SHOULD WE PLAY DIRTY TRICKS IN THE WORLD?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77M00144R000400090002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 6, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 21, 1975
• Content Type: NSPR

NEW YORK TIMES
21 Dec. 75
Approved For Release 2004/10/27: CIA-RDP77M00144R00040
$houi
Zy .-tam , 16
Cobra poison and assassination plots notwithstanding,
the-problem is not of a monster C.I.A. run amok.
STATINTL
It is whether the U._S.' wants'and needs
the capacity to perform covert operations abroad.
And if' so, under what controls?
rule, violate accepted norms of international be-
ByLeslie H. Gelb, havior and morality. The problem lies-as it al-
ways has-in improving the predictions based on
WASHINGTON. The current spate of Congres- the information brought in. The information is
sional and . press investigations .-of -the Central- usually adequate, but analysts and political leaders
Intelligence Agency has cast - that organization, have blinders that make them reluctant to draw -
for many Americans, in a new and sinister light, the necessary conclusions. For example, all the
The men who have devoted their lives to an.ony- warning signs were there for Pearl Harbor, yet our
mows power-Richard Helms, William Colby, Thom- leaders could not believe that the Japanese would a
as Karamessines, James Angleton have had - their dare attack. Improving the analysis of the informa-
day on ; national television, and they don't -look tion collected is, thus, mainly a matter for execu-
illegal break-ins, mail-openings, stashes of cobra
to overthrow foreign governments and assassinate
foreign leaders.. Past concerns over allegations
of irresponsibility and zealotry within the C.I.A.
-,y a..u .acgc, uu~a.uc UL LGAAIa Vt iILc_Mgenfe Kate^-
ering. It is a.question of policy. Does the United
States want an intelligence agency capable of con-
d
fl
i
i
t i
a
n
uenc
.g p0- -
me
have been heightened by a cumulative impression- ducting operations a
litiral develo
ments in other countries-anA if s
p
ti
a.,
mes, o a monster run amok. Yet there
has been little debate about the question that
will have to be faced after the sensations recede
and the reports are all in: What kind of intelligence
agency does the country need, and how are its
officials to be kept under better, control?
The essential goal, of course, has always been
capability to collect important intelligence informa-
tion and analyze it well. One reason for the
ludicrous nature of some of the revelations of
C.I.A. derring-do in collecting information is that
u
these efforts led to predictions that cannot be called Foreign Policy, led by retired Ambassador Robert
b
ll
t
I
f
for what purposes and under what restrictions?
The question, with its implicit dilemma of how
to reconcile secrecy with the kind of supervision I
.necessary to a democracy, is not new to Washing--?j
ton. The conclusions of various studies of the i
past 20 years have been distilled in recent months {
into three approaches. One, advanced by the Com-
mission on C.I.A. Activities Within the United
States, headed by Vice President Rockefeller-and
largely endorsed by the Commission on the Organi-
ri
ian
.
n
act, the agency s entire record in fore- D. Murphy-calls for streamlining supervision of
casting outbreaks like the 1973 Middle East war, or,
assessing power factors such as the Soviet missile
program, has been mixed to poor. Yet the nub of
the intelligence problem does not lie here.
If there ever was a time when intelligence looked
first to a "mole" hidden away in the interstices
of Power in another government, or to a Mata
Hari, that day has long since passed. Intelligence
gathering now depends pre-eminently on open nonproductive, too risky and inherently uncontroI-
sources, such as newspapers, and technical means,
such as listening posts that can hear conversations
at great distances and spy 'satellites. that can
photograph a tie.-clasp-methods that do not, as a over, by reducing the number of hurdles to appre-
vat, both within the executive branch and Congress,
Leslie H. Gelb is a c j y ~c ~0~l t ~e>f1004`~1~1 :' ~111~ ~' 1 94t1`?0 0 0
The New York Times who spent a number of years covert actions, a secon approach aims at, one
as a Senate staff-member and Defense Department
the C.I.A. within the executive branch and for
reporting covert operations to a new joint Congres-
sional committee. A second approach would take
covert operations out of the C.I.A.. and entrust
them to some other agency, perhaps the State
Department, and would require prior Congressional
approval of such activities. A third approach
holds that covert operations are almost 'always
zation of the Government for the Cond
ct of
table, and should be prohibited by law.
The first proposal amounts to nothing more
continued.
