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October 28, 1975
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Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000400050090-7 S 18699 O:cti9ber 28, 1975 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE t t#lo~~ of the city ought to be written down goyernmen jig committee had, by then, neither received itself felt. About 25% of the spartmen an e protec on The Chile leaks reveal another in- buildings are already In arrears on their rest ff"M es s. And, the committee teresting story. On September 2, 1975, a ' estate taxes. About 90 of the city s 125 su third New York Times article on Chile eidized Mitchell-Lama projects for middle income residents are in various stages of de- ma .,~. appeared. If one reads the first two Chile fault on their mortgages: A rent strike at the espi a these precautions, there have articles carefully, as the select committee huge Coop City development, backed by many been leaks. None, to my knowledge, in- did, and then looks at the third article, it members of the city government; is the prin- jurious to our national security, but leaks is curious that these articles take on dif- cipal reason th'e' Housing Finance nevertheless. When leaks have occurred, fering interpretations of essentially the Agency is in financial jeopardy. The outright many have concluded that they came same facts. There is, quite simply, a dis- abandonment of a ments runs at about 40,000 housing unit year, or the equiva- from the committee. The record does not pute in the articles over what was and lent of the entire housing stock In many justify this conclusion. Leaks can come was not authorized back in the fall of smaller cities now asked to guarantee New from many sources, as well as for many 1970. The first two articles interpret the York's debt. motives. Many of the lea 11 s during thy- authorization question in a light most rrniess rent control?Is repealed, this hemor- course of -tTfM" ommftte s investigation favorable to the Nixon White House, the rhago will not only continue but accelerate. e o rom me c t third article favored the CIA. There is The city is devouring its own tax base just . f - an old metaphor about ships passing in at the moment t`ls asking the rest of the ci y, the night; I would like to revise that in nation to co-sign notes that base is supposed to pay off. Making the end of rent control rh i"AliqR 08 @;Q avid ~heFIBE 3104, light of these leaks to state that we may federal action armuuiI5 IT no determine have a case here of "bureaucracies f an o ndit y n o i the very first co is not a matter of ideology, but a matter of the specific source of leaks or the motives clashing in the night.', simple prudence. for them. Despite this fact, I would like NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- to mention exmples of leaks from sources Recently the committee has been look- pore. The time of the Senator from Ala- which clearly are not committee-related. ing into the super-secret National Secur- bama has expired. ASSASSINATION ity Agency. The committee has been at- Under the previous order, the Sen- During the course of the committee's tempting to decide how most prudently ator from Colorado (Mr. GARY HART) is assassination inquiry, a number of key to disclose the information we have recognized for not to exceed 15 minutes. witnesses have gone straight to the press gathered. with their stories, either prior to or fol- Throughout its investigation of the th f LEAKS AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY Mr. GARY HART. Mr. President, al- most 10 months ago, on January 27, 1975, the Senate Select Committee on Intel- ti me, ligence wasestablished. At that few questioned the need for a full review of and inquiry Into the U.S. intelligence community, although many doubted the ability of Congress to conduct such an inquiry in a responsible manner. Some predicted` that the committee would be- come asteve for State secrets. Others even chi ed that such an inquiry would hamper, 11 hot destroy, the effectiveness of our intelligence agencies. Only a few weeks tlgo,the Secretary of Defense charged that leaks from congressional committees investigating the CIA had "dramatically reduced" the Agency's effectiveness. Although the Secretary did not specify 'what leaks he was referring to, his Ol arge was directly related to the question gf Congress ability to conduct such a sensitive investigation. As me#1-ber of the select committee, I am particularly disturbed by these charges. fn the past, Congress has failed to provfde adequate oversight of the CIA and other intelligence agencies, and Con- gress Il1tl t now demonstrate its ability to conductea thorough and complete in- quiry,and do so in a responsible manner. gels o. nn , e a sieve. No Ieaks O At the outset of the committee's in- quiry, elaborate precautions were taken to prevent leaks. Tough committee rules, tas well, ash security restrictions, were ore lowing their appearance be e com- NSA, the committee has been most sen- mittee. The first example of 'this was sitive to charges that the disclosure of Richard Goodwin, a former Kennedy any information on the NSA would be White House aide. Mr. Goodwin was a harmful to U.S. national security inter- key witness in the committee's inquiry ests. In fact, the select committee has into the Trujillo assassination. Mr. delayed hearings on NSA for just that Goodwin appeared before the committee reason. on July 10 and 18. On July 19, the Wash- Nevertheless, numerous articles have ington Post reported essentially all Mr. appeared in recent days dealing with the Goodwin told the committee in executive and discussing many of the same session. Who was the source of the leak? NSA None other than Mr. Goodwin himselftopics that his committee wanted to ex- . o The committee has also been looking toorp fully inclosed se before ,on n into the assassination of former Congo October 1public hears, an an a F For rn o eappeared in leader Patrice Lumumba. A key witness f O New Y Yorrk k Times stati o In this case was Richard Bissell, former o receiv app tha earer two Deputy Director for plans of the CIA. reports from de Pre had received private I attended a closed session with Mr. Bis- Americ ans m were S d doing and what sayinn g abroad. . abroa sell to discuss his knowledge of this case The article cited "present and d s - and the next day I read a carefully se- Gov An lected revision of that testimony in the otrher, mor mere re en t, a as s sources. . Ant newspaper. The source? Richard Bissell. e recent "inforormmP p- articl icle, this time citing g nfed in- CHILE telligent community sources," discussed For several months now the commit- tee has been looking into covert opera- tions conducted by the CIA in Chile as well as into a specific case which in- volved the killing of a Chilean general, Rene Schneider. During the most intense period of investigation into the Schneider killing, two articles appeared in the New York Times discussing this case. The first article, on July 23, contained sev- eral references to material that had come to the committee's attention. One could not identify where the leak originated, for the article referred to second article on Chile, which appeared In the New York Times 4 days later, helped to clear up this mystery. The ar- ticle referred to a memorandum pre- pared by Richard Helms in the fall of 1970 on CIA activities in Chile. It re= ferred to the Schneider incident. Al- though not pinpointing the person re- sponsible for leaking this ma'terial, the tb f~si doubt-the select committee was not the JlV1?{"-~ui~-o-r~- the NSA's interception of conversations of Jane Fonda, Benjamin Spock, and other leading antiwar figures in 1969 and 1970. These same "informed in- telligence community sources" disclosed that these conversations were intercep- ted by NSA from overseas cable traffic. The article went on to reveal the code designations used for the intercept of these communications. The article was replete with references to "intelligence community" sources and, unless the se- lect committee has become a part of the intelligence community, one must point the finger elsewhere for these leaks. It is also interesting to note that a few days after the committee's last ex- ecutive session on NSA, at which it de- cided to postpone temporarily public hearings, an article appeared in the Washington Post, which revealed, among other things, that NSA's advanced tech- nology had made it possible to scan thou- sands of telephone conversations, cables, and other wire and radio commmunica- tions, and select those with valuable na- Approved For Release 2002/01/10 CIA-RDP77M00144R000400050090-7 SSA S 18700 Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000400050090-7 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE October 28, 1975 tional security data. The article went on to say that the NSA has a "Watch List" of names including numerous leaders of the American antiwar movement. The source for this article? None other than "highly placed administration sources." One further example of an NSA leak is worth noting. In an October 11 Los Angeles Times article, a "former high- ranking member of the U.S. intelligence community" told the Times that NSA has "an amazing capability"-beyond that of most other nations. According to this official and "another source involved in the system," the NSA gave the FBI secret data, purportedly for domestic se- curity reasons. Also, the article stated that "according to knowledgeable offi- cials" the NSA monitored millions of overseas phone calls as well as those within foreign countries as part of its code-breaking and foreign Intelligence- gathering operations. Ironically, this same article noted that the select com- mittee had abruptly postponed its hear- ings on this topic to honor the admin- istration's request tha the matter be further explored before public disclo- sure. MAIL OPENINGS On August 5, 1975, there appeared an article in the New York Times which stated that agents of the FBI opened and photographed foreign and domestic mail at several U.S. cities beginning in 1958, and continuing possibly until 1970. The source for this article was at- tributed to someone "with direct knowl- edge of the secret operation." Since neither members of the committee nor staff have ever participated in opening and photographing mail, it is obvious that no one connected with the com- mittee could have "direct knowledge of the secret operation." The article went on to state that the source's account and the FBI's unusual confirmation of part of his account represented the first dis- closure that, like the CIA, the FBI also participated in the opening and photo- graphing of parcels and letters it be- lieved to be of some intelligence value. FBI BLA^K BAG JOBS On July 28, 1975, Newsweek magazine contained an article entitled "The FBI's 'Black Bag Boys' " which referred to FBI Director Clarence Kelley's confirmation that the FBI had, in the past, made "sur- reptitious entries" into various places, foreign embassies included, to obtain what if felt to be impor L Brit information. The Newsweek article went on to say that "most intriguingly, the Director's disclosure also set `other tongues wag- :ging.' " The "other toripucs wagging" included former FBI agents, as well as Justice Department officials. One Justice Department official, according to News- week, even disclosed the number of black bag jobs conducted by the F13I as well as the targets of these operations. SIIELLIISH TOXIN Back in September the select commit- postpone the hearings for a week in order been done b the cQ mitt.