# CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS

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CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1
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RIFPUB
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K
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62
Document Creation Date:
December 12, 2016
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September 6, 2001
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18
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December 16, 1975
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Lease...2001AM CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 December 16, 1P4A2 ?V61WitftSIONAL KECORt4? Extensions of Remarks shall was born and raised, and the post's Marshall Hall is named in. his memory. The Uniontown Bypass is a modern highway providing quick and safe access to the entire Tjniontewn area a,rici will play an important role in the economic development of the. areal , Peneral Marshall was vne Qf Araerica's great States=11, and Thlientown resi- dents are especially pleased_ tp honor the General in this small but appropriate manner. LEOISLATION INTRODUCED TO IN- . CORPORATE CrOLD STAR WIVES OF,AM CA HON. EDWIN B. FORSYTHE gICVV JERSEY IN THE ROUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 2104dall, Ilece4nber 1.5, 1975 Mr. PORSYTNE,. Mr. Speaker, I re- cently introduced legislation to incorpo- rate the Gold_ Star Wives ef America. This IgAlOnea erganization was estab- lished in 1945 by the widows of members of the Armed Forces who ,clied while in active service of their countrY, groWing, active organization, it now has snore than 2.000 energetic members located in every part of the Nation. The Gold Star Wives. Mr. Speaker, shave been. seekbag incorporation in the form of a Federal charter for numy years. Because the Iiouse Judiciary Com- mittee 1145 refused tat on such legisla- tion in the past, I decided, in 1973 to seek a I)istrict of CP1Inabia incorporation so the Judiciary Committee could be by- However, because the leadership of the organization strengly believes they should have a fuU.Yederal charter, I am sponsoring 'this legislation, which un- doubtedly will be referred to the House Judiciary Committee. Within the committee, however, there prevails an entirely new atmosphere sur- rounding Federal legislation ,to incorpo- rate organizations, I believe the time is right for the highly respeetable Gold Star Wives of America to be federally incorporated. I know of no other group more deserv- ing of national incorporation. Its mem- bership is comPcsed of women who have expertancecl the great anguish of losing their husbands through active duty in the Armed Forces of our Nation. Their objectives are both praiseworthy and significant; What More valuable con- tribution to society can be made than to bolster the fortitude and uplift the spirits, as well as to aid materially, the WidoWs and children of those who paid the supreme sacrifice in the interest of their fellow citizens? The Gold Star Wives of America has a role to play that is nationwide in scope and worthy of IlatiOnal recognition. The organizatiela has droller noteworthy ac- cOraplishments to those made by our vetpruas' and _adjunct organizations which, have been granted national char- ters, Txt additions, for several years Gold Star Wives of Araerica has been partici- pating actively in the Annual Women's Forum on National Security, which is composed of 16 organizations which have received Federal charters. I have been informed by the officers of this organization that its goals could be more effectively and easily attained if it were incorporated at the national level. The scope of its membership and busi- ness now transcends any one State or group of States. Its declared purposes and activities extend to the widows and children of servicemen ?killed who live in every section of the country, and the ntunber of chapters doubled in a short time, as hundreds of new widows turned to Gold Star Wives of America for as- sistance with their financial and emo- tional problems. Its officers and board members reside in such scattered States as Massachusetts, Washington, Califor- nia, Colorado, Kansas, Minnesota, Vir- ginia, Missouri, Louisiana, Kentucky, New Jersey, Illinois, Arkansas, Florida, and Indiana. In every. sense of the term and in all aspects of its operations this is truly a national organization dedicated to significant national purposes. The Gold Star Wives of America has repeatedly been 14indered and prevented from giving assistance to the young widows who desperately need the help that could have been available to them through this organization, solely because of their lack of a Federal charter. Efforts to make the Gold Star Wives of America known through survivor assistance of- ficers at military installations have been refused on the basis that the organiza- tion is not recognized as a reputable or- ganization, while in other instances, con- tacts at military bases have resulted in inquiries to the Department of Defense as to the reliability of Gold Star Wives of America. Officials of the Veterans' Ad- ministration, I am advised, have sug- gested that a Federal charter should be priority legislation for Gold Star Wives of America, as a means of establishing the status and integrity of this relatively young organization. The organization could thus acquire the respect and sta- ture which come only to those organiza- tions who are so recognized by the Congress. Mr. Speaker, I have carefully exam- ined the criteria set forth in 1969 in the Standards for the Granting of Federal Charters by subcommittees of the Sen- ate and House Committees on the Judi- ciary. In every aspect it appears to me that the Gold Star Wives of America, Inc., more than measures up to those required standards. It is clearly a nation- al permanent organization operating in the public interest; the character of this organization is such that chartering by the Congress as a Federal corporation is the only appropriate form of incorpora- tion; it is solely a patriotic, nonprofit, nonpartisan organization devoted to civic and membership betterment; and it aspires to provide nationwide services which cannot be adequately organized without a nationally granted charter. The objects and purposes of the Gold 'Star Wives of America are most com- mendable. In addition to honoring the memory of loved ones who paid the su- preme sacrifice while serving in the Armed Forces of the United States, it is committed to assisting their, widows and E 6707 children, both materially and spiritually. One of its stated goals, for example, is to provide the benefits of a happy, health- ful, and wholesome life to minor children of persons who died in the service of our country. Another aim is to promote ac- tivities and interests designed to foster among its members the proper mental attitude to face the future with courage. Direct aid to the widows and children of former servicemen is likewise an obliga- tion which this organization has as- sumed. I am pleased to note also that the Gold Star Wives of America have dedicated themselves to the noble cause of safeguarding and transmitting to pos- terity the principles of justice, freedom, and democracy for which members of our armed services fought and died. They have likewise pledged themselves to as- sist in upholding the Constitution and laws of the United States of America, and to inculcate a sense of individual ob- ligation to the community, State, and Nation. In all these respects this orga- nization deserves the treatment which Congress has previously accorded other similar national groups. Mr. Speaker, our colleague in the Sen- ate, Senator BAYH of Indiana, introduced similar legislation in the other body on June 24, 1975. I strongly urge the prompt consideration be given to the adoption of these bills for incorporation of the Gold Star Wives of America in order that the organization can have the national stature and corporate structure so essen- tial to implement achievement of its very desirable purposes. NORTH CAROLINA DAY CARE ASSOCIATION HON. RICHARDSON PREYER Or NORTH CAROLINA IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Monday, December 15, 1975 Mr. PREYER. Mr. Speaker, I would like to share with my colleagues a posi- tion statement from the North Carolina Day Care Association regarding child care delivery systems. I share the con- cern of the Association about the Federal Inter-Agency Day Care Requirements? FIDCR's--of 1968 now incorporated into Federal law through the enactment of the Social Security Amendments of 1974. One of the primary differences be- tween the Federal requirements and most State licensing requirements are those requirements which call for more staff and space. These differences can make a dramatic difference in the cost of proViding this care. Congress has mandated a study of the impact of the FIDCR's and I offer this statement for your consideration as this matter is fur- ther studied by the Congress: NORTH CAROLINA DAY CARE ASSOCIATION? - POSITION STATEMENT ON CHILD CARE DELIV- ERY SYSTEMS REVISION: ADOPTED AUGUST 7, 1975 The NODCA promotes these premises as vital to child care in our state and nation: 1. The child is the responsibility of the parent (s) . The community has the responsi- bility for providing services to help in the Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 E6708 Approved For Relea_se_2001/AR66r 1.,1:Fipizmuiewmpipsioovek_elfri ,3 el, 1 , 1 ITh R9 AL development of every child to his fullest po- tential. The community also has the respon- sibility for providing information to assist parents in the selection of these services. 2. Quality child care service should be available in every community to every child whose family needs and wants them. Child care services should be diverse enough to meet the varied needs of different children in different families and allow the parents choice in what program best fits their child's needs. 3. On the basis of need, public funds should be used to enable the parent(s) to exericse their responsibility and right to pur- chase child care. All barriers to the flow of public fun.ds should be removed so that all existing child care programs, both public and private, are being utilized and government operated programs are initiated only when services cannot be provided under private auspices. S. 622: "ENERGY FLIM FLAM" HON. WILLIS D. GRADISON, JR. OF OHIO IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Monday, December 15, 1975 Mr. GRADISON. Mr. Speaker, I am shocked that the Congress of the United States would play games with an issue as important as our national energy policy. In an area where there is an urgent need for comprehensive, foresighted leg- islation to meet our future energy needs, the Congress has chosen the politically easy way out, rolling back oil prices until atter the next election then allowing them to rise until controls are lifted. This legislation is polities at its most cynical. The energy bill we are considering today makes a serious mistake in treat- ing the American people as "economic illiterates," to quote an apt phrase from the Cincinnati Post. Supporters of the bill would have us believe that this is a consumer bill. Nothing could be further from the truth. S. 622 ignores the damage that a tem- porary price rollback would cause at this time. A rollback would encourage con- sumption precisely at a time we are try- ing to reduce gasoline usage. It will in- crease imports precisely when we are seeking to reduce our dependence on for- eign sources. It will discourage domestic production when we wish to become en- ergy independent. Finally, it will create legislated short- ages and long lines at the gas stations. Passage of this bill will put the United States at the mercy of the OPEC nations through their ability to set the market price of oil. Congress needs to pursue long range policies which will encourage domestic exploration and development of our en- ergy supplies. I will continue to support gradual elimination of price controls on oil together with a windfall profits tax, This tax is necessary to assure that ad- ditional revenues are plowed back into continued energy research and develop- ment rather than used to further enrich the oil companies. Mr. Speaker, it is time we stopped play- ing "politics as usual" in Congress an got down to the tough decisions needea in pressing issues. I believe the American )eople will no longer stand for this kind politically-motivated policymaking, n which Congressmen look out for them- ielves first and the Nation second. As an indication of the failure of Con- gress to fool the American people on this issue, I am including copies of two edi- Gorials from Cincinnati papers, the Cin- cinnati Post and the Cincinnati Enquirer. [From the Cincinnati Enquirer, Nov. 13, 1975] A SELF-DEFEATING LAW It is the very kind of program to "benefit" the American consumer that has put us in bondage to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and that the Congress has just adopted in trying to legis- late lower petroleum prices. From the early 1950s on, it was the con- scious policy of the federal government, both. Congress and the executive, to increase pros- perity by holding down the cost of gasoline, jet fuel, heating oil and natural gas. Prosperity is a much-desired and worthy goal, but the national energy policy was shortsighted and self-defeating in the long run. We have given the 13 member nations of OPEC the power to set the price of crude oil, and with that the steadily rising price of re- fined petroleum products. We have done so by deliberately making ourselves dependent on this source of energy, and discouraging both domestic production of it and economic use of it by holding the price down. The chasm between the needs of the nation and the price-consumption policy of the federal government is most strikingly and painfully clear in the shortage of natural gas. By seeking to decree that the price of a barrel of domestically produced petroleum shall be only about two-third of that of im- ported oil over the next few years, the Con- gress is hurting the national economy and undercutting the very prosperity it seeks to promote. At the legislated price of petroleum the Congress would have, Americans are going to Use ever more OPEC petroleum. They will do so because mixing domestic and foreign crude oil together in price low- ers the net price by about a fourth. That as- sumes the present ratio of about 40% im- ported oil to 60% domestic oil. The lower price encourages consumption without, how- ever, generating an equal increase in supply. The Congress fails to legislate greater sup- plies because it controls neither the decisions of the OPEC nations on the price at which they will be willing to sell their oil leer the decisions of the American petroleum indus- try on production here at home. The Congress can, of course,' influence those decisions. The influence in this piece of legislation is negative. It discourages domes- tic production by the artificially low ceiling price set on our awn petroleum and by al- lowing the petroleum industry to pass through to the consumer the costs of im- ported oil. There is no short-term profit loss to the industry from the legislation, al- though there is a long-term profit gain that it would be forced to forgo. This is a bail piece of legislation. It de- serves to be vetoed by President Ford. [From the Cincinnati Post, Nov. 19, 1975] ENERGY FLIMFLAM With its eye fixed firmly on the 1976 elec- tion, Congress has decided on an energy bill that is good politics and bad national policy. And what may be worse, President Ford, who knows better, is reported by his aides to be leaning toward signing Congress' handi- work. The measure treats Americans like eco- nomic illiterates, believing that they will be so grateful for temporanly cheaper gaso- line that they will overloc k long-term dam- age to the country. If Ford swallows the bill it woiald promptly roll back the average pr ce of a barrel of domestic crude oil by 12 ier cent, from the present level of $8.75 to$ .66. That is designed to cut tie price of gasoline by 3.5 cents a gallon. Due er its complicated provisions, the bill woull keep gas prices down until the election l safely past. Then they would start rising and would be 3.5 cents above today's price i when price con- trols expire in 40 months. The plan is an ingenious one to allow con- gressmen to posture as champions of the con- sumer and promote the re-election of as many as possible. But it uould be harmful in at least three major ways. By artificially lowering gasoline prices, it would encourage consuription when con- servation should be the watchword. By cutting the oil industry's income, which Is already slipping, it would cause a drop in exploration and a faster ,lecline in domeetic oil production. As a result of using mo e fuel and produc- ing less, this country wonld have to import more high-priced foreign all, now 40 per cent of overall consumption. Inevitably we would beeome more depend- ent on the pricing and a' tpply whims of the OPEC cartel and more vulnerable to another embargo. Apart from its baelc :laws, the measure contains a number of user ul provisions, These include requiring Detroit to produce more fuel-efficient cars; setting energy standards for household appliances building up an oil reserve to protect agaInt t an embargo, and helping small coal operators to increase out- put. Such steps toward a sensible energy policy show that Congress MD VD better on the oil- price Issue?If President Ford vetoes its film- ilam and demands an honest bill. ANGOLA IS OUR NEW VIETNAM HON. HERMAN BADILLO OF NEW 70EN IN THE HOUSE OF RI PRESENTATIVES Monday, December 15, 1975 Mr. BADILLO. Mr. Speaker, Sunday, the New York Times' story on the wors- ening situation in Angola stated: When the United Stapes finally evacuated Saigon in defeat, a national debate on Amer- ican policy seemed inurenent It never really occurred. . . . Now the same subject seems to have returned, cancel Angola: American and Russian power ane influence colliding in distant places that are in, as Mr. Kennedy said, a small world. And what has changed since the end of our involvement it Vietnam? Appar- ently not much. CIA Director Colby tells us that his interpretation of the War Powers Act does not Preclude "paramili- tary operation." And to, Henry Kissinger and William Colby have consulted, and, now the 25 million of the taxpayer's money has been spent covertly, we are asked to believe that this is another in- volvement in the American interest. The parallels with Vietnam must be drawn and reinforced We have been told that the Communists have put much more money and arms into Angola than we have and so we have to "catch up." Yet in doing so we have aligned ourselves with South Africa?a country whose poli- Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIARDP77IV100144R000400100018-1 December 16, 1975 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?Extensions of Remarks cies we loudly proclam as being repug- nant to US. As in Vietnam, we proclaim the right of the people to determine their own future, and yet we have allied our- selves with factions in Angola that are so weak that they are almost certainly doomed to failure. And yet we persist. Despite the fact that we may lose close allies like Zaire and Zambia, despite the fact that Africa- watchers have been advising against our inVolvement for many months, and most of all, despite the War Powers Act, the Secretary of State has once again chosen the imperial route of unilateral action in the formulation of our foreign policy. It is my fervent hope that before the Congress recesses we will assert our _ role as an egual partner in the policy- . making process, and inform the admin- istration just how antithetical our con- tinued involvement in the affairs of an- ?dux country is to the Congress. %"4 fon9wwg articles from yesterday's and today's New York Time clearly define the situation in Angola, and the folly of our role: No QUESTIONS PLEASE (By Anthony Lewis) BosTofs, Deceinher 14.--tEn the lest six months the Ford AcireinistratiOn has secretly supplied25 million in arms and money to factions it favOrs in Angola. The President has just approved another $25 million. Amer- ican pilots are flyingff ve American artillery spotter planes in and out of Angola from neighboring Zaire. The Angola operation is already one of the largest covert actiOirks ever rapunted by the United States outside Inflochinp., and it raises large questions of policy. Does the An- golan faction we oppose, which gets hid from the Soviet 'gni= and Cuba, threaten American interests? Is there any realistic 4311auce of defeating it, or is the prospect an endless struggle without success? And more. But there is a fundamental question of process before those of policy. If American action is needed, why should it be clandes- tine? Why has our policy on so dangerous a problem been made and executed in secret? The answer given is that U.S. aid might embarrass the recipients if sent openly. American motives are suspect in Africa these days, in part because of leftist bias but also because of the record of American activities In the Congo, Chile and elsewhere. But an operation as large as that in An- gola could hardly be expected to remain secret for long, so that 'answer is less than persuasive. In any event, the Angola action has now been disclosed in considerable de- tall--by unnamed sources who sounds Very much like the C.I.A. Continuing to handle the policy covertly is not likely to avoid em- barre,sstrient. The Angolan affair, in fact, makes clear, what must often be the real reason that offi- cials choose the covert path. It is more con- venient. It allows policy to be made by a handful of men who know best. It avoids annoying questions by Congress, the public and experts within the executive branch. After Vietnam, an open decision to inter- vene in an armed struggle thousands of miles from the United States and ontside our tra- ditional sphere of interest would surely have aroused some questions. There is no need for conjecture. Seymour M. Hersh of The New York Times has disclosed m feirgieago,yr_ ernmental OppoOtlpil, 24143figunpresse . .4aeit tate Kissinger made the deci- sion for military aid against the advice at his own Assistant Secretary for African Af- fairs, Nathaniel Davis. Mr. Davis felt so strongly about it that he quit the job last August. Since then Mr. Kissinger has cut down the flow of cables on. Angola to the department's African specialists and even to the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, which also opposed his decision. Mr. Davis is said to have seen three main dangers in the growing U.S. involvement in Angola. The factions we favor are so weak that the policy probably will not work. A prolonged struggle ending in failure would deeply damage the two African figures on whom we most rely, Presidents Kaunda of Zambia and Mobutu of Zaire. And the United States may become identified with white South Africa. Those arguments look rather convincing today, attar a direct South African military intervention in Angola and after the decline in the fortunes of the Angolan groups fa- vored by the Ford Administration.. But right or wrong, the arguments should have been heard?heard by someone other than. Henry Kissinger. Under the American system, secret deci- sions by one official or a few are wrong in principle. They also tend to be wrong in practice. Whatever good we can imagine co- vert operations doing, what they actually did Is evident enough in the major examples: Vietnam, Laos, Cuba. Henry Kissinger's record snakes it particu- larly unwise to leave policy on Angola largely in. his hands. A National Security Council memorandum drafted under his direction in 1979 predicted continued Portuguese power in Angola, and thereafter some help was giv- en to Portugal in its colonial war. This ab- surd episode is described by Tad Szulc in the current issue of Foreign Policy. But the point is much larger than the specifics of Angola. Our attitude toward that affair will really indicate whether we have learned from Vietnam and Watergate and the rest how much harm we do to ourselves by secrecy?by letting a handful of officials make policy without public examination of the premises. The worst danger of covert action on such a scale is that it may commit the United States to a position and make extrication awkward. That may indeed be the intention. The time to stop the process is now. Senator Dick Clark of Iowa has a forehgn aid bill amendment that would bar any Angolan aid unless Congress has authorized it. That pro- posal takes no position on the rights or wrongs in Angola. It would simply make sure that the country has a constitutional op- portunity to look out for quagmires before taking this large step. THE MINI-VIETNAM IN ANGOLA (By C. L. Sulzberger) WINDHOEK, S017TH-WEST AFRICA.?The An- golan mess bears some resemblance to Viet- nam, if on a smaller scale. The civil war started among rival nationalists after the principle of independence had been gained and foreigners intervened to suit their global interests. But, unlike Vietnam, no great- power intruder came from regions near the chosen battlefield. The external forces involved aren't stran- gers to the game. The United States has at various times exerted tangible influence to attain policy goals in Zaire (formerly the Belgian Congo). The Soviet Union has in- vested much in unproductive attempts to control Zaire, Sudan and Egypt, and in areas where success was achieved, notably Somalia. China has Nen. involv.esi?in..Alric over SLausja.,?Aquatagjxxoney, engineers and esilltiarv. experts to various lands including Zalie, Tanzania and Mozambique. Everyone has used one or another form of mereenazies: unemployed professional sol- diem or military,units from smaller ideologi- cal allies. Thus, Russia has been employing convnando troops from its little client, Cuba, E 6709 on African assignments since the 1960's. North Korean officers are on a training mis- sion in Zaire. All these factors play a role in the civil war that has engulfed Angola, just north of South-West Africa (controlled by Pretoria). Three principal guerrilla groups are fighting each other to gain ascendancy and an odd mixture of foreign nations are directly in- volved. The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, headed by Agostinho Neto, which seems at present to have an upper hand, is heavily backed by the Soviet Union. There is evidence that Soviet advisers are helping Neto in Luanda, his capital, and that Moscow has sent him an extensive inventory of arms. Standing loyally with Russia is Fidel Castro, who has dispatched between three and five thousand Cuban regulars to spear- head M.P.L.A. attacks. The Cubans are the only large non-African combat force in An- gola. Several hundred of them are combat veterans of the independence struggle in Guinea-Bissau. The two anti-M.P.L.A. guerrilla forces, UNITA (National Union for the Total Inde- pendence of Angola), and F.N.L.A. (Front for the National Liberation of Angola), have 'joined in. uneasy alliance. UNITA is led by Jonas Savimbi and F.N,L.A. by Holden. Ro- berto, brother-in-law of Zaire's President Mo- butu. This coalition is at present supported by Communist China, the United States, Zaire and South Africa. The United States uneasily opposes the threat of a Soviet-dominated Angola that would provide Russia with naval and air bases and a strong-point aimed at the enor- mous mineral wealth of Southern Africa and Zaire. Even if Moscow proves unable to con- trol these resources, it would be in a position to deny them to others with its strong navy. Washington is well aware of this danger and the Soviet threat to move into the South Atlantic as it has in the Indian Ocean, but it is leery of direct involvement because of its Vietnam experience. China has less of a complex. Last June Mr. Roberto boasted: "All my troops have been trained by the Chinese." Whether Chinese instructors are still with F.L.NA. cannot be proved and some reports claim Peking is diminishing its role. But China is concerned with its third-world rela- tions and is extra-susceptible to copper-pro- ducing states, from Chile to Zambia and Zaire, where Robertot brother-in-law is boss. South Africa, for its part, fears Soviet ef- forts to spread revolutionary propaganda in South-West Africa and also through the Af- rican National Council in the republic itself. Small South African forces have been sta- tioned twenty miles inside southern Angola with instructions to engage in hot pursuit, if necessary, 200 miles northward. There are South African advisers and armor farther north and its troops apparently control Sar da Bandeira airfield south of Huambo. It is still early to forecast how the Angolan contest will end. So far the Soviet Union has shown great resolve but, in the past, its stay- ing power in West Africa has not been im- pressive. China, on the other hand, has been courting the black states for years and its ideological practices have considerable ap- peal. But African nations have not been nota- ble for tying themselves inexorably to any ideological creed. The outcome in Angela--zand its eventual implications?may be affected by any United StaleS" determination to step up its role or even by the import of further mercenaries( by one or another competing group. Well- trained professional soldiers with good weap- ons have shown they can have considerable effect on African battlefields. The Black Companies now being led around Angola by Cuban ideologues or white officer hirelings are every bit as important as the Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 E 6710 CONGRESS] ONAL RECORD ? Extensions of Remarks DeceAiber 16, 1975 White Companies of unemployed English knights who settled 1,rguments between Ital- ian city-states following the Hundred Years War. But this time the ultimate strategic re- percussions might echo on a global scale. COMMUNISM AND THE WAR In ANGOLA (By George M. Houser) The conflict of opposing political move- ments for control of an independent Angola is rapidly escalating into an international confrontation reminiscent of Vietnam, and United States spokesmen are grossly distort- ing the real issues involved. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger has pointed an accusing finger at the Soviet Union and Cuba for intervening in Angola. Characteristically, United Nations Ambassa- dor Daniel P. Moynihan went further when he said that Soviet involvement in Angola was a erst step in the colonizing of the whole continent. But little is said about reported United States military aid sent to Angola. American spokesmen are simplistically portraying the Angolan conflict as "Commu- nism" versus "anti-Commusism." The Popu- lar Movement for the Liberation of Angola (M.P.L.A.), whose government at Luanda has been recognized by sixteen African states (33 countries in all), is constantly described as "Marxist," "Soviet-backed" or just "Com- munist." The National Front for the Libera- tion of Angola (F.N.L.A.) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola ("UNITA) are called "anti-Communist." Before any portion of the American people respond to any call for Vietnam veterans to join the fight against Communism in Angola, several important factors should be con- sidered. What about the Communism of the M.P.L.A.? I have been in touch with the leaders of this movement for many years, most re- cently last March when I was in Angola, where I met with members of all three polit- ical movements. They make no secret of a basically socialist orientation in their design for Angola. In a continent where there is little pri- vate accumulation of capital, socialism of one sort or another is an accepted norm. Capitalism is a reality in most of Africa only through the interests of foreign corporations and enterprises. So organizing a society along socialist lines is to be expected. Such a form of social organization should not automatically end United States willing- ness to maintain friendly relations. And in- deed the United States has recently agreed to diplomatic relations with Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique, counties in which the political parties (African Parties for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde and the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique) have pro- grams very similar to that of the M.P.L.A. In fact, all three had been joined in an al- liance against Portuguese colonialism for more than fifteen years. Why then does the United States treat the M.P.L.A. differently? The issue is portrayed as Soviet influence and control In Angola. Soviet support of the M.P.L.A. is not new. It goes back to the be- ginning of the armed conflict in Angola in 1961. Scandinavian countries gave support to the M.P.L.A., too. The M.P.L.A. would have been glad to take help form wherever it was offered?even from the United States. Where was the United States during the years of struggle? It was firmly welded into an alliance With Portugal and had a policy of avoiding .1seekisstireeWitteeetffie .liberation movemente in Portuguese colettestesseesteese The United States limited its "support" to high-sounding statements on the right to self-determination. The M.P.L.A. has little reason to be grateful to the United States. M.P.L.A. support from the Soviet Union does not mean Soviet control in Angola. It has not meant this in Mozambique, .Guinea-Bissau, or Cape Verde. Some Americans may find this difficult to understand in view of our widespread biases against the Soviet Union and Communism. But these political movements, after long years of combat against the Portuguese, will not easily accept domination by a new foreign power. It is a gross and demeaning distortion of reality to present the men and women of M.P.L.A. as Soviet puppets. And certainly the Cubans are not taking over Angola. There is a second distortion involved in official United States interpretation of -events in Angola. Spokesmen have said virtually nothing about United States involvement in Angola. Covert United States support for the F.N.L.A, and UNITA was admitted in testimony before the Senate Foreign- Rela- tions Committee on Nov." 6 by William E. Colby, the Director of Central Intelligence, and Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. The New York Times reported Friday that, according to a high-ranking Government of- ficial, the United States had sent$25 million in arms and support funds to Angola over the last three months and planned to send s25 million more in supplies. The official said that the first sum had been distributed by the Central Intelligence Agency. This aid has gone principally through the Government of Zaire, which since 1962 has been the mainstay of the F.N.L.A., the most conservative of the Angolan parties. Major publications here and abroad have reported that United States transports have been flying daily from Zaire into F.N.L.A. military centers in northern Angola, such as Ambriz, with guns, ammunition and gas. For Mr. Kissinger and other United States leaders to point the finger at the Soviet Union and make no mention of United States involvement in the conflict in An- gola is hypocritical. United States spokesmen have made no mention of South Africa's growing inter- vention in Angola. Presumably the involve- ment of this white-supremacist state is an embarrassment the United States would pre- fer to ignore. But this involvement is an im- portant development in the Angolan conflict, with far-reaching repercussions. It was the incursion of South African troops that has led Nigeria's "moderate" Government?even in United States Government eyes?to rec- ognize the M.P.L.A. government in Luanda. There can be no doubt about the growing South African intervention. When I was in Zambia in early November, I was told by high Zambian officials that at that time South African troops and some dissident Portu- guese mercenaries from Angola and Mozam- bique had already occupied a strip fifty miles deep across southern Angola. South African columns have penetrated hundreds of miles into the interior, with many casualties reported and at least one reconnaissance plane shot down. An immediate objective of South Africa is to use the Angolan fighting as a smoke- screen behind which it can eliminate the forces of S.W.A.P.O. (Southwest African Peo- ple's Organization, the main liberation movement of Namibia) from northern Nam- ibia and southern Angola. Namibia?South Africa calls it South-West Africa?is the territory occupied by South Africa in defiance of United Nations deci- sions that even the United States has sup- ported. South Africa sees the Angolan conflict as the real beginning of the war for its own statelseeles Wee _s_whiteeelorolnated state in aoutheette gouth Africa has been attempting et:Iteelf into the golan elements, is directly abetting South African strategy. It is not helping the An- golans preserve their independence but mak- ing them victims of the most reactionary force in Africa. It would be a tragedy for the United States to repea,t the errors of Vietnam because it look, upon the Angolan conflict as an occasion for another anti- Communist crusade. ......??????111.10MW-4.1???????????.- "INTEGRITY IN THE BUSINESS LANDSCAPE," AN ARTICLE BY STANLEY MARCUS HON. JOHN BRADEMAS OF INDIANA IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Monday, December 15, 1975 Mr. BRADEMAS, Mr. Speaker, one of the most thoughtful and public spirited business leaders in th3 United States is Mr. Stanley Marcus, .thairrnan of Nei- man-Marcus of Dallas, Tex. I believe that every Member of the House of Representatives and Senate will read with great interest the following article by Mr. Marcus "Integrity in the Business Landscape," published in the New York Times of DeiTmber 15, 1975. The article, which follows, was ex- cerpted from an address Mr. Marcus de- livered in Omaha, Neb.: INTEGRITY IN THE IHTS7NESS LANDSCAPE (By Stanley elarcus) There is a massive h as of faith in the business community by the American peo- ple?and perhaps a loss of faith on the part of businessmen as well. Let's not kid ourselves into believing that the negative attitude I oward business is merely part of an "anti-Establishment" mood throughout the nation. It is a lot more specific than that?and .1 lot more justified than that. Americans still bellevi in the free-enter- prise system. They have no quarrel with profit-making. But they do have a quarrel with unethical and questionable business practices conducted at tie public expense. They do have a gnarl el with companies which pollute our water And air and are ap- parently indifferent to the hazards of pollu- tion until the Governmt 'it intervenes. They do have a quarrel with that majority of businesmen who have fought and ob- structed and delayed eeery piece of pro- gressive legislation en;?cted during this century. Who among the business community today would seriously propose that Congress repeal our child-labor laws?or the Sherman Anti- trust Act? The Federal Reserve Act, the Securities Exchange Act? Or workman's corn- pensation? Or Social See arity? Or minimum wage? Or Medicare? Or civil rights legisla- tion? All of us today recognise that such legisla- tion is an integral part of our system: that it has made us a stronger, more prosperous nation?and, in the long run, has been good for business. But we can take precious little credit for any of the social legislation now on the books, for business vigorously opposed most of this legislation. I wonder sometimes ii we really believe in the free-enterprise system. When those who Western alliance on the back of thisetteiiiiscseasees the. greatest stake in it often turn out Communist cause. Now South Africa is call- to be ite fiWeiNkftmaeste6issei, wonder if free lag for the Western alliance to stop a "take- enterprise can survive. '...--aliatgate,4144,;-,s. over" in Angola. Can it survive when some of its greatest The current United States position, sup- proponents seem determined to strangle the porting the most conservative internal An- life force of the system?competition?with Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 December 16, ANY ov ttftlite?glettaP1 !MO PP I aril9r9 Nsi 00018-1 though exports are vital and most be Main- tained, the American consumer Must, never again be forced to subsidize foreigp sales. Access to American grain supplies must in- stead be assured on a, basis consistent with maintaining reasonable food prices at home. That objective can be accomplished by es- tablishing an export policy in place of the stop and go non-policies of the Republican Adrainistration?non-polieles which rob cell- isomers, farmers and, our trading partners alike. The policy.I advocate would set mini- mum and maximum quantities for all major foreign buyers, so that 4uctuations in de- mean:is will be smoother by requiring import- ing nations to accumulate stocks in times of high world production. Our Government's approval would be needeci for a country to buy more?or Igsa?tb.a.n the agreed amounts. To assure, adequate domestic supplies, the United States would announce to the world its domestic requirements, as well as its commitment to foreign customers and less develbped countries. We would make it clear tint those supply requirements would be met 1:13' Whatever management devices are required. As an eseential.element ,of our ..exPott Pol- icy, the United States should take the lead in, creating, with other exporting and im- porting nations an international reserve pro- gram for grains?as caned for by the World Food Conference. Such a reserve would serve not only the interests of the participating countries but also our moral obligation to the hungry. These policies would not displace the free enterprise ,aystern. Rather, they would put that satem to work for people by taking the shoat out of supermarket purchases and farm laleg, ut .we must re,cogialze that the system will nOt work if farmers and con- sumers are, plOed against each other in a struggle which can end only in losses for both. Theeotapactbetween. fanners and. con- sunless Which X propose guarantees neither group. everything it might wish. As in. any partnership, there are risks to be shared and hard choices to be infrifiP. The accommodation of 'conflicting interests which I propose means some give and take by all. The reserve System puts a ceiling on the prices consum- ers raust pay in bad crop years, just as it sets a floor under the prices farmers will get in surplus crop years. I believe American farmers and consumers will accept this. To cement the, new alliance between. farm- ers and constuners? we must also focus at- tention on those trends In equipment menu- fe.eturing, food processing and agricultural marketing that work against the interests of producers and families alike. When, ac- cording in the Federal Trade Commission, supermarkets enjoy a? DM return on in- vestment. when monopoly in the manu- facture of farm machinery costs farmers a quarter of a billion dollars each year, when monopolistic meatpacking robs consumers of a half a billion dollars annually, when bread prices rise nearly 17% at the same time flour prices fall 25%, and when shoppers continue to be misled by labeling and ad- vertising that distorts the truth about nutri- tion. It doesn't take an expert to conclude that manufacturers and middlemen need to be brought into line?and fast. It's not enough to talk about vigorous antitrust enforcement in litigation that will take years and may consume millions of dollars. In food, as in fuel and medical care?and in every industry that is vital to daily sur- vival?legislation is needed that would shift the burden of proof against those wielding coneentrateer or Irresponsible economic pow- er. Wherever those interests fail to justify their structurls and practices to fair-minded melt and women, they must be broken up or subjected to whatever controls are needed to create prices people can afford, under marketing principles people can accept. 'What all of this adds up to is a specific instance of that principle I described on the day I announced my candidacy: Above all, what this nation and the world need Is a commitment to a common existence_a sharing ,of benefits and burdens in a com- munity of interest between groups that can- not succeed or even survive unless they come to perceive their mutuality of concern and learn to act in creative concert rather than divisive competition. We have long talked about turning our swords into plowshares. But the truth is: We have yet to make the most of the plow- shares already available. When the world's most resourceful farmer, working the world's richest soil with the world's most advanced agricultural technology are manipulated by politics, subordinated to middlemen, and pitted against both consumer needs and the realities of hunger and malnutrition, we can be sure the fault ilea not with those who produce our food but with those whom we have elected to high office. It is time to bring new vision and new leadership to the farm and food policies of America. That is ray pledge in this campaign: it will be the commitment of my presidency. A LETTER FROM THE HEART HON. ALBERT W. JOHNSON OF PENNSYLVANIA IN ilia HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Tuesday, December 16, 1975 Mr. JOHNSON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I was quite pleased last week to notice that a letter to the editor had been published in the Bradford, Pa. Era which was written by Mrs. Sarah Smith. Mrs. Smith is a resident of East Smeth- port, Pa., which is located in my 23rd Congressional District. Mrs. Smith calls on the people of the United States to pray for our Nation during these troubled times, and also comments on the belief that prayer and Bible reading should be allowed in the public schools. I would like to share Mrs. Smith's warm letter from the heart with my colleagues. The letter is as follows: OTIIER VOICES Dear Sir: While reading The Era Saturday, Nov. 22, I read where President Ford picked certain Bible verses to be read for eight days beginning Nov. 23 through Nov. 30. Being a Christian I know this is a good idea, not only for the eight days mentioned, but all year round. This great country of ours can stand a lot of Bible reading and prayers. As I stated in an editorial last spring about prayers and Bible reading being out of our schools, that's when some of our young peo- ple started a life of crime. Many children never hear the word of God, only when it's used as a swear word. In the Era Nov. 15 our Congressman, A. W. Johnson, (In whose home here In Smethport I work as part-time house- maid and caretaker), had an article about putting prayers back in our schools. After working in their home over twenty years and the many talks we have had about this. I really know he means it, but one man can- not do it alone. Our whole nation must stand for the cause. As we read in the passages from the Bible given by President Ford, let us also read and remember- 2 Chronicles, 7:14?"If my people which are called by my name shall humble them- selves and pray, and seek my face, and turn from their wicked ways, then I will hear from heaven and forgive their sin and will heal their land." We all know our country needs a lot Of APes: E67,23 healing. We also know that our country was founded for religious rights and it seems that even this is being taken away from us. So as we stand on the threshhold of our 200- year celebration next year, let everyone of God's people pray for our nation. It can still be a nation to be proud of. So let's all of us that are called by His name and those who wish to be called by His name humble themselves and pray. I know our God will hear and answer. This may not get printed before Thanksgiving day, but it Is for all the year round. Those that claim to love the Lord, please pray without ceasing for our country. MTS. SARAH SMITH. ENERGY CONFLRENCE REPORT SPEECH OF HON. RICHARDSON PREYER OF NORTH CAROLINA IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Monday, December 15, 1975 Mr. PREYER. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased by that part of the text recom- mended by the conference report to ac- company S. 622 which adds a new sec- tion 11 to the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973 and which deals with the regulation which the 1973 act mandated the President to issue under section 4(a). The new section 11 will re- quire the President to "promulgate, pur- suant to the limitations and authority under section 12, such amendment, or amendments, to the regulation promul- gated under section 4(a) as he deter- mines are necessary or appropriate? first, to modify any provisions of such regulation In a manner which is consist- ent with the attainment, to the maxi- mum extent practicable, or objectives specified in section 4(b) (1) ; or second, to eliminate any provisions of such regu- lation no longer necessary to provide for the attainment of such objectives." Pres- idential action would follow a hearing procedure which would allow interested parties to comment on the operation of the existing regulation. My interest in this section results from my concern that the existing regulation works to stifle competition although the law, and the clear congressional intent, requires FEA to "restore and foster com- petition." The relevant section, section 4(b) (1) of the 1973 act, says that the regulation shall provide for? (D) preservation to an economically sound and competitive petroleum industry; in- cluding the priority needs to restore and foster competition in the producing, refining. distribution, marketing, and petrochemical sectors of such industry, and to preserve the competitive viability of independent refin- ers, small refiners, nonbranded independent marketers, and branded independent market- ers; (emphasis added). However, one section of the regulation now in effect, section 211.63, does pre- cisely the opposite, and would appear to lock in a monopoly of wholesale mar- keters while keeping out new competi- tors. Until recently?November 24?this regulation said: - All supplier/purchaser relationships in effect under contracts for sales, purchases and exchanges of domestic crude oil on De- cember 1, 1973, shall remain in effect for the duration of this program. . . . Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 E&724 ? Approved For Release 2001/11/01 ? CIA-RDP77.M00144a000400100.018-1 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? Extensions of Remarks December 16, 1975 Thus, the regulation requires producers to continue sales to the same marketers with whom they were doing business on December 1, 1973, and prohibits new crude oil marketers from purchases which would disturb these relationships. No provision is made by which new crude oil marketing companies may obtain supply sources. Competition is denied. The effect of this is to freeze in, pro- tect and perpetuate a monopoly. Data filed by one of these companies with the SEC reveals an enlargement of profits under the challenged regulation which resulted in those profits jumping from $19 million in 1973 to$59 million in 1974. Per barrel profits had a corresponding Increase. The U.S. District Court for the western district of Texas, San Antonio Division, in a decision October 6, 1975, captioned Basin, Inc. v. Federal Energy Adminis- tration, Civil Action No. 75-CA 250, is- sued a preliminary injunction against PEA. It ruled: There is a substantial question as to whether section 211.63 of the regulations, Insofar as it denies plaintiff as a crude oil marketing company the right to purchase crude on and makes no provision for alloca- tion of supply purchased by the crude oil Marketing industry on a fair and equitable basis among the members of that industry Is in compliance with the Congressional mandate of the Emergency Petroleum Allo- cation Act of 1973 to restore, foster, and preserve competition in all segments of the petroleum industry. . . The court found that as a result "the plaintiff will in all likelihood be forced to discontinue its business." Clearly free enterprise competition was not being served by the regulation in the court's mind and an independent business was threatened by the enforcement of a reg- ulation which this Congress did not an- ticipate in its 1973 act and which is con- trary to the intent of the Congress in encouraging competition. The FEA appealed that decision and amended its regulations. On the eve of the argument in the Court of Appeals, after months in which PEA acknowledged inequity in the ex- , isting regulation, the new regulation was Published. The announcement identified the purpose of the new regulation as "to allow for the new entry into the business of marketing crude oil"?conceding the inequity the court had already found. However, the new language then ne- gated the impact it should have afforded by requiring as a condition to the estab- lishment of a new supplier-purchaser relationship that the new wholesale marketer obtain from the refiner "their written consent to the proposed supplier substitution." Commonsense tells us that few refiners, if any, would want to con- sent to the substitution. He already has a relationship with the entrenched large operator who is protected by the FEA regulations and the refiner would not imperil that arrangement by telling the marketer to stop selling to the refiner, move over and give up part of the busi- ness to the little competitor. All the competition the 1973 law envisioned is undone by a telephone call between the earties to the existing relationship. It would appear that the new regulation might become an invitation to collusion arid clearly violates the spirit of the sotutory mandato for competition. The joint explanatory statement of tie conference committee on the bill which became the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, said of section 4 (b) : It is imperative that the Federal Govern- rent now accept its responsibility to inter- v 3ne in this marketplace to preserve compe- l-on and to assure an equitable distribution o critically short supplies. Toward this end, tie conference substitute requires the Pres- Went to promptly implement a mandatory anocation program which must be drafted so as to accomplish Congressionally defined o4jectives. These are set out principally in s,)ction 4( b) of the conference substitute. ery generally stated they establish guide- nes for the priority uses of fuels covered by this Act and set forth standards of action concerning the competitive structure of the industry and general economic policy to be followed in the establishment of the fuel ailocation program. (Italics added.) The history of the efforts of smaller, independent marketers to engage in the lind of competition mandated by the 1973 law is best told in the San Antonio eeetsion. The FEA regulation does not foster competition; it stifles it. The new regulation offers no real change. The new section 11 is the best hope we resently have for a real change. It is ur best hope for the kind of competi- tion the Congress intended in 1973 and ihich it must reaffirm today. U.S. SECRET INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA HON. ANDREW YOUNG Or GEORGIA IN THE HOUSE OF REPRE'SENTATIVES Tuesday, December 16, 1975 Mr. YOUNG of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, s we now witness the agony of civil strife in the newly independent African state of Angola, we are more each day made :mare of the covert role our Nation is playing in this tragedy. This dangerous eourse, embarked upon by the executive 1)ranch of government in the spring, is 'reing challenged in the Congress and by .eublic interest groups increasingly across )ur Nation as an inappropriate response ,0 southern Africa events. John Marks, author of the article in- serted below, represents this growing sosition of advocacy. Currently, he is an Associate of the Center for National security Studies in Washington and is loauthor of the book, "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence." He has served as an Ixecutive assistant to Senator CLIPPORD :14?ASE of New Jersey and also as an assist- Int to the director of the State depart- nent of intelligence, Mr. Ray Cline. I have recently returned from a visit o Zambia where in conversations with ,iberation groups based in that country and with President Kenneth Kaunda and Foreign Minister Rupiah Banda much of John Marks' analysis was confirmed :through their observations. I believe, Mr. Speaker, that it is crucial that the Congress act now to cut off the flow of U.S. funding to various factions In Angola and that all U.S. military in- volvement in the way of armaments and supplies be immediatel v discontinued. The Congress must havt the courage to stipulate that outside intervention on the Part of South Africa aid the military escalation supported by I ne Soviet Union, Cuba and above all the United States must cease and that an African initiated political solution ought to be a priority. Angola, after years of truggle to liber- ate itself from the cruel power of Portu- guese colonialism, should not have to suf- fer a more devastating period of external power partitioning. Ae Iola, after 500 Years of.imperial domination, should and must be left alone to cu)rdinate its own prospects of nationhood. There is no basis, Mr. Speaker, for the United States to wield its vast power within the confines of the fragile new State of Angola. To cohtinue along the path of covert or overt ietervention there will be a monstrous mistake for our na- tional destiny and pee plehood. I urge every one of my colleaeues to read the article below and then to act decisively to change this course oC American his- tory: Tns SECRET WAR ANGOLA (By John Ma-ks) The United States is tod.iy deeply involved In a war in Angola. Like the Vietnamese and Laotian conflicts in their early years, the Angolan war is?as far as the public and most of the Congress are concerned?a secret war, rim by the CIA. But a was true in Indo- china, the President himsglf has been mak- ing the key decisions. In 'act, at about the same time last spring that the Indochina war was finally ending and toe administration seemed determined to show its toughness (d la Mayaguez), Preside: t Ford personally authorized the CIA to provide covert money and arms to two African in iependence groups In Angola. The Soviet Union, Cube, and other coun- tries have steadily increa,ed their aid to a third Angolan liberation group in recent months, and the adminisi nation has reacted by escalating the CIA programs. A well- placed government source reports that the CIA is now spending "in Vie tens Of millions of dollars" on the Angolsn war. According to the source, U.S. Air Foi C-Ml transport jets, flying in behalf of th.- CIA are regularly landing at the airport in K:nshasa, Zaire (the former Congo, bordering on Angola), and disgorging tons of militia' r supplieS, includ- ing machine guns, light artillery, and 41111- munition; these supplies are in turn being flown into Angola by smal planes. According to another government source, Henry Kissinger pushed 1 ird last spring for the CIA intervention. "Honry wanted to be told why we should in ervene," says the source. "not why not." Ma oy within the gov- ernment, including Nathaniel Davis, then the State Department's highest official for African affairs, were opposed, but Kissinger carried the bureaucratic Aruggle, first at a meeting of the supersecrel 40 Committee and then, ultimately, when toe President gave his approval or?as the policy-makers say-- "signed off on" the secret war. The President's momont of truth, the source believes, came lad.t spring when he endorsed the decision of the 40 Committee (chaired by Kissinger) to give several hun- dred thousand dollars in "overt "black bag" funds to Jonas Savimbi, head of 'UNITA, the independence group baseo in southern An- gola. The immediate quest ton, in the source's words, wa,-, whether or not "to put Savimbi in the genie, to have the =-1A give him some Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 De4mber 16, IF F T eeSierdaggfOr&E' iffEbit9A--- Ripxvxybonoi Iggivi) 00018-1 By this, he explains, the US government provided the Salazar dictatorship with a modest degree of military and political sup- port; took a public stance in favor of non- violent change in the colonies; and secretly subsidized (but never with enough support to turn the tide) independence groups com- mitted to armed revolution against Portugal. The official says that the CIA had the "habit of picking out single individuals and making them our guys, somehow assuming they would turn out all right. It was mainly a cash-in-the-envelope kind of thing?con- science money to show American good in- tentions." In Mozambique, the source notes, the CIA's man was Eduardo Mondlane (the FRELIMO leader who was assassinated a few years ago), and in Angola it was Holden Ro- berto. Roberto's FNLA operated out of bases in Zaire?as it still does?and ranch of the CIA's assistance to. Roberto flowed through the CIA's surrogate, Zaire's Mobutu. In 1969, according to the official, the Nixon adminis- tration decided to end the CIA's "program aid" to the independence groups, as part of a larger Nixonian policy to ease up American pressure against white-minority rule in southern Africa. The CIA did, however, re- tain a connection with Roberto, according to three State Department aides, paying him as an intelligence, source. Therefore, when the Ford administration decided last spring to become actively?if covertly?involved in An- gola, it was a relatively simple matter, as one official describes it, "to turn Roberto back on." In fact, Roberto was never really turned off, since in the 1969-1975 period, his brother- in-law Mobutu supplied him with large amounts of weapons and other aid. That aid came at least indirectly from Mobutu's most important foreign benefactor, the United States. Mobutu told a visiting US congres- sional delegation this summer that he ex- pects to be reimbursed for all the assistance he has given to Roberto. Knowledgeable Capitol Hill aides believe that the pay back has come in the form of the administration's current request for a $79 million aid pack- age for Zaire (roughly a ten-fold increase over last years aid levels). Nevertheless, Henry Kissinger explained to Congress that stepped up military assistance ($19 million of the total amount) was needed "to help modernize (Zaire's) forces and meet its le- gitimate defense needs in view of increased threats to its security?particularly that posed by the instability in Angola." Kissinger failed to mention that Zaire needed the help because it had been giving away large amounts of its own military supplies to Holden Roberto's FNLA or that Zaire's own troops had been fighting in Angola. (It is illegal under US law for American military to be used for "non-defensive" purposes or to be transferred to a third country.) The administration has so far chosen to keep most members of Congress (and of course, the public) in the dark about the secret war in Angola, although in accordance with a 1974 law it informed a few senior members of six House and Senate commit- tees last spring of the CIA's actions. One ad- ministration official who opposed the policy noted how disappointed he and his fellow dissenters were that the Senate Foreign Re- lations Committee (of whose members only Senators John Sparkman and Clifford Case were briefed) did nothing to stop the CIA's paramilitary programs. He believes that "especially in the context of the times and current attitudes toward the CIA," the sen- ators could have threatened to go public with the information or at least call a meet- ing of the full committee to discuss the situ- ation. Neither Sparkman nor Case?nor any of the witting members of the five other committees?did anything of the kind. Another senator?Who was not briefed? notes that the oversight law requires only E 6725 chfps." The Agency was already providing a modest level of secret assistance to another faction, the FNLA in the north, but the source states that Kissinger and Ford were clearly aware that adding umrrA to the American payroll would signal a major es- calation, indeed a commitment declaring that the UnitectStates was not about to allow the third independence group, the MPLA, to control Angola. Angola, which was granted independence by Portugal on November 11, is a rich, fertile Country, twice the size of Texas, blessed with abundant supplies of oil, iron ore, atomic minerals, and diamonds. State Department officials deny that the American interest there is economic, although the number two man in the Defense Department has told a congressional committee that American pol- icy is tied to "resources we will need in the future." The administration claims that its principal concern In Angola is to show the Soviets that they cannot make advance in Africa through the victory of the group they (and many other countries) support, the MPLA. Unfortunately, the conflict inside Angola does not easily reduce itself to an ideological struggle, a conflict between communist and capitalists. All three of the independence groups have come out in favor of some form of African socialism, and each has a strong tribal base. The MPLA is unquestionably to the left of the other two groups, but then the MPLA has also been able to work out a rela- tively smooth working relationship with Gulf Oil, which continues to operate extremely productive wells in the northern enclave of Cabinda. Moreover, independence groups with similar views to the MPLA have taken over in Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, without any apparent damage to American interests. . Henry Kissinger stated on September 23, "We are most alarmed at the interference of extra-continental powers [in Angola] who do not wish Africa well, and whose involve- ment is inconsistent with the promise of true independence." He was presumably talking about the Soviet Union and not the United States. In any case, with both pow- ers currently stepping up their involvement, the stage has been set in Angola for a classic, cold war confrontation. The result, so far, aecarding to a well-placed State Department official, has been "a mutual ante-raising, an Inconclusive situation, and a hele of a lot dead Angolans." The great power conflict in Angola is fur- ther complicated by the fast that a lot of other foreign -countries are involved. A gov- ernment source reports that the aridai have joined with the United States (and South Africa) in aiding UNITA. French assistance is going to the FNLA through Zaire. Zaire it- self is helping both UNITA and the FNLA, arii in fact, a key element in the American decision to intervene was the fervent urging of Zaire's President Mobutu, who is the United States' most important client in Africa. The Chinese had been giving mili- tary aid and training to the FNLA, but they have now backed off as the US rote has Increased. Portuguese mercenaries are serv- ing with UNITA and the MLA, and two gov- ernment officials report that another factor In the US intervention was a desire to coun- ter leftist forces in Portugal who support the MPLA. Support for the MPLA has arrived from Cuba and from newly independent Mozambique. Still other countries are do- ing what they can for the faction of their choice. All three independence groups have foreigners fighting with them. If this all seems horribly complicated, it Is. There is some thought in Washington that the administration believes it can get away with waging secret war in Angola be- 'cause the public will not be able to under- stand what the initials stand for or who is on what side. But the country with the largest direct involvement in Angola is currently white- supremacist South Africa. South African troops entered Angola in late October, ac- cording to communications intercepts picked up by US intelligence, and there are now two separate mechanized South African units, With a strength between 1000 and 1500 men each, operating inside the country. Addition- ally, a separate armored column of about 1500 Africans and 500 white mercenaries? equipped in South Africa and staging from South African bases?has in the last month been steadily advancing through southern Angola and seizing key positions from the MPLA, ostensibly in behalf of UNITA and the FNLA which have joined together in a shaky alliance. A State Department policy-maker, while acknowledging that the South Africans were- supporting the same groups as the United States, says rather defensively, "The South" African operations are not in concert with us. We did not initiate them. Whatever they're doing Is strictly on their own." There may well not be any overt [but, of course, Covent US-South African coopera- tion lie Angola, as there was in the Congo (now Zaire) during the early 1960's when South African intelligence worked together with the CIA to recruit mercenary forces fighting in an earlier CIA secret war. The CIA may not even be taking advantage of what three government sources describe as the "close" liaison relationship which the CIA has maintained for many years with South African intelligence. But even if the OIA has been able to resist joint planning with its South African counterparts, there is no way the United States is going to avoid, as one official says, "being tainted with the South African brush." For all effects and purposes, the official believes, the South Af- ricens are "our faithful allies," backing the same two Angolan clients. As the secret war proceeds, the official believes that the United States is building up an increasing debt to the South Africans, who "are not at all ad- verse to calling in their markers." Indeed, Smith. Africa already has asked the United States and other western countries to in- crease their aid to South African-supported forces in Angola. Because invading columns must maintain radio communication with their own head- quarters, supply bases, and supporting air- craft, American policy-makers have been able to keep track of the South African advances inside Angola by having the National Se- curity , Agency (NSA) monitor their radio channels. Similar techniques have been used to produce data on increased Soviet and Cuban activity, and the administration has net hesitated to selectively leak this highly classified information to the press. Thus, the New York Times reported on November 21 that 3009 Cuban "fighting men and advis- ers" have been sent to Angola "in recent weeks" te support the MPLA. No mention was made in the article of the South African frees that had already invaded the coun- try a month before, although the "United States officials" who provided the story pre- sumably had access to the intelligence prov- ing the South African presence. The Milos article does state (in the 13th paragraph) that "an undisclosed number of South Af- rican military advisors" were with UNITA's forces in the south. Although CIA money and other support has been going to UNITA since last spring, the Agency has seemed content to largely leave the southern front to the South Africans while the CIA's major effort has been in the north in behalf of Holden Roberto's FNLA. According to five different CIA, 'White House, and State Department sources, Roberto has been secretly on the CIA payroll since 1962. A former White House aide recalls that during the Johnson administration, Amer- ican policy toward the Portuguese colonies was "to play all ends against the middle." Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 E 6726 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? Extensions of Remarks Decemb 'r 16, 1975 that the committees be informed, and makes Ito provision for congressional review or ap- proval. The senator notes, however, that the CIA has taken the lack of Congressional ob- jections as their tacit approval for covert operations. This fall, after the New York Times' Leslie Oelb wrote the first article about CIA assist- ance to the FNLA and UNITA, Senator Dick Clark, the chairman of the Foreign Relations subcommittee on Africa, asked that the full committee be briefed by the CIA and the State Department on the US role in Angola. According to reliable sources, only "three or four" senators out of 16 members bothered to attend. Partial accounts of the adminis- tration briefing, which apparently centered on covert arms shipments to the FNLA and UNITA, quickly leaked out to the New York Times and the Washington Post, but nothing appeared in the press about the large sums of money involved or the growing South African presence. Finally knowledgeable about what was go- ing on, Senator Clark had a real problem. He opposed the CIA's secret war in Angola, but the testimony he had received was classified. Revealing it would have put him in violation of the Senate's rules. Congressman Michael Harrington had faced the very same dilemma last year when he read a secret transcript in which CIA Director Colby laid out how the CIA had destabilized the Allende govern- ment in Chile from 1970 through 1973. Har- rington chose to disclose the information, claiming a higher responsibility to reveal CIA misdeeds. As a result, Harrington was fiercely attacked within the House for break- ing the rules, and he was forced to submit to censure proceedings. Clark has chosen not to go public. Instead, he is fighting back through the slow process of legislation. He now plans to introduce an amendment that would cut off all military aid?overt and covert?to Angola and Zaire. When I called Senator Clark, he would not talk about the secret war. He stated, "If I were to tell you that the US was involved in covert activities in Angola, I could be kicked out of the Senate." He agreed that his free- dom of action had been limited by receiving the classified briefing, but he stressed that having access to the facts would not prevent him from taking a position against the se- cret war in Angola. Clark traces the problem in Angola to the "super-powers who want to play out the cold war in every part of the world." He believes that "the super-powers ought to be able to get together with a spirit of detente to say it's in their own best interest?and that's all anyone seems concerned with?not to let this thing get out of hand." For the moment at least, the super-powers along with the South Africans and other outsiders seem perfectly willing to fight on to the last Angolan. There is no evidence of restraint on any side nor. of meaningful negotiations which could bring the blood- shed to an end. A clear military victory for any faction appears unlikely, and the alter- natives seem to be either an endless war or partition of the country into three feuding parts. (The latter solution might not be too objectionable to US policy-makers with a South African-supported UNITA state in the south, Holden Roberto's FNLA in the north, the MPLA squeezed into the middle, and the northern enclave of Cabinda, where Gulf oil has large holdings, either controlled by Roberto or brother-in-law Mobutu who has been openly coveting it for Zaire.) Nevertheless, in violation of the constitu- tional provision that only Congress can de- clare war, an American president has once again used the CIA to take the country into a secret war. Against Castro's Cuba, the tac- tic was a miserable failure. It didn't work in Vietnam where the CIA's secret involvement grew into the commitment of half a million American troops. Nor did it work in Laos where the Meo tribesmen who fought the Cl Ws Armee Clandestine were largely deci- sted by the time the US government was forced to withdraw. All one can say is, here we go again. . . aielED FOR INCREASED HEW COM- MITMENT TO BLACK COLLEGES HON. CHARLES B. RANGEL OF rirvir YORK rl'HE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Tuesday, December 16, 1975 Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, the Ares- el it economic crisis is severely affecting tie black colleges in America. These are mstitutions which have historically pro- vi educational opportunities for mi- nority students who would otherwise be denied access to higher education. The esidents of a number of black colleges met recently with David Matthews, Sec- rutary of Health, Education, and Wei- ii re, to discuss the plight of their schools al id the urgent need for an increased Yuderal commitment to their survival x id expansion. I include at this point in the RECORD mmis accounts of the meeting and dis- cr tssion : 'STY-POUR BLACK COLLEGE PRESIDENTS TELL HEW or NEED FOR PARITY WASIIINGTON.?The presidents and aides sm 44 black colleges and universities met sa A Tuesday with the new Secretary of H ualth, Education and Welfare, Dr. David ithews, to press for parity of educational fa ilities for their students. While they received no definite promises fr sm Secretary Mathews, former president of II e University of Alabeana who knows many ce the black college heads personally, his 01 ice has ladiexted that there will be follow- u meetings with these colleges to find ways ee meeting their needs. Speaking for the colleges were; Dr. Charles S. Lyons, Jr., president of the conference Ii onsoring body, the National Association Ct. r Equal Opportunity in Higher Education and also chancellor of Fayetteville, N.C., S- ate University who presided; Dr. Roy D. H Aeon, vice president of the a,ssociation and esident of' Hampton Institute. Dr. Milton K. Curry, Jr.. president of the U sited Negro College Fund and heed of n shop College; and Dr. Charles L. Hayes, puesident of Albany, Oa., State College and ci .airman of the Office for Advancement of P iblic Negro College Advisory Committee. All ol the colleges represented are members of as- s( elation. Mark Fisher, IV, is its executive et eretary. Goal set by the speakers was for a leader- slip partnership between their colleges and tie federal government to achieve parity for t] e historically black colleges by the 200. If Mich a partnership is not set in motion, the Cs liege heads expressed fear that the rela- te ee gap between the number of whites and blacks who finish college will continue tx: widen. The gap, they said, widened from es van percent in 1960 to 13 percent in 1974. Major emphasis was placed on the need ft r more opportunities at black colleges and nversitles for their students to pursue p ofessional and technical education. For ce ample, there are only two black medical celleges with a third being developed at ()rehouse. Also the college heads pressed for more fends for student aid programs. They said they now need $250 million for such aid, h stead of the$100 million they are receiving. Dr. Mathews, Who indicated a great under- standing of the problems of black colleges, was introduced by Dr. Joffre T. Whisenton, a former teacher of educatiot al psychology at the University of Alabatne. whom he has brought hen) to serve as he special assistant for educational policy. For the past several year, Dir. Whisenton has been with the Southern Association of Co leges. The following black colleges and univer- sities were represented at the conference: Alabama A & M, Lomax-Han eon college, Miles College, Oakwood College, etillinan. College, Tuskegee Institute, Delaware Slate, Federal City College, Howard, Wash.ngten Tech. Ed- ward Waters College, Albany State, Atlanta University, Fort Valley State, MLYITIS Brown, Pine, Southern, Bowie State, Morgan State, Shaw College at Detroit. Al corn, Rust, Utica Jr. College, Lincoln University of Missouri, Barber-Scotia, Fayetteville State, Johnson C. Smith, Livingstone, Shaw, St. Augustine's College, Wilberforce, Oheyney State, Lincoln, Benedict, South Carolina State, Fisk, Lane, Tennessee State University, Bishop, Texas Southern, Wiley, Hampton, et. Paul's College and Virginia. Union. BLACK COLLEGE PREsreretee TELL HEW OF NERD FOR PAR air WASHINGTON..--"We boldly propose that the federal government recognize the his- torically black colleges as ehe major archi- tects, traditionally, of equal opportunity with attainment and productivity," a group of black college presidents told Dr. P. David Mathews, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare in a meeting last week. "We further propose that in concert with this additional development, HEW develop a leadership partnership with the historically black colleges for the purpose of achieving parity in all areas of higher education and parity in all professional and technical fields in the work force." The National Association for Equal Op- portunity in Higher Education met with Mathews, a former president of the Uni- versity of Alabama, to map out a "Partner- ship for Leadership in the Development of a Year 2000 Plan for Parity In Education." They recommended to Mathews that blacks participate in the policy planning and re- view process for all major HEW agencies; that the federal government undertake an annual collection of racial data in higher education; that programs having a "signi- ficant impact on equalizing opportunity for blacks" not be regionalized and that dis- criminatory funding patterns be ended in minority programs. A black college president panel told Mathew that black colleges play a special "role" in higher education. "We have 100 years of experience in deeling with those victimized by elementary and secondary school discriminatory patterns," said Dr. Roy D. Hudson, president of Hempton Institute. "More than half the baccalaureate degrees are given by black colleges," Dr. Milton IC. Curry, president of Bishop College, said that black Institutions "trained young people to believe le themselves and told them if they had integrity or heart and developed their intellieence, they could make great achievements." Mathews pledged "cooperation" with the black college organization, representing over 100 black colleges, but did not detail any specific programs. He called the black col- leges a "reservoir of hope and determina- tion." Afterwards he expressed ivmpathy for the plight of many black colleges caught between desegregation decrees aimed at integrating their facilities to a "tiepin; point" where in effect they may no longer remain "black." Black college enrollment is now approach- ing 200,000 with a pattern of growth from about 140,000 in 1966 to almost 200,000 in 1975. Freshman enrollment. increased by 10.7 Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 December 16, 1975 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-- HOUSE H 12665 tleman from Washington nor anybody ? in this room nor the President of the United States can tell us today where he is going to spend or cut that $395 billion. Mr. ULLMAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise to close the debate on this issue. I want to commend the members of the conference and particularly the staff 'for the monumental job of getting the paper work done in such a short period of time. This is a responsible bill. The economy of this country is in trouble. The indica- tors during the past 2 months have indi- cated a downturn at a time when we ought to .see a strong upturn in the economy. It would be suicidal. in my judgment to allow a tax increase of major proportions to go into, place in January. This Congress cannot allow that to hap- pen. If the President persists in his effort to move to a spending ceiling in fiscal - year 1977 on this bill and decides to veto the bill, I am con#derit that this Con- gress can override.the veto. This tax cut extension is of importance to the Nation. It is something; it seems to me, that we cannot go home without providing. This is a responsible package. We have considered it carefully. It is a worthwhile bill. ? We have extended for six months the withholding. levels that are now in place?the withholding rates we put in place in the Tax Reduction Act of 1975 and we have also extended the tax cuts for this 6 months. Mr. Speaker, this 6-month period will give the Congress an opportunity to work its will on the tax reform bill that is now pending in the other body. At that time we can also look at the economy to see whether the tax reduction should be extended. Mr. Speaker, this is a sound Package. I urge its approval overwhelmingly by the Congress. , The SPEAKER. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Oregon (Mr. ULLivrax) that the 'House suspend the rules and agree to the con- ference report on the bill (H.R. 5550). The question' was taken. Mr. SCHNEE'BELI. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays. The yeas and nays were ordered. The vote was taken by electronic de- vice, and there were?yeas 2-56, nays 160, not voting 18, as follows: [Roll No. '1981 YEAS-256 Abzug Bolling de la Garza Adams Honker Delaney Addabbp Bra demas Dellums All en Breckinridge Dent Ambro Brinkley Derrick Anderson, Brodhead Diggs Calif. Brooks Dingell Andrew s, Brown, Calif. Dodd N. Dak. Burke, Calif. Downey, N.Y. Annunzio Burke, Mass, Drinan Ashley Burton, John Minoan, Oreg. Aspin Burton, Philip Early AuCoin Carney Eckhardt Badillo Carr Edgar Baldus Chisholm Edwards, Calif. Barrett Clay Eilberg Baucus Cohen Emery Beard, R.I. Collins, Ill. Evens, Colo. Bedell Conte Evan's, /nd. Bergland Conyere Eying, Tenn. Bevill Corman Fary Biaggi Cornell Fascell Binghp m Cotter Fisher Blanchard D'Amoure Fithian Biouin Daniels, N.J. Flood Boggs Danielson Florio Boland. Davis Foley Ford, Tenn, Forsythe Fountain Fraser Fuqua Giaimo Gibbons Ginn Gonzalez Green Gude Hall Hamilton Hammer- schmidt Hanley Hannaford Harkin Harrington Harris Hawkins Hayes, Ind. Hays, Ohio Heckler, Mass. Hefner Helstoski Henderson Hicks Holland Holtzman Horton Howard Howe Hubbard Hughes Jenrette Johnson, Calif. Jones, Ala. Jones, N.C. . Jones, Olda. Jordan Earth Kastenmeier Kazen Keys Koch Krebs LeFalce Landrum Leggett Lehman Levitas Litton Lloyd, Calif. Lloyd, Tenn. Long, La, Long, Md. McCormack McDade McFall Abdnor Alexander Anderson, Ill. Andrews, N.C. Archer Armstrong Ashbrook Befalls Bauman Beard, Tenn. Bell Bennett Biester Bowen Breaux Broomfield Brown, Mich. -Brown, Ohio Broyhill Buchanan Burgener Burleson, Tex. Burlison, Mo. Butler Byron Garter Cederberg Chappell Clancy ClaUsen, Don H. Clawson, Del Cleveland Cochran Collins, Tex, Conable Conlan Coughlin Crane Daniel, Dan Daniel, R. W. Derwinskl Devine Dickinson McHugh McKay Madden Madigan Maguire Mahon Matsunaga Mazzolt Meeds Melcher Meyner Mezvinsky Mikva Miller, Calif. Mills Mineta Minish Mink Mitchell, Md. Moakley Moffett Mollohan Morgan Moss Mottl Murphy, Ill. Murphy, N.Y. Murtha Myers, Pa. Natcher Neal Nedzi Nix Nolan Nowak oberstar Obey O'Brien O'Hara O'Neill Ottinger Patten, N.J. Patterson, . Calif. Pattison, N.Y. Pepper Perkins Peyser Pickle Pike Pressler Preyer Price Railsback Rangel Rees Reuss Richmond Riegle Rinaldo NAYS-160 Downing, 17a. Duncan, Tenn. du Pont Edwards, Ala. English Erlertborn Esch Eshleman Fenwick Findley Fish Flowers Flynt Frenzel Frey Gilman Goldwater Gooding Gradison Grassley Guyer Hagedorn Haley Hansen Harsha Hastings Passman Hechler, W. Va. Pettis Hightower Poage Hillis Pritchard Holt Quie Hungate Quillen Hutchinson Randall Hyde Regula Ichord Rhodes Jacobs Roberts Jarman Robinson Jeffords Rousselot Johnson, Colo. Ruppe Johnson, Pa. Barasin Kasten Satterfield Kelly Schneebell Kemp Schulze Ketch-um Sebellus Kindness Shriver Hisenhoover Rodino Roe Rogers Emmen? Rooney Rose Rosenthal Rostenkowski Roush Roybal Russo Ryan St Germain Santini Sarbanes Scheuer Schroeder Seiberling Sharp Shipley Sikes Simon Sisk Slack Smith, ]:ows Solarz Spellman Staggers Stanton, James V. Stark Steed Stokes Stratton Studds Sullivan Symington Taylor, N.C. Thornton Traxler Tsongas 'Ullman Van Deerlin Vander Veen Vanik Vigorito Weaver Whalen White Wilson, C. H. wirth Wolff Wright Yates Ye,tron Young. Ga. Young Tex. Zablocki Zeferetti Krueger Lagomarsino Latta Lent Lott Lujan McClory McCloskey McCollister McDonald McEwen Mann Martin Mathis Michel Milford Miller, Ohio Mitchell, N.Y. Montgomery Moore Moorhead, Calif. Mosher Myers, Ind. Nichols Shuster Skubitz Smith, Nebr. Snyder Spence Stanton, J. William Steelman Steiger, Ariz. Steiger, Wis. Stuckey Burke, Fla. Casey Ford, Mich. Gaydos Hebert Heinz Symms Talcott Taylor, Mo. Teague Thone Treen Vander Jagt Waggonner Walsh Wampler Whitehurst NOT VOTING-18 Whitten Wiggins Wilson, Bob Wilson, Tex. Winn Wydler Wylie Young, Alaska Young, Fla. Hinshaw Jones, Tenn. McKinney Macdonald Metcalfe Moorhead, Pa. Patman, Tex. Runnels Stephens Thompson Udall Waxman The Clerk announced the following pairs: On this vote: Mr. Udall and Mr. Thompson for, with Mr. Hebert against. Mr. Waxman and Mr. Moorhead of Penn- sylvania for, with Mr. Stephens against, Mr. Ford of Michigan and Mr. Metcalfe for, with Mr. Casey against. Mr. Macdonald of Massachusetts and Mr. Jones of Tennessee for, with Mr. Runnels against. Messrs. ANDREWS of North Carolina, JEFFORDS, and FOUNTAIN changed their votes from "yea" to "nay." Mr. FOUNTAIN changed his vote from "nay" to "yea." So the motion was rejected. The result of the vote was announced as above recorded. PROVIDING FOR BEGINNING OF 2D SESSION OF THE 94TH CON- GRESS Mr. O'NEILL. Mr. Speaker, I offer 9. joint resolution (H.J. Res. 749) and ask unanimous consent for its immediate consideration. The Clerk read the title of the joint resolution. The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Mas- sachusetts? There was no objection. The Clerk read the joint resolution as follows: HI. RES 749 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the second regular session of the Ninety-fourth Congress shall begin at noon on Monday. January 19, 1976. SEC. 2. That (a) notwithstanding the pro- visions of section 201 of the Act of June 10, 1922, as amended (31 U.S.C. section 11) , the President shall transmit to the Congress not later than January 21, 1976, the budget for the fiscal year 1977, and (b) notwithstanding the provisions of section 3 of the Act of February 20, 1946, as amended (15 U.S.C. sec- tion 1022) , the President shall transmit to the Congress not later than January 26, 1976, the Economic report. The joint resolution was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table. LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM FOR TO- MORROW AND REMAINDER OF WEEK (Mr. O'NEILL was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.) Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 H 12666 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE Dec Mr. O'NEILL. Mr. Speaker, I have taken this time in order that I may give the schedule for today and for tomorrow. Mr. Speaker, all legislation has been completed for today. We will meet to- morrow at 10 a.m., and the program for Wednesday will be as follows: First we will consider H.R. 5559, th tax reduction extension conference re - port. There will be a rule on that, of course, and that will be the first item on the calendar for tomorrow, followett by H.R. 10979, the railroad revitaliza- tion and regulatory reform bill, with an open rule and 2 hems of debate. Then we will bring up H.R. 8235, the Federal Aid Highway Act, with an open rule and 3 hours of debate. The rule ha, already been adopted on that. Next, we will bring up Senate Join-, Resolution 121, the quarterly adjust ments in the support price for milk con ference report. Finally, we will consider H.R. 9771, the Airport and Airways Development Act. with an open rule and 2 hours of debate Mr. Speaker, in view of the fact that the Members are going to the White House tomorrow evening, we would hope to be able to finish at a reasonable hour We would appreciate it if we could keep Members on the floor because there an those who like to ask for quorum calls We would like to finish the _whole schedule at a reasonable hour on Friday in view of the fact that there are a couple of airplane strikes and many 03 the Members of Congress have made ar- rangements to go home. Mr. Speaker, we hope that everybody in the spirit of Christmas, will keep that in mind. That is all the legislation for today. and I thank the Members. U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA (Mr. SEIBERLING ask e and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. SEIBERLING. Mr. Speaker, share the misgivings of the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Mor) on the question of Angola. I wonder whether our coun- try is backing into another Vietnam. The Russian involvement in Angola ia. very disturbing. But so is U.S. inovlve- ment. Particularly disturbing is the fact that the Congress was not consulted in advance about the actions being taker by the administration with regard to Angola. We do not even know for sure what actions are being taken by tlu administration. Furthermore, it appears that once again, high officials of the executivf branch have deliberately lied to us. Two weeks ago at a large dinner in connection with the Pacem in Terris Conference Mr. William Colby, Director of the CIA publicly stated that the United States was not, directly or indirectly, supplying Ony military or paramilitary assistance to any of the factions in Angola. That statement was, as we now know, absol- utely false. We are given the impression that once again, the executive branch is acting unilaterally without approval by Con- gress, without disclosing the facts, and without having made any attempt to bring the conflict before appropriate international organizations, such as the United Nations Security Council. Mr. Speaker, although I would strongly oppose sending U.S. troops to Angola, I am not now prepared to say that the Congress should prohibit any and all forms of assistance to any of the factions in Angola. However, I think it is time the Congress demanded full and accurate disclosure of the facts and the oppor- tunity to participate in the formulation of national policy on this dangerous situation. To that end, I am introducing a resolution to prohibit military assist- ance to any faction in Angola without specific authorization by Congress. osel NEW YORK CONSTRUCTION LABOR ASSAILS INTERSTATE RIP-OFF The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentle- man from New Hampshire (Mr. CLEVE- LAND) is recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. CLEVELAND. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Ohio, the ranking mi- nority member on the Committee on Pub- lic Works and Transportation, and I have received telegrams from the construc- tion industry and trade union locals in New York City protesting the intent to wipe out the West side highway construc- tion as an interstate project under H.R. 8235, the Federal Aid to Highways Act of 1975. New York labor and management make a compelling case that any Interstate capital funds resulting from the inter- state withdrawal would merely allow di- version of city and State capital con- struction funds for operating subsidies, with no net gain in construction for mass transit. I include the text in the RECORD at this point with one caveat: While otherwise an excellent statement, it ap- pears in error in the assertion that trust fund moneys?as distinguished from general revenues?could be diverted temporarily under the "Beame Shuffle." Now, I ask, Mr. Speaker, are we going to upend the entire interstate program from coast to coast and make ourselves party to this brand of mischief? For those Members to whom the text Is not self-explanatory, I commend the minority views in the report to accom- pany HR. 8235 and the "Dear Col- league" circulated to Members Monday evening by the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. HARSHA). The text follows: HR. 8235, DECEMBER 8, 1975, THE 1975 HIGHWAY ACT On behalf of the 100,000 construction tradesmen and the 475 contracting arms in our city alone who would be affected by the above referenced House bill, we wish to thank you for your opposition to the Abzug amendment appearing under section 109, pages 42, etc. We are currently experiencing unemploy- ment of 40% to 90% and disastrous bank- ruptcies on behalf of employers. The west side highway is necessary as a self-help project (no charity) to save New York City. You undoubtedly, in your capacity, have recognized the causes for New York's present economic plight. mber 16, 1975 Transfer of capit ,1 funds to expense budget items: The city of New "Stork administration a past master of and has a long standing practice of transferrtag capital monies or disguising capital inwiles for operating ex- penses. In just last Year's capital budget,$30( million out of $1.1 bIllion went for operat- ing expenses disguisod as capital budge( items and this has be on the history for well into two decades. State bond monies: In late 1960 the voters of the State of Nev: York approved a hige way and mass transii bond issue. These monies were to build among other things, Second Avenue sub- way extemion to al, Bronx. The mon let were diverted to op( -ating expense items and now, we, as New Yorkers, have only ivy() huge holes in the ground on Second Ave- nue and massive unemployment. channel 13, WNET, the Educational and Community Public Service TV station in our area con- ducted a program to 3 past summer where they characterized those financial manipu- lations as "The Great Train Robbery". (A) Irresistible impulse, from over 30 yettrE of seeing how things happen in New York City, the Abzug amendment would once again establish the game plali whereunder the local officials would be subjected to irresistible pressure to cancel the West Side Highway project. (a project that can save New York City) and divert thoi 1 monies to some al- legecl capital subway project. (B) The amendment provides for purchase of passenger equipment, including roiling stock which is once al-ala the old technique used not to build any more subways, and of course, not to build the West Highway. "BEANIE RIDER" TO Tat: URBAN MASS TRAITS- PORTATIMq ACT Mayor Hearne, 51, cough the -Beanie Rider" can now borrow up to 50% of Federal grant moneys allocated to New York for capital construction of mass transit facilities and use said monies for operating expenses, providing a 1.romise is made to re- pay. You know the env cannot repay any- thing, nor will it be :,ble to in the future, except the highways trust fund's money that could be transferred te mass transit can now be used as operating expense funds just on a promise to repay. Please save the city from another two generations of fund .shifting so that we can have jobs and save our city. The Abzug amendment language .s subtle and sophis- ticatedly disguised and hides the actual pro- cedures that will be followed and have been followed. Please save us. General Contractors Association, City of New York; International Union of Operating Engineers, Locals 14 and IS; International Union of Laborers, Locals 731, 1010, 1018, 147, 29; District Council of Carpenters? Timbermen Local 1536; Doekbuilders Local 1456; Metallic Lathers Local 46; Teamsters Local 282. The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentle- man from Connecticut (Mr. MeKiistismy) is recognized for 5 minutes. [Mr. McKINNEY addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarl:s.] The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentle- man from Alaska (Mr. Youlte) is rec- ognized for 5 minute. [Mr. YOUNG of Alaska addressed the House. His remarks v. ill appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.] Approved For Release 2001111101: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 .7.41woroosoloor, Approved For Release 2001/11/01 ? CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 December 18, 1975 CONGRESSIONAL ItECORD ? SENATE S 22805 unilaterally stop our own assistance, at least to the extent that assistance is be- ing put into the civil war within Angola by other outside forces. As I said at the beginning of my re- marks today, in open session, I believe that the policy of the United States should very clearly say that we believe that the people of Angola should be free to make their ozoi decisions about what kind, of government they want. They snould be free to state, without any inter- vention on the part of any other country, which one of the groups of people or leaders within their own country they would select to be their leaders; and that we would hope that not only we would refrain from intervening in their internal political processes but that we have the right to insist that all other countries likewise refrain from interfering in the httesmal political affairs of the nation of Angola. Unfortunately, that is not the situa- tion that exists today in Angola. We have foreign intervention in the internal po- litical affairs of that country. Unfortu- nately, they are not free to make their own decisions today and we would hope that we can apply our diplomatic and economic pressures in a way which is constructive enough to lead to the time that the people of Angola will again be free from the intervention and interfer- ence of foreign countries in their internal affairs. 'Until that time comes, there is, I think, a need for caution in terms of our precipitate withdrawal of our assist- ance to one or two or three factions that exist and the almost predictable course of events that would follow from our withdrawal without any quid pro quo, without any paralleling or corresponding reduction in the efforts of the Soviet Union to bend the events in that country to their own desire. One of the other concerns that I have with the resolution of the Senator from Illinois is the rather broad and inflexible application that is called for in para- graph 4 of the resolution, because that paragraph reads as follows: The President, pursuant to his authority under the Export Administration Act of 1969, should curtail exports to countries which persist in intervening in the conflict in Angola. Mr. President, I think, it would be understood almost from the beginning of any discussion of that provision of the resolution that any Senator representing a farm State is going to be concerned about the application of that language. It has very little standing except to say to the President of the United States, "If other countries are persisting, you shall apply the sanctions of the act." That Would mean, under the Export Adminis- tration Act of 1969, that the President has the authority, and, under this reso- lution, would be directed to use it, to cut off all trade with countries that are in- tervening in Angola. I think we would have an opportunity to adjust to that so far as farm commodities are con- cerned. But we could not adjust to it immediately. The farmers in this country are the most efficient producers in the history of the world when it comes to turning out a greater and greaterllow of agricultural commodities. Since the Korean war, and up until 1973, our policies in the United States have been geared to cope with the surpluses created by that tremen- dous ability to produce. Mr. LONG. Will the Senator yield for a unanimous-consent request? Mr. McCLURE. I shall be glad to yield to the Senator from Louisiana for a unanimous-consent request without los- ing my right to the floor and without the resumption being considered a second speech. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. \ SUSPENSION OF DUTIES OF - \ TAIN SILK?HR. 7727 AMENDMENT NO. 1322 1?. LONG. Mr. President, I int/oduce an endment to H.R. 7727 This amen ent is known as the d adwood bill. It eals with the so-called 4adwood provisio s which simplify the te laws by removin from the Interna} Revenue Revenue Code thos provisions which re obsolete or no long r important and frarely used. Th provi 'ons, which hifre been de- veloped ove a number orears, would repeal almos 150 sectio s of the In- ternal Revenu Code anc would amend more than 850 ? her sect' ns of the Code. The bill also w ld m e other simpli- fying changes su as lhe substitution of the term "ordina i ome" for phrases in present law wh obtain this result by referring to the i 'come as "gain from the sale or exchany' of property which is neither a capital ss 't nor property de- scribed in section 231..' The deleted pr visio would include those which de only ith past years, situations whic were n rowly defined and are unlike to recur, s well as pro- visions which ave largely utlived their usefulness. I some situation, provisions would he ad ed to preserve tie right of persons to ontinue to receil) benefits under Cod provisions which'generally would be o-pealed. The cf.:4 dwood provisions do ot at- tempt to achieve simplification ough substan ive changes in existing law. Theref 0 re, the provisions do not Veal with 6olicy issues or with substan ive chant es in generally applicable p - visio s. I / DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPRO- PRIATIONS, FISCAL YEAR 1976 The Senate continued with the con- sideration of amendment in disagree- ment No. 75 to H.R. 9861, an act making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1976, and for the period beginning July 1, 1976, and ending September 30, 1976, and for other purposes. Mr. McCLURE. Since the Korean war and up until 1973, our policies had to be directed toward what to do with the abil- ity of the farmers of the United States to produce more food than we could con- sume in the markets in our own country. So we had an elaborate system built up-- jerrybuilt, some say?over the years to deal with the twin problems of too much production and how to reduce produc- tion. So we had farmers paid not to produce; we had programs to encourage and to pay farmers for withholding land from production. We had commodity purchase programs in which the Govern- ment bought the commodities off the market, removed them from the market; we had storage programs to pay people to store commodities that were excess to our needs. We had all these programs and we had Public Law 480, which is not a very, euphonious title for a bill which then became known, with more artistic fervor, as the food-for-peace program. Through this, we used our surpluses to try to feed hungry people in this world. All of this *as evidence of the tremen- dous ability of the farmers of this coun- try to produce more than we could con- sume in this country. In 1973, for the first time, because of the demand for food and because of the ability of various foreign countries to purchase that food, we were able to ex- port enough of our surpluses that we began to reach the point that our agri- cultural commodities could find a free market price. Since 1973, those prices have moved to a price that is established by a market and not by a governmental program. That, I believe, Mr. President, has been progress. I think not just the farmers of the United States have benefited greatly from that, but so have the communities in which they live?the automobile deal- ers, the implement dealers, the ware- housemen, the people in Peoria have benefitted from that because they manu- facture the machinery that has been sold to those farmers. I might, incidentally, note that in the very brief period of time following the initial massive purchase of wheat by the government of Russia, when the price of wheat moved up very rapidly in my area of the country from an average of about$1.85 a bushel to better than $5 a bushel, it took less than 6 months for the price of a tractor to double. I do not think it cost more to produce a tractor in that period; it was just a reflection of the old supply and demand law again. Farmers had a little bit more money and they were willing to spend it to update some of their older equipment and replace some of it and the demand on the market exceeded the supply and the price went up. The price doubled, literally doubled. A large, four-wheel-drive tractor that is used in the wheat-growing areas of my State, that had sold for about$20,000, went to $43,000 in 6 months. A self-pro- pelled combine of the type that is much in use in that same area; in that same period of time, went from about$28,000 to $48,000. I might add that the price of wheat may have peaked out at around$6 a bushel. Certainly, a great many farmers got better than $5 a bushel. The price went back down to$3 a bushel, but I did not see the price of a tractor go down, following the price of wheat going back down. But the farmers of this country have been able to survive and they will survive on the market condition, which is the Approved For Release 2001/11/01.: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 S 22806 Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE December 18, 1975 situation which I think we should all support. They can do so only if they have access to world markets for the sale of the produce that cannot be consumed in this country. If we are going, under a resolution like this and for other reasons than the management of our agricultural surplus, to limit the sale of agricultural products, as they would be limited under this resolution, then, Mr. President, we must be prepared to pay the price of go- ing back into a regulated agriculture and pay the price of the kinds of agricultural programs that we had in the late 1950's and through the 1960's; a price that is. I think, not an inconsiderable one. If you will compare it to the cost of the continuation of the program we are talking about here it is very dispropor- tionate. I have heard it said that because we are talking about committing an ad- ditional $28 million to a program in An- gola, we must change our foreign policy. I am suggesting if that$28 million is the reason for us to change that foreign pol- icy, let us look at the hundreds of mil- lions of dollars and probably billions of dollars that will be required to adjust our agricultural programs to the realities of a foreign policy that turns in the way that is suggested by the resolution of the Senator from Illinois. The Senator from South Carolina (Mr. TinTemoNn) has circulated a resolution which has slightly different wording, and I would commend that to the consid- eration of the Senate. I certainly hope that, perhaps, if we get to the considera- tion of the resolution of the Senator from Illinois, we may also consider the possibility of modifying the language more along the lines of the resolution suggested by the Senator from South Carolina. That resolution, as I recall?and I do not seem to have a copy of it at the mo- ment?states that the President shall ex- plore the possibility of economic sanc- tions while instituting diplomatic pres- sures, and shall report back to the Con- gress of the United States within 60 days specific economic sanctions that he thinks should be applied. I think that formulation rather than the more rigid formulation in the Stev- enson resolution may be the kind of ac- tion the Senate could responsibly take today in trying to resolve the question of how to respond to the changes in An- gola and the changes of the political situation brought about by the Soviet Union's intervention. I have been handed a copy of the res- olution, and section 2 of that resolu- tion states as follows: The Senate requests the President to sub- mit to the Congress such recommendation as he deems appropriate regarding the reduc- tion, prohibition, suspension or termination of trade with the Soviet Union in the event he is unable to successfully negotiate an agreement referred to in the first section of this resolution within 90 days after the adoption of this resolution That, I think, is the kind of flexibility necessary so that we might avoid the consequences that seem to me to flow from the language that is in the Steven- son resolution. These are several of the reasons why I think we must be concerned not only about the policy implications within An- gola and foreign policy but the impact of our response upon domestic political policy. The domestic political policy is not unrelated to what we may decide is right to do in Angola. It has been suggested by some that we .el iould not be involved in Angola because the United States does not have that much at stake in Angola. That implies to me, at least, that we will never be in- velved in providing the means by which people can fight for their own independ- ei ice, if they desire to do so, against for- eign subversion or subversion within their own country supported by foreign powers unless the-United States has a di- rect security interest in it. I would ask the Senate if that is the same standard we are applying in the Middle East as we approach the multi- Milton dollar aid to the nation of Israel. I ani not suggesting that we should not provide military assistance to Israel but I am saying we are applying that mili- tery assistance to Israel because we be- lieve it is right that they ought to have the opportunity to fight for their own to irvival. Are we willing to make that moral jedgment and to commit ourselves and our resources to the support of the peo- ple in Israel because they happen to be more like us and are unwilling to do so in Angola because they happen to be black? Is that the kind of policy this Senate is about to adopt? Is that the kend of motivation we would be proud to have ascribed to the action that is taken by us? I, happen to believe we are right in saying to the world that Israel has a reght to exist and that we underscore that by providing them with whatever aesistance is. necessary for them to fight for their survival. Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question? Mr. McCLURE. In just a moment. I think we also ought to, in the same spirit that motivated the President in enunciating what has become known as the Guam doctrine, say that we will pro- vide the means to people who desire to fight for their own survival when they ace threatened by subversion that is be- Ii supported from external forces. I think the President was also right in that policy enunciation when he said we ace not going to try to fight everyone's bottles for them. But I believe if we are going to say we are not going to be the policemen of the world, we also ought to recog-nize there are struggles going on ithin this world?there have been and v ill continue to be?where it is sought to subjugate people against their will to satisfy the ambitions of large powers out- side their countries, and the United States cannot morally ignore what hap- pens in those instances. I would be happy to yield to the Sen- a ,or from Oklahoma for a question. Mr. BARTLETT'. I would like to point cit to the Senator from Idaho there are those who advocate passage of the Tun- nay amendment, and then also appar- eetly advocate the Congress overtly pass- ing the necessary legislation to provide for military support in Angola, and to do this openly either on regular legisla- tion or with special consideration. It seems to me this creates a hiatus that would be very dangerous, and I just wonder if the Senator from Idaho would comment on this to give me his opinion of the danger of a hiatus that would exist during that period even if Congress did adopt later on an amount of military help equivalent to that which is contemplated now with the readjustment of the funds. Mr. McCLURE. Well, let me say to the Senator from Oklahoma that has to be one of the major concerns that confront us now. Certainly I agree with those Members of the Senate who say the kind of in- volvement we are engaged in now, that we are apparently engaged in, where we started out with a few thousand dollars and now we are up to $25 million spent and$7 million programed, and $28 mil- lion requested, is the kind of decision in which Congress should be involved; that it cannot be a covert operation, it should be an overt decision. It is my feeling that it is already an overt policy. If it was ever a secret policy it no longer is. So the decision we are making now is not whether to get in- volved to that extent, it is a question of whether we are going to stop being in- volved to that extent because we already are. The President of the United States, through the activities of the State De- partment and the CIA and, to some de- gree, pursuant to the involvement of appropriate committees of this Congress that have approved at least portions of this action in the past, has already brought us to the point where the world sees us as being involved in Angola. If we adopt the Tunney amendment now we stop that involvement, and the signal is not whether we may decide at some future date to get involved again, but the signal is we have stopped being involved and, I think, that has immedi- ate consequences in the perception of peoples around the world as to the will of the United States, the direction of the United States, and it simply is not some- thing that will not affect other people's beliefs concerning the United States, and they will start making policy decisions of their own based upon that decision as they see it and not await a further deter- mination by Congress as to whether we wish again to program moneys to put In at some time in the future. It is not a neutral step. Mr. BARTLETT. If the Senator will yield further, the Senator makes a very good point about the whole matter be- ing overtly known and discussed by the people of this country. The reason I mentioned the hiatus is that presumably the funds can be re- assigned within a matter of several weeks after the first of the year, and on the other hand, new legislation for Angola would take several months at the earliest. So a hiatus would be created if we passed the Tunney amendment and then waited until later congressional action. On the other hand, Ii' we would pro- ceed with further aid now, there would still be the opportunity for the Congress Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 ihRproved FebRi\fuie,Rfg...2ootA/ sioN? iightcdaBile3049ppt4R000400100018-1 S 22807 December 18, to decide what future action it would want to take and there would be the chance for a more orderly transition from the covert actions that have been sanctioned and established as options for the executive branch by the legis- lative branch, there would be more time for transition from those options that are now being exercised by the executive branch to whatever was decided later on by the joint decision of the Congress and the executive branch, would that not be the case? Mr, McCLURE. The Senator is correct. I might add to that, it seems to me that one of the options that is available to us at this time to avoid that hiatus might be, for the time being, to operate under the continuing resolution which has already passed, rather than seek to get final action on this legislation at this time. I say that because whether we like It or not, some kind of signal is going to come out of any kind of action we take on this bill. Some kind of signal Is going to be fla,shed to the participants in the struggle and others who are not participating in the struggle if we adopt the Tunney amendment or if we defeat the Tunney amendment. The situation that would occur if we operate under the continuing resolution, as I understand it, would be this, the Senator from Arkansas, the chairman of the Appropriations Committee (Mr. MCCLELLAN), has indicated that the re- quest for reprograming of funds will not be granted until the committee has had an opportunity for a hearing and a briefing and a discussion and a deter- mination by the committee, which means that the funds which they seek to re- program would not be available until some time after Congress convened again in January. The Congress, in the meantime, would not have said that they cannot continue to use the money which is in the pipeline now, and it would not have said they could not reprogram other moneys which might be available. I think there is a discretionary pool that exists that does not require reprograming, and that "'would be available in the absence of the Tunney amendment, although a very much smaller suin of money. It might be possible for us just to hold this matter in abeyance until we come back in January and operate, mean- while, under the continuing resolution with the much more constricted ability to use additional funds in Angola and make the determination at that time after the committees have had the op- portunity to be briefed and to discuss and make their own decision. Mr. HASKELL addressed the Chair. Mr. BARTLETT. Will the Senator yield to me for one more question? Mr. HASKELL. I just wonder if the Senator from Idaho will yield without losing his right to the floor while I offer an amendment to S. 1469 which involves the Alaska Claims Act. It should not take - long. Mr. McCLURE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may yield to the Senator from Colorado for that pur- pose without losing my right to the floor and without my resumption being con- sidered a second speech. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. ALASKA NATIVE CLAIMS SETTL MENT ACT AMENDMENTS Mir, HASKELL. Mr. President, I ask the %air to lay before the Sen 4e a mess from the House of Repreent- atives on S. 1469. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. STONE) lid before the Senat the amendment\ of the House of Rep sent- atives to the bill (S. 1469) to rlrovide, under or by \amendment of the Alaska Native Claims' Settlement Act, for the late enrollment of certain Natives, the establishment of an escrow ac ount for the proceeds of of, lands, ie treat- ment of certain payments ailcl grants, and the consolidation of e 3ting re- gional corporations, -end for pther pur- poses. , (The amendments of the House are printed in the RECORD %if D,?ceinber 16, 1975, beginning at page II1624.) Mr. HASKELL. I wish\tb thank the Senator from Idaho. Mr. President, I would 1 e to preface this by stating that I am ftnfqrmed that the amendments I am albut 'to ask the Chair to lay before the S ate have been cleared with both Senat s froni-,Alaska, Senator GRAVEL being h re. It has been cleared with Senator F max anct\ a,s a ' matter of fact, has Wen cleared Ivith the Department of the Interior and 'has satisfied all concerned. ?? Mr. President, I senft to the desk seVc eral amendments and minor substantive amendments, and ask tinanimous consent \ that they be considted en bloc. The PRESIDING rviCER, Without ' objection, the, ame,r ments will be con- sidered en bloc. Th clerk will state the amendments. . pro- ceeded to read th amendments. The assistant ligislative clerk pro- Mr. HASKELL. /1 ask unanimous con- sent that further reading of the amend- ments be dispened with. The PRESIDI G OFFiCER, Without objection, it is #) ordered. The amendnents are as follows: _ 1. On page 1, line 3, strike "authorized" and insert in li u thereof "directed". 2. On page 2i line 22 strike "village cor- porations" and Ansert in lieu thereof "Village Corporations".I 3. On page2 line 23, strike "Alaska Native y Claims" and sert in lieu thereof "the". 4. On pag el 2, line 24, strike "who" and Insert in Heti thereof "the Village Corpora- tion or Corphrations of which". 5. On pag 2, line 25, strike "receive sur- face and su surface entitlement" and insert in lieu the eof "acquire title to the surface and siibsu4f ace estates of said reserves". 6, On pare 3, line 12, strike "the minimum number'' nd insert in lieu thereof "a suffi- cient nu ber". 7. On page 4, line 24, strike "reexamina- tion" arI insert in lieu thereof "redeter- minatio ". 8. On age 5, lines 6 and 7, strike ", issued pursue t to section 14(g) of the Settlement Act, p taining to land" and Insert in lieu there? "pertaining to lands". 9. qn page 5, lines 14 and 15, strike "the proce ds which" and insert in lieu thereof "the proceeds, together with interest, which". 10. On page 5, line 16, strike "pertaining nds" and insert in lieu thereof "pertainin t such lands". \11. On page 5, line 18, strike "together wi interest", 2. On page 5, line 24, and page 6, ljtne 1, trike "deposited in the Treasury of he United States or". 13 On page 6, lines 7 and 8, strike de- posit such deposit to bear simple int rest at a tate determined by the Secretary qt the Treaskay" and insert in lieu thereof: "de- posit1,10 the date of payment with imple intere at the rate determined by tile Sec- retary 9f the Treasury to be the rate ayable on short-term obligations of the United States prevailing at the time of pay ent". 14. 01\ page 6, line 12, strike "( 5 U.S.C. 162 a)" and insert in lieu thereof '7(62 Stat. 1037)". 1, ,o ". 15. On 'page 6, line 18, strike "srsection." and insert in lieu thereof "secti 16. On pre 7, between lines 5/ and 6, in- sert "Temp rary exemption from,' certain se- curities laws". 17. On page 7, line 17, between "all" and "information" insert "the". ; . 18. On page 7, between lines pl and 22, in- sert "Relation'to other programr. 19. On page, 8, line 4, after "1964" insert "(78 Stat. 703)\ as amended"./ 20. On page 81 between lineis 21 and 22, in- sert "Merger of rtive corporations". 21. On page 1 , line 4, bertween "corpora- tions and share lders whip-i" and "partici- pated", insert "alici. who". 22. On page 11. line 1, Strike "consolida- tions" and insert In lieu Vaereof "consolida- tion". 23. On page 12;', line 114, strike "Alaska Natives" and insert V-4. Hein thereof "Natives". 24. On page 12, line& 18 and 19, strike "Alaska Native RegiOnal Corporations or by .! in Alaska or by". Alaska Native" andiknaert in lieu thereof" Regional Corporatio 25. On page 13, lint* 1 and 2, and lines 5 and 6, strike "Alaska IRegional Corporation" and insert in lieu thereiof "Regional Corpora- tion in Alaska" in both laces. - 26. On page 13, lips , 8, and 9, strike "In e event section 5(1a) of the Settlement Act 14 amended to reopen the Alaska Native Roll thereof "Whenever addi tonal enrollment for\additional enropinenI and insert in lieu undk the Settlement Act 'is permitted pur- suant\ to this Ac t or any dther provision- of law,". 1 27. Oi\page 4, line 11, itrike "such Act" and inse t in lieu thereof '/the Settlement 28. On pltge/13, line 12, beItween "enroll- ment" and .?'elect" insert a cOmma. 29. On pag '13, line 14, strilike "the Settle- ment" and ifert in lieu thereof "such". 30. On page 3, line 15, strilke "Natives'" and insert in 1 u thereof "Native's". 31. On page ii, lines 18 an 22, strike "Alaska" in/ bath aces. 1 m insert in il 32. On pitge 13, 1 es 23 and 24,1 strike "re- gional orillage cooration" lieu ther of "Region 1 or Village\ Corpora- tion". 33. On/pages 15 and 1, amend sec ion 11 to read as follows: "SEc. fil. The boundary ?etween th south- eastern; and Chugach re ons shall be the 141st 7i.eridian: Provided, at the gional Corp?, ation for the Chugach region s all ac- cord lo the Natives enrolled -to the village of Y kutat the same rights nd prin,ileges to u e any lands which may b conve d to the egional Corporation in th Icy fBay for such purposes as s ha e traditionally made thereof, bu not limited to, subsistence hula in and gathering, as the Regional tin accords to its own shareholde s all take no unreasonable or arbitrary lative to such lands for the primary ose and having the effect, of impairin urtailing such rights and privileges.". vicinity of h Na Ives clud ng, 'ng, h- a- Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 S2808 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE December 18, 1973 e 340n page 16, line 12, strike "COOK IN- N LET TTLEMENT.--". 35. 0 page 16, lines 15 and 16, strike " 'region \hereinafter" and insert in lieu thereof "h einafter in this section referred to as the \ 'Region' ". 36. On pag 17. line 6, strike "Alaska Na- tive Claims". e 37. On page tee, line 21, strike "set forth therein" and inseke in lieu thereof "and the Region, as a mat* of Federal law". 38. On page 17, lb a, 12 and 17, betwee "Ile " and "approxi- 22, page 18, lines 5, \ 7 mately", "(3) " and "Federal", "(4) " and "township", "(5)" and ",twenty-nine", and ' (6) " and "lands", in eaetiecase, insert -title to". 39. On page 18, line 5. strike "townships 10 south" and insert in lieu thereof "township 10 south". e 40. On page 18, line 21. strike "Alaska Native Claims". . 41. On page 19, line 10, strike eoweter" and insert in lieu thereof "Region so longe,as the Region owns such lands". . e 42. On page 19, line 11, strike "Alaska 'Vet- tive Claims". 43. On page 19, line 15, between "land\ and "without restriction" insert "conveyed". ,. 44, On page 19, line 18 and lines 23 and 24, strike "Cook Inlet Region, Incorporated," and in both places insert in lieu thereof "the Region". 45. On page 19, line 23, between "11(a) (1)" and the comma insert "of the Settle- ment Act", 46. On page 19, line 24, strike "the Region" and insert in lieu thereof "the Regional Cor- poration", 47. On page 20, line 2, between "11(a) (3) " and "as" insert "of the Settlement Act-. 48. On-page 20, lines 3 and 4 e.nd line 20, strike "Cook Inlet Region, Incorporated," in both places and insert in lieu thereof "the Region". 49. On page 20, line 17, strike "the Region" and insert in lieu thereof "the affected Re- gional Corporation". 50. on page 20, line 10. between -any sec- tion 11(a) (1)" and the period insert "with- drawal". 51. On page 20, line 17, strike "affected Region" and insert in lieu thereof "affected Regional Corporation", 52. On page 21, lines 5, 7, and 8, 16, and 21, strike "Alaska Native claims" in each of the four places it appears. 53. On page 22, lines 8 and 9, :strike "35 townships of subsurface" and insert in lieu thereof "3,58 townships of oil and gas and coal". 54. On page 21, lines 19 and 20, strike "re- gional corporation or village corporation" and insert in lieu thereof "Regional Corpo- ration or Village Cosporation". 55. On page 22, line 2, strike "Alaska Na- tive Claims-. 56. On page 23, lines 9 through 11, strike Provided, That if the land is not used for the above purposes it shall revert to the United States". 57. On page 23, line 16, strike "Act:" and insert in lieu thereof "Act, and the convey- ance of such lands shall also contain a pro-; vision that, if the lands cease to be used foe/ the purposes for which they were convey the lands and title thereto shall revert/ to the United States:". 58. On page 24, line 9, after "Act." sert "This conveyance shall be conMderd and treated as a conveyance under the/Settle- ment Act", 59. On page 24, lines 15 and ?46, strike "Alaska Native Claims". 60. On page 26, line 1, str9C "corpora- tioria" and insert in lieu zherloi "Corpora- tions". 61. Page , line , striki("Alaslca Native Claims". , 62. On page 25, lines .57 and 18, strike "Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of December 18, 1971 (86 Stat. 688), Is hereby" and insert in lieu thereof "Settlement Act is". 63. On page 28, line 2, between "2033" and 'If" insert ", or any successor provisions,". 64. On pages 27 and 28, strike each of the periods between and including line 6 on page 27 and line 6 on page 28 and insert in lieu of each such period a ,setnieelon. 65. On page 28, line 6, directly after the eumber "13" and the semicolon provided or in amendment no. 65 above insert "S.M., Alaska, notwithstanding" and delete "Not- withstanding" on line 7. 66. On page 28, line 21, between "assigns," end "and" insert "such". 67. On page 29, line 23, and page 30, line e strike "Alaska Native Claims Settlement let (85 Stat. 588)." and insert in lieu thereof "Se ttl ement Act". 68. On page 29, line 8, strike "national ?rests system" and insert in lieu thereof 'National Forest System". 69. On page 29, lines 11 and 12 and line 3, strike "Alaska Native Claims" in both 1'laces. 70. On page 29, line 18. strike "Group I orporations" and insert in lieu thereof 't corporations organised by Native groups". ,71. On page 21) lines 19 and 20, strike "the Ne'elve Corporations for the cities of" and insert in lieu thereof "and the corporations i egarrized by Natives residing in". 72. eu page 30, line 20, after "Kenai," e.nd,' leave "hillier" insert "all as defined on tiya (.et, and". 73. On pigs 31, line 4, between "the" end i ' Secretary" fserl, "apt ropriate' '. , Mr. McC E. Will the Senatoiyield i Jr one question? Mr. HASKELlb\ I yield to theAlenater. Mr. McCLURE.I want to malte certain I understood the Senator, I wa,s talking e t the time he made, the sOtement. My understanding 'is that these are t ichnical amendments 'arhich have been 6 )scussed wtih the Sena* from Arizona (Via FANNIN) ? Mr. HASKELL. WS. I a\l'i informed t let they have beereteleared\with Seis- e tor FANNIN, that Utley are sa't, sfactory , ti Senator Glum; that they ai satis- f eitory to Senay ST,reeNS, and fuether- ti ore, I am infer, ed they are satisfactory V) the SecretaeY of the Interior. e, ? As the Senator knows, I can only 'No o 1 what I am informed. \ , Mr. I-IAqK:ELL. S. 1469 makes certain a nendments to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act in order to resolve vale- o is ditinculties which have arisen dUr- ing the implementation of that act. S 1a69 was passed by the Senate on Au- g-if 2. 1975, and was passed by the House co December 16, 1975, with an amend- ti ent in the nature of a substitute. With /bet a few exceptions, the House-passed i) 11 is the same in substance as that p issed by the Senate. Mr. President, the House has added eertain provisions which, while they were n e. in the Senate-passed bill, have been ',IC subject of hearings and considera- Thee by the Senate Interior Committee. I will briefly describe those new sections -a eich should be accepetd by the Senate wah certain changes. Section 8 of S. 1469, as added by the Ii Juse, relates, to the establishment of a 13th region and the incorporation of a 13th Regional Corporation for the benefit of enrolled Natives who were not permanent residents 'if the S of Alaska. When the Secretary of the/Interior certified the final Native roll 911 Decem- ber 18, 1973, he also declarefi that less than a majority of the non esident Na- tives voted for the 13h nd the 13th region issue had failed, AJZI nonresidents were, accordingly, enrolled in the ap- propriate region in Alsiska. Two orga- nizations--the Alaskae'ederation of Na- tives International, c. and the Alaska Native Association/ of Oregon?repre- senting the interests of nonresidents and the concept of the 13,,h region, sepa- rately, brought -uit against the Secre- tary in the 1.14 District Court for the District of Coeumbia re, uesting that the declaration et the Secretary be declared invalid and that the 13th region be established, On October 6, 1975, the dis- trict court entered an order implement- ing an Other order in 1974, directing the Secretary to ceate the 13th region, en- roll therein all nonresident Natives who had/indicated, on their ;ast formal com- munication with the Secretary, their de- s e to enroll in a 13th region, and to rovide for the incorporetion of the 13th egional Corporation. Section 8 -is necessare to supplement the court's order. The amendment pro- vides that no change in enrollment to either the 13th region or to one of the 12 regions in Alaska which is required or permitted by the court's order shall affect any land entitlements of an Alaska Na- tive Regional or Village Corporation ex- isting at the time of the creation of the 13th region. Also, it provides that, in furtherance of the court's order, any can- cellation of stock of a Native shall he without liability to either the corpora- tion or the individual Finally, it provides that in the event the Native roll is re- opened for new enrollment, eligible Na- tives who are permanent- nonresidents of Alaska are to elect whether they wish to enroll in the 13th region or the appro- priate Alaska region at the time of their enrollment. Section 10, as added by the House, re- lates to a certain land selection problem in the southeastern region of Alaska Con- cerning which the comi iittee has twice \received testimony. This section provides that Sealaska, Inc me- select its ap- imately 200,000-acre entitlement lands which were withdrawn in the al forest for selection by village Ons of the southeastern region, ere not so selected. The sec- es that Sealaska, Inc., may y lands on Admiralty Island wal for the village of An- ion, no sections can be idrawal for the villages xman, unless the Gov- f Alaska or his dele- setection. This sec- flit Sealaska's se- f ro natio corpo but whi ton pro not select a In the with goon. In acid made in the wi of Yakutat and ernor of the State gate consents to sue tion is necessary to lection rights under t Settlement Act. Section 11 as added lie the House re- solves a boundary dispul t between Sea- laska and the Chugath .egion. The amendment is supported by ? affected regions. Section 12 as added he the House re- lates to a settlement of a land selection problem in the Cook Inlet Region. On A?proved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 10, December 18 19 7A:A p roved comeartssuagrinlieffeCRORDISMOO unarlirao the giro call be rescinded. The P7 DL- 1110110 OFFICER.. Without objoction, it i o ordered.. . The questio is on agreeing to the amendment' of e Senator from Michi- gan. Under the a evious order, there is a time limitation 40 minutes on the amendment, to be - .ually divided be- 't.ween the Senator f ern Michigan (Mr. GR,IFY2N) and the Se ator from Cali- fornia (Mr. Tummy). I o yields time? Mr. CLARK. ivtr, Presi ent, I suggest the .,ahsence Of a quorum, d ask unani- moll$ '. laSCO t ,that the ti e for the ekt qUOrtrra ce84, equally divid Mr. M . IVEr.,Pre,siel reserv- ing the right to object, what as the request? The Faila411:00 OFFICER. J divide the ' time On the quorum . equally. consent that the order for under the Defense Appropriation Act, which would have to be reprogrammed if they wanted to do something about Angola, still does not change the various military necessities. We may decide, if the House and the Senate agree on this conference report, that we are going to tighten our belt on program A, B, C, or D and cut $33 million out of it. We may and we may not. My amendment will make that un- necessary. It will facilitate an agree- ment between the House and the Sen- ate, as there may be great difference of opinion on that score, and it will get the matter down to its essentials. To argue about a$33 million provision in a $90 billion bill seems to be unnecessarily throwing a monkey wrench into the t to works, We know what we want to do. If all we decide to do it, let us not compli- cate it with a money equation. Mr. McCLURE. l%1O objective. Mr. YOUNG. Mr. President, will the The t'RES,1DAZIO (AVIM'a. Withou Senator yield? Objection, it is so ordered. Mr. JAVITS. I yield. sggest the absence of Mr. YOUNG. I think this is a good a quorum, a endment. I do not think it is the The PREaDIPTG OFFICER. The clerk int ion of the sponsors to delete will Pea .the roll. mon in the bill. I think some Sen- ators, hough, assume that the$28 mil lion ha already been approved, whi haino , Mr. JA TS. Of course. It leaves the conference cement in balance be- cause the tv o sides have agree ?the House and th Senate?and we,klo not disturb that agi ment. However, we ye a new pro em, just arisen, and ndbo 's feathe can be ruffled if we try to al with t in a sub- stantive way rather an lug to dis- turb what may have the give and take on the money ci.. n the confer- ence. Mr- CRANSTON. 5' both Sena- tors who have spoken A at eelieve that the principal sponse of t e Ttumey amendment?and I m one of em?are totally prepared support Javits approach, becaus we recognize t t our principal object e, which is to c t off funds used for ramilitary, covert, d other -purpose in Angola and aro d Angola, will ?e served by the amen ment that ey change in the dolla figure. It is hope that members of the Appropth ons Committee who are con- cerned e out a change will look with greater eenevolence upon our amend- ment. Mr JAVITS. May I say, in fairness to the thors of the amendment, that they we told that in the parliamentary sit- on, they had to move to reduce the omit; otherwise, their amendment ould not be in order. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired. Ur. JAVITS. I yield myself 2 addition- - al minutes. d- Whereas, my amendment is only in ent order because theirs already has been of in order. So that everybody's role is se- cure. ..14444taut legislative clerk prOcee - ? a call the roll. Mr,. JAVTTS. W. PreSident, I ask unantruous ,oeneent that the order for the gAlo f1, -call be rescinded. na, - idIUM1011 i 0 OFFICE4. 'Without objection. It is so ordered. MX, ANt.S. Mr. pre8i4ent, I ask unanimous consent that I MAY yield my- self time on the time reserved on my amendment *which is to follow the Griffin amendment* and I Would like, to yield myself _5 Min The e a OIC. 14 there objeetioi ? chair hears none, and it is 60 Or ivfX; S ation vill 1Y in VIP e the gran am a. mozront .0 and then w arnendraent lieeee On. nay amendment. The thrt of the Oriffin amendment Is to prevent groat going into Angola any U.S. military or ciyiliart forces involved In hOSI. ,i,u or over ,or from off the Ali shore4 0 g ola? un on less Congress specif- ically a,Utp , orizes At. The: 4hrust.ot the. Tunney amendment, EIS It Welrld be enameled by my amend- ment, which will either be added onto the Grffin amendment or will,be a sepa- rate ainendrnent fullyspialifleci, once the Griffin amendment is, acted 14140n. is that only intelligence gathering wlll be per- mitted as an activity in respect of An- gola, under the Defense Appropriation Act, which is the subject of the confer- ence report. The difference between inY merit and the present Tunney tune merit ?.is tdivat the , Tunney wren prOpOS:os to recluse by $33 million the Iterna. of appropriation in con- ference report. I omit any sue reduc- Mr. President, I hope the Senate will tion and simply keep the sum it is. realize that we have achieved our objec- The reason for my action is is: Obvi- tive. Whatever decision we make, even if ously, it is important to get e greatest it is on the negative side, will be a na- conSerious here, and there e Members tional policy decision. The House and who feel that the funds, programmed the Senate will have passed on this par- , ;)resident, the Situ- Pet49.44en.ted, .45 sho,14 - re?preSent action on will, analyze in what that will cle? gr net the Qrifan 1.44R000400100018-1 ow' S2? ticular question. I hope very much that we will make it positive an that we will start anew, as we should ave started when this sum got to be 5 million and we began to put milita materiel into the situation. I do not believe t at the transition will be harmful to t executive depart- ment, because it ? obably takes some time to absorb thi kind of military aid in the area, any w, and it will give us an opportunity or a more deliberate judgment as to hat must be done and how much. In the Fort gn Relations Subcommit- tee?I am c nfident the committee will take it?w have materially accelerated the proce re by which the administra- tion can act and Congress must act if it wishef to stop. So I hink this is a plan which holds toget er. I am very hopeful that we will get t e Defense appropriation on its way an will have dealt effectively with our pr,?lems respecting Angola. flufr. President, I say to the acting ma- rity leader that it will be my purpose now to seek advice from the leadership as to whether they will accept a recess until 1:45, because Senator GRIFFIN has asked our indulgence, as he has necessarily had to see the President. Mr. CRANSTON. Certainly. Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum, and I ask unanimous consent that the time may be charged to both amendments and both sides of both amendments. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. JAVITS. I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. MANSlarLD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OrviCER. Without objection, it is so ordered. RECESS AANTLE, 1:50 P.M.; AND UNAN- IMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask animous consent that the Senate stand ecess until the hour of 10 minutes to d that teginning at that time there limitation of 10 minutes on the amendment to be equally di- n the Senator from Michi- GRIFFIN) , the sponsor of the and the Senator from Cali- Tummy) , and that the vote merit occur at 2 o'clock. 