 Approved
issue of the policy behind the operations. And
the case for the third has not been made persuasive
ly. But it is with the third approach that the
debate has to begin. For if the intelligence commu-
nity is barred from carrying out covert operations,
no bureaucratic boxes need be juggled, no compli-
cated new policy guidelines need be established,
up, there being no serious
For Release 20041 @/f7g.uOtALRIDPFVM0O144RODWO099092 n would
need be set
supervision
overt operations encompass many things, J
They include sub rasa relationships with
top political leaders, such as the C.I.A.
had with the late military junta in Greece;
bribing foreign officials, from police chiefs to heads
of state; secret financing of election campaigns,
along with "dirty tricks" against opposing candi--4
dates; use of organizations like the Catholic Church,
the A.F.I.-C.I.O. and the oil companies as covers for a
operators and funnels for delivery of money, "tech 4
nical assistance" and arms; covert propaganda,
such as the radio broadcasts and leaflets that en-
couraged the Hungarians in 1956 to revolt, by
leading them to believe that the - United States
would help; developing a network of foreign spies
and arranging for exchanges of captured agents,
such as the 1962 swap of Soviet Col.. Rudolf Abel="
for U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers; economic opera-
tions, like the fantastic scheme in the early 60's to.
destroy Cuba's economy by depressing the world'
price of sugar; and, finally, various levels of para-
military action to support or overthrow a regime.-
the list is long, but includes the Bay of Pigs, the
secret war in Laos, the assassination of President
Diem, and the coup against the Mossadegh Govern-
ment in Iran. -
As this list suggests, the distinction made earlier
br-tween activities designed to influence events 4
and: activities aimed at gathering information must'
bee hedged to some extent. Intelligence collection
by satellites, listening posts in third countries,_
and electronic devices on ships or aircraft outside:ll
of the target nation's territory are mostly nonpio-41
vocative and not prone to incident. But these tech--.
niques have led to some of the most embarrassing.:1
and controversial incidents of past years. They :
include the U-2 spy plane shot down over Soviet-'
territory in 1960; the Pueblo spy ship captured by
the North Koreans in 1968; the EC-121 spy plane
shot down by the North Igor-
Beans in 1969; and the opera-
tion known as Holystone, in
which American submarines
were assigned to tail Soviet
?ubmarines -even into Soviet
lerritorial waters for pur-
_ioses of antisubmarine war-1
fare: I
vert operations go as follows:: sweep Latin America, but
There is no statute that sanc-
tions them. They are contrary
to the highest principles of
international law concerning
national sovereignty. We do
not and would not tolerate
others doing these things to
us. As Richard J. Barnet of
the Institute of Policy Studies
has written. these operations
are the product of a great-
power mentality "primarily
directed against those socie-
ties least able to hurt the
United States because they
are least able to protect them-
selves from penetration." That
means against the third
world nations, and not Mos- y1
Prof. Richard A. _Falk of
Princeton University has- ar-
gued. "The C1.A: s role has
been to keep repressive gov-1,
erninents in power and to 3
overthrow or harass more
progressive regimes" Many
of these operations, like the
Bay of Pigs invasion and the-
secret war in Laos, have been
colossal failures. And, to the
heart of the matter, David
Wise has written: "The fact
that other nations may engage
in covert political action is
not sufficient justification for
the United States to do so;
for if we adopt the methods
of our adversaries, we will
become indistinguishable from
them."
Seated in his office over-
looking the parklike grounds
of "the Agency" at McLean,
Va., William Colby, lame-duck
director of the C.I.A., who,
has held that post for more
than two years, presented his
case for continuing the covert
operations. He talked about
the many situations around
the world where, he said, "be-
nign" technological' collection
of information was not
enough. In closed societies
particularly, he argued, tech-
nology must be supplemented
by human collection. "WeJ
were startled by the Soviet
launching of sputnik, and we
can't afford to be startled
like that." And the record
of C.I.A. interventions has not
been one of unrelieved failure; 3
there were important succes- 4
"Postwar Westem
Europe was
through the Organization of
American States, the Alliance
for Progress, and with C.I.A.
assistance, this did not hap-
pen. In the 60's the Soviets
made a major effort to involve
themselves in Africa, and it
was a bust."
