CONVERSATION WITH RUSS ROURKE, WHITE HOUSE STAFF, RE THE PASTORE RESOLUTION TO CREATE A SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
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January 21, 1975
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21 January 1975
SUBJECT: Conversation with Russ Rourke, White House Staff, re the
Pastore Resolution to Create a Select Committee on Intelligence
Today I called Russ Rourke to alert him to the Pastore Resolution to
create a Select Committee on Intelligence. I asked if anyone there was
keeping an eye on this. Rourke said not that he was aware of. I told him
it could pose problems for much of the Executive Branch since it will get
into everything that has anything to do with intelligence- -CIA, FBI, NSA, etc.
I said I didn't know if there were any constitutional issues involved but it
might be worth checking. I also pointed out that Chairman John Stennis,
Senate Armed Services Committee, had fought the Resolution in the
Democratic Caucus but lost. Rourke asked what they can do about it and I
replied the only possible thing would be to get a constitutional handle on it.
I said another question is who will be on the Committee. I told Rourke that
we are very concerned about the security aspects of the Committee's inquiry.
I told Rourke we also are concerned about the reports under the Foreign
Assistance Act to the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees and
we are trying to get things buttoned up with these two Committees. I said
all this was worth Jack Marsh's attention and even further up the line.
Rourke said he would brief Marsh as soon as he returns this evening. I
said I would send a copy of the Pastore Resolution over to him in the
morning.
25X1A
Distribution:
Original - Subject
1-DA File
1 - OLC Chrono
,-'l?- Select Committee file
GEO- GE L. CAR
Legislative Counsel
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
the CIA has been asked to play under that
law.
In 1970 and 1971, White House aides asked
CIA to participate, in what was known as the
Huston domestic intelligence plan and to
provide assistance to a former agency official,
F. Howard Hunt, who at the time worked for
the President. Again, the question must be
raised as to what White House authorization
the agency was given to undertake the re-
quested activities. Hunt's aid was cut off
only when, in the words of the man who was
then chief- assistant to the deputy director,
it appeared the agency was becoming ifivol.ved
in a "domestic clandestine operation."
In 1971 and 1972, according to Colby, the
CIA undertook physical surveillances of five
Americans including, apparently, newsman
Jack Anderson, "to identify the sources of
(news) leaks." This appears to complement
the so-called "national security" wiretaps
conducted by the FBI at the direction of the
Nixon White House from 1969 to 1971. Again,
the agency and the White House must make
clear the authority under which the CIA
conducted such operations.
In March 1974, Colby "terminated the do-
mestic intelligence collection program (be-
gun 7 years earlier) and issued specific guide-
lines that any collection of counterintelli-
gence information on Americans would only
take place abroad and would be initiated only
in response to requests from the FBI. .
Was this at White House direction? And if
not, could a future President reverse such a
policy?
The FBI situation is slightly different.
There is no information as to how or why
former FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover began
collecting politically-tantalizing material
about congressmen and other public figures.
One point is clear, however-he frequently
used the information to titillate Presidents,
and apparently no Chief Executive or White
House aide ever told him to stop. When the
so-called "national security" FBI wiretaps
were operating, Hoover regularly sent social
and political gossip picked up from over-
heard conversations to Nixon chief of staff,
11, R. Haldeman. No objection or order to
stop ever came back from the Oval Office.
One other presidential role in these areas
needs exploration. Were agency directors
ordered by the White House to cover up
certain activities when called before con-
gressional committees? Former CIA Director
Helms, for example, when questioned by the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee in
February 1973, was asked directly about CIA
participation in a White House plan In 1969
or 1970 to coordinate domestic Intelligence
activities. Helms said he could not recall-
though he knew full well of his activities in
1970 Huston plan discussions. Last week he
told senators he misunderstood the question.
At a May 1973 hearing, Helms told senators
he had no Idea that Hunt, prior to public
mention of the Ellsberg break in, "was going'
to be involved in any domestic activity."
Of course, he did-that was why aid to Hunttt'rr
stopped. Former President Nixon and his'
aides kept - close watch over any congres-
sional I
sional ter irony that could implicate them
or their assistants in Watergate. Was Helms
told to mislead?
If current congressional efforts to harness
the intelligence community break up as a
result of lack of White House cooperation,
additional allegations of past wrongdoings
are bound to be made because the climate
both inside and outside the secret security
services has changed. Strong internal agency
leadership has gope. And on Capitol Hill, the
,;id staunch defenders of intelligence ac-
tivities are either gone or powerless.
For those interested in protecting the legit-
imate functions of the intelligence commu-
nity, the future looks grim-indeed black if
the Ford White House fails to see that fax
more is needed than a narrow blue-ribbon
commission studying a very narrow set of
allegations.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I sug-
gest the absence of it quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The second assistant legislative clerk
proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. MANSFIELD,. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for the
quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield for 2 minutes?
Mr. PASTORE. I yield.
JOINT REFERRAL OF CERTAIN
COMMUNICATIONS
Mr. MANSFIELD, Mr. President, I ask
unanimous- consent that a communica-
tion from the Federal Energy Adminis-
tration transmitting a study under Pub-
lic Law 93-391, be referred jointly to the
Committees on Interior and Insular Af-
fairs, Public Works, Commerce and Fi-
nance, and that a second communication
received this day from the Council on En-
vironmental Quality on Land Use, pre-
pared as a part of its annual report, be
referred ;jointly to the Committees an
Interior and Insular Affairs, Public
Works, Commerce, Agriculture and For-
estry.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
AUTHORIZATION FOR COMNL[TTEE
ON COMMERCE `ID FILE REPORTS
UNTIL MPDNIGHT TONIGHT
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the Committee
on Commerce be authorized to file re-
ports until midnight tonight.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
QUORUM CALL
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY
GOVERNMENTAL INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES
The Senate continued with the con-
sideration of the resolution (S. Res. 21)
to establish a Select Committee of the
Senate to conduct an investigation and
study of governmental operations with
respect to intelligence activities.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I ask for
the yeas and nays on passage.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I sug-
gest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk-
will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
0110105-2
January 27, 1975
unanimous consent that the order for the
quorum be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Pursuant to the previous order, the
Senate will now proceed to vote on the
resolution, as amended. On this question
the yeas, and nays have been ordered, and
clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk called
the roll.
Mr. YOUNG (after having voted in the
negative). On this vote I have a pair with
the junior Senator from Washington
(Mr. JACKSON). If he were present, he
would vote "Yea." If I were permitted to
vote, I would vote "Nay." I therefore
withdraw my vote.
Mr. GRIFFIN (after having voted in
the affirmative). On this vote I have a
pair with the Senator from Ohio (Mr,
TAFT). If he were present, he would vote
"nay." If I were permitted to vote, I
would vote "yea." I therefore withdraw
my vote.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce
that the Senator from Washington (Mr.
JACKSON), the Senator from Rhode Island
(Mr. PELL), the Senator from California
(Mr. TUNNEY), and the Senator from
Indiana (Mr. HARTKE) are necessarily
absent.
I further announce that the Senator
from Kentucky (Mr. HUDDLESTON), and
the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. INo"ovi)
are absent on official business.
I further announce that, if present and
voting, the Senator from Rhode Island
(Mr. PELL), and the Senator from Cali-
fornia (Mr. TUNNEY) would each vote
"yea."
Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the
Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS) is
necessarily absent.
I also announce that the Senator from
Maryland (Mr. MATHIAS), the Senator
from Idaho (Mr. MCCLURE), and the Sen-
ator from Vermont (Mr. STAFFORD) are
absent on official business.
I further announce that the Senator
from Ohio (Mr. TAFT) is absent to attend
a funeral.
I further announce that, if present and
voting, the Senator from New York (Mr.
JAVITS), and the Senator from Maryland
(Mr. MATHIAS) would each vote "yea.."
The result was announced-yeas 82,
nays 4, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 1 Leg.]
YEAS---92
Abourezk
Eastland
Metcalf
Allen -
Fannin
Mondale
Baker
Fong
Montoya
Bartlett
Ford
Morgan
Bayh
Garn
Moss
Beall
Glenn
Muskie
Bellmon
Goldwater
Nelson
Bentsen
Gravel
Nunn
Biden
Hansen .
Packwood
Brock
Hart, Gary W.
Pastore
Brooke
Hart, Philip A.