~p n,tbe Lo be more fully prepared. In the mean- aam ni don or agency sources them- t;ime, however, an article appeared in the Washington Post, quoting "informed he committee has a very important sources," which leaked many of the de- job to do. It is performing Its constitu- tails of this case which were to be dis- tional duty. The commit tee has attempt- closed by the committee. On the same- ed to demonstrate that it is not a sieve. day. there was a similar article in the New York Times. It is interesting to note that "adrnin- istration 'sources," if not directly re- s ponsible for the leak itself, responded very quickly to it. The Washington Post article stated that "administration sources acknowledged that the bacterio- logical material should have been de- stroyed but added that the substances wound up at Fort Detrick without, any clear understanding that they ere deadly or even dangerous." Clearly these "administration sources" were attempt- ing to shed the best light on a rather bad story. The purpose of this leak, of course, was to attempt to pre-empt the committee's hearings. Mr. President, far be it for any Mem- ber of Congress to cast the first stone v'hen it comes to talking with the press. Attempting to deny that one is a source of a newspaper leak is about as easy as responding to the question of "when did Sou stop beating your wifa?" However, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has done an excellent job in this respect. It has stayed behind closed doors--and out of the press-when necessary, and issued public statements when appropriate. Despite this fact. leaks have occurred and there are at least two motives. First, 'highly placed administration sources," "authoritative Government sources," and "intelligence community sources," are leaking to protect their own bureaucratic and political interests. These sources want to get their side of the story in print first, hopefully in the most favor- able light. Becond, these leaks are a conscious attempt to preempt the pub- lic disclosures of this committee. If there is one disease endemic to offi- i' al Washington, it is hypocrisy. Hypoc- r sy is saying one thing and doing an- other. It is fashionable in Washington oday to suggest possible misconduct by nihers, then, under the cover of that >nokescreen, carry out such misconduct oneself. The record strongly supports a i:,)nclusion that such activities are going on here. This sort of hypocrisy threatens to d,:,stroy even further the public's con- fidence in Government, The obvious ex- amples of leaking cited here further un- ii~rmines the credibility of our instilu- tions and actions. It is time that we re- ect the games Washington plays. ":highly placed administration sources," cabinet officers, and agency officials ',hould either exercise self-restraint or ,.13p criticizing, hypocritically, the Sen- officers to destroy deadly toxins in spite trs, t on. Never a ess; It has attempted to be leak-proof. We would appreciate equall;' responsible ac- tion from witnesses who appear before the committee, "autho~itative Govern- ment sources," "intelligence community sources," and all "informed sources" whoever they may be. Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- sent that newspaper articles document- ing this statement be printed in the RECORD at this point. There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be print- d in the RECORD, as follows: [From The Washington Pst. Aug. 3, 19751 SCIILESTNGEE SAYS I,F.A KS Cosa CIA (By Stan Creek) Secretary or Defense Jar,ies R. Schlesinger said leaks from congress oval committees investigating the Central l ;telligence Agency have "dramatically reduced" the agency's sources of information. Asked by Sen. James L. I'.uckley (Cons.-It.- N.Y.) during a taped television interview set up by Buckley's office whether there is reason to fear that the leaks will under- cut the willingness of forei#?a governments to work with the United StatC,, Schlesinger re- plied, "I think we have 1 tore than reason to fear. "I think that werecognit-:, that the sources of information coming into the CIA have been dramatically reducer= in both liaison relationships and in relatican to the willing- ness of foreigners to work with our intelli- gence people." Schlesinger, a former C',% director, called the problems "the inevital;:e effect of these kinds of revelations." In the interview made public yesterday, which is to be released to M ,w York television stations this week, Schlesinger rejected the argument that information from intelligence sources is not needed because photographs that U.S. satellites take ar_ sufficient. Such an argument is ";a dramatic oier- simplification," he said- "Photographs, of course, can provide you with indications with resp ct to the gro~vt:h of certain types of capabilities, but one must recognize that nobody has ever been able to photograph intentions," he said. Because of the limitations of photographs, "all the elements of the in,.'lligence commu- nity must be effective if tl e U.S. is to Save eyes and ears in what continues to be a r:,la- tively dangerous world," lie aid. He told Buckley he believes the world is "more dangerous than it wi+ a year ago," cit- ing "growing priblems" fron one end of ,he Mediterranean to the cthc: Lnd the aftcr- niath of the "American deb tale in Southeast Asia." Reducing defense spendfi: and increaci;ig money spent on public wori;s would augment instead of solve the uneriployment pr-'h- 1em, Schlesinger said. Schlesinger said those wrta favor such a reduction "tend to forget t)e most valuaole of social welfare services tl at a society can provide for its citizens is tt keep them alive and free." Schlesinger also said NATO members in Europe face a greater morale problem than the United States, but denied that they are not shouldering their militai v burden. With 2.5 million men under arms, the NATO allies far outnuml,er the 300,000 Americans in Europe, he af!id. These coun- Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000400050090-7 Approved For Release 2002/01/10: CIA-RDP77M pp1 q48000400050090-7 October 28, 1 975 CIONGRESSIONAL RECORD_ SENATE S18701 tries "cannot individually and at the present eral guns to certain Dominican dissidents wards immediately brief Attorney General time `ciollectively stand up against the Soviet who were later involved in the Trujillo as- Robert F. Kennedy about the contacts. I1ous- Uniop without the backbone that is repre- sassination. ton said he doubted Edwards had acted alone sented by another superpower," he said. Three .38-caliber revolvers and three car- in arranging the contacts. bines with accompanying ammunition, it Bissell said arrangements with the Mafia [From the Washington Star, Aug. 3, 19751 was confirmed by other sources, were handed were handled by Edwards' office through over to the dissident group. Robert A. Maheu. Hr,L. LEglcs a fglqaT ence Iam H. ESchlesi , ,The special group had approved the trans- Maheu, a former top aide to industrialist xetarsv of Defense'James es H. Schlesinger fer only on the condition that it take place Howard Hughes, gave his first closed door 6ai ),esteiday fyieeCIA's sources of informs- outside the Dominican Republic-with the testimony to Senate CIA investigators yester- tiorlbroad" "have been dramatically re- understanding that the underground rebels day after being granted immunity from al Investigating ' as a result of leaks from congression- would have to smuggle the guns into the prosecution earlier this month. Maheu has at investigating committees. country themselves. said he will meet with reporters today if he Schlesinger, who formerly headed the CIA, The CIA, however, sent them straight to completes his testimony. was asked by Sen. James Buckley, R-N.Y., in Ciudad Trujillo (now Santo Domingo) in a Bissell said Edwards had arranged the diplomatic pouch, Goodwin declared. The highly secret cooperation with underworld a recorded television *interview whether "we have, n gve to fear rnments to that work the with us is s b willingness ein of guns were turned over to the dissidents with figures Sam Gianeana and Johnny Rosselli, form goove bg the help of Henry Dearborn, the U.S. consul but that Bissell--outranking Edwards-also undercut'" because of CIA secrets made pub- general there. approved it. Trujillo had a very tight grip on the coun- Bissell said the Mafia work was not under ,1 tlIink we havel more than reason to try, another source said, and the rebels were his personal direction, however. tear,m'' Schl that we recied. unable to work out their own method of get- "In everything related to this matter, I be- I;thirik that we recognize that the sources ting the guns in. liever Edwards reported directly to Dulles- of information coming into the CIA have Alluding to the documents he saw as a with my knowledge and concurrence," Bissell been dramatically reduced In both liaison White House aide, Goodwin said the revolv- said. i n relationships and In relation to the willing- ers and carbines were depicted by the CIA as Bissell said these arrangements began warning months of the Eisenhower ad- ...,,..,. ..,rev, .,,,.? in _ _____ th f is inistration as plans were also being ma e ectgene; peo Ie and that an inevitable effect sidents "attendant to their projected efforts in es er dlstillssed as "a dramatic over- ~g According ng to evidence now in the hands of land. These plans ended in the disastrous eimplcation" the nation that the only kind the Senate Intelligence Committee, the CIA Bay of Pigs Invasion In April. 