2, be pend vided ? gan (M amendme fornia (Mr. on the amen There being o objection, the Senate, at 1:15 p.m., essed until 1:50 p.m.; whereupon, the ate reassembled when called to order b the Presiding Officer (Mr. CRANSTON). DEPARTMENT OF D NSE APPRO- PRIATIONS, FISCAL YEAR 1976 The Senate continued w the consid- eration of amendment in ? agreement No. 75 to H.R. 9861, an act ma ng appro- priations for the Department ? Defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1976, Approved For Release 2001/11,101: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 ,t44 -4muma- V776 Approved For Re I eee VaingS/1/81?1:ATMEFRIV- 00hisgin40010001.2fel.ct inber 18, 1975 and \for the period beginning July 1, 1976 and lending September 30, 1976, and foa other purposes. The PRESIDING OFFICER. WU( yielde. time? The Chair, in his capacity as the Sen- ator from California, suggests the/ ab- sence of a quorum. The lerk will call the roll. The sistaaat legislative clerk, p o- ceeded t< call the roll. Mr. CLURE. Mr. President, I ask unanhnois consent that the orderlor th( quorum dell be rescinded. The PRVIDING 0101010ER. (Mr. HAS- KELL). Wi out objection, it is so ordered Mr. McCLURE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous ,consent that Samantha Sen- ger and John Cevette, of Senator HAS - HELL'S staff, be granted the privilege of the floor during the consideration of ano voting on alI tariff bills teday. The PRESIDING OFFICIPIR. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. McCLIIRE. Mr. Preeldent, I sug- gest the absence of a quortim. The PRESIEZtNG OFFIOVER. The clerk will call the roll The second ststant Legislative clerk proceeded to cal the roll. Mr. ROBERT ?BYRD. Mr. President. I ask unanimous consent that the ordei for the quorum dtll bei rescinded. The PRESM G ,O.FieiCER (Mr. Pacswooe). Without Objection, it is so ordered. Under the previqua order, the Senate will proceed to vote on the amendment of the Senator from?lVfichigan. Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, have the yeas and nays been: erdered? The PRESIDINO OFFICER. The yeas and nays have not been ordered. Mr. ROBERT C; BYE). Mr. President, I ask for the ye and, nays. Is a sufficient The PRESID G 011.CER. Is there a sufficient second Thee second. The yeas an nays were ordered. The PRESID G OFFCER. The ques- tion is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Micltgan. On this question the y as and nays have been or- dered, and 4ie clerk will\ c,all the roll. The legislit1ve clerk called the roll. Mr. ROBRT C. BYRD1 I announce that the Senator from Indiana (Mr. BATH), is liecessarily absent. Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the Senator fi>m Arizona (Mr. OLDWATER), is necessally absent. The r ult was armounce4?yeas 26, nays '72, s follows: tiRollcall Vote No. 60b Le YEAS-28 Eastle:Ici Farm Fong Garn Griffin y P., Jr. HAIDSelt Helms Hrusk nici Laxalt Baker Bellmo Buckl Bartletst Byrd, Harfr Curt Dole, DonW 1 Ab urezk Al Al en B all B ntsen den rock rooke umpers Long McCI lan McClure Morga* Scott, ugh Stenni Thurm , d Tower , Young NAYS----72 Burdick Colvcr Byrd, Robert C. Durkin, Cannon Eagleton Case Ford Chiles Glenn Church C Gravel Clark Hart, Gary Cranston Bart, Philip , Rartke Raskell Hatfield Hathaway Railings Huddleston Humphrey Inonye Jackson Javits Johnston Kennedy Leahy Magnuion Mansfield Mathias McGee McGovern McIntyre Metcalf Mondale Montoya Moss Mutikie Nelson NW= Packwood Pastore Pearson Pell Percy Proxmire Randolph Ribicoff NOT VOTING-2 Bayh Goldwater Roth Schweikor Scott, William Sparkman ' Stafford Stevens ; Stevenson, Stone Symington Taft Ta1made Tunn Weick So Mr. GRIFFIN'S amendment re- jected. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Pursuant to the previews order, the Senator from New York recognized to call up his amendment. Mr. TUNNY. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment wairej ected. Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I yield for that purpose. I move to lay \ that motion on the table. ; The motion to Dty on the table was agreed to. Mr. JAVITS. Mr, President, I yield half a minute of my time to Senator Cue= for a unanimous-eonsent request. The PRESIDIaG -OFFICER. Will the Senator withhold for just a moment. Will those in the aisles please remove them- selves from the aisles lifIhe Senate is not in order. t I believe tlie Senator fit= New York said half a minute to the Senator from Nebraska. was SUBSTITIJTION OF SENATOR BROCK FOR SENATOR FANNIN AS A CON- FEREE?H.R. 10727 Mr. CURTIS. Mr. Preside*, I ask unanimous consent that the \Sena.tor from Tennessee (Mr. BROCK) be confetee on H.R. 10727, and the from Arizona (Mr. FANNIN) be r as a conferee on that bill. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. CURTIS. I thank the Senator. \ tuned a enator mved DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPRO- PRIATIONS, FISCAL YEAR 1976 The Senate continued with the con- sideration of amendment in disagree- ment No. 75 to H.R. 9861, an act making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1976, and for the period beginning July 1, 1976, and ending September 30, 1976, and for other purposes. Mr. JAVITS. I call up my amendment and send it to the desk to be stated. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will state the amendment. The second assistant legislative clerk read as follows: The Senator from New York (Mr. Javits) proposes an amendment No. 1312 to amend- ment No. 1303. The amendment is as follows: Strike "205,800,000" and in lieu of the language proposed to be inserted by amend- ment 1303 insert the following: "8205,600.- 000, none of Which, nor any other funds ap- propriated in this Act may be used for a y activities involving Angola other than in- telligence gathering, &La which funds are . Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays. The PRESIDING OrTICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is a sufficient second. The yeas and nay:: were ordered. Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I yield myself 5 minutes. Mr. President, th amendment pro- poses only to elhnintte the figures from the Tunney amendment which reduced the amount of$205,600,000 down to $172,600,000. My amendment co4,ains the same fig- ure agreed upon in conference,$20,- 600,000, and it includes the Tunney language. Mr. President, may we have order. I will be through very quickly. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Will the Senator withhold? The Senate will please be in order. Mr. JAVITS. The reason for MY amendment is simple to strip this con- troversy, which we have debated at such length, of any question about the amounts involved. The amount will re- main exactly as the conferees agreed on, but we do include the injunction against spending any money appropriated in this act or any part of that $205 million for any activities involving Angola other than intelligence gathering. That is the whole sum of it. The reason for it I - we have been to7c1 that the way in which money would be available if we did nothing for the Angola operation will be by reprograming other funds for various purposes contained in this act, and it was my feeling as the debate developed that as the conferees had arrived at a balance of their respec- tive views on money?that is what the essence of this bill Jr all about?and as It was made clear to as there was no sum of money here for Ar gola, it would have to come from cuttine down other pro- grams on which they had agreed, which- ever ones they were, which they called reprograming, it seen ied to me the pro- ponents of the fundr mental proposition put before us by Senator TurrNgv, by Senator CLARK, and others, really would only embarrass their cause by seeking to reduce the money. There was no point to it once we got the basic prohibition established, and that '7 what this will do. May I say for my colleague, Senator TUNNEY, and others on that side that they could not have gotten into this situation in a parliamentary sense unless they had done something about the money. But having o =ened the door, we should now walk through it, and I hope the Senate will carry this as the substi- tute language for the Tunney language without renegotiatir the dollars in- volved. My final point, 11.2r President. that it will save a lot of time -,vith the other body if they are in any mood to do anything about Angola. It will certainly be a lot easier to get them to do it if they do not have to retrade all their deals on the defense appropriations. Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 ..6;contsur 18, 197Ap p roved EONCelitraigtk/W11VIACQIIR-RDO*140/A 44R000400100018-1 S 22777 For those reasons, Mr. President, I hope every one of the parties interested, except on a straight division of whether we will Or will not go the Tunney route, will airee that this amendment is the right course to follow and that, as this amendment replaces the whole of the Tunney arriendrnent, this will be the final action on that proposition. Mr, President, I yield to the Senator froni California 2 minutes. Mr. TUNNEY. Mr. President, the Sen- ator from New York and I have had a chance to discuss his substitute at some length and the way he described the Impact of his substitute is, in my mind, correct. I think the substitute offered is a good one. I point out the reason that the$33 million as 'Placed originally in my amend- ment was that it would have been out of order if we had hot referred to a dollar figure in the 'amendment in disagreement No, 75 that came over from the House. We no longer need that dollar figure. The dollar figure did represent our best estimate of the rnoneys that had been spent or were being programed to be spent in Angola. Therefore, I am prepared to yield back the remainder Of my time, and let us have a vote on the Senator's amendment. I think it is a good one. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ate will be in order. Again will those conversing in the well please go some- place else. Will those conversing in the well please 'leave the Chamber. Mr. sAvrrs. Mr. President, in yield- ing, I would appreciate it if the Chair would inform me so that I do not use the last 2 minutes of my time. I Yield. Mr. BUIVIPERS. just one short ques- tion. One thing that did not come up yesterday and did not come up this morning that I was curious about, and that is whether or not this amendment or the Timmy aniendment as it was orig- inally written, 'would be other than an expression of the sentiment of the Sen- ate and would it have any more than possibly an inhibiting effect on the pos- sible use of any other funds the CIA has which could be used for covert activities? Mr. JAVITS. I am not so young in this body as to believe that in a budget run- ning into several hundred billions of dol- lars that the administration could not find money to do this. It would obviously bar them from using money in the $90 But I really believe with such a preci- sion of expression by the Senate and the House on such a major bill as the de- fense appropriations bill, I would not believe the administration would move In that direction and, if it did, I assure the Senator there are lots of other ways In which a body as large as that ma- jority which turned down the Griffin amendment could see that they rue the day. So I do not believe we are acting other than very substantively and deci- sively'if we adopt the amendment I have sent to the desk. May I say, Mr. President, that aniend- ment, is for myself and Senator HUM- PHREY of Minnesota. Mr. McCLURE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for one question? Mr. JAVITS. Yes. Mr. McCLURE. Mr. President, the Senator from California a moment ago referred to the( dollar amount figure in his amendment which the Senator from New York seeks to eliminate as being the best estimate of the amount of money that had been spent or would be repro- gramed. Am I not correct in remembering the statements made by the Senator from North Dakota and the Senator from Arkansas that a request for reprogram- ing in this dollar amount had been made but, as a matter of fact, no reprograming has occurred and, I think, the Senator from Arkansas indicated that before the committees were about to grant such an authorization, there would be hearings and further inquiry by the committee? Mr. JAVITS. That Is my recollection, and I hope we are both correct, because whatever happens to this conference report? Mr. YOUNG. Will the Senator yield? Mr. JAVITS. Of course I yield. Mr. YOUNG. The amount is to be pro- gramed, it is$28 million. I think the Tunney amendment deletion of claim money is not necessary to accomplish his objection. Mr. JAVITS. I thank my colleague. Mr. McCLURE. Would the Senator from North Dakota not agree with the Senator from New York and myself that although that request have been made, no sum of money has been reprogramed? Mr. YOUNG. In fact, Chairman Mc- CLELLAN notified the CIA he would not be taking up the reprograming until Con- gress convenes in January. Mr. McCLURE. I thank the Senator. Mr. JAVITS. I might say to Senator YOUNG, the chairman's trusted minority senior member, I would hope that what- ever happens to the conference report, we hear rumors there are intentions to debate it until we quit, and things like that, that is up to all those involved, but I would hope with the clear expression of view by the whole Senate that at the very least it is intended by this repro- graming method to let them use the money, that the matter would be sub- mitted to the Senate, and if it felt we cannot wait the 20-odd days involved, I would hope it would be submitted to- day, tomorrow, or Saturday. I think that is the least due us, having gone through the enormous exercise, and at long last trying to join the Congress and those major policy decisions on for- eign policy, and being, as Arthur Van- denberg, for one of the first times in modern times, in at the takeoff instead of just at the landing, so many of which will crash. Mr. TUNNEY. Will the Senator yield? Mr. JAVITS. Yes. Mr. TUNNEY. I feel so strongly that this amendment offers the Senate an op- portunity to express its opinion on the basic principle that no moneys under this defense appropriation bill ought to go to Angola for military purposes that I ask to be a cosponsor of this amendment because it is directly on point, the? lan- guage is exactly the same as the amend- ment that has been introduced by me. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator from New York asked to be advised when he had 2 minutes remaining. He has 2 minutes remaining. Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Tux- NEY may be added as a cosponsor of the amendment. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I am pre- pared to vote now, but I do not see any- one from the Appropriations Committee who could speak for them, so I reserve the remainder of my time. Mr. TUNNEY. I think that I control the other half of the time. I am happy to yield the floor to the Senator from New York. Mr. BUCKLEY. I thank the Senator from California. Mr. President, I rise because he stated that a vote in favor of the Javits amend- ment would constitute a vote in approval of the principles underlying the Tunney amendment. I just want the RECORD to make it clear that a vote to improve an undesirable amendment does not constitute a vote of approval for that same amendment. So I do not want my vote that will be forthcoming to be confused with ap- proval of the Tunney proposal. Mr. TUNNEY. I am prepared to yield back my time unless another Senator wishes to speak. Mr. YOUNG. Will the Senator yield me 1 minute? The PRESIDING OFFICER. On whose time? Is this on the time of the Senator from California? Mr. TUNNEY. Yes. Mr. YOUNG. I ask the Senator from New York, does his amendment embody the language of the Tunney amendment? What I am trying to determine is does your amendment restore money, and also encompass the Tunney language? Mr. JAVITS. It does. Mr. YOUNG. I support that. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator CASE may be made a cosponsor. The PRESIDING OFFICER Without objection, it is so ordered. Who yields time? Mr. McCLURE. Mr. President, a par- liamentary inquiry. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator will state it. Mr. McCLURE. The pending amend- ment is an amendment to the Tunney amendment? The PRESIDING OFFICER. An amendment in the nature of a substitute for the Tunney amendment. Mr. McCLURE. And if this amend- ment is adopted, it would require a fur- ther vote upo nthe Tunney amendment as amended? The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct. Mr. McCLURE. I thank the Chair. Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 S 22778 Approved For Releeeu The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? Mr. TUNNEY. I am prepared to yield back my time unless there is any Sena- tor that wants to have my time. Does any Senator request time? Mr. FANNIN. Mr. President, could v e clarify whether the Javits amendment does include the Tunney amendment? Mr. TUNNEY. The Javits amendment Includes the language in the Tunney amendment with one exception. The $33 million is eliminated. Mr. FANNIN. But not on the? Mr. TUNNEY. The only way the Tun- ney amendment can be adopted is to have a vote. This represents a substitute for my amendment. Mr. FANNIN. That is what I wanted to know. I thank the Senator. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? Mr. TUNNEY. Will the Senator from Idaho agree to yield back the time ey does he want to use my time'? Mr. McCLURE. There is a little con- fusion, will the Senator yield for a moment? Mr. TUNNEY. Certainly. Mr. McCLURE. So we can qualify the situation so that everybody may know exactly-what is involved here. The Javits amendment is an amend- ment in the nature of a substitute for the Tunney amendment, but a vote for the Javits amendment does not adopt the Tunney amendment. If the Javits amendment is adopted, there would still be a vote on the Tun- ney amendment as amended by the Sen- ator from New York. Mr. TUNNEY. That is correct. Mr. McCLURE. So that I, for one, al- though not necessarily in support of the Tunney amendment, would support the Javits amendment as being an improve- ment. I think the Senator from California has indicated he thinks so, also. Mr. TUNNEY. I would just like to say that I think if the Javits amendment is accepted, it is going to make it very clear what the sentiment of the Senate is in respect to cutting off funds to Angola. It would then be my view, if the Javits amendment carries, it would then be clear that a majority of this body wants to cut off funds under this defense ap- propriations bill. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? Mr. TUNNEY. I am prepared to yield back, but the Senator from New York de- sires to speak. Mr. BUCKLEY. Mr. President, I went to some pains just now? The PRESIDING OFFICER. There will be order, please. Mr. BUCKLEY. I went to some pains just now to rebut the presumption just stated by the Senator from California. My vote in favor of the Javits amend- ment must not be construed as a vote in favor of cutting off these funds for co- vert affairs in Angola. Mr. TUNNEY. Then I suggest the Sen- ator vote against it. Mr. BUCKLEY. The Senator from Cal- ifornia has no right to instruct me how to vote or determine the reasons for my vote. Mr. TUNNEY. I have no right, but I make the suggestion. Mr. JACKSON. Will the Senator yield for a unanimous-consent request? Mr. TUNNEY. I yield to the Senator. Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Dan Dreyfus and Ben Yamagato be granted privilege of the floor in connection with H.R. 3474. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it es so ordered. Who yields time? Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Charles Warren of my staff, be granted privilege of the floor. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time. Mr. DOIVIENICI. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a unanimous-consent request? Mr. TUNNEY. Yes, I yield to the Sena- tor from New Mexico. Mr. DOMENIC'. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Frank DuBois, of my staff, be granted privilege of the floor. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. TUNNEY. I yield back the remain- der of my time. The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time having been yielded back, the question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from New York. The yeas and nays? Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. Presi- dent, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Washington (Mr. JACK- SON) may proceed for not to exceed 3 minutes. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there (Abjection? Without objection, it is so ordered. / ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVET,OP- MENT ADMINISTRATION i AU- THORIZATIONS Mr. JACIVN. Mr. Presideot, I ask the Chair to . y before the Senate a mes- sage from the House of Representatives on H.R. 3474, \e The PR ES' WW1 0 FkICER ( Mr. PacrewooD) laid efore the Senate the amendment of the. Hooke of the Represent- ativesSenate to e amerid nt of the Sena to the bill (H.R. 347) to authorize ap- propriations to the E ergy Research and Development Administration in accord- ance with sectyr 26t of the Atomic Energy Act of 54, as ainended, section 305 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, and seceion 16 of the,Federal Non- euclear Energy Research aiod Develop- ment Act of 1974, and for othter purposes. (The Amendment of the' House is )rnted, in the RECORD of December 11, 1975, beginning at page H12424.), Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, move .-e) concur with the House amendm?.s to he Senate amendments to the fluse mil. A Mr. President, this amendment which 'Mlle over from the House was a pa of the original conference report o December 1-8, 19245 e ERDA. The House deleted certain loeri gliarantee provisions and in situ oil shale letiae provisions from the bill and other than that they sent the bill back as the Senate had adopted it . t I eve cleared this matter with Sena- tor ASTORE, who handles the nuclear part f it, with Senator FANNIN and Sen- ator EAKER Weare all in agreement that in 'view of thetmargin of vote in the House, there is no noint trying to go back to canfer- ence or sending it baek with an aamene- ment, despite the fact the Senate/passed the bill tO to 10. Mr. resident. the confers haft adopted the provisions of the Senate Ver - sion of the bill whieti would authorize the Administrator of ERDA tat' guaran- tee loans for the construction of one- of-a-kind Aacilities to demonetrate new energy tee nologies. Among the technol- ogies which were eligible for euch assist- ance were energy Proluctio from solid wastes, sola i energy appli ations, geo- thermal ene gy, conversio of coal to synthetic fu s, and pro ction of oil from shale. the conferees Would have authorized the Another Senate pretasit adopted by Administrator to carry t, in coopera - tion with industry, a car fully controlled experiment in c mmerc 1 production or oil from shale us g in .situ methods. The in situ method, i uccessful, would elim- inate most of e extreme environ- mental conseque es which will other- wise result from% mining and above ground retorting of shale. It would greatly reduce wat use, water quality degradation, and production of solid wastes for disposal. , On December 11 in an unprecedented i action, the Hous Of Representatives bowed to the de wiles of some of it:, Members and v ted separately upon these two provis ons of the Senate-ap- proved conferenle repo t. The provisions were rejected and the remainder of the conference rept is new before us as an amended bill. i 1 I intend to cept the deei prove the bill do so not be cision but be other provis I am not e Home will ternatives mentione ove thattthe Senate ae- on of the House and ap- ithout ean ndment. I will ause I agre with the do- ause it is im rtant for the ns of the bill t become law. ouraged to believe that the accept any r sonabIe al- the two provi 'ons I have at this time. Mr. Pr sident, the House ai these pr visions was rernar loan gu ntee provision was some M bers as a$6 billion the ene gy industries. It was j hemen y opposed by others as step i nationalizing the oil Editor Is in major national ne suppo ed both arguments. I a ure the Senate that the P woul i have neither of the alleged It s ms self-evident that it co hay both. e debate includes contentions debate on able. The posed by ipoff" by t as ve- the first dustry. papers thi to ision tilts. not that is a gift to major oil companie and imonials that It is opposed by m jor companies. It includes content n.e at these kinds of facilities will be en- s ructed immediately by industry with Out Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 b'ecembr 18, liWroved Fed er?assistance and contentions that they at?mpossible dreams and that the guaranted loans will default. The h tory of discussions about syn- thetic fu s policy is dramatically re- flected in t e House debate. This Nation is no longe self-sufficient in petroleum resources, bu it has vast resources of coal and oil shale. We consume energy pri- marily in thr forms?gas for industrial and domestic eating:, liquid fuels for transportation, nd electricity. All of these demands c uld be supplied from coal, oil shale, an more advanced sys- tems if socially, e vironmentally, and economically accept le conversion tech- nologies could be reazed. There are those whk remain compla- cent that industry wi \bring about the technologies When the ivarket dictates, and there are those who b lieve the tech- nical or economic probles are insur- mountable. Industry has b n alleged to be on the verge of demon,s ating shale oil and coal gasification pro uction for years, but action is never forth oming. Meanwhile, fundamental national Policy decisions are being mac based upon gross assuniptions about ou1energy fUture. The viability of domestic ergy self-sufficiency is critical to our' ter- national posture, even if we do not clpose the course of energy self-sufficiency. Real changes in life style and sev re energy conservation decisions are be' deferred because of complacency tha technological solutions to the energy crisis are possible. Our, energy-based etOnomY continues to face the uncer- tainties of increasing prices and short- ages. The provisions stricken by the House Were intended to encourage early dem- onstrations of available, but unproven, technologies?to assess the real techno- logical, environmental, economic, and social consequences of synthetic fuel pro duction. They were not intended?a could not?conunit us to a synthetic fu s future, but they would provide the b is for reasoned and rational decisions. The House action ,peems likely t re- sult in one more costly deferral of tion; to extend for at least another any real initiative to find out if sy thetics are a solution to our problems. At best, our continued ambiv lence on research and, demonstration ? f energy alternatives will condemn u to taking expedient and blind action n synthetic fuels at some future date It will con- demn us to crisis comniit ents without the safeguards without d iberate analy- sis, and without knowle ge of the con- sequences. At worst, it ill condemn the American public to g ater dependence upon Arab oil and gr ater expansion of the nuclear altemat e. And it will re- Suit not in energy onservation, but in economic deprivati n. I hope that t e opponents of this measure in the ouse and the critics in the media will aend some time during the forthcomi holiday season reflect- ing on the opt ans we have for the future. If, they rema convinced that there is seine Way t t new energy technologies will materi ize without energy industry involveme without government assist- ance, or out experimentation I hope that they will advance their own pr posals for our consideration early ne t year. If they have no alternative propo I hope that they can constructively up- port a program of the kind whic has been deleted from this conference eport before more crucial years of le time are wasted in inaction. Mr. President, I think we ar in com- plete agreement on the part o the par- ticipants in the conference oi both sides of the aisle. I yield to the Senator fro Arizona. Mr. FANNIN. Mr. Presi nt, I concur with what the distingu7shed Senator from Washington has sai . It is unfortunate the House did take out a very important a,cet of the bill, which was the loan g arantee program. It is going to be ver damaging to the program. At the same ti e, we do not have sufficient time to go into that matter with the House. t was such an over- whelming vote. do not think it would be wise to try at this time to place that particula item back in the bill. Mr. BU RS. Will the Senator yield? Mr. JA SON. I yield to the Sen- ator. Mr. F . There were two items. The othe was on the old mine involve- ment, the $750 million. Mr. ACKSON. That was the other bill. Mr ANNIN. That is right. M . JACKSON. This involved the sit- at' n of the loan guarantee provision. r. BUMPERS. I think that answers question. e House dropped the$6 million loan ntee and the oil shale project, hose are the only two things? Mr. ACKSON. That is correct. Mr. OMENICI. Mr. President, I re- luctantl support H.R. 3474 the ERDA authoriz 'on bill, as amended by the House. I m disappointed the House struck the rovisions which would have prOvided a l? guarantee program for synthetic fue development. I feel there is an urgenc to bring about the com- mercialization if synthetic fuels. How- ever, I do not eel that we can delay on approving th authorization of funds for the Energy search and Develop- ment Administrati , because the rest of the provisions in t bill are extremely Important to the Na on as we strive for energy independence. I am hopeful that members of the Senate Interior Comm ttee who spent long hours developing th legislative lan- guage contained in sectio 103 will make every possible effort to ass e that simi- lar legislation is consider separately early in the second session. I cannot stress enough the portance of a loan guaranteed program to insure the development of our synfuels ? rogram in the United States. It is impo nt to the State of New Mexico because have several coal gasification plants pr sed for the northwest corner of the te. These plants offer an option to conti ed excessive dependence on foreign so es of energy. We cannot allow the millio s of tons of coal in the United States to Ii 000400100018-1 S 22779 for another 3 million years, unused unattended to while the Nation's energy eeds go unmet. Intelligent, resourceful, and envirpn- entally sound development of tgese able resources, which offer so uch to erica's desire to be energy )hde- p- ? ent, must proceed. But, it qbnnot without an aggressive p gram of vernment aid in what is au enor- mous expensive proposition. Th technology for producing pipeline qualit synthane?synthetic mqthane or natura gas?has been demon trated in Scotian in a coal gasifica on plant using a iomb1nation lurgi an4 methana- tion pro?ss to create 25 nyThion cubic feet of gc per day. While th1s plant is 100 times mailer than th commercial size synt plants propsed by com- panies in is country, th fundamental process is kn wn well eno h to minimize the technic 'sk that thtse larger plants will not func on proper &. The synth c fuels p oject can involve both mining a d m acturing facili- ties requiring uge l7lvestmentu in re- source a.ssessm t, rsource acquisition, and development essary infrastruc- tures and comm y facilities. Protec- tion of the enviro eat also can require costly environmen analysis and safe- guards. The fin 1 community will in all probability more conservative Investments unl e Federal Govern- ment is willing a a. cipate. The PRESID I G 0 CER. The ques- tion is on agr he motion of the Senator from n. The motio d to. Mr. JAC ON. Mr. P esident, I move to reconsid the vote by\which the mo- tion was a -d to. Mr. FANNIN. Mr. Presid, I move to lay that motion on the table. The tin to lay on the table was agreed Mr. ARRY P. BYRD, JR. Mr. Presi- dent, voted to approve the egislation autho izing funds for the E ergy Re- searc and Development Acimin stration, as odified by action of the 1ouse of Rep esentatives. Our R. & D. pro ams in en gy are an essential element in our na ional effort to achieve greate inde- p & dence from unreliable foreign s urces o petroleum. I favor the House position as m- ? o ared to the Senate proposal and 7- port the changes made by the Housf Representatives. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPRO- PRIATIONS, FISCAL YEAR 1976 The Senate continued with the con- sideration of amendment in disagreement No. 75 to H.R. 9861, an act making ap- propriations for the Department of De- fense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1976, and for the period beginning July 1, 1976, and ending September 30, 1976, and for other purposes. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question now recurs on the amendment of the Senator from New York to the amendment of the Senator from Cali- fornia. The yeas and nays have been or- dered, and the clerk will call the roll. Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 S 22780 Approved For ROW3O9giti11941:: RifirMIUZ-MgP0434100 040 01 01:10180n 1,(-31. 18, 19 'lig , )(2) to assure the burn line treatment ;of m1'11818 during transportation in commeck:e: an 1,1 (6) to protect the owners of animals from the theft of their animals by preventing the sale or use of animals which have ;been sthele T lI Congress further finds that it is e.ssen- tial to regulate, as provided in this Aet, the transportation, purchase, sale, housing, care, handling, and treatment in animals by car- riers oft by persons or orgsnizations engnised - i in using them for researen or experimental purposes or for exhibition purposes or hold- ing them for sale as nets or for any such purpose er use. SEC. 3. Section 2 of such Ant (7 U.S.C. 2132) is amended? i 1 ) by striking out sussections (c) am; (d) thereof and inserting in lieu the follow- ing: "(c) The term 'commerce' Means trade. traffic; tranfnxirtation, or other/ commerce? "(1) between a place in a state and any place outside of such State' or "(2) which\ affects trade, traffic, transpor- tation, or other commerce deseribed in para- graph (1). ' "(d) The term 'State' nieatis a State of the United States, the Districs Of Columbia, the Commonwealth - of Puerte Itico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Safnoa, or any other territory or possession of tie United States;". (2) by strikink out the term "affectine commerce" in subsections (e) and (f) and inserting in lieu thereof "In commerce"; (3) by amending subsection Ag) thereof to read as follows: , "(g) The term 'animal' means any dog cat, monkey, guinea /fig, hamster, rabbit. bird, horse, or any nthar animal, which the Secretary determiners is it :ended for use for research, testing, exPerin-entation, or exhi- bition purposes, or w1Vch is used or intended for use as a pet. Wit ti respect to a dog, the term also includes; dog used for hunting. alp security, or breeding Arposes. The term does not include farm a ins\s/f, such as, but not limited to, livestocilt or ,psultry, used or in- tended for use as food Of fiber, or livestock or poultry used oriintenced for use for im- proving animal niltritioni breeding, manage- ment, or production efficiency.". (3) by amending subsection (f) theretif bs Inserting after "sir sells- nnd before "iiny' the following: "" or offers for sale.", (4) by furthet ameridingnubsection (f) by inserting a sernfleolon afterithe word "pets" and by striking ", but snob term excludes any retail pet Store except sisch store which sells any anirnels to 4 inseid(ch facilii s, an exhibitor, or al dealer,"; , (5) by aan iding suisse tioni(h) thereof by striking out7 ", which w u 0 ere t rch,ased In commerce the intended d tribution of which affects commerce, or will affect corn- s. l!41 rrierce," and inserting -in lieu ntherecif "in commerce 'j and i , (6) add ng at the end thereof\the follow- ing new sib section: t "11) TIle term 'carrier' means any person subject t regulation by 1he fate ate Com- merce Oommission, the Civil A Board, ge the Federal Maritime Co or any hther person or Class of pe gaged, mats f to suc Secre SE is ate The second assistant legislative clerk called the roll. Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD, I announce that the Senator from Indiana (Mr. BaYI-1) , the Senator from Louisiana (Mr. LoNc) are necossarily absent. Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER) is necessarily absent. The result was announced?yeas 93, nays 4, as follows: (Rollcall Vote No. 606 Leg.] YEAS-93 Abourevk Allen Baker Bartlett Beall Belimon Bentsen Biden Brock Brooke Buckley Bumpers Burdick Byrd, Humphrey Harry F., Jr. Inouye Byrd, Robert C. Jackson Cannon Javits Case Johnston Chiles Kennedy Laxalt Leahy Magnuson Mansfield Mathias McClellan McClure McGee McGovern McIntyre Metcalf Mondale Montoya NAYS-4 Scott, William Is NOT VOTING-3 Both Goldwater Long So the Javits amendment (amend- ment No. 1312) to the Tunney amend- ment (amendment No. 1303) was agreed to Glenn Morgan Gravel MOSS Hansen Muskie Hart, Gary Nelson Hart, Philip A. Nunn Hartke Packwood Haskell Pastore Hatfield Pearson Hathaway Pell Helms Percy Hollings Proxmire Hruska Randolph Huddleston Ribicoff Roth Schweiker Scott, Hugh Sparkman Ste fford Stevens Stevenson Stone Symington Tart , Talmadge Thurmond Tower Tunney Weicker Williams Young Church Clark Cranston Culver Dole Domeniei Durkin Eagleton Eastland Fannin Fong Ford Garn Curtis Griffin Stennis Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amend- ment was agreed to. Mr. MOSS. I move to lay that mo- tion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques- tion is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from California (Mr. Tux-- HEY) , as amended. Several Senators addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Tile Sen- ator from Montana. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I yield to the Republican leader, without losing my right to the floor. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ate will be in order. The Senator from Pennsylvania may proceed. TEMPOR CONTINUAT N OF CURREN TAX WITH OLDING TABLES? 815 Mr. HUGH S TT. MI/President, I send to the desk bill ?roviding that the current tax wit' ii ding tables re- main in effect until M h 15, 1976. It is obvious that sse has been reached between th Presid t and Con- gress. The purpos of my bill to allow Approved egUtiations to proceed on the spenci- eeiling issue while keeping the rh- I olding tax rates at current levels or a bort beriod of time. Mr. Rresident, I would ask for im- iediate consideration of my 41 but I calize that an objection would be raised. "herefore, ask unanimous cqnsent that i:iy bill be cansidered as having been read twice and be laced on the calendar until F uch time as the Democratic Leadership ( ecides to bring this matter before the I enatc. The PRESIDIIIG OFFICER. Without . bjection, it is so Ordered. The text of the , _ 1 ill is as follows: ' tiXs8 . S. 15 Be it enacted by , e enate and House of e7.presentatives of' the% United States of / le:writ:a in Gong ess aAentbled, That (a) i ection 3402(a) o the Internal Revenue Code ni 1954 (relati ' to income, tax collected at . ?ince), as a nded by section 205 of the ' 'ax Reduct Act of 1975, is amended by nserting ir the second se tence thereof be followi ? "The tables so pr scribed with aspect t wages paid after ember 31, 975, an on or before March 15,s 1976, shall fe the me as the tables prescri ed under his section which were in effe on De- . emb 10, 1975.". (b Section 209(c) of the Tax lie\uction tot /of 1975 is amended by striking ou "be- January 1, 1976" and inserting in lieu ereof 'on or before March 15, 1976". \ ',..NIMAL WELFARE AMENDMENTS OF 1975 Mk, WEICKER. Mr. President, I ask manimous consent that the Senate pro- eed tie the immediate consideratiOn of 3. 1941, which was reported froM the ommittee on Commerce today, The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there )bjection "\to proceeding to the mmedi- N (te consi ration of the bill? There b g rio objection, e Senate )roceeded t consider the b (S. 1941) Lo increase e protection orded ani- mals in trans and to assurelhe humane treatment of si:maLs, and fbr other pur- poses, which as been ported from the Committee .,,on Co erce with an amendment. ' The amendmei was agreed to. . The bill, was o ered to be engrossed for a third readin rOad the third time, and passed, as fall Be it enacted by Senate and house of Representatives e United States of 4 merica Congre s aAembled, That this Act may be cited /as the, "Animal Welfare Amendments of 1 5". . SEC. 2. Section of the Act of August 24, 1966, as amende (7 U.S.C. 2\31). is amended to read as folio : SHORT TITLE ND DECLARAT OW POLICY SECTION 1. a) This Act n be cited as the "Animal Welfare Act". (bc The ngress finds that nimals and activities w ich are regulated un er this Act are either interstate or foreign commerce or substa lly affected such co merce or the free ow thereof, and that re lation of animals and activities as provide in this Act is ecessary to prevent and e minate burdens/upon such commerce and effec- tively egulate such commerce, in ord - use n research facilities or for exhib tion purposes or for use as pets are prov ed (1i)/ to insure that animals intend for humane care and treatment; \ For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 onauties mission, ns t the business o.: transporting ani- r hire or providing services inAidental transportation, as designate by the ry of Transportatim.". k . 4. Section 3 of such Act (7 U.S.Cs2133 ended by inserting after "his facilities" and /before "comply" is the first peoviso the f the following: -. including any; ter- mi ito 1 facilities used by such person,". ' , EC. 5. Sections 4, 11, and 12 of such ('li.U.S.C. 2134, 2141, and 2142) are ame b striking out "affecting commerce" i serting in lieu thereof "in commerce". / SEC. 6. Section 6 of such Act (7 U.S.C. 1361 ib amended by striking out "Every research facility and every" and inserting in lieu Approved For MaPgsf8Mil/ CO W1E6AbilDPHANCIV4R000400100018-1 S 22781 district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to enfOrce any such order by ap- propriate means. Xi"; (4) by amending subsection (c) thereof by inserting "knowingly" after "who" and before "violates"; and (5) by adding at the end thereof of the following twci new subsections: "(d) Any dealer, exhibitor, carrier, or op- erator of an auction sale subject to this Act who is determined by the Secretary, after notice and an opportunity for a hearing, to have vierfated a provision of this Act or of a standafd or regulation prescribed pursuant to th0: Act, shall be liable to the United Stat ea for a civil penalty. The amount of such penalty shall be not more than $2,000 fon-each violation, and if any violation is a continuing one, each day of violation con- stitutes a separate offense. The amount of any auch penalty shall be assessed by the Secre- tary by written notice. In determining the amount of such penalty, the Secretary shall take into account the nature, circumstances, extent, and gravity of the violation commit- ted and, with respect to the person found to have committed such violation, the degree of culpability, any history of prior offenses, ability to pay, effect on ability to continue to do business, and such other matters as justice may require. "(e) Any action under this section may be brought before a United States Magistrate in the district court of the United States in any judicial district in which such person is found, and such magistrate shall have juris- diction to hear and decide-such action.". SEC. 13. Section 21 of such Act (7 U.S.C. 2151) is amended by adding at the end there- of the following two new sentences: "Record- keeping requirements prescribed pursuant -no section 8, and standards promulgated pur- suant to subsections (a) and (b) of section 10, shall be prescribed or promulgated in ac- cordance with section 553 of title 5, United States Code, except that interested persons shall be entitled to make oral as well as written presentations. A transcript shall be taken of any oral presentation.". SEC. 14. (a) Section 23 of such Act (7 U.S.C. 2153) is amended by striking out the last sontence. (b) Such Act is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new seetion: "Sac. 26. There is authorized to be appro- priated to the Secretary to carry out the provisions of this Act not to exceed$4,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1976, not to son sublec to regulation by it.". exceed $1,000,000 for the transitional fiscal SEC. 11. ection 16(a) of such Act ( '7 U.S.0 quarter ending September 30, 1976, not to is amended? n exceed$4,000,000 for the fiscal year ending eptember 30, 1977, and not to exceed $4,000,- 0 for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1 8.". c. 15. Section 24 of such Act (7 U.S.C. 2154 is amended? (1) by inserting "and carriers" after the term ealers" in the third sentence there- of, and (2) by dding after "of this Act" and be- fore the f?od at the end of the first sen- tence the f lowing: ", except that the regu- lations relat g to carriers shall be prescribed not later tha nine months after the date of enactment c the 'Animal Welfare Amend- ments of 1975.' SEC. 16 Sectiok 25 of such Act (7 U.S.C. 2155) is amended (1) by striking kut "and" at the end of paragraph (2) there f; (2) by redesignatin paragraph (3) there- of as paragraph (4) th eof; and (3) by inserting therein the following new paragraph: "(3) recommendations and conclusions approved by the Secretary of Transportation, the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration and the Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board, concerning flight safety, including the aircraft, its environ- December 18, 197 thereof "Every research facility, carrier, and", danger such animal or other animals during Sae. 7. Section 9 of such Act (7 U.S.C. 2139) , transportation in commerce. Any such cer- is amended by inserting after "dealer," the tificate shall be issued at a time interval, and first time it appears the team "a carrier,", shall be retained by the receiving carrier for and the second time it appears the term a reasonable period of time in accordance "carrier", a with regulations of the Secretary. SW. 8. Section 10 of such Act (7 13.5.0. "(c) No carrier involved in the transpor- 2140) is amended by deleting ''amon forms tation of any animal in commerce shall par- Supplied by the Secretary" in the first sen- ticipate in any arrangement, or engage in tence thereof and by adding after the sec- any practice, under which the cost of the ond sentence thereof the following 'awo new transportation of such animal, or any other sentences: "Carriers shall keep such -records charges (including the purchase price of any as are necessary to carry out this Act, with such animal), is required to be paid and col- respect to the transportation, recetving, lected upon the delivery of such animal to handling, and delivering of animals, as the the consignee, unless the consignor guaran- Secretary may prescribe: Provided, That' in tees in writing the payment of transportation the case of those carriers required to main- charges, including, where necessary, both the tam n records under requirements of other. return transportation charges and an amount Federal agencies, if the Secretary determines sufficient to reimburse such carrier for all that any additional records are needed for \out-of-pocket expenses incurred for the care, the purposes or this Act, and proposes to require such records, such requirements shall not become effectiVe until they have been approved by such other agencies. Any Such records shall be made available at all reasonable times for inspection and copying by the Secretary.". SRC. 9. Section 13 of such Act (7 U.S.C. 2143), is amended? (1) by amending the title thereof to read as follows; "HUMANE STANDARDS FOR ANI- MALS"; (2) by inserting "(a)" immediately be- fore the first sentence thereof; (3) by amending the second sentence thereof by inserting after "Such standards" and before "shall include" the following: "shall apply with respect to the facilities of any person licensed or registered pursuant to this Act and with respect to any terminal facilities used by a carrier subject to this Aet and"; and (4) by adding at the end thereof the following two new subsections: "(1)) The Secretary shall promulgate standards in accordance with this subsec- tion to govern the transportation in com- merce, and the handling, care; and treatment Ip connection therewith, by carriers, of ani- mals consigned by any dealer, research facil- ity, owner of a pet, exhibitor, operator of an auction sale, department, agency, or instru- mentality of the Federal Government or of any State or local government, or other per- son. Such standards shall include, but need not be limited to, minimum requirenaents with respect to containers, feed, water, rest, ventilation, temperature, handling, veteri- nary care, and other factors determined by the Secretary to be relevant to assuring the humane treatment of animals in the course of their transportation in commerce. Such standards shall be designed to assure the safe transportation in commerce of all animals receved in healthy condition and to safe- guard such animals against disease, injury, and death in the course thereof. The Secre- tary may revise such standards to the extent necessary or appropriate. Such standards may include a requirement that no animal of a designated kind shall be? "(1) delivered by a dealer, research facil- ity, exhibitor, operator of an auction sale owner of a pet, or by a department, agenc or instrumentality of the Federal Gover ment or of any State or local governm t, to a Carrier, for transportation in comme e; Or "(2) received by a carrier, for trans orta- tion in commerce, from any person or vern- ment entity described in paragraph ) unless it is accoMpanied by a cert' cate is- sued with respect to such animal y an ac- credited (as defined by the Seer' ary) vet- erinarian, Each snail certificate hall attest that such veteriarien inspected such animal within a time interval which all be speci- fied And that, when so inspe ed, such ani- Mal appeared to be free of an infectious dis- iatee or physical abnormality' hich might en- / Seeding, and storage of any such animal in the event that such animal is not claimed upam delivery. Such transportation shall be perfaitted by the carriers after a period of twenty-four hours.". SEC.'. 10. Section 15 of such Act (7 1J.St. 2145) is amended by adding at the end thereof 'tale following new subsection: "(e) n, addition to other applicable re- quirement, the Secretary shall consult and cooperate With the Secretary of Taaneporta- tion, the Acitninistrator of the FederAl Avia- tion AdminiAration, the Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Chairman of the Interstate Gommerce Commassion, and the Chairman of he Federal Mayitime Com- mission with resr)ect to the Otablishment and enforcement of humane fitandards for animals in the course( of their/transportation in commerce and in i rming facilities prior to and after such tran ortakion. 13efore pro- mulgating any standard erning air trans- portation and related h?dling of animals, the Secretary shall consu ith the Secretary of Transportation, and e dministrator of the Federal Aviation Adm istration who shall have the autho ty to isapprove any such standard if he. notifies me Secretary, within thirty days aifter sucht nsultation, that changes are natessary in th interest of ing the safety the air- ent. The e Civil itime ctive as a- safety flight inclu craft, its environ Interstate Com Aeronautics Bo Commission, t lawful autho ent, or its equip erce Commission, t d, and the Federal M the extent of their resp ties, shall take such a,cti is appropria?o implement any determ tion by the/Secretary with respect to a p 2146(a)) (1) b tence t time (2 the inserting "carrier," in the first sen- ereof after the term "exhibitor", each ch term appears in such sentence; by striking out "or" before "(4)" in hird sentence thereof; I by inserting before the period at the of the third sentence thereof the follow- g: ", or (5) such animal is held by a arrier"; and (4) by adding the following new sentence at the end thereof: "The United States at- torneys are authorized to prosecute all crim- inal violations of this Act reported by- the Secretary and to invite civil actions to en- force orders of and to recover all civil penal- ties assessed and reported by the Secretary, or which come to their notice or knowledge by other means.". Sac. 12. Section 19 of such Act, as amended (7.U.S.C. 2149), is amended? (1) by inserting after "exhibitor," each time the term appears the following: "car- rier,"; (2) by striking out "one year" in subsection ? (e) thereof and inserting in lieu thereof "six months"; (3) by amending subsection (a) thereof by striking "violation, and 1f" and inserting in lieu thereof the following; "violation. The Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 S 22782 \ CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE Dece,nber 18, 1915 merit, or equ nient as they relate to the carriage of live animals lir air transporta? tion; and". SEC. 17. Section (c) of such Act (7 U.S.C. 2146c) is amended yo, striking ", and the provisions of title II the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 46k Stat. 856; 18 U.S.C. 6001 et seq.) ,". DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPRO- PRIATIONS, FISCAL YEAR 1976 The Senate continued with the con- sideration of amendment in disagree- ment No. 75 to H.R. 9861, an net making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1976, and for the period begin- ning July 1, 1976, and ending Septern - ber 30, 1976, and for other purposes. ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS ON ANGOLA Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I rise to support the amendment offered by the .Senator from California, Mr. TUNNEY, which I have cosponsored, to halt covers U.S. involvement in the civil war in Angola. It is evident from the secret session recently concluded that the Senate as a body has neither been informed of the details of our military aid to one of the factions in Angola, advised of the poli- cies being pursued nor been given an opportunity to express its view on this matter. - We are faced with a secret operation that may reach an expenditure of$60 million. Those are taxpayer dollars be- ing used in a way that promotes au es- calation of the civil war and massive and tragic loss of life and property that in- evitably will result. We all deplore the intervention by the Soviet Union and Cuba in that newly independent nation of Africa. Yet we neither promote our own interests nor those of a peaceful solution by respond- ing with a CIA-financed covert opera- tion, apparently conducted in concert with the Union of South Africa. The Congress has an equal role in for policymaking with the administra- tion. Our obligations cannot be fulfilled if we are kept in the dark or if we are confronted with an opportunity to act only after the fact. And that is what we are faced with in Angola. A major covert operation has been conducted without full public explanation of the policy being pursued or the interests, objectives, and goals that policy is designed to promote. Until Congress is given that oppor- tunity and makes that determination. I do not believe we should permit the con- tinued expenditure of tax dollars by tile CIA in the Angolan civil war. And I believe that even were the ques- tion before us today as a request for authorization for such action, the risks of that policy clearly outweigh any fleeting short-term benefits. First, we know that covert involve- ment of U.S. money and U.S. personnel-- whether CIA employees or mercenaries hired by the CIA?in a foreign civil war can ensnare this Nation in growing and undesired commitments. Although we are told that there is no intention of producing another Vietnam on the con- tinent of Africa, the dangers of step-by- step increments of U.S. money, man- power and Prestige are clear. Sarnayana's warning seems never so apt as today that those who will not learn from history are destined to repeat it. If we have learned anything from Vietnam, it is that the United States cannot police the world. Any effort to do so in Angola without full public and congressional acceptance of the need for the expenditure of U.S. resources in a foreign civil war cannot be sustained-- and should not be sustained. Second, if we look at the continued statements of the Council of the Orga- nization of African Unity in opposition to foreign intervention in Angola, it is clear that our actions?however fre- quently we identify them as a reaction to Soviet and Cuban initiatives?will be condemned as foreign intervention. We cannot hope but antagonize many of the African nations with whom we desire improved relations. Third, it is unchallengeable that throughout black Africa. our involve- ment on the side of the white supremacist regime of the Union of South Africa and increasing reports of our acting in con- cert with that government, will be cause for attack. Ultimately, we could well find ourselves isolated from the dominant forces on that continent?a result which clearly is not in our interests. Finally, the actions we are taking to finance covert operations which prolong the bloody civil war yield tragic human- itarian consequences: loss of life, crea- tion of new populations of refugees, dis- ruption of food supply and resulting mal- nutrition and hunger. Those covert op- erations have involved already some $33 million with up to$60 million authoriza- tion. Yet our support for humanitarian relief has been limited to $200,000. This juxtaposition of priorities is not in the interests of the people of Angola nor in the interests of the United States. Let us look at the long story behind our current involvement in Angola. Angola, as a colony of Portugal, gained its independence on November 11. Yet because of the abundant natural re- sources spread throughout that terri- tory, both internal and outside forces have spent months and years vying for full control of this land. To some ob- servers, the conflict and internal strife were inevitable. For, the end of colonial- ism in African countries has too often been followed by a scramble among war- ring factions that seek to enjoy the spoils, even before the local residents have a chance to begin guiding their own fate_ Too much of what is happening in An- gola today has been repeated time and sime again throughout the colonial world. Thus, after years of colonial rule, an African nation emerges with its own internal struggle for powers already drawn upon ethnic, tribal and historical Adding to that, is the awesome might ,ss: the superpowers in the Soviet Union, he United States, and China. Our Government reluctantly admits .nvolvement for the sake of protecting our interests?particularly our interest in Angola's potential on supply. And for years, along with the Russians and the Chinese, our Government has been a sup- porter of at least one liberation faction in Angola. Zaire. Zambia, and other black African states are also deeply involved in Angolti, and for their part the people of Angola are forced to question this deep involve- ment in Angolan affairs by se man:: - eign governments. Yet, a third facti---, poses one of the rs--:st imponderab'o aspects of thh; cntire conflict. For, t': Republic of South AL'ica has also con- nutted troops, munitions and other 2'e - sources to the Angolan struggle. Our de- bate today on this serious matter inuet focus noon the real dangers posed by the US, involvement in that troubled land. As long agc$ as 1969, the administra- tion decided that black Angolans would not obtain majority rule in the land of their birth. And so, our Government chose to support the Portugese govern - ments of Caetano and Salazar. But, for at least 13 years, it has been reported, the CIA has funneled assist- once to the FNLA--one of the three An- golan liberation parties. When Portugal's government collapsed in 1974, independ- ence for Angola and all of the Portugesc colonies became the hallmark of the new Portilgese government's democratic ex periment. After that event, the world's attention cautiously turned to the anticipated buildup by interests outside of Angola- - interests that have been nurtured by a continuing search for power, but inter. ests that bore no compassion or empathy for self-determination. In 1974, Portu- gal, after 500 years of colonialism, sur- rendered her claim to that land, far from the shores of Lisbon. And now, in 1975, the mighty nation, of the world have reached out to pull apart any hope for Angolans to deter- mine for themselves how that newly formed state ought to be directed. I fully support and have cosponsored the amendment to prohibit military funds for use in Angola, because I agree with those who feel that a continued U.S. buildup can only provide fuel for the warring factions to blaze away at each other. And the victims of continued fighting will be not only the soldiers of MPLA, UNITA and FNLA--bus the women and children and those who are too old to fight who will be the tragic, helpless tar- gets of the rockets, bullets, and miseiles that are "Made in the USA." There are clearly no easy answers to the problems posed by tile conflict in An- gola. Yet. the issues considered by the administration have too often been sur- rounded in secrecy. So that even now, as the Senate comes out of a closed briefing and debate on this grave matter, there still remains the difficult issue of where should this country place its resources, its public policy anti its moral commitment. For me, that question has a plain and direct response. The United States should not be involved in Angola. Not only should we get out, but our doing so should be a signal for South Africa, for China, for the Soviet Union, for Zaire Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CJA:RDP771510.01.44R000400100018-1 December 18, 197'5 CONGRESSIONAL RECOKD sEN A i S 22783 and for every foreign government to ex- tricate themselves from Angola's civil war. Indeed, if our Government insists on being involved, then we should seek ways not only to encourage the ouster of all foreign governments, but we should make It clear that this Nation is ,prepared to a.sthist any and every effort to negotiate a settlement between the forces of libera- tion in Angola. Next year as Americans around the world celebrate an independence that has such precedents throughout civiliza- tion, at least we should be prepared to support and assist those efforts designed to insure that peace may prevail in the new nation of Angola. Last October I listed at least five dis- tinct steps that the United States can and must take in order to serye the causes of peace and justice in Angola. First, the United States should respect the territorial integrity of Angola, as urged for that country by the three An- golan parties and the Organization of African Unity. All efforts to partition the country or separate Cabinda must be vigorously opposed. Second, we must do what we can to halt all foreign involvement and inter- Vention?including our own?so that the future of Angola can be decided upon by Angolans themselves. Third, we should support efforts both within Angola, and on the part of third parties, to mediate between the rival groups to Angola, to halt the bloodshed, and to seize opportunity for a peaceful transition to independence. In particu- lar, we should support the Conciliation Committee of the OAU in its attempt to bring a solution to the Angola crisis. Fourth, we should demonstrate a will- ingness to work with any Angolan gov- ernment that emerges as the people of that nation work out their own plans for sel t-development. Finally, governments and interna- tional organizations should offer hu- manitarian assistance to victims of the fighting, wherever they are found, and thereafter, give financial and technical assistance to Angola to help rebuild the country. We have in this instance a good op- portunity for the United States to de- velop a policy regarding an African na- tion that has been designed by the Af- ricans themselves. For too long our Gov- ernment has taken its cue on African policy from other nations in Europe. In this case we know that the OAU has con- sistently urged all foreign interests to leave Angola. It is clear that our Govern- ment deserves to take Its lead from those in Africa who want Angolans 'to decide for themselves the fate of their great land. I urge my colleagues to support the pending amendment to the Defense De- partment appropriation so that peace and reason can replace the fire of war that is now consuming the new state of Angola. Mr, GAM Mr. President, the debate we are engaged In today is a momentous one, a historic one. Far more is at stake than the fate of Angola. Both sides of the debate over the strategic importance of Angola are correct: we can live with- out a non-Communist, non-Sovietized Angola, and at the same time,, Angola is of enormous importance in today's geo- politics. That is true because the fate of Angola will help to answer the question, "Whom does America protect?" So far, the answer to that question appears to be, "Nobody." Angola is important be- cause of its effect on the perception of American strength by both friend and foe. Just incidentally, the failure of Soviet action in Angola would preserve a meas- ure of freedom to the people there, but the larger significance is its effect on the fate of other non-CoMmunist nations throughout the world. I have been concerned about the se- crecy involved in the U.S. contribution to the anti-Communist resistance in Angola. Concerned because action of this kind tends to be ineffective, unless it is coupled with some &Olt of national re- solve, which expresses itself in diplo- matic terms. It was the lack of such a resolve that led to our defeat in Viet- nam, which in turn has contributed to our paralysis in Angola. As an editorial in the London Daily Telegraph noted yes- terday, "America's self-imposed defeat" in Vietnam has been the best weapon the Communists have had. Of course, in the case of Vietnam, our leaders failed mis- erably to develop a natonal resolve. They failed on the one hand because they were themselves unsure about our objectives there, and on the other because they proceeded in secret. It is the secrecy of our action in Angola which is also trou- bling today. In my view, we ought to strip away the mask of secrecy, move openly, and communicate with our con- stituents the true importance of stand- ing firm in Africa. For instance, Mr. President, suppose we were to continue our present level of aid, send in the $25 million or so we are talk- ing about today, using the Governments of Zaire and Zambia as conduits, and that we were at the same time to say to the Soviet Union that if a single Mig-21 leaves the runway in Angola, we will sim- ply break off all arms limitation talks, in- definitely. I am willing to bet that the Migs would never take off. Suppose we were to couple our econom- ic aid with notice to Fidel Castro that his action in Angola constitutes a clear violation of the agreements reached with the United States in 1962. Cuba agreed at that time that there would be no ex- port of the revolution, and we agreed to forego any further attempts to liberate the unhappy people of that island. Sup- pose we were to tell Castro that since he has violated the agreement, we no longer consider ourselves bound by it, and that we are going to resume active naval op- erations in the Carribean, for the purpose of preventing any further shipment of Cuban soldiers to Angola. Again, I am willing to bet that we would see some seri- ous action towards a decrease in Cuban activity in Africa. In short, Mr. President, if we are un- willing to intervene directly in Angola, we should immediately raise the dipro- mate costs to the nations that do inter- vene. Such a course of action should be obvious, and would be if we were not blinded by the rhetoric about the benevo- lent nature of the Neto movement in Angola. Listening to some of the de- scriptions of this movement is very rem- iniscent of the descriptions we heard in the late 1950s of Fidel Castro, or the earlier descriptions of the "agrarian re- formers" in China. However, it is only fair to note that such a policy is incompatible with the policy of d?nte as recently practiced in the United States. In that respect, Secre- tary Kissinger's angry comments about foreign involvement in Africa are some, what startling. Secretary Kissinger has shown an almost amazing tolerance for offensive and insulting action by the So- viet Union and her client states. Now, all of a sudden, he is upset about Soviet in- tervention in Angola. Well, Mr. Presi- dent, a number of us have been upset about Soviet actions for a long time. My constituents have never understood the passion for accommodation which has characterized the State Department, and American foreign policy in general. My constituents are strongly opposed to treating the Soviets as good buddies, be- cause they feel in their bones that Angola-style action is what we can al- ways expect from them. And they are correct. Some observers, more sophisticated than the Senator from Utah, are now coming to the same conclusion. Victor Zorza, in this morning's Washington Post, claims that there has been a shift in Soviet policy, away from accommoda- tion and in the direction of confronta- tion. The increasing willingness of the Soviets to confront us is explained as follows: The military buildup is increasingly giving it the confidence?and the hardWare?with which to intervene in far-off places, and to disregard calls for moderation. With all due respect to Mr. Zona, I do not, myself, see any shift in policy, but I am glad to see that he now joins me in questioning the intentions of the Krem- lin. I return to a point hinted at earlier, and one which I have made many times on the floor of the Senate: psychological relations are important in geopolitics. Very often the amount of our contribu- tion; or the degree of our involvement is less important than the will we show in acting at all. What I am asking us to do in Angola, Mr. President, is to stand up for the principle of self-determination, and to act to minimize the interference by Communist nations in the affairs of a small, but strategically located coun- try. To do so, we will have to free our- selves from the constraints imposed on us by our blind adherence to the 'policy of d?nte. If we do not Angola will be dominated by the Soviet Union, as Somalia is al- ready, as Guinea is already, and as sev- eral other nations of Africa threaten to become. Angola's fall will further vali- date the good old domino theory, which was restricted to Southeast Asia only by its attackers. Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, during the past several days the Senate has at- tempted a substantive discussion of the Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 S 22784 Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 CON :iRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE December 18, 1975 Angolan crisis. We have met in secret ses- sion twice. We have debated several amendments, one of which I am a co- sponsor, and a resolution setting forth certain policy perspectives on the matter. The decisions we have made or will make by our votes are important ones for which the Congress, in exercising its power, must bear a major share of the responsi- bility for the events that result there- fsom. Before I detail why I believe the prop- er policy choice for the Congress is to legislate a cessation of covert support for any of the Angolan factions, it is neces- sary to set forth certain basic considera- tions. First, the Angolan conflict is not another Vietnam in any meaningful an- alytical sense. This is the case even though there are certain generic sim- ilarities in that both can be viewed as primarily internal conflicts while at the same time being situations wherein the Soviet Union has attempted to expand its influence by massive support of one of the contending parties. Our reaction in both cases, however unwise it may have been or is, has been predicated on a belief that our interests demand some form of support for elements opposing the Soviet-backed groups. But. I empha- size that these are generic similarities endemic to any so-called liberation struggle in which Soviet expansionism and U.S. interests collide. These similar- ities do not provide an adequate basis to judge the specific case of Angola. Far too often in our discussions in the Congress and in performing our educa- tional responsibilities to the American people, the Vietnam tragedy is being used as an emotive rationale for certain actions when what is needed is sober, re- sponsible analysis of a unique situation and its relevance to U.S. interests. It is wisdom to learn from past errors. It is folly to be the prisoner of them. Second, our limited involvement to date in the Angolan conflict is not an- other example of Executive malfeasance, nor an indication that the Executive has tried to cover up its actions by ignoring the congressional channels set up for the processing of highly sensitive infor- mation. There are designated individuals in this chamber who have been or should have been aware that the United States has been interested in certain Angolan groups for a number of years. The exact nature of that interest may not have been widely known, but the fact that we have had an active interest in the An- golan situation for some time certainly should not have come as a great surprise to many individuals in the Congress. Nor would it have been impossible for other Members, through study of the situation there, to attain a general understanding of how we have sought to promote our interests. On this matter the Executive has reached certain conclusions based upon its interpretation of information avail- able to it and U.S. interests. We may reach different conclusions at this point in time. If we do, they should be based noon our own best judgments on the substantive issues involved in the An- golan situation, not on any shallow at- empt to argue the matter as a Congres- ional Executive confrontation. Third, contrary to what some have rgued, I do' not believe that Angola is unimportant to us. The plight of the An- olan peoples should be of great concern to our country. Angola is stategically ocated close to important sea lanes. An- g ola is richly endowed with natural re- sources and will become one of the more nportant countries of Africa in the 3 ears ahead. It is ludicrous to claim that y-e have no interest in Angola's future iti light of these factors; just as ludi- crous, in fact, as the claim that our in- t irests inevitably compel us to inter- code further in the present conflict. Finally, the Angolan conflict, while mainly a war between competing groups ii Angola, is not without its interna- tonal implications. The relatively mas- s we involvement of the Soviet Union and Cuba in the conflict, the abhorrent pres- f nce of South African forces in Angola, end our own comparatively modest in- % olvement to date have made the conflict more than just a civil war. We obscure hie complex nature of the problem by eltegorizing it as such. Having examined the Angolan ques- ton with these considerations in mind, I have concluded that long-term U.S. i tterests will not be served by continued c )vert support of any of the contend- ing factions. No convicing case has hos been made for such continued sup- port under existing conditions. The far- tons that we have helped cannot hope attain effective control of Angola. Our continued covert involvement serves to h terease rather than decrease Soviet in- fluence over elements that may come out o the conflict in the strongest position. Cur involvement runs counter to the ex- p-essed desire of OAU countries for a cessation of all foreign intervention in ngola. Our present policies threaten to cceate an association, at least in the luinds of many Africans, of ourselves with the South African forces who have intervened in. Angola. Any such associa- tion with a country whose government continues to advocate racial separation is anathema to most Americans and will ill sorve our interests in Africa for years to come. For these and other reasons, con- tained U.S. covert support for any of the fsctions in Angola is not the proper course of action for the United States_ I am naturally concerned with the illingness of the Soviet Union and its c lent state, Cuba, to intervene in the Angolan conflict. Such intervention. I believe, is one indication that d?nte, as wakticed by the Kremlin, could be used ; a cover for Soviet expansionism. While o le must hope that such will not be the case, it is impossible to ignore the con- tradiction posed by the Soviet interven- tion in Angola. The Soviet Union may gain certain ad- vintages if the faction it is supporting wins uncontested control of Angola. One such advantage would be Soviet access to and possible control of certain port fa- cilities in Angola. This would provide SiOscow with an opportunity to project a very strong naval presence in the South Atlantic and along shipping lanes of great importance to Western Europe and the United States. Sovii t control of An- golan resources would also be very dis- turbing. Yet, I am firmly convinced that such advantages, if they materialize, will be shortlived. African states, whatever their expressed ideologi ?s, will not long tolerate dominance by any outside power. They have struggled too long for independence to forfeit it to the Soviet Union or anyone else. Indeed, I venture to predict that the Soviet Union will be astonished at the depth of ingratitude the MPLA will manifest a the aftermath of the current struggle should it emerge as the victor. ? The need now is for the United States to fashion its policies so that it will be in a position to provide any party that ultimately gains control in Angola the option to establish good relations with our country. In doing so we will give an Angolan regime the opportunity to avoid dependence on the Soviet Union or some other power. It is a proper objective of U.S. foreign policy to provide such an option. To be in a position to do so we must indicate our willingness to abide by the desire of the majority of African states for nonintervention in Angola by any outside power. Mr. CASE. Mr_ Presid,,nt, I believe we have come to a watershed in our rela- tionship to black Africa If we approve stepped up covert military assistance to Angola today the America.n position in black Africa will be damaged severely and, increasingly, we will find ourselves isolated on that continent. While we were involved in helping one of the factions in Angola as early as last March, the first Presidential decisibn to give some limited military aid came in the middle of July. That was after at least one other black African country decided it had to resume military assist- ance to the non-Soviet factions?the FNLA and UNITA. It wa... at a time when the People's Republic of China was back- ing the non-Soviet factions in Angola. At that time the President's decision to provide limited militery aid was un- derstandable. The Soviets were involved with MPLA; the opposing factions in Angola had the backing of several black African countries and she Chinese. Conditions have now changed dra- matically. The Peoples Republic of China has pulled out. A- the same time the increasing presence c-f South African soldiers has put the United States in an unhappy position. The Soviets will be quick to paint us an ally of white South Africa, anathema to mos; black Africans, In the hope of isolating us from black Africa as a whole. On- supporters in black Africa will fall by the wayside if we fall into this trap. The signs of deteriorahrin have already set in. At the beginning of this week no less than 15 African nations?two of them Moslem Arab states?had decided to recognize the Soviet-hacked MPLA as the legitimate Government of Angola. This increasing support. for the MPLA will not be ignored by the Organization of African Unity. So far the OAU has remained neutral and has tried to bring the warring factions in Angola together. Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 December /8, ,roved For E8weasositm iam077Kklivo00400100018-1 The danger is that the OAU's policy will change to support for the Soviet-backed /VtPLA as African politics polarize on this Issue. At the early stage American support for the FNLA and 17NITA was shielded somewhat by the backing for those fac- tions given by other black African coun- tries. It is unclear how long other Afri- can countries can afford politically to continue their support if the United States steps up its military aid. To pursue the course we are on is self-defeating in the context of African politics. We cannot win in the long run. Nor, can we win in the short run. Ac- cording to the CIA, if the United States Were able to give Soviet-style support? and if we could provide military advisors and pay for mercenaries to fight in An- gola?then the FNLA and TJNITA might have a chance to hang on. Because the Soviets are likely to match us in the de- livery of arm.s and the commitment of foreign soldiers to the conflict, it is clear that at best, we too, can only "hang on." Now is the time to call a halt. The termination of military aid is essential I believe, if we want to preserve for our- selves a meaningful role in black Africa and to protect our long run strategic in- terests in tile region. It is essential too for the creation of conditions in which the African nations can settle the prob- lem and at the same time preserve their Independence from outside domination. AN ASSESSMENT OF CUBA'S INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA?CASTRO'S CONSISTENT FOREIGN poucy Mr. STONE. Mr. President, for the past several days we have been debating a course of action with regard to the cur- rent situation in Angola. It is no secret that Cuba has sent thousands of armed soldiers to join combat for the Soviets in Angola. Finally this body and the entire weld is beginning to understand how Fi- del Castro operates and what he stands for. Our ()facial State Department position of encouraging relations with Castro seems to have been silenced. Perhaps those who have been proponents of re- laxed relations, who have called for uni- lateral concessions to Castro, are now beginning to realize what they would be getting into. The December 22, 1975, edition of U.S. News & World Report contains an edi- torial by Howard Fleiger entitled "Fidel's Fidelity." It is an article which provides a revealing analysis of Castro's tactics in seeking our favors. It aptly points out that Castro has not altered his policies. that separated the United States and Cuba 15 years ago and has never shown a willingness to change these policies of international subversion in return for improved relations with us. It warns that the only policy-changing to occur will be submission on our part to Castro's game. I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: FIDEL'S FIDELTY (By Howard Ffieger) One thing you should not forget about Fidel Castro: whatever else he may be, he is Very consistent. Cuba's latest Joint venture with the Soviet Union of intervention in Angola re-empha- sizes the point. Those in the U.S. who have been in favor of easing the American embargo and of en- couraging renewed contacts between Wash- ington and Havana would do well to keep this fundamental fact in mind: If any concessions are made. Castro expects the United States to make them. He isn't going to. He has made it perfectly clear from the beginning that his system is untouchable and there is to be no softening of his Govern- ment's anti-U.S. foreign policy at any price. In all fairness to Castro, he has never promised to change his basic policies in re- turn: for improved relations with the' U.S., or even hinted at a willingness to do so. Those in America who feel he might change are indulging in wishful thinking. They get no encouragement from Castro now. They never have from the day he seized Cuba. All one needs to do is look at the record. Castro has never kept it secret. During the 1960s, Communist Cuba backed revolution throughout Latin America, and its propagandists and agents encouraged anti-Vietnam War demonstrations in the U.S. Young Americans were welcomed to Cuba? in fact, invited in with all expe:ases paid?to cut sugar cane and study Marxism. When it became apparent during the early 1970s that revolutions in this 'Hemisphere were not a fertile field for Communism, Cas- tro shifted tactics. He did not shift goals. Now he is interested in forming commodity exporting associations among Latin American nations as a type of economic warfare against the United States. Cuba is a member of the new Latin American Economic System com- prising the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. The U.S. is not a member. As a matter of fact, it was not asked to Join. . Last August, it began to appear in Con- gress and elsewhere that sentiment was on the increase in this country to break the ice with Castro and get the two Governments on more accommodating terms. How did Fidel Castro receive the news? By making it emphatically clear that, come what may, he had no intention of altering his anti-U.S. ways. The Cuban dictator reacted by holding a conference in Havana on Puerto Rican inde- pendence. He made One Of his typical speeches on that occasion. He declared that, if he were faced with a choice between a re- sumption of Cuban-American relations or backing Puerto Rican independence from the U.S., he would choose the latter without hesitation. It makes no difference to him that only a relative handful of Puerto Ricans ac- tively agitate for independence. Now Castro has sent thousands of his sol- diers into Angola inAfrica to join forces with troops from the Soviet Union. These are not mercenaries or soldiers of fortune. They are Cuban army regulars. As pointed out in a news story in this magazine recently, the Angola force is only one of the detachments of Cuban troops that have been 'deployed in 10 countries?not to act in Havana's interest but against the in- terests of the United States, which opposes armed intervention by outsiders in the af- fairs of newly independent nations. What it adds up to is this: If the U.S. if willing to deal with a dic- tator who has no intention of altering the policies that separated Washington and Ha- vana 15 years ago, then there is a possibility of resumed contacts between the two. " But nobody can say the signals from Ha- vana are obscure. They couldn't be- clearer. If relations improve, it will be the U.S. that has changed?not Fidel Castro. ' Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, what Is the pending business? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pend- S 22785 ing question is on agreeing to the amend- ment of the Senator from California (Mr. TUNNEY) as amended by the amend- ment of the Senator from New York (Mr. JAvrrs) . Mr. MANSFIELD. Are we prepared to vote? Mr. BUCKLEY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield briefly to the Senator from New York. Mr. BUCKLEY. Mr. President, I have an amendment that I am prepared to offer in due course, an amendment to the amendment as amended. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is not in order. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Cali- fornia, as amended. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I wonder if I could get some indication from the Senate as to whether or not it is prepared at this time to vote on the amendment of the Senator from Califor- nia, as amended by the amendment of the Senator from New York. Mr. McCLURE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield. Mr. McCLURE. I would hope we could have some time for debate in open ses- sion on this matter. I do not know that Senators are ready to set a time limita- tion on it. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the vote on the pending question, that is, the Tunney amendment as amended by the Javits amendment, occur at 4 p.m. today. Mr. GRIFFIN. I object. The PRESIDING OrriCER. Objection is heard. Mr. MANSFIELD. I make the request for 5 o'clock. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Mr. GRIFFIN. I object. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection Is heard. Mr. MANSFIELD. I make the request for 7 o'clock. Mr. GRIFFIN. I object. The PRESIDING OkleiCER. Objection is heard. Mr. MANSFIELD. I make the request for 9 o'clock. Mr. GRIFFIN. I object, Mr. President. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard. Mr. MANSFIELD. Well, I better go through all the way. I make the request for 11 o'clock tonight. Mr. WILLIAM L. SCOTT. Mr. Presi- dent, I object. - The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objec- tion is heard. Mr. MANSFIELD. I ask unanimous consent that the vote on the pending amendment occur at the hour of 10 o'clock tomorrow morning. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, I object for the time being. The PRESIDING 010FICER. Objec- tion is heard. Mr. MANSFIELD, Mr. President, it is very apparent that there is a filibuster in progress against the Tunney amend- Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 S 22786 Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE Deeembcp 18, 1915 ment as amended by the Javits amend - ment. I hope that the Senate will be a ware of the possibilities inherent there- ill We had held out a faint hope that we could adjourn sine die tonight. That is an impossibility. We still have some hope that we will be able to adjourn sine die tomorrow; but if we do not, we can anticipate being 'm on Sunday; I hope not next week, but perhaps. I hope that those who have had to scrounge for airplane reservations will not be too inconvenienced by what has developed in the consideration of this most important amendment. affect- ing our participation in the affairs of two of the three factions struggling for control in Angola. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques- tion is on agreeing to the amendment. Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I ask unani- mous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Tarr). Without objection, it Is so ordered. Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I ask unani- mous consent that Bruce Thompson, of my staff, be permitted the privilege of the floor during the consideration of this matter. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. / MILK PRICE SUPPORT ADJIiIST- MENTS?CONVERENCE REPQRT Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President. I subknit a report of the co tee of confeVence on Senate Joint ?talon 121, and ask for its immediate nsidera- tion. , The VRESIDING WWI ER (Mr. TAFT). The report will be stted by title. The assiatant legislative lerk read as follows: The commite of conference on the dis- agreeing votes pf the two,/ Houses on the amendment of tie Senate to the bill (S .J. Res. 121) to pr ide for fquarterly adjust- ments in the sup ort p e of milk, having met, after full a !re conference. hal,e agreed to recommen ad do recommend to their respective Ron thti report, signed by all the conferees. The PRESIDINci FFICER. Is there objection to theSco deration of the vonference report? There being o object n, the Senate proceeded to colisider the report. I The confen ce report is rinted in the Pause procee mgs of the R CORD of De- (Tniber 12, 1q75, at page H12 9.) Mr. HUMpHREY. Mr. Presirt. I am gratified that the House has p -sed leg- islation y sterday which I intioduced, Senate J9lnt Resolution 121, by a 07-111 vote, de gned to help deal with kite of tile mo /t pressing problems facing,our Nation this bill establishes the quarterly ad- jusanent of the price support level for milk, to assure dairy farmers that the pri li ; assurance provided through the dairy price support program will be more nes rly attuned to the cost of milk pro- dui tionakAs amended by the House of. RearesentAtives, the support level for milk woad be increased to 85 percent oi p.iiity. t 'I he Senate has twice passed legisla- tion embodykig these features?and by sill stantial mlirgins--in the last year. .1 or the past everal years, dairy farm- ers have been cjight in one of the tight- est cost-price sq eezes ever encountered. Pr( duction costs iave skyrocketed but ITWk prices have n kept pace. in 1972. we pro ced almost 120 bil- lion pounds of milk fi the United States, I il at year the milk aupply was in very cline balance with theademand for milk a:a i dairy products. During late 1972 and early 1973, prices for cilia and dairy pa ducts began to rise serally. Unfor- tunately, rather than rmit market fones to operate so as t4 bring forth tie additional production ieeded, the administration ordered repe ed expan- sin Is of dairy product impois for the CX) ress purpose of depressing rices. While these sections were not medi- ately successful, the ultimate re,411t was the accumulation of inventories oX dairy preducts in this country and a decNne in the farm price for milk of almost 2 per- cert from March to July of 1974. ? While dairy prices have recovered 'Xe- cot tly, producers are still not meetiti,g pacduction costs, and some of the lin ' p x vement has been due to reduced f costs. And the outlook at this point, s uneertain as to what will happen to feed costs in the future. in Minnesota, we have always 'been proud of our dairy industry. In s ite of cli tin Flanigan report, I would nat Oncede that our dairy farmers are less/efficient thin producers in any other country. But today that industry is threatened. During the last 2 years, 5,009 Minnesota dairy farmers quit. Right n*, the num- ha of dairy farms in the state is at an a:.1 time low. / in the past, declining nOrnbers of dairy hti niers and dairy cows as been made up for by larger units ai higher produc- tml per COIN. We are not cert 1n how fast dairy fat mers can respon,4 to the need for in- cacased productior And we need to face tin cold, hard fa? that despite the will- ingness to put i 7-day weeks, 52 weeks a !ear, the dal farmer just is not re- eel ang enoug return to provide the liv- ing needed fqt his family. We all k r what inflation has done to our econ my. On the farm it has been en n shar. . Fertilizer, fuel, feed, equip- ment, ta es, interest rates?every item the pro cer faces has increased in cost in he 1 st few years. In some cases, these in( re es have been as much as 200 to 30t cent. Only recently have these trends slowed down with the recession. 'she dairy farmer has witnessed the *ion of his investment. In August 1973, the average dairy cow in Minne- sota was worth$590. The total value of the State's milk cow inventory was $537.7 million. Two years later, the' aver- age dairy cow in Minnesota Os only worth$355 and the value of the State's dairy herd had eroded to $310,e million. Faced with this situation, 'the dairy farmer has had little alternative. He has been forced to cut back. For some, this has taken the form of culling herds more closely. For others it has meant reduc- tions in rates of feedinas For all too many others, the choice has been to leave the business entirely. a As this has been ddne, we have seen milk production fall. (Prom the balanced situation we saw in/1972. when produc- tion was almost 120 billion pounds, we saw it drop to 1,15.4 billion pounds in 1973; 1974 produCtion was almost identi- cal with the 1973 level. While milk production has gone up by 1.9 percent irif November over the same month in 1974, total production for the first 11 months of 1975 was down 0.1 percent over the same period last year. November milk production in Minne- sota wasfa modest 1 million gallon in- crease Wer the previous month, but was 3.2 minion gallons or 6 percent lower than ihr November 1974. Minnesota's milk production for the firstill months of 1975 was 706.9 million gallons which is down 35.4 million gal- loiis or 5 percent below the same period lest year. Unfortunately, the Department of Agriculture has again resorted to scare tactics as to what this bill might cost consumers. They claim that this bill could lead to price increases of 3 cents per alf gallon of milk, 7 cents per pound of utter. and 43 cents aer pound of c eese. at we have learned to discount the U A cost estimates. Ana we also know that educedmilk prices paid to farmers resul in little benefit to our consumers. In karly 1974, prices paid to dairy farmer declined by almost 25 percent, but ther was almost no change whatso- ever in p ces paid for milk at the super- market. Our urbdt consumers have seen that the Nixon- rd-Butz roller coaster farm prices do no serve their interests. It is far better to'assure farmers a reliable income so that they at least have the opportunity to iake a fair income. This bill woul not result in any pur- chases at present nce market prices are well above the 85- ercent support level. And while some p chases may be re- quired during the spr1g flash period, this is a small price to maiptamn some stabil- ity and keep our produ s in business. I would like to shath the projections prepared by the Nation Producers Federation which indicate two things; First, a support level of 5 percent is needed to induce enough toduction In 'meet our needs; and second, Iie Govern- ment cost of these prolira1s will be minimal. \ The following is the production-con- sumption data on which this conclusion Is based: Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 Dec em Cr Approved 18, 1975 For Release 2001/11/01 ? _CIA-BDPWRitilit4R000400100018-1 CONGRESSIONAL REcoR S 22787 In billions of pounds Estimated 1974 \ actual 1975 projected 1976 1977 Production ti. 4 115. 0 116.0 117.0 Imports 3.9 1.4 1.7 1.7 Beginning inventory 5. 5.8 3.7 3.0 Total supply_ 123. 5\ 122. 2 121.4 121.7 Ending inventory 5.8 . 3.7 3.0 3.4 Total use.. _ _ _ . 117.7 118.4 118.3 Export; I. 2 1.0 1.0 Fed to calves__ 1. 6 1.3 1.2 Military I. 1 1. 1. 1 1. 1 Civiliat use 113.8 115. 115.0 115.0 The assumptions on which t ese pro- jections and estimates are made ti,re rea- sonable and conservative. ImpoI are projected at the norm which has -pre- vailed for several years, somewhat higher than those for 1975. The "fed to calv figure is declining, because there a fewer cows-and calves-on farms. Civilian use, which has shown an in- crease in recent years, is projected as stabilizing with the slight per capita de- cline in consumption offset by the in- creased population total. There have been extensive hearings on this bill both in the House and the Sen- ate which have detailed the problems of dairying and particularly the ever in- creasing production costs. The consensus of the recently held field hearings by the House Agriculture Com- mittee supported the two provisions of this bill as being essential to restore stability in dairY production and reverse the present trends which could lead to shortages in dairy products. For our Nation's best long-term in- terests, imports are not the answer. In- stead, the answer is to encourage our dairly farmers to maintain a production sufficient to meet our needs. Even at 85 percent of parity, these figures paint a grim picture which I hope proves to be too conservative. It shows that in the current year and in 1976 we will be using more dairy products than are available to us through production and imports. Because dairying requires several years to redevelop production, these figures show that setting supports at 85 percent of parity now will barely correct this situation by 1977. That is why, if we are to maintain ade- quate dairy supplies, it is necessary for us to make this adjustment now-to give dairy farmers assurances through an 85 percent of parity support level that it will pay them to stay in dairying and to produce our needed dairy supplies. The longer we wait, the longer it will take for this situation to correct itself. Mr. President, as originally passed by the Senate, the joint resolution provide that-effective for the period beginnin on the date of enactment and ending n March 31, 1979-the Secretary of A? 1- culture would be required to adjust p- ward the support price of manufac o? ring milk at the beginning of each qua ter to reflect any estimated increase du ng the immediately preceding calarter the in- dex of prices paid by farmers fi produc- tion items, interest, taxes, and arm wage rates. As passed by the House, the resolution provided that the date for the termina- tion of the quarterly adjustment would be March 31, 1978, instead of March 31, 1979, in order that this legislation would again be considered when new farm legislation involving other major com- modities is considered. The House also added an amendment which required that the support price for milk be established at 85 per centum of the parity price therefor. The Senate conferees were readily agreeable to the termination date change and found the House persuasive in re- spect to the 85 per centum support price for milk. As a result, the Senate receded to both amendments. Mr. PRESIDENT. There has been some controversy regarding the cost of the conference report on Senate Joint Reso- lution 121. As usual, the Department of Agricul- ture has estimated a cost figure which I feel is unjustified. As a result, I had a cost estimate pre- \vared. That cost figure is substantially less th'n their as determined by the Depart- me t. Ba ed on an assumed production of 11B net 75-76 ng the d$44.2 pro- billion pounds of milk in 1976-77, a 117 bill n pounds in 1977-78, and ci ian cons ption estimated at 115 b ion pounds in ach marketing year, t increases costs above the 1 costs amoun to $27.9 million du e new program econd year of/the first year of t million in the gram. Mr. President, sent that these co made a part of the ask una t dete COR There being no ob rial was ordered to b RECORD, as follows: mous con- [nations be at this point. c on, the mate- ? printed in the 1975- Milk production (billion noun CCC purchases: Nonfat dry milk (netre million pounds) Additional milk utterfat and nonfat soli ; billion pounds) ovals; 1976-77 1977-78 115 116 117 330 330 0 0 0 CCC cost, 85 perce parity with quarterly adjust ent(millions): Nonfat dry$200. II $220.1$231. Butter and heese for pro- gram u 63.0 70.8 75. 6 Is Total 263.0 Use for Go rnment distribution at cost Mons) 103.6 t price support cost (millions) lucre e in CCC cost from 1975-76 ( lions) Inc ase in CCC cost less cost for overnment distribution 290.5 307.2 114.2 121.3 159. 4 176.7 185.9 27.9 44.2 17.3. 26.5 The National Milk Producers Federation contends that increased population and need to rebuild commercial stocks will require 1 billion pounds additional milk for 1976-77 and another 1 billion pounds for 1977-78. It is assumed that CCC will purchase the same amount of nonfat dry milk for winch no butterfat purchases will be made for each year. Government program use will not be less than for the 1975-76 marketing year. Program costs estimates based on USDA projections of price support levels at as% parity with quarterly adjustment. Mr. BELLMON. Mr. President, Senate Joint Resolution 121, which involves the milk price support program is a good example of legislation ihich creates great trouble for the budget. It was just last week that Congress fixed budget ceilings-ceilings which totaled $408 bil- lion in budget authority,$374.9 billion in outlays resulting in O' deficit of $74.1 bil- lion. Most of us did not like that deficit of$74.1 billion buy we recognized that it was the product Of current law and cur- rent economic alnditions. So, by an over- whelming Senae vote of 69 to 23, we approved this/budget. Now, only a week later, we are/ faced with a piece of pro- posed legislation which would add to that huge deficit of $74.1 billion. The budget we approved such a short time ago/ included in function 350-the agricultbre function-total budget au- thorityl of$4.1 billion and outlays of $2.6 billioh. Existing programs based either on 9laactment this session or in prior yes-including the existing milk price s port level of 80 percent parity-cause tie totals in this function of the budget to reach the ceilings. We have no room fin this function for increased Govern- ment support levels. Yet, Senate Joint Resolution 121 would ask us to increase the milk support price level from 80 to 85 percent of parity. The actual cost to the budget of this change in support price will depend on future market prices and thus we are forced to use historical patterns and fu- ture expectations regarding market prices; nevertheless, according to the latest USDA estimates, the budget cost of the changes will approximate$90 mil- lion for fiscal year 1976, 05 million for the transition quarter, $290 million for fiscal year 1977, and$120 million for fis- cal year 1978. These numbers total $535 million-ex- tra dollars to be spent over the level to be spent if the price support level is left at 80 percent. And these extra dollars are dollars we do not have-they will breach the targets set in the agriculture func- tion. This resolution itself is not subject to a point of order but it will break the agriculture budget and the increased cost of milk support prices will simply crowd out of, the budget something else which was anticipated. This crowding out will possibly occur next spring and it might involve agriculture or it could involve me totally unrelated Item. upport price payment items are no 11 part of the agriculture budget. In the agriculture budget targets set ring had to be moved up by$583 this fall due to increased com- ayments. Such payments are he so-called "uncontrollable entitlement programs" which cussed on this floor so many . These are the programs toniatic expenditures to eel the qualifications law. By expanding grams or expanding ng programs, we are insuring that more more of the budg- et will be "uncontrollable," and less and less of the budget will be available in future years to meet the priorities deemed most important at that time. I urge my colleagues to return this resolution to conference so that the sup- port level can be put at 80 percent of parity, a level which the marketplace is sm fact, last millio modity part of mandator have been times this ye which create anyone who 'mandated by these kinds of p benefit levels in exis Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 oossoo Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE Deco; uses o and a level which our budget,,yin affol Mr. MPHREY. Mr. Presnt, I move tha e Senate agree t e con- ference repo The PRESI I NG OFFICjidt. The ques- tion is on agree to motion of the Senator from Min The motion was a eed to. Mr. HUMPHR r. President, I move to reconsiner the v by which the motion was agreed to. Mr. KENVEDY. I move to t.y that mo- tion on the' table. The ,p1otion to lay on the ta e was agreed to. s? DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AP- PROPRIATIONS FISCAL YEAR 1976 The Senate continued with considera- tion of amendment in disagreement No. 75 to H.R. 9861, an act making appro- priations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1976, and for the period beginning July 1. 1976, and ending September 30, 1976, and for other purposes. Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Schneider and Mr. Bates be permitted the privilege of the floor during the consideration of the Tunney amendment. The PRESIDING OFFICER With/lit objection, it is so ordered. Mr. PACKWOOD. Mr. President. I ask unanimous consent that Bob Jerome, of my staff, be permitted the privilege of the floor during the debate and vote on this subject. The PRESIDING OFFICER Without objection, it is so ordered. The question is on agreeing to the amendment. Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, I slig- gest the absence of a quorum. - The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. McCLURE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. McCLURE. Mr. President, the majority leader has indicated that, in his judgment, a filibuster has been ini- tiated. I do not know whether a. filibus- ter will be maintained or not, but I think that some serious questions should be asked and answered in open session. We have had the opportunity to dis- cuss some of the issues in closed session: and I shared the opinion yesterday in our closed session that we spent far too much of the time in the closed session talking about things that were not directly per- tinent to the question of aid to Angola. This morning, we were able to confine the discussion to the question of Angola, but we oftentimes had comments that were not pertinent to classified informa- tion but were general discussion matters relative to a policy decision on our for- eign policy in support of an element struggling in Angola. It was my feeling then, and it is my feeling now, that the public is entitled to have a clear and public expression of Members of this body of their concerns and their view of the issues that are at stake with respect to U.S. policy. I think we need to do that on the record. We need to do it out in front of the public. That will be my purpose now?to try to raise some of the .questions now that nere raised hi the closed session. Let me say, parenthetically, that after saving spent 3 hours yesterday and 2 lours plus today in closed session, seek- ng to determine what classified or secret nformation was available to us that .ears on this subject, I have to conclude -hat the decisions being reached are be- ug reached on the basis of matters that. .,Iready have been almost fully reported the press and that there is very little :hat bears upon our decision that has iot been reported fully in the press al- eady. I do not, know whether that is a latter of comfort to the people of this euntry or whether that is a matter that light shock them. I had hoped that we would discover in le closed sessions some factual Infos- lotion concerning our policy and the 4mifieations and the aims of our policy nit was not already reported. I had _loped that we would find in the closed ssssions some information that deals ith or bears upon thennotives, the as- irations, the involvement, and the goals ? the Soviet Union in their involvement Angola. I find that, again, all or vir- t, ially all of the information available to Lie Senate in making our decision has a ready been discussed fully in the public p ass. I had hoped that we would find out nmething in the secret sessions about the involvement of South Africa in the ? ruggie that is now going on in Angola, Yet, the discussions that we have had in ? ese closed sessions indicate to me that e Senate has no information and that information can be made available so the Senate in regard to the involve- ment of South Africa in the ongoing e?ent in Angola, save those things which al seady have been discussed in public pi int. I make that statement as a hack- inniund, simply so that no one will be in sled as to the reason why I asked at the time for the closed sessions. Not ? ng on any of the committees which re -Oval these briefings or this informa - ti in as a matter of course, I had hoped to be informed by Members of the Seri- ? , who are thus privy to the infortna- t presented to them in those closed sessions, and I had hoped that I might be better informed and better able to mike a decision with regard to our policy. Slaving said that, let us look at what ? policy decisions might be. Let us tal:e a look at where we are, and let us determine, if we can, the effect of the Tenney amendment upon our involve- mint in Angola or, as a matter of fact, up/n the general flow of our foreign pol- icy. I think it is fair to state, from all tin information---at least it is my son- elusion from the information?that we din not start it; that, as Portugal gr sited independence to the native peo - pki in Angola and withdrew that rem- nant of colonial rule in Africa, there Jo- 18, 1975 emerged within Argo) t three different groups, each of whom was seeking to control the flow of government after in was granted to them. I think it is also fair to state that the record will indicate that each of these three movements has some popular sup- port, and that we have responded to the flow by joining others :n support of two of three factions and, in effect, in so doing, against the third of the three fac- tions, that faction being backed by the Soviet Union and supported, also, by some outside elements. Those who argue that we should not be involved have poinsed out that we should not be involved because the So- viet-backed element is the strongest. most well organized, ant most dedicated, and therefore the most likely to win of the three elements involved; and, con- versely, that we should not be involved in backing the two elements with whom we have chosen to affiliate our efforts be- cause, being less strongly motivated and less dedicated and presumably weaker. they are bound to lose. I asked one of the Members who had indicated that we ought not to continue our effort because it is bound to lose. and some of us who had said it makes no difference to the Untied States which one of the factions wins, that then it would seem to me obvious we ought to join the Soviet. Union in backing the one element that is going to win because then we would be on the side of the win- ner, and it does not matter who wins. If that is the kind of logic that impels us to a decision, I am distressed for the policy of this country and, incidentally, when I made that suggestion the people who said we ought not back losers be- cause they are losers, said, "Well, but that is not the reason." I simply suggested that certainly they must think we were joining the other side simply because the Soviet Union was involved on one side and we automati- cally took the other, end that seemed to me to be a very unwise oolicy, and the kind of a kneejerk reaction that does not bear upon the logical snalysis of the situation that there are choices. Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. McCLURE. I would be happy to yield without losing my right to the floor. Mr. DOMENICI. My reason for inter- rupting the Senator from Idaho is that I have to leave the floor for a moment and I wanted to ask the Senator one question before 'left. Based upon everything you have heard, would you agree that if we adopt the Tunney amendment that. we are effect- ing a major change in American foreign policy by adopting such an amendment? Mr. McCLURE. I would say to the Senator from New Mexico I agree with him, although there are some people who support the Tunney amendment who are trying to persuade us that it is neutral in regard to the future course of Ameri- can foreign policy. - I cannot view, it as such, and I do not think the rest of the world would view it as such. Mr. DOMENICI. I would say to the Senator that I am sure if we spend Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 ?Q. Approved For Release 2001/11/01 ? CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 December 18, 1975 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 22789 little time on the floor in open discussion and if we had expressions from both sides to supplement what was said in the se- cret sessions, then the public can judge as to whether we are changing America's foreign policy or not. Let me ask the Senator one further question. It is my understanding, based upon everything we have heard to this point in time, that there have been no discussions, private or otherwise, Senate committees involved or the Senate lead- ership with the President of the United States. Does the Senator understand that to be the state of the facts? Mr. McCLURE. I understand it. Mr. DOMENICI. I would also ask whether or not there have been discus- sions directly with the 'secretary of State on this issue prior to the presenta- tion of the Tunney amendment. Mr. McCLURE. I would_ say from all the discussions we have had for the last 2 days on the floor and from some rather detailed inquiry of the proponents of the amendment and those who are deeply involved in the appropriate committees In the development of policy, that they never presented any evidence of any statement by the President of the United States, that there was no hint that the Secretary of State of the United States made any statement to them nor had they sought that information from the Secretary of State. Mr. DOMENICI. In all fairness, it is true a number of committees have in- quired of various CIA officials and various State Department officials. How- ever, my specific question is: To this point in time has there been any direct communication with the President of the United ,States, or with the Secretary of State, in reference to the effect of this amendment on the foreign policy of the United States? Mr. MoCLURE. I would have to say to the Senator there is no evidence of any such direct contact or direct input into the deliberations. I think, in fairness, however, we should Indicate that there are people within the CIA and within the State Department, Including Assistant Secretaries of State, who have made such statements and, I assume, the proponents would urge that the Positions articulated by these men are imputed both to the Secretary of State or the President. But there was no direct statement by the 'President, no direct statement or involvement in the statements by the Secretary of State. Mr. DO1VIENICI. I say this to the dis- tinguished Senator, from Idaho and to my Senate colleagues because I am not one who usually participates in lengthy dialogs on the floor of the Senate. I am one who has said the Senate ought to be more intoIved in foreign policy, and I am one who has said the American people ought to be more informed on what we are doing. It does appear to me if those who pro- pose this amendment thought that it was a rather insignificant act, that there was another option that would still be open. That, as a matter of fact, we ought not to get in on the ground floor of a budding Vietnam. That in reality, with the Russian massive buildup in Angola, and with Cuban mercenaries approach- ing between 3,000 and 5,000 :in number already there, that what the world per- ceives and what the Soviet Union per- ceives to be the existing American pol- icy may very well have seemed to change to then as a result of this particular amendment, whether or not the admin- istration has another option yet to come down the line in a few weeks. That this amendment can be perceived as a major change in American foreign policy with reference to that part of the world and the activities of the Soviet Union. I say that because it appears to me if that is the case, then regardless of what we think we are doing in terms of tech- nical changes in the way we fund this kind of activity, it May indeed be per- ceived as far more than that and may, indeed, be far more than that because perception may be reality in foreign affairs. Mr. McCLURE. May I say to the Sen- ator from New Mexico that he has put his finger on the problem, the crux of the problem, that confronts many of us. In spite of the urging of some who support the Tunney amendment, who say it merely leaves our options open or, putting it in another way, it gives the Congress of the United States an opportunity to express its will prior to the adoption of a foreign policy, that it is not going to be perceived that way by other people in the world who see that we do now have, as a matter of fact, a policy in Angola which will be, as a matter of fact, changed by the adoption of this amendment. I think the Senator from New Mexico is exactly correct. Mr. DOMENICI. Just one last com- ment. I appreciate the Senator giving me this opportunity while he has the floor. It appears to me that the issue that we are discussing is so intimately tied into the major issue of d?nte and our re- lationships with the Soviet Union that they cannot be separated. We do not purport in this amendment to be ad- dressing the relationships with the Soviet Union as they exist today under the guise of d?nte. It appears to me that the long-term solution to the Soviet Union involvement in Angola and an ever-escalating effort on their part to take over that part of the world is ul- timately going to be tied to d?nte. Does America, indeed, change its pol- icies with reference to d?nte and the Soviet Union or not? Is this the time that we should? If it is not, are we ever going to? Are the economics between the Soviet Union and America, including the sale of technology, trade relationships, cul- tural exchanges, SALT II, and all those kinds of negotiations?could they not be the leveraging mechanism for just this kind of activity? And are we not throwing that leverage out the window when we completely change our policy on this one without exercising that kind of leverage? ? That is what concerns me. l think that is clearly a prerogative of the executive. It ought to be explored with the execu- tive. In fact, I believe that a sense of the Senate proposition telling the executive that we want him to exercise whatever leverage there is in that relationship, to make it clear that we do not want the Russians nor American equipment, nor other foreign powers, in that part of the world, would be a proper role for the Senate. Such a sense of the Senate res- olution could say that we want to ex- plore this kind of use of American lever- age since neither the Russians nor Amer- icans can win in Angola. Maybe they will all get out if indeed we exercise the type of maximum leverage that is unrelated to sending materials into Angola. I leave with that and thank the Sena- tor from Idaho for yielding. - Mr. McCLURE. I thank the Senator from New Mexico for making that state- ment, because it focuses on something I should have said at the outset that motivates the Senator from Idaho. That is that I wish the people of Angola were free to make their own decision about their own destiny without the outside interference of anyone. I do not want to see the United States interfering in their internal affairs. I do not want to see the South Africans or Soviets inter- fering in their affairs. I would prefer that the neighboring African states did not interfere in the internal affairs of Angola. I would prefer that these people be allowed to work out their own destiny in their own way, without the interfer- ence of anyone. The fact of the matter is that other forces are involved, that the United States has responded, over a period of time, in a way which is perceived in the world, partly as a result of the discus- sions here in the Senate of the United States, as a direct involvement and that we cannot subtract that without signal- ing to the world that the Senate of the United States has directed a change in foreign policy of the United States. I think the Senator from New Mexico Is exactly correct. - Mr. DOMENICI. Just one final com- ment. I think that certainly, the Sena- tor from Idaho and others will discuss the pros and cons of the actual strategic value of this piece of the world to the United States. There will be a very seri- ous split of opinion as to whether it is valuable or is not. I wish to make it clear that to this point, I have not been talk- ing about the fact that the Soviet Union may very well be changing its policy with reference to the direct intervention in another major country and, perhaps, in another major continent. That, in and of itself, becomes a matter of grave na- tional concern to America. If that is a change in policy or an elaboration or an extension of a policy, then we have to look at it in terms of what options are available to us to make sure that it does not reach its final fruition or goal with- out any limitation placed upon it. It is my opinion that the Tunney amendment sets no limit on the Russian policy and does not perceive its potential as a kind of openended change in Soviet policy with massive support and mer- cenaries taking over another country. It Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 5 22790 Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE December 18, 1975 is in that context that I have discussed it with the Senator to this point. Mr. McCLURE. I say to the Senator from New Mexico, in response to that question, that I agree with his statement iind I agree with the implications that will be read into actions by the Senate. That is one of the dilemmas that I think we face. When we discover a policy, whether we agree with it or not, we can- not directly move to stop that applica- tion of that policy without that, in itself, being a policy. We have never had the opportunity to adopt a policy. We in the Senate of the United States or in the Congress of the United States have not, until this time, congressionally adopted a policy or articulated a policy for the United States to follow with regard to Angola. That is a tragedy. Mr. DOMENICI. I thank the Senator. Mr. McCLURE. I agree with some of iny friends, the Senator from New York + Mr. Jams), the Senator from New Jer- sey (Mr. Can), the Senator from Min- nesota (Mr. HUMPHREY). They have all most eloquently stated the need for Con- gress to be involved in the application of foreign policy, particularly with respect to what we may or may not be doing in Angola, now or in the future. But I wish that we had been involved in the develop- ment of the policy. I hope that we will be involved in the development of the pol- icy. But I do not think we can, in this context, adopt an amendment without that, in itself, being the adoption of a policy. The Senators, some of whom 1 have mentioned, and others, have said this is too serious a matter to be decided by the Senate of the United States without any extended debate and without some hear- ings and without some very serious con- sideration of the implications of the pol- icy. Yet, they would have us adopt the amendment which, in itself, is an adop- tion of a policy. Mr. BUCKLEY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a moment? Mr. McCLURE. Mr. President, I shall yield to the Senator from New York if I may yield without losing my right to the floor, without the resumption being considered a second speech. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none. With- out objection, it is so ordered. Mr. McCLURE. I yield. Mr BUCKLEY. Mr. President. I thank my friend from Idaho. I should like to dispose of some pending business. EXECU IVE PROTECTIVE SERVICE Mr. BU EY. I call from th desk H.R. 11184'end ask for its inunediate consideration\ The PRESI will be stated. G OFFI R The bill The assistant le slat'4 clerk read as follows A bill (H.R. 11184) t end title 3, United States Code, to pro de or foreign diplo- matic missions, to nereas the size of the Executive Protect e Servic and for other purposes. The PRE objection t of the bil DING OFFIC Is there the immediate co ideratioxy 1)!It. CRANSTON. Reserving the right 0 Opiect, will the Senator explain the requevst? MraI3UCKLEY. This is similar to leg- islation that was adopted by the Con- gress 2onths ago, but which the Pres- tient ve ed. It had leen adopted in both Houses by s very sulistantial majority. Since the veto we ha Vte negotiated a tighter bill. It provides f (vi reimbursement under spe- cial circumst ces, controlled by the Sec- retary of the reasury, for any extraor- dinary expense incurred in the protec- iaon of foreign ilomats coming to this Country. Mr. CRANSTON. Has action been cleared by Senator Randolph? Mr. BUCKINY.ik has been cleared. In fact, an identical '11 was reported out by the Public Works committee yester- day. In addition, the 'chairman of the subcommittee (Mr. MH,RGAN) has au- t iorized me to go ahead 'and call up this matter at this time. \ Mr. CRANSTON. I have' no objection. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senate will inoceed to its immediate consideration. ?+ Mr. BUCKLEY. Mr. President, as I Love stated, I introduced a coinpanion bill, S. 2796, on Tuesday. The Coiprnittee on Public Works, yesterday, considered i.? iie bill and reported it by unanimous vote to the Senate. s Mr. President, I ask unanimous eon- sant to have printed in the Rum)), an e+(cerpt from the report (No. 94-573), e4plaining the purposes of the measurk There being no objection, the exce as ordered to be printed in the RECO , follows: PURPOSE The purpose of S.2796, as reported, le to increase by 350 the authorized nux6er of Executive Protective Service officers nd to rect the Service to provide, mid certain mditions for extraordinary protec ve needs ris foreign missions in cities where 0 or more snob facilities exist. The Executiv Protective Ssrvice would be authorized an encouraged to delegate this special p ive service, under limited circumstances, local police is licials in those cities outse Washington, E Cs with reimbursement. BACKGROUND AND NEED E'OR LEGISLATION Public Law 91-217 eh ged the name of the White House Police tb the Executive Pro- itsctive Service and exp ided its responsibill- 'ries to include the regflar protection of for- e en embassies in th ashington, D.C., area aid diplomatic mis ons outside Washington a , the President direct on a case-by-case b Isis. The author ed strength of the Service 'A as set at 850 o ers. Public Law 91-217 was written in recto ition of the nation's obli- gations under titernationai law and practice te take all re sonable precautions in assur- itg the safet of foreign diplomatic missions aid their pe sonnet. The Executive Protective !.i3 trvice als 2retained its responsibility to pro- hoti the ildings and grounds of the White Douse a Executive Office Buildings. Since 1970, however, incidents of political ttrrorIln have increased, along with the de- nand?for protective s:ervices. A strong na- tion interest exists in assuring the safety eign officials visiting the United States, er those visits are to Washington, D.C., of other areas of the United States. Develop- ictents since the passage of P.L. 91-217 dent- itistrate the need for protective services wherever a substantial number of foreign missions exist. As this need has increased? a: Id it could increase still further?local corn- / mitnities should no longer be forced to bear the full cost of what is essentially a national obligation. This in no way affects the day-t6-day protection of foreign diplomatic missions, which remains the responsibility of local police departments outside Washington, D.C. But h 2796 recognises that there are instances of extraordinary protedtive need when Federal assistance is wise Enid Justified. This legislation facilitates suclif assistance. The validity of this assistance can be shown by the fact that the ptrmanent and observer missions associateil With the Unt Sed Nations pay no property of other taxes or payments in lieu of taxes under Article 23 of the Vienna Convention and the Conven- tion on the United Natimes. Nor do those em- ployees of the United Nations who are aliens pay local income taxes jib help offset any costs that their presence iiti the city imposes on rps local government, out 4.000 of the 5,000 United Nations em oyees ^stationed in New York City are fo ign nationals and thus exempt from sit, local taxes. To a lesser extent, a similar/burden is carried by many cities. PROVIiIONS OP LEGISLATION xe In additioro raising the personnel reil- ing of the cutive Protective Service to 1200 officers from 850 officers, S. 2796 directs the Secretitry of the Treasury to provide uni- formed ppice protection el foreign missions Ira caseseof extraordinary protective need in cities where 20 or more such IIIISSIOriS are lo- cated.i, ' The following cities, according to Stat Department figures, have 20 or more foreign consular offices: Chicago, Houston, LctifAngelee, Miami, New Orleans, New York C y, and San Francisco. /To provide this protectien, the Secretary fust also find that the protective need was associated with the visit by a dignitary who, at some point during his visit to the United States, participated In the activities of an in- ternational organization of which the United States is a member, such as the United Na- \tions. Or the Secretary must find that the firotective need will occur at or outside either a \permanent mission to such an interne- tianal organization or an observer mission thiiit has been invited to participate in the worlt, of such an organization. Permanent missinns are maintained by member states. e Obser r missions may be maintained by or- c\t1 ganiza ons such as the government of Switzerl nd or the Palestine Liberation Or- ganizatio . The au ority for such protection is ex- tended in 'the case of the cities with 20 or more missiOns to those places where the visiting dignitary may be staying, not sim- ply the officielt mission site. Representatives of foreign govktiments and others who may create a situati n leading so protection un- )xt. der this bill gene ally reside at a hotel, rather than at what in lit be defined under the strictest interpre ion as a foreign mission. when visiting outsill\evWasbington, D.C. This was the case urine the visit to New York City in Novemb r 1974 of Yasir Arafat. \it the leader of the Pale tine Liberation Orga- nization. The extraor _nary protection for of New York City in ex RS of $700,000. To that one-day Arafat vis cost the taxpayers assure equitable treatment in such situa- tions, this legislation covers the extraordi- nary protective needs provkled at hotels or other facilities utilized by te visitor. This bill offers two wispiest, es to the ac- tual extension of protection. he Secretary may dispatch the necessary co element of EPS officers from Washing ton. ut S. 2796 provides the Secretary with ne flexibility to utilize the services, personnel, e uipment. and facilities of State and local goy nments. with their consent and on a reim urssible basis, to meet such extraordinary pr ective needs. ' Following any decision that an extra rdi- nary protective need exists under the tSms Approved Fors\Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 iot December 18, Aroved Fo Th northwest quarter of the south est quarte of section 3, township 15 north, ange 4 east, Lse meridian, Valley County, daho. SEC. 2. he conveyance authorize by the first sectio of this Act shall be de upon payment b. Valley County, Ida to the Secretary of e Interior of an a ount equal to the fair m aket value of h land, as determined by e Secretary ter appraisal. APPOINTME CONFER DITIONAL S. 2718 Mr. MANSFIELD r. President, on behalf of the Sen or rem Washington (Mr. MAGNUSON) , ask nanimous con- sent that the S ator fro Kansas (Mr. PEARSON) be n ed as an a ditional con- feree on the art of the nate on S. 2718. The PR v,IDING OFFICER Without objection, t is so ordered. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPRO- PRIATIONS, FISCAL 'YEAR 1976 StM2SNMADIR:Er?161tWe7gPAIMR000400100018-1 S 22793 The Senate continued with the consid- eration Of amendment in disagreement No. 75 to H.R. 9861, an act making ap- propriations for the Department of De- fen3e for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1976, and for the period beginning July 1, 1976, and ending September 30, 1976, and for other purposes. Mr. WILLIAM L. SCOTT. Will the Senator yield? Mr. McCLURE. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Virginia for a question. Mr. WILLIAM L. SCOTT. Mr. Presi- der t, I appreciate the Senator's yielding and compliment him on the statements he has made about the amendment that has been proposed by the Senator from Cal if ornia. The Senator commenced his remarks by reference to the majority leader's con iments about a filibuster on this amendment. I was one who objected to a vote at a definite time, but the reason for my ob- jection was that it was 10 o'clock in the evening and I do not think that is the time to vote on such matters. I am ready to vote right now, so I am not participating in a filibuster in any way. In fact, I may vote in favor of the Tunney amendment. I am inclined to do that. I do have a concern. Perhaps the distinguished Senator from Idaho may be in possession of in- formation that I do not have. I, like him, did not receive a great deal of enlighten- ment during the closed session of the Senate, either yesterday or today. Mr. McCLURE. Might I say to the Senator parenthetically at that point, I believe we had some good debate in the closed session today, but the debate was not really bearing upon matters that were classified or secret and that could not have been debated in full public view. Mr. WILLIAM L. SCOTT. I agree with the Senator. That, in effect, is my thought also. I am interested in what the administration and what the De- partment of State may or may not have done in this situation that might relate to this concept of d?nte, and whether or not we can compartmentalize d?nte; whether we can say, "We will sign agree- ments with you and we would like to get your signature on almost any agreement. We feel we have accomplished something because you signed a piece of paper." Then be friends with the Soviet Union, normalize relations with Cuba, and at- tempt in some manner to combat the activities of Cuba or Russia in Angola. It seems to me that when we talk about friendship we have to be a friend world- wide. We cannot be a friend in one part of the world and be conducting some type of antagonistic effort in another part of the world. It seems to me through diplo- matic channels the President of the United States and the Secretary of State should indicate to the Soviet Union and to Cuba that we would like to normalize relationships; that we would like for all of the nations within the family of na- tions to be friends, one with another. I do not think there is any doubt that one has to be a friend to have a friend. This means that one does not go around in various parts of the world and at- tempt to establish bases, attempt to take over a newly formed independent nation. It seems to me that Russia is badly in need of grain. I am advised that Rus- sia does have problems with regard to feeding its population. I am not opposed to assisting a friendly, needy nation any- where in the world. I understand we have been helping Russia with regard to some truck factor- ies, with regard to computers; that we have been trying to help them develop their oil resources. I am opposed to doing that sort of thing when Russia is acting as a friend as long as we are doing this but then goes into another part of the world and does not act in a friendly fashion. As the distinguished Senator knows, as a lawyer, there is such a thing as mu- tuality in every valid contract. There is consideration that flows in both direc- tions. It just appears to this Senator that most of the consideration in our contact with the Soviet Union is flowing out of this country and into the Soviet Union. I do not see the mutuality in these agree- ments. I wonder if the Senator has heard any mention made in our discussions here in the Chamber about diplomatic efforts having been made by the State Depart- ment, in effect, to say to the Soviet Union: "If you want the friendship of this country, if you want our assistance In the way that you feel you need our assistance, are you going to be a friend and show your friendship throughout the world by your actions as well as any words which you might utter?" Would the distinguished Senator have any comment on that? Mr. McCLURE. Let me respond to the distinguished Senator from Virginia in this manner, if I may. First of all with respect to-whether or not in the closed sessions we developed any information concerning State De- partment or diplomatic initiatives with regard to the Soviet involvement in Angola?and I think there was nothing of a classified nature stated there and I think, as a matter of fact, the only information? Mr. WILLIAM L. SCOTT. I would not ask the Senator to disclose any classified information. Mr. McCLURE. I am aware of that. The only information that was dis- closed or discussed was that the State Department has sent a perfunctory note, or at least they sent a note and received a perfunctory reply, and they may have followed that up with a perfunctory re- sponse to the perfunctory reply. In other words, practically no diplomatic initia- tive directly bearing upon this issue, so far as the Soviet Union is concerned. Let me state further that I do not re- gard the policy of d?nte, as I under- stand it to have been articulated by Sec- retary Kissinger, by President Nixon and President Ford, as being a statement of friendship between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is, instead, a policy under which the opposing forces in the world may live together without imme- diate armed conflict and with a lessening of tensions which lessens the likelihood of the outbreak of armed conflict. I do not believe the policy of d?nte ought to be confused with the statement of friendship that we would all desire occur. Mr. WILLIAM L. SCOTT. The distin- guished Senator will recall that state- ments have been made after conferences with the Soviet Union and other Commu- nist nations that while we have a differ- ent type of government, and while we may not agree as to all matters, we do want to live together in peace and settle our disagreements by negotiation rather than settle the differences through any type of armed conflict. I believe such statements as this have been made in general from time to time. I submit that the Soviet action in An- gola, as I understand that action to be, is not in the broad, general spirit of d?nte as it is generally understood to be, whether we call it friendship between na- tions, toleration of nations, or living to- gether in the absence of any armed conflict. Would not the distinguished Senator from Idaho agree that the executive branch of the Government should, in some way, convey to those who have either military personnel or military ad- visers in Angola that this Nation views with concern their presence there, and that it might very well jeopardize this spirit that we have been trying to ac- complish over the past several years? Mr. McCLURE. Mr. President, I would reply to the Senator's question in this fashion: I believe there are a number of things which can be done. I agree to- tally with the sentiment expressed by the distinguished Senator from Virginia, that we should use diplomatic channels to indicate to the Soviet Union, and to other external participants in the inter- nal affairs of Angola, that we believe the Angolans ought to be able to make up their own minds without outside Interference. We should express our concern to the Soviet Union about their involvement in attempting to back a less than one-third segment of the society in Angola in order to subvert and to impose their will upon two-thirds of the people of Angola. I Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 S 22794 Approved -4:uftWRgSINI:111110iCattDRDISEMODS44R0004aeletiViilli 18, 1975 would hope that we would also utilize the diplomatic channels that we can utilize to put pressure upon Cuba, which is the indirect pawn of the Soviet Union and a direct participant in Angola to the extent of 4,000 to 5,000 troops actively involved in combat operations, using the Soviet Union equipment supplied to that one section in Angola in an attempt to extend Soviet administration and domi- nance over the lives of the people in An- gola. Mr. WILLIAM L. SCOTT. Is it not a fact that this country has had an express foreign- policy over the years of self-de- termination for all the nations of the world? This has been our expressed for- eign policy; and would it not be consist- ent with the expressed foreign policy of this Nation to call that to the attention of the Soviet Union or other nations that have troops or Military advisers in the African nation, and urge them, in the general oVerall spirit of detente, that they should withdraw from Angola? The real thrust of my thought is that any foreign policy such as d?nte not be compartmentalized. In my opinion, it is not realistic to practice detente in one part of the world and not have it apply in other areas of the world. Would the distinguished Senator agree with that? Mr. McCL17RE. I would agree with most portions of the statement of the Senator from Virginia, particularly one point, in regard to the expression of the ? opinion to the Soviet Union that d?nte Is indeed 'threatened by their continued Intervention in Angola; and second, that It is the policy of the United States and it ought to be the policy of the United States to support the right of self-deter- mination of all people in all countries. We have for many years supported a declaration in the captive nations treaty wherein we have said to the people of the world that we still look back with abhor- rence at the dominance of the lives of the people in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia by the Soviet Union; that we do not like the interference in the lives of the people of Finland; that we abhor the interference in Hungary, when the Soviets sought to change the lives of the People there; that we have never liked the interposition of the Soviet Union in Czechoslovakia. We believe the people of Czechoslo- vakia should have the privilege of mak- ing up their own minds what kind of government they should have. We sup- port and applaud the efforts of the peo- ple of Poland to free themselves from the dominance of their massive neighbor to the east. But we should be no less concerned about the rights of the people of An- gola, simply because they are a small and less developed country. As a matter of fact, perhaps we should be more sen- sitive to their right to make their own determination in their own way, simply because they are small and less developed than. some of these other nations. Mr. WILLIAM L. SCOTT. I appreciate the Senator's yielding. Of course, I would like for our country to be con- cerned about the welfare of the small nations of the world, for self-determina- tion by all of the nations of the world; but I also have a concern that we not become involved in the affairs of another nation without Congress having com- plete information, without Congress par- ticipating in the policymaking decision. Although some individual Members of Congress may have been consulted, I am not aWare of the Congress as a body being involved in the situation in An- gola. I certainly do not want this to de- velop into any type of affair that would involve the use of American troops. The distinguished junior Senator from Illinois (Mr. STEVENSON) has a sense of the Senate resolution which, in effect, calls upon the executive branch of the Government to endeavor, through diplo- matic channels, to encourage the Soviet Union and other nations, without naming them, other nations involved in the An- gola affair, to withdraw and to permit that nation to determine its own internal affairs, to govern itself. I intend to support that sense of Con- gress resolution in the event that it comes before the Senate for considera- tion. I understand it is cosponsored by the distingiushed Democratic whip, and I believe other Senators have cosponsored it also. I believe it is a good resolution. I would amend it somewhat to indicate that this Nation will, to an extent, govern its future relationship with the Soviet Union by the actions that the Soviet Union takes in Angola and other coun- tries, so as to say that d?nte is world- wide, that if it is going to work at all it has to work all over the world, and that it cannot work in one nation with- out working in the others. I have infringed upon the Senator's time, but I thank him for yielding. Mr. McCLURE. I thank the Senator for his contribution to the discussion and the questions that he has raised. The latter subject that he referred to, the resolution of the Senator from Illi- nois (Mr. STEVENSON) , appears at page S22539 of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, be- ing the record of the proceedings in open session yesterday. I am told that the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. THURMOND) also ha S a resolution in slightly different terms, but directed to- ward the Senate amendment. I am told that at least two other Senators are sponsors of a third resolution with some- thing of a similar aim, directing the Ex- ecutive to become involved in very posi- tive diplomatic efforts to bring pressure to bear on those who would subvert the internal processes of Angola to their own ends. I am perfectly willing, as one Member of the Senate, to support appropriate ef- , forts directed toward that end. I would hope that we would change ? our policy that now eiists until we have a quid pro quo for the change, and I think that is the very importance of the question we are involved in. I yield to the Senator from Oregon under the previously stated conditions. Mr. PACKWOOD. Mr. President, I think the Senator from Idaho has put his finger on it, and I would like to engage in some colloquy with the Senator from California. We are talking about three different things here, really. We are talking about the resolution of the Senator from Illi- nois, which is almost an embargo theory because it does not relate just to the So- viet Union; it relates to any nation, as I recall his words, that persists in in- volving itself in Angola. That could be Zaire, South Africa, France, or any na- tion that persists in involving itself. That could be worthy of consideration, although not hasty consideration, by the Senate. Then we are talking about detente, our relations with the Soviet Union, specifi- cally whether we should require a quid pro quo; should we send them Ford Motor Co. machinery if they do not get out of Angola? Then third, as I understand the amendment of the Senator from Cali- fornia he is, in essence, saying what our unilateral policy should be toward An- gola regardless of d?nte, regardless of whether or not we adopt the Stevenson resolution. Is that a fair statement? Mr. TUNNEY. The question as to what we ought to do with Angola irrespective of what the Russians do is one that we could spend a good deal of time on. I am happy to offer some thoughts to the Senator from Oregon if he cares to listen to my opinions on the subject. Mr. PACKWOOD. I wish to hear them. As I understand the specific amendment, and I shall be fair, I think the world as well as this country is going to read it, and the headlines are going to be "Sen- ate Rejects Angola," or words to that effect; they are not going to get into the niceties. This is one bill and one appro- priation. I think that it is a philosophi- cally fair conclusion to draw from the debate that this is going to be our policy, if it passes, toward Angola and may be correctly a harbinger of what our policy ought to be toward involvement in Africa at all. Mr. TUNNEY. What the amendment does is to make it very clear that the United States cannot send military equipment to Angola, nor can it send money to another country which in turn will then make the purchases of military equipment for use in Angola, but there is nothing in my amendment that pre- vents economic aid from being given to Angola. There is no reason why we could not participate in giving assistance to all sides. We could give humanitarian aid. Mr. PACKWOOD. I stand corrected on that because the amendment of the Senator is clear in that respect. In addi- tion, we could gather intelligence in Angola if we wanted to because the amendment has exempted intelligence gathering. Mr. TUNNEY. Yes. I wish to point out to my friend that we now know that the Gulf Oil Co. has made a very large payment of money, ap- proximately$100 million, that has been placed in the bank in Luanda of which the MPLA has now control since the Portuguese pulled out on November 11. In effect what has happened is that we have the Gulf Oil Co., an American cor- poration, with a subsidiary in Angola, drilling for oil, having made a very sub- stantial $100 million payment to the side that is being backed by the Russians, and Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 December /8/,Ikm.ved For Ret5ArteiRsOs1040A1L: RkwangpktopooLlool00018-1 S 22795 our Government apparently did nothing to prevent that payment from being made. It is my understanding that an- other substantial payment is due in the very near future, and that there was an agreement that$500 million would be paid in the form of royalties by Gulf to the bank in Luanda, which would then be available to the government that was in control and that government which happens now to be the mPLA. Initially there was that provisional governinent that was made up of all three factions, UNITA, the MLA, and the IVIPLA. But the other two factions with- drew and so now the MPLA has total con- trol over these funds. I only say to my friend that, if we have a policy which on its face is operating at such cross purposes as to allow, on the one hand, an American corporation to make those kind of payments to the faction that we are now supplying arms against, it really deserves some very special attention on the part of Con- gress before we make any arms avail- able. I say to my friend that, if we are going to make arms available, it ought to be clone through the route of the Foreign Military Assistance Act, and we ought to ? have the Committe on Foreign Relations go into it, as the Senator suggested ear- lier. We ought to have a clear definition of what American policy is, what Amer- ica's interests are in Angola and other parts of Africa. We ought to have a clear understanding of what our State Depart- ment and CIA perceive to be the Soviet goals in Angola and in other parts of Africa and then make a decision based upon those facts. What very deeply concerns me from my oWri private investigation?and these are conversations that I have had with members of the CIA and State Denart- meat officials, and conversations that my staff as had?is that there really does not seem to be any centrally controlling objective of American policy in An- gola. That is what I consider to be so dangerous. Mr. PACKWOOD. I think we are mak- ing a central policy, and I am inclined to agree with it, but when we vote on the amendment of the Senator from Cal- ifornia f think we are making a central policy in this Congress for better or for Worse, What we are saying is that no matter What happens, no matter what happens in Angola, it cannot be worth the risk of American involvement, with American troops and American military equipment. Earlier today, and I cannot remember whether it was in closed or open session, but the information was not classified, we tried to determine if we knew what the Russian intentions are. We do not know. We have no idea what the Russian intentions are. We do not know if they plan to go in and wipe out the entire politic as they practically did in the Baltic countries and make it a Russian puppet populated by Russians. We do not know if they plan to put in half a million troops and hold the country by force against the will of the people or whether they are going to try to influence the govern- merit through economic and military aid and keep their own personnel out. We have to operate under the assump- tion they might do the worst, but we do not know. That is ane. Second, we are saying if Russia wants to make the mistake, in our judgment, the mistake of holding Angola by force of sending in a half-million troops, and probably Russia could hold Angola with a half-million troops, if Russia wants to make that mistake, Russia is prob- ably writing off the rest of black Africa, probably writing off most of any chance to subvert South America, because every nation would ,very clearly see what Rus- sia had in mind and would have no truck with them, would have no dealing with them, and would probably make our job in terms of gaining allies infinitely easier. If Russia chooses not to do that, if Russia comes up with a hope and prayer and some material in hopes they can get a government that will be a Soviet-lean- ing government on every occasion, then I think they are mistaken. Nationalism is rampant. Angola is going to go the ?way it wants unless it is subjected and held down by literally Russian military personnel. If that is the case, if this even ends up being a Communist government but an independent Communist govern- ment we can deal with them. We dealt with Yugoslavia. We are dealing with China. We learned to deal with Communist governments around the world, including some of the Eastern European ones. Where Soviet troops have occupied them, the countries have en- deavored toward the West. That we can deal with. I would be surprised if Russia were to put massive troops into Angola and try to hold Angola on the basis of sheer brute force. But they might. It seems to me, therefore, that our pol- icy wisely says for better or for worse we are going to leave Angola to the An- golans. If Russia chooses to intervene, because we think our best interest cannot be served in any event by either trying to fight to keep the 'Russians out or in- volving ourselves, we think that what- ever Russia does in that case we will come out the winners. Is that a fair statement of where we are headed? Mr. TUNNEY. I think that is a fair statement as to where we are headed assuming that the Foreign Relations Committee in their consideration to the Foreign Military Assistance Act takes the same kind of action on that bill as we are taking on this bill. I cannot see any justification for an intervention by the United States in Angola. One of the things I should like to point out to the Senator from Oregon Is that reports that have come to me indicate that in black Africa there are many leaders who are wondering why the United States is so quick to inter- vene in Africa, when we did not partici- pate in the U.N. debate and the various attempts to get resolutions through, condemning the racist policies of South Africa, Southwest Africa, and Southern Rhodesia. There is no doubt that the reason why we did not participate in those debates in a meaningful way was that the United States has had a very special relation- ship with South Africa. We have many economic interests in South Africa. We have done a great deal of trade with South Africa. Much of our mineral sup- ply in this country comes from South Africa in an unprocessed form or proc- essed form as it is brought to this coun- try to maintain our high technology society. Yet, the leaders in black Africa are wondering why the United States is so quick to put up $60 million for war in Angola, when we would not participate in these U.N. resolutions and debates in connection with condemning racism in South Africa. Another point that I think is impor- tant is that for 2 years we have been cutting back on our economic aid to Africa?not just Africa, but other parts of the world as well. When we look at the kind of commitment we have made In the form of economic aid to black Africa and then look at the kind of money we would be willing to put in for military equipment in Angola?after the Russians came in or in a contemporane- ous fashion with our own efforts to sup- ply our military equipment?it is ade clear to many Africans that the U ited States really has no interest in their eco- nomic development, in the kind o so- ciety they are trying to restructur for themselves, the quality of life that they are going to have in the future, but that the United States is only interestcl in Africa as it relates to a defensive ploy to counteract any maneuvers that the Soviet Union has undertaken in Arica. It is of particular importance to look at this in the context of one state ent that was made to me by a man whd had spent many years in Nigeria. In the late 1960's, he was particularly friendly with one minister in the Nigerian Govern- ment, and this minister said? The only way we could interest the United States in Nigeria, to give us aid, is apparent- ly to invent a Communist party. In other words, at that particular point in time we were giving much more aid to Ghana, which looked as though it might slip into the Communist fold. So we were prepared to put money into Ghana, but we were not willing to do anything for Nigeria, which was considered our friend and safe. So this rather pathetic statement was made by a minister in Nigeria: The only way we can get aid from the United States, apparently, is to invent a Communist party, and then maybe they will give us some aid. Mr. PACKWOOD. Mr. President, I think there is a consequence to Russia's actions, and it is negative to them. To- day we heard how Russia, with brute force, tramped into Hungary and Czech- cislovakia and did not care about world opinion. What that probably cost them was control over all-of the Communist parties in Western Europe. Today, if the Communists were to win an election in Italy, it would not be a Russian Commu- nist party, because they have seen the brutality of Russia. Russia knew that Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 S 22796 Approved For eetIstsitiffitiMACI:1 it9W_UWILRIOF0004001999Mber when they chose to choke off Czechoslo- vakia and Hungary, and that is a de- ciEdon they made. If they choose to go into Angola With force, they are going to lose more than they will ever gain. They, will be able to hold Angola, but they will lose the rest of the area. Assuming that this amendment is adopted and similar language out of the Foreign Relations Committee, our policy will be that, henceforth, American policy toward Africa will be nonmilitary in-, volvement, regardless of d?nte, regard- s of the actions of other nations. Mr. TTJNNEY. I concur with the Sena- tor's conclusion, That is about as suc- cinct an expression of What this amend- ment is as I have heard on the floor. ? Mr. ?AC WOOD. I thank the Senator. Mr. 1VIcCIATAE. Mr... President, I ask unanimous consent that I may yield to the Senator from North Carolina without losing my right to the floor, that any restunption by me not be considered a second speech, and that under no cir- cumstances I lose my right to the floor. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. HELMS. I thank the distinguished Senator from Idaho. Mr. President, the Tunney amendment presents us 'i,vith an unacceptable choice. On the one hand the distingnished Senator from Califor- nia IS asking us to stop the executive branch from giving any military assist- ance directly, or indirectly, to strife- torn Angola; while on the other hand the executive branch proposes to use funds in this appropriation bill to provide Angola with at least$60 million in mili- tary aid. We are asked to vote for either one or the other. It is clear that the Soviet Union has made a major thrust In Angola, providing top-quality weap- ons and an undetermined number of Sovietj)ersonnel to assist the MPLA. It is also clear that Castro has sent 4,000 trained Cuban troops to fight on the Communist side. Thus, on the one hand, if we vote with tile distinguished Senator froM California, we seem to be saying that the executive branch has no authority what- soeVer to respond to threuts of violence outside the United Otates, no authority to take steps to throw up barriers to the spread of communism through force, un- less approved in advance by the Con- gress of the United States. But on the other hand, if we vote against the Tun- ney amendment, we seem to be giving a Vote of approval to the way in which the executive branch is conducting its policies. If the issue had not been forced here today, there would have been no Implication that the Senate had partici- pated in approving or disapproving our nolicies in Angola. Unfortunately, the issue has been forced. It is within the purview of the executive branch to conduct foreign pol- ity on a day-to-day basis. We have tradi- tionally given the executive branch dis- cretionary funds for the conduct of for- eign policy, and they have been used in the conduct of policies such as have been followed in Angola. Let it be clear that the United States has not entered into a war in Angola. We have supplied arms, but we have not put troops or advisers Into Angola. The scope of the war powers is not under consideration here. What is happening here is an effort to force the issue of covert action before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has completed its work and made its recom- mendations, and before any consensus has been reached in this body about the nature and purpose of that kind of activity. But now that the issue, has been forced, there is no way to run away from it. It is a very difficult choice to make for someone who believes that this Nation desperately needs to resume a world. leadership position, and to defend our traditional values of human rights, private property, and spiritual freedom against the advance of communism. When communism uses naked force and internal subversion to conquer an in- creasing proportion of the earth's terri- tory and subjugate the people who are unfortunate enough to live in the con- quered territories, it is our proper role to work to restore freedom to those areas. Frankly, we cannot say that It is none of our concern. As the proportion of the global scope of activity is narrowed, the choices that we, as a Nation, can make grow fewer and fewer, and eventually we will be so restricted that, our inde- pendence as a nation?and the freedom that independence guarantees us?will be in jeopardy. But is the choice as simple as it seems? Must we abandon our role as the leader of the free nations?as is implied in the amendment of the Senator from California? Are we voting here for a choice between freedom and communism for Angola? By no means. If we adopt the amendment of the dis- tinguished Senator, we force the execu- tive branch to do nothing at all But by doing so, do we deliver Angola into the hands of the Communists? Given the measure of Soviet determination dis- played here, it is most likely that Angola will fall into the hands of the Commu- nists, with all. that such a collapse im- plies: The deliverance of the Angolan peoples into a Stalinist terror, the loss of mineral resources that can help sus- tain the freedom of the West, a base from which Soviet forces can threaten South Atlantic shipping lanes and project Vier- rillas over the border into the territory of South West Africa, But if we reject the Tunney amend- ment, what do we get? The word is out. The millions of dollars which the admin- istration is throwing into Angola are not for the deliverance of the people there or for the securing of the territory from Communist domination. The millions of dollars are for securing another "nego- tiated settlement." The State Depart- ment has, in effect, admitted that this Is the case. Indeed, it appears that some spokesmen for this point of view thought that they were putting forth a strong card in bidding for a "negotiated settlement." The Senator from North Carolina wishes to say that he will never be part of any negotiated settlement. We have seen these negotiated settlements stale- mated in Korea, imposed with indiffer- ence in Laos, and thrust brutally upon 18, 1975 Vietnam. Is there anyone in this Cham- ber or in the cloakrooms or in the offices in the Dirksen or Russell building who does not believe that a "negotiated settle- ment" is negotiated, surrender? Have we not learned the lesson of what happened in Vietnam? Do we not realize that the negotiating process for the Communists is simply' a method to entrench their positions more firmly? Do we not recall haw the Vietnam settlement left the Communist troops firmly in control of their enclaves in South Vietnam, and left them loopholes for resupply of those troops? Do we not remember what a de- moralizing effect the "settlement" had upon South Vietnam as a nation? I ask whether any Senator thinks that the Cuban troops would be removed from Angola under such a negotiated settle- ment, and whether the Soviets would withdraw their supplies and personnel? After the experience which this Nation has had under the negotiations conduct- ed by Dr. Kissinger in the past, no one could say with assurance that the Soviets would withdraw, or would give up any of the advantages they now hold, Indeed, I can say right now that to press for such key concessions would bring charges that such firmness would threaten the "deli- cate state of d?nte. I can hear it now. I can hear the wails that we might even endanger the SALT II negotiation. I say, Mr. President, "So what?" Mr. President, the sad fact is that it Is better to pull out at once, than to enter into a protracted negotiation lead- ing to the ultimate takeover of Angola by the Communists in any case. The Tunney amendments?which I do not like; I wish it had never been submitted?is never- theless offering us the choice of outright abandonment of our responsibilities or a negotiated abandonment of our respons- ibilities. That has been made clear in the closed sessions of the Senate, yesterday and today. The first is quick and cheap; that is the Tunney amendment. The second is long, protracted, painful, and expensive. Both arrive at the same ultimate end. The comparison of Angola to Viet- nam is valid only because we are de- liberately making it another Vietnam. What makes it a Vietnam are the restric- tions, the obstructionism, and painful trap of negotiations. Do we not remember that in both Korea and in Vietnam we had more casualty losses after the negotiations began than before? Viet- namization is a state of mind which pre- sents us with immoral choices. Those are the choices offered us here today by the Tunney amendment. The Senator from North Carolina will not be taken down that path. I am pres- ently inclined?oh, so reluctantly, Mr. President?to vote for the Tunney amendment in order to let it be known that I will have no part of wasting money when the goal is to negotiate a settle- ment of the type which has always left the Communists in place, and given them a base for imperialistic expansion. Mr. PACKWOOD. Will the Senator yield for a question? Mr. HELMS. I am delighted to yield. Mr. PACKWOOD. The Senator men- tioned our responsibility in Angola. What Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 a A5pproved For Re December 18, 197 CONGRESS RECOR lgasenL R11M1 ? CIA-PDP77RAAit44R000400100018-1 S 22797 IV1-2SEN' is our obligation? What are our responsi- bilities to Angola? Mr. HELMS. I am going to address myself to that if the Senator will allow me to complete my remarks. Then I shall be delighted to discuss it further with him. Mr. President, the administration does not need to sit on its hands. There is a very simple way to get the Communists out of Angola without getting us involved there at all. The best way is to go to where the decisions are made. The de- cisions are not made in Angola; they are made in Moscow. The Soviet thrust is a major new policy decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Never before have the Soviets shipped new armaments of a high quality to client grotps outside of the Soviet, empire, or its traditional area of influence. Ann s ikere sent for cash to the Middle East, and technicians, but the thrust in the Middle East has been a traditional goal of Soviet policy. More Often, the arms sent to client states have been used junk al no particular value. ButT the arms sent- to Angola with no payment asked, and the presence of hun- dreds of Soviet personnel, are an entirely new development, based uPon a new worldwide strategy on the part of the Communists. It is also indicative of the Soviet military effort that for the first time their arms preduetion is sufficient to support suchhIpments. No one can claim that the Soviet presence In Angola is accidental, or a spur of the moment decision. It is a long, calculated plan which has been in operation for a long time, and which threatens the peace-and stability of every free nation on earth. But does our adrninistration see this? I think not. The Secretary of State is still inflexibly conimitted to detente and, to this date, I know of no one Who can satisfactorily define the word "d?nte." The President is committed to detente, and the President recently got rid of the single voice for reason and prudence in his Cabinet In this regard, Secretary Schlesinger. The President and the Sec- retary of State go to China for no ap- parent purpose and with no apparent result. They are -planning to go to the Soviet Union as soon as the SALT II details are worked out, and we are told that we must not disturb such delicate negotiations. - - More and more it is becoming evident that detente is nothing other than a name' fora protracted period filled with negotiated settlements of -many kinds. The overall impact of d?nte is the same as the individual impact of each negoti- ation process, and that is, to Mit it bluntly, surrender. D?nte is the ration- alization of surrender just as our nego- tiations have 'been a protracted process of confirming the Communists in posi- tions of strength in various places around the world. So I say, Mr. President, let us go to - Moscow not to Angola. This Senator says no more wheat deali with the Commu- nists, no more trade agreements, no more tax concessions of the kind we approved just the other day until the Soviets make some Concessions. We do not have to finance and supply the deficiencies of the Communist system. We do not have- to allow them to divert consumer produc- tion into tanks, and farm machinery production into weapons manufacture. Why is it that the Communists do not have tractors to get in their harvest when, at the very same time, they are able to produce guns and rockets for this Angolan adventure? That is where you get down to the nitty-gritty. If we want the Cuban Communist troops out of Angola, Mr. President? and here I will begin to comment on the question raised by my friend from Oregon?if we want the Communist troops out of Angola, let us go to Mos- cow and have Moscow send a message to Havana. Better yet, let us send a message to Havana ourselves. Let Havana order the Cuban troops home and, while we are at it, tell Havana to send back to the Soviet Union those Echo class nu- clear submarines based in Cuban ports and armed with 500-mile nuclear cruise missiles. Why on earth should the captive Cuban people fight in Angola at the Soviet whim? Why should the Cuban people al- low themselves to be used as shock troops for what is clearly the Soviet grand design in Angola? I think, Mr. President, the United States should call upon the people of Cuba to rise up against the Soviet's cyn- ical use of their young sons in this grand design and to throw off the dicta- tor who has handed over the Cuban youth for such purposes. But, do we do so? No. Our policy has been to encourage the resumption of nor- mal relations, so-called, with the Com- munist tyrant in Cuba, and there you go. This is the fault of this whole question that is before us today. Are we really against communism? Do we really con- sider it a threat to liberty in the world? How much longer, how many more times, will we surrender to it in the name of d?nte or in the name of "negotiated settlements"? With reference to normalized relations with Cuba that we hear so much about, our diplomats worked hard at the Organ- ization of American States meeting last July to give the air of legitimacy to the Castro regime. It bordered on the nau- seating, Mr. President, to observe what went on. In the name of d?nte we worked against the interests of our sister American States such as Uruguay, Chile, and Argentina, whose internal order has been disrupted by the export of Cuban- trained revolutionaries throughout South America. What is our answer? Detente. I will wager that not one citizen out of a hun- dred in America can give a serious and secure definition of the word. Even our own security is threatened in the major cities of this land by the Cas- tro-backed Puerto Rican terrorist move- ment while anti-Castro leaders are as- sassinated right here in the United States Itself. So that is why, Mr. President, I am fed up with negotiated settlements. I am fed up with the United States never quite saying what it means about communism, stalemates, coalition governments, and I think the American people are tired of salami-sliced surrender carrying the in- evitable enormous price tag. I think the taxpayers are sick of sub- sidizing Secretary Kissinger's mistakes. If the United States is not seeking to win then I think we should not enter into a protected conflict where there is no in- tent to win. I suggest again that the Tunney amendment, bad as it is, at least has the virtue of giving the administration a striking opportunity to reject mistaken policies of surrender and adopt a clear anti-Communist stance in the world. Sooner or later we are going to have to do it, unless later or sooner we decide to surrender, period. Now, the way to peace in Angola is to get the Soviets and the Cubans out of there. The way to do that is to get tough with this thing called detente?whatever it is. No negotiation, not even a SALT nego- tiation, is important if it allows the So- viets to take the world, piece by piece. I do not think there is a Senator in this body who will deny that that is precisely what has been going on. I hope that whatever else the Senate may do at this time and in connection with this matter, we will at least en- deavor to make sure that the American people understand what is at stake. In that sense, Angola, aside from its mineral value, the shipping lanes ques- tion and all the rest, is a symbol and it Is an opportunity. I promised to yield to the Senator for a question. Mr. PACKWOOD. No more than the Senator from North Carolina do I trust the Russians. I think they lie, cheat, and steal and that their sole foreign policy is based upon what is in their interest, not that they like us or love us. I would like to think our foreign policy would be based upon what is good for us. Mr. HELMS. Does the Senator believe that is the case? Mr. PACKWOOD. I think we delude ourselves on occasion. I am not a great supporter of d?nte. I think from time to time there can be things Russia and the United States agree on, that happen to be in our mutual interest. But we should realize then that each nation agrees upon it and we should not think it is because we love each other. But as for Angola, forgetting d?nte for a moment because I am not sure it is ever going to work, what should be our obligation toward Angola? Mr. HELMS. I will answer the Senator, as I tried to say in my statement, my concern is for the interest of the United States. Mr. PACKWOOD. Right. Mr. THURMOND. I wish to thank the able, distinguished Senator from North Carolina. Some people have criticized the United States' role in Africa, but, as a matter of fact, the United States does not have any bases iri Africa, does it? Mr. HELMS. No. Mr. THURMOND. Is it not true the Soviets have a naval and air' base in Ber- bera and Somalia with about 1,000 mili- tary personnel there? Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 S 22798 Approved For Relmanyli/01 ? LIMPPIIM00144R00040010001,0-1 S1ONAL ORD? SENATE December 18, 1975 Mr. HELMS. That is my under- standing. Mr. THURMOND. On the east coast of Africa? Mr. HELMS. That is my under- standing. ? Mr. THURMOND. Is it not true also, that the Soviets are in Mozambique by giving arms and seeking bases there on the east cpast of Africa? Mr. HELMS. That is correct. Mr. THt7RMOND. Is it not true the Soviets are aware their naval facilities on Guinea on the west coast of Africa pa- trol the sea lanes off the west coast, of ships and planes? Mr. HELMS. That is the understand- ing of the Senator from North Carolina, Mr. THURMOND. Is it not true that the Soviets have assigned about 2,000 military advisors to African nations seeking influence, bases or both? Mr. HELMS. My understanding is identical to that of the Senator from South Carolina. I would ask the Senator if he would estimate what percentage of the Ameri- can people understand the facts he is so eloquently bringing out by his questions? Mr. THURMOND. I aux not too sure that the American people understand These things because for some unknown reason, so Much of the press do not bring out these facts when it seems to affect 'the Soviet Union. I have never understood why some of the media take the position they do. With anything against the United States, It seems they are right there, Johnny on the spot. Now, is it not true that the Soviets and their socialist allies in Africa were in- strumenta1l getting only 16 of the 46 states in the Organization for African 'Unity to recognize the pro-Soviet MPLA faction? Mr. HELMS, That is my understand- ing. Mr. THURMOND. Showing that out of 46 countries in Africa, only 16, through '4 prodded by the Seviets, were only able to induce 10 to recognize the MPLA fac- tiOn as the zovernMent in Angola? Mr. HELMS. That is factually in ac- cordance WI MY understanding. Mr. THURMOND. Is it not true that the Soviets were behind the U.S. ex- pulsion from the Tripoli Air Base in Libya a few years ago? Mr. HELMS, The Senator is correct. Mr. THURIVIOND. Is it not true that the Soviets armed And urged Egypt to launch an attack to regain the Sinai? Mr. HELMS. No question abou out. Mr. THURMOND. Is it not also true that the Soviets have sent in the past 10 years about $400 million worth of mili- tary equipment tp 10 black African countries, including Migs and tanks? Mr. HELMS. The Senator is absolutely correct, and that raises a question, the Inescapable question of why. So they could take over the continent. Mr. THURMOND. Is it not true that since 1974, Soviet military aid has gone to Nigeria, Congo, Uganda, Mali, Tan- zania, Zambia, Equatorial Guiena, and the Central African Republic? Mr. HELMS. The Senator did say mili- tary aid, did he not? Mr. THURMOND. That is right. Mr. HELMS. I draw the distinction be- cause that is the kind of aid the Soviet Union gives in an effort to line up and take over, and that is exactly, as the Sen- ator so eloquently emphasizes, what they have in mind in this case. Mr. THURMOND. Is It not true that the Soviets and Cubans have been train- ing MPLA military representatives, esti- mated to be about 2,000, in Cuba and Russia since the late 1960's? Mr. HELMS. That is my understand- ing. I would say to the Senator that earlier this year I visited some South American countries and Castro-trained terrorists are all over. They are being sent out not only in South America, but, as is so demonstrable in this case, in Angola. It will happen throughout the world in increasing intensity. The Senator is exactly right. Mr. THURMOND. Is it not true the Soviets have transported between 5,000 and 6,000 Cuban soldiers, mostly blacks, to fight with the MPLA and provided them with heavy equipment, much more deadly than the light equipment provided by the United States to the other side? Mr. HELMS. That information has been completely verified. I would say to the Senator. Mr. THURMOND. Is it not true the Soviets have sent about 400 military ad- visers to assist the MPLA? Mr. HELMS. That, too, is correct. Mr. THURMOND. Is it not true that only limited aid from the United States, mainly some small arms, has been sent In response to the heavy Soviet military aid? Mr. HELMS. That is the understand- ing of the Senator from North Carolina, yes. Mr. THURMOND. Is it not further true that the United States aid has not been direct, but transported mostly in commercial carriers through third coun- tries such as Zaire and Zambia? Mr. HELMS. That is correct. Mr. THURMOND. In other words, we have not sent planes over there, we have not sent tankers over there, we have not sent tanks and heavy equipment, such as the Soviets have sent to the MPLA. Is it true that intelligence believes the Soviet interest in Angola is to acquire use of the deepwater ports, the airfields, and to monitor the passing ships? Mr. HELMS. That is correct, as a pre- lude to taking over the entire country. Mr. THURMOND. Is it the policy of the United States to favor a negotiated settlement between all three factions in the hope that what we have sent, or the little aid that we may send, will create a deadlock, thus forcing a negotiated settlement? Is that the real purpose of our Government so far? Mr. HELMS. Here is where it gets sticky in the understanding of the Sen- ator from North Carolina. It depends on where we go with our negotiated set- tlements. If we settle on the Communist terms, we are repeating the folly of the past. I am hopeful, as the Senator has stated, that if a negotiated settlement is chieved, it will be done sensibly and in the best interest of containing and re- straining the advance of communism in Africa. Mr. THURMOND. Someone says that we are getting involved over there. It has been clearly stated by the admin- istration, even on November 23 by Dr. Kissinger, Secretary of State, that the United States will not intervene mili- tarily in Angola, has it not? Mr. HELMS. I understand that is what Dr. Kissinger said. Mr. THURMOND. Is it true that, by taking the position it has with regard to Angola, the Soviets have proven again that they are ready to foster violence in pursuit of their aims? , Mr. HELMS. I believe that is correct. Mr. THURMOND. Is it true that the use of Cuban troops, Soviet advisers ahd heavy military equipment far exceeds any U.S. aid to the Angolan faction? Mr. HELMS. There is no question about that. Mr. THURMOND. Is is true that con- tinued U.S. aid,,tied to a prohibition on any U.S. personnel involvement, might force the Soviets to back off long enough to bring about a negotiated settlement? I realize on that question there is a dif- ference of opinion, but that is the hope of our Government in the matter, I believe. Mr. HELMS. It is a hope, I say to the distinguished Senator, that I am afraid Is tissue thin. As I said in my earlier remarks, it is my hope that there will be an under- standing on the part of our leaders that we have to deal with the Communists in a fashion that will preclude a continua- tion of our giving them everything they want and their proceeding to do what- ever they want to do. That is the way d?nte has worked up to now, insofar as the Senator from North Carolina is concerned. Mr. THURMOND. Does the Senator feel that detente is not worth the paper on which it is written unless one has the power to back it? Mr. HELMS. And the will and the courage, I would say. Mr. THURMOND. One has to have the power and the will to use the power. Mr. HELMS. Exactly. Mr. THURMOND. Otherwise, d?nte Is of no value. Mr. HELMS. D?nte can be equated to surrender without the qualities which the Senator has stated. Mr. THURMOND. Does the Senator feel that the time has come in this time of history, in this time in which we are living, that the United States should take the stand with regard to the Soviet Union that, "If you do not get out of Angola, and if you do not quit interven- ing in the affairs of other countries of the world, we are going to quit trading with you. We are not going to sell you grain, even though it might be to the advantage of the farmers of America. We are not going to sell you many other things which would be of benefit to your people in the way of comforts or even luxuries. In other words, unless you abandon your goal of world aggression and intent to take over other countries, we will not carry on business with you." Furthermore, would it even be wise to cancel diplomatic relations if they can- not work with us on an equal basis? Mr. HELMS. I say to the Senator that Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP7_7A11,114R000400100018-1 neceniber 18, 1975 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SEN it is the impression of the Senator from North Carolina that it is dangerous to Dat a rattlesnake on the head. That is precisely what we have been doing. We have been acceding to the Communists and the Soviet Union for all of these years. We have protracted the negotia- tions. We have, in the end without fail, yielded on theirsterms. I say that is a bad way to conduct foreign policy, if indeed It can be called foreign policy. Mr. THURMOND. Is it true that as long as we attempt to placate and ap- pease the Communists, the more they are going to ask, the more they are going to demand, and the harder it is going to be for us to live in the same world with them? Mr. HELMS. Not only that, I would say to the Senator, but in the meantime they are growing stronger. They are growing stronger with material assists from us, as In the case of wheat, in the case of the truck factories, in the case of sorts of arrangements which have been made through the years which, in the judgment ofI the Senator from North Carolina, were totally unwise and un- justified. Mr. THURMOND. Does the Senator, for instance, go back to 1962 when Pres- ident Kennedy agreed to sell the Soviets wheat? We not only sold them wheat which would enable them to keep more Men in their missile factories and gun plants, but also we guaranteed repay- ment to the bankers that loaned the Soviets the money to buy the wheat. Mr. HELMS. The Senator is correct. Mr. THURMOND. Does that make sense? Is that 'helping to build up the Soviet Government and keep its 200 mil- lion people under their control? Mr. HELMS. The Senator is absolutely cor rect. Mr. THURMOND. If people got hun- gry over there, they would rise up in a revolt, would they not? Mr. HELMS. Or they would start grow- ing their own wheat and building their own appliances-. Mr. THURMOND. And they would not be building munitions to such an extent. Mr. HELMS. That is correct. That is all the Senator from North Carolina has ever contended. Nobody would more wel- come peace in the world and complete accord with everybody than the Senator from North Carolina. But that is not What we are Moving to. We are moving toward absolute totalitarianism in the world,' and it is being done under the screen of d?nte and negotiated settle- ments, and, I might add, complete mis- representation of so many situations. I daresay to the Senator that only a small percentage of the American people understand really what happened in Vietnam, the no-win war that the Sena- tor is so familiar with, and all of the tragedies that grew out of that. But I think we have to confront the inevitable: are Ike opposed to tyranny? Are we op- posed to communism? Do we really un- derstand what it is? And then the ques- tion. Do we have the courage to stand up to it? That is the question I believe which is raised by the Tunney amendment. Mr. THURMOND. Is it true that if this country had enforced the Paris agree- ment with regard to Vietnam, which we probably could have done by using the Air Force for 1 or 2 days to let them know we meant business,- South Vietnam would be a free nation today? Mr. HELMS. I do not believe there is any question about it. I have talked with so many friends who were in Vietnam, as I know the Senator has--:and he, far more than I, as a matter of fact?who have told me of the frustration they felt in not being allowed to win a war they could have won. Yet the American people have been given an impression of Viet- nam that is just not accurate. They ought to ask some of the people who were there. We should have won it. Communism could have been contained and restrained, but it was not done. Mr. THURMOND. And is it not true we could have won the war in Korea, but had a stalemate? Mr. HELMS. No question about it. Mr. THURMOND. That was the first war this country never won. Mr. HELMS. No question about it. Mr. THURMOND. And is not not true that we had the Vietnam war as a consequence? Mr. HELMS. The Senator is absolutely correct. Mr. THURMOND. And there we spent over$150 billion, had 50,000 men killed and over 300,000 wounded, and then turned tail and ran, so to speak? Mr. HELMS. And we departed from Vietnam with all of the concessions in favor of the Communists. Their troops were allowed to stay in the South, and it is no wonder that Vietnam fell. All of the concessions were given to the Com- munists, and none to the people of South Vietnam. Mr. THURMOND. Is not the Senator of the opinion that the United States should not go to war unless we have to, but once we go to a war we ought to put all the power we have into it, air power, sea power, ground power, artil- lery power, all the power we have, to win it, get out, and get through; and we stayed in Vietnam 10 years and never did that, did we? Mr. HELMS. The Senator is correct; we did not. Mr. THURMOND. And does the Sena- tor not think that is one reason the peo- ple of this country now feel as they do toward the whole situation existing throughout the world? Mr. HELMS. The people of this coun- try have lost faith in so many of their institutions because they have seen prin- ciples eroded and even destroyed. Mr. THURMOND. They have seen ex- pediency control instead of principle, have they not? Mr. HELMS. I am sad to say the Senator is correct. Mr. THURMOND. I commend the able Senator from North Carolina. I just wish we had a whole Congress, Senate and House of Representatives, who had the vision, the ability, and the integrity that he does, who could understand this world situation and would be willing to grapple with it as he does. Mr. HELMS. I thank the Senator for his generous remarks, and I assure him they are reciprocated threefold. S 22799 Mr. President, is the Senator from North Carolina correct in his impression that he holds the floor as a result of a unanimous-consent agreement obtained by the distinguished Senator from Idaho, which stipulated that under no circum- stances would the Senator from Idaho lose his right to the floor by yielding to me? Is that correct? The PRESIDING 010.FICER (Mr. HUDDLESTON) . The Chair is advised the Senator is correct. Mr. HELMS. I thank the Chair. I ask unanimous consent that, with the right of the Senator from Idaho protected as stipulated in that tuaanimous-consent agreement, I be permitted to yield to my distinguished colleague from North Carolina (Mr. MORGAN) . The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. MORGAN. I thank my distin- guished colleague from North Carolina. Mr. President, I wanted to take this opportunity to make some observations concerning the matter that is before the Senate, and also to repeat some observa- tions that I had made recently concern- ing our foreign policy. While I think sometimes we are at- tempting to conduct the foreign policy of this country for and on behalf of the President rather than by consulting and advising with the President, I do believe that the debate today has been as infor- mative and helpful as any debate that I have heard on foreign policy since I have been in the Senate. I was especially pleased this morning to hear the very enlightened discussion by the distinguished Senator from Illi- nois (Mr. STEVENSON) , and I think per- haps his point of view might be a satis- factory solution to the question that is before us. Mr. President, I believe this: Notwith- standing all of the oratory and the de- bate, the problem facing us when we turn to foreign policy is, in my opinion, very easy to define. There are only a small number of alternatives involved. We can take up the call of isolationism, pull back our initiatives, and ignore the world. As the distinguished Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MeGoymusi) pointed out with a quotation from a news colum- nist this morning, if we lost Angola "We still have the Atlantic Ocean between us." As he read that ouotation to the Sen- ate, I thought it rather ironic that I had in my pocket at that time a quotation frm the January 22, 199. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, that I had copied this morning. It was a similar statement by a very dis- tinguished and able former U.S. Senator. It referred, of course, to the debate then involving our rendering of aid and assistance to our European allies after Hitler had taken several countries in Europe. So it, too, involved a debate on foreign policy. In essence, this is whqt that distin- guished Senator had to say: The United States need not and shall not be involved. We have an isolated location, and it is still isolated in spite of all of the Improvements in air transportation. That was as late as January 22, 1939. But, Mr. President we found later that Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 S 22800 er? Approved For R " e6greaRs1i/N11,: gl&RIFil7MR.E\114M00400100BM:lmber 18, 1975 14 We were not as isolated as that distin- guished Senator had thought on that day in 1939. And I would suggest that we are not as isolated today as the quotation by the distinguished Senator from South Dakota this morning would tend to in- dicate. In other words, if we take up the call of isolationism, we can turn the world over to the Communists, for both the Soviet Union and China are expansionist nations. Each wants to expand as far as possible its sphere of influence. Russia's domination of Eastern Europe and China's domination of eastern Asia are today almost accomplished facts. Only a pitiful few nations in both parts of the World have been able to maintain their independence, and even they are in con- stant jeopardy. The Soviet Union and China have no compunction about aiding Communist Movements throughout the world. And original although my remarks were pre- pared 2 or 3 months ago, Mr. President, I thought it interesting to note that in the debate this morning it was pointed out that when the Belgians granted inde- pendence to the Congo, the Russians were just as quick to move in then as they have been in Angola now. It was pointed out this morning by the distinguished Senator from New York (Mr. JAvns), a very able man, that the Russians were kicked out of the Congo. If my knowledge of history and my recol- lection of recent events and investiga- tions by the Church committee serve me correctly, I rather suspect that the rea- son why the Russians were kieked out of the Congo was largely the covert action of Our Government in the support and encouragement given to that govern- ment. So I am not so sure that, if the Soviet .Union decides to maintain its position in Angola and wedo abandon it, the people Of that nation will be able to rid them- selves of the Soviet influence alone. I doubt that any nation in Africa has removed that influence walling some en- couragement and assistance from those who stand and resist the expansionist programs of the Communist nations. If we should choose in this country to abandon democratic movements in the third world, the Communist movements are sure to succeed. As a matter of fact, these Communist countries are always ready to oppose any movement in the world that seems sympathetic to the Western ideals of freedom. Angola is now the most obvious ex- ample. There we already have heard what the Soviet Union has done to foment strife and trouble and to domi- nate at least 30 percent of the population of that country as the Portuguese have moved out. Communists are indeed persistent ad- versaries and, if we should choose isola- tionism as a policy, these adversaries will quickly move into any vacuum our isola- tionism creates. Of course, isolationism is an extreme position. Its other extreme is antagonism. At times we Americans have also adopted this policy. We did it at the coldest part of the cold war. We opposed almost every move or every initiative of the Soviet Union and the Chinese. In large part our efforts were mostly and highly success- ful. Our efforts Maintained the freedom of Greece, Italy, Turkey, West Berlin, and South Korea, among Others. We heard discussed in the secret ses- sion ways in which we helped these coun- tries maintain their freedom. I suggest to the Senate and to my col- leagues everywhere that had our actions in Italy after World War II been made public before they took place they would have been totally ineffective and that country would have succumbed to com- munism shortly after World War II. But this policy also got us into two land wars in Asia. As we all know, one was fought to an inconclusive result and the other was lost entirely. It was this extreme position and the difficulties we were having making it wbrk that has led, I believe, to the strained isolationism that we now find in our so- ciety today. Unfortunately, one failure seems to erase all of our successes. Hav- ing been bitten by one dog, so to speak, we now refuse to approach any other. We seem willing to abandon even longstanding commitments. Our oppo- nents are not so shallow. Defeats do not deter their initiatives. To them any op- portunity is an opportunity for success. That they have often failed is not a de- terrent. Failure to them is but a tempo- rary setback. To us it seems to be the end. It is inconceivable to me that we should withdraw so completely. It seems Moon- ceiyable to me that we should have so little faith in the ability of our ideas. We made this Nation into a model of freedom and prosperity. Do we now feel that our position is too weak to propagate? Do we now feel ?that others cannot benefit from the freedoms which have been ours to enjoy? Why are we willing to surrender them to Communist totalitarianism? It seems to me that some in our society may be panicking. I suggest, Mr. Presi- dent, our pride in this country has suf- fered more than our position. We are still the most powerful Nation in the world. Whether we want it or not, the position of leadership in the world has been thrust upon this?Nation. I have heard today in the Chamber of this Senate the suggestion that, if the freedom of Angola is so important, why do we not call upon our NATO allies to carry the burden of maintaining and bringing freedom there? I say, Mr. President, I would feel much better about it if our good friends in Western Europe were to assume more of a role of leadership in protecting free- dom around the world. But because they fail to carry their part of the burden, are we also going to fail in the role of leadership that has been thrust upon us by the high ideas that we believe in and the success that has been ours? How I remember, Mr. President. the words of that young dynamic new Pres- ident, John F. Kennedy, as I stood here in the snow in 1961 and listened to his Inaugural address and heard him say words to this effect. I do not remember them verbatim and I do not have them here, but it was something to this effect: Let every nation- know, whether it wishes Us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, sup- port any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty. Have we in this country forgotten those great principles to which we com- mitted ourselves on that cold January day here in 1961? Because we badly handled our last con- frontation in Vietnam, are we now to say that we no longer will offer encourage- ment and aid to those who have the cour- age and the stamina to stand up and resist Communist aggression and expan- sionism wherever it is to be found in the world? I say that there is no reason for free- dom-loving Americans to abandon the Third World totalitarianism, for if we do we are not only isolationists, we shall find ourselves isolated. So what alternative remains? If we are to be neither isolationists nor all-out antagonist, where can we stand? The answer obviously is somewhere between the two. The trouble with being all-out antagonist is that each confrontation brings the world to the brink of a nuclear war, and no person in his right mind can countenance that possibility. So I think, Mr. President, that d?nte with great powers seems inevitable. I like to think of d?nte as meaning the im- provement of our relations with other nations, with Russia. I believe we should have approached it more cautiously than we did. But if we are to avoid this kind of confrontation, I do not believe we can rule out the question of d?nte. I heard earlier in the debate that we simply should cut off all aid to the Afri- can nation of Angola and say to the So- viet Union, "If you don't get out, we will have no more SALT talks. We will sell you no more wheat." We will rebuild, in effect, the Iron Curtain. I suggest, Mr. President, that rekin- dling the hostilities that formerly existed between the Soviet Union and this coun- try may very well generate and create more dangers for our Nation than the matter we are considering now. We sim- ply cannot go to war with the Soviet Un- ion or with Communist China. The de- struction that would result is simply too horrible to contemplate. I think that no one in his right mind can advocate such a position. But this does not mean that we should become isolationists. I suggest that we are turning inward at this point, although I am sure that many of my colleagues will disagree with me. But we cannot become isolationist in this country. The Third World is fer- tile ground for the growth of freedom and democracy, and both overt and co- vert forms of influence are available to us. There is no reason in the world why we should not use our influence to direct the course of history in the Third World. To me, it seems immoral not to do so. If we truly believe that if men are born with an inalienable right, we must be- lieve that Africans and Asians are born with it, and we cannot agree to any at- tempt to alienate them. Freedom is too precious to abandon. It is precibus here; it is precious there; it is precious every- where. Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 4 December 18, 1 roved For_Release,2nalili/nA wiNuKt5-1131NIAI: -itteairt3D-EWPRIS4R000400100018-1 S 22801 Recent criticisms of our attempt to steer the course of history in the third vorld has led many to think that we should abandon this meaningful alter- native. Some are arguing that we should only involve ourselves in the internal af- fairs of another cotIntry when it is essen- tial to our national interests. From this premise they argue that since the affairs of the Congo?Zaire?are not essential to our national interests, we should not have become involved in the eatly 1960's In the Congo; that since the affairs of Chile are not essential to our national Interests, we should not have become in- volved in Chile; and that since the affairs of Portugal and Angola are not essential to our national interest, we should not have become involved in Angola. So far as the Third World countries are concerned, it is perhaps also possible to argue that any particular nation's affairs are not essential to our Nation's Interest. Of course, what goes on in the Congo, taken by itself, has little, if any, effect on our national interest; and the same can be said of Chile, Portugal, An- gola, and any- of the other Third World nations. But I suggest that we cannot consider each nation by itself when con- sidering what is and what- is not in our national interest; for when dealing with the Communist world, we have to deal With it collectively. Although the Congo?or Zaire, as it is now called? Chile, Portugal, and Angola individually have little, if any, bearing on our national interest, if we permit each Third World nation to go Communist, the result Indeed will be detrimental to our na- tional interest. For the result would be an isolated America, buffeted by the winds of a united Communist world, maintain- ing its freedom only by the threat of nu- clear war, cut off from natural resources and trading partners?in short, one free nation surrounded by a totalitarian world. Boy long does one think we can survive in that kind of situation? The answer is obWous enough. The freedom of men will have been relegated to history. But, believe me, freedom is much too precious to be lost by default. Foreign policy is an important ingredient in our overall national program. It is a defense not only for our shores, but also the shores of other democratic Third World nations. We must do what we can to preserve the freedom of the world; for we shall find that one free country in the world--mirs--cannot survive alone. An isolated country is sure to be only a tem- porary bastion of freedom. It is our one sure road to destruction, and I sincerely hope that we do not follow it. Mr. President, the debate before this body now, in my opinion, is a debate on more than the question of whether or not we shall give another $25 million or$30 million of military aid and assistance to Angola. I conclude my remarks by saying, Mr. President, that the remarks I made, es- sentially, were prepared a long time ago. I thought of making them several times. But it is a question that has bothered me. I do not understand how the President can carry out his constitutional obliga- tions and duties of conducting foreign policy in a fishbowl. Of course, the American people have a right to know. But, Mr. President, many of the things that are going on in Government we in Congress must hold in trust for the American people. The present crisis was not handled by the President in a vacuum. Appropriate committees of Congress were kept in- formed. I was informed as a member of one of the committees. Nevertheless, I think it is well that the question has been debated. I am not sure, at this moment, how I would vote on the Tunney amendment, as amended by the distinguished Senator from New York. I have mixed emotions. I think it would be catastrophic in a way if we say to the President of the United States, "You cannot do anything else for the preservation of freedom in Angola." It would say to those brave individuals? and I am sure there are thousands of them?Who thought they were going to have freedom, "You cannot look to your friends across the way for any more help." It would also serve notice, in my opinion, to others seeking freedom and seeking to maintain their freedom around the world that they possibly could not look to this great Nation for assist- ance in preservation of their freedom. No one would argue or contend for one moment that we should even commit one troop to that conflict. The President has made that clear, and I voted for the Griffin amendment this afternoon for the purpose of reiterating that. But where do we draw the line? I am sure that is the same question that many of those who have been looking to us are asking tonight. I have detected, in recent weeks, a definite crumbling away of support for our courageous and brave friends in Israel. Without our support, that free nation cannot survive. 'On the other hand, I have agonized over the thought that maybe it is best to adopt this amendment in this par- ticular debate, for if it is not adopted, it will surely be a political issue in next year's campaign to stir the emotions of the American people?much as the de- bate in the last campaign involved a question of our foreign policy. So, I may very well vote for it; I do not know, realizing the dangerous conse- quences of it. I was particularly impressed this morn- ing with the very calm and deliberate? and I might say one of the few calm and deliberate discussions e this issue before the Senate of the distinguished Senator from Illinois (Mr. STEVENSON). It seems to me that he has approached it in a logical manner, considering the consequences both ways. I have joined with Senator STEVENSON in sponsoring his resolution, although it may never come to a vote because of the rules. But it seems to me that if we really do believe in the United Nations, this might be the proper route for us to follow. ?It involved more than immediately calling on the United Nations to con- demn, not just one nation for becom- ing involved, but all nations that are in- volved. As I recall the resolution, it called for a cessation of assistance while this matter was brought to the attention of the United Nations and while our lead- ers begin to work and negotiate with the leaders of the Soviet Union. It seems to me that this is an honorable and perhaps the most effective way out of the di- lemma in which we find ourselves. Finally, it has been suggested that we ought not to assist the two factions in Angola because they are also being as- sisted by other nations whose ideologies do not agree with ours, other nations who violate human.rights. But I mention also that the African nations did not condemn that nation, although I do not understand and I do not think anyone does, just how much inir.olvement there is. But is there a na- tion on the face of the Earth that has violated human rights and dignity more than the Soviet Union? We know of the Indignities and the persecution that are being endured by the Soviet Jews. I had a Jewish lady in my office last week who had emigrated from Russia to Israel with her little girl, bringing me information of her husband, who is con- fined in prison in the Soviet Union. That was information which indicated beyond any doubt, to me, that her husband is enduring the most trying hardships that any human being can endure. So I say, Mr. President, that no nation has in- fringed upon the rights of its citizens more than the Soviet Union and, not- withstanding the Helsinki Agreement, we know that the document which guar- anteed to the citizens of Europe the right to travel freely was nothing more to the Soviet Union than empty promise and a worthless piece of paper. Even the great winner of the Nobel prize was unable to leave that country. So, Mr. President, I suggest this is, per- haps, the most serious matter or certain- ly one of the most serious matters that has been before this body during the 11 months I have been privileged to serve in this body. It is one that this body should not approach emotionally and uncompromisingly. It is one we should try to resolve together for the best in- terests of America and the best interests of free men and women everywhere. Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. STONE). The clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk pro- ceeded to call the roll. Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask un- animous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. STONE) . Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask un- animous consent that James Lucier of my staff be granted privilege of the floor during the consideration of this amend- ment and any votes thereon. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask it be in order for me to ask for a quorum call protecting the previously stated rights of the Senator from Idaho. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered. Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 S 22802 Approved For zi3migglowgi :/affiguiggimili000Lloolontmber Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a,quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. McCLURE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. McCLURE. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from North Carolina for protecting my right to the floor under the unanimous consent that we had previously agreed upon. As I think most Merribers of the Sen- ate are aware, there has been for the last hour and 45 minutes a meeting, at- tempting to find a resolution of the prob- lem we are now confronted with. That meeting has not been completed 41 and discussions are continuing. While those Members are involved in that meeting and further discuss the possible solution that might be applied to the question that has been pending before the Senate at this time and also the parliamentary problem which con- fronts the Senate in dealing with this possible solution, I think it might be useful to discuss for a few minutes some of the arguments that have been raised and have only been partially discussed thus far in the open sessions. There have been a number of Sena- tors who have remarked that they are afraid that this involvement in Angola and Its progression portended another Vietnam, that somehow we will be sucked into another Vietnam. Yet the Senator from New York' (Mr. JAVITS) very prop- erly remarked Yesterday that the Griffin amendment was unnecessary. The Grif- fin amendment today was defeated, be- -cause of the arguments that it was un- necessary because of the passage of the War Powers Act which makes it impossi- ble for us to get sucked into another Vietnam in the same way that we es- calated through assistance, through ad- visers, through military advisers and then directly into troop involvement; that is not possible any longer under the War Powers Act. I think the fears which have been expressed, and I think legitimate fears expressed by a number of the Members of the Senate, that we might thus be progressing into another Vietnam is an inaccurate reflection of a very real fear, not in technical terms of being sucked Into another Vietnam, but in the way of an escalation of involvement. I think that is possible under what we are talking about. I think if we confine it to those terms we will understand the concerns that people are expressing when they use that terminology. We not only have the War Powers Act, but we also have on the record the state- ment of the President of the United States and of the Secretary of State very clearly saying that no troops will be com- mitted; that that is absolutely impossible. So 'we are not talking about precisely following the escalation of involvement In Angola in the same way we did in Vietnam. It has been suggested by some that we should not be involved as we are with the 'factions that we are simply because South, Africa is also involved. Well, I think that is an equal paranoia with those who charge others with wanting to be involved on the opposite side of the Soviet Union no matter where they are er why. I think just to be uninvolved be- cause South Africa is involved is equally blind as to be involved simply because the Soviet Union is. I am concerned, Mr. President, that In the consideration of our policy here we have not adequately reflected on the problems that deal with Soviet aims, goals, and penetration in Africa. Earlier in closed session I made reference to the situation that exists on. the other side of Africa, on the Indian Ocean side, in Somalia. It has been suggested here that we do not need to fear Soviet presence in An- gola, because they are fiercely national- istic: that the black African countries are so nationalistic that Soviet presence is an impossibility. Yet, what is the fact in Somalia? Are they less nationalistic than other Afri- can countries? Is there anyone who really believes that the leadership in Somalia is less inclined to be concerned about the maintenance of their independence than other black African nations are? The fact is that there is a Russian military base in Somalia, at Berbera. In July of this last year I had the privilege of participating with several other Members of the Senate in a delega- tion meeting in Moscow with the lead- ers of the Soviet Union. That delegation was led by the distinguished Senator from Minnesota? (Mr. HUMPHREY) and the distinguished Senator from New York (Mr. JAvrrs) . Others; including Senator MORGAN, were present in that delegation. As I recall, on the second day of July we sat across the table from some of our counterparts in the Supreme Soviet, the leaders of that country in fact as well as in name. The question was directly asked about the allegations of a Soviet military presence and base in Somalia. They just ridiculed that. They were sitting less than 5 feet away from me when they did, right across the table. They laughed at the suggestion that they were involved. All they were doing at Berbera was helping the Somalia Gov- ernment build a port facility for com- mercial port reasons. Three or 4 days later the distinguished Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. )3ARTLETT) was present in that country with a group from our Government inspecting the facilities on the ground and from the air in Berbera. Our delegation happened at that time to have moved on to Leningrad, in the Soviet Union. The Senator from Oklahoma has re- ported to the Senate and to the country by written report that their inspection revealed not only the presence of Soviet military personnel in Berbera, but the construction of what is obviously a mis- sile-handling facility in Somalia. The President of that country had as- sured our delegation that they could have access to anything they wanted to 1,8, 1975 see. There were no areas in his country that were off limits. The delegation could go anywhere they wanted and look at anything they wanted to look at in Ber- bera to satisfy themselves. The Senator from Oklahoma reported to the Senate and to the country that as they followed his charge to look, and the guarantee of the President of that country that they could look at any- thing, they were denied access to certain areas in Berbera; that they went to the gates of the barbed wire enclosures and were met with soldiers with guns leveled at them from behind sandbags who said, "You will not enter here." The Senator's response was, "The President told us we could see anything we wanted to see. Why can we not enter here?" They said, "You cannot enter here, because this is a Soviet base." Yet, 3 or 4 days before I had been sit- ting across the table from the leaders of the Soviet Union in Mopcow and they had told us there was nothing to those rumors or charges. So I do not think we can just brush aside the consideration of whether or not there will be expanded Soviet military operations based in Angola simply on the basis that these countries are fiercely nationalistic or that we have no proof they want to build a military base in An- gola. I believe it is a possibility. I believe it is a consideration that ought to be included in the evaluation of our policy concern- ing Angola. From our discussions, both in open sepsion and in closed session, I be- lieve it is fair to say that, based upon the evidence, we have not even considered that fact. We should have considered that fact. The committees and those individuals who have suggested to us we should ter- minate involvement in Angola ought to be able to tell the Senate, and ought to be able to tell the people of this country, they have considered that fact, and they have decided after mature consideration of that possibility further involvement in Angola is not justified. They cannot make that statement. In fairness, I would think they would agree with me they have not tried to make that statement to us, because they have not considered that possibility. I am concerned, too, that the sugges- tion is made that we shall confine our new programing money and covert activ- ity to intelligence gathering alone. I as- sume that if we are going to do that, if we are going to be consistent, we are going to say that is true wherever we are in- volved; we are not going to enter into co- vert military assistance to any country. Maybe the Members of this body who have been suggesting that will make a distinction. Maybe they will make the distinction that we should confine the reprogramed or covert activities to in- telligence gathering and intelligence in- formation activities, and that only in the event of a positive action of Congress shall we engage in military supply any- where in the world. I think that kind of a policy might be very wisely adopted by Congress. I be- Approved For Release '2001/11/01: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 I. FobtIMOVAI.A1[01z:klaid9P7grAlitiR000400100018-1 December 18, A?groved S 22803 lieve that is a policy which I could sup- port. But it has not been presented to us ' as a general pOlIcy for the Congress of the United States or the Government of the United States. It has been presented- to us as a policy which applies only to Angola. I have to ask myself, why? What ra- tional distinction has been made which says that in this instance this shall be our policy, but in other instances it is not our policy? I think we must be concerned about the implications that that will have if, - indeed, the distinction I have suggested is not the reason why they are Making that policy statement. If, without that distinction, it is to be our policy that we will supply money to acquire informa- tion 'to guide our own decisions, then I would suggest that that same kind of de- cisionmaking process will apply also in the Middle East. And what does that do to the commitments that we have under- taken with respect to Israel as well as to other countries in the Middle East? Are we, by that application of policy pursued on a broader scale, then, to confine our- selves to intelligence gathering and in- formational processes, and are we going to say, then, to other countries in the Middle East, "There will be no military assistance from henceforth from the Congress of the United States and the people of the United States?" If that is to be our policy, or that is the implication of those who seek in this Instance to initiate that policy, then I think we had better know it now. And if it is not, then I suggest we had better know what the rational distinction is that keeps that from being the policy that wpuld be applied in the Middle East as well as in Africa. Mr. President, I am concerned, too, when we get into the question of how our policy and our involvement in Africa may affect the relationships between national groups in Africa. It is suggested by some, If I understand their arguments cor- rectly, that we must not be involved in Angola because to do so will inflame the racial tensions in Southern Africa. Yet It seems to me that a hasty application of the Tunney amendment to this bill and the signal that that would be to the Soviet Union to increase its penetra- tion in Angola and in Southwest Africa could very well lead to a worsening of racial relations, not because of the ac- tion we took there, but because of the action we take here. Why do I say that? Mr. President, I think it is obvious from the statements that have been made by the people who are involved in this debate in Angola? not in the arguments made here, not in the arguments made in NATO councils, but in arguments made by people within Angola itself?that the institution of rule by the segment of society being backed by the Soviet Union could lead to the extinction of terrorist activities aimed at a change of internal political policies in Southwest Africa, in Rhodesia, and in South Africa, and we would see across those borders the beginning of the flow of terrorist activities in much the same way we have seen it across the borders of Israel, which has exacerbated the very difficult situation that exists there, and that has made it almost impossible for us to reach a resolution of the political or military situation in the Middle East, and we would see across the borders of these countries the beginning of a guerrilla warfare which is directed toward a change of racial balance, and therefore becomes a very real addition to racial tensions in the entire region of South- western Africa. I think, Mr. President, that rather than contributing to the easing of racial tensions, we might very well, by this action, exacerbate the racial tensions that exist already in that area of the world. And when we start looking 'at the question of, "Well, will the United States be alined itself against black African countries if we continue the policy which is the policy of the United States today," I think it is well that we look toward the best evidence of what may occur in the minds of Africans by looking at their statements. I think the Senate ought to look at the content of the debate that occurred in the United Nations on December 10, just a week ago yesterday. That debate, which took place over a resolution which had originally been devised to condemn the policies of racial separation in South 'Africa. had been changed suddenly in its character by a resolution offered by the Soviet Union as an amendment to that resolution, which would have condemned South Africa's intervention in the in- ternal affairs of Angola. One difference, though, from the statements that have been made here on the floor of the Senate in the last 2 days, is that that would have had automatic unquestioning support of all black Afri- can nations, who condemn South Africa for their intervention in Angola. But what was the fact? What did actually happen? The Soviet Union did not succeed in their condemnation of South Africa in that instance, becaus^ other black Af- rican nations very quickly pointed out that South Africa was not the only country, even the major offender, in the intervention in internal affairs in Angola, that the Soviet Union itself was the major offender in the intervention, and the black African nations presented an amendment to that resolution which would have condemned all foreign in- tervention in Angola; and in the debate on that amendment it was clear that they were talking about the interven- tion of the Soviet Union. The debate raged. I have transcripts of the debate that took plate at thit time. The arguments were raised by various of the black African nations in support of and in opposition to the amendment which was offered by the representative of the Government of Zaire, condemn- ing all foreign intervention in Angola, to exclude that resolution which the So- viet Union had offered which would have condemned only South Africa but to include the condemnation of the So- viet Union's activities in Angola, and that debate makes very interesting reading for those who are concerned about black Africans' reactions to for- eign intervention in Angola. The upshot or the final result of that debate was that both of the amend- ments were withdrawn. They were with- drawn after the Soviet Union amend- ment was rejected on a vote of 42 to 43 with 43 abstentions. If those who believe that the black African reaction to the intervention in Angola must be so uniformly adverse to the position that we have taken, I in- vite them to look at that action taken in the United Nations and to take a look at the debate that took place and to consider the vote that occurred only a week ago yesterday in the United Na- tions in New York, because I think it begins to paint a very different picture of black Africans' reactions to foreign intervention in Angola. For those who wish a little bit more background about that debate and the meaning of that debate, I invite the at- tention of Members to an article that appeared in the New York Times on the 11th of December which is entitled "Moynihan Accused in U.N. on Angola." But the point which I refer occurs in the third paragraph in that article by John F. Burns. I read from that article this portion: Diplomats in touch with the sponsors of the amendment which was supported by the Soviet Union and opposed by the United States said that it had been withdrawn when it became apparent It could not win a ma- jority of votes in the assembly. I also call attention of the Senate to the article that appeared in the Wash- ington Post on Thursday, December 11, just 1 week ago today, a bylined article by Victor Vorza, entitled "A New Wave of Soviet Expansionism." He points to a couple of matters which are of par- ticular interest in our discussion of pol- icy in Angola, and let me read briefly from that article: The relaxation of international tensions. Pravda says, has been a powerful force be- hind the new upsurge in the struggle for the total liberation of peoples, and Commu- nist Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko explains that that support of national lib- eration forces is an extremely important sec- tor of our foreign policy work. At another point in the same article, Mr. Vorza makes this comment: But if the Kremlin is allowed to get away with it. Angola may prove to be only the be- ginning of a new drive to expand Soviet power under the cover of detente and not just in the third world. If Members wish further material and editorial comment in regard to this situ- ation, I suggest that they read the edi- torial that appeared in the Washington Post on the 15th of December in which, among other things, the editorial had this to say: In the United Nations the other day, for instance, the 'Russians suffered a smart set- back, one of their first of this sort in years, when the bottom fell out from under a pro- posed amendment that would have ignored Soviet intervention and condemned only the Angolan role of South Africa whose in- tervention is at once much smaller than Moscow's and more justified. Mr. President, I think it is important for us to note this course of events and Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 S 22804 ? 'alb ^ ? Approved FobnansM1411{96. 1611.1?_P7R.1MR000400119Pelkger 18, 1975 the commentary on the events by people who have been much closer to it and I hope more informed by it than has been the case for many Members of the Senate of the United States: There is another factor that needs to be considered as we look at the motiva- tions of the emerging countries. I agree with the statement that has been made in the Chamber of this Senate that no foreign power is going to have great success in penetrating the govern- ments of any of the African countries if they do not use force. But if they are willing to use force or if they are willing to use enough economic aid to buy their way in, they can, in some instances, be successful in either subverting the gov- ernment or turning that government's interests toward their own interests. Why is it that the Soviet Union has failed in many of its overtures to emerg- ing countries in the past? I think it can be rather clearly stated because these countries that are throwing off the yoke of colonialism are not willing to substi- tute one colonial master for another. I think, as the colonial empires grew start- ing late in the 17th century and through the 18th and 19th centuries and were used for economic exploitation of the col- onized areas of the world, these people threw off that yoke in order to seek not only political freedom but economic op- portunity for their people. - Their experience when they have fallen within the Soviet orb has been that they get neither political freedom nor eco- nomic progress. To the extent that they are within the Soviet orb, they find themselves exploited in exactly the same way that they felt themselves exploited under the colonial empires of the preceding century. The new colonialism of the Soviet expansionism has been all too evident to the people who have lived under it. Witness the course of events in country after country where the Soviet Union moved in as colonial powers moved out. We will find that those countries got only one thing from the Soviet Union: mili- tary support, military goods, and they paid for them. They paid for them in whatever resources they had at prices which were very favorable to the Soviet Union. Analyze case after case after case of countries that have gone that route, tasted that cup, and discarded it be- cause they found that, although they could get military supplies to fight against colonial oppression, they could get military supplies to fight over who should control the new country, and they could get military supplies to subvert the governments of adjacent areas or to dis- rupt the political stability in the region in which these countries are located, they could not get any meaningful economic assistance and no real economic growth occurred for them. So country after country after country, having gone through that evolution, has turned away from the help of the Soviet Union and toward a greater and freer economic coordination with the Western powers. They do not seek to substitute for the Soviet Union a different master in any Western power or Western alli- ance, but they seek opportunity of eco- nomic growth and social betterment for their own people. That is their motiva- tion and a very proper motivation. So I am in agreement with Members of this body who have suggested that the Soviet Union might well be walking into a morass in Angola, a morass from which they would find it difficult to extricate themselves with any great gain, and they might very well fail in their efforts to subvert either Angola for a very long period of time or larger areas of Africa for any substantial period of time. But we have not yet decided, and I do not think we can decide, how much the So- viet Union is willing to invest in that effort, how much they are willing to in- vest economically, how much they are willing to invest from the standpoint of prestige, how much they are willing to invest in terms of military involvement. They can, if they desire, make great penetration and great inroads into the political independence of various areas of this world, as they have shown a will- ingness to invest. We may not be talking about evolution in which a government, having tasted from the cup of economic cooperation with the Soviet Union, dis- dards it. We may be seeing the kind of situation in which the Soviet Union feels it is worthwhile to them to Invest mili- tarily a sufficient force to gain a rela- tively long-term political-military dom- inance of an area, as they did in Eastern Europe. We know the sad litany of the coun- tries that have been subverted by the strength of Soviet military might in an area where the Soviet Union felt that it was worthwhile to make that invest- ment. And they have done so. I was interested earlier this afternoon as the very able Senator from Oregon (Mr. PACKWOOD) was talking about the price they paid for their involvement in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and they have indeed paid a price, in terms of the reaction of peoples in other countries of Europe. But that was a price, presum- ably, that they were willing to pay, in exchange for the gains they made in those countries during that period of time and during the period cif time since the revolution in Hungary and the at- tempts by the people of Czechoslovakia to gain independence over their own in- ternal political processes. Mr. President, I think there are a num- ber of reasons why we must be concerned about the evolution of a policy in Angola that may have long-lasting and far- reaching effects upon riot just one small black African country. I was interested in some of the com- ments that were made in the debate in the United Nations to which I made reference earlier that touched on the question of the reactions of black peo- ples to domination by foreign countries which are not black. I should like to read from the remarks by the representative Of the Government of Zaire at that time, because I believe they shed light on the attitudes of black nations. I make this reservation as I read from those remarks: They are translations, obviously, and I apologize for any inac- curacy in the translation. I hope the translation is accurate enough to reflect the truth of the statements made by the representative of the Government of Zaire in those debates. He said this: In certain quarters it is believed that Zaire is against the MPLA. We are not. The first shot fired against the Portuguese colonial administration did not come from the Soviet Union but from Zairean national territory, and in the first hours of the MPLA, where was NATO? Is there a desire deliberately to ignore the history of the national liberation movements in Angola? The Soviet Union believes itself to be the champion and the savior of Angola. At a time when the Portuguese colonial ad- ministration was rampaging in Angola, where were the armored cars, the tanks, and the sophisticated weaponry with which the So- viet Union is now flooding Angola? No doubt Soviet weapons could not be seen to be used against the Portuguese rights. This is racism stood on its head. And now they are dividing Angolan brothers, providing them with murderous weapons and helping them to kill each other. They are black, so they can kill each other. But when the white Portuguese were there, we did not see such weapons coming into Angola. Whom are they trying to deceive? Why play hide and seek? At another point, later, he said: And if the Soviet Union, that great friend of independent Africa, were really as friendly as all that, it could take into account the decisions of our heads of state on the African continent. I think it is very clear, Mr. President. that the black African nations, them- selves, do not share the same fears about our involvement in Angola as has been stated and do not see our involvement in the same light as some of the Members of the U.S. Senate see it in terms of their own statements here today. Let me make just one additional refer- ence to the pending resolution of the Senator from Illinois (Mr. STEVENSON). I made reference to that resolution earlier today and pointed out to the Members that it can be found on page S22539 of the RECORD of yesterday. I have two con- cerns with the resolution as presented by the able Senator from Illinois. ' First, it has a number of preamble clauses, and then in the resolution por- tion there are six paragraphs. The first five paragraphs refer to a number of items that can be found in sequence, and the sixth item is the one to which I want to refer, because it says: The President should suspend further as- sistance to any faction in Angola pending ef- forts to seek an end to all foreign interven- tion in Angola. I think that has an inversion in the language of the resolution, an inversion that I hope the Senator from Illinois will correct. If that and a couple of other items in the resolution are changed, it would make it possible for me to support the resolution, because I think the Sen- ator from Illinois did not intend that we do nothing, awaiting this kind of action on the part of the withdrawal of those people who are now involved in Angola. He did not intend, I should think, to say that we will do nothing until we say that they have withdrawn. Instead, I think it would be more con- structive to say that as they withdraw, we will react; and if they do not with- draw, we will apply these sanctions. But, pending that period of time, we will not Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 December 19, Saii-oved Forctopmggpign inedmag ezwpmwo 00400100018-1 Veto actiokif the legislation does not conform exactly to the wishes of the Secretary of Tsportation. Mr. Presidentthe committee has held hearings for hal/ a year on this legisla- tion,\ and has r eived the advice of countless experts b th within the Gov- ernment and outsid the Government. The bill is the product' f this exhaustive process, and in the op on of both my- self and the ranking ml?ity member of the subcommittee, is fkr superior to the proposals of the De artment of Transportation. If we are g? to per- mit these kinds of threats to etermine the substance of legislation, R is my opinion that we should just pl e the administration's request legislat on the consent Calendar, dispense wit re- ferring it to committee, do away with e studies that have been conducted these issues by the Office of Technolog Assessment and outside consultants, and pass whatever Secretary Coleman demands of us. We have come a long way in meeting the administration's demands on this legislation, and the conference yesterday made substantial further adjustments designed to come more than halfway on all the major issues dividing us. The ad- ministration has yet to compromise on one major issue. If we simply allow the Congress of the United States to be push- ed around in this manner, it would rep- resent a negation of the entire legislative process. The legislation before the Sen- ate today is strongly supported by a tre- mendous hearing record and a volumin- ous report. The administration's de- mands are supported by nothing other than the political views of the Secretary of Transportation and the Office of Man- agement and Budget. I urge my collea- gues to demonstrate by their vote here today that the Congress will not be in- timidated by these threats and will not abandon reason and rationale in the face of a Secretary of Transportation or an Office of Management and Budget that make unsupported allegations and ir- responsible charges. If this legislation is enacted as the administration would like, it will do nothing other than provide the Secre- tary of Transportation with the total power to restructure the Nation's rail system without any public interest con- trols, and the executive branch would be given the complete and unfettered dis- cretion to control the funding and op- erations not only of the Northeast rail- roads, but of all railroads in the Nation. Aside from the problems that this would cause in the courts with respect to the question of whether Government has effectively nationalized the northeast and midwest rail system, it is my firm belief that it would be very detrimental to the railroad system of the entire Na- tion. It is not the judgment of the Sen- ate Commerce Committee that the American system works best by grantin total discretion to the executive branc to do whatever it pleases with respect a major sector of the Nation's traps- portation system. , If the pending rail legislation lj not enacted into law at once, at least 2- or 3-month delay of the long-planIed re- vitalization of Northwest rail service is Inevitable. Delay is costly to the taxpayer and the reorganization process. Grants to the Penn Central and other bankrupts must continue, at the rate of well over $1 million a day. These funds are lost forever. They result in no im- provements of service. Grant funds will run out by the sched- uled date for startup of ConRail under the final system plan, unless funds now dedicated to rehabilitation are repro- gramed. If new funding is not made available, there is a danger that rail service will terminate. The bankrupt railroads are now run- ning their operations on a going-out-of- business basis that threatens the integrity of the final system plan. They are assid- uously selling off properties and run- ning down inventories. Delay only feeds this process. ; \ Delay creates uncertainty that can; set plans for participation in the final' em plan of the Chessie System and 0th' solvent rail carriers. y means that advance planning for tr sfer of functions from the bafik- rupts ConRail and Chessie will be thrown to disarray and result in/extra costs. Delay w d cause a shutdown' of the advance reh ilitation program-,-section 215. This wo result in imme5fiate lay- offs of 3,000 e ployees and extra costs of some$300 mil n to ConRail. A lapse of serv e on some( commuter and light density lines, ginning as early as February robably will occur. Extended delay 1k s rtup of the plan may upset CqraMj financial per- formance and cake 4fusion as to whether the final sS, tein lan had been fully successful. N Delays also may add Ak, potential claims against the . United ,'Itz.tes for "erosion" of the asiets of the ankrupt estates. - \ Mr. President, I m ready to vote' '\ X would just 1 e to say that d1 ing the .\ e time of this onference we have ad the help of n alone some dedicat d members of th Commerce Committee it., self, but fro *staff members, both on the \ majority an minority side. I think it would be a ropriate for me to say this at this tim I do no now a man who has contrib- uted mo /e to the success of this legis- lation t an the Senator from Connecti- cut (I41. Weimea). He has been out- stand' g in his concern, his depth of un- derst nding, and his realization that what we are doing here is really provid- ing/for a massive reorganization on a pr ate enterprise basis of the railroad stem, and in our hope that we will not faced with this type of situation in e future. We know we have not cleared all the errors, but I will say this: Without Sen- ator WEICKER'S concern it would have been very difficult for us to pass this leg- islation in the form and in the positive stance which it has at the present time. I would also like to pay tribute to the staff members, particularly Lynn Sut- cliffe, general counsel; Tom Allison, Paul Cunningham, Mal Sterrett, Geoff Baker, S 23045 John Kirtland, and David Clanton for the work they have done. It has been one of the real joys to have People who have understanding and wis- dom and, at the same time, the ability to move with ,speed at a time when speed was needed.. It has been a real pleasure to work with these gentlemen. Mr. BELL. Mr. President, as a mem- ber of thp Surface Transportation Sub- committee and as a member of the con- ference , committee, I urge the Senate to approve S. 2718, the Railroad Revital- izatiou and Regulatory Reform Act. AO stated on December 4 when this measure passed the Senate, this is must legislation. It is simply imperative that we, move ahead and allow ConRail to take over as quickly as possible the op- ations of Penn Central. From what I ave heard, Penn Central is doing little, -except depleting inventories and contin- uing to allow its bankrupt operations to go farther down hill. S. 2718 seeks to stop this deterioration and not only to develop a viable rail system in the Northeast but also to assure a healthy rail network nationwide. Hopefully, the enactment of this bill will signal an end to an era of neglect for the Nation's railroads. Railroads had not only been victims of neglect, but also in many instances of public policy and regulatory action which worked against greater utilization of this energy effi- cient, ecologically sound, and safe transportation mode. S. 2718 would: First. Reform the regulatory system and the regulatory agency, the Inter- state Commerce Commission. One exam- ple is the expediting of railroad mergers and rationalization in order to avoid situations such as the Rock Island case which dragged out for over 10 years. Second. Implement the reorganization of the bankrupt railroads of the North- east. I am pleased that the conference committee included the Senate protec- tion against deficiency judgments. This provision was included by the Senate committee at my urging and is essential for the acquisition by Southern Railroad of the lines on Maryland's Eastern Shore. This important section of my tate thus will be able to count on serv- ic s by one of the Nation's outstanding ra oads. rd. Reaffirm the commitment by Con ss to the Northeast corridor proj- ect wh h Congress endorsed in the Re- gional il Act of 1973. This provision is designed to bring modern, first-rate transporta .on service to this heavily populated a a of the country. Projec- tions show in reased population growth and additional ravel requirements. Ex- isting transport tion systems will have difficulty accom dating such growth. Therefore, it beho s this Nation to get on with this project. t has been studied e. Delay today costs and in- enough. It is team ogically feasiable and economically via will mean only increase adequate transportation omorrow. Better ways to move peo. e in energy- efficient, environmentally sound, and safe ways must be given higher priority. The time to act is now?not when another energy crisis is upon us. Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 S 23046 ourth. Provide a subsidy for local rail lit service of 100 percent the first 90 percent the second, 80 percent ird, and 70 percent for the fourth th years. This will make certain State and/or local communities pers will be able to continue es which they deem vital. ndate continuation of rail erviees for 6 months with a fre yei the and that and s branch Fifth. commuter 100-percent federal subsidy for that pe- riod and forte succeeding 6-month pe- r, a subsidy of 90 percent for 1 year and 50 percent Year for State and local encfes willing to con- is provision is essen- rail commuter serv- roximately 500 pas- senger g between Bal more and Wash- ington, would be lost. 1un confident that With this provision ray State will be able to see that this impbrtant transpor- tation service will continue, and Sixth. Authorize a near, program to provide for the conversion a,f abandoned railroad rights-of-way to piablic use. S. 2718 the bill before thesSenate to- Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-- SENATE, December - IRollcall Vote NO. 609 Leg.] YEAS-51 Beall \ Hathaway Biden Hollings Brooke Iluddleston Buckley Humphrey Bumpers Inouye Burdick Jackson Case Javits Clark Kennedy Cranston Leahy Culver Long Durkin agnuison Ford caeo Glenn l4Govern Gravel Mklntyre Hart. Philip A. M calf Hartke /do dale Hat del d Mos NA S-29 Allen Hanse Baker Hart, Bartlett Haskell Bellmon Helms Byrd, Ilruska Harry F., Jr. Mansflel Byrd, Robert C. McClell rod. Thereaf Will be availabl for a succeedin transportation a Jamie this service. tial for otherwise t ice, which serves ap day, is complex legislation. Gi garitic problems and issues w measure addresses and the cri portance not only to the North else to the entire Nation of their tion, this is understandable. While S. 2'718 is not perfect, an comprehensive measure involving tnariy issues and interests could be, laeirertheless represents a Herculean e fort and should be supported by the Sen- ate. As I look back on our work, the process and procedures we mandated seemed to have worked well. I feel the office of Public counsel was particularly helpful alerting communities and shippers re- garding the act's impact on them and In helping them to prepare their cases. It was an open Process with inputs from many. Again, not perfect, but as fair and as open as seems humanly possible. , Of course, the final test of the wor remains ahead. ConRail has an increasft task confronting it. With the suppolt Provided in the bill and with new ma- ageriterit, there is reason for guarded ep- timism. In any event, we had little choices. ning. cated . I am ated in n the gi- ich this cal tru- st but solue, 110 SO The railroads had to be kept Nationalization, as a few ad would have been even more cost pleased and proud to have partic this historical and significant/effort. I urge the enactment of the ebnference report. ,g/ Mr. PERCY. Mr. Presiclen with some reservations I concluded I, should vote against the conference report on the Rail Services Act, S. 2718. While certain reductisins In outlays were achieved in confere*ce, I still main- tabs the bill authori4es expenditures beyond what I believe tO be prudent both k for improving vice from Boston District of Colum- PPorter of rail pas- eral and of .Amtrak with all the other iorities and our soar- et / feel compelled to With respect to Amt Northeast corrider s to New York and th bia. I am a strong senger serVice in g In particular. B Urgent funding irig Federal bu oppose spending which does not in et what I consider to be a prudent and fflly justifiable cost-benefit analyses.( I applaud the movement toward Com- promise but I do not believe we have trimmed to the proper level yet. I am disappointed that the Hoqse lan- guage with respect to certifi tes of value was largely retained. I be eve this is a serious flaw in that it pe its and may encourage years of litigation. The virtual assurance that man, of these suits Will not be decided a:a swiftly as would have been the case had the Senate language been accepted, I think will deter financial institutions/ from making capital available to our /railroads and, possibly, our utilities. Finally, I oppose giving authorities to the U.S. Railway AssOciation which I believe properly belo 'g in the Depart- m / ent of Transportati n. For these reasons will oppose the act as now drafted andt will vote to sustain the Presidential veto that is expected. Mr. WEICKERI Mr. President, I am prepared to yield/back the remainder of my time. I want to thank the distinguished Senator from." Indiana for his very gracious remarks about me. I also want to commend: Mal Sterrett and Geoff Baker who Worked hand-in-glove in a cooperative Way with the majority mem- bers of the itaff. I yield bAck the remainder of my time. Mr. HARTKE. I yield back the re- rnaindeabf my time. The PRESIDING OietsiC'ER. All time has b4etn yielded back. The question is On a eeing to the conference report. he yeas and nays have been ordered, ad the clerk will call the roll. e legislative clerk called the roll. r. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce tie the Senator from Indiana (Mr. AY , the Senator from Texas (Mr. 3ENTS N) , the Senator from Nevada (Mr. /CANN() the Senator from Florida (Mr. ' Crimes) the Senator from Missouri (Mr. EA LETON) , the Senator from Louisiani (Mr. JOHNSTON) , the Senator from New exico (Mr. Moarroya) , the Senator froIi Florida (Mr. STONE) , the Senator from ississippi ;Mr. EASTLAND) , the Senator kom South Dakota (Mr. ABOUREEK) , the enator from Mississippi (Mr. Smalls) , nd the Senator from Illinois (Mr. ST ESON) are necessarily absent. I also announce at the Senator from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH) \is absent on official business. On this vote, the Se ator from Illinois (Mr. STEVENSON) IS palrkd with the Sena- tor from Florida (Mr. S NE). If present and voting, the Senato from Illinois would vote "yea" and the enator from Florida would vote "nay." Mr. GRIFFIN. I announ e that the Senator from Tennessee ( . Baocx), the Senator from Kansas ( . DOLE) , the Senator from Arizona (Mr. ANNIN) , the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. FoxG) , the Senator from Arizona (Mr. OLD- WATER), the Senator from Nevada (Mr. LAxALT I, and the Senator from Mar and (Mr. MATHIAS) are necessarily absen The result was announced?yeas 1 nays 29,, as follows: 19, 1975 Curtis Domenici Garn Griffin Abourezk Bayh Bentsen Brock Cannon Chiles Church So the Mr. to reco McClur MorgaF Nunn Packyrood NOT VOTING-- 0 Muskie Nelson Pastore Pearson , Pell , Randolph / Rlbicoff .' Roth 1 Schwei Scott, ugh Spark an Staffotd Stev,ens Syington T ney Joker illiams Percy Proxmire Scott, William L. Taft Talmadge Thurmond Tower Young Dole E,Agleton Eastland iVannin / Fong y Goldwater Johnston. xalt thias M ntoya St nis Ste anion Sto nference report was a RTKE. Mr. President, sider the vote by which th ferenc report was agreed to. Mr WEICKER. I move to lay that tion on the table. e motion to lay on the table was eed to. r. PASTORE. May we have order, pilease, Mr. President. reed to. move Con- DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPRO- PRIATIONS, FISCAL YEAR 1976 The PRESIDING OrasiCER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now resume consideration of H.R. 9861, which the clerk will state by title. The legislative clerk read as follows: Amendment in disagreement No. 75 to H.R. 9861, an act making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1976, and for the period beginning July 1, 1976, and ending Septem- ber 30, 1976, and for other pimposes. Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, let us have order. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ate will be in order. Senators will please take their seats. The Senator from Montana. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the leadership has been endeavoring all day to arrive at an agreement affecting the conference report on the defense ap- propriation and the amendment offered by the distinguished Senator from Cali- fornia (Mr. Tummy). We thought we had arrived at a rea- sonable solution by means of which the pending business would be laid aside and the Senate would then have the oppor- tunity to turn to the consideration of such measure as the 200-mile leigslation, in which the distinguished Senator from Washington (Mr. MAGNUSON) is so in- terested, and who has exerted so much Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 c'ember 19,Amyved For mmitiggiown: TGIAARInP77 muukxrcr, ?DAIMII000400100018-1 S 23047 pressure that I DM getting a bent back from Contacts with him. Then it was hoped that it would be possible to turn to H.R. 9852, the so- Called Mobile Housing Act, which has a time limitation. Then it was the intention of the lead- erShip, because of the pressure exerted by the distinguished Chairman of the Committee on Appropriations?low key, qUiet?that we would take up a bill to establish improved programs for the benefit of producers and consumers of rice. the proposed agreement we thought, wUld ave been the best way out of a Official situation, especially for the ad- Ministration. We would have turned to at least one and possibly two of these Other measures, and what we did not coMplete in that sphere would be taken lip the first thing on our return next January 19, the House willing to send us a resolution to that effect, which we do riot have at the present time. Tlje matter was discussed with the ;chairman and the ranking melnber of the Appropriations Committee, with the Itepublican leadership, with people in- tereated on both sides of the issue. It was impossible to reach an agree- ntent, and therefore we are faced with a tt,?Which only will allow for more allying on the part of the Senate. r. President, I think I have covered the main points. - Mr, IIITGH SCOTT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr, /vIANSFIELD. If I may, let me $41.11SkPlease. I think I have covered the *thain points In what I intended to say to the Senator at this time. I wish to say to the distinguished Senator from Wash- ling (Mr. MicicosoN) that I will make 'effort to bring up the 200-mile bill 'otirretUrn after the recess. I will make e plege to the distinguished Sen- or rom 'Arkansas (Mr. MCCLELLAN) .0bI1C0/11/19 the rice bill, and I will make tbe same *rinse to the distinguished Senator from Missouri (Mr. EAGLETON) concerning the mobile housing bill. I hope' that in this respect we will be able to advance the work of the Senate, and at this time I am glad to yield to my distinguished friend the Republican leader of the Senate. MOITYGH SCOTT. I thank the dis- tinguished majority leader. Mr. President in addition to much Other agonizing over this issue, about two dozen Senators spent nearly 4 hours yes- terdaY afternoon trying to arrive at a viable solution. There seems to me to be at least substantial majority sentiment for a proposal which would not have satisfied anyone entirely, I suppose, and certainly not satisfied everyone, but which at least would have allowed some raoVement in the area which the admin- istration seilght, really, very hard indeed to achieve; and I will say that the meet- ing was With the Secretary of State. This morning some of us met with the majority leader in a further effort to work out the order of business on the basis of a declaration of intention by the majority leader beginning next year. . All of these attempts have fallen by the wayside, because some Senators are of One mind and one point of view here, and others are diametrically opposed. If the distinguished majority moves to lay on the table the pending amendment, while I would have to vote against the amendment, I would like to make it clear that that should not be interpreted as reflecting my views on the Angola situa- tion one way or the other, on the merits. Such a motion may well be offered by him in order to bring about a resolution of the question. Perhaps if he does offer it, it would be better to table it, and I would so vote. Then we cart get on with the rest of the business, and the Appro- priations Committee can get on with this tough situation, as well as a number of others we will have to take up as soon as we possibly can arrange the meetings. I wanted the distinguished majority leader to know that I myself hope that under the circumstances the amend- ment can be laid on the table, so that when we come back in January, simi- lar amendments could be offered and similar arguments could be made. The debate at that time might look differ- ent. The administration feels that the adoption of the amendment at this time would be disastrous, would be a catas- trophe, and they have made their views very strongly clear. Again I repeat, and then I am through, that I am not stating my own views here on Angola one way or the other. I am very much concerned about the American position. I am also con- cerned about the impact on world opin- ion of what the Senate may do here today. I wanted the chance to get that on the RECORD before the Senator pro- ceeded further. I thank the majority leader. Mr. MANSeIELD. Mr. President, be- fore I make the motion to, lay on the table the Tunney amendment, I wish to state unequivocally that I favor the Tunney amendment; that I am against our intervention in the affairs of two of the three tribal elements within An- gola; that in my opinion the national in- terest and security of this country are not involved in the events in Angola; and I wish to say that I can see many parallelisms between this situation and the beginning of the adventure in Viet- nam. Mr. President, I move to lay on the table the amendment of the Senator from California (Mr. TUNNEY) , and I ask for the yeas and nays. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is a sufficient second. The yeas and nays were ordered. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BELLMON) . The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Mon- tana (Mr. MANSFIELD) to lay on the ta- ble the amendment of the Senator from California. On this question the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk called the roll. Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce that the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. ABOUREZK) , the Senator from Indiana (Mr. BAYH) , the Senator from Texas (Mr. BENTSEN) , the Senator from Nevada (Mr. CANNoN), the Senator from Florida (Mr. Cnnocs), the Senator from Missouri (Mr. EAGLETON) , the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. EASTLAND) , the Senator from Louisiana (Mr. JOHNSTON) , the Senator from Montana (Mr. Mar- ems), the Senator from New, Mexico (Mr. -MoNrovA), the Senator from Mis- sissippi (Mr. STENNIS), the Senator from Illinois (Mr. STEVENSON) and the Sena- tor from Florida (Mr. STONE) are neces- sarily absent. I further announce that the Senator from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH) is absent on official business. I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH) , and the Senator from Florida (Mr. STONE) would each vote "nay." Mr. GRato.toIN. I announce that the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. Baoex) , the Senator from Kansas (Mr. DOLE) , the Senator from Arizona (Mr. FANNIN) , the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. Foxe), the Senator from Arizona (Mr. GoLn- wATER), the Senator from Nevada (Mr. LAxAvr), and the Senator from Maryland (Mr. MATHIAS) are necessarily absent. The result was announced?yeas 21, nays 58, as follows: I Rollcall Vote No. 610 Leg.] YEAS-21 Griffin Hansen Hruska Long McClellan McClure McGee Baker Bartlett Beall Bellmon Buckley Curtis Dom eni ci Allen Biden Brooke Bumpers Burdick Byrd, Harry F., Jr. Humphrey Byrd, Robert C. Inouye Case Jackson Clark Javits Cranston Kennedy Culver Leahy Durkin Magnuson Ford Mansfield Garn McGovern Glenn McIntyre Gravel Mondale Hart, Gary Moss Hart, Philip A. Muskie Hartke Nelson NAYS-58 Haskell Hatfield Hathaway Helms Hollings Huddleston Abourezk Bayh - Bentsen Brock Cannon Chiles Church Morgan Roth Scott, Hugh Stevens Thurmond Tower Young Nunn Packwood Pastore Pearson Pell Percy Proxmire Randolph Ribicoff Schweiker Scott, winiam L. Sparkman Stafford Symington Taft Talmadge Tunney Welcker Williams NOT VOTING-21 Dole Laxalt Eagleton Mathias Eastland Metcalf Fannin Montoya Fong Stennis Goldwater Stevenson Johnston Stone So the motion to table Mr. TUNNEY'S amendment was rejected. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question now recurs on the amendment of the Senator from California, as amended. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I have discussed this possibility with the Republican leadership. I have received no assurances, but I think it is worthy of the effort. I ask unanimous consent that there be not to exceed 40 minutes on the Tunney amendment, the time to be equally di- vided between the distinguished manager of the bill, the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. McCLELLAN) and the distinguished Senator from California (Mr. TuNNEy). Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 S 23048 Approved FcEstEigeleMiXONIVILOREMZEDP-AIWA The PRESIDING OF'FIC.r..a. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it Ia sO ordered. Mr. MANSOIELD. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas arid nays. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is a sufficient second. The yeas and nays were ordered. Mr. mAN8prEto. Mr. President I yield to the distinguished Senator from Kentucky. ATE CONCURRENT RESOLTJTI AND SENATE CONCtTRRENT soLtrnoil 83?CORRECTIONS ENROLLMENT OF S. 2718, RML- R REVrrALIZATION AND REG- 'CIL TORY REFORM ACT OF '1975 Mr. RD. Mr. Pregident / serl two oOtiourettt resolutions to the dek and atkfors their immediate oonsid ation, en bloc. The PESIDING Ornurat. e con- current resolutions will be stated by title. The as tent legislative cler read as follows : A eoarurreit resolution (S 0/n. Res. 82) to make con tionia In the enrollment of S. 2718, a bill tt improve the cii.hIity of rail rough regu- rail services ion and im- ther purposes Con. Res. 83) services in the\ TJnited States t ?ordination o nd rehabilit ng, and for solution ( s in the #nrollment of S. rove thl quality of rail ed Sta s through regu- tnatios of rail services ehalilitation and bn- nd or other purposes. latory reform, and facilities, provement linen concUrrent to make borrectio 271.8, a bill to im servicea in the 'CM latory reform, coor and facilities, and provement financing, Mr. FORD. Mr. Pe dent, these reso- lutions make correc r, .ns in the enroll- ment of S. 2718, wh is the Senate has just passed. The cor tions are for the purpose of seeing t t he bill meets the agreement at the rence and what we passed today. e s if worked long and hard last nil t in rder to put it together. These re sirirly technical changes. Mr. oraFTTN. o substaxtive changes? Mr. vont). N substantW changes at all. The P G OFFICE1 The ques- tion is on # eeing to the'concurrent resolutions. The conc ent resolutions% (S. Con. Res. 82 and . Cori. Res. 83) we e agreed to, as foriow : S. Cox. RES. 8'2 Resolved y the Senate (the Houselof Rep- resentative concurring). That the S retary of the Se te is direated to make ?Orr tionra in the en llment of S. 2718, a bill to 1 rove the qu y of rail services in the U ited States t rough regulatory reforni, coor na- tion of all services and facilities, and r a- bilitati n and irrrprovement financing, rid for ot r purposes as follows: e out section 308 of the bill in i s y and redeSignate sections 309 throng$L2 the bill as section 308 through 31 ther of. S. Cox. RES. 83 sOlved by the Senate (the Rouse of resentatives concurring), That the Clerk the Senate is directed 'to make correc- ns in the enrollment of S. 2718, a bill 'Improve the quality of rail services in the Starr States through regulatory reform, ?Ordination of ran services and fatillties, \nd rehabilitation and improvement financ- Dig, and for other purposes as follows: sc. 2. In section 308 of the Regional Rail Rganization Act (as added by section 609 (b) of the bill) strike the bracket at the be- ginntrig of the section. Sec.. 3. In title VI of the bill redesignate the sectand section 614 as 615, and redesignate sections ,615 and 616 as 616 and 617 re- spectively, SEC. 4. In section 801(b) (3) of the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, SS added by 617 of the kill as redesignated is amended by? (a) striking,." (1)" the second time it ap- pears; and kb) striking the brackets and the mate- rial therein, except the quotation mark and the final period. \ SEC. 5. Before tire section heading of sec- tion 701 of the bill inaert the following: "TITLE VII?NOR AST CORRIDOR PROJECT IMP MENTATION" SEC. 6. Section 4(m) f the Department of Transportation Act, (as dded by section 803 of the bill) is amended tg inserting the last sentence immediately af r the period of the sentence preceding it. SEC. 7. Section 4(n) of he Department of Transportation Act (as dcled by sec- tion 803 of the bill) is ame ed by strik- ing "(1)" and inserting in lieu tereof "(p)". SEC. 8. Section 4(o) of the Department of Transportation Act, (as added by ection 803 of the bill) is amended by strikin "(1) " and inserting in lieu thereof "(p)". SEC. 9. Subdivision (e) of secti 20(3) of the Interstate Commerce Act, as aklended by section 307 of the bill is deleted an sub- division (f) is redesignated as subdi ision (e). SEC. 10. Section 4(r) of the Departmen of Transportation Act (as added by section ? of the bill) is amended by striking " (1) " a "(j)" and inserting in lieu thereof "(p)" an "(q)" respectively. SEC. 11. Insert a period after "(6) neces, sary studies" in section 101 of the bill. SEC. 12. In section 15(6) of the Inters Commerce Act (as amended by section of the bill) strike "(C)" and Insert in thereof "(c)". SEC. 13. In seotion 202(b) of the bill trike out all of the matter starting with "f(6) In any hearing under" and ending wit "at the earliest practicable time". Sec. 14. In the matter inserte /into the Interstate Commerce Act by sec on 202(e) (B) of the bill? (1) strike " ' (9) (a)" and insert in lieu thereof" ' (8)i(0"; i) of this part" eof and insert )(b)-(i) of this ivision (b) strike paragraph. That" of "sudivision (d) (2) strike "section 1(5) (B) In new subdivision (b) to in lieu thereof "section 1 part" and in such new su "subparagraph (d) of th and insert in lieu the alleging that"; (3) strike in its enti ety clause (iv) of new subdivision (c) ther of and insert in lieu thereof the follown new such clause (1v) " ' (iv) the inore e or decrease for any rate filed within e second year following such date of en ctment is not more than 7 per centum o the rate in effect on Jan- uary 1,1977;"; (4) in new bdivision (d) thereof? (A) after interested partY" and before "that?" in rt the following: "or of the Office of Public Counsel"; (B) af "injury to the oomplainant" and before ";, and" insert the following "or, in the case/ of the complaint of such Office, njury ,to a member of the public or the ublicizenerally"; In new subdivision (f) thereof after rst sentence thereof and before the 1 sentence thereof insert the following two nq sentences: "In any hearing under this TAR000400gdotifhr 19, 1975. section, the burden of proof is on the car- rier to show that the proposed changed rate, fare, charge, classification, rule, regulation, or practice is compensatory, just, and reason- able. The Commission shall specifically con- sider, in any such hearing, proof that such proposed changed rate, fare, charge, classifi- cation, rule, regulation, or practice will have a significantly adverse effect on the competi- tive posture of shippers or consignees to be affected by such change." SEC. 15. In section 202(f) of the bill in the clause preceding paragraph (1) thereof strike "to" and in paragraph (I) thereof immedi- ately before "modify" insert "to". SEC. 16. In section 15(3) 6f the Interstate Commerce Act (as amended by section 203(a) of the bill) (1) strike "In determining" in the first sentence of th t new matter and insert in lieu thereof "With respect to car- riers by railroad, in determining"; and (2) strike "(C)" and insert in lieu thereof "(c)". SEC. 17. In new section 5b of the Interstate Commerce Act (as inserted in section 208(b) of the bill? (1) in paragraph (6) (a) (1) thereof strike "discussions or";/ (2) in paragraph (6) (a) (it) thereof strike "discussions ory. SEC. 18. In .new section 24 of the Inter- state Commeice Act (as Inserted by section 304 of the bill) -- (1) strike out the brackets and the second sentence in subsection (b) thereof and insert in lieu thereof the following: "The Director shall be. appointed by the commission and shall bV qualified and take office upon the approvAl of such appointment by a concur- rent psolution of the Senate and of the HouVe of Representatives"; (7) in subsection (c) thereof strike "rec- mrpriendations" and insert in lieu thereof "recommendations"; / (3) in subsection (e) thereof strike the /Comma after President and all that follows through the end of such subsection and in- sert in lieu thereof a period. SEC. 19, In section 306 of the Regional Rail organization Act of 1973 (as inserted in tion 609(b) of the bill) strike out the cket immediately before "Sec. 306.". c. 20. In section 403 of the bill? (1 insert "(a)" immediately after "403."; (2) strike "(c) Section 5 of the Interstate Comm rce Act (49 U.S.C. 5) is" and insert in lieu th eof "(b) Section 5 of such Act (49 U.S.C. 511s further". SEC. 21 In section 404 of the bill, strike the brack?efore "SEC.". SEC. 22. kmencl the first six printed lines on page 69 ?the Conference Report to read as follows: "PROTECTI N Or GOVERNMENT rums "Sec. 608. Ti 'e III of the Regional Rail Reorganization A?of 1973, as amended by section 609 of th Act, is further amended by inserting the fo wing new section: " 'PROTECTION 0 GOVERNMENT FONDS "'Sec. 307. (a) ATM .?(1) The Comp- SEC. 23. In section 7(1) (d) of the Inter- state Commerce Act as dded by section 306 of the bill, strike "or c ntract carrier sub- ject to this part I, part part III, or part IV of this Act" and inse t in lieu thereof "carrier by railroad subjec to this part". SEC. 24. In section 15(3) the Interstate Commerce Act as amended b section 203(a) of the bill is amended by fserting after "proposed cancellation" the srds "involv- ing any common carrier by rat oad." Sec. 25. The amendment to section 6(6) of the Interstate Commerce Act by ?ion 209 of the bill is amended by (A) striking "each carrier or" and iserting in lieu thereof "each common carrier y rail- road subject to this part or rail" and (B) striking "any carrier" and inse ting "any such carrier." Sgc, 26. Paragraph 9(b) of section 17 .of Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 / Ma roved Fcta*mgik944X1i0IttCWRINDR7A114))311A4R000400100018-1 D'?tembt. 19, the a. proach contained in S. 1823 an H.R. 16 represents a reasonable promis -nd the most equitable fo ala for divis n of these funds am g the three grou The P IDING OPPIC ir. The bill is open to a endment. I here be no amendment to e propo , the question is on the third adin of the bill. The bill was 0 d to a third read- ing, read the thin time, and passed. Mr. BARTL . r. President, I ask unanimous co cent t at S. 1823 be in- definitely p poned. is is a compan- ion bill. The pISIDTNG 0 R. Without objecJ6n, it is so ordered. DEPARTMENT OP Dhe.e.NSE APPRO- 1=111AI:togs, rtscm, YEAR 1976 The Senate continued with the consid- eration of amendment in disagreeMent NO. '75 to H.R. 9661, an act making ap- propriations for the Department of De- fense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1976, and for the period beginning July 1, 1976, and ending September 30, 1976, and for other piirpoSes. Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? ? Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield. Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President for the information of the Senate, I am asking this question of the majority leader: Do we correctly understand that once ac- tion is taken either way on the Tunney amendment, that is final action in this body, and it will then go 'to the other body, and other action may be required; but so far as we are conterned, that is it? Mr. 1V/ANSFIELD. The Senator is cor- rect, because the conference report has been agreed to and all other elements in dispute have been agreed to. Mr. JAVITS. I thank the Senator. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? Mr. TUNNEY Mr. President, I am very happy that the Senate, at long last, is going to haVe an Opportunity to vote up or down on an arriendment which is designed to prevent any funds under this defense appropriation bill from being programed for military operations in Angola. I have tried during the past week to make it very clear that I, for one, felt that it was a disastrous policy for us to become engaged in military action, either directly or through proxies, in Angola. Angola is a country which, unfortu- nately, is undergoing a rather tragic tribal war, teitilting in some more than 450 years of Portuguese colonial rule, a rule that left about 10 percent of the people in that country literate when it ended. " I think there is a larger meaning than just Angola to the amendment which I and a number of others have spon- sored. It Seems clear to the that from itoW Ori, We should not allow the execu- tive branch of government to engage the United State's, directly or indirectly, in military actions in any part of the world without the prior approval of Congress. The Constitution makes it very clear that Congress has the power to make war. Yet, in recent years we have lost that power to a considerable extent by the executive branch taking unilateral action and then presenting Congress with a fait accompli. What was attempted in this defense appropriation bill was to secrete moneys that were to go to Angola for military purposes, to get Congress to approve of those funds, not knowing what they were approving, and then to say that they had congressional approval, once those mon- eys were made available, if anything went wrong. I am very pleased that we are at last having an opportunity to vote on this issue up or down. should like to ask the distinguished and esteemed chairman of the Commit- tee on Appropriations a question. As the distinguished chairman knows, if my amendment carries, no funds will be available under the defense appro- priation bill for use in Angola, directly or indirectly, for military purposes. The only funds that would be available would be for intelligence-gathering. Yet, with- in the last couple of weeks, we have pass- ed a supplemental appropriation bill which, conceivably, might have funds in it which could be used for military pur- poses in Angola. It is my understanding that the distinguished chairman has in- dicated that before there could be -any reprograming of any funds that are subject to the supplemental appropria- tion bill, the chairman, when notified by the administration, by the President or anyone else in the administration, that such reprograming is going to take place, would make that fact known to the full Appropriations Committee. I also under- stand that if the full Appropriations Committee agreed to that request for reprograming, the chairman would then make such request to the full Senate; and that the full Senate, either in open session or in secret session, would have the right to approve of such funds. Is my understanding correct? Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, there may be funds?the Senator said the sup- plemental appropriation bill? Mr. TUNNEY. In the supplemental ap- propriation bill, yes. Mr. McCLELLAN. Whether in the sup- plemental appropriation bill or some carryover funds from some other year or appropriation, any reprograming re- quest under the present system?and there is one pending, as the Senator knows, for $28 million in this instance. The funds proposed to be reprogramed there are out of this particular bill and not funds in the supplemental or some past appropriation, or carryover appro- priation. So the pending request would apply to this appropriation bill. May I say to the distinguished Sen- ator, as I said yesterday when I initiated some effort to resolve this dilemma that Confronted us, I said then and I repeat now that, in view of what I thought the sentiment of the Senate was then, be- fore this vote a few minutes ago, I an- nounced to my colleagues in the confer- ence, where the Senator was present and a number of other Senators, that I would g 23051 not sign approval of reprograming in this instance, except and only after full committee hearings on this proposal and a report to the Senate thereon giving the Senate an opportunity to work its will on the reprograming request. I made that statement yesterday to the leader- ship as well as the distinguished Senator. That is the way I feel about it now. Anyway, the Senator is aware that it takes both the Appropriations Commit- tees of the House and the Senate, and also the Committees on Armed Services of the two bodies to approve this repro- graming request that is before us. Then I think?I do not know, but I Would as- sume the others feel as I do about it, particularly now after the sentiment that has been indicated by this vote, but even before that. In view of the considerable amount of money involved, I would not, where there is any dissension apparent in the Senate, take the responsibility for authorizing such a reprograming person- ally, and I doubt if many Senators would. In this matter, I do not know wheth- er now I shall hold any hearings at all on it. I feel it would be going through a futile exercise. I may not hold any hear- ings at all. There may be some develop- ments that will arise later that will in- dicate that hearings should be held. But as of now, with the situation before us, and with this amendment as it is final- ly resolved, I would hold no hearings at all. This would indicate that no funds could be used for that purpose. Mr. TUNNEY. I understand, and if there were an attempt to reprogram funds under any other appropriation bill that had passed?say 1974 funds or 1975 funds, would the Senator take the same attitude? He is saying he would take the same attitude? Mr. McCLELLAN. I would not take it. I have already taken it. I took it yester- day, I take it today, I shall take it tomor- row. I think the Senate has the right to determine in these matters. I say fur- ther that I have suggested in another area that the Senate take some affirma- tive action to change the present situa- tion. There are many requests for repro- graming. Some of them come up in a way that could not possibly have been anticipated. Some Change in situation de- velops and the reprograming process, I think, is indispensable, maybe, to good government. But it casts upon some of us a pretty heavy responsibility. I say to the Senator, not only in re- spect to this particular item or request that is now pending, there would be, pos- sibly, other requests for reprograming coming along where I would choose, and where I think my colleagues on the com- mittee would choose, rather than make a decision ourselves, to hold hearings, pos- sibly, and report to the Senate and, with a resolution, give the Senate the oppor- tunity to express its will. But there are some of these requests where I do not think it would be expedient or neces- sary that every request for reprogram- ing through that cumbersome process. If there is anything further, I shall try to answer the Senator. Mr. TUNNEY. That answers my que,s- Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 S 23052 Approved For 1320NEFAIMIONAt : ateR57/11/yEs1Rft000400101yWiber .fg 19775 tion very fully. I thank my distinguished friend and chairman for having made it Very clear what he did yesterday in the way of making a decision and now am- plifying, on the Senate floor, what his understanding is with respect to future action on making funds available for Angola. Mr. PASTOR,E, Will the Senator Yield? Mr. TUNNEY. Yes, I yield. Mr. PASTORE. Will the Senator add me as cosponsor to this amendment? Mr. TUNNEY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the distin- guished Senator's name be added as cosponsor. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HarrsErsi). Without objection, it is so ordered, Mr. TUNNEY. I yield the floor. The PRESIDING OrsICER. Who yields time? Mr, McCLELLAN. Has the Senator yielded the floor? Mr. TUNNEY. I have yielded the floor. Mr. 1VIcCLELLAN. I yield to the dis- tinguished Senator from North Dakota. Mr. YO'TJNG. Mr. President, I shall be voting against the Tunney amendment, I feel that it is a serious mistake. The most that could be made available under the new procedureS of the Senate Com- mittee on Appropriations just announced by the distinguished chairman (Mr. McCura,m0 would be$9 million. These funds would require reprograming. If the Tunney amendment is approved, there will be no more funds. There could be developments in Angola where maybe a little more money would be very helpful, It could mean the difference between winning and losing. We might want to provide additional funds, but it could not be done in time to do any good. We are nounclngl to the world that we are through with Angola. I doubt if this is the right way to do it. I can tmderstand people's feelings, but I am concerned about the many assertions made that it would cost us hundreds of ? millions of dollars in Angola. That is so far from the truth. ? May I say, once more, that even if the Tunney amendment does not pass under the bill, the most that may be made available for CIA operations in Angola would be $9 million, any additional would require reprograming with the approval of the Senate Committee on Appropria- tions and the full Senate, las well as the Appropriations Committee in the House and the Armed Services Committees of both houses. We should not be establishing far reaching foreign policy such as this with- out even a hearing by the committee. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? Mr. McCLELLAN. I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished minority leader. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator from Pennsylvania. Mr. HUGH SCOTT. Mr. President, I feel like another Senator who said to me yesterday, When I listen to one side I .an convinced, and when I listen to the other side I am convinced," because there is much to be said and much has been said. I do not like the Senate making for- eign policy unilaterally. I, as a party leader, have certain responsibilities. I am aware, as I have said earlier, of the fact that the Secretary of State and, I presume, the President, regard this amendment as disastrous to our foreign policy in that part of the world. Let me state the other side of it which also concerns me. I do not like us to get into situations which may tempt us into escalation. I do not believe we have a major national policy interest in Angola. I do recognize that the presence of the Soviet Union ought to be taken into con- sideration, and that there should be some response to it. ,Tow, this raises for me, frankly, a Very serious dilemma. As I said, in speak- ing before the table resolution, I have never failed to support every President of the United States under whom I served in his foreign policy objectives, and sometimes that has been very difficult, and it has been without regard to the political party of the President, and I do believe that, as a party leader, I have that, at times, very difficult responsibil- ity of seeking to advance the announced foreign policy of the United States. So my own personal concern and my own heart is very heavy with the fear that we may reach a point of involve- ment which we have not anticipated. My deep concern is that we may be running a risk of more involvement than we ought to assume. On the other hand, as the leader here representing the administration's view- point, I have to conclude that I am more directly bound to accept their as- sertion as fact that the foreign policy of the United States will be seriously ham- pered by the adoption of the Tunney amendment. This forces me with re- luctance to conclude that I must vote against the amendment. I have taken the lead, with others, in seeking compromises. I firmly believe the proposed compromise discussed last night would have been better all around. I do not think the country is served by extreme positions on either side. I think if we had more time we would have more moderation here. I think we are setting a very danger- ous precedent if we are going to uni- laterally alter the U.S. foreign policy and, for what is done here today, the Senate had better be prepared to ac- cept full responsibility. So I find my heart very much tilted in one direction. I find my sense of duty leading me to the conclusion that I must be consistent with supporting what I am convinced is the firm conviction of the administration that this amendment would be bad for the national interests of the United States and, therefore, I will have to vote against the amendment as sympathetically as I have listened to the arguments on both sides. I may say I had not made up my mind until this very minute, and I have agon- ized over it ever since the issue arose. I wish these hard decisions would go away, but they will not. They have to be faced, and that is the way I am going to face them. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? Mr. McCLELLAN. I yield to the dis- tinguished Senator from Idaho. Mr. McCLURE. I thank the Senator' for yielding his time. Mr. President, I think there is so much to be said that it is difficult to synthesize it into the time that is available to us today. Of course, there has been extended debate on the floor of the Senate in the last 2 days in both closed session and open session in regard to this issue. Let me say only this: The distin- guished Senator from Minnesota, in the session the day before yesterday, made some comment about actions taken by the Senate which might be interpreted as fools following the fools. The diffi- culty I have is determining who are the fools that the rest are following. I have a very difficult problem of res- olution in my own mind based upon the almost total lack of information that this Senate had before us on which to base our judgment. I think there is one thing that has emerged very clearly from all of these discussions, and that is the administra- tion is still following the practices that have grown up over the years: They be- lieve they can still, on sensitive matters, brief only a few Members of the Senate and have their policies adopted without a full and open discussion in the Senate of the United States. Rightly or wrongly that time has end- ed and I hope the administration in all of its departments and agencies will have come to the conclusion at last that they must bring the Senate of the United States into the discussion and give us the facts by which we can make our own determination. There is as of today a confusion con- cerning the facts of reprograming money and how much money is available. The fact is that under the Tunney amend- ment, if it is adopted?and I have no doubt that it will be?no sufficient mon- eys can be reprogramed to keep any kind of a viable operation going in Angola during the period of time we are trying to determine whether or not there should be one. The result will be, as a matter of fact, that whatever operations the United States is involved in in Angola will cease?let me repeat, will cease. Let us not kid ourselves one minute about the fact that in some way we may be able to reprogram and keep this program go- ing in Angola while we decide in Janu- ary or February what it is we want to do. We are making that decision today. Who are the fools following which fools? Where is the information on which 'we should be making our determination in regard to the cutoff of the program, a change of policy because, make no mis- take about it, there is in this amend- ment a change ofpolicy. It would seem to me that on a matter of this gravity we should have in any kind of logic or good sense given our- selves the time to develop the informa- tion base, which was not provided us by the administration in the ordinary course of events up here, so that we could make Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 Affroved For Release 2001/11/01 ? CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 Detembjf. 19, 19 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE S 23053 an informed judgment about what our foreign policy decision should be. The Senator from California, exercis- ing a perfect right on his part, has forced Us to make a decision before the Senate of the United States has enough infor- mation upon which it can make that decision. , Mr. NUNN. Will the Senator yield for a brief comment? Mr. MoCLURE. A very brief one. Mr. NUNN. I want to answer that last statement of the Senator. We are being forced to make a decision within adequate information. We are being forced to make a decision with in- adequate information. We are being forced to make a decision that could be fundamentally important to the United States of America without having ade- quate information. I have heard in the last few minutes classified information, I do not know whether it is absolutely accurate, that rebutes a lot of what was said in the secret session here yesterday. We have heard a one-sided presentation. I dp not in any way blame the people who feel the way they do on the Tunney _?ainendment. I3ut on the other hand, in the secret session we hear one thing and now other information which cannot be talked about on the floor, yet we are being called on under a time limitation to vote on an amendment. There may be other people who feel like I do, and that is, it is very uncomfort- able to have to make the kind of decision we are going to make with this kind of time limitation when we are getting new Information about every 15 minutes on this subject. I, personally, am very disturbed about this uncomfortable, awkward, and I think irresponsible position which we are placed in, I do not blame any one in- dividual, but I think it is not the way to run a government. Mr. McCLURE, I thank the Senator from Georgia arid I agree with his senti- ments. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator's time has eXpired. Mr, McCLURE. I yield the Senator from New York 5 minutes. Mr. BUCKLEY, Mr. President, I con- cur with all the sentiments expressed by the Senator from Idaho and the Senator from Oeorgik The fact is that we are subverting our own procedures, procedures designed by the Congress of the United States, for better or for worse, to oversee necessary activities of a sensitive, delicate type that require a flexibility of approach that this body simply is not equipped to handle. In the process, I believe that we are throwing some signals around the world that can be extraordinarily dangerous In its potential. Let us face it, we are not talking about Angola in this respect, but we are talk- ing about the impressions that coun- tries around the globe, friend and foe alike, will have from the action of this body in arbitrarily and abruptly cutting operations that the administration is pursuing in full accordance with the law, negotiations and operations that do not commit the United States down the line to extravagance or something that would lead to warfare. We seem to have abandoned any con- fidence in the legislation we enacted last year, the war powers law, which was supposed to have protected us from any such possibility, and at the same time we are preempting the work of the Church committee. Let us face it, the Soviet Union is a serious power. The Soviet Union has ob- jectives that cannot be described as either peaceful or friendly. The Soviet Union is willing to make large commit- ments. The Soviet Union can keep secrets. It seems to me that what we are doing here today can only encourage further Soviet adventurism around the globe, and it can only discourage uncommitted nations or weak nations from ever look- ing toward the United States for any kind of support. I believe, Mr. President, that this is a course of action that we are taking that can only be described as reckless, ill- considered, and dangerous. I know that there is no hope of defeat- ing the Tunney amendment, but I hope that it will, nevertheless, be defeated. I hope that over the intervening weeks Members of this body will reflect on what it is we are doing, reflect on the fact that in a very important way we are usurping the responsibilities that the Constitution of the United States places primarily in the Executive, that we have, in fact, destroyed the abilities of this Govern- ment to conduct covert operations. I hope, Mr. President, that this amend- ment will be defeated. Mr. CLARK. Will the Senator from California yield? Mr. TUNNEY. Yes, I yield to the Senator from Iowa. Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, the issue before us is very clear, as several Mem- bers here have stated. The question is whether this body wishes to go on record at this time favoring the possible expenditure of an additional$9 million in a tribal civil war in central. Africa. The question is really that simple. As we know from other discussions here, it is not going to be possible to receive other funds through a reprogram- ing OT other methods. So the decision the Members of this body must make is whether they feel that by spending another $9 million, that somehow the policies of our Government in Angola are going to be suddenly turned around. I think, in view of the magnitude of the problem on bath sides, that is inconceivable. I think before yielding back, because I know there are Members that are pre- pared to vote, that we ought to face up to that issue, each of us. One can say many things about why we ought to be in Angola or ought not to be, but the real question is, if we vote yes or no here, do we wish to authorize and appropriate the money,$9 million, to continue the war in central Africa. Mr. MORGAN. If the Senator will yield for a question, are we down to $9 million, and if we are down to$9 million how did we get there? Mr. CLARK. I think it would be. But It is clear from the figures the various committees and administration officials have presented to us that that is all that is in this bill that could conceivably be transferred. It is not earmarked for that purpose. Mr. McCLELLAN. That is not all that will be transferred. That is all that could be used without reprograming. Mr. CLARK. Yes; and as the Appro- priations Committee said. Mr. NUNN. Is the Senator telling us now, as far as the money is concerned, this entire amount boils down to whether we are going to save $9 million, or whether we are going to spend the$9 million as far as the money part is con- cerned? It is not $28 million involved or$50 million or $60 million, it is$9 million? Mr. McCLELLAN. In this bill, there is only $9 million. Mr. NUNN. I would just like to ob- serve--- Mr. MeCLELLAN. That could be used. None of the rest in this bill can be used without reprograming, but I have ad- vised the Senate would come to the Sen- ate itself so it could work its will. Mr. NUNN. That certainly is a fact, In my opinion. I do not think enough people realize that is the amount of money we are talking about. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? Mr. MeCLELLAN. I yield to the dis- tinguished Senator from New Mexico. Mr. DOMENICI. I thank the distin- guished Senator from Arkansas. I think the distinguished minority leader indicated in his opening remarks that he was heavyhearted. He was con- cerned about the U.S. Senate assuming the full responsibility of the decision. The PRESIDING OrriCER. May I interrupt a moment to say that the Sen- ator from Arkansas has only 1 minute remaining. I wanted him to be aware of that. Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I beg the Chair's pardon, it is 40 minutes to the side. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The unanimous consent? Mr. MoCLELLAN. I am compelled to ask unanimous consent for another 15 minutes on each side. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Mr. MeCLELLAN. I was under the im- pression I had 40 minutes. I am very sorry. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered. The Senator from New Mexico is recognized. Mr. DOMENICI. I thank the Chair. As I was indicating, I, too, am heavy- hearted because we are going to assume the full responsibility here today, not be- cause I do not want us to, but because I am firmly convinced we are going to as- sume the full responsibility for denying the U.S. Government an option in for- Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 823054 Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE Decembol eign policy for somewhere between$9 million and $28 million, which could be determinative of America's relationship with the Soviet Union and, more impor- tantly, because we are doing it predomi- nantly upon misinformation or lack of information. Suffice it to say that there has not been a committee Member reporting to this Senate who spoke to the Secretary of State of the United States before this matter came to the floor of the Senate. As a matter of fact, while we come here today to vote on this, it is only by acci- ? dent that informally the Secretary of State was ealled to tell us the facts about the options he is trying to protect here. I can say this, if he is to be believed then we are acting upon ? either the im- pressions or opinions of other than the Secretary of State, which are different from his in at least five major areas. Without going into details, I will say What they are: his opinion as to whether we are alining ourselves with white South Africa so as to cause all of black Africa to be aga4nst us. His answer is, no. To the contrary, we have been invited by two major black countries to continue this participation for the next few weeks. giebond, suffice it to say that we have not been told all the facts as to why China is no longer putting some arma- ment in this area. I will not go beyond that. Suffice it to say that we have been led to believe this is a unilateral effort on our. part. We have been told some of our isTATo allies have been talked to; that the OA Unity group in South Africa has been called upOn and will be working on the matter: Suffice it to say we have been told-- The nES/DING OFFICER. The Sen- ator's 4 minutes Have expired. Mr. DCIMENICI. I thank the Senator for the time yielded, and thank him for accommodating nie. Mr. MeCLELLAN. I yield 4 minutes to the Senator from Mississippi. . Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, if I may, would like to point out I do not care anything about the vote one way or the other, particularly at this time, favorable or not as to the money for Angola. I believe the Senator from California has already Won his point. He has driven home the principles he is fighting for. He has obtained results. There will be none of this new money spent in Angola with- out the consent of the two Appropriations Committees of the Congress plus, as the ?-Senator from Arkansas has said, this body. So, Mr. President, this primarily Is a foreign relations policy question. We are attempting to decide the question , her as a rider, a limitation, on an ap- propriation bill. We ought to have the testimony and the counsel of the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs and other commit- tees: The policy question ought to be de- cided in a bill, after hearings, and not as a limitation on an appropriation bill. ?_ We are not going to settle the Angola question here with a little limitation on an approPilation bill. We are not going to settle it tonight, tomorrow, this year Or next year, in nriy humble opinion. This Is going to be along, drawn-out affair in- ,. volving many-of the countries of Africa. But where is the Senate going in the meantime? We have a$90 billion appropriation bill, plus the additional part that is in the 3-month period. It has been worked on now for 13 months, to my own knowledge, by this subcommittee, and the Armed Services Committee considered the authorization for the military hardware and personnel and research that is in it. Some of the best staff members on Capital Hill have worked laboriously on this entire bill. All adjustments have been made, every- thing has been considered, as to what will our spending policy for armament, research and personnel for the military. This is for 12 months and an additional 3-month period. What do our adversaries think of us? We have already run over 6 months into the year for which we are supposed to appropriate. This will take it over an- other month?'7 months out of 12 for this period for which we are appropriat- ing already gone. If I was an adversary of this country, I would be thinking, "Those people do not know what they want and they do not know how to get anything settled when they do want it." The Senator from California has es- tablished his point. I am not directing anything at him except victory for his side of this matter. The Senator won his point for getting consideration on this particular money. There must be a policy evolved. I have been wanting more of a policy evolved on all covert matters. I have never liked the taste of it. I will say if this country is going to run its foreign relations and military affairs and everything else, by limitations com- ing in at the last minute, with half of the year gone, as limitations on appro- priations bills and thereby set vast, worldwide policy questions, then we are on the way down. Everybody will know it except us. I say this deliberately because I an concerned. I hope that what little I can say?I do not expect ,to change votes?will have some warning value. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator's 4 minutes have expired. Mr. KENNEDY. Will the Senator yield 2 minutes? Mr. TUNNEY. Does the Senator want another minute or two to complete his remarks? Mr. STENNIS. I would like to continue for another minute. Mr. TUMMY. I yield. Mr. STENNIS. I would just like to mention several programs that are con- sidered important. They have been de- bated when the bill was up. The money has been put in the bill. All items are still being held up. No contract plans can be made. Industry is standing by and the Department is standing by. Everybody is standing by having to wait, wait, wait 6 months, almost 7 months, but nothing can be done. I plead for a better policy than that, not just for the Department of Defense, but for all departments. Otherwise, we are not handling our affairs, I humbly suggest and with great respect to every- one, in the right method and in the right manner, and we are not being effective. Particularly, let us not try here to settle a worldwide policy question by a rider on an appropriation bill. How far can we go? I thank the Senator for yielding. Mr. KENNEDY. Will the Senator yield 3 minutes? Mr. TUNNEY. I yield 3 minutes. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator from Massachusetts is recognized for 3 minutes. Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I think our distinguished colleague and chair- man of the Armed Services Committee has put the question very clearly, when he states that the real issue is whether we are or are not going to decide policy. I believe everyone in this body remem- bers the years when, by the failure of the Congress to act on the Vietnam is- sue, we had indeed voted for a defense appropriation that was thrown back to us time and time again, and that we were in error by approving a policy that kept us in Vietnam. Every Member of this body remembers that. Without the inclusion of the Tunney amendment we will be saying exactly the same thing with regard to Angola. We will permit the administration to say, without the Tunney amendment, that we have known about our Nation's involve- ment in Angola, and yet we are un- prepared to take a position on this pol- icy issue. I would agree with the Senator from Mississippi, that this is the issue, whether we are going to pass an appropriation bill that is going to permit the admin- istration to say, "They knew about it up there in the Senate oZ the United States and refused to take a position," or whether we are going to heed the lessons of Vietnam. As shown by the early votes on this issue we have a clear bipartisan majority in this Senate insisting, that we have learned the lesson of Vietnam as it applies to covert activity in Third World countries, and that we are going to stamp into policy on this bill this afternoon the fact that we in the U.S. Senate do not concur with the adminis- tration, which apparently has not learned the policy and has not learned the lessons of Vietnam by suggesting that we abandon the Tunney amend- ment. I am hopeful that for the very reasons that the Senator from Mississippi has stated, for the policy reasons, the amendment of the Senator from Cali- fornia will be overwhelmingly accepted. I reserve the remainder of my time. Mr. BARTLETT. Will the Senator yield? Mr. McCLELLAN. I yield 1 minute. Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. President, the question is not whether we decide to act in this manner but it is how we decide to act, whether we decide to act in haste or act deliberately. Are we going to just undercut the executive branch of the Government, which is following the outlines of con- gressional options, and cut off what they have already started without proper Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 Decemb'er 19 6ved For FGANGETORKOMAt:Emeizemgmmfio00400100018-1 S 23655 deliberations, without the full informa- tion that we are entitled to have? Certainly it is not a matter of favor- ing covert action, but I think it is a mat- ter of considering at some length what the future policy should, be, and con- tinuing the present support for the time being, in order that we can act in Janu- ary or February, after considering all sides and all the facts and knowing what we are doing. Mr. KENNEDY. Mr, President, will the Senator yield on that point? Mr. BARTLETT. You bet. Mr. KENNEDY. 'Why not just put on a moratorium now, and let the admin- istration come up and defend the policy? The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? Mr. TUNNEY. Does the Senator wish more time? Mr. BARTLETT. Yes, I would appre- ciate it. Mr. TUNNEY. I yield the Senator another minute. Mr. BARTLETT, I thank the distin- guished Senator. There was nothing in the legislation which authorized the executive branch to counter coyert actions by the Soviets with covert actions by ourselves, and to come up to Congress and justify that, other than to do it through committee. This is being done. But if we act very precipitously here, in great haste, and undercut them, who would really be Speaking for the United States? I think they would be saying around the world that we are speaking with a forked tongue, that no one knows what the United States is doing, that the execu- tive branch says one thing and Congress acts contrary to that. I think we should support the admin- istration until we have a chance to con- sider this matter in a deliberate fashion, as a deliberative body should. Mr. McCT,TILLAN, Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may require. I would like to preface my remarks by saying that whatever I may say is said 'With due deference to and respect for my colleagues who may have differing views from those which,I shall express. I speak more, Mr. President, in the role of a Senator than I do as chairman of the Appropriations Committee, because as chairman of the Appropriations Commit- tee I have little Concern about whether some particular item in an appropriation bill is stricken out or some item is added to the bill. Certainly that is true when the sum involved is only $9 million. But there is something much greater Involved here than just$9 million. Mr. President, I made every effort I could to bring about a solution to this situation. First, I sought not to have any expenditure made between now and when Congress returns. Yesterday afternoon in the conference that has been referred to there WAS an apparent agreement, or obviously a possibility. of an agreement to let the administration spend this $9 million, with the additional balance of$3 million they still have in the reserve fund, which would carry the issue over until we come back in January at which time or during which time I proposed to call the Appropriations Committee to- gether and hold hearings, and give the administration an opportunity to make its case. I said the committee would then report to the Senate on the pending re- programing request and give the Senate an opportunity to work its will. That was clearly understood. There can be no mistake about it. Now this morning the Senate comes in and turns down the $9 million in this bill. This ac- tion denies the opportunity for the ad- ministration to thoroughly make its case and for us to hold hearings and do what this body should do, conscientiously con- sider and fully deliberate on this issue. We are signaling to the world today? we are signaling to the Kremlin at this hour that now that you are there, what- ever your ambitions are, whatever your goals may be?even to establish a mili- tary base right across the shipping lanes of the Atlantic, we are moving out, and "you can have it." We are saying we will not even invest$9 million for 3 or 4 weeks' time, to give us an opportunity to properly consider and deliberate upon this issue before we decide it. Yes, I think there will be great elation in the Kremlin when they know what we are doing and have done. I think there is confusion and consternation in other countries, who look to us for leadership and wonder whether our word is good any longer, or whether this Nation is so divided that there can be no reliance upon the efforts of our constitutional officers whose duty it is to conduct for- eign affairs for us. Well, you have made the decision. To- day you strain at a gnat. When you get the foreign aid bill up, which provides $1.5 billion in military aid to Israel and$750 million to Egypt, Israel's enemy, in economic funds, you do not strain there, you swallow a camel. What kind of a policy does this Nation have? I think there is good reason for the Senate, in meeting its responsibility, to weigh most carefully the whole policy in this field. But it is not weighing it carefully now. It is precipitously saying, "All right, Mr. Soviet, we are stepping out; take what you want. You have got the arms over there; you can overpower these people if you want to, you can establish military bases if you like. We have no further interest." God save America from that kind of a retreating foreign policy and the con- sequences thereof. You will have your way today but this can well be a sad day indeed for America and other areas of the non-Communist world. SEVERAL SENATORS: Vote! Vete! The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, I have listened closely and carefully to the Sen- ator from Idaho (Mr. MCCLURE), the Senator from Georgia (Mr. NUNN), and the Senator from New York (Mr. BUCK- LEY). I associate myself with these remarks. Much of the argument heard on this is- sue has been based upon inadeqiiate and' oftentimes faulty information. I am sure we all agree that we do not want to back into another war with our eyes closed. I would hope, on the other hand, that with the important negotia- tions taking place between our country and the Soviets, we would not resolve a worldwide policy issue in the fashion and with as few facts as we presently possess. Mr. President, I think the proposal made by the distinguished chairman of the Appropriations Committee has great merit. I regret that it was not given the consideration I believe it deserves. I shall vote against the Tunney amendment. Mr. FELL. Mr. President, in consider- ing the dangerously evolving situation in Angola, in what has become the first major test of post-Vietnam policy, it is discouraging in the extreme that so little appears to have been learned from the past. Once again, a long and largely se- cret U.S. involvement in a distant coun- try has reached the threshold of a major commitment. And, until recently, few have been in a position to raise funda- mental questions regarding the direction and nature of this policy. There is little need to trace the de- tailed history of the present situation in Angola. The United States, Soviet Union, People's Republic of China, and most re- cently South Africa have all attempted both indirectly. and directly to influence the balance of power in that country. Por years three competing focal factions, the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA have sought to dominate this newly emergent country. For years, this struggle was ob- scure and hardly noticed; suddenly, it is being debated everywhere. What, then, is the reason for this dramatic upsurge in interest in Angola? It is difficult to believe, as some have claimed, that it is due to any new-found, strategic importance in Angola itself. Angola has always possessed significant mineral resources and has always been the beneficiary of a fine harbor with mil- itary potential. Rather, increased American concern in Angola appears to result, from increased Soviet involvement in Angola. The United States has been caught re- acting to Soviet initiatives, while the goals of American policy remain un- defined. As the situation now stands, unless the United States injects a massive amount of military assistance, the Soviet-backed MPLA will emerge victorious. But what will the Soviets have gained for all their intrigue and efforts? Quite simply, any Soviet "victory" will be short-lived. The most powerful force in the nonalined world is nationalism? an ideology that rejects external control regardless of whether the ideology comes from the East or West. One has only to recall recent Soviet failures in Egypt and Mozambique to realize this fundamental fact characterizing the world today. Tragically, the United States is forfeiting opportunities for long-term benefits in Africa and elsewhere by over-reacting to the short-term Soviet initiative in An- gola. The United States would do far better to take a long view of history, condemning all outside interference in Angola while concentrating on more con- structive policies of assisting economic and social development in Angola and elsewhere. Moreover, the United States has been Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 ghtekl57_73AltiNMIt00040014)4?14,ber 1 9., 1975 S 2-3056 - Approved For ligftigallgioIttlitt tainted in all Africa by its "guilt by association" with the Government of South Africa. As a result, we are sure not only to fare badly in Angola, but we are sure to fare badly throughout the entire continent of Africa until this ill- adVised association is dissolved. Today, more than 20 years since the initial American involvement in Viet- nam, it seems that the foreign policy of the United States is still guided by the philosophy of containment Yet cold war perceptions of global strategy and "zero- sum" competition with the Soviet Union bear little relevance to a situation dic- tated mostly by local loyalties defined primairly by region and tribe. Manu- f actnred rationales for the United States Involvement in Angola cannot hide the fact that Angola itself is not the issue; rather, it would appear that Angola has been chosen as but the most recent sym- bol of U.S. determination to act inter- nationally. Before the United States further in- volves itself in Angola, it is the responsi- bility of the administration to explain fully its policy both to Congress and the American people. Many questions remain unanswered. What is the strategic im- portance of Angola? What are the impli- cations of either continuing or terminat- ing our involvement? What diplomatic alternatives exist bilaterally with the Soviet Union or multilaterally in the United Nations for the United States? Ultimately, however, Angola may be most important for providing a dramatic reminder that the United States has yet to fashion a coherent foreign policy, for the post-Vietnam era. What is clear is that expectations of d?nte must be lowered. D?nte is not a mutual com- mitment between superpowers who sup- port the status quo but rather a fluid relationship which primarily attempts to avoid direct confrontation. And be- yond a more realistic view of d?nte, what is required is a new definition of Interests and commitments?one which is supported by the American people and which recognizes the limitations of America's ability to influence events everywhere in the world. Mr. TUNNEY. I am ready to yield back the remainder of my time. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Arkansas yield back the remainder of his time? Mr. McCLELLAN, I yield it back. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amend- ment of the Senator from California (Mr. DOWNEY) , as amended. On this question, the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll. The legislative Clerk proceeded to call the roil. Mr. McGEE (when his name was called). On this vete, I have a pair with the distinguished Senator from the State of Washington (Mr. JACKSON). If he were present and voting, he would vote "nay." If I were at liberty to vote, I would vote "yea." I withhold my vote. The roleg!dative clerk resumed the call of the The PRESIDING oFFichat. The clerk will suspend. The clerk is having difficulty hearing responses of Senators. The Senate will be in order. The clerk may proceed. The legislative clerk resumed the call Of the roll. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will suspend. The Senate will be in order so Senators may hear their names when called. The Senate is not in order. Senators are asked to take their conver- sations to the cloakroom. The clerk will not proceed until the Senate is in order. Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, some Senators Shave airline reservations. I hope Senators will heed the request of the Chair in the Chair's efforts to get order in the Senate which is the duty of the Chair, by the way, under the rule. The PRESIDING OeviCER. The Sen- ate is still not in order. The clerk may proceed. The legislative clerk resumed and con- cluded the call of the r(411. Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, may we have order in the Senate and may the well be cleared? The PRESIDING OFFICER. Senators and staff members are asked to clear the well. Senators are asked to take their conversations to the cloakrooms. The Senate will be in order. The Chair thanks Senators. Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. -I announce that the Senator from Indiana (Mr. awn) , the Senator from Texas (Mr. BENTSEN) , the Senator from Nevada (Mr. CANNoN), the Senator from Florida (Mr. CHILES), the Senator from Missouri (Mr. EAGLETON) , the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. EASTLAND) , the Senator from Wash- ington (Mr. JACKSON), the Senator from Louisiana (Mr. JOHNSTON), the Senator from New Mexico (Mr. MoNrovA) , the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PAS- TORE) , the Senator from Illinois (Mr. STEVENSON) , the Senator from Florida (Mr. STONE) , the Senator from Indiana (Mr. HARTKE) , the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. HourNos), and the Sen- ator from Georgia (Mr. TALMADGE) are necessarily absent. I also announce that the Senator from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH) is absent on official business. I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from IDAHO (Mr. CHURCH) , the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PAsron), and the Senator from Florida (Mr. STONE) would each vote "yea." Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. Smell), the Senator from Kansas (Mr. DOLE), the Senator from Arizona (Mr. FANNIN) , the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. FoNc), the Senator from' Arizona (Mr. GOLD- WATER) , the Senator from Nevada (Mr. LAXALT) , and the Senator from Maryland (Mr, MATHIAS) are necessarily absent. I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER) would vote "nay." The result was announced?yeas 54, nays 22, as follows: fR011eall Vote No. 611 Leg.] YEAS--51 Abouresk Hatfield Allen Hathaway Eiden Helms Brooke Huddleston Bumpers Humphrey Burdick Inouye Byrd, Robert C. javits Case Kennedy Clark Leahy Cranston Magnuson Culver Mansfield Durkin McGovern Ford McIntyre Garn Metcalf Glenn Mondale Gravel Moss Hart, Gary Muskle Hart, Philip A. Nelson Haskell Packwood NAYS-22 Baker Domenic' Bartlett Griffin Beall Hansen Bellmon Hruska Buckley Long Byrd, McClellan Harry F., Jr. McClure Curtis Morgan Pearson Pell Percy Proxmire Randolph Ribicolf Roth Schweiker Scott, William L. Stafford Stevens Symington Taft Tunney Weicker Williams Nunn Scott, Hugh Sparkman Stennis Thurmond Tower Young PRESENT AND OWING A LIVE PAIR, AS PREVIOUSLY RECORDED-1 McGee, for. NOT VOTING-23 Bayh Eastland Laxalt Bentsen Fannin Mathias Brock Fong Montoya Cannon Goldwater Pastore Chiles Hartke Stevenson Church . Hollings Stone Dole Jackson Talmadge Eagleton Johnston So Mr. To/mimes amendment, as amended, was agreed to. Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I move that the Senate insist upon its amendment and request a further con- ference with the House of Representa- tives on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and that the Chair be authorized to appoint the conferees on the part of the Senate. Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I object. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HELMS). The question is on agreeing to the motion. Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is a sufficient second. The yeas and nays were ordered. Mr. FORD. Mr. President, a parlia- mentary inquiry. The PRESIDING 0.10.1010ER. The Sen- ator will state it. Mr. FORD. What is the question now? If a Senator will vote "aye," what hap- pens? If he votes "no," what occurs? Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I have followed the usual procedure. If the Senator does not want conferees, I will withdraw the motion. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator withdraw his motion? Mr. FORD. That answers my question. The PRESIDING OeviCER. The mo- tion is withdrawn. SENATE AND ANGOLA: IN TNE TRADITION Or WAYNE MORSE Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, today the Senate has refused to accept what might well later have been termed the Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 ? Dry e ntVer 19, Aggroved Fordtstimmggimairschtikgaufigpm-ro00400100018-1 ? equivalent of a "Gulf of Guinea Resolu- tion." But we will now have no new "Gulf of Tonken Resolution" opening the way to a Vietnam-type disaster in Angola. That is the meaning of the majority vote for the Tunney amendment barring any funds in the Defense appropriations bill from being used "for any activities Involving Angola other than intelligence gathering." We have refused to commit this body by voting funds for covert purposes that could be used to more deeply involve the United States in a civil war. The voting of funds could have been cited later by the administration as congressional au- thorization of deeper and ever more dangerous U.S. involvement in Angola. We have weighed the potential con- sequences of intervention on an install- ment plan, as Wayne Morse tried to get his colleagues to do back in August 1964, when the Senate was debating the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. Mr. President, we have over the past several days heard repeated assurances that we are defending "freedom" in Angola. We have heard assurances that what the administration seeks will not lead Inevitably to escalation. We have heard again that the Presi- dent has limited intentions, and that Congress will have ample opportunity under the exercise of its constitutional powers, with the help of the War Powers Act, to restrain the President, should his intentions change. All of this has a familiar ring. But the simple fact remains that once the President involves the Nation in a war, whether with money, weapons, or men, it is harder to turn back. National pride becomes involved. Crises develop which produce emo- tional, not rational, reactions. The time to stop is at the beginning. Mr. President, I was not in this body In 1964, when the debate over the Ton- ..kin Gulf Resolution took place. ? The approval of that resolution led inevitably to ,the catastrophic escalation of the war in Vietnam. There are many here now who were here then?and have long since come to regret the action that the overwhelming majority of the Senate took that day? on August 7, 1064, by a vote of 88 to 2. Just before that historic vote took place, the late, great Senator Wayne ? Morse of Oregon, who?along with the late, distinguished Senator from Alaska Ernest Gruening?were the sole dissent- ers that day, made a speech on the floor of this body. For its courage, prescience and inherent wisdom, it must go down as one of the greatest speeches ever delivered in the U.S. Senate. Senators Morse and Gruening both lost their seats in 19?8, and died less than a month apart in 1974. Their voices cannot instruct us now. But, for the benefit of those who did net hear that 1964 speech, and as a re- der 0 those who heard, but did not heed Ifs.1,nmage, I ask unanimous con- sent that Senator Morse's speech be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the mate- rial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: SPEECH OF SENATOR MORSE Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, in view of the debate which took place last night, which we did not contemplate at the time we en- tered into the unanimous-consent agree- ment, as I have stated to the majority lead- er, I wish now that we had fixed the time to vote at 12 o'clock today. There is little re- maining to add, by way of rebuttal, to what I said last night, except the points that I shall cover this morning. However, I do want to discuss in some detail the predated de- claration of war aspects of this unfortunate resolution. I hope, as I said to the majority leader, that the defenders of this unfortunate re- solution will come to the floor of the Senate and give a defense of it in answer to the points that I made in rebuttal last night and shall amplify this morning. I am wait- ing for their replies. I have a little reply of my own to make this morning to the Washington Post. There is a very fallacious editorial in this morning's Washington Post entitled "Democracy's Re- sponse." I ask unanimous consent that it be printed at this point in the RECORD. There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: DEMOCRACY'S RESPONSE Congress is responding with commendable promptness and with an almost unanimous voice to President Johnson's request for sup- port in the Southeast Asia crisis. The President consulted the leaders of both Houses and then asked for a supporting res- olution not only because he felt the neces- sity for congressional approval of what is being done, but also because he wished to demonstrate before the world the unity of the American people in resisting Communist aggression. That unity has been demon- strated despite the reckless and querulous dissent of Senator MORSE. There is no substance in Senator MORSE'S charge that the resolution amounts to a "predated declaration of war." On the con- trary, it reaffirms the longstanding policy of the United States of aiding the States cov- ered by the Southeast Asia Collective De- fense Treaty in the protection of their free- doin as a contribution to international peace. It pledges military action only to resist ag- gression against American forces in that area. Of course, the President has authority to respond to attacks upon American forces without any approval in advance by Con- gress. So the resolution means only a re- commitment of the Nation to the policy it has been following?an almost unanimous recommitment in the face of the inexplica- ble North Vietnamese challenge. This means of reasserting the national will, far short of a declaration of war, fol- lows sound -precedents set in other crises. President Johnson noted in his message to Congress that similar resolutions had been passed at the request of President Eisen- hower in connection with the threat to For- mosa in 1955 and the threat to the Middle East in 1957. The same course was followed in 1962 at the request of President Kennedy to meet the missile threat in Cuba. None of these emergencies lead to War. Rether, the firm action that this country took inter- rupted Communist maneuvers that might otherwise have led to war. Congress ought to be very pleased with the now firm establishment of this mecha- nism fer meeting an emergency with a unit- ed front. Reliance solely upon the power of Congress to declare war as a last resort would not be appropriate in these days of repeated criseg short of war. A resolution S 23057 of support for the executive arm in meeting an emergency has all the virtue of rallying national strength behind a firm policy? without taking the calamitous step of war in this nuclear age. We surmise that the al- most unanimous sentiment behind this res- olution on Capitol Hill reflects appreciation for the President's sharing of responsibility as well as support for the tough punishment for aggression that he initiated. Mr. MORSE. The Washington Post has demonstrated in editorial after editorial that it does not have a good constitutional law- yer on its editorial staff. The editorials pub- lished in the newspaper demonstrated that fact constantly. In an editorial which ap- peared in this morning's issue of the news- paper there appears the following statement: "There is no substance in Senator Morse's charge that the resolution amounts to a 'predated declaration of war,'" One wonders whether or not the editorial writer has ever read the joint resolution. No one can read the joint resolution and the authority proposed to be given the President in the joint resolution without recognizing that it would clearly authorize the President to proceed to follow whatever courses of action are necessary in his opinion and such action would constitute authority to con- duct war. I should like to make an additional com- ment on a statement in the editorial in re- ference to resolutions / passed by previous Congresses. In the body of the editorial the statement is made: "President Johnson noted in his message to Congress that similar resolutions had been passed at the request of Preeident Eisen- hower in connection with the threat to For- mosa in 1955 and the threat to the Middle East in 1947. The same course was followed in 1962 at the request of President Kennedy to meet the missile threat in Cuba." The editorial writer apparently had not read, or certainly had not read recently be- fore he wrote that editorial, the Cuban reso- lution, for there is no similarity between the Cuban resolution on the one hand and the Formosa, the Middle East, and the pending resolutions on the other hand But returning to the comment of the Washington Post that there is no sub- stance in Senator Morse's charge that the resolution amounts to a "predated declara- tion of war," I should like to read for the benefit of that unenlightened editorial writ- er of the Washington Post page 2 of the joint resolution: "Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress approves and supports the determi- nation of the President?" Not the Congress, but of the President? "as Commander in Chief, to take all neces- sary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to Prevent further aggression." The joint resolution thus gives the Presi- dent warmaking power. I shall come to another section of the reso- lution same item in a moment. The Com- mander in Chief, the President of the United States, has the inherent constitutional power immediately to defend the United States in case of an attaek, but he does not have the inherent power after that immediate defense to proceed to make war. That is the distinc- tion which this unenlightened editorial writer of the Washington Post has never grasped. Mr. President, the right of immediate de- fense is something quite different from the right to proceed to lay out a campaign of war. Under the joint resolution the President would be given the authority to go beyond Immediate self-defense of the United States and proceed with a war campaign. That is Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP7711/100144R000400100018-1 S 23058 Approved For ReiwuveRyggiloW1/ WI3litI3LMffit4IR004001099klber?4-19, 17 5 why I say today, as I said in 1955, and as I said at the time of the Middle East resolution, that such resolutions constitute a predated declaration of war. The Washington Post edi- torial writers ought to consult with Senators who occupy high positions in the Senate on the other side of the issue in connection with the defense activities of the country. They might be surprised to learn that they are not quarreling with the Senator from Oregon in regard to the effect of the joint resolution. The joint resolution does propose to give the President of the United States au- thority beyond the inherent authority that he already possesses to act immediately in national self-defense. Mr. President, that is a very important dis- tinction, in constitutional law. The Senator from Oregon repeats that, under the Con- stitution, the President has no power to wage war until a declaration of war is passed by the Congress. The joint resolution is a con- travention of article I, section 8, of the Con- stitution, just as the Formosa resolution and the Middle East resoluticin were contraven- tions of the Constitution and caused the se- nior Senator from Oregon in the debate on those two resolutitons to take a stand in opposition. As one of the Armed Services Committee leaders of the Semite told me this morning. "Wayne, there is no difference be- tween the position that you are taking to- day and the position that you have taken consistently with regard to the other resolu- tions. No one can really quarrel with your conclusion that the joint resolution does go beyond the inherent authority of the Presi- dent to act in the self-defense of our coun- try and does vest in him authority to pro- ceed to carry out a campaign that amounts in fact to the waging of war." Mr. President, I do not believe we should do it. Tt is Dpit necessary to do it. There is inherent power in the President as Com- Mender in Chief under the Constitution to meet an attack immediately, and then come to the Congress of the United States asking for a declaration of war. We should reaufre those steps, rather than give the President blanket authority under the joint resolution to proceed to wage war without a declaration of war. Ah, but it may he said, and is said, by Some in conversations with me, "But, WAYNE, a President would not do that for very long." do not care whether he does it for a short time or a long time. It is not neces- sary for him to do it, so long as he has the inherent authority to meet attack with im- mediate self-defense actions. As I said in 1955. I believe it is important in these trying times that we not extend and expand the authority of the President of the United States beyond the limits of the Constitution. It may be said that if the President should commit an unconstitutional act under the joint resolution, or if the joint resolution in effect, as argued by the Senator from Oregon, is an attempt to give to the Presi- dent an unconstitutional power, he can be checked. I wish I could say that he could be. The difficulty in relation to these constitu- tional questions as they involve the Presi- dency of the United States is that we do not have a procedure far having them tested in the U.S. Supreme Court. That has been the subject of great discussion, concern, and de- bate among constitutional lawyers for many decades. It is difficult to bring the President of the United States before the U.S. Supreme Court. Our constitutional fathers provided for other procedural checks upon the Presi- dent of tire 'United States, one of which is impeachment, which, of course, is unthink- able when we have a President who seeks only in the exercise of his powers--though he may be mistaken in regard to having ex- ceeded an inherent power?to protect the Interest of the *United States. But that is a check that is provided in the Constitution. Then, of course, we cheek the President In regard to the purse strings by way of ap- propriations. We have the authority, of course, to check the President by way of appropriations, with his ancillary check on Congress of the veto. It is not impossible to eventually get a case before the Supreme Court involving the vsarmmaking powers of the President, but the legal road could be long and tortuous. The time consumed would make the ques- tion moot by the time it was decided as -far as the emergency is concerned will give rise to the issue in the first instance. When Congress passes a joint resolution such as this, it is practically impossible?in fact, I think it impracticable?procedurally to have the power checked, on constitutional grounds, before the U.S. Supreme Court. I do not know, and I know of no constitutional lawyer who has ever been able to point out, a procedure by which we could bring the President before the Court on the charge that he was making war unconstitutionally. I can hear the Court, in refusing jurisdiction, sat, "Congress will have to follow the pro- cedures set out in the Constitution for check- ing the President." So I am concerned about the resolution in respect to its giving to the President what I honestly and sincerely believe is an uncon- stitutional power?that is, the power to make war without a declaration of war. It feeds a political trend in this country that needs to be checked. For some time past in this Republic we have been moving in the direction of a government by executive supremacy. It is very interesting to listen to the argu- ments that one hears for extending and expanding the power of the White House. It is extremely important?and I speak sob- erly and out of a depth of great sincerity? that we never grant a single power to any President, I care not who he is, that in any way cannot be reconciled with that precious fundamental foundation of our Republic; namely, a system of three coordinate and coequal branches of Government. It is dangerous to the freedoms and liberties of the American people to vest in any President, at any time, under any cir- cumstances, power that exceeds the con- stitutional concept of three coordinate and coequal branches of Government. The American people will quickly lose their liberty if you do not stop feeding the trend toward Government by executive supremacy. In my opinion, the joint resolution would do just exactly that. It would give to the President of the United States an authority which, in my judgment, he does not need, by any stretch of the imagination. He has inherent power to react, in the self-defense of this Republic, in the event of an immedi- ate attack. It is particularly essential that we con- tinue to require a President of the United States to conform to article /, section 8, of the Constitution, in regard to making war, and that we continue to hold any Presi- dent?I care not who he is?under the strict- est restraint with regard to the making of war. We have entered an era of civilization in which an unconstitutional act of war on the part of a President of the United States can lead to nuclear war and the end of this Republic, no matter how sincere a Presi- dent may be in his intentions in respect to exercising the power to make war. We need to be on guard in respect to vest- ing power in the ? White House. The White House has plenty of power under the Con- stitution. I am for giving the White House no more power than the Constitution gives him. I have heard sincere colleagues on the floor of the Senate?and I respect them? differ with me in regard to the effect of the joint resolution. There are also colleagues on the other side of the issue who have come to me and said, as did one who discussed it with me this morning, "WAYNE, there is no doubt as to the effect of the resolution that you are pointing out, and that you pointed out in 1955. It bothered sue in 1955; but we have every reason to count on the fact that the President of the United States will not abuse the power." Mr. President, I do not think he would deliberately abuse the power, but he could most sincerely exercise the power in a man- ner that would result in great damage to this Republic. There is an elementary rule of law which states that when we come to deal with pro- cedural matters, if a procedure is subject to abuse we had better change the procedure. My majority leader, who always is courte- ous to me and was exceedingly courteous to me in arranging the format for this debate, has heard me say many times as we have served together in this body that we should never forget that our substantive rights are never any better, and can never be any bet- ter, than our procedural rights. Our proce- dural rights determine our substantive rights. There are no substantive rights un- less there are procedures for implementing them. I have said many times?and the statement should be applied to this issue, because it is applicable?let me determine the procedure of any human institution or the administra- tion of any law, and I will determine all the substantive rights anyone may have under that law, that tribunal, or that administra- tive body. Let me determine the procedure of any courtroom. and I will determine all the substantive rights that can be adjudi- cated in that courtroom. Although some critics will say that this principle involves a legalistic abstraction, nevertheless the great principles of so- called legalistic abstraction are principles that determine, in the last analysis, whether one remains a free man or not. This is true because the procedures of our Government written into the Constitution and the laws of our country determine our substantive rights as freemen. In my judgment, the pending joint res- olution tinkers with and impairs the great procedural rights of the American people written in article I. section 8 of the Consti- tution?namely, that the power and the right to declare war is vested in the Congress, and not in the President of the United States. War cannot be declared speculatively; war cannot be declared in futuro under article I, section 8 of the Constitution. War cannot be declared to meet hypothetical situations yet to arise on the horizons of the world. War is declared in relation to existing operative facts of the moment of the call for a declara- tion of war. In the resolution before the Senate?and I shall read the section to which I have re- ferred and another section momentarily? the President of the United States would be given power to make war in relation to opera- tive facts not now in. existence, but which may come into existence in futuro. That cannot be reconciled with article I, section 8 of the Constitution. For the education of the unenlightened editor of the Washington Post who wrote the ignorant editorial in respect to this con- stitutional point, I hope he will reread arti- cle I, section 8 of the Constitution, and that he will read again?assuming that he ever read the resolution before he wrote the editorial?the section to which I have referred and read, and which I repeat. That part of the joint resolution reads: "The Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Com- mander in Chief, to take all necessary meas- Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 akemeer 19, /45031-"ed FT-M6AspANNAMOkted&BORRIAlittit4R000400100018-1 S 23059 tires to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression." Let :us analyze that sentence for a mo- ment. Let us analyze that part of the sen- tence that deals ivith the inherent power of any, commander in chief, any President, to repot immediately in the defense of this Republic. That part of the sentence is not needed. He has that power now. If there is to be read into that part of the sentence which starts on line 4?"to take all necessary measure? to repel any armed attack against the Sprees of the United States"?authority to commit an act of aggression, preventive in nature, it goes beyond the Constitution. That was my argument in 1955. How well I remember it. In 1955 I participated in the Sallee format of committee organization in which I took part yesterday namely, a joint meeting of the Armed Servides 'Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee. I op- posed the Formosa reeolution. My recollec- tion is that in 'committee in 1955 two of us tea that position. When we came to the tiOor of the Senate, my recollection is that I WaS supported by a third fneinber, as / said last night,. the great Senator from New York, Herbert Lehman ; .and I believe we ended in 106 with three Senators voting against the resolutien, As I remember my opening speech in. 1955--and,?thaRECORD will speak for it- self?I said, as I say now, that I was stand- ing in a position on the floor of the Senate in which a few ,other liberals had stood throughout the history of this great par: liaMentary body. Like them I was confront- bd_with the choice of telling, the American people What I was satisfied they were en- titled to know about their foreign policy, and run the risk Of violating the rules of eeereCer of the Senate, thereby risking the discipline of the Senate, or failing in my ob- ligation to tell the American people things that $tlaought they were entitled to know in regard to the foreign policy of the coun- try and avoid running the 'risk of being dis- ciplined by the .0e/fate. If Senators will read that speech they wlleee that I said I thought I could give the American people what they should be War led about within the rules of the Sen- ate, without subjecting myself to Senate discipline. Senators will tnci. that I said?I paraphrase the Speech, but accurately: "I wish to tell the American people that this a preventive war resolution; and if any Senator has any question about it, let him go to the floor below and read the testi- him go to the Foreign Relations Committee on the floor below - and read" the testimony of the Secretary of State? Who Was then John Foster Dullee 'tan1 the testimony of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Military Estab- lishment?" Who was then Admiral Radford. I said: If Senators will read that testimony, they will know that behind this resolution is the proposal that the Military Establishment and those in charge of American foreign p6I- icy are to be 'given the authbrity to make a strike against the mainland of China before China makes a 'Strike against the 'United States, Such a strike would be an act of aggression. Such is strike would be an act of war. Authorization for such a strike in the Formosa resolution amounts to seeking to give to the Military Establistiment,'with- out a decleration of war, the power to make War. Senators wfll find that clear power in the rasorutiorr." Senators will remeniber that in 1055 the senior Senator from Oregon took that posi- tion in the hearing before the committee gy, ptsitiofi became known. -After I teink that position the chairman of the committees sit- ting jointly, Mr. Walter George, of Georgia, declared a recess, and announced that he would go to the White House for the pur- pose of discussing with the President the argstment that I had made in committee. He went to the White House. Out of that con- ference came the famous White House pro- nouncement with respect to the Formosa res- olution, in which President Eisenhower an- nounced that he, and he alone, would make the decision under that resolution as to what course of action this Government would fol- low in implementing the Formosa resolution. Senator George came back and had a con- ference with me. He thanked me for what he considered to be the service I had ren- dered. He said, "It was a very important service. I would not support the resolution in the absence of the White House an- nouncement," He said, "WAYNE, I hope you will work with me now to help get the resolution through the Senate." I said to the chairman of the Foreign Rela- tions Committee, who served on that oc- casion as chairman of the committees sitting jointly. "That does not make it any better so far as I am concerned. You missed the point of my objection. Although the testi- mony in committee would have left the im- pression that the Secretary of State and the military officials could have made the deci- sion, they will still he making tb e decision, because the President will follow their ad- vice." I said, "I would not vote for it if they had no voice in it at all, because I will not vote to give to any President this power, because the Congress of the United States must jealously guard its prerogatives under article I, section 8 of the Constitution. All that the President needs to do is to come be- fore Congress and ask for a declaration of war. He has inherent authority to meet an emergency that requires national self-de- fense action prior to the time he gets to the Congress." Senators will note in the RECORD that I used the beginning of the war with Japan as a precedent. I said, "After the strike at Pearl Harbor, Franklin Delano Roosevelt exercised the power as Commander in Chief to defend tihs country in national self-defense, but he came to Congress for a declaration of war. I made that argument in 1955. I repeated it in summary form at the time of the Mid- dle East difficulty, and I am summarizing it again in this historic debate. I have heard no answer in all the inter- vening years to the constitutional point that I now raise, and of which the editor of the Washington Post who wrote the editorial this morning is abysmally ignorant. Mr. President, this joint resolution is not needed for the defense of the Republic. It should not be used to make an end run around article I, section 8, of the Constitu- tion. So long as an attack is in progress, the President has the inherent power to protect the Republic in self-defense. But there is reserved to Congress, under the Constitution, the responsibility of passing judgment on whether, or not even an attack calls for our declaring war. It may very Well be that after a response to an attack, the attacking party may start diplomatic maneuvers into mo- tion?to surrender, to capitulate, to ask for a negotiated settlement, or to resort to the rule of law?which might cause Congress, in exercising its authority under the Constitu- tion, to check the President and cause him to decide not to make war at that time. It is an important procedural check. It is easy, understandable, and natural in a time of high national emotion, in a time of strong patriotic fervor, to say, "Give 'em th,e works." It is also true that in such an hour of high national emotion and hysteria, we who sit in seats of responsibility, so far as the legislative process Is concerned, can say, "Let us Wait. Let Us first analyze the situation on the facts and 'then vote the au- thority that is needed to Meitect the country. Sincere and honest men can differ as to the procedural form that the grant of such au- thority shall take." In 1955. and again in 1957 the senior Sena- tor from Oregon took the position, as he does in the instance of this resolution, that the Middle East resolution and the Formosa resolution would be grants of authority to the President to exercise power which would amount to predated declarations of war. That should not he done. It is not necessary. All the world knows that any country that at- tacks the United States will be met immedia- ately with the exercise of the inherent power of the President, under the Constitution, to defend the Republic. All the world knows that if any country continues an attack upon this country, the President will come before this body and quickly, as the great Roosevelt did after Pear Harbor, in 1941, obtain from Congress a declaratien of war. What more is needed? A constitutional principle, is involved. It is dangerous to give to any President an un- checked power, after the passage of a joint resolution, to make war. Consider the proce- dural conmplications that could develop if Congress decided that the President was making serious mistakes in the conduct of a personal war?for it would be a Presidetial war at that point. How could the President be stopped? He could not be stopped. Con- sider what would happen to this Republic if we got into that kind of conflict with the President in carrying out the joint res- olution. But, say some, see what the end of sec- tion 3 provides: "This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably as- sured by International conditions created by action of the United Nations or Otherwise except that it may be terminated earlier by concurrent resolution of the Congress." That would create a nice mess, would it not? That would be a nice portrait of the United States to paint before the eyes of the world. What havoc of disunity that kind of procedure' would encompass. What is wrong with letting the Consti- tution operate as written by our constitu- tional fathers? Why this indirect amend- ment of the Constitution? There are Sena- tors, for whom I have deep affection, who become a little shaken, in our private con- versations, when I say, "What you are really seeking to do is to get around the amending process of the Constitution. In effect, you are trying to get around article I, section 8, by amending the Constitution by way of a joint resolution." I do not believe we ought to establish any more precedents of this kind. I do not ac- cept the argument that because we have made two mistakes in the past?we made no mistake in connection with the Cuban reso- lution; and I shall speak of that later?be- cause we made mistakes in the Formosa and the Middle East joint resolutions, we can make another one. Eyed a repetition of mis- takes does not create a legal right in the President. I do not believe it is good legisla, tive procesS to repeat Mistakes. We ought to stop making them. In effect this joint resolution constitutes an amendment of article I, section 8, Of the Constitution, in that it would give the Pres- ident, in practice and effect, the power to make war in the absence of a declaration of war. It is also important to demonstrate to the world, including the free nations, that the Constitution of the United States is not an instrument to be tinkered with; that the Constitution is a precious, sacred &omit-nen% so far as our form 6f government is con- cerned, and is not subject to subversion in the 'legislative process. We should never miss an opportunity to demonstrate this prin- ciple to the totalitarian nittons of the world. We should never forget that under Fascist or Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 S 23060 ; Approved For Its&CseRMaicktfrythR1z1kssivN00400109904,ber Communist regimes there are no rights and liberties of the person It is proposed, by this joint resolution, to subvert the Constitution. We are engaging in a subterfuge, so far as article I, Section 8, is concerned. We should not do that. We should not in any resolution tinker' with the Constitution in respect to the powers and prerogatives of the Pr?dent, and the limi- tations upon such powers and prerogatives. Going back to section 1 of the resolution, I assert again that in the language "to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States," there is no question about the in- herent power of the President to do so with- out a-resolution. I have stated that if this proposed grant of P6wer implies 'that the right- of the Pres- ident of the United States to take all the necessary measures to "repel any armed- at- tack against the forces of the United Statee?which former Secretary of State Dulles and Admiral Radford asked for in 1954?includes the authority to commit an 'act of aggression before an act of aggression is committed ,against the 'United States, on the basis of the theory of a preventive war, that is a dangerous doctrine. It cannot pos- sibly be reconciled with the Constitution; nor can it be reconciled with sound national policy. renleinher that in 1955 former Secretary of State Dulles said to me, "Would you wait for the Red Chinese to strike?" My reply was that when I thought of the billions of dollars I had joined in voting for the defense of my country, including great Sums -of money for intelligenee serv- ice, if there were particular concern about a Red Chinese air base closet to the coast of Alaska and our intelligence agency had given us repOrtarta to what it had found in regard to the size of that Communist air armada, I would wish 'to believe that when the first Red Chinese plane left the ground and started for Alaska, our alerting stations and our intelligence would 'be such that our planes would meet it before it ever reached Alaska. At that. time, I also made perfectly clear ? to foilner Secretary of State Dulles and fornier-Chairrnan of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral 13,adforci, that under international law weScquld -not possibly justify our being an,, aggl'esSbr in 'the first instance. 