Pearson
Buckley
Haskell
Percy
Bumpers
Hatfield
Proxmire
Burdick
Hathaway
Randolph
Byrd,
Hollings
Ribicoff
Harry F., Jr.
Hruska
Roth
Byrd, Robert C. Humphrey
Schweiker
Cannon
Johnston
Scott, Hugh
Case
Kennedy
Sparkman
Chiles
Laxalt
Stennis
Church
Leahy
Stevens
Clark
Long
Stevenson
Cranston
Magnuson
Stone
Culver
Mansfield
Symington
Curtis
McClellan
Tower
Dole
McGee
Weicker
Domenici
McGovern
Williams
Eagleton
McIntyre
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January 27, 1975 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SEN ATE
do I agree to the criticism that has been
made concerning our existing commit-
tees. I know that our colleagues on these
committees have done their utmost to
carry out the trust of the Senate.
Bet: tiuse the attacks on the intelligence
community persist, and because part of
that attack :s directed to the existing
committees. I am supporting Senate Res-
ralution 21 as a way to clear the air and
A the record.
t
When the distinguished senior Sena-
I.'Or from Arkansas was chairman of the
iermanent Investigations Subcommittee.
is believe he established the procedure of
laving closed hearings before open hear-
ings were held. If I remember correctly.
the di:-tinguisbed Senator from Arkansas
established this procedure to protect both
ais subcommittee and witnesses from
ulriecessary embarrassment.
It is my hope that the Senate select
committee will proceed in a careful and
deliberate manner. I believe the com-
mittee's work. at least initially, should be
li camera.
Mos;~ of the Senators and staff, who
are going to serve on the committee, are
not thoroughly familiar with the orga-
nizati ;n and functions of the intelli-
gence community. Before any decision
'aft utica nearings is made, I would hope
,he niernoers and staff would have ample
opportunity to do some homework.
The Senators and staff who serve on
''?'he se,.ect committee are going to have
s:uowiedge of a lot of matters which, if
.nproterly handled, can cause our Na-
hon harm.
It n important that the select com-
:utteee establish sensible rules in dealing
0th he intelligence community. In
other words, let us get the information
>ve riee d to do the job but no more.
There is a reason over and above se-
'urir..y considerations for the select com-
inittee to hold its meetings in camera:
The, basic American idea of protecting
s.rofesr:ional and personal reputations
unless unlawful or unethical acts are in-
volved.
Alt ;u;_>h Senate Resolution 21 does
not specifically make this point, I believe
#,iie w, o-k of the select committee should
have a its focus the National Security
Arai; ) 1847. It is that act and the direc-
i-!v?es r- u.ed under its provisions which
gave r-gated the intelligence community
to determine whether or not the
847 needs revision.
id, to determine whether or not
_at'e been illegal activities within
e have been illegal activities,
1 believe the committee must de-
?vhet, rer these illegal activities
,,ctivit y may turn out to be some-
ruite di-ferent.
ttit,cciately. the select committee will
stake its findings and recommendations
onown to the Senate. It would be a trag-
c'iy for the Nation should this document
reflect anything but the best of the Sen-
ate.
If surgery is required. let it be per-
formed only after the most caretul diag-
nosis. And, if there is surgery, let us use
a very sharp scalpel---not a meat ax.
Mr. DOMLiNICI. Mr. President, the
Central Intelligence Agency is charged
with conducting the kinds of intelligence
activities that are absolutely essential to
preserve our free and open democratic
society in the real world in which we live
I say this because example after- exam-
ple has shown that our Nation must re-
main ever-via=ilant against the publicly
stated desires of other governments to
destroy our free existence.
The charter establishing the CIA lim-
ited it to foreign intelligence gathering.
Allegations have been made that the
charter has been exceeded on occasion.
If correct, then much of the blame for
these excesses lies with the Congress for
failure to discharge its duty of congres-
sional oversight. Recognizing that our
Nation must have an intelligence gath-
ering capacity that Congress has failed
in its oversight responsibility, the ques-
tion becomes: Is the creation of a select
committee to investigate our intelligence
operations, with all its extensive press
coverage and certain leaks, the wisest
method to explore and correct past
wrongs and prevent future abuses? I
have grave doubts.
There are many possible alternatives
to such a suggested select committee.
One alternative that come; immediately
to mi-nd is the creation of a permanent
joint committee to oversee intelligence
gathering by our Nation's agencies. Such
an -alternative has been offered in the
form of S. 32". which I have cosponsored
and intend to support.
However, trle realities of. our current
situation dictate my reluctant support
of Senate Resoultion 21, with the strong
reservations mentioned previously and
an admonition to my colleagues that we
must not breach our national security by
revealing matters of truly critical impor-
tance. These hearings must not be char-
acterized by a veritable food cf leaks
and publicity stunts that will perma-
nently jeopardize the effectiveness of
our intelligence operations which serve a
very legitimate purpose. We must be on
our r-uard that such legislation with a
commendable purpose is not c.llowed,
through error or excess, to unc>ermine
our c olintr is security.
Mr. PACKWOOD. Mr. P -eside;it, yes-
terday's Washington Post incluled an
editorial by Walter Pincus entitled
"'Spies' and Presidents." In speaking of
the investigation before a select commit-
tee to study the Federal intelligence
community, Mr. Pincus declares that:
No select Senate committee-not even a
joint congressional committee--will get to
the bottom of the U.S. intel i~=ence commu-
ui ?:robfen;e. without the full arl active
of President Ford and his sta T." This
is lie ;oes on to say "The inquiry
into intclll,.ence activities it is, inevitably
lino ;,ii. wh gas. Pre:iaen(- urho~zed the
::e Ls . s to do.
Because of its particular relevance to
the bill we will vote on todav, I an) bring-
ing this article to the attention of my
S 981
colleagues. Mr. President, I ask unani-
mous consent that the text of Mr. Pin-
cus' editorial be printed at this point in
the REcoaa.
There being no objection, the editorial
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
gig follows:
"`Xps-, " (ND PRESIDENTS
(By Walter Pincus)
No select Senate committee-not even a
}...at caugressiolial committee-will get to
t-e bottom of the U.S. intelligence com-
-".pity's problems without the full and ac-
tive support of President Fordand his staff.
The reason is simple: such an inquiry must
inevitably end up trying to find out what past
Presidents and their staffs authorized these
agencies to do; what formal groups, such as
Ito 40 Committee, approved; and what steps,
i f any, the White House ever took to stop
a'iiusei; of authority or projects that were il-
le =a1 on their face.
Current newspaper allegations about the
C-ntral Intelligence Age:lcy's domestic ac-
tiaities and the CIA partial confirmation plus
admission that the Federal Bureau of Iaives-
tigation has collected files on members of
Congress illustrate the point.
i+"order CIA Director Richard Helms tied
the start of that agency's domestic activities
in the late 1960s to "the express concern of
the President" (Lyndon Johnson), although
he did not detail how this "concern" was
tr i,nsmitted to him. The present CIA Direc-
tor, William Colby. told a Senate subcom-
mittee that, under Helms, the agency on Aug.
lb, 1907 established a unit within its coun-
terintelligence department "to look into the
possibility of foreign links to American dis-
shient elements." Two weeks later, Colby
wE'nt on, the executive director of the Presi-
dent's National Advisors' Commission on
Civil Disorder asked how tl?e CIA might as:ist
that inquiry.
In setting up the commission, President
Johnson's executive order had called upon all
government agencies to cooperate. Colby
never stated, in his prepared text, why or
(I_Lder what authority Helms had established
the unit prior to receipt of the commission's
reruest for assistance. Colby did add, how-
--r, that later the same year "the CIA ac-
tivity became part of an interagency program,
in support of the national commission (en
disorder), among others."
What that program was and who the "ct.h-
era" were who received its output were not
spelled. out. The only known group estab-
1is.tied at that time was one intended to work
out a plan for handling disorders in Wa.sh-
ln ;ton. Former participants on that incer-
agency panel from the Pentagon and Justice
Department don't remember CIA having been.
a party. Coih9's later disclosure-that at this
time the agency's Office of Security "inserted
10 agents into dissident organizations operat-
ing in the Washington, D.C. area . . . to
gather information relating to plans for
1euno11strations . that might endanger
CIA personnel, facilities and information"-
a;?allels whet this interagency group did.