1961, in the of ip;teff ' e.nce the United States needs is also sent four .45-caliber submachine guns early days of the Kennedy administration. that whi is provided by spy satellites. and some grenades to the Dominican Repub- Rosselli has reportedly told Senate In- ,Llllo gI'apps, of, course; can provide you lic apparently In another diplomatic pouch. vestigators that he helped plan or direct Witl} tions ith respect to the growth The CIA informed the White House on May about six attempts on Castro's life in the of certwin tain types of capabilities, but one must 13, 1961, that these, too, could be provided early 19605. recognize that nobody has ever been able to to the anti-Trujillo group "for their use in Bissell, when asked how cooperation with photo "h~ gnly away wen are ever able to get at personal defense" if authorization were the Mafia arose, said: "I think the history granted. is very uncertain as to whose original idea that, , there ire aalere Goodwin said he vetoed the suggestion, at it was." gerlde, ao riicl ' fs in through addition to normal human eace' Mr. Kennedy's instructions, in the same late Gianeana or other Mafia members might various m tical parameters that one can have suggested It themselves, he said, be- May cablegram to Dearborn. nail' learn though photographs. Dearborn, now retired, declined to corn- cause "they did have very large Interests in T1 rld Is in chief said da athat, in nge gerou fs his state opinion, than ment. However, he worked cl^sely with both Cuba that were totally celipsed or destroyed the world is a more pro-U.S. dissidents and the CIA at the time. by Castro." It was a year ago. "I believe the record shows that they "From one end of the Mediterranean to Dearborn, it was learned, doubled as the can worked without pay (for the CIA) for the CIA's unofficial station chief in the Domini- the ot2 prcid of the Mediterranean there are can Republic for several months In 1960, most part," he said. growing problems," he said. Other government sources have said the when the United States withdrew its diplo- Mafia watned to remove Castro from power []?'rom the Boston Globe, July 19, 19751 made recognition of the country, and called to reopen lucrative gambling operations in back many of its employees, including CIA JFK RULED OUT U.S. ROLE IN IRIIJILLO DEATH, Havana that Castro had closed down. personnel. AIDE &itys There is no evidence that the carbines or Bissell, a top planner of the Bay of Pigs (By George Lardner, Jr.) the revolvers were used when Trujillo was invasion, left the CIA In February, 1961, dur- WASHINGTON.-President Kennedy per- gunned down on May 30, 1961, Goodwin said, ing a Kennedy administration shakeup of the agency sonally siruled out RaUS. fael Involvement in the but he maintained that the machine guns the Mafia work continued, although others assassination of Rafael Trujillo shortly be- were sought for fpe that purpose. "They weren't have said Rosselli's anti-Castro plans contin- tore the Dominican dictator was killed in intended for personal defense," he declared. u.ed until 1963. May 1961,_ according to a former Kennedy Another source maintained that the CIA has told Sen- knew Bissell sell has plans White louse aide. guns, were all sought simply as a token to It ate Investigators was wan learned that $ichard Goodwin, who was Mr. Kennedy's satisfy the skeptics 'among them that the ate n made when he approved in the Mafia principal advisor on Latin American affairs, United States supported their efforts to over- cooperation, but when heed pro Mafia M could the said the President not only disapproved of throw Trujillo. plans. U.S. participation in the scheme, but in- ever er execute he such had dlad clear recollection or settee a strong warning against such involve- [From The Washington Post, July 10, 1975] hard He no evidence" that the White House or At- ment in a May 1981 cable to the U.S. consul CIA-MAFIA Lrwxs CONrIRMED torney General Kennedy knew about any as- general in the Dominican Republic. (By Robert L. Jackson) sassination plans. "He said, 'Look, if Trujillo goes, he goes, A former chief of clandestine services for ive but why are pushing"' that? Goodwin M. the Central Intelligence Agency said yester- [From the Washington Post, Sept. 12, 19751 recalled of a conversation on he had with th Mr. day he personally approved CIA cooperation LT7MUMBA DEATH PLAN TOLD fi . b.e I at the time. with Mafia figures who wanted to assassinate The Central Intelligence Agency in 1960 Goodwinn the added, laid down In Cuban Premier Fidel Castro in 1960. the e cable, Goodwin stated that the explored ways to poison Congolese leader Pa- "U.S., as a matter of general policy, cannot Richard M. Bissell, the ex-CTA official, acid trice Lumumba, a former head of the agen- condone assassination.". in an interview that he also believed the cy's clandestine operations said yesterday. Then an assistant special coune l to the late Allen W. Dulles, then director of the In an interview, Richard M. Bisset said, President, Goodwin said he was speaking up CIA. received regular reports on the Mafia "There was an occasion when the feasibility publicly?now to refute suggestions' that John connection. of an action of that kind was investi'ated." F. Kennedy, who was sworn in as President Bissell's statements marked the first time but he added that he personally decided not on. Jap. 21, 1951, may have known and even a former member of the CIA hierarchy had to implement the plans "for various opera- approved of CIA complicity in efforts to kill acknowledged responsibility for the unusual tional reasons." foreign leaders. cooperation in the early 1960s between the Then-CIA director Allen Dulles was aware Evidence Goodwin cited suggested, Instead, underworld and U.S. Intelligence planners of the planning effort, Bissell said, but thak high officials of the Eisenhower Admin- Lawrence R. Houston, former CIA general said he did not know whether anyone out- istration had encouraged such undertakings. counsel, told reporters last week that he first side the agency was informed. In an,lnterview. Goodwin said for example, learned about the CIA-Mafia links in April, "To the best of my knowledge and belief" that on Jan. 12, 1961, while Eisenhower was 1962, from the late Col. Shefleld Edwards, the CIA had nothing to do with Lumumba's still President, the White House's so-called then the agency's director of security. death in early 1961, Bissell said. special group in charge of covert CIA opera- Houston said he never authorized these "The particular operation that was looked tions authorized the CIA to turn over'sev- arrangements and insisted that he and Ed- into was aborted for reasons'which did not Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000400050090-7 S 18702 Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000400050090-7 CON rRESSIONAL .RECORD - SENATE October 28, 1975 have anything to do with events in the Congo," Bissell said. "There was a decision within the agency not to carry the operation beyond the feasibility stage." Bissell, who left the agency in the wake of the Bay of Pigs fiasco, said he could not recall any of the' operational details of the plan. He said he could not identify what kind of poison was to be used or even "wheth- er It was lethal or incapacitating." He specifically refused to make, any con- nection between plans to poison Lumumba and the cache of deadly poisons recently dis- covered at a CIA laboratory. According to Bissell, the planning effort would have consisted, among other things, of development of a suitable poison by the agency's Technical Services Division and in- vestigation by agents in the field of whether it was possible to administer the poison to Lumumba. (From the Los Angeles Times, May 31, 19751 CASTRO REMOVAL PLAN--EX-GENliRAL CITES KENNEDY ORDERS WASHINGTON.-Retired Maj. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale said Friday that, acting on or- ders from President John F. Kennedy de- livered through an intermediary, he devel- oped plans for removing Cuban Premier Fidel Castro by any means including assassination. "I just wanted to see if the United States had any such capabilities," the former Air Force officer and expert on counterinsur- gency tactics said. In a telephone interview, Lansdale stressed that his planning effort In- cluded other means, such as a coup, for removing Castro from power. Asked if any attempts against Castro's life were made as a result of his project. Lans- dale said, "Certainly nothing I ever heard about. Nothing was ever initiated on it as far as I know." However, a source familiar with the tenta- tive findings of the Rockefeller commission oil the Central Intelligence Agency said he had been told that some subsequent assas- sination efforts were undertaken. Although Lansdale avoided using the word "assassination," he twice replied in the af- firmative to the specific question of whether assassination was one of the means he con- sidered. "I was working for the highest authority in the land," Lansdale said of the report. Asked to be more specific, Lansdale replied, "It was the President." Lansdale said he did not deal directly with President Kennedy on the project but worked through an intermediary. Asked if the Inter- mediary was McGeorge Bundy, then Presi- dent Kennedy's assistant for national secu- rity affairs, Lansdale replied, "No it was some- one much more intimate." He refused to provide the Intermediary name for the record. Lansdale said he was assigned to the proj- ect