Colby spoke of the need
to retain a -capability for
covert intelligence operations,
with respect to "the future]
regional big power," like
Iran, Brazil, Zaire and Indone-
sia. He projected situations
years hence, when these pow-
ers presumably would be
strong enough -to. have an
appreciable impact on the
American economy. Alluding.
to the danger of their acquir- ,
ing nuclear weapons, he made
the point that knowing about
their nuclear development
programs would give the
American Government a :
chance of affecting decisions
in their capitals. But the heart
of the matter for him was
this: "We are- going through
a temporary period where
events in most lands don't'
affect our national security,
but `circumstances do change."..
The implication was that
detente with the Soviet Union
is a transitory phase, that
Washington and Moscow- will
find themselves at sword's
point again, and that the capa-
bility for covert operations
had better be retained.
Before these pros and cons
can be sorted out, a myth
must be cleared away. From
Berlin to Guatemala, from
Vietnam to Cuba, the C.I.A.
has been the -cutting edge
of American cold-war foreign 1
policy. In many places, it I
seemed too dangerous-or too j
blatant to use men in uniform,
and too unreliable and insuffi- I
cient to employ traditional
diplomatic tools. Between the ,
worlds of the soldier and the
diplomat, our leaders plunged
the C.I.A. into an underworld
of international diplomacy.
But the C.LA. did not run
amok. While the agency is taking the - heat- now for
covert ventures, virtually ev- ?
eryone with direct knowledge
of these matters maintains
that policy objectives are for-
threatened by mil- 1 mutated outside the C.I.A.,`
economic. chaos 1, and the C.I.A. carries out the
Approved For Release 20Y
der
hWAWVO Wt J 44R00a'ddMbdt policy.
the Marshall Plan and C.I.A.
help. It was thought that Cas-
 Wherever the eye is cast, - is charged with coordinating
y~ p~
-fxom the massivcovert ~ P.kct
nancial aid to v f Or rfc cue ac _tt
ropean Socialist parties after
World War II to the under-
mining of President Allende
of Chile, the decisions were
made and reviewed by the
responsible policy-makers, in-
eluding Presidents them-
selves. In some instances-
most conspicuously in Indo-
china---the C.I.A. pressed hard
for its own programs and
strategies and was quite in-
fluential; and in some other
instances, the agency began
by following orders but ended
up shaping policy to its own
ends, as in the case of the
Bay of Pigs and perhaps in
some. assassination efforts.
But by and large, when- it
comes to assessing responsibil-
ity for the initiation or failure
of covert operations, the fault
lies less with the C.I.A. than
with. the White House and.
with Presidential policy. And
it often lies with Congress
as well. The fact is that Con-
gress, both by what it has
done and what it has not
done, abdicated its superviso-
ry responsibilities. Just as it.
was wrong to-pin American
involvement in Vietnam on
the lies of the Pentagon, so
it makes little sense now to -a
blame the C.I:A. for 30 years
of covert operations. In both
cases, the causes were rooted
in the national American con-
sensus behind the waging of
the cold war. And in neither
case will the nation profit
from the - experience unless
this is recognized.
The very - magnitude of the
"intelligence community" at-.-
tests to a. program and pur-
pose that are governmental
in scope. At the top of the I
structure stands the President
and his. National Security
Council. Decisions on covert
operations are taken by the
is a~group of officials at the-
Deputy-Secretary - level from-1
all the major departments;' 1
headed by Henry Kissinger or
the President's chief national--
security aide. These decisions,
and intelligence activities
generally, are reviewed by the
President's . Foreign Intelli- -}
of very. distinguished,: and
National Security Council's,
gence enre matters -rs -- - is "L7Itl-BM AI
B
of Central Intelligence, who is
the Director's actual authority
begins and ends with the
C.I.A.
His staff numbers about
15,000. That does not make
it the largest of the intel-
ligence units. The National
Security Agency,- which is re-
sponsible for monitoring and
deciphering foreign electronic
communications and protect
ing the .Government's coded
traffic, has a staff of about.
ligence branch has about 38,-
500 men. Air Force. -intel-
ligence, with the related Na-
which`,runs the 'shay-satellite'
60,000 Ia' addition,?;-there -is
men;- the Defense- Intelligence
Agency, which coordinates an?-
telligence from the' military
services, with a staff of 5,000;
-- and- the State, Department's
small .Bureau -of. -Intelligence
Nor is the C.I.A: the cost-
liest of the intelligence units.
Although the agency's budget
is one of Washington's most .