Wi_iatever the facts were, only information
from the White House tracing establishment
of such a group could shed light on how the
CIA became a participant.
n 1969, the CIA was asked by the White
House to undertake surveillance of the Presi-
de,it's broth-1-r. Donald Nixon, who, accord-
inn to docu'nents from the House impeach-
ment inquiry, was moving to Las Vegas where
it was feared he "would come into contact
wi.h crimina elements." The agency refused,
the Scoot Service Act, which requires
ernment agencies to cooperate in the pro-
te' 'ion of t1.e President and his family, may
have been the source of other such requests.
Orly the White House can disclose what role
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January 27, 1975 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
NAYS-4 kind which have any tendency to reveal the covert intelligence activities in the United
Helms Talmadge full facts with respect to the following mat- States and abroad.
Such other related matters as the
tens or questions: (16)
Scott, Thurmond
William L. (1) Whether the Central Intelligence committee deems necessary in order to carry
PRESENT AND GIVING LIVE PAIRS, AS Agency has conducted an illegal domestic out its responsibilities under section (a).
PREVIOUSLY RECORDED-2 intelligence operation in the United States, SEC. 3. (a) To enable the select commit..
(2) The conduct of domestic Intelligence tee to make the investigation and study an.-
Young, against or counterintelligence operations against thorized and directed by this resolution, the
Griffin, for United States citizens by the Federal Bureau Senate hereby empowers the select com-
NOT VOTING-11 of Investigation or any other Federal agency. mittee as an agency of the Senate (1) to
(3) The origin a:dd disposition of the so- employ and fix the compensation of such
Hartke Javits Stafford called Huston Plan to apply United States In- clerical, investigatory, legal, technical, and
Huddleston Mathias Taft telligence, agency capabilities against indi- other assistants as it deems necessary or
Inouye McClure Tunney victuals or organizations within the United appropriate, but it may not exceed the nor-
Jackson Pell States. mal Senate salary schedules; (2) to sit and
So the resolution (S. Res. 21) WaS (4) The extant to which the Federal Bu- act at any time or place during sessions, re-
agreed to, as follows: reau. of Investigation, the Central Intelli- cesses, and adjournment periods of the Sen-
S. RES. 21 gence Agency, and other Federal law enforce- ate; (3) to hold hearings for taking
Rest sed, To establish a select committee ment or intelligence agencies coordinate their testimony on oath or to receive documentary
of th Senate to conduct an investigation respective activities, any agreements which or physical evidence relating to the matters
and si udy of governmental operations with govern that coordination, and the extent and questions it is authorized to investigate
respect to intelligence activities and of the towhich a lack of coordination has contrib- or study; (4) to require by subpena or
extent, if any, to which illegal, improper, or uted to activities or actions which are ille- otherwise the attendance as witnesses of
unethical activities were engaged in by any gal, improper, inefficient, unethical, or con- any- persons who the select committee be-
agency of the Federal Government or by any trary to the intent of Congress. lieves have knowledge or information con-
The extant to which the operation of cerning any of the matters or questions it
tion with others, with resp pect to any Intel- domestic intelligence or counterintelligence is authorized to investigate and study; (5)
Lion with acting Individually respect to ny Intel- m
ligence activity carried out by or on behalf activities and the operation of any other ac- to require by subpena or order any depart-
of the Federal Government; be it further tivities within the United. States by the Cen- ment, agency, officer, or employee of the
Resolved, That (a) there is hereby estab- tral Intelligency Agency conforms to the Leg- executive branch of the United States Gov-
lished a select committee of the Senate which islative charter of that Agency and the intent ernment, or any private person, firm, or cor-
may called, of the Congreal. poration, to produce for its consideration or
convenience To To Sctud ud of expression,
the Select Committee m for mitteee y Governmen- ($) The past and present interpretation for use as evidence in its investigation and
tal c ;ieratlons With Respect to Intelligence by the Director of Central Intelligence of the study any books, checks, canceled checks;
Activities to conduct an investigation and responsibility to protect intelligence sources correspondence, c via nications,ddocument,
record-
stuay of the extent, if any, to which illegal, and methods as it relates to the provision in papers, physical
improper, or, unethical activities were en- section 102(d) (3) of the National Security ings, tapes, or materials relating to any of
gaged in by any agency or by any persons, Act of 1947 (160 U.S.C. 403(d) (3)) that ". the matters or questions It is authorized to
acting either individually or in combination that the agency shall have no police, subpena, Investigate and study which they or any of
with others, in carrying out any intelligence law enforcement powers, or internal security them may have in their custody or under
functions. ." their control; (6) to make to the Senate by or or surveillance a Fedeer ral l Go on reanment. behalf of (7) Nature and extent of executive branch any recommendations it deems appropriate
any agency of the e Fed oversight of all United States intelligence in respect to the willful failure or refusal
(b) The select commof el tern members of this activities. - of any person to answer questions or give
the Se Ian shall cobeia ned by the P l (8) The need for specific legislative au- testimony in his character as a witness dur-
dent of the e, six a be ppo the by the mere- thority to govern the operations of any Intel- ing his appearance before it or in respect to
b of he em li ence agencies of the Federal Govern- the willful failure or refusal of any officer or
dent of tSenate from t the recommendations m
off ts the the Senate upon f tSand five merit now existing without that explicit stat- employee of the executive branch of the
minority the members a leader the the n Senate, t be five utory authority, including but not limited to United States Government or any person,
mty members President tSenate to be on agencies such as the Defense Intelligence firm, or corporation to produce before the
P by the eared m the aon of of the Senate upon Agency and the National. Security Agency. - committee any books, checks, canceled
trecommendation of the minority leader The nature and extent to which Federal checks, correspondence, communications,
of the of rule. For the Spurposes tands of Rules of agencies cooperate and exchange intelligence document, financial records, papers, physical
graph 6 of rule XXV of the Standing Rules of information and the adequacy of any regula- evidence, records, recordings, tapes, or
materials in obedience to any subpena or
the Senate, service of a Senator as a mem- tions or statuses which govern such coopera-
cot, chairman, sh l not chairman into account. select tion and exchange of intelligence informa- order; (7) to take depositions and other
majority not members be taken into the eco tom- om- tion. testimony on oath anywhere within the
tom) Teeshall
(t) The e a and (9) The extent to which United States in- United States or in any other country; (W
mittee shall select a chairman ch the minor- te] li ence agencies are governed by Executive to procure the temporary or intermittent
sty members shall select a vice chairman and orders, rule, or regulations either published services of individual consultants, or orga-
the committee shall adopt rules and prose or secret and the extent to which those Exec- nizations thereof, in the same manner and
lures to govern its proceedings. The vice e utive orders, rules, or regulations interpret, under the same conditions as a standing
chairman sha11 preside over meetings of the expand, or are in conflict with specific legis- committee of the Senate may procure such
select committee during the absence of the la'ive authority. services under section 202(1) of the Legis-
ch, sib roes and discharge such other respon- 10) The violation or suspected violation lative Reorganization Act of 1946; (9) to use
sib ties as may be assigned to him by the of ( any State or Federal statute by any in- on a reimbursable basis, with the prior con-?
eel u committee or the chairman. Vacancies
in he membership of the select committee telligence agency or by any person by or on sent of the, Committee on Rules and Ad-
si 1 not affect the authority of the remain- behalf of any intelligence agency of the Fed- malit such dinistration, epart the ment or services age of ncy; persorsonneal of
use
i- members to execute the functions of the eral Government including but not limited on a rei d e basis or e otherwise (10) with
ct committee and shall be filled in the to surreptitious entries, surveillance, wire- the prior bpartrsabl of the chairman any
ne manner as original appointments to it taps, or eavesdropping, illegal opening of the subcommittee of any committee of the San-
ure made. United States mail, or the monitoring of the ate the facilities or services of any members
(d) A majority of the members of the se- United States mail, of the staffs of such other Senate commit..