In 1962 when the U.S, first received in- telligence that Castro was prepared to In- stall Soviet-made nuclear missiles In Cuba. "It was something that was very closely held then and still is," Lansdale said. Last week, the Associated Press identified Lansdale as the author of an August, 1962, memo, now in the possession of the Rocke- feller commission, that authorative sources said provided the CIA with authority to develop contingency plans for the assassina- tion of Castro. Lansdale maintained, as he had last week, that he did not remember the memo, but he acknowledged that It would not have been "Incompatible" with his as- signed task. "I didn't know what all the potentials were," Lansdale said, "the feasibilities, the practicalities of doing something like that." In response to a question, Lansdale con- firmed that the phrase "something like that" included the possibility of assassination. In previous interviews, Lansdale had re- fused to discuss his role in the anti-Cuban operations that informed sources have said were directed by a special Cabinet-level group headed by then Atty. Gen. Robert F. Kennedy and titled operation Mongoose. Other members of the group included Bundy, CIA director John A. McCone, Sec- ri tart' of Defense Robert S. McNamara and 1'+eretary of State Dean Rusk. The Rockefel- ler commission reportedly has obtained the minutes of, an Aug. 10, 1962, meeting of this g oup, the official title of which was Spe- cs al Group (Augmented), that indicate that lie subject of assassination was discussed. The minutes show that Robert Kennedy was not present, sources have said. Although Lansdale is officially listed as an :vrsistant to the secretary of defense In Au- c st, 1962, McNamara objected to the de- scription of Lansdale as a McNamara assis- tint. "I had no personal knowledge of what II, ? was doing," McNamara said. From The New York Times July 23, 19751 `71 NIxox ORDER TO C.I.A. To BALK ALLENDE REPORTED-P:CESIDENT'S AUTHORIZATION TERMED CAUSE OF AGENCY'S ROLE IN MrLr- TARY PLOTS To THWART MARXIST'S ELECTION (By Nicholas M. Horrock) WASHINGTON,. July 23.-Preident Richard M Nixon authorized the Central Intelligence A,r:ency to make, a last-ditch, all-out effort to September, 1970, to keep Salvador Allende t'-ssens from becoming President of Chile, ni thoritative Government sources said today. is a result of the assignment, the sources ad, the C.I.A. became involved in the plan- )lag of two military coups d'etate-planning that included proposals to kidnap Gen. Rene :c hneider, Chief of Staff of the Chilean A1my. Theoretically, the kidnapping of General Schneider would have given the Chilean mil- it;.ry a justification for declaring martial law sod assuming the powers of government. The sources said that the C.I.A. tried later to stop the carrying out of one plan, but that It, went forward nevertheless and General Sc ineider was killed by Chilean military platters in the kidnap attempt. n the other plot, the agency was said to I'are supplied insurgents with three machine gu as and with tear-gas grenades. When it was i' ii cerned that the plot could not get broad po,itical support it was halted and the guns vrere later returned to the C.I.A. unused th. sources said. ?Ienry A. Kissinger, thou President Nixon's ass istant for national security affairs, was br efed about the first plot on Oct. 12, 1970, by Thomas J. Karamessines, then chief of overt operations for the intelligence agency, tit-, sources said. Mr. Karamessines reportedly told Mr. Kissinger the plot had little chance of success and It was at that point the two aq? eed it should be halted. fir. Kissinger has told President Ford of t:is plot, Administration sources said, but ha said he did not know that the C.I.A. was nrs,,otiating with yet another group. Intel- lig nce sources said, however, that agency 016Mals felt Mi. Nixon's orders to block Mr. AU mds, each were strongly worded, con- s`l'uted a blanket authorization for their ariivities. CONTRADICTIONS INVESTIGATED iteports in The New York Times last fall iriaicated that the C.I.A. was involved in ef- for is to stop Mr. Allende from assuming the Pix sidency: But In these accounts and In sus ~sequent Congressional hearings the ef- forks appeared to be limited to the secret fi- nas icing of opposition parties and labor unions. The latest disclosures are the first col firmatfon that President Nixon and the C.I A. contemplated military coups or the vio;.ent take-over of the Chilean Government. The new information, with copies of Con- gressional testimony in 1973 by Richard M. Helms, then Director of Central Intelligence, hay a been forwarded to the Department of Justice for study on the contradic- tions may constitute penury, the sources confirmed. Mr. Helms testified on C;ille before a Sen- ate committee as early as May, 1973, and later a connection with his confirmation as United States Ambassador to Iran- He also testified at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on Chile earlier this year. There are contradictions in his testimony' Oder the depth and extent of C.I.A. activities against Mr. Allende. HISSINGER'S TESTIMONY SOUGHT Meanwhile, Senator Frank Church, chair- man of the Senate Select committee on In- telligence announced today that the commit- tee would call Mr. Kissinger to testify on the "line of authority implem=.,nttng the Nixon policy toward' Chile." The Idahoe Democrat said that Mr. Kissinger could offer insight into the extent of the knowledge and con- trol" exercised by the policy-makers. The announcement brought a sharp reac- tion from Roderick Hills, a counsel to Presi- dent Ford. He said the request for Mr. Kis- singer's testimony was abrupt" and was not handled with the same courtesy he knew the committee had extended to other witnesses. The committee, Mr. Hill:: said, had made no attempt to send out what Mr. Kissinger could really add on the question. He said, however, that his action should not "in any way" indicate that Mr. Kissinger would at- tempt to avoid fortifying. Government sources and sources within the intelligence community gave this report on the fast-paced events of the fall of 1970: On Sept. 15, 1970, 11 days after Mr. Allende a Marxist, had won the presidential elections by a plurality, President Nixon called a secret meeting at the White House. It was attended by Mr. Kissinger, Mr. Helms and John Mitchell, then Attorney General. The meeting was unusual because it was out of the normal channels of transmitting instructions to the C.I.A. Under the law and in practice CIA covert operations are passed on by the 40 Committee, a top level White House security group, and transmitted through the national Security Council. It is unclear whether the matter ever reached the agenda of the committee. Mr. Nixon was, one source said, "ex- tremelytanxious" about Mr. Allende's rise to power In Chile. Another source said the former President was "franu.ic." He told Mr. Helms in "strong language" that the CIA Was not doing enough in the situation and it had better "come up with some ideas." He said that money was no object and au- thorized an initial expenditure of $10-million to unseat the Chilean Marxist. CIA's EFFORTS REDO USLED Notes on the meeting, however, do not indicate that Mr. Nixon ever specifically or- dered the CIA to arrange a coup d'etat in Chile. But the "tone" of tote meeting, one source said, was "do everything you can." The agency redoubled its efforts. Mr. Kara- messines, deputy director of plans at CIA and thus the chief covert operator went to Chile himself, one source said. On Oct. 13, 1970, Mr. Kara messines briefed Mr. Kissinger on the CIA's ;,rogress. He told Mr. Kissinger ?that Brig. Gen Roberto Vlaux, who had recently retired from the Chilean Army, was plotting to t idnap General Schneider as the prelude to I, military take- over. Mr. Karamessines said. however, that it was the opinion of the CTA that General Viaux's project could not sricceed. Mr. Kis- singer told the CIA to "keep the pressure up" and keep the CIA's "assets" in Chile up to par, but agreed that this plan should not go forward. He told the agency to try to halt General Viauxs plot. These sources said that CIA cable traffic, copies of which =,re in the hands of the Senate Select Commt ttee on Intelli- Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000400050090-7 Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000400050090-7 October 28, 1975 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE geilce,' indicate that the CIA did make an efloOi to halt the plan. Nevertheless, General Viaux's plot went forward. On October 22, 48 hours tefore the Chilean Congress was seheduled to vote on M. I ller}de's eleetTori-the fact that he had 114t N'on 4iiajority threw the decision into CQllc~'ess-anWtempt was made to kidnap General Schneider. When it appeared the general was going to resist, these sources said he was killed by three .45 caliber bul- lets, according to Chilean press accounts. However, between the Oct. 13 meeting and the killing of General Schneide on Oct. 22, these souces said, the C.I.A. was negotiating with a completely separate group of plotters. A group of military officers under Gen. Ca- milo Valenzuela, then commander of the Santiago army garrison; was also planning to kidnap General Schneider to pave the way for a military take-over. The C.T.A. these. sources said, at first had greater confidence in General Valenzuela's plot. Accordingly, officials at the agency headquarters at Langley, Va., authorized the C.I.A. Station in Santiago to give the incur gents three machine guns and tear gas gre- nades for use in a kidnapping attempt. The authorization was Issued on Sunday, Oct. 24. But within hours the ' C.I.A. had ascer- tained that` the'Valenzuela coup not get suf- ficient political support to succeed and that Jorge Alessandri Rodriguez of the right-wing National party, the runner-up in the elec- tion, would not accept the presidency. Never- theless, apparently on the order of C.I.A. officials in Santiago, the guns and tear gas were reportedly given to the conspirators. They were later returned to the agency unt sed. After Mr. Allende had been confirmed and had assumed office, the agency secretly sent money to the families of