors become afraid to sneak to one
-would be herded into the "bull ring"
or lined up in front of firing squads.
"Unfortunately." he despaired,. "Ws
becoming impossible to carry out a so-
cialist revolution by completely peace-
ful means.'
It is not considered a coincidence
that a Cuban military delegation al.-
_ rived in Lisbon about. the same time
that Carvailio.returned. from. Havana..
- The visitors. included Brig. Gen. Senen
Casa-s, the Army chief; Brig.. Gen. Fen
nando Weiner,. the Army's political
czar; and Capt.. Ernicliga. Baez,. the,
,Navy
These three, are considered special.;
1st; on monolithic discipline in the
. -armed forces. Within days after their
arrival, the Portnguese junta began
? purging conservatives from key units.
To cement the Cuban-Portuguese
-connection, Castro -also sent one of
Castro:: ",Secret adviser'? his most trusted aides, Francisca
? .! ? -? -t Astray, to Lisbon fiS his top diplomat.
another for fear of retribution frOint , Significantly, one of Astray's close
the Communist goon squads. - friends is the personable, young So-
In late July, Gen. Otelo Saraiva do viet ambassador to Portugal, Arnold
Carvalho, the portuguese internal se- L
curity. chief ' and a member of the Intelligence reports claim that Kid-
ruling troika, paid a nine-day visit to inin was trained by the KGB and was
Cuba. assigned to Lisbon specifically to help
In heart-to-'heart talks with Castro., the Communists gain power. Ile_heePa
according to intelligence, sources; Car-, a low profile, but behind the active
,valho was lectured on how to proceed Cubans is a shadowy Soviet presence;
with the "revolution" The Cuban Intelligence reports suggest, indeed,
dictator stressed that .the Portuguese that the Soviets are using the Cubans
should avoid Allende's - mistalce of to manipulate events in Portugal.
putting up with democracy . and- at- The United States, meanwhile, is
tempting "transactional settlements" doing little more than watch the. Por-
with the opposition. _ ? ? tuguese crisis unravel. To the dismay
Castro described Allende, contemn- of U.S. diplomats on the scene, Secre---
tuously as' "a:fool" who -..thought he tary of State Kissinger has refused to
could ? achieve a revolution n Chile help the moderate. Lisbon leaders in
through the :democratic processes, their struggle against the left:wing
The press must be silenced, the op- radicals..
position. intimidated ..and -.the. popu- Some top advisers were hoping, for
lace regimented, Castro urged. Ha example, that President Ford would.
warned it /would take "mass mobiliza-- visit Lisbon after his stopover in Spain
tion"?meaning Communist control of last spring. Such a gesture would
every, neighborhood?to. carry out. the have been a tremendous boost for the
revolution. . Portuguese moderates. But Ford and
The brash, flamboyant Carvalho Kissinger decided against it, without
apparently was impressed. He is char- even bothering to ask the opinion of
acterized by intelligence analysts as the State Department experts.
a radical Marxist, enormously ambi-
esiclent?would
tious, who may see himself as the .prrJetoencUbQQTAtothyescue.
Castro of Portugal. Ittit_the Senate _Apy_tstigatiork..,of the
He cane .out of his meetings with ciA, he iccently Jamented,hak pre-
the Betrded One proclaiming: .."T
- gathered profound guidelines, teach- e &op e rations?- u ga 1.
ings evei. , which I believe will be ex-. Retorted a diplomatic source, with
tremely iseful for the continuity of barely controlled disgust: "Who wants
our' revolution." covert action? What the Portuguese
Back in Lisbon, Carvalho began put- moderates need right now is a little
21:Lamy tesktuizmoPrilompoliuiftooditia 61614
sued stern warnings that oissiden.S53-5
41) is/s, United Feature Syridicht, Tr*.