lest committee shall constitute a quorum for (11) The need for improved, strengthened, tees or any subcommittees of such other
transaction of business, but the select or consolidated oversight of United States in. Senate committees whenever the select
committee may affix a lesser number as a telligence activities by the Congress. committee or its chairman deems that such
quorum for the purpose of taking testimony (12) Whether any of the existing laws of action is necessary or appropriate to enable
or depositions. - - the United States are Inadequate, either in the select committee to make the investi-
their provisions or manner of enforcement, to and study authorized and directed
SEC. The select committee is authorized safeguard the rights of American citizens, gation
and directed to leet to do everything necessary or by this resolution; (11) to have direct access
appropriate to make the investigations and to improve executive and legislative control through the agency of any members of the
study specified in subsection (a) of the first of intelligence and related activities, and to select committee or any of its investigatory
section. Without abridging in any way the resolve uncertainties as to the authority of or legal assistants designated by it or its
authority conferred upon the select com- United States intelligence and related agen- chairman or the ranking minority member
saes. to any data, evidence, information, report,
mittee by the preceding sentence, the Sen- Whether there Is unnecessary dupli- analysis, or document or papers, relating to
ate further expressly authorizes and directs (13)
the select t committee t to o .make a complete cation of expenditure and effort in the col- any of the matters or questions which it is
investigation and study of the activities of lection and processing of intelligence, infer- authorized and directed to investigate and
any agency or of any and all persons or nation by United States agencies. study in the custody or under the control
groups of persons or organizations of any (14) The extent; and necessity of overt and of any department, agency, officer, or em-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SF`.NATE Jalluar' 27, 1975
ou ee or one-executive branch of the United ties of the Central Intelligence Agency in
E--s Government, including any depart- foreign countries or the intelligence act n-
ml t, agency, officer, or employee of the ties in foreign countries of any other le-
1 ni ed -States Government having the- power partment or agency of the Federal Gove'n-
ti+}r_er the laws of the United States to inves- ment.
e any alleged criminal activities or to Sec. 8. As a condition for employment as
:cute persons charged with crimes described in section 3 of this resolution, e.-Oh
nst the United States and any depart- person shall agree not to accept any hon
:rJ, agen=cy, officer, or employee of the arium, royalty or other payment for a epe :k-
tl-ited States Government having the au- ing engagement, magazine article, book, or
;o-rity to conduct intelligence or surveil- other endeavor connected with the investi;:.;a-
-.-nce within or outside the Unite' Stat
iz will aid the select committee to pre- or any -'v-yO V1 one select commit '-e
for or conduct t e person engaged by contract or oth r-
investi
ati
g
o an
he
-
select committee un4s
Ss e ^ m,nes
made necessary
available or i appropriate such employee or person has received an Ep-
b the sell
i
tt . the type or security
tiv rs conferred upon it by this resolution
E31m
:si!d s make the upon Investigation and study it clearance to be required hi the case of arty
y such employee or person shall, within the
it authorized by this resolution to n
ciiiznittee acting through the chairman or
any other member designated by him, and
1:11v be served by any person designated by
:;ucn chairman or other member anywhere
within the borders of the United States. The
chairman of the select committee, or any
ether member thereof, is hereby authorized
to administer oaths to any witnesses appear-
ing before the committee.
fei In preparing for or conducting the
investigation and study authorized and di-
rueted by this resolution, the select com-
niittee shall be empowered to exercise the
powers conferred upon committees of the
Senate by section 6002 of title 18, United
States Code, or any other Act of Congress
regulating the granting of immunity to
witnesses.
8rc- 4. The select committee shall have au-
thori,y to recommend theenactment of any
now legislation or the amendment of any
existing statute which it considers neces-
sary or desirable to strengthen or clarify the
national security, intelligence, or surveil-
lance activities of the United States and to
protect the rights of United States citizens
with regard to those activities.
Sac. 5. The select committee shall make a
final report of the results of the investiga-
tion and study conducted by it pursuant to
this resolution, together with its findings
and its recommendations as to new congres-
sional legislation it deems necessary or de-
sirable, to the Senate at the earliest practica-
to establish a select committee of the-
Senate to conduct an Investigation and
study of governmental operations with
respect to intelligence activities.
Mr. MANSFIEL Mr. President, I wish
to state, before proceeding with the dis-
cussions and consideration of this resolu-
tion, that insofar as the majority leader
is concerned, the chairman of the Com-
mittee on Armed Services, our colleague
from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS) is owed a
vote of thanks because throughout the
years he has scrupulously endeavored, to
the: best of his ability and in line with
his other responsibilities, to scrutinize all
activities of intelligence agencies related
to the defense community. He need not
yield to any Member of this body his
stance as the preeminent "watchdog" of
the Congress in performing this critical
function
t
JOHN
commensurate with the sensitivity of tae STENNIS.
The
Senate commends J
OHN
classified information to which such em- STENNIS for his assiduous and conscien-
ployee or person will be given access by t'e tious work in this endeavor.
select committee. - Mr. President, now that the select
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I m0 re committee has been approved by the Sen-
to reconsider the vote by which the res, ate, the minority leader and I have di-
lution was agreed to. rected a letter to the heads of agencies
Mr. MANSFIELD. I move to lay that and, departments of Government most
motion on the table. preeminently concerned with intelli-
The motion to lay on the table w:is gence endeavors. The letter reads as
agreed to. follows:
SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE -
CREDENTIALS
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under tl:e
previous order, the Senate will now pr+--
ceed to the consideration of the moue n
by the Senator from Montana (Mr.
MANSFIELD) to refer all credentials and
papers dealing with the New Hampshi: e
election dispute to the Committee cu
Rules and Administration, which tie
clerk will state. The time on this deba
is limited to 1 hour, to be equally d:-
vided and controlled by the Senator irons
Montana (Mr. MANSFIELD) and the Set. -
ator from Michigan (Mr. GRzrFIN).
The Senate will be in order.
The clerk will state the motion.
The legislative clerk read as follow.:
U; the Senate such interim reports as it con- FIEL") moves that the credentials of Lou s
}iders appropriate. After submission of its now Wyman and John A. Darken and all paper:
linal report, the select committee shall have non file with the Senate relating to tl
three calendar months to close its affairs, and same be referred to the Committee on Ruit
on the expiration of such three calendar and Administration for recommendation
'nonths shall cease to exist. thereon.
Sec. 6. The expenses of the select commit- Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I as):
tree through September 1, 1975, under this unanimous consent that the pendlns
resolution shall not exceed $750,000 of which business be laid aside temporarily, Sr
amount not to exceed $100,000 shall be avail- that I may able for the procurement of the services of pcomplete roviding for the Swork on elect the vet
Individual consultants or organizations tee, e, on whichich tfor Senate ate has just Such expenses shall be paid from the the has just ex -
contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers pressed ed its approval.
approved by the chairman of the select com- The PRESIDING OFFICER. Withou
anlttee_ objection, it is so ordered.
-iic. 7. The select committee shall institute Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, mar'
and carry out such rules and procedures as we have order?
t may deem necessary to prevent (1) the dis- The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
closure, outside the select committee, or any ator from Montana has the floor. May we
nforination relation to the activities of the have order in the Senate?
Central Intelligence Agency or any other
department or agency of the Federal Govern-
.cent engaged in intelligence activities, ob-
tained by the select committee during the SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY
course of its study and investigation, not GOVERNMENT INTELLIGENCE AC-
authorized by the select committee to be TIVITIES
disclosed; and (2) the disclosure, outside the
select committee, of any information which The Senate continued with the con-
would adversely affect the intelligence activi- sideration of the resolution (S. Res. 21)
As you may be aware, the Senate is to con-
duce; an Investigation and study of govern-
ment operations with respect to intelligence
activities. The scope of the Investigation is
set out in S. Res. 21, a copy of which has been
enclosed for your information.
We are writing to request that you not
destroy, remove from your possession or con-
trol, or otherwise dispose or permit the dis-
posal of any records or documents which
might have a bearing on the subjects under
investigation, including but not limited to all
records or documents pertaining in any way
to thematters set out in section 2 of S. Res,
21.
Sincerely yours,
This letter is being directed to heads of
19 separate governmental units as listed
here:
JANUARY 21, 1975.
Honorable William E. Colby, Director, Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, and as Coordinator
of Intelligence Activities, Washington, D.C.
20505.
Lt. Gen. Daniel 0. Graham, Director, De-
fense Intelligence Agency, The Pentagon,
Washington, D.C. 20301.
Honorable William B. Saxbe, Attorney
General, Dept. of Justice, 9th and Constitu-
tion N.W., Washington, D.C. 20530.
Mr. John C. Keeney, Acting Asst. Attorney
General, Criminal Div., 9th and Constitution
N.W., Washington, D.C. 20530.
Mr. John R. Bartels Jr., Administrator,
Drug Enforcement Administration, 1405 Eye
S t. N. W., Washington, D.C. 20537.