men arrested In General Viaux's abortive plot, the sources said. The money, one source said, was paid to "keep the families quiet about the contacts with C.I.A." NIXON REPORTEb TOLD According to the sources, Mr. Kissinger told President Ford after Mr. Nixon had resigned, of the stepped-up 'effort to unseat Mr. Al- lende and about the Viaux Plot. But Mr. Kis- singer has maintained, in private conversa- tions, that he never knew about the second plot, the sources said. Mr. Kissinger has said, in these private conversations, that had the C.I.A. proposed a military coup in Chile the agency would presumably have come back to him and out- lined the plot, and the President and the 40 Committee would either have authorized or prohibited it. The 40 Committee is a special group under the National Security Council that passes on all covert operations. One source said that the 40 '"ommittee had approved an covert activities in Chile except the involvement in the,Viaux and Valenzuela affairs.. But another source said that "from the beginning it appeared the matter was be- ing handled on its own special track." Another source Said that C.I.A. officials had felt that the President's strongly worded as- signment on Sept. 15, 1970, was a "blanket authorization", to become involved in plan- ning for a military take-over. 24 $TtS;, IS CONCEDED Since the military coup in September, 1973, in which President Allende was killed, there has been a growing national inquiry into the role of Mr. Kissinger and the C.I.A. in efforts to undermine the Chilean Government. When Mr. Helms testified before the Senate Foreign. Relations Committee during hearings in 1973 on his nomination, as ambassador, he gave very scanty testimony on the Chilean matter. Earlier this year, in private testimony later made public. Mr. Helms told the Senators he had "made a mistake in his earlier testi- mony" in that he had not revealed that Presi- dent Nixon wanted President Allende's Gov- ernment overthrown. In other testimony this year, Mr. Helms said there had been a "probe" to see if there were any forces in Chile to oppo--e Dr. Al- lende's advent as President. "It was very quickly established there were not," he added, "and therefore no further effort was made along these lines to the best of my knowledge, at least I know of none." Mr. Helms returned to Teheran, where he Is Ambassador. He could not be reached by The New York Times today. [From the New York Times, July 27, 19751 HELMS LINKED TO C.I.A. MEMO FOR KISSINGER AND MITCHELL ON PLOT IN CHILE (By Nicholas M. Horrock) WASHINGTON, July 25.-Richard Helms, while director of the Central Intelligence Agency, prepared a memorandum in the fall of 1970 informing Henry Kissinger and John N. Mitchell that the agency had supplied machine guns and tear-gas grenades to men plotting to overthrow the Chilean Govern- ment authoritative Government sources said today. The memorandum may become crucial evidence as the Senate Select Committee on intelligence attempts to learn who author- ized the C.I.A. to become involved in plan- ning two military coups In Chile in October, 1970. One of the plans resulted in the death of Gene Rene Schneder Chereau, Chief of Staff of the Chilean Army. According to sources who have seen the memorandum, it was written by Mr. Helms after the plot involving the machine guns had been called off. It was in the sense, they said, of an "advisory" to the Administration of President Richard M. Nixon on C.I.A. activities. The memorandum was written to Mr. Mitchell, then Attorney General, and was to have been passed on to Mr. Kissinger, then assistant to Nixon for National security affairs. But, these sources said, there is no evi- dence that either Mr. Kissinger or Mr. Mitchell received the document. Neither Mr. Kissinger nor Mr. Mitchell could be reached for comment. But Mr. Kis- singer is reported to have told associates in private conversations that he was unaware the C.I.A. had smuggled machine guns and tear gas grenades to Chilean Insurrectionists. Mr. Kissinger has said however, that he was aware of an earlier plot to kidnap Gen- eral Schneider and spark a military coup that both he and the C.I.A. agreed to stop. The Helms memorandum was part of a col- lection of Mr. Helm's papers and files that were turned over to the Rockefeller com- mission by William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence. Although the eight- man commission, headed by Vice President Rockefeller, was concentrating on alleged domestic wrongdoing by the C.I.A. its staff did review the documents. AGENCY LINKED TO PLOTS The Rockefeller staff concluded from its review that the C.I.A. did not plot to assassi- nate anyone in Chile, but it found substan- tial evidence that the agency had become in- volved in planning a military take-over. On Thursday, The New York Times quoted authoritative Government sources as having said that on Sept. 15, 1970, President Nixon ordered the C.I.A. to make an all-out, last minute effort to keep Salvador Allende Gos- sens from becoming President of Chile. Mr. Allende won the Presidency by a plu- rality early in September and his election was to be certified by the Chilean Parliament late in October. The United States feared that he would create a hostile Marxist gov- ernment. S 18703 In this six-week period, these sources said, the C.I.A. became involved in two separate plots to seize power in Chile by military means. Both plots involved the kidnapping General Schneider, a highly respected mili- tary leader, and inducement of the army to take power. On Oct. 13, 1970, Thomas J. Iaramessines, then chief of the agency's covert operations, briefed Mr. Kissinger about its progress in Chile. He told Mr. Kissinger, these sources said, that a group of retired military officers planned to abduct General Schneider. But Mr. Karamessines warned Mr. Kissin- ger that it was the C.I.A.'s opinion that the plot could not succeed. The two agreed to try to halt it, according to the sources. They said there were copies of cablegrams in which the C.I.A. tried to head off the plan. The conspiracy went ahead, however, and General Schneider was killed on Oct: 22, 1970. Meanwhile, the sources said, the C.I.A. was conspiring with the commander of the Santi- ago garrison in a similar plot. The agency felt at one point that this endeavor had more chance of success, and authorized C.I.A. em- ployes in Chile to give the plotters three machine guns and tear-gas grenades. At the last minute, this plot also appeared to be doomed to failure, and the tear gas and guns, unused, were returned to the C.I.A. It was at this point, in the last days of October or early in November, the sources said, that Mr. Helms prepared the advisory memorandum to Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Kissinger. - Intelligence sources have said the C.Z.A. became involved in planning the coups un- der the general authorization of President Nixon on Sept. 15, 1970. However, there are no documents showing that Mr. Nixon told the C.I.A. to plan a coup, they said. Mr. Kissinger has made few public state- ments concerning the role of the C.I.A. In undermining the Allende Government. How- ever, in his 1973 Senate confirmation hear- ings as Secretary of State, Mr. Kissinger testi- fied in closed hearings: "The intent of the United States Govern- ment was not to destabilize or to subvert him [Mr. Allende[ but to keep in being those political parties that had traditionally con- tested the elections. Our concern was the election of 1976 and not at all with a coup in 1973, about which we had nothing to do with. [From the New 'York Times, Sept. 3, 19751 PENTAGON ROLE REPORTED IN '70 PLOT AGAINST ALLENDE (By Nicholas M. llorrock) WASHINGTON, Sept. 2.-The Defense De- partment ordered the United States military attache in Chile to give strong covert sup- port to an October, 1970, plan for a military coup aimed at keeping Salvador Allende Gossens out of the Chilean presidency, sources familiar with the operation reported today. According to the sources, the Defense Department sent "at least two cables" be- tween Oct. 2, 1970, urging Col. Paul Wimert, then military attache in Chile to secretly assure Chilean military officers plotting a coup that the United States would give them total support "short of troops," as one source put it. Dr. Allende led a left-wing coalition In- cluding the Chilean Communist party to an election victory in September, 1970. The election had to be confirmed by the Chilean congress because Dr. Allende lacked a ma- jority. This was done in October. Dr. Allende did not take office until November. The information on that period was gathered by the Senate Select Committees on intelligence. WIDER OPERATION SEEN Evidence submitted on the role of the Defense Department in the plotting of mili- tary coups in Chile appears to indicate that Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000400050090-7 S 18704 Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000400050090-7 CON 1RESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE 0,19,'-or 28, 19'1'5 involvement was not limited to the Central Intelligence Agency. On July 24, 1975, The New York Times quoted intelligence sources who raid that on Sept. 15, 1970, President Nixon ordered an all-out last-minute attempt to keep Dr. Allende from becoming president of Chile. Acting on this genera! i:atraction, the sources said, the CIA learned of two plots for a military take-over in Chile, one involv- ing retired personnel and one icvolving of- ficers on active duty. One of the plots, put into effect on Oct. 22, resulted in the death or Gen. Rend Schneider, chief of the Chilean General Staff. Secretary of State Kissinger, who has testified before the committee, has said pub- licly that he knew of no assassination plots. Privately he has reportedly acknowledged that he learned of one coup plan, but that he and CIA officials opposed it. PLOT DISCUSSED On Oct. 15, 1970, several sources said, Mr. Kissinger, then Presidential Assistant for National Security Affairs; Col. Alexander M. Haig Jr., his deputy, and Thomas J. Kara- messines, then chief of the C.I.A.'s under- cover operations, met to discuss Chile. At this meeting, the sources said, Mr. Kissinger agreed with