-prized secrets,- Senator Wil-'-
limam -Proxmire,- Democrat. of
Wisconsin, who 'has- studied -
the subject, estimates the fig-,
ure- at _.$750 million.': That,..
according _to-Proxmire's esti-
mates, compares--with $775
million _-spent': `annually. -on-
-Army intelligence,"A like- sum
-for'Navy= intelligence; ~$1 bit-
-lion. for-the National-`Security
Agency, and - $2.8 billion- for-
:Air;- l~oree intelligence.-. The-
'Defense Intelligence. Agency
takes ? - an - estimated -- .$I00-
`Million and State Department
~ith the myth-of
stantiai . interference, -and on-'
its
t~s
P77Mve ~fg 04~,
very essen o 1
the- C.LA as -
rogue elephant
disposed_:_ of,
another,,-misconception must
be;_ tackled ~-"that-'the-:de-
bate .should--turn on whether j
.the United .States should in-"~
tervene in -the workings.- of
ranother nation. Such interven-
tion goes-oh, and has always-
gone on, every day..It inheres
in' almost - every foreign act
'of' state. -The giving or deny
'ingof economic and militaryaid, ;public' speeches aimed
,__a.._,....A .;,rte
Rem
men --a
an
the extension of the power and
influence. of one nationover-
the affairs-: of, other nations..i
minated by' saying that. overt.
j
intervention' is_inevitable-but
,the:. line 'must- be drawn. at.
.covertintervention .Covert-
ness, has~-ahvays. been-part:
` of'.the- international game. In-
,the case of the=United States,-:
other agencies besides the-
C.I.-A. conduct' covert. opera--
tion s. -The D.efe-ise Intelligence
Agency; the military services,-,
sometirheeg-even.,the State.De-
=-partment; undertake. money---
passing -operations, run agents.
and' informers, and sometimes`:,
`do. More.. American Embassies
-have been known.to give. quiz .
et- succor 'to certain would-be
-leaders, A o lobby - quietly for?-
this.; or' that ''policy And it's
is--not unusual for, an?'Asnbas
sailor ter` have a "friend at=
court' ~rlio keeps hun in
formed of Cabinet affairs as
they sit at the fireside sipping
brandy.. Is there any real dif-
ference between the Ambassa-
dor's friend and the- C.I.A.'s
informer? The informer is of-
ten paid, but sometimes he
does it for principle. And the
rewards to the Ambassador's ?.
friend, although less tangible
perhaps than payment in
money, are nonetheless real.
So it is not intervention per
se, overt or covert, that lies
at the heart of the question.
Rather, it is the allure of. using
these operations as ``easy solu-
tions," the-- uncertainties of
control. over implementation,
and the danger to the demo-
cratic process inherent in
covertness.
Thus, secrecy encourages
excesses; the capability for
covert operations has clearly
been abused. As one Senate
investigator put it, "Because
it's there, big, ready,'willing
and secret, policy makers have
used it too readily,: as some
thing _.to do, regardless of
risks." The operations held out
the temptation of the quick
fix when it appeared that
-nothing else could be done.
Because it would be quick
and secret, the prestige of the
United States would not he
committed. Yet many of these',
ert enterprises were secret
co
v
rs~
77M0(~yd*4 t ' a~o-1
of Congress;. Moscow ` and ;
Peking knew all about:-them.
p. 3
continued
 And some of the fixes, like Americans plainly disagree ?.
the Laos war, wouldn't take on whether their Govern- s Church of Idaho, who heads
and had to be drAppd t-v*.d For Releasen10Q,4611Qd2be G4vMR177iM00144RQ; 04,QPOONZ-P Committee
Thus, also, in the words of
former Defense Secretary Clark
Clifford, who knew this busi-
ness intimately during the
60's, "There were too many
cases where the agency was
given the authority to start
with A and go to B, and when
it got to B it seemed logical
to go to C on its own author-
ity, and so on to D and be-
yond." And thus, on the po-
tential dangers to American
democracy, Clifford warned:
"My concern is that a Presi-
dent like Mr. Nixon could turn
the C.I.A. inward and destroy
our liberties here at home."
Another reason for concern
on this score is that much of
this vast covert apparatus is
located within the United.
States. American businessmen
are involved as covers and .
channels, and the process of.
funneling money and arms ne-
cessitates friendly banking
concerns, "private' airlines,
forgers and thieves in training
-all within our own borders.