Honorable James R. Schlesinger, Secretary
of Defense, Room 3E 880, The Pentagon,
Washington, D.C. 20301.
Honorable Howard H. Callaway, Secretary
of the Army. Room 3E '718, The Pentagon,
Washington. D.C_20310.
Hon. J. W. Middendorf, Secretary of the
Navy, Room 4E 710, The Pentagon, Washing-
ton, D.C. 20350.
Hon. John L. McLucas, Secretary of the
Air Force, Room 4E 871, The Pentagon, Wash-
ir_gtbrt, D.C. 20330.
Lt. Gen. Lew Allen Jr., Director, National
Security Agency, Fort George G Meade,
Maryland 20755.
I add that the administration about
the preservation of records, documents,
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE January 21, 1975
therewith be paid out of the contingent fund
of the House.
Resolved, That the Clerk communicate
these resolutions to the Senate and transmit
a copy thereof to the family of the deceased.
Resolved, That as a further mark of re-
spect, the House do now adjourn.
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I have sent
to the desk a resolution and ask for its
immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ate will be in order. The Senator from
Illinois has the floor.
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, a resolu-
tion is at the desk, and I ask for its im-
mediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will state the resolution.
The assistant legislative clerk read as
follows:
S. RES. 34
Resolved, That the Senate has heard with
profound sorrow the announcement of the
death of Honorable John C. Kluczynski, late
a Representative from the State of Illinois.
Resolved, That a committee of two Sen-
ators be appointed by the Presiding Officer
to join the committee appointed on the part
of the House of Representatives to attend
the funeral of the deceased Representative.
Resolved, That the Secretary communicate
these resolut as to the House of Represent-
atives and t ismit an enrolled copy thereof
to the famil )f the deceased.
Resolved, hat when the Senate adjourns
today, it ac.,ourn as a further mark of re-
spect to the memory of the deceased Repre-
sentative.
Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, I have no
objection, and I commend the Senator
on his resolution.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ate will proceed to its immediate con-
sideration. -
The question is on agreeing to the res-
olution.
The resolution was agreed'to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair
appoints the Senators from Illinois (Mr.
PERCY and Mr. St's;vENSON) as members
of the committee required by the reso-
lution.
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, with a
strong sense of personal sorrow, I offer
his resolution on behalf of myself and
my distinguished colleague, Senator
STEVENSON. We deeply regret the passing
of our esteemed colleague, whose services
to his country, to his `State, and to his
community have been a matter of record
for so many years. I yield to my distin-
guished colleague.
Mr. STEVENSON. Mr. President, I
was much saddened to hear of Congress-
man JOHN KLUCZYNSKI'S death earlier
today. He has been a valued Member of
the Congress of the United States and
a good friend.
I join with my distinguished col-
league, Senator PERCY, in offering this
resolution and our condolence to all
members of the Kluczynski family.
Mr. President, earlier today, Repre-
sentative -JOHN C. KLUCZYNSKI, the dean
of Chicago's congressional delegation,
died. His passing is a great loss for the
people of Illinois' Fifth Congressional
District, the citizens of Chicago, of Il-
linois, and the Nation.
Congressman KLUCZYNSKI first en-
tered the public service in an elective
capacity in 1932 when he was elected
to the Illinois House of Representatives.
He served in that body for 16 years until
1948, when he ran successfully for the
State senate. He resigned the State sen-
ate just over a year later, in December
1949, to become a candidate for the U.S.
Congress. He was elected to Congress in
November of 1950, and he has been in
Washington serving the people of his
district ever since.
Congressman KLUCZYNSKI was a Pol-
ish-American of great distinction. He cut
a colorful figure in local, State, and na-
tional politics, but his work was the hard
work of fostering the public interest. In
the Congress he served on the House
Public Works Committee and in recent
years as chairman of the committee's
Transportation Subcommittee's chair-
man, Congressman KLUCZYNSKI played
a large and active role in the forma-
tion of our Nation's transportation pol-
icy, and particularly in the building of
our great Interstate Highway System.
Congressman KLUCZYNSKI is to be
buried Thursday in Chicago. My sym-
pathies, and I am. sure those of every
Senator, go out to his widow Estelle and
the entire family. We shall all mourn
the loss of Congressman JOHN KI,UCZYN-
SKI.
ORDER OF BUSINESS
The :?RESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time-?
Mr. MCCLELLAN. Mr. President, who
has control of the time?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ators from Montana and Michigan.
Mr, MAN,SF'IELI). Is time under con-
trol?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is
1 hour equally divided between the
Senator from Montana and the Senator
from Michigan.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield as much time
as the Senator wishes.
CONTINUING AUTHORITY FOR THE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
TO MAKE REPORTS DURING SES-
SIONS OF THE SENATE
Mr. M:CCLET.LAN. Mr. President, on
behalf of myself and the senior Senator
from North Dakota (Mr. YOUNG) I ask
unanimous consent that the Committee
on Appropriations be, and it is hereby au-
thorized during the 94th Congress, to re-
port bills, including resolutions and joint
resolutions, and to file reports during ad-
journments or recesses of the Senate, on
appropriation bills, including resolutions
and joint resolutions, together with any
accompanying notices of motions to sus-
pend rule XVI pursuant to rule XL for
the purpose of offering certain amend-
ments to such bills or resolutions or joint
resolutions, which ;proposed amendments
shall be printed,
Mr. President, this is the usual unani-
mous-consent request agreed to at the
beginning of each session of Congress,
and I ask unanimous consent accordingly.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
RESOLUTION HONORING ROY
WILKINS
Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I
send to the desk a resolution.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield as much time
as the Senator wants.
Mr. HUMPHREY. I thank the leader.
I ask for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
resolution will be stated.
The assistant legislative clerk read as
follows:
The Senator from Minnesota presents a
resolution honoring Roy Wilkins on the oc-
casion of his being named American of the
Year by the American Religious Town Hall.
Meeting.
Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, Roy
Wilkins, executive director of the NAACP,
has been named "American of the Year"
by the American Religious Town Hall
Meeting. This is a conference of Roman
Catholics, Protestants, and Jews, formed
to promote tolerance and understanding
among all peoples of every race and
creed. They could not have chosen a bet-
ter man to honor than Roy Wilkins. The
Senate should take this opportunity to
join in recognizing the great accom-
plishments of this courageous American.
Accordingly, I am today introducing, for
myself and Senators BENTSEN, TOWER,
MANSFIELD, HUGH SCOTT, ROBERT C.:BYRD,
MONDALE, GRIFFIN, and GOLDWATER, a
Senate resolution to honor the contribu-
tions of this distinguished American
citizen to the cause of human dignity
and justice.
We all know the depth of Roy Wilkins'
commitment to justice, to equal oppor-
tunity for all Americans, to making the
democratic process work, and to what
he has called "the most radical idea of
the 20th century-abolition of racial
segregation." We all know what a pro-
found mark he- has made on the history
of this country.
Our paths have crossed a number of
times over the years of struggle for civil
rights and economic opportunity for
black Americans. I worked closely with
Roy on the Civil Rights Act of 1957, 1960,
1964, and 1965. As chairman of the Lead-
ership Conference on Civil Rights, he
served as representative and coordinator
of all the civic, labor, and church organ-
zations committed . - equal rights for all
Americans. His en, gy, his -dedication,
his pragmatism, his clear vision of what
had to be done, and his realistic assess-
ment of how reform could best be accom-
plished, were invaluable in securing the
passage of that legislation. I also have
worked with Roy in th- effort to assure
equal opportunity for black L.nericans
and decent living conditions for those in
the inner city. He has worked as hard and
long to end economic discrimination as
he has to end legal and political. dis-
crimination.
I am particularly proud that the State
of Minnesota can claim Roy Wilkins as a
son. He grew up in Minnesota. He grad-
uated from the University of Minnesota.
He began his career as a journalist and
a powerful civil rights advocate in our
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January 27, 1975 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
et cetera, applies as well to all agencies
and subagencies concerned but not spe-
cifically singled out.
The task faced by the select commit-
tee which the Senate has just established
is to examine into the intelligence ac-
tivities of the U.S. Government. No more
important responsibility to the people of
the Nation can be assumed by Senators
than membership on this committee.