Mr. Karamessines that one of the plots in Chile was unlikely to succeed and should not go forward. But, Senate investigators have been told, Colonel Haig and Mr. Karamessines met the next day-Oct. 16, 1970--and support for another plot in Chile was discussed. The C.I.A., these sources said, received "tacit" approval to go ahead and support this plot. Whether the approval came from Mr. Kissinger, President Nixon "or other channels" is in dispute in the testimony, several sources said. It was after the Haig-Karamessines meet- ing, however, that the Defense Department cabled Colonel Wimert his instructions. Colonel Wimert was brought before the committee last month as a "secret witness." He declined to comment today on the mat- ter. "That Is behind me now," he said. "I'm retired. I can look myself In the mirror when I shave. I don't want to get back into hat business." He advised that facts be checked very carefully. After hearing that such orders had been given Colonel Wimert, the Senate commit- tee Interviewed former officials of the De- fense Intelligence Agency, which was a con- duit for the cables sent to Colonel Wimert. "There apparently is some dispute over who signed the cables and who authorized them," a source said. It was during the critical days between Oct. 15 and Oct. 22-the Chilean Congress ,as due to make its decision on Dec. 24- that the C.I.A. authorized three machine guns and a quantity of tear gt:s grenades be given to one group of military plotters. Before the plot could be put into effect. However, another group of plotters at- tempted to kidnap General Schneider. Theoretically this would have given the military justification for declaring martial law and assuming the powers of government. The General was shot during the attempt and died a few days later. Chilean political leaders to the right of Mr. Allende then apparently declined to support any other plots. Mr. Allende assumed office the next month. Complicating the matter is that in remarks about United States Involvement In Chile In tliat period made at a news conference last fall, President Ford said the involvement was intended only to "assist the preservation of opposition newspapers and electronic media and to preserve opposition political parties." NSA FED GOSSIP TO PRESIDENTS (By Nicholas M. Hcrrock) Presidents Richard M. Nixon and Lyndon B. Johnson received private reports from the I ational Securtty Agency on what prominent Fneertcans were doing and saying abroad, apparently obtained from electronic eaves- cropping, according to present and former e over.oment officials. These sources said yes?erday the reports were not matter; of national security and cid not come to' the presidents through nor- z.lal intelligence channels. Instead, they said, they were sent directly f em NSA to the presidents and marked for "White House distribution only" to prevent t weir being circulated to other intelligence envies. The existence of this type of reporting has teen made known to both the Senate and house intelligence committees, and they are i ivestigatin';. Several sources raised the question of vhether it was a proper use of NSA facilities t) gather and make such reports. They said t: sere are also questions of improper intrusion o'i the privacy of the Americans. A spokesman for NSA said the agency had o comment. NSA officials as a matter of r utine have never made comments on s cries about the agency's operations. In one case, a source reported, the NSA dispatch informed Johnson that a group of Texas businessmen involved in private nego- t>ations in the Middle East had claimed a p- rivate relationship with him to improve tieir bargaining position. Another source said Johnson received de- tails about Sen. Robert F. Kennedy's personal activities and nightlife in Paris from intel- gence sources. He could not confirm that tree material came from NSA. Nixon received similar reports, particularly a i businessmen, a third source said. There is no indication that the practice as exclusive to either Nixon or Johnson, but 1 he New York: Times was unable to confirm i stances in any other administration. A senior aide to President Ford said pri- v etely that he believed Ford "would not I ilerate this practice," and that to his knowl- e ige no such reports had been delivered. The sources familiar with the private re- r:)rts said they appeared to be "unsolicited" = id were "gossipy" in nature. One account of testimony by NSA officials a a closed session of the House intelligence c immittee several weeks ago indicated the a ;envy picked up information of what Ameri- ins might privately say to foreign govern- r tents by eavesdropping on the communica- t ens of those governments and their em- t issies in Washington. But other sources said NSA ability to gather is iformation on the movement of prominent Fmerican business and professional leaders aoroad can he far more direct. NSA monitors v:rtually all foreign cable traffic and many osinesses send enormous amounts of top- !' vel information by cable, these sources said. Prom the Washington Post, Oct. 13, 19751 MESSAGES Or ACTIVISTS INTERCEPTED (By .Bob Woodward) The National Security Agency intercepted conversations of Jane Fonda, Dr. Benjamin 'pock and other leading antiwar figures in 1369 and 1970, according to informed intel- ligence community sources. The communications were intercepted by tie NSA from overseas cable traffic, some do- n estic telegrams and long-distance tele- gdone calls, the sources said. Transcripts vere then circulated to top government offi- c.als under one of the nation's most highly o?assifled and closely held code designations, they said. At least 160 messages of conversations and communications of antis' ar leaders were routed to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other official= under a special intelligence designation i?t the "Gamma" series for sensitive comp unlcations Ii: ta'r- cepts, the sources said, Special officers in the CIA, FBI and the counterintelligence unit of the Defense Intelligence Agency were designated to re- ceive and handle these m sages, according to the sources. The sources revealed tb- exact code de' g- nation In the G ,.mma series used for the intercepts of the cominu'ilcations of anti- war figures, but an intelligence official sug- gested last week that It w, ald be imprudent to make it public. The National Security A >ency used a sim- ilar designation in the C,-tmma series-the designation "Gamma Gucey"-for the com- munications it monitored from the limou- sine radio calls of Soviet union officials in Moscow. This proect was first reported in newspapers In 1971. The Gamma reef' nation? were reserved ex- elusively for intercepts of Russian communi- cations until the NSA received orders in 1969 to use the same sensitive methods and pro- cedures to monitor the communications of U.S. antiwar leaders, the sources said. It could not be learned who issued the orders. Inaddition to Fonda an4 Spook, the NSA monitored communieatio is of "Chicago Seven" defendants Abbe Hoffman and David T. Dellinger and firmer Black Pan- ther leader Eldridge Cle,eer, the sources said. All these persons tree sled extensively abroad and throughout this country dur- ing 1969 and 1970. Cleaver. for example, vis- ited Cuba, Algeria, Swedes and North Viet- nam during, this period. Virtually all the intercepted messages wen.'! short and in- volved travel plans or appointments. the sources said. Under another, less see. i.tive code desig- nation, the NSA, also obtai;.r.ed and circulated information on the pers+ nal life of Rev. Ralph Abernathy, Dr. Ma; sic Luther King's succes=or as head of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the sources said. It could not be determined, how the NSA came by this information. Those familiar with ti-4, monitoring pro- grams said the conversatuns involving top Soviet leaders would cone' in one moment and those of the antiwar personalities the next. "What Brezhnev and Jore Fonda said got about the same treatment." one source said. The National Security A ency is in charge of protecting comlunicat:r`ns security and U.S. message codes while ;attempting to in- tercept and break the messages and codes of foreign powers. NSA Director Lt. Gen. Lew Allen Jr. said through a ar>okesman that he would have no comment on this story. A Pentagon spokesman also declined to comment, and retired & rmy Gen. Earle Wheeler, the chairman of the. Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time, could not be reached for comment. Sources said Wheeler reviewed most of the messages fro; antiwar leaders and initialed them with a' tn7:" One source within the ntelligence com- munity said the commun' ':scions intercepts were confined to international cables, Two other sources, however, sa`.d the NSA Inter- cepter a limited number ?!-f domestic com- munications as well. There is no indication tl it. the method for intercepting communications involved con- venticnal wiretapping. Instead, the sources said, the Information came from various air- wave interceptions such a:: from microwave stations that are used to transmit or relay telephone calls and telegrais. Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000400050090-7 October 28, 19frroved Fora 1 ~ 1 8 P7 A ~1,~, 8000400050090-7 S 18705 prom the New York Times, Oct. 15, 19751 ]) Au,ES. SEEK To MODIFY LAWS ON SPYING ? ETSOR-THE ATTORNEY GENERAL WOULD _R'OI,E ON LEGALITY OF N.S.A. ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE .. .4 (By Nicholas M.Ilorrock) WASHINGTON, Oct. 14.