1 frankly stated that it was a risk Which we must run in order to remaln in a ktind constitutional framework, under our system of government. Why should we give arbitrary discretion to mere men who happen to hold office at a given tirae, when the American people and their lives. are at the mercy of the discre- tion of those mere men? One Of the great protections that the American people have in constitutional theory, under our form of government, is that we are 11. government of laws and not of men. Granted, we are a 'government of laws, it is also true that those laws must be administered by men. Human failings being what they are, we Must always keep a check on the exercise of the 'discretion of mere men Who 4Cipiltitste'r government, or we shall constantly run the risk Of being victimized by arbitrary 6,ta capricibus discretion. ' 'In 1955, I made clear that / had observed too frequently the psychology of trigger- happy military men, and the psychology of diplomats who convince themselves that it is necessary to pull the trigger before an act .of war has been committed against us.: Mr. President, we like to boast?and for the most part our glorious history sustains the boast?that we are not an aggressor na- tion. Resolutions such as the pending joint resolution, as well as the Formosa resolution and the Middle East resolution, frequently raise, grave doubts among our friends in the ,trok wor7.4, as to whether there are not great differences between our theory and our practice. So, then as now, on the constitutional grounds to which I objected in the Formosa resolution, / voted against it?as I shall vote against the pending joint resolution today. / repeat this, so that there can be no mis- understanding of my position: So far as the inherent right of the President to meet an aggression in the self-defense of the Republic is concerned, the pending resolution is not needed. The President has that inherent right now, under the Constitution. But, so far as having any right to commit an act of war in the absence of an aggression, he does not have that right under the Constitution. The 'pending resolution cannot give it to him un- der the Constitution. Of course, we can sanction his exercise of that unconstitutional right. That is what the Senate will be doing today in adopting the pending resolution. In constitutional effect, the Congress is caving to the President, "You can go ahead and act unconstitutionally and we will look the other way," because it is known that there is no existing procedure :which would be effective by which we can check the President. Once the pending resolution is adopted, the Senate thereby will sanction such conduct. There is no way to check it by taking the case before the U.S, Supreme Court for final determination of the constitutionality of this , course of action in time to be effective. I am asked, "Should we not amend the Constitution in this respect?" ? I believe that we should amend it by clearly denying to the Congress the power to pass such a resolution as this one. Because the past situations such as are present in this case are such rarities, so extraordinary and so novel, I am enough of a political realist to know that we shall never get anywhere with that kind of constitutional amendment. The only time we become interested in it is when a crisis such as this exists. When a crisis ex- ists, it is so serious that people are not going to become interested in a very important con- stitutional abstraction, even though it is a constitutional abstraction which after all, is determinative, in the last analysis, of their rights as free men. In times of hysteria and high national emo- tionalism, it is only human for most people, particularly those not sitting in the seats of legislative responsibility, to be willing to look the other way on such questions as I raise in this debate again this year. But I believe it is so dangerous to establish another prece- dent toward the creation of a government by Executive sunremacy in the United States, that I am willing to stand up and oppose the overwhelming riutiority against me, and take all the Castigation and criticism which is bound to be heaned upon :my head, for a constitutional principle that I am sincerely convinced is vital to the very preservation of this Republic. I am satisfied that if we continue to build up a Wall, brick by brick, precedent by prece- dent, which separates the executive branch of the Government from the people, resulting in making the executive branch of the Gov- ernment more and more inaccessible to direct control, we shall endanger the very survival and Preservation of the Republic and our constitutional system upon which it is based. Mr. President, if it is self-defense we are concerned about, we do not need this resolu- tion. If it is lo empower the President to commit an act of aggression before an act of ' aggreasion is committed upon us, as was the program in 1955, and as was openly testified to, let me say?I can say it now?as the transcript will show, by the Secretary of State and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time, it is a dangerous prece- dent, a power that never should be given, never should have been granted by the Con- gress, and should not be granted now under the pending resolution. Turning to the language I have read, "to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States," does that mean that the attack must have started, or does it mean that all the President and his advisers have to conclude is that in all probability an attack may be made. That is preventive war. There is no power in the Constitution for the President of the United States to wage a preventive war. I cannot imagine a set of hypothetical facts which would cause the President of the United States, the Congress, the Department of State, and those in the Pentagon Building to become alarmed about the danger of an attack against the United States that cannot , be taken immediately to existing channels of international law. The right of national self- defense would still vest in the inherent con- stitutional power of the President. The fact that we are not doing very much about using those channels of international law does not excuse Us. And as we use those channels of international law, the inherent power of the President to defend this country continues. With all the military might of this country at the present time, the world knows that that power of self-defense is adequate to protect the security interests of this coun- try until the processes of international law can run their course. There is no question about the meaning of the next four words on line 6 of page 2 clearly authorize?"to prevent further aggression." That is when the whole realm of judgment upon the part of the President of the United States comes into play. That is when we sub- stitute the President for article I, section 8 of the Constitution. That is when we say to tb e President, "You can go beyond acts of immediate self-defense of the Republic. You do not have to come to the Congress, as Franklin Roosevelt did after Pearl Harbor, and ask for a declaration of war. You can proceed in the exercise of your judgment to prevent further aggression." The uninformed, unenlightened editor of the Washington Post who wrote that stupid editorial in this morning's paper has not the slightest conception of the meaning of those words. If he had, he would not have written in his editorial: "There is no substance in Senator MORSE'S charge that the resolution amounts to a 'predated declaration of war.'" ? There is no doubt that the language, "to prevent further aggression," rouses all the objections that I made in 1955 to the Formosa resolution. This proposal seeks to vest in the President of the United States the power to carry on a so-called preventive war. By preventive war, we mean making a war against another country because it is as- sumed that that country is about to make war, or contemplates making war, against the United States. Such authority is not to be fonnd in the Constitution. The Congress cannot give such authority to the President of the United States as far as the Constitu- tion is concerned. It can sanction the exer- cise of the authority, but the exercise of the authority would still be just as much outside the Constitution as though the President acted without the joint resolution. The joint resolution could never make legal the exercise of such authority by the Presi- dent of the United States. That is not the only place in the resolution in which we would give to the President a preventive war anthority. I refer the Senate to section 2, line 7, which provides? "SEC. 2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution?" It has been agreed, by way of an amend- Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 Deelemb al, 19, Approved Foc6gligitpsIMAIALOUEcjekitie7gMliSER000400100018-1 meht to the joint resolution, that that means the 'PonStittreion ot the United States? ' "and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the SoUtheesi Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President, deter:tea, to take all necessary steps, including he use Of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the eCtotheast Asia C011eCtive Defense Treaty re- questing assistance in defense of its free- dom." President, that is an awfui, power to give to a President. If the Washington Porit does not think that that is a predated declar- ation of war, the editor ought' to start asking himself some questions about certain hypo- thetical situations. Shall we allow any President ofthe "United States to decide, !Atli no 'chick?that' is, no check for ienrced4te Application?to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to absist any menthes- or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Coll:cc-dye Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of Its freedom? We bad better ?pease r'leng enough to take a look at the nature of poipe Of the countries involved, because Many of the' countries are nOt free eoutitriei 14a,ny of those countries ate totalitarian CouritrieS. Many of those countries , are dietatorSblps. It is wishful thinking to assume that it Would be safe to give the President of the 'United States un- checked authority: to'Proceed"fo Use American boys in defense of those countries on the ba- sis of claims that ects of aggression are being committed against them by some other coun- try, without a 'congressional 'Check. Have we reached the point' in American foreign pol- icy where we are going to permit the Presi- dent to send. Americanboys tO their death in the defense of military dictatorships, men- archles, and fascist regitheg around' the world with Which we have., entered into treaty obli- gations involving mutual security, no matter What the provocation and no matter what wrongs they May haVe cbriamitted that cause an attack upon f,hern? Are We going' to do that without et'clack of,69ngress by way of a declaration of Wan. What are we thinking of? Whet, time' factor Would petify such precipi- tate *lotion? a Mr. President, this Senator will never vote to send an American. boy to his death, any- where in the world under any such language as is contained in 'that part of the joint reso- lution. It Is Of litrilOst importance that we surround that language with ,a,eongresaional check. And there is none. One 'could Say, as I said a few moments - ago, "But, Mr. Senator, the Congress can ter- minate this authority by a concurrent reso- lution." , I have already pointed Out the kind of hassle that such a situation. would create, and the lend Of.Cliaunity :that such action would produce. The American people should be protected from a possible abuse Of the authority. So long as abuse of a procedure is pdssible, the procedure should be Modified to prevent the pOssibility of the abuse. Mr. President, that is why it is so impor- tant that we hold any, President?I care not who he is?to Article T, section 8, of the Con- stitutiell.ln the carrying out of mutual se- entity agreements. We should hold him to the approiAra/ f th-e bongrese ;before t1i6 fact and not after the feet. . Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will the Sen- ator yield? Mr. MORSE. I. yield. 'Mr: Gatrzwrsls.. I wish the _Senator .would discuss what seems to, me the RbViglia esca- lation of the. War by the authority granted in Seal= 2 of the joint resolution? "To assist any member or Protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective IlefenSe Treaty." Mr. MORSE. I was about to do so. Mr. Cbruzwrsza. Hitherto we have been deal- ing wholly with south Vietnam. The Presi- dent has stated his puirpose, which is quite evident?not to extend the war. In the section to which I referred we are ineluding a number of additional nations into which we could send our Armed Forces. The Joint resolution would extend the pros- pective war all over southeast Asia, would it not? Mr. MORSE. It certainly would, with no check on it. Mr. GRITENING. In other words, in effect, the Congress would authoriZe an escalation of the war to Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, North Vietnam, South Vietnam--and what else? Mr. MORSE. Pakistan. Mr. GRUENING. I have in my possession, which I intend to present when the foreign aid bill comes before the Senate, a statement from a high official of Pakistan indicating that his government has no intention of 'using the nearly$1 billion in military aid that we have given to Pakistan to help out our cause because it is needed in their pros- peetive difficulties with India. Mr. MORSE. The Foreign Minister of Pald- stan in effect made that statement in Wash- ington, D.C., when he addressed the Press Club not so many weeks ago. He was asked by a newspaperman at the meeting to state whether or not Pakistan could be counted upbn to 'be of assistance in southeast Asia. He said, "No." He gave his reason. Ills reason was Paki- stan's involvement with India. Pakistan has no intention of responding to any calls to SEATO members. I yield further. GRUENING. It seems to me that the joint resolution presents an unlimited au- thorization for war anywhere in southeast Asia, including Pakistan, which is really not In southeast Asia, but which is in south cen- tral Asia, and it seems to me a very danger- ous, unwarranted, and unprecedented action. Mr. Aloasz. Do not forget, Pakistan is a member of SEATO; it obligations to South Vietnam are the same as ours. Mr. GRUENING. Yes; but It has shown no disposition whatever to carry out its obliga- tions under that treaty. Mr. Mossz. That is correct: but, she being a SEATO member, we would be obligated to go to her assistance. Mr. GRUEN/NO. This resolution, in effect, is an authorization which would be the equivalent of a declaration of war by the Congress. Would it not be? Mr. MORSE. I think so. Mr. GRUENING. That is one thing I am very apprehensive about. If we should get into an all-out war, which I fear may happen, this resolution would be considered the au- thorization by the Congress to so proceed. Would it not? Mr. MORSE. That is correct. Mr. GRUENING. I expressed my views on it yesterday. I do not at all criticize the Presi- dent?in fact, I think the President was cor- rect?for repelling the assault, whatever may be the background, on American vessels and destroying the attackers. I approve of that action, but the resolution goes far beyond such action, which apparently precipitated the request by the President for such a reso- lution, and covers the whole of the south- east Asia area. I distinctly disagree with the administration policy. As I have stated repeatedly, this was a policy which the President inherited, and from which I hoped he would disengage him- self. He inherited it from the Eisenhower ad- ministration, from John Foster Dulles, when we picked up the fiasco the French had en- gaged in with the loss of over 100,000 young lives. We contributed vast sums of money to that operation. It was obviously a failure. Now we have escalated it, as could be fore- 8 23061 seen, and as I in fact did foretell, and as the Senator from Oregon foretold, into an all- out wax in southeast Asia. -Regrettably, the end is not Yet. I am extremely fearful about the situation. This is a moment when patriotic passions are around, and it seems indicated that we should do whatever the President asks. It is very painful for those of us who dis- agree with the policy. I felt it was wrong in the beginning and have repeatedly stated for 5 months that I thought it was wrong, and that we should continue to try to find a peaceful solution; that we should take the issue to the United Nations, and seek a cease fire. It is, as I have said, painful not to sup- port the President, but I cannot do so in good 'conscience under the blanket terms of this resolution. Mr. MORSE. As the Senator knows, last night it was impossible for him, because of a previous appointment, to be present when I paid my high respects to him for his cour- age, statesmanship, and leadership in this matter for many months past. I said last night that the Senator from Alaska had put the issue squarely. Now, in a very few moments, the Senator from Alaska has summarized succinctly the major points of the address I have been making on the floor of the Senate the last hour and 15 minutes. I wish to formalize those points before I come to the next ma- jor issue which I shall discuss in my speech. What I have said expresses my views as to the power that would be granted to the President in the resolution.. It is what I have called an undated declaration of war. I summarize the points as follows:. First, the unlimited language of the res- olution would authorize acts of war without specifying countries, places, or times. That language cannot be reconciled with article I, section 8 of the Constitution. It amounts, in fact as well as in law, to a predated declaration of war. Next, as I said last night, we have armed forces in South Vietnam, some 20,000. or more, apparently, with the number increas- ing by planeload after planeload. - Senators can bemoan and warn against a land war in Asia, but the resolution would put the United States in the middle of the Vietnam civil war, which is basically a land' war. Under the resolution Congress would give to the President of the United States great authority, without coming to the Congress and obtaining approval by way of a declara- tion of war, to carry on a land war in South Vietnam. The choice is left up to him. As I said last night, the interesting thing is that South Vietnam, with a population of 15 million, and an armed force of 400,000 to 450,000 men, has been unable, through all the years of the holocaust in South Vietnam, to put down a Vietcong force of a maximum of 35,000 men. The Pentagon and the State Department, in testifying before the com- mittee, say the number probably does not exceed 25,000. We have to have more than 20,000 American boys over there, to die in whatever numbers they are killed, in an at- tempt to win that war. And for whom? Mr. President, the leaders of this Govern- ment keep talking about freedom in South Vietnam. There is not one iota of freedom in South Vietnam, for the South Vietnamese people, by and large, do not know what the word means. I quoted, in a speech the day be- fore yesterday, a letter I received from a Re- publican Member of Congress, in full support of the position I have taken on this issue. I paraphrase it, although the quotation is already in the RECORD. He said that the aver- age man of North or South Vietnam would not know what democracy looked like if he met it on the main street of Saigon. The dif- ference between their governments is like the difference between tweedledum. and Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 23062 Approved For WITINGRESSICINAL : triCia11137-magi4gro004001okfffberY 9, 1,1115 tweedledee. But both are interested in the neg 'bowl of rice. That is why this Senator has been pleading for years, in connection with foreign policy, that the great need of the United States in the field of foreign policy is to export eco- 11011110 freedom, and to stop exporting mill. tary aid, for 'Our military aid makes Corn- raunista. Prepare the seedbeds of economic freedont Unless the people are first eco- country and we prepare for the growth of freedom. Unless the people are first eco- nomioaily tree, they cannot be politically free; and, what is more important, they will .never understand political freedom until they are first economically free. There is , great danger now that Con- gress will give to the President of the United States power to carry on whatever type of war he wishes to wage in southeast Asks. That is why I said, in answer to an argument that VMS made on the floor of the Senate yesterday, apparently some col- leagues are laboring under the illusion that perhaps the resolution would reduce the danger of fighting a land war in Asia. There la not a word in the resolution that has any bearing on the subjedt. To the contrary, the broad, sweeping, sanction of power?note my language, because it canont be done legally?the broad, arbitrary, sweeping power Congress is sanctioning for the President would in no way stop him from sending as many America boys as he wants to send into ? Vietnain to make war. As the Senator from Alaska has said over and over again, and as I have joined him in saying, all South Vietnam is not worth the life of a single American boy; and the killing of a single American boy in South Vietnam is an unjustified killing. It ought to stop. It is not going to stop until we turn our warms,king polthy into a peacekeeping policy. It is not going to stop until we insist that our alleged allies in SEATO come in with as many divisions of peacekeeping units as are necessary to keep the belligerents apart It is not going to stop until the United Na- tions, under the procedures of international law, can cathe in and keep the peace arid set up whateVer" `controls are needed, by way of i Mated Nations trusteeships if necessary, to bring that war to an end. TAU result will not be achieved by uni- lateral military action. It makes me sad to have to say ft, but / am satisfied that history will reeard this horrendous mistake of the United Stites in its false assumption in the year 1964 that it could supplant in South Vietnam military control by Asiatics with military control by the United States. We could never win such a war. We might Win military victory after military victory. If we did not stop the escalation, we would kill millions of people, because the escala- non, step by step, would lead to a11-out bombing of North Vietnam and Red Chinese eitiFe. When we were through, we should have killed milli-one, and won military victory after military victory, but we should still have lost the war. The United States can never dominate and control Asia, With 800 million people in China alone; That kind of war would create a hitred for the United States and for the white Titan generally that would per- sist for centuries. Dominating Asia, after , destroying her clties and killing her millions by bombings?that is the danger that we are walking into?would not make the white man supreme in Asia, but only hated. We know what the floods of human his- tory do. Eventually the white man will be engulfed in that Asiatic flood and drowned. ? I do not know why we should be so short- sighted. it is difficult to follow the processes of international law. I suppose the saddest announcement that has been made recently Is that of the Secretary General of the United Nations, Mr. II Thant, from Burma, who is not even a shadow of the great world states- man who preceded him, Dag Hammarskjold. He announced in Washington yesterday his grave doubts as to whether the Security ? Council could help resolve the matter. Mr. President, we will never know until such procedures are tried. The Secretary General should have been using his voice and his influence to persuade the Security Council to carry out its obligations under the charter. Not a word has been heard from the Secretary General in regard to the power and authority for the General Assembly of the United Nations. The Secretary General knows the power of the 'General Assembly if the Security Council is incapacitated by a Russian veto. a repeat what I have said for many months past on the floor of the Senate. I wish to put Russia on the spot. Let her exercise her veto, if she dares. The rest of the world will be her judge. We did not find her following that 'course in the Middle East, or in Cyprus, or in the Congo. I was highly disappointed by what I con- sidered to be the abdication of leadership and responsibility on the part of the Secre- tary General of the United Nations in the unfortunate statement he made in Washing- ton yesterday. The next point I wish to make, by way of summary, is that the fear expressed by some Senators in this debate against involvement in a land war means no more than the reser- vation expressed in 1954, that we should not become militarily involved in South Viet- nam. We did not intend then to do any of the things we are now doing in South Viet- nam. We did not intend then to do any of pression of intention in 1954 came to naught. This policy is sucking us into military in- volvement deeper and deeper, and will con- tinue to suck us in, under this resolution, deeper and deeper. Mr. President, you and I will be gone in a few years; but I am satisfied that the end oaf the road that we are traveling today will be the engulfment and drowning in world history of the influence of the white man in Asia, if we follow this course of action. I despair frequently at the fact that so often people in positions Of responsibility are inclined to think only of the present, and not a century hence. Yet, when we are dealing with matters of foreign policy and the roots of peace or war, we need to remember that the seed we plant today, be it a seed of peace or seed of war, is the seed that will finally come to fruition in a blossoming plant, per- haps a 100 years hence. I say most respectfully and sadly that in my judgment, in this resolution, we are planting seeds not of peace, but of war. Those who will follow us in the years to come will cry out in anguish and despair in criticism over the mistake that was made in 1964 when the joint resolution was passed. Why do we do it? I do not know. We are dealing here basically with a civil war be- tween conflicting forces in South Vietnam. So many in this debate have overlooked the geographic problem. Let us not forget that prior to the Geneva accord of 1954 North Vietnam and South Vietnam were one peo- ple. One could go into North Vietnam to- day, after he had been in Saigon, and think that he was still in South Vietnam. He would feel the same way if he first Went to North Vietnam and then to Saigon. They are the same people. Unfortunately, as a result of the partition under the Geneva accord in 1954, they were divided into two countries, North Vietnam and South Vietnam. Many of the people in South Vietnam who are involved in this civil war have close rela- tives in North Vietnam. One reason why the military dictator-puppet whom we are sup- porting in South Vietnam, Khanh, is having so much difficulty with the mass of the peo- ple?and he is having a serious difficulty? in his insistence that he must stage a blood bath in North Vietnam. He will never get the support of the people, because a blood bath would kill the relatives of hundreds of thou- sands of people in South Vietnam; and vice versa. It is a tragedy that the Vietcongs try to subvert South Vietnam, but that is a real- ity. The solution is not the exercise of mili- tary might. As a critic of De Gaulle on many points, I say that the sad fact is that the De Gaulle solution is far superior to the American solution. The solution is a political and economic solution, not a military solu- tion. De Gaulle is right. We should go to the conference table. We should not take the American position that we will go to the conference table only after we dominate the battlefield. If we ever establish that principle, we shall have assassinated the rule of law as an in- strumentality for settling disputes among na- tions. If we ever take the position that we must first dominate the battlefield, that we must be in control, that our orders must be carried out, then going to a conference table will mean only that the dominating author- ity tells the others at the conference table what, in effect, Adlai Stevenson unfortunate- ly said in the sad speech he made some weeks ago before the Security Council?that, in effect, we are going to do what we think is necessary, and the others can like it or not. When he did that, as I said, he extinguished his lamp of world statesmanship. We cannot follow the theory that under- lies the present policy of our Government: namely, that until we first dominate the battlefield, we will not follow De Gaulle's suggestion to settle this dispute at the con- ference table. De Gaulle is right. This prob- lem will never be settled except by a political and economic settlement. It can never be settled by the imposition of the military might of the United States upon Asia. Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, in de- bating the Angolan issue this week, we did not plead ignorance. We tried to find out the facts, both in regard to the com- peting political consideration in Angola and in regard to the amounts of money potentially involved. We knew there was money in this bill headed for Angola, if the executive had had its way. To argue that it was not specifically earmarked for Angola and, therefore, we could not get at it--as some did?while arguing that there was, indeed, money in the Defense appropriation bill that could be used for Angola, was to admit either legislative impotence or legislative complicity. I am proud to say that such a position was un- acceptable to a majority in the world's most powerful legislative body. In refusing to vote more money for the covert funding of paramilitary ac- tivities in Angola and environs, we have rejected the road to another Vietnam. We have only to listen to the global con- frontation terms used to describe what Is at stake there. This is the rhetoric that led us into Vietnam. Further, we have rejected insofar as Angola Is concerned the closed system under which so many fateful foreign and defense policy decisions have been made by a few men in the executive branch and even fewer rnen in Congress. This is an Important precedent. The Senate has in- dicated today that it is fed up with "for- eign policy by contingency fund." As a body, it insists upon being involved in de- cisions to spend millions of dollars abroad covertly, after such funding has been "authorized" by the 40 Committee or some other secretive executive group. Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 Deemm 19, Approved Foc6p,bgingWILI(11A191fflacjeditia7MIQMR000400100018-1 S 23063 To sum up, Mr president, we have sent some important messages today. We have rejected a world view that sees every foreign conflict in "United States versus them," Americans versus Russian terms. We have tried to evaluate our An- golan policy in the context of more rele- vant political and geographical realities. My colleague, JOHN TUNNEY, has Performed historic and effectual work on this vital matter, providing real leader- ship. So have Senators CLARK, BROOKE, KENNEDY, HUMPHREY, JAVITS, WEICKER, PERCY, and others. It has been a reward- ing experienee to work with them. I thank Bill Jackson, of my staff, for his able aid to me. We have reminded the 'executive branch that congress will play a large role in determining the policies of this country, as, indeed, the people want us to do?not to mention the constitutional obligations placed upon the legislature. And, very importantly, we have recog- nized through five days of debate that we have to improve the internal pro- cedures of the Senate to insure that the whole body can fully debate all issues of great consequence to their nation's se- curity. Mr. President, in trying to group the complex historical and political context of the current Angolan conflict, I asked my staff to develop information briefs for me. I want to especially thank Ms. Emily Thurber for her work in this re- gard; it was grounded in actual experi- ence in Africa for many years. To accomplish all of these tasks, Mr. President, a vigorous free press was in- dispensable. I ask unanimous consent to place in the RECORD an article by John Averill in the Los Angeles Times, and articles by David Binder and Sy Hersh in the New York Times. There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: [From the Los Angeles Times] SENATE FOES OF ANGOLA AID OPTIMISTIC (By John H. Averill) Wasnneerow.?Senate critics of US. in- volvement in Angola expressed cautious op- timism Wednesday night that the Senate will vote to block further military aid to anti-Soviet factions in the West African nation. "I think we have the votes to win as of now," said Sen. Alan Cranston (D-Calif.), who has helped revive the Senate's Vietnam era antiwar coalition into a bloc opposed to further U.S. involvement in Angola. Cranston expressed that outlook in an in- terview after Ford Administration supporters blocked until today a vote on an arms-cutoff amendment. The amendment, sponsored by Sen. John V. Tunney (D-Calif,), Would deny the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency funds to finance military assistance to two Angolan factions Opposing a third faction that is strongly supported by the Soviet Union and Cuba in a civil war. Tunney, Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey (ID- Mien,) and other critics of the Administra- tion's Angolan policy said it could lead to another Vietnam-type commitment by the United States. In an emotional arm-waving speech, Humphrey said that until recently the United States was spending Only $150 million a year on all kinds of assistance to the entire con- tinent of Africa. "Then in one month, we are going to put in$60 million in Angola to chase the Russians out," said Humphrey, a one-time staunch de- fender of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. A better way to counter the Russians, he said, would be to use trade leverage, such as grain sales, to force them to withdraw from Angola. As a substitute for the Tunney amendment, Senate Minority Whip Robert P. Griffin (R. Mich.) offered a proposal that would prohibit the use of U.S. military or civilian forces in Angola but would not affect CIA spending. "Cuba has sent thousands of well-trained soldiers to Angola," Griffin said. He told the Senate that those forces, armed with massive supplies shipped in by Russia, have been largely responsible for gains by the Soviet- backed Angolan faction. "I agree that we ought to slam the door and keep it closed on the use of any U.S. military or civilian forces in Angola," Griffin argued. "But do you' want to close the door on CIA flexibility? Is there no way that we can assist the majority of people in Angola who are resisting Soviet imperialism?" Sen. Dick Clark (D-Iowa) said the Griffin amendment did "asolutely nothing about military assistance and CTA activities." At the White House, Dep. Press Secretary William I. Greener said the Ford'Administra- tion has no intention of sending either mili- tary or civilian advisers to Angola. "There are no U.S. government-sponsored advisers in Angola," he said under question- ing. "Nor do we contemplate any form of U.S, combat intervention there." Tunney introduced his amendment after the Senate wrangled behind closed doors for three hours about the extent of CIA involve- ment in Angola, a former Portuguese colony. Emerging from the closed session, Tunney. Humphrey and others said they were able to learn very little about the extent of CIA spending in Angola. The reason, they ex- plained, was that Sen. John L. McClellan (D- Ark.) , chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee one of the very few people in Congress who is privy to the CIA budget, interpreted Senate rules as barring him from disclosing highly secret national security in- formation. Taking issue with McClellan's rule inter- pretation, Tunney told reporters: "I feel the Senate has an inherent right in closed session to obtain secret information which one or more senators may obtain as a result of their position on a Senate commits+ tee." Tunney originally proposed cutting $33 million out of the Pentagon budget which he said he had reason to believe was ear- marked for CIA operations in Angola. But he dropped any dollar figure after Humphrey said he understood that there was$750 mil- lion in the Pentagon budget that could be tapped by the CIA. Tunney offered his amendment as a rider to a $112.3 billion defense appropriations bill. Any Angolan amendment that the Senate might adopt would have to be approved by the House. , [From the New York Times] EARLY ANGOLA AID BY UNITED STATES REPORTED (By Seymour M. Hersh) WASHINGTON, December 18.?The Ford Ad- ministration's initial authorization for sub- stantial Central Intelligence Agency finan- cial operations inside Angola came in Janu- ary 1975, more than two months before the first significant Soviet build-up, well-in- formed officials report. It could not be learned on what specific basis the agency approval to deepen its clan- destine involvement in Angola at that point, but William E. Colby of Central Intelligence told a secret Congressional hearing two months ago that the January increase in C.I.A. activity was needed to match increas- ed Soviet activity. The Soviet Union has been involved in Angola since 1956 but, according to well- informed American intelligence officials, did not substantially increase its support for one of the liberation armies in Angola until March and April of this year. At that time at least two shiploads and two planeloads of Soviet war materiel were sent. Told of the Administration's decision, of January, 1975 a number of Government of- ficials and lawmakers contended that it was impossible without more information to de- termine whether the subsequent Soviet build-up had been purely aggressive and expansionist, as Secretary of State Henry .A.. Kissinger and others have contended, or whether it might have been in part a Soviet response to the action by the United States.$300,000 FOR ROBERTO The Administration's high-level intelli- gence-review panel, known as the 40 Com- mittee, discussed Angola at its January meeting?the first such discussion of the African nation since the mid-1960's, officials said. They said the group agreed to permit' the C.I.A. to provide $300,000 clandestinely to Holden Roberto, the leader of one of three factions now seeking control of Angola. At the time, Mr. Roberto, whose links with the C.I.A. began in 1961, was on a$10,000-a- year agency retainer for "intelligence col- lection," the officials said. Mr. Roberto leads the National Front for the Liberation of Angola, which also has been aided by Zaire and China. During the same 40 Committee meeting in January, the officials said, the C.I.A. un- successfully also sought authority to pro- vide a $100,000 subsidy secretly to Jonas Savimbi, leader of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola. At the time, the movements led by Mr. Roberto and Mr. Savimbi?since merged? were trying to negotiate a settlement with the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, a third liberation group, which has been supported by arms and aid from the Soviet Union since its formation in 1956. Those talks failed. There was a sharp division today among Government officials and some lawmakers about the significance of the 40 Committee's decision in January to increase the funds available to Mr. Roberto, LINK TO MOM= SEEN ? Some officials belittled its importance and argued that the funds, which reportedly were not meant for direct military support, were supplied merely to reassure President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire that the Ford Administra- tion was not going to permit the Popular Movement to win the Angolan civil war. Mr. Mobutu, who is Mr. Roberto's father-in-law, was an early advocate of American interven- tion. Many others, including Senators and Rep- resentatives who have had access to secret C.I.A. briefings on Angola, believe that dis- closure of the January decision to increase the American involvement raises new ques- tions about which nation?the United States or the Soviet Union?initiated what inside Angola. "I think it's very important," one well- informed official acknowledged. "That money gave him a lot of extra muscle. He'd been sitting in Kinshasa for nearly 10 years and all of a sudden he's got a lot of bread?he's beginning to do things." Since the early 1960's, Mr. Roberto had maintained his headquarters in Kinshasa, the capital of Zaire. The official's point was that the C.T.A. source of the revitalized flow of funds for the Roberto movement would be quickly per- Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 Approved For S 23064 ? eviNg4"4"'IMINgittillt :Kiitelten43:13MAFE30040010arliMber 75B, 197.5 .calved by the Popular Movement and its Soviet supporters. The disclosure further contradicts the in- sistence of Secretary Kissinger in Senate testimony that is still secret that the State Department's Bureau of African Affairs had, in effect, withheld information about Angola from him early this year. He suggested that the bureau had done so in an effort to limit the options available to the Ford Adminis- tration. In January Mr. Kissinger was Secretary of State and also President Ford's adviser on national security. As adviser, he was chair- man of the 40 Committee when the decision was made to increase greatly the C.I.A. cash subsidy to Mr. Roberto. BEHIND TETE DECISIONS In an extensive recounting of Washing- ton's Angola decision-making, well-informed officials also made these points: C.I.A. statistics as of early last month show that the agency had paid$5.4 million to ship what was listed as $10 million in arms to Angola between late July and October. The high shipping costs were described by many knowledgable officials as evidence that the agency had been systematically Underestimating the value of the weapons chipped thus far, in an effort to make the United States role appear as minimal as possible. The intelligence agency was explicitly au- therized by President Ford on July 27, 1975, to begin a$500,000 information program in- side Angola as part of a 40 Committee de- eision to begin major shipments of United States arms there. The precise date of the 40 Committee's meeting in January, 1975, could not be learned, but January was a pivotal month in Angola. JOINT POLITICAL PACT On Jan. 6, leaders of the three liberation Movements met in Kenya and signed a politi- cal accord that was viewed as paving a way for independence for the Portuguese terri- tory. On Jan. 10 Portugal formally agreed to grant independence in Angola in the follow- ing November. On Jan. 31 the three liberation movements agreed to share cabinets posts and power equally with a Portuguese contingent until the formal date of independence. The three liberation movements further agreed to prepare for and hold national elec- tions for a constituent assembly. Those elec- tions were never held, however, as the coali- tion dissolved over the next few monhts and warfare broke out. American officials were interviewed re- peatedly by correspondents of The New York Times in redeht ? weeks, but none suggested what Mr. Colby and other C.I.A. officials have said in recent seciret 'briefings in Congress? that Soviet buildups in Angola before this year Were in any way a factor in the subse- quent United States decision to intervene directly in July 1975 with shipments of arms and aid. 100 'TONS or Aims More than 100 tons of arms were reported to have been landed by Soviet planes in southern Angola and the Congo in March and knit It was thethe shipments, American officials haire aontended up to now, that led to rapid military advances by the Popular Movement and the subsequent decision by Secretary Kissinger and President Ford to intervene directly. Throughout the spring, a *number of of- ficials have said, the C.I.A. lobbied intensive- ly for a larger tnited States role in Angola, justifying its agrUnient on increased Soviet activities. Specifically, the C.I.A. was seeking high-level approval to begin supplying funds directly to Mr. Savimbi. . , The matter was discussed at a 40 Com- mittee meeting in June, officials said, with no tesOlution, although a full-scale National Security Council study of the issues and the various options was authorized. It was at this point, State Department sources said, that opposition to further United States involvement was repeatedly raised by Nathaniel Davis, then the Assist- ant Secretary of State for African Affairs. Mr. Dayis, who resigned in protest over the Administration's policies on Angola, is now Ambassador to Switzerland. He explicit- ly argued in June that the decision by the 40 Committee to support both Mr. Roberto and Mr. Savimbi would be perceived as an escalation by the Soviet Union and lead, in turn, to even more involvement by the Rus- sians. IN CONTROL OF LUANDA Following the National Security Council review, officials said, the 40 Committee met on July 17, 1975. By then the Popular Move- ment, using the Soviet supplies shipped since March, had seized firm control of Luanda, Angola's capital, and had won significant victories elsewehre. The Popular Movement was claiming con- trol of 11 of Angola's 16 provinces. The 40 Committee authorised the follow- ing steps: The direct shipment of arms to the forces led by Mr. Savimbi and Mr. Roberto and the replacement of arms that had been previous- ly supplied and would continue to be sup- plied by Zaire and Zambia, the two neigh- boring African nations that supported the American intervention. It was agreed to per- mit Zambia and Zaire to provide as much non-American equipment as possible at first in order to minimize the overt link with the United States. Exposure through information programs and other means of the Soviet arming of the Popular Movement, with emphasis on the possible embarrassment of African nations relaying the Russian arms or in other ways serving as conduits for such aid. The use of an information program to build the abilities and integrity of the forces controlled by Mr. Savimbi and Mr. Roberto. The dispatch of cash in two stages of Angola, with $6 million to be expended in Stage 1 and$8 million in Stage 2. The signi- ficance of the two-tiered approach has not been made clear by the sources. i"ORD SUPPORTERS START FILIBUS, cat ANGOLAN Am (By David Binder) WASHINGTON, December 18.?The Ford Ad- ministration sought today to reach a com- promise with the Senate that would allow the United States to continue covert sup- port operations in the Angolan civil war. The move was initiated by Senator Robert P. Griffin, Republican of Michigan, after John L. McClellan, chairman of the Senate Appro- priations Committee, failed to induce Presi- dent Ford to concur in a system that would enable the Congress to play a larger role in deciding on such secret operations. On Senator Griffin's invitation, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger conferred with about 25 leading Senators on an arrange- ment that would end the present stalemate. A filibuster is being conducted in the Senate against an amendment that would immedi- ately cut off funds for assistance to two An- golan factions. NO MEETING OF MINDS Emerging from the meeting, Mr. Kissinger said that it had not been "a meeting of minds," but that he was taking the Senate leadership's proposals to Mr. Ford. Senator John Tunney, a California Demo- crat, who is leading an attempt to cut off all funds for Angola, said he intended to push for the cutoff tomorrow. "Nothing is acceptable that won't result in a Cutoff of all funds for military aid to Angola," he said. "I don't want to see more money down this rathole." The filibuster began about 2 P.M. when Senator Mike Mansfield, the Democratic ma- jority leader, requested a vote on the cutoff amendment submitted by Senator Tunney and 12 others. Senator McClellan, the Arkansas Democrat who has been managing the $112 billion de- fense appropriations bill, slipped out and tele- phoned President Ford, appealing for his ap- proval of a procedure involving Congress in the funding of covert operations. The funds for the Angola operations have come out of the defense appropriations, ac- cording to officials of the Central Intelligence Agency in testimony before a Senate com- mittee. According to other Senators, Mr. McClellan proposed that in future requests for covert funds, the President should first seek the approval of the Appropriations Comrnittee and, upon approval, the request would go di- rectly to the full Senate. Under the present system the Administra- tion simply informs Senator McClellan and his minority colleague on the Appropriations Committee, Senator Milton R. Young, Repub- lican of North Dakota, and they either ap- prove or disapprove without any further air- ing in committee or in the Senate as a whole. A White House spokesman, William I. Greener, said President Ford had discussed the proposal with Senate McClellan, but "no arrangement could be reached." As the filibuster by conservative Senators wore on, Mr. Kissinger arrived at the office of Hugh Scott, the Republican Minority Leader from Pennsylvania, and agreed to provide the leadership with more informa- tion about the Angola situation, as well as the Administration's view on the covert op- erations, on which$33 million has already been spent. HISSINGER CONVEYS OFFER After two hours of discussion, Mr. Kis- singer promised to convey a refined com- promise proposal to the President and to re- turn tomorrow with a response. The com- promise was described by a Senator as in- volving a concurrence of the Senate in a $10 million increment for Angolan aid, after which the Administration would have to ob- tain regular Senate approval of any further funding. The Administration is seeking$28 million in additional funds for the Front for the Na- tional Liberation of Angola in the north and the National Union For Total Independence of Angola in the south. The two groups are opposing the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, which has the support of the Soviet Union and has established a government in Luanda, the capital of the former Portuguese colony. The total aid projected by the Administra- tion for Angolan aid this year comes to $60 million. But, the Central Intelligence Agency's con- tingency funds for covert activity are said to total only$50 million, of which two-thirds is already exhausted, either through expendi- tures and commitments. It is the belief of Senator Tunney and his Senate allies that by amending the defense appropriation to bar further covert expendi- tures it can deny the C.I.A. the capacity to continue Angola operations. The Tunney forces showed their strength early in the afternoon in defeating a sub- stitute amendment by Senator Griffin that would have allowed the covert operations to continue. The vote was 72 to 26. This left the pro-Administration Senators with the filibuster as their only weapon, made more effective by the nearness of the Christmas holidays and the desire of a num- ber of Senators to go home tomorrow or Saturday. Senator Tunney and some of his allies said they were determined to force a resolution of the issue, even if it meant staying in Wash- ington. Several said they believe they had the Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 0".a...56coniffer 19, AMISoved Forftie 60 votes needed to bring about cloture, end- ing the filibuster and compelling a vote on the cutoff amendment. It was this threat, according to Adminis- tration officials, that caused Secretary Kis- singer and the White House to agree to the compromise attempt. While the Senate prepared for its third day of debate on the Angola issue, the House In- ternational Relations Committee approved an amendment to the foreign assistance bill that would, require the Administration to clear future Angola expenditures with the Congress. ANATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTIO 81?PROVIDING FOR A CON T1ONAL ADJOURNMENT OF C MESS M MANSFIELD. Mr. President, ask that e Senate proceed to the cosid- eratlo?f Senate Concurrent Resolution 81. The BESIDING OFFICER. Th con- current esolution will be stated b&r title. The le islative clerk read as fo ows: A concu ent resolution (S. Con. es. 81) providing f r the adjournment of pongress. The PRIDING OFFICER. Without objection, tlie Senate will -proc ed to the Immediate c nsideration of t concur- rent resolutio Mr. GRIEF. Mr. Presidenik, I suggest the absence of quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call th roll. , The second as istant le slative clerk proceeded to call tie roll. I Mr. ROBERT C:' BYRDIMr. President I ask unanimous c nsent hat the order for the quorum call e res inded. The PRESIDING p I" CER. Without objection, it is so ordef Mr. MANSFIELD. ? . President, I withdraw my request 4p proceed to the consideration of the c ncurrent resolu- tion. Mr. ROBERT C. B . Mr. President, I ask unanimous con ent that Mr. Prox- mire may proceed f 3 rinutes. The PRESIDING .OFFI?. Without f objection, it is so or ered. I '? Under the order f procedure, the con- current tesolution; is laid aVde tempo- rarily. I The Senator fri.m Wisconsp is recog- nized. REAL ESTAT SETTLEMEN PRO- CEDURES CT AMENDM NTS? CONFEREN E REPORT Mr. PROX IRE. Mr. President, mit a report grb- the committee of c fer- ence on S. 23 7, and ask for its imnrdi- ate consider. ion. The PR SIDING OFFICER ( r. HE LMS). Th report will be stated by ti e. The sec ? d assistant legislative clei\k read as fol The co agreeing amendme 2327) to "Real 1974," fetence end to their respective Houses this or signed by all the conferees. Th PRESIDING OFFICER, Is there obje ton to the consideration of the con rence report? OWS : ttee of conference on the d1s4, otes of the two Houses on thek its of the House to the bill (S. uspend sections 4, 6, and 7 of the \ ate Settlement Procedures Act of \ ving met, after full and free con- \ have agreed to recommend and do MORIDP-z7110QA4tR000Llool00018-1 S 23065 here being no objection, the Senate Pr' eeded to consider the report, as fol- lows. JoIi?EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE The th.nagers on the part of the House and the nate at the conference on the dis- agreeing tes of the two Houses on the amendmen of the Senate to the amend- ments of th House to the bill (S. 2327) en- titled "An Ac to suspend sections 4, 6, and 7 of the 'Real state Settlement Procedures Act of 1974 ", submit the following joint statement to th House and the Senate in explanation of th effect of the action agreed upon by the man ers and recommended in the accompanying onference report: TRUTH-IN-LE ING DISCLOSURES The Senate bill co ained a provision not in the House amen ents which would authorize the Federal eserve Board to re- quire the disclosure of 11 or a part of the Information required in e Truth-In-Lend- ing Act at or prior to the t e a written com- mitment to make a real e ate loan was is- sued. The conference repor does not con- tain the Senate provision. The conferees believe tha the advance disclosure of truth-in-lending information, which has been provided as page \three of the RESPA statement, has been use ul to con- sumers. With the repeal of section \6 of RES- PA, there is doubt whether the Fe eral Re- serve Board of Governors retains he au- thority to require advance disci? ure of truth-in-lending information. The co ferees believe that continuation of some fotu of advance truth-in-lending disclosure in on- sumer real estate transactions has m rit. However, this question was not treated in hearings and neither of the banking commi - tees has had an opportunity to consider th deta:ls of such disclosure. The conferees be- lieve that rather than include a truth-in- lending provision in this Act, the appropriate committees should consider the question early in 1976, and recommend legislation ati the earliest feasible time. I COMPLETION AND INSPECTION OF SETTLEMEXT FORM IN ADVANCE ! The Senate bill contained a provision not in the House amendments which wou re- quire the settlement agent to complete the uniform settlement form one busin s day prior to the day of settlement and make it available for inspection by the iorrower. The conference report contains the Sen- ate provision in amended form. tIle provi- sion as revised makes clear that, he obliga- tion of the settlement agent tb make the settlement form available prior to settlement is to be triggered by the riquest of the borrower and that the agent's/sole obligation is to make available only that information which is known to him at We time of disclo- sure.I The amended langua also makes clear that the information is o ly required to be made available sometime uring the business day immediately precefing the settlement day. WILLIAM 1/ROXMIRE, KMAN, A. Wn-Lisms, KWOOD, RN, he Part of the Senate. Y S. REUSS, IAM A. BARRETT, LIAM S. MOORHEAD, BERT G. STEPHENS, Jr., NAND J. ST GERMA/N, ART BROWN, OHN H. ROUSSELOT, gers on the Part of the House. RESIDING OFFICER. The will be in order. The Chair so- e cooperation of Senators. Staff ers are asked to cooperate simi- JOHN Si' HARRIS? BOB PA JAKE Managers on The Senato liens mem larly. The Senate is not in orler. The Chair has plenty of time. Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. But Senators who have airline reservations ,do not have plenty of time. I hope Mentrers will accede to the request of the C air that there be order in the Senate, 96 that we can get on with the business./ Mr. NELSON. Mr. Preside t, I do not believe that the Members/at the rear of the Chamber have beex, able to hear the Chair. I wonder if tl Chair would repeat the request. The PRESIDING OFIFICER. If the Senator would speak to/them personally, the Chair would apprebiate it. Mr. NELSON. Me 15ers at the Repub- lican cloakroom side pparently have not heard the request, Vack by the entrance door and on my 1 t. I wonder whether the Chair would/ speak a little louder or ask them to /turn on their hearing aids again. / The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vlsconsin may try to pro- ceed now. Mr. PRO MIRE. The conference re- port is on he Real Estate Settlements Procedure Act which we acted on a few days ago./ There were two amendments that we 'passed. The first amendment, the Ho/se agreed to, we receded in the Senate/on providing a modified 1-day advanbe disclosure of settlement charges. On tjie second amendment, the Senate rece ed in the truth-in-lending area. We thiyik we can work that out a little later o I think the conference report, as eed to, is one that is very close to the ill as it passed the Senate. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques- on is on agreeing to the conference port. he conference report was agreed to. SEN TE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 81 PROVIDING FOR ADJOURN- ME T OF CONGRESS Mr. NSFIELD. Mr. President, I re- new my equest that the resolution on adjournm t be laid before the Senate. It is my i ention, if it is agreed to, to hold it at e desk pending an appro- priate time. The PRES SING OFFICER. The clerk will state the c rrent resolution. The legislativ clerk read as follows: Resolved by th Senate (the House of Representatives con rring), That when the two Houses adjourn n Friday, December 19, 1975, they shall sten adjourned sine die or until 12:00 noon on he second day after their respective Membe are notified to re- assemble in accordance th section 2 of this resolution, whichever eve t first occurs. SEC. 2. The Speaker of fe House of Rep- resentatives and the Presid? pro tempore of the Senate shall notify e Members of the House and the Senate, espectively, to reassemble whenever, in thei opinion, the public interest shall warrant it, or whenever the majority leader of the Sen te and the majority leader of the House, ac ng jointly, or the minority leader of the Sena and the minority leader oil the House, actiIg jointly, file a written request with the Sec tary of the Senate and the Clerk of ..ne Hoiie that the Congress reassemble for considera on of legislation. SEC. 3. During the adjournment of oth Houses of Congress as provided in sectio 1 the Secretary of the Senate and the Cl k of the House, respectively be, and they her Approved For Release 2001/11101: CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1 S23066 Approved For 6091M12581011/111 ReaClaW7-7KOINIAR0004001kelevlbe by are, authorized to receive messages, in- cluding veto messages, from the President of the United States. Mr. MANbrata.D. And the date? The legis tive clerk read: When the to Houses adjourn on Friday, December 19, 195. Mr. MANS agreed to Janua Mr. CURTIS. right there? Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. CURTIS. 'What the status of any similar resolution i the House of Representatives? Mr. MANSFIELD. We ha,Naot receiv- ed any. Hence, we are forced "o take ac- tion. Pending action by the Abuse, it is the leadership's intention to h d it at the desk. Mr. WEICXER. Will the Senato for a question? D. Yesterday, we 9. 1 the Senator yield s. ield The legislative clerk read as follows: A resolution (S. Res. 336) to authorize James Fstep, Senate Computer Center, and Harold W. Needham, Superintendent, Sen- ate Service Department, to appear as wit- nesses in the case of Common Cause, et al. v. Benjamin Bailer, et al. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the resolution? There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the resolution. Mr.- MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I want at this time to bring to the atten- tion of the Members of the Senate the legal proceeding brought by Common Cause to have the court declare the franking statute unconstitutional on its face because according to Common Cause it disadvantages challengers to incumbents seeking reelection to Con- gress, uses taxpayers' dollars for a non- public purpose 'and discriminates against Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes. other users of the mails. Mr. WEIMER. The Senator sale For discovery and evidence purposes this will be held at the desk pending an's in this case, Common Cause has sub- enaed Senate records, including: irst. The complaints with respect to vidations of the frank received by the Sele t Committee on Standards and Cond ct and their disposition, advisory/ opinioN given by the committee and itt staff?both written and oral?and inter- pretive mekkiorandums prepared for cam- mittee use as well as testimony /con- cerning matters conducted by the/com- mittee in exe utive session; e Computer Ce ter rec- e User's ide and s which /show how s of f,tanked mail recipients are deveyeel,( how those d the group- appropriate time. Why is this not an appropriate time? Mr. MANSFIELD. We want to make sure that the Senate is not caught short again, as it was my first year as the ma- jority leader, when the House passed an adjournment resolution, left the city in a 'harry, and left us with a pack of ex- pensive legislation on our desks. Mr. WEICK.E.R. I thank the Senator. Mr. orarrm. Would it not be true, I ask the distinguished majority leader, that if we were to pass this legislation and send it over to the House, then we Could be in the situation that the ma- jority leader has just described, because both Houses do have to pass that ad- journment resolution? Mr. MANMELD. That is correct, but If we passed it and went out, which we never do, then the House would have to take what they Were given, as we were given by the House some 16 years ago. Mr, GRIFFIN. Earlier, when the ma- jority leader presented the resoluton, I put in a quorum tall because I wanted to send for the minority leader and let him know that the Senator was calling this up. If he cannot come to the floor, I take it from the statement of the majority leader that he would consult with the minority leader before he would take it from the desk and consider it. Mr. mANtrran. Oh, yes, indeed. The PRESIDING 0.e.HCER. The ques- tion is- on agreeing to the concurrent resolution. Second. Sena ords including computer progra names and addres names are categorize ings into which the na arated, work orders f and records which cl' clos of franked mail la ls pri use of each Senatdr, the ca names maintained' on the Sen puter by each 0-riator, the nu names in each ,iategory, the code nation for eaeh category; and Third. Seriate Service Departm records of the number of franked m pieces sery each Senator, work order from eac Senator reflecting the number of newsletters printed and copies of all newsletters printed. Conimon Cause contends that the fra is used for mass mail material that is olitical in nature and for particular flings that it says are targeted to fiecial interest groups very much like The concurrent resolution was agreed ampaign literature is. Common Cause to. /has told the court that the Senate docu- ---,-awama....?. merits it seeks will show that what it has AUTHORIZATION' FOR, APPEARAN E discovered so far is a very widespread Or WITNESS practice. A three-judge court found that the Mr. MANSFIELD Mr. Preside4t, I documents were relevant to Common send to the desk a resolution w the Causes case, rejected the Senate and Concurrence of the distinguish ,d Sen- House claims of privilege, and ordered ator from Pennsylvania, the R publican that the documents must be produced leader, and me. This is a matter which with the identity of individual Senators Was discussed at the Ilemocr tic confer- not disclosed as far as it is possible to aide on. Thursday last an which I be- achieve this result withDut unduly ham- /ie'Ve was discussed likew e by the Re- pering the full and expeditious processing publicans. I ask that it read. of the lawsuit. The PRESIDING 0 CER. The clerk We have given consideration to the will state the resolutio alternative courses of action the Senate es can be sep- r ',address labels the number ed for the gories of te com- ber of esig- nt ake. might take at this time with resp ct to these legal proceedings and the co der granting the discovery soug Common Cause subpenas. Ba have three alternatives. One ply with the demands of pursuant to the court's or is a conteMpt proceedin rt or- by the cally we to com- sUbpenas r. A second against the Senate documents and /testify as de- manded. The third is: to attempt to achieve a compromise with Common Cause. In deciding which alternative to adopt we are guided by the following considerations. ,/ The facilities cif the Senate Service Department and/Senate Computer Cen- ter are utilized/by the Senate, its Mem- bers and comAittees for many types of official busZess, including information on the stat e of legislation, internal ad- ministratiye records, information re- trieval sterns for individual Senate of- flees, a questi sent tees the printing and addressing of naires, newsletters, and reports by Senators and Senate commit- no case are Members of the Senate or' Senate committees authorized to use *hese Senate facilities for political or /personal purposes and Members of the Senate and Senate employees are sub- ject to disciplinary proceedings with re- spect to such unauthorized use of these facilities. For these reasons, the Senate originally asserted its constitutional privileges with respect to the Senate rec- ords subpenaed by the plaintiffs in this litigation and also its objection to any attempt to obtain such records by sub- penas requiring that these documents be produced by Senate employees con- trary to the express order of the Senate as set forth in Senate Resolutions 423 and 431, adopted by the Senate on Octo- ber 9, 1974, and October 11, 1974, re- spectively. In administering the use of these and other Senate facilities and services, the primary criterion is the size of the popu- lation of the State of the Member, al- though under the rules, regulations, and practices of the Senate Members from smaller States may make a proportion- ately greater use of such facilities than Members from larger States. A review of records reflecting the use of these Senate SVs indicates that 93 percent of the ate mailed less than two pieces of maij, under frank per voting age constit- uent during the general election year 1974 'according to the records of these units. llie seven Members of the Senate who sen voting ag States whi tion category. Furthermor ate sent out les per voting age frank in 1974, acco In comparing 1974 e to 1973 mailings, the number of pieces of ma for candidates and 60.4 candidates, according to by the Senate computer. Th ords also show that of the mailing the largest volume mail, two were candidates for r and defeated, and the mailings out two or more mailings per onstituent in 1974 were from fall in the lowest popula- 82 Members of the Sen- than one Piece of mail onstituent under the ing to these records. ction year mailings verage increase in was 31.6 percent rcent for non- ta computed Senate rec- Senators franked election I the Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1