What is asked of them, in the name of
the Senate, is to probe fully and to as-
sess completely, to understand thorough-
ly and to evaluate judiciously. To the ex-
tent that the intelligence agencies have
acted correctly and within the law, that
must be made known. If there have been
abuses, they, too, must be set forth. There
can be no whitewash in this inquiry; nor
is there room for a vendetta. In the end,
the Senate must know what has tran-
spired so that it may seek to close legal
loopholes if there are any. In the end, we
must know so that together with the
House and the President, we may move
to foreclose any demeaning of the basic
premises of a free society.
What is at stake in the work of this
committee is a resolution of doubts. What
is at stake is a restoration of confidence
in a large and costly and little known
segment of the Federal Government. The
Senate must be satisfied that the Intelli-
gence community is doing the people's
business, to the end that the Nation may
be with assurance so advised. The Sen-
ate must be persuaded that what is be-
ing done in the name of security under
a cloak of obscurity is the people's busi-
ness, as defined, not by employees of a
Government agency, but the people's
business as defined by the Constitution
and the laws duly enacted thereunder.
The committee is called on, further-
more, to elucidate for the Senate the
relevance of the intelligence commu-
nity as it now operates to the Nation's
contemporary needs. We need to know
what may be required, today, not what
might have seemed necessary yesterday.
The fact that a commission is looking
into the CIA is all to the good; the re-
sponsibility of that group is to the Presi-
dent who created it. Its existence in no
way relieves us of our responsibilities. It
is appropriate and proper at any time
that the Senate so determines, to inquire
into any agency and, as necessary, to
seek to clarify and redefine its functions
and the scope of its activities.
One aspect of the impending inquiry
concerns covert activities. Thsee activ-
ities have been acquiesced in, to say the
least, by the Congress for a long time. No
one should be surprised or appalled,
therefore, to discover their existence a
quarter of a century later. In recent
years, however, the extent and necessity
for them have come under question. Who
sets the policy and why? What obtuse
intrusions may there have been by these
activities into the President's conduct of
'foreign affairs? What indifference, if
any, to the laws passed by the Congress?
What damage, if any, to the demeanor of
the Nation? What interference in the
personal lives of Americans and by whose
authority and under what guidelines?
What public funds have been committed
and to what end? What proliferation of
activities and how much overlap and
duplication?
It used to be fashionable, Mr. Presi-
dent, for members of Congress to say
that insofar as the intelligence agencies
were concerned, the less they knew about
such questions, the better. Well, in my
judgment, it is about time that that at-
titude went out of fashion. It is time for
the Senate to take the trouble and, yes,
the risks of knowing more rather than
less. We have a duty, individually, and
collectively, to know what legislation en-
acted by Congress and paid for by ap-
propriations of the people's money has
spawned in practice in the name of the
United States. The Congress needs to
recognize, to accept and to discharge with
care its coequal responsibility with the
Presidency in these matters.
The Senate has begun to address itself
to these questions by approving the cre-
ation of this select committee. There is
a need to understand not only the pres-
ent intelligence requirements of the
United States but also what systems or
procedures for oversight and account-
ability may be required to keep them
within bounds set by the Constitution,
the President and the elected Repre-
sentatives of the people in Congress.
Wisely, I believe, a special committee
for handling the investigation has been
established by this action today. The
scope of inquiry is far larger than can
come within the purview of any single
committee. Hopefully, within the select
committee, the pieces-all of the pieces-
can be fitted together. May I say that in-
sofar as the Senate is concerned, I think
this action expresses the expectation
that the matter will be concentrated in
this one committee. In my judgment, it
would be most inappropriate for a bevy
of studies of intelligence to proceed
simultaneously in several others.
May I say, Air. President, that this in
no way conflicts with the legislative
jurisdiction of the legislative committees
so charged.
The select committee is equipped with
a bipartisan membership. The Senators
who will be selected for service on this
committee are no different than the rest
of us. They are not tied with a blue rib-
bon or a white or pink ribbon. There Is no
higher or lower order of patriotism in
the Senate. There are no first- and sec-
ond-class Senators. Those who will serve
are men of competence, understanding,
and decency. They will do the job which
the circumstances and the Senate re-
quire of them.
The committee has been equipped
with full authority to study, to hold
hearings and to investigate all activi-
ties-foreign and domestic-of the intel-
ligence agencies of the Federal Govern-
ment. In the pursuit of that mandate, I
have every confidence that the commit-
tee will act with discretion, with re-
straint and with a high sense of na-
tional responsibility. There is no cause
and inclination to pursue this matter as
a. Roman circus or a TV spectacular.
There is only the need to see to the sober
discharge of very sober responsibilities.
How the committee proceeds is largely
up to the members of the committee.
They have the authority to make their
S985
rules and to define their procedures, and
that would include the question of when
to close or open the door to the use-of
television. As I have indicated, I would
not anticipate any great requirements
for the latter at this time. Most emphat-
ically, I would express the hope, too, that
committee staff would be selected with
as much concern for discretion as for
other qualifications. What comes to the
public from this committee and when,
aught to be solely-I stress the word
'solely"-determined by the members of
the committee.
The Senate is entrusting this commit-
tee with its deepest confidence. I know
that that trust is secure and that the re-
sults of the inquiry will reflect the high-
est credit on this Institution. I submit to
the Chair the names of those assigned to
the Senate Select Committee To Study
Governmental Operations With Respect
to Intelligence Activities and ask that
they be read and I do so on behalf of the
distinguished Republican leader and
myself.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will read the nominations.
The assistant legislative clerk read as
follows::
Senators Church, Hart of Michigan, Mon-
dale. Huddleston, Morgan, and Hart of
Colorado.
Mr. MANSFIELD. The Republicans
also.
The assistant legislative clerk read as
follows :
Senators Tower, Baker, Goldwater,
Mathias, and Schweiker.
SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE-
CREDENTIALS
The Senate continued with the con-
sideration of the credentials of the claim-
ants to be U.S. Senator from the State
of New Hampshire.
The PRESIDING , OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, are
we back on the regular order of business?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. We are
back on the Mansfield motion.
The Senator from Illinois is recognized.
RESOLUTION RELATIVE TO THE
DEATH OF REPRESENTATIVE
JOHN C. KLU'CZYNSKI, OF ILLI-
NOIS
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I ask the
Chair to lay before the Senate a message
from the House on H.R. 97.
The,PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will read the message from the House.
The assistant legislative clerk read as
follows:
Resolved, That the House has heard with
profound sorrow of the death of the Honor-
able John C. Kluczynski. a Representative
from the State of Illinois.
Resolved, That a committee of 65 Members
of the House. with such Members of the Sen-
ate as may be joined, be appointed to attend
the funeral.
Resolved, That the Sergeant at Arms of the
House be authorized and directed to take
such steps as may be necessary for carrying
out the provisions of these resolutions and
that; the necessary expenses in connection
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January 27, 1975 . CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
least 5 years within the 8-year period ending
on the date of the sale.
Taxpayers meeting these two requirements
may elect to exclude the entire gain from
gross income' If the adjusted sales price of
their reside, e is $20,000 or less. (This elec-
tion can on , be made once during a tax-
payer's life.t ie.) If the adjusted sales price
exceeds $20 00, an election mr v be made
to exclude p in of the gain baseu )n a ratio
of $20,000 ov r theadjusted sales p:'ce of the
residence. Fe rm 2119 (Sale or Ex.( ange of
Personal F denee) is helpful it determin-
ing who
an eldea
Additiu
reporting
residence
after the
residence
the adji
Addition
struct
on actil
Puiblicat
Your Ho
Retire
the retir
be a U.f
ceived e
each of
and (c)
"retirem
pensions
included
rents fro
qualify f the retiremeht into credit.
- The cr, t is 15% of the lessf f:
1. A t payer's qualifying irement in-
come, or
2. $1,5: ($2,286 for a join .aturn where
both taxi yers are 65 or older) minus the
total of n ntaxable pensions (such as Social
Security benefits or Railroad Retirement an-
nuities) and earned income (depending upon
the taxpayer's age and the amount of any
earnings he may have).
If the taxpayer is under 62, 5 ; must reduce
the $1,524 figure by the amount of earned
income in xcess of $900. For persons at least
62 years c but less than 72, this amount is
reduced 1 one-half of the earned income in
excess of 1,200 up to $1,700, plus the total
amount ~ r $1,700. Persons 72 and over are
not subj' . to the earned income limitation.
Sched :e R is used for taxpayers who claim
the reti oment income credit.
The 'ternal Revenue Service will also
was violated. Had the Genocide Conven-
tion been in existence two decades ago
those who perpetuated atrocities between
1933 and 1939 could have been brought to
justice.