-The Ford Adminis- tration ha i# become convinced that a signifi- cant; Aiart of the 1lational Security Agency's ign intelligence gathering, though vital, be of "questionable legality" and it has devised a plan by which it hopes to continue Such operations while protecting the rights of Americans, according to highly placed Ad- ministration sources, The sources said today that the bulk of the law limiting electronic eavesdropping was developed in connection with domestic crim- inal investlgations and as one source put it, a "lc iopal security needs were not given sig- cant consideration." The result, the sol{xc,) p%id, was that the N.S.A.'s massive e),ectrepJe, gurveillance techniques may have bee i In "technical violation" of the law. lresident Ford, they said, is considering an ItOutlve order that would empower Attor- ngy General Edward H. Levi to approve or disapprove specific electronic intrusions by the, security agency. The plan is not complete ah.l several sources were concerned that pub- Uoation of its detail might endanger national septlrity. AN AUTHORIZED INTRUSION But these details were pieced together from Several interviews with Administration sources: The security agency's advanced technology has made it possible for the agency to scan thousands of telephone calls, cables and other wire and radio communications and select those with valuable national security data.. The proposal Mr. Ford is considering would require that when the agency records a com- munication i believes contains important intelligence data, the agency would notify the Attorhey General and he would authorize a national Security intrusion. If the Attorney General did not give his approval, the record- igs would be destroyed, under the proposal. If such approval was received, the security agency would then be able to disseminate the information t( other intelligence agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency and the IYgder4l 9u au of Investigation. The operations of the security agency, Which has 20 0 0 employees and an estimated bud;;et of $1.2 l"4ion a year, are regarded by the Admillistrtiip qs the "top priority" in intelligence-g61 hering techniques, the sources said. ' If tie public could know some of the things they've done over the past two years it would li Justly proud," one source said. But at tale same time, these sources said, the agency's technology has "outstripped" current l ~,n he United States, particularly domestic cii"lnal law, which deals mainly with wiretppping and room bugging. How- ever, several Administration lawyers con- tended, the Slpmgstic laws and court deci- sions are " ague and "ambivalent." Ultimate y,- Administration sources said, Mr. Ford., y, decide to ask Congress for new legislation onto cover "space age" electronic survefllan tg l piques. The proposal to as- sign decis iii" making responsibility to the Attorneyeneral would provide a test period to discovo; just what new law is needed, they said. What ks. }trade the agency's techniques particularly' difficult to match with current law or practice is that the agency makes an Intrusion p . a communication before it knows t1le . c versation or cable contains matters of n4flonal security. At the,llama time recent court decisions have been,sl9 ly limiting the Government's power to conduct warrantless national or dopr,,estic seetiity electronic surveillance. A recent decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum- bia said that the Government should obtain a warrant before it eavestdrops on an Amer- ican citizen in a national security case un- less it can establish that he is an agent of a foreign government. AGENCY OPERATES IN SECRECY A large part of recent law and legislation was formed without any Real knowledge of what the super-secret National Security Agency was doing. But under the pressure of the Congres- sional Investigations and the Rockefeller commission investigation of intelligence agencies, what some Administration aides called "bothersome indications" of unac- ceptable activity began to emerge. The indications included the following: In June, the Presidential commission on the C.I.A., headed by Vice President Rocke- feller, reported that an unnamed agency of the Government had supplied 1,100 pages of materials on dissident Americans gleaned from communications between the United States and foreign countries. In August, Government sources confirmed that the agency was the N.S.A. and that a "watch- list" of names included numerous leaders of the American antiwar movement. There is no indication that any Attorney General approved these eavesdroppings or obtained a court order for them. In early September, The New York Times reported that in addition to spying on anti- war leaders, the security agency had intruded on virtually every cable or printed matter transmission that entered or left the United States. The result, sources told The Times, was that the agency intruded on communi- cations that might have nothing to do with national security. Senator Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, chairman of the Senate Select Committee, on Intelligence, warned in a television inter- view that the current bugging technology "could be turned around on the American people and no American would have any privacy left." When Senator Church's committee sought to hold public hearings on the security agency last week, President Ford called Mr. Church personally and asked him to permit Attorney General Levi to argue the Admin- istration's case against investigating the agency in public. The committee voted to put off hearings for the present and study the Administration's plea. Mr. Levi, responsible sources said, pre- sented the committee in this closed session with the legal complications of the agency's role. According to a report in The Los Angeles Times, the committee had independently learned that some of intelligence data gathered by the agency was routinely sent to the F.B.I. and may have been used in domes- tic cases. Administration sources said that their role was to preserve the agency's foreign in- telligence capability while avoiding illegal or unconstitutional intrusions on Americans. However, they resist the current legal view that Suggests the courts should decide what justifies a national security electronic surveillance. {From the Los Angeles Times, Oct. 11, 1975] GLOBAL MONITORING SYSTEM PROVIDED FBI INFORMATION (By Robert L. Jackson and Ronald J. Ostrow) WASHINGTON.-A worldwide electronic monitoring network of the National Secu- rity Agency was about to be disclosed last week when Senate hearings were abruptly postponed, The Times has learned. Investigators for the Senate Select Com- mittee on Intelligence Activities had planned to disclose that the NSA , for years had provided FBI officials with information gleaned from overseas phone calls and cables. The NSA's data are obtained from a highly sophisticated computer system that has monitored foreign telephone calls and cables on a vast scale, according to knowl- edgeable sources. A former high-ranking member of the U.S. intelligence community told The Times that this system had "an amazing capability"- beyond that of most other nations. According to this offs' ial and another source involved in the system, the NSA gave the FBI secret data, purportedly for domes- tic security reasons. But it was understood that the Justice Department, the parent organization of the FBI, had curbed this arrangement within the last two years because it had become difficult to separate domestic security intel- ligence from information that could have a bearing on criminal cases. Department officials feared that criminal cases against U.S. citizens could be legally tainted if they were based, at least in part, on phone calls recorded without a warrant. One source said that this practice had con- stituted "bad judgment" on the part of the FBI, although it was legal. Another defended the NSA's overseas elec- tronic surveillance in these words, insofar as it affected the FBI: "It doesn't violate the law. It doesn't re- quire burglary and doesn't require opening mail. It's a pretty healthy capability in terms of civil rights." However, a Justice Department official questioned whether information gathered by electronic surveillance outside the United States would be admissible in a criminal proceeding. "It is unclear to what extent the Fourth Amendment (guarantee against unreason- able search and seizure) would apply over- seas," he said. Even a noncitizen overseas has some Fourth Amendment right if the stuff is going to be used in criminal pro- ceedings here." On the eve of the scheduled Senate beat- ings, Atty. Gen. Edward H. Levi, at the re- quest of President Ford, paid a visit last Tuesday to Chairman Frank Church (D- Ida.) and the other committee members. According to committee spokesman Spen- cer Davis, Levi made a "generalized appeal" for postponement of the hearings on na- tional security grounds. The panel voted to honor the Administration's request until the matter could be explored further. "The committee was not trying to de- stroy the electronic surveillance capabilities of the NSA," a committee source said. "The abuse of these capabilities was the reason for our hearings. We were not about to re- veal the techniques." Those techniques are so sensitive they cannot be described publicly, The Times' sources said. According to knowledgeable officials, the NSA monitors millions of overseas phone calls, as well as those within foreign coun- tries, as part of its code-breaking and for- eign intelligence-gathering operations. In addition, it intercepts certain radio and cable communications. The agency does not monitor domestic phone calls, they said, although U.S. citi- zens may be overheard when they are parties to overseas calls. Because the quantity is so large, the NSA uses computers to screen out conversations that have no intelligence value, one source said. These computers are programmed to scan conversations and record those- in which key words are used, including the names of particular persons or organizations. The Senate committee is also understood to, be investigating evidence that the FBI furnished the NSA with a list of U.S. citi- zens whose overseas calls were of interest to the bureau. Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000400050090-7 Approved For Releei GRT~SIt~Nt1L I-, 7ZM00ENATE 400050090Oet .her 28, 197. Congressional sources said that the FBI. in turn, assisted the NSA by 7reaking into foreign embassies to obtain code-books and other material to help the agency decipher intercepted messages. [From the New York Times, Aug. 6, 197b] OPENING OF MAIL IS TRACED TO FBI-AGENCY CONCEDES OPERATION--DECLIRES PsRPOaa WAS '.'To THWART ESPIONAGE" (By John M. Crewds,)n) WASHINGTON, Aug. 5.