The operations also embrace
manufacturing concerns, and
situations like paying Howard
Hughes's firm to build a "deep-
sea . mining vessel" for the
secret purpose of lifting a
sunken Soviet submarine.And
when the National Security..?
Agency was intercepting "for-
eign" conversations and mes-
sages, it- was listening - in on
many innocent Americahs as
well...
Finally, it - must be recog-
nized that much of the cur-
rent criticism against covert
I
operations is motivated` not
so much by the principle of
noninterference as by - the
ends to which ? a good deal
of such interference has been
directed, and by the degree
of. covert intervention. This
is a problem. not of controls
but of foreign policy. The
C.I.A.'s capability for covert
action has led in the past to
ventures, like paramilitary
operations to overthrow duly
constituted governments, A hat
people in those countries have
every reason to regard as be-
ing beyond. the -pale. Covert
operations of that nature and
scale do indeed raise issues of I
principle. j,
progressive regimes or con-
servative ones, or stopping
Communism, or being in-
different. A look at two
current operations will show
that even Congressmen with
good liberal credentials find
themselves torn on the sub-
ject.
Since last spring, the Ford
Administration has used the
C.I.A. to funnel millions of
dollars into the hands of non- -
Communist parties in Portu-
gal. The conduits were the
West European Socialist par-
ties, labor unions, American
citizens of Portuguese ances- ?,
try, and the Catholic Church.
many of these groups were
already, giving overt and
covert aid to .-their friends
in Portugal. The aim was to
make the non-Communist par 1
ties, which had won the last
free election by- an over-
whelming majority, competi
despite the election,` the Com-
munists were beginning to con-
trol the Government through
their supporters in the milita-
ry--and there was substantial 'A
evidence of an even more -
massive influx of covert funds
trom Moscow to the Portu-
guese Communist Party.
In the other operation, the
C.I.A.. -plow6d money and
arms through President Mobu-
tu of, Zaire to support two
liberation movements in
Angola. .The third libera-
. tion movement had - been
receiving substantial amounts
? of arms from the Soviet bloc
and was on the verge of an
outright military victory. The
rationale -_ given for covert
American support was not to
defeat the Soviet - backed
group but to make the others
strong enough to negotiate
a coalition government for;
Angolan independence.
Most liberal Congressmen!
did not react strongly. to the
public - revelation of . either
operation. Some, like Senator -
Dick Clark of Iowa, privately
criticized the Angolan opera-
tion, but said nothing about -!
Portugal. Senator George Mc-
Govern of South Dakota pub-
licly 'attacked the action in'!
Portugal, but remained mute on Angola. - Senator Frank
on Intelligence, said on na-
tional television that he would
not have ruled out the Portu-
guese operation in principle,
but that he thought enough
was already being done for
the non-Communists by the
Western ' Europeans. And
about 40 members of Con-
gress knew about both opera-
tions and raised no objections.
y own reaction
to the arguments
for and against
retaining a cap
ability for covert operations
is somewhat ambiguous. Much
of Colby's reasoning appeals
to me on prudential grounds;
our attitudes may well change
again, and it is better to main-
tain the capability in law than '>.
to ask Congress at some future
time, to reinstate the opera. 1
Lions,, with all the attendant
dangers of delay and diplomat
is embarrassment.--Yet I can't
escape the conviction that
Colby means more by his con-
clusions than I would agree
with. And I -find myself as- +
senting to the arguments of j
the critics while disagreeing
with their proposal that covert
actions be abolished. -
The critics have convinced
me that many, but far from I
all, covert operations have
been - wrong-minded. But it
was- right, - I - feel, to help
Western European Socialists -
and Christian Democrats re-
tain power in France, West -i
Germany arid Italy after World {
War II. -(Contrary to- what
Professor-'Falk asserts,.-there.
have been occasions when
C.I.A. aid has gone to progres-
,sives, such as the aid -being
given now to the- Angolan
independence leader - Jonas.