This situation displays the same kind
of inaction that was brought against
those responsible for the Armenian mas-
sacres even though Turkey and her Ger-
man allies were defeated in World War I.
There is evidence on the record that
Hitler duly noted this fact when he pre-
pared his program of exterminations.
Documents introduced at the Nurem-
berg trials contain the following state-
ment made by Hitler in. August 1939 just
before the invasion of Poland:
What the weak western European civiliza.
tion thinks about one does not matter. .
I have sent to the East only my Death's
head units with the order to kill without
pity or mercy all men, women, and children
of the Polish race and language. Only in such
a way will we win the vital space we need.
Who still talks nowadays of the extermina-
tion of the Armenians?
It is quite apparent from the previous
statement that Hitler interpreted the
world's Inaction on the Armenian mas-
sacres as tacit consent to do as he
pleased. Why should the world stop him
when they have always failed in the past
to show concern??
The Genocide Treaty is the document
that displays the world's outrage and
concern over acts of Genocide. Yet the
United States has refused to sign this
important document. In the interest of
further international peace and safety,
in the Elopes of eliminating all future
crimes against humanity, I urge my cal-
leagues to join me in support of the
Genocide Convention accords.
CONCLUSION OF MORNING
BUSINESS
The PRESIDING OFFICER.. The time
for the conclusion of morning business
having arrived, morning business is
closed.
S 967
Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.
Ivt'r. ? GRIFFIN. Mr. President, I ask
that the time on this side be yielded to
the control of the Senator from Texas
(Mr. TOWER).
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll.
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for the
quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that Miss Pam Tur-
ner, of my staff, have the privilege of
the floor during the consideration of Sen-
ate Resolution 21 and all amendments
thereto.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. GARY
W. HART). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President,, I suggest
the absence of a quorum..
The PRESIDING OFFICER. On whose
time?
Mr. TOWER. To be charged equally to
both sides.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
cceded to call the roll.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, a parli-
amentary inquiry.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator will state it.
Mr. PASTORE. What is the pending
business?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
pending business is Senate Resolution
No. 21.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President and col-
leagues, I am not going to belabor this
measure this morning by an extended
explanation. As a matter of fact, I did
explain it last week and I think that
what we are trying to achieve is quite
well understood by the Members of the
Senate.
I do not think we are going to have any
difficulty with this resolution. As a mat-
ter of fact, it is generally conceded, to be
necessary, and I point up the fact that,
by a vote of 45 to 7, it was approved by
the Democratic Conference.
As I understand it, the minority
leader has stated today his selection of
members of the select committee, so I
construe from that that the other side
is more or less amenable to-this resolu-
tion.
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. PASTORE. Unless it was a gesture
of futility.
Mr. TOWER. It was acceptance of the
inevitable, I think.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I wish
to make it abundantly clear at the out-
set that the FBI, the CIA, and Military
Intelligence are absolutely necessary to
the security and the survival of this
taxpayer he has requested that IRS com-
pute his .x and he answers the questions
for colug 3 A and B and completes lines 2
and 5 on hedule R-relating to the amount
of his ' .,ial Security benefits Railroad Re-
tireir c annuities, earnee income, and
qual. ing retirement income nensions, an-
nuiti( interest, dividends, an, rents). The
taxpay should also write "RIC" on line 17,
Form 40.
NUREMBERG TRIALS ONLY REIN-
FORCE NEED FOR THr ADOPTION
OF THE GENOCIDE TR ATY
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. Pres. 'ent, one of
the worst offenders of the crime of geno-
cide before the action was outlawed by
the United Nations was the Nazi's ex-
termina , ion of 6 million Jews, 2 r/z.million
Poles, hundreds of thousands of Czechs,
Serbs, and Russians.
When the Nuremberg trials convened
it was decided that the Nazis could not
be punished for acts of genocide com-
mitted prior to 1939. The Nuremberg
tribunal which tried war criminals for
crimes against humanity refused to con-
sider outrages occurring before the war
on the grounds that no international law
ain, if any, may be excluded by
-axpayer when he sells his home.
ly, a taxpayer may elect to defer
gain on the sale of his personal
within 1 year before or 1, year
e he buys and occupies another
.e cost of which equals or exceeds
d sale price of the old residence.
time is allowed if ;1) you con-
new residence or (2) you were
luty in the U.S. Armed Forces.
523 (Tax Information on Selling
may also be helpful.
ct income Credit.-To qualify for
nit income credit, you must (a)
Itizen or resident, (b) have re-
ed income in excess of $600 in
y 10 calendar ye: before' 1974,
ave certain types ? qualifying
income". Five type f income-
anuities, interest, v dividends
i line 15, Form 10, and gross
SELECT . COMMITTEE TO STUDY
GOVERNMENTAL INTELLIGENCE-
GATHERING ACTIVITIES
The PRESIDING OF'F'ICE].,. Under the
previous order, the hour of 1 p.m. having
arrived, the Senate will now proceed to
the consideration of Senate Resolution
21, which will be stated by title.
The assistant legislative clerk read as
follows:
A resolution (S. Res. 21) to establish a
Select Committee of the Senate to conduct an
investigation and study with respect to in-
telligence activities carried out by or on be-
half of the Federal Government.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time
for debate on this resolution is limited to
2 hours, to be equally divided between
and controlled by the majority and
minority leaders or. their designees, with
the vote to occur at 3 p.m.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
yield my time to the distinguished senior
Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PAS-
TORE).
I suggest the absence of a quorum, with
the time to be charged against both
sides.
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S 968
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD
great Republic. Anyone who questions
for a moment, anyone who should try or
anyone who should even begin to imagine
that the Senator from Rhode Island is
trying to do anything to disrupt or to
injure in any way these fine agencies,
should immediately disabuse hiss mind
of it.
I have been connected for a long time
with the workings of these agencies. I
realize why they were instituted in the
first place. We could not survive as a
decent society without the FBI. We could
never survive as a great nation in this
troubled world, this sensitive world, with-
out a CIA or military intelligence. So I
wish to make it abundantly clear, Mr.
President, that what we are trying to
do is find out the abuses of the past and
also of the present, to find out how it
-dl started, how far it went, to remedy
these abuses and make sure that in the
future they will not happen; and in the
final analysis, ultimately, that the confi-
dence of the people wil be reaffirmed
and strengthened in their appreciation
and their consideration, as to the essen-
tiality of these great arms of Govern-
ment.
Mr. President, having said that. I must
in all fairness say that there have been
some very serious abuses. I am not going
to debate them this morning. As a matter
of fact. our newspaper headlines have
been replete with a dissertation of what
they are. There have been charges and
countercharges. There have been those
vho have exaggerated some of the
,vrongs; there are those who have mini-
_miiized some the wrongs. Because the su-
^ervision on the part of Congress is
,spread throughout several committees,
each of which has jurisdiction in its own
wvay---the Committee on Foreign Rela-
-ions is absolutely interested in inteli-
gence abroad; the Committee on the
Armed Services is absolutely interested
in military intelligence; the Joint Com-
,nittee on Atomic Energy is absolutely
interested in where our nuclear weapons
zre and now well they are being pro-
tected and, vis-a-vis with our adver-
saries, what they have and what we must
have--there is no question at all about
the essentiality.
Th important thing here is to restore
liublic confidence so that these agencies,
in the final analysis, will be responsive.
That is what this is all about. This is
not to challenge the chairman of one
committee or to challenge the chairman
of another committee. We are not here
to rebuke any Member of Congress for
what supervision he gave or did not give.
Thai; is not the question this morning.
Whet we are trying to do here is create
a select committee consisting of 1.1 mem-
ber----6 from the majority, 5 from the
minority. I know it is not going to be
partisan. There is not a Member of the
Senate who does not put his country
before his party, or even. indeed, his own
interest. If it were otherwise, that would
be a blot on this great establishment.
What do we do by this resolution? We
create a committee of 11 members. The
names have already been suggested by
the minority leader of those on the part
of the minority party. We know who
-- SENATE January 27, 1 15
they are. I am sure they will all render
fine service.
We do not know yet who the members
are on the majority side. I know I am
not one of them; I do not want to be one
of them. I made that pledge at the time
that I introduced this resolution, that
I was not doing it for any selfish reason;
I was doing it because I thought it. needed
to be done.