- Agent3 of the Fed- eral Bureau of Investigation opened and photographed foreign and domestic mail at several sites in the United States beginning in 1958 and continuing until possibly 1970, according to a source with direct knowledge of the secret operation. The source said that the openings were centered In New York and Washington, where they Involved chiefly mail addressed to So- viet-bloc embassies and missions to the United Nations, but occurred also in other cities, including San Francisco. ,. STATEMENT BY F.B.I. He said that the openings, I mown within the F.B.I. as "Z-covers," were accomplished without the authority of judicini search war- rants, and were thus a violation of Federal statutes prohibiting obstruc",ion of the mails. He added that the openings had been made with the assistance of "curtain officials of the Post Office [who] knew what the F.B.I. was doing." Asked about the source's assertions, an F.B.I. spokesman issued the following state- ment: "In connection with its fort it;n counter- intelligence responsibilities, the F.B.I. did engage in opening of mail until 1966, when former Director J. Edgar Hoover ordered the activity to be discountinued. "The motive behind it was s)lely to carry out F.B.I. counterintelligence responsibili- ties in order to thwart espionage efforts di- rected against the United States by foreign powers. "No activities of this nature were under- taken by the F.B.I. after 1966." A spokesman for the Postal Service said that his agency would have no comment on the report "at this time." The source's account and the bureau's unusual confirmation of part of his account represent the first disclosure that, like the Central Intelligence Agency, the Y.B.I. also participated in the opening and photograph- ing of parcels and letters it believed to be of some intelligence value. The New York Times reported yesterday that Justice Department lawyers investigat- ing alleged wrongdoing by the C.I.A. had concluded that the agency's "miii intercept" program, which lasted from 1953 until 1973, had violated Federal statutes protecting the sanctity of first-class mail. The same standards would presumably be applied by the Justice Department to. the F.B.I: s "Z-covers," although, as with the C.I.A. investigation, a key question would be whether the openings took place within the last five years. That is the period in which, according to the Federal statute of limitaticns violations of Section 1702 of Title 18 01 the United State Code, which prohibits the detention or opening of the malls without a search war- rant, must have taken place if they are to be prosecuted. Asked whether any attempt had been made to obtain search warrants in the "Z-oover" program, the source said that the senders and recipients of the letters bad not been the subjects of a criminal investigation by the bureau. "How could you gets, warrant?" the source asked rhetorically. The year 1966, given as the Cutoff date for the mail openings is the name year, according to Clarence M. Kelley, the F.B.I. director, that bureau agents stopped committing burglaries to gain foreign Intelligence information.. STOLEN LETTER CITED 'T'here have been reports, however, that al- though Mr. Hoover apparently trimmed bark the bureau's counterespionage effort in 1966, such break-ins continued on a less formal basis, and there are also indications that the mail openings persisted as well. T`iic source cited, for example, a copy of a letter that was stolen from the F.B.I.'s office in Media, Pa,., in 1971 and subsequently made available to several newspapers. That letter, dated Nov. 30, 1970, was from Thomas E. Ingerson, a Boy Scout leader from Moscow, Idaho, to the Soviet Embassy in Washington and contained a request for in- formation about a prospective visit to the U.S.S.R. by his troop of six Explorer Scouts. Asked how, if the mail openings were halted in 1966, the 1970 letter found its way to the F.B.I.'s files, the bureau spokesman replied that this agency would stand on its statement. One Justice Department source said, how- ever, that after 1966 the F.B.I. continued to receive doples of correspondence produced by the C.I.A.'s mail intercept program, which at that time was also centered in New York and San Francisco. TUNE REPORT RECArLED One well-informed source said that he was virtually certain that the Idaho letter, which he said was "discussed quite a bit" within the bureau after it had become public, had been obtained by the F.B.I. as a result of a "Z-cover." Another well-placed source said, however, that after 1966 the F.B.I. continued to re- ceive copies of correspondence produced by the C.I.A.'s mail intercept program, which at that time was also centered in New York and San Francisco. The source suggested that the Idaho letter might have been provided to the F.B.I., by the C.I.A., rather than obtained directly by the F.B.I,, which, if true, would represent the first known instance in which the C.I.A. tampered with mail from one domestic ad- dress to another. A commission appointed last January by President Ford to look into the C.I.A.'s domestic activities reported in June that the agency, over a 20-year period, had opened and examined mail between the United States and various Communist countries. The commission, which was headed by Vice President Rockefeller, reported that in Jan- nary, 1958, the F.B.I. approached the Post Office Department "for the purpose of In- stituting similar coverage of mail to and from the Soviet Union." - The bureau was told, the conunission re- ported, that the C.I.A. was already conduct- ing such an effort, and an agreement was subsequently reached in which "the C.I.A. would send to the F.B.I. mail project items which were of internal security interest.." The commission report said, however, that "the bureau. agreed with the C.I.A.'s sug- g;estlon that the project should be handled by the C.I.A. alone." From Newsweek Magazine, July 28, 197b) THE FBI's "BLACK-BAG BOYS" (No'E.-Every foreign Intelligence agent had suspected it and every major mafioso had known for sure, but last week director Clar- ence Kelley made it .official: the FBI, he re- ported, has In the past made "surreptitious entries" into various places, foreign embas- sies included, to obtain what it felt was Important information. Kelley said the break-ins began during World War II and were largely discontinued by J. Edgar Hoover in 1966, and he implied they were legal be- cause the agents "acted in good faith." But the disclosure touched off a major furor: Attorney General Edward Levi promised a criminal investigation several foreign am- bassadors called the White House to learn whether they had been targets, and Presi dential counsel Philip Puchen berated LeEi for not keeping Kelley "on a shorter leash Most intriguingly, the director's disclosure also set other tongues wagging. Newsweek'- Anthony Marro pieced together this stoat; of the FThI's after-hours adventures.) The FBI agents usual/ y went In clean: no badge, no guns, no credentials. Almostalway;3 they wore the standard uniform of suit and tie, but with labels and cleaners' marking:: removed. "It was your as:; if you got caught," recalled a former agent who said he hart taken part in many break-ins. "You were told, 'If you get caught, you're on your own'." They were known as "black-bast teams" or "black-bag boys" and they usually consisted--at a sninimc,rn-of a locksmith, a lookout and a couple of men to do the ransacking. Depending on the purpose of the break-in, one of them nould know how to use a camera or instal, a bug. Sometimes a "slugger" wassent along to intercept un- expected visitors. "We h ;'d guys who, if they went bad, would be the best second-story men in the world," boasted one former Rgent Over the years, a Justice Department of1- cial told Newsweek's Stephan Lecher, the F13I conducted about 1,500 igreak-ins of foreign embassies and missions, :nob hangouts and the headquarters of su..ii extremist groups as the Ku Klux Klan and the Americas Communist Party. Embi,ssy break-ins, aver=- aging one a month by one estimate, wet v usually staged to get information that could. help the National security Agency break foreign Codes. Bugs: One top source said last week thin, he never knew of a oat, In which the FBI. planted a bug in an embassy; if the code were cracked, no bug would be needed any- way and, besides, a diplomatic bug was ac' most sure to be found. But break-ins againe:t, organized-creme figures and U.S. Commit- nists were almost always to plant bug,:, "They had bugs in mob apartments all over New York," said one government invest;" gator. A break-in at a mob office in Brooklyn, for example, might employ only a lookout, a. driver for a getaway car and a couple of agents. But a break-in ?Li: a major embassy or mission would require not only a skilled team, but dozens of agents to fan out acros. the city and watch all of the 50 to 60 persons known to have keys tc the building. The agents who entered usr:.slly would take in sensitive cameras (capable of taking pictures without a flash) and Small copying machines that could be folded ins,, a suitcase. `"T .'hey wouldn't read anythiri:t." said. one FBI source. `They'd just copy everything in sight." The agents would photograph the coding machine from every possible angle, then copy messages and replace the orig- inals. The idea was that the National Secu- rity Agency would have intercepted incom- ing coded messages and the FBI would have decoded copies. That, pits the photographs, might enable the NSA to break the code. Two sources said thai the FBI actually smuggled out as entire coding machine about fifteen years ago Borrowing a truck and uniforms from a gar" ate collection com- pany, agents drove into the yard of the Czech Embassy in Washington and waited near an open window, through which a Czeel) defector passed not onlc the machine but, nearly a truckload of fi;es. "They were so excited that they forgot to pick up the gar- bage," said one source. The next morning, the FBI filmed the results from a hide-out:. "One of the funniest thi?es you'd ever see," the source said, "was the film of the Czech deputy chief of security ;going to the Soviet Embassy with his hat in his hand. The Czechs couldn't even ware Prague to tell them what had happened They had to go to Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000400050090-7