PROBLEM AREAS ARISING FROM THE HSC AND SSC INVESTIGATIONS FOR CONSIDERATION AT WHITE HOUSE MEETING ON 13 OCTOBER 1975

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77M00144R000400050048-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 13, 2001
• Sequence Number: 48
• Publication Date: October 13, 1975
• Content Type: PAPER

STATINTL
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Problem Areas Arisin from the HSC and
SSC Investi ations for Consideration at
White House Meeting on 13 October 1975
1. The most serious current problem in dealing
with the Congressional investigations is the tyrannical,
arbitrary and demogogic conduct of the IISC Chairman.'
Mr. Pike's erratic behaviour permeates to his key staff
members making it very difficult to maintain civilized
relationships with them. His public characterization
yesterday of the "family jewels" as a compendium of
"crimes" committed by CIA and as a file which he had
newly uncovered is a case in point. A sanitized copy
of the document has been in the hands of the I-ISC since
12 August. The Rockefeller Commission, the SSC and the
Department of Justice r.eceived copies of the "family
jewels" at an early stage in the investigations. This
is another case where Mr. Pike is seeking to take poli-
tical advantage from these investigations.
2. A problem of interpretation has arisen out of
the 30 September "agreement" with the HSC. The HSC feels
that under the agreement, almost unlimited direct access
should be afforded the HSC staff. to the Agency's most
sensitive documents. The HSC, in taking this stand, is
attempting to drastically downgrade CIA's ability to
sanitize documents prior to their being passed to the
Committee. It would be helpful to future conduct of the
investigation if CIA's ability to sanitize documents prior
to passing them to the HSC were to be once again clearly
established. The complicated cross currents of interests
which the HSC is showing, plus the large number of people
involved plus the different locations to which the documents
may be taken, once they are out of CIA control, makes this the
minimum acceptable safety standard which the Agency can
accept. To date,. the HSC has made no determination as to
the ultimate disposition of classified documents in its
possession..
3. The prosecutorial environment in the HOUSE
Select Committee hearings mitigates against balanced
presentations. Handling of the post-mortems on intelli-
genc~- inadequacies in selected crisis situations is an
example. The DCI's offer to provide the committee a.
presentation which would offer a balanced view of
succEsses and failures was rejected.
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SSC The investigation to date reveals two major lines
of inquiry as follows:
1. A searching inquiry into the Agency's
activities with a view to recommending new
Legislation.
2. An exhaustive investigation into
allegations of wrong-doing with the aim of
publicizing as much as possible alleged wrong-
doings.
The key questions in both areas are command and
control. Are Agency procedures adequate to provide
internal command and control? Is the authority of the
President, the NSC, and the Congress adequate to provide
external command and control over the intelligence
community's activities? How and how much should the
Congressional role be strengthened?
The Committee believes that its mandate overrides
any statutory responsibility of the DCI to protect the
following:
1. sensitive sources and methods
2. names of cooperating U.S. citizens
3. names of cooperating U.S. companies
Despite lengthy negotiations on procedures and
specific issues, the committee staff persists in its
requests for unrestricted access to raw files on numerous
subjects.
The SSC is unable to accept the fact that the Third
Agency rule is binding on CIA. Given their interest in
command and control, they feel frustrated in their efforts
to gain access to the Agency's involvement with other
departments and agencies, especially the White House and
the 40 committee. They consider our inability to respond
as obstructionism and delay.
Despite a basic agreement on access under controlled
conditions, the committee staff presures daily to expand
access by increasing the number of designated staff members.
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The deadlines imposed by the staff are generally
unrealistic, especially in demanding rapid declassification
for open hearings.
The shot gun approach of asking for "any and all
files" on broad subjects persists despite firm under-
standings to the contrary. The Agency continues to
request that the staff refine its requests, arguing "if
you'll tell us where you're going, we'll help you get
there." The dilemma is that either the Agency grants
unrestricted access. or has to undertake extensive sani-
tization of files.
Staff members divide up into two categories; those
who are conducting the "serious"inquiry" and those who
are conducting a "prosecutorial investigation." Demands
from both areas impose an enormous workload; yet it is
hard to believe that the staff can absorb what it has
already received, especially in view of their self-imposed
deadlines. Nevertheless, as they approach what they call
the-"'final phase" of their inquiries, their requests are
still broadening, and new subjects arise almost daily.
In short, they want unrestricted access to all files in
the Agency when they are not able to manage what they have
already have, given the time-frame they are working on.
(See Horrocks article in the 1.0 October New York Times)
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General 1. Thusfar, the investigations have pointed
toward providing basis for legislation to restrict
intelligence activities in questionable areas but
not to provide basis for legislation concerning the
organization and management of the Intelligence
Community.
a. The select committees have under-
standably focused attention on allegations
of past misconduct, but this has thusfar
been at the expense of an intensive examination
of the structure and functioning of the Intelli-
igence Community..
b. There has been little indication of
committee interest on means of capitalizing
on the existing strengths of the U.S. intelli-
gence organizations in order to improve future
capabilities as well as to eliminate questionable
activities.
W. 2. The scope of the mandates of the. select committees
is not commensurate with the time limits set for completion
of the investigations - which poses the. risk that
legislation of far-reaching significance may be proposed
without sufficient consideration of the impact of such
,statutes on the future functioning of intelligence
areas - such as the activities of the National Security
Agency - which the Intelligence Community is convinced
must be treated only on a highly classified basis.
4. Markedly different viewpoints -exist between the
Intelligence Community and the committees- particularly
the House Select Committee--as-to the extent to which
the protection of sensitive sources and methods justifies
deletions from materials provided to-the committees.
5. There is no assurance.,as to the ultimate disposition
of classified materials provided to the committees, or of
classified transcripts of committee interviews and
hearings.
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