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December 12, 2016
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December 28, 2001
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August 10, 1975
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Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300090053-5 Sue, A copy of this article is to be attached to the 12 August 1975 journal. Cathy Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300090053-5 THE AS ill 8gItase 2002/01/10: C1431543PA 90EINWE drkei70.1?30 VT ATRErif (15 jack Anderson Portugal's ruling generals have a secret adviser who has been teaching them how to impose a Communist dic- tatorship on an unwilling populace. He is none other than Cuban Pre- mier Fidel Castro, a pre-eminent ex- pert at subverting the will of the people. . On April 25, the Portuguese people voted overwhelmingly in favor of the moderate political parties which sup- port democracy. A scant 12.5 per cent of the voters backed the Communist party. But the military triumvirate re- ceived an urgent recommendation from Castro, according to intelligence reports, that they ' ignore the 'April ' elections, suppress the press and over- power the opposition. _ The Cuban leader cited the experi- ence of the late Salvador Allende, the martyred Marxist president of Chile, as evidence that a successful revolu- tion cannot be consummated in the ' framework of a demoeracy. The advice from Havana was echoed in Lisbon by party boss Alvaro Cunhal . who acknowledged with uncharacter- istic candor: "We .Communists do' not accept the game of elections." Cunhal began plotting with Castro . two months before the Portuguese coup. The secret intelligence reports reveal that Cunhal made a secret trip to Havana in February, 1974. Two months later, the Portuguese .-Communists in cahoots with leftist military officers oyerthrevv the right- wing dictatorship of Marcella Cae- tano. ? _ ? The triumphant military junta, ac- cording to the intelligence reports, - began listening to Castro from the first. A close working relationship was developed through Cuba's Gen- eral Intelligence Directorate, which maintains a large Portugese-speak- ing Brazilian section. This made it possible for the Cubans to communi- cate easily with the Portuguese left- ists. Already, the Cubans have helped the Portuguese organize an internal security apparatus, which could evolve quietly into a secret police force. Cuban-style "defense councils" are also blossoming all over Portugal... These are little more than armed , .commando units, which the Commun: ists use to intimidate the moderate majority. The disciplined rowdies, break up dA1AratiTla au 0 beat their oppon FifeteS116i(*.KalfigIS,e hors become afraid to sneak to one -would be herded into the "bull ring" or lined up in front of firing squads. "Unfortunately." he despaired,. "Ws becoming impossible to carry out a so- cialist revolution by completely peace- ful means.' It is not considered a coincidence that a Cuban military delegation al.- _ rived in Lisbon about. the same time that Carvailio.returned. from. Havana.. - The visitors. included Brig. Gen. Senen Casa-s, the Army chief; Brig.. Gen. Fen nando Weiner,. the Army's political czar; and Capt.. Ernicliga. Baez,. the, ,Navy These three, are considered special.; 1st; on monolithic discipline in the . -armed forces. Within days after their arrival, the Portnguese junta began ? purging conservatives from key units. To cement the Cuban-Portuguese -connection, Castro -also sent one of Castro:: ",Secret adviser'? his most trusted aides, Francisca ? .! ? -? -t Astray, to Lisbon fiS his top diplomat. another for fear of retribution frOint , Significantly, one of Astray's close the Communist goon squads. - friends is the personable, young So- In late July, Gen. Otelo Saraiva do viet ambassador to Portugal, Arnold Carvalho, the portuguese internal se- L curity. chief ' and a member of the Intelligence reports claim that Kid- ruling troika, paid a nine-day visit to inin was trained by the KGB and was Cuba. assigned to Lisbon specifically to help In heart-to-'heart talks with Castro., the Communists gain power. Ile_heePa according to intelligence, sources; Car-, a low profile, but behind the active ,valho was lectured on how to proceed Cubans is a shadowy Soviet presence; with the "revolution" The Cuban Intelligence reports suggest, indeed, dictator stressed that .the Portuguese that the Soviets are using the Cubans should avoid Allende's - mistalce of to manipulate events in Portugal. putting up with democracy . and- at- The United States, meanwhile, is tempting "transactional settlements" doing little more than watch the. Por- with the opposition. _ ? ? tuguese crisis unravel. To the dismay Castro described Allende, contemn- of U.S. diplomats on the scene, Secre--- tuously as' "a:fool" who -..thought he tary of State Kissinger has refused to could ? achieve a revolution n Chile help the moderate. Lisbon leaders in through the :democratic processes, their struggle against the left:wing The press must be silenced, the op- radicals.. position. intimidated ..and -.the. popu- Some top advisers were hoping, for lace regimented, Castro urged. Ha example, that President Ford would. warned it /would take "mass mobiliza-- visit Lisbon after his stopover in Spain tion"?meaning Communist control of last spring. Such a gesture would every, neighborhood?to. carry out. the have been a tremendous boost for the revolution. . Portuguese moderates. But Ford and The brash, flamboyant Carvalho Kissinger decided against it, without apparently was impressed. He is char- even bothering to ask the opinion of acterized by intelligence analysts as the State Department experts. a radical Marxist, enormously ambi- esiclent?would tious, who may see himself as the .prrJetoencUbQQTAtothyescue. Castro of Portugal. Ittit_the Senate _Apy_tstigatiork..,of the He cane .out of his meetings with ciA, he iccently Jamented,hak pre- the Betrded One proclaiming: .."T - gathered profound guidelines, teach- e &op e rations?- u ga 1. ings evei. , which I believe will be ex-. Retorted a diplomatic source, with tremely iseful for the continuity of barely controlled disgust: "Who wants our' revolution." covert action? What the Portuguese Back in Lisbon, Carvalho began put- moderates need right now is a little 21:Lamy tesktuizmoPrilompoliuiftooditia 61614 sued stern warnings that oissiden.S53-5 41) is/s, United Feature Syridicht, Tr*.