Savimbi.) The critics have per-
suaded me of - the dangers
posed by a "king's army" to
many of the critics, I see noth-
ing inherently evil in -past
exercise- of executive- power,
and nothing necessarily sal-
utary in legally denying the. I
President the right to act co-. -`i
vertly in certain carefully de- `-I
fined areas,. under ' strong
Congressional supervision. If
.Congress. and the- President-'
are not prepared to do=lt this
way, then abolish the capabil-
Approved For Release 2004/10/27: CIA-RDP77M00144RQHO ElOQr9'6 2cbon.. -But if,
they-are, it-;should be -tried,..
p-4
before the capability is aban-',
1'v 1 1
 work at the bidding of the
Besides, the question will not National Security Council. The
wo, be settled in a c rx/+1dEdr Relea tei2G 4lb$042 t Gfik4WP 9fib001#- chief
um but in the highly political agency can do to protect its had come by and if you want
atmosphere of Washington,, secrets within the United to know what he had to say,
and if anything about States. Congress gave itself you can come by. No one
the politics of the situation is no supervisory (or "over- did. As one liberal member
clear, it is that.. Congress is sight") responsibilities. The confided, "I don't : like the
simply not going to abolish executive-branch -authors of set-up, but I don't want to
covert operations. The the. act intended it that way. be saddled with-the informa
strength of this sentiment can The Central Intelligence Act _ tion either." The fact is that
be seen in two recent Con- of 1949 carried this folly many liberals stay away from
gressional votes on making further. In flat violation of?l all the intelligence subcom-
public the secret budget of the Constitution, which re- mittees because they do not-j
the C.I.A. Last September, quires regular appropriations ; want to be tagged in the
the House Appropriations and regular accounting of re- future with having tacitly ap-
Committee voted 30 to 19, ceipts and expenditures, the.; proved an operation, even if
iii closed session, to deny it- act allowed the C.I.A. budget they agreed with it, or be
self knowledge of the C.I.A. to be secreted in the Federal cause they want . to be free 1?
Budget that had just been ap- budget and permitted the Di- to criticize if anything goes
proved by its own subcommit- rector of Central Intelligence wrong-
tee on -intelligence. -. And in to authorize spending on his A new law- must be enacted. 'I I
October, the full House voted own voucher. The proposals advanced be-
An amendment to the low represent, for the most 1
267 to 147, against public dis -'
Foreign - Assistance Act of
Closure of the budget. part, the middle ground in
Withthe basic question thus 1947, passed last _ year in the I the Washington debate.
' .
answered, others ran. be_ wake-of disclosures of C.T.A. First; the name of the Cen-
Asked. What should be -the involvement in the - coup tral Intelligence Agency;
policy guidelines? How can against Allende, improved su- -should be changed to the
these guidelines best be em- pervision only marginally.. The Foreign Intelligence =Agency,
bodied in law? What-changes -- law made the President per to underline the, point "that i
should- be '?made in the intel-' sonally responsible for covert domestic actions are off lim-
ilgence bureaucracy and else- operations, but did not define its. (Maintaining this insula-
where in the executive branch such operations. It was lion, however, is not as easy as
to ensure compliance? How riddled with loopholes. For . it sounds, because of intricate '?.
. . -
can Congress be reorganized- example, rt said the opera- ; legal problems created by 1
to exercise meaningful super= tions had to be 'reported to -technology, multinational con.
vision while allowing for se- Congress in a timely fash- { porations, and the inherent
committee met in closed ses- reduced at least by half-and
for and a Communist dicta- sion and, without vote or ex- then see. This reduction
tor, any involvement should would fit the restricted policy
be viewed with suspicion. tensive discussion, more or The current laws are a 1 less devolved its general guidelines discussed above.
1 authority on the two senior ' It would also lessen the
shambles, and they need to I members, Senators Johna r operators' influence in Wash-
be . redrafted to underpin the' Sparkman and Clifford Case.: ington, and would bring their
new policy guidelines. The The other members were to', number more . into line with
National Security Act of 1947,: be kept informed. After Colbyl present and projected require-
which: established t,}Ir~ or Relek f1. c~ ''77MOO'fi000'40oo0lef~`ices. j
consists of a fe un rers on e ert a
related circumstances. Where symptomatic of much of the gressional scrutiny.
there are tough choices as problem. As well as -several,; Fifth, the C.LA's, corps o
.
ones I would propose: Don't law was to enlarge Congres- foreign political leaders
overthrow or undermine-dem- signal knowledge of covert
should be prohibited. If a
ocratically elected or popu- actions. Until that time, only
President wants to kill a fu-
lariy supported or progressive the House and Senate Armed ture Hitler, he'll have
Services and to stand
regimes, whether or not- they Appropriations ready were privy. These Y to justify his - action
are Communist. Don't engage later.
in paramilitary operations. If four committees had formed.
the President wants to send themselves into subcom- Third, the budget of the--,
l
Americans into combat, open mittees with ties of friendship whole intelligence community!
Congressional approval should to the agency; even some of should be made public, so as to
their members described their abide by the Constitution
be mandatory. No as less provide accountabilit , and alb
tions; no thuggery. Any ny less "oversight" as perfunctory. y
explicit directives are subject To this cozy situation the low for debate on. spending
.
to erosion. amendment added the Senate. priorities.
Foreign Relations Committee Fourth, the law must cover'
What is left? Financial aid
re agencies intelli gcuries and
to democratically elected lead- and the House International all gen
ers and parties, who. would Relations Committee. all Operations,, for -otherwise 4
What then transpired in activities have a way of being
otherwise lose hone and free-
crecy? ion ; in practice this has involvement earlier noted-
The best policy guidelines meant after the fact, when of Americans and American
for covert action are flat little can be done about it.) concerns.) s
These are the The main contribution of the:
Second assassinations of
prohibitions
gray words., The agency is l Portugal, a note was . sent i
around to mesnbers. saying,1
t. 4
p.5
 g.6
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Transferring covert and re-
lated personnel to the State I
Department or the. Pentagon,
and establishing a new, home
for these services, would only
serve to transfer the problem,
while creating the illusion of
having done something. From
my experience, wherever the j
covert functions and secret
operators are located, they
same few senior officials
continue making policy, so
changing the venue would
not change the policy makers..
Those who - propose these
changes also argue that the
covert operators in the C.I.A. -
distort the agency's intelli-
gence estimates. But 1-would
rather have them doing that
than having- greater and more
direct influence over policy
under the protective wings
of the Secretaries of State or
Defense. These Secretaries
are bound to be more wary
of covert operators located in .
the- CI-A- than if the opera-
tors" were part of the State
Department or Pentagon bu-
reaucracy.
Sixth, a Joint House-Senate
Intelligence Committee should
be established with real pow-
ers and a professional staff--
not as a substitute for but
in addition to the six com-
mittees with current supervi-
sory authority. The committee
could consist of about 10 leg-
islators representing diver-
gent ideological persuasions.
Half the members might ro-
tate off: every four years; this
would serve to keep the com-
mittee from becoming imbued
with C.I.A. attitudes. The
committee would serve as the
focal point for all intelligence
information transmitted by
the executive branch, and
would be empowered to know
whatever it wanted. The other
six committees would con-.
tinue their practice of very
general policy supervision. In
this way, secrets initially
would remain only with the
Joint Committee.
The Joint Committee would
have the power of prior ap-
the know, appears to feature
a Joint ? Committee of Con- -
gress with ' little power,- a
more independent Inspector
General of the . C.LA., : a
strengthening of his Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board,
proval of covert and related and perhaps a new Presi-
operations and the right of dential special assistant for
policy review in clandestine intelligence. If that runs into
collection and related activi---,, resistance on Capitol Hill, the
ties. If a majority disap-
proved, no operation. If, say,
one-third of the members dis-
approved, they would _ have
the right to take the. matter
to the six already -existing
Congressional "oversight"
committees, , either seeking
their support. or proposing a
Congressional resolution pro-
hibiting the operation in area
White House is apparently
-prepared to' send its proposed
new C.I.A. director, Ambas-
sador George Bush, to Con-
gress to plead against new
legislation that would tie his
hands before he has had time
to study the problem.
Normally, Congress would
be responsive to such a plea;
time would pass, and the
X or country -Y.. momentum toward reform
p would dissipate. How well de
Washington is only begin- - laying tactics of, this sort
ping to go through that long _would work in this case de--
gestation period of ploys, pends on whether the House
leaks and- politics that pre- and Senate are ready, at long
cedes any change. Adminis- last,_ to assume responsibility
tration officials do not expect "-- in the field of foreign intel-
Conaress to wipe the intel- ligence. The question is whe
osed
di
C
i
h
sp
ongress
s
e
ligence slate clean. But the t
White House, the C.IA. and treat the future of the C.I.A.
its many friends in town, who as a transitory problem, roil-.
have long constituted a ing a few heads, altering insti-
informal society for tutional facades and warning
potent,
prevention- of tampering with against violations of the law.._
the agency, are trying to turn - or whether it sees it as part
aside whatever movement for - of the Vietnam-Watergate ex-
reform may be developing. perience, requiring some fun-.
Ford's own reorganization damental checks on the covert
plan, according to those in exercise--of power. 0
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