Mr. President, having said thal.. I have
nothing further. I am perfectly willing
to answer any questions. It is a vc :''y sim-
ple resolution. It is all speller.. out. I
understand there are going to be two
amendments. I am amenable ,o both
amendments, with the exception that on
the Tower amendment, I hope we can
clarify one statement at the end where:
it saris:
The type of security clearance I -, be re-
quired In the case of any such em s[oyee or
person shall be commensurate with tiie senst-,
tivity of the classified Information -o which
such employee or person will be giv'n access
by the select committee.
I think we ought to nail that ;;own to
be within the determination of tae com-
mittee itself.
I should like to add some language in
there, in the last sentence: "within the
determination made by the committee:
itself."
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I wonder
if I might visit with the distinguished
Senator from Rhode Island.
Mr. PASTORE. When the pro ,er time
comes. I do not think we are t.o much
in disagreement. I repeat wha I said
last week when I was questione I by the
distinguished Senator from Mi :dssippi,
the chairman of the Comm ;,lee oil
Armed Services: The jurisdiction of each
committee as it now stands will continue-.
There is nothing in this resolul ion that
changes that one iota. I suppose that the
authorization bills, when they come up,
will be referred to the Comas tttee on
Armed Services, there is no quest m at all
about that. I suppose before dec ding the
authorization the chairman will conduct
some kind of hearings, not coir.petitive
to the select committee; it could! be con-
sonant with it, I am not opposed' to that.
As a matter of fact, let us face it: We
are all here trying to do the rig .t thing.
Let us do it. That is about the : ize of it.
Now, Mr. President, I have: here a
statement by Senator HTTDDLESJON who
asked me to have it inserted! in the
R.Eroan, and I ask unanimous consent
that that be done.
The PRESIDIN.x OFFICER. Without
obje~_tion, it is so ordered.
SSTLT MENT B. SmATOS HUDBLF::tON
I am pleased to support Senate IResolutio:n
21, which would establish a select committee
on intelligence activities.
I believe the creation of such a c - mrnittee
is essential at this time.
I believe the committee as proposed in the
resolution before us will meet the needs of
the Senate and our Nation in term, of struc-
ture, representation and mandate,
A 2ommittee such as we are abc.at to cre-
ate roust touch upon the various a es, views,
geographical areas and philosoph es which
are a part of the Senate and our l.stion-at-
large.
To structure it otherwise would diminish
not only the acceptance of any findings and
recommendations but also the possibility of
reconciling contrasting views and theories
which must be accommodated.
Ultimately, the report of this select com-
mittee must be widely accepted by many
elements of the American people. Otherwise,
efforts to correct past improprieties and re-
store confidence in our government's ability
to conduct in an appropriate manner the
very sensitive and important intelligence
function, will falter.
To fail to create a broadly based commi ttee
would in the end be a disservice to ourselves,
the Senate, our country and the American
people.
Testimony already taken in the Congress
strongly indicates that there have been
abuses and misuses of authority within the
Central Intelligence Agency. Allegations of
other improprieties remain unanswered. A
virtual floodgate of questions and charges
has been opened, engulfing our intelligence
community in suspicion and uncertainty.
While some of this may have been more sen-
sation than substance, the facts remain that
both damaging testimony and allegations of
serious misconduct are before us and. that
they have not been rebutted to the satisfac-
tion of most members of Congress or of the
American people.
The floodgate cannot and should not be
closed; the questions raised must be an-
swered; the faith of the people in this most
sensitive area of their government must be
restored.
If an agency has' overstepped its author-
ity, if it has violated the rights of citizens
whom it is supposed to serve, if it has been
involved in illegal activities, if it has been
utilized in derogation of its public trust,
then these matters must be fully investi-
gated. Corrective steps must be taken.
There was an earlier time in this Nation
when the agencies in question-born in a
turbulent area of violentcrime half it cen-
tury ago, or in the aftermath of war 25 years
later-enjoyed a very different image. they
were looked upon as guardians of the Nation
and protectors of law-abiding citizens. But,
like so many of this country's institutions in
recent years, they have fallen in esteem. The
intelligence community has lost its glitter.
The FBI hero of the 1930's has been replaced
in the public eye by a much more dui-ious
character.
'thus, the need for a full investigation
of the tide of current charges goes beyond
the obvious requirements of discipline within
the government: it goes to a restoration of
confidence in a segment of government that,
more than any other, must hold the pub-
lic's confidence.
No nation can gamble with its security.
Indeed, the guarantee of that security is
perhaps the most fundamental of all govern-
mental responsibilities. Without it, all else
can quickly fade.
National security arrangements, defense
and foreign policy strategies, and dec;aions
regarding a host of other issues rely upon
intelligence. In fact, there are few who would
argue that we could.do without intelligence
gathering activities-especially in wha': ap-
pears to be an increasingly complex and
uncertain world.
Furthermore, the very nature of sins.: ac-
tivities requires that they be closely held
and carried out with a certain degas -e of
secretiveness and confidentialit v.
But, the agencies involved in such c.ctiv-
ities, like Caesar's wife, must be above re-
proach-not just because of their special
status and charge but also because actions
which involve them in suspicion and ques-
tion tend to impair if not destroy their abil-
ity to function.
There are those in this body who have fol-
lowed closely the activities of the CIA and
other agencies with intelligence respon:;ibil-
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January 27, 1975 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE
ities-the Defense Intelligence Agency, the
National Security Agency, the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation, and the Secret Service,
For that reason, we should certainly make
the best -use of these persons; we should
build upon their knowledge and experience.
At the same time, I believe we could bene-
fit from new and fresh perspectives which
could bring to such review an inquiring ap-
proach which might not only develop new
ideas but also do much to insure a positive
public response to the ultimate findings and
recommendations.
I do, consequently, support establish-
ment of a special committee to- review in-
telligence operations in this country. I also
think, however, that our intent and deter-
mination to insure a broadly representative
committee must be made clear.
To accommodate the representation of the
various views, I proposed in the Democratic
Conference that we consider an 11-member
body, rather than a smaller one. While this
is an admittedly rather large committee, in
this particular case, I believe that it is re-
quired. Many Committees have some juris-
dictional claim over Intelligence activities.
Interest and concern over this matter goes
far beyond the jurisdictional bounds of com-
mittees, encompassing, I would imagine,
every member of the Senate, Views on the
subject vary widely.
Furthermore, I believe that the special
committee must have broad authority, as
the resolution contains. It must be em-
powered not only to investigate possible il-
legal activities and abuses In the intelli-
gence community, but also to review the
mandates of the agencies concerned; to study
the role of_ intelligence in today's world and
to make recommendations regarding the type
of structure which can best meet the intel-
ligence objectives which are deemed neces-
sary and proper.
Some may perceive the proposal before us
as fraught with implications of sensational-
ism and headline hunting-an approach
which we clearly cannot.aford and which
we would be irresponsible to permit. Our de-
termination on that point, too, should be
made clear. But in this year-so soon after
Watergate-we cannot leave in doubt the
operations and activities of agencies Involved
in such sensitive and significant endeavors.
We must instead place our important intel-
ligence-gathering activities on a sound and
viable basis. In this case, skeletons in the
closet are likely to haunt us not only at
home but also abroad, not only bn security
issues but also in domestic politics. They
must be laid to rest. -
The alternative is to let matters ride, to
permit a series of well-intentioned but over-
lapping investigations proceed, to divide ef-
forts at a time when prompt and comprehen-
sive action is needed.
Thus, the preferable course, it seems to me
is the creation of a special committee (1)
broadly representative of the various Con-
gressional concerns on intelligence (2) dedi-
cated to a thorough investigation of ques-
tioned activities and current intelligence op-
erations and a reexamination of the role of
intelligence operations in our society, and (3)
charged with the responsibility of making
recommendations to the Senate as expediti-
ously as possible regarding both necessary
corrective actions and the future structure,
authority and relationships within the in-
telligence community.
I believe Senate Resolution 21 will accom-
plish this and that adoption of it would be a
right move in the right direction.
Mr. PASTORE. I now yield to my dis-
tinguished colleagues from California.
Mr. CRANSTON. I thank the Senator
very much for yielding.
I want first to thank the Senator from
Rhode Island for his magnificent lead-
ership in this matter. Without his help
we would not have accomplished as much
as we have so swiftly in this very impor-
tant matter. The efforts of the Senator
from Rhode Island have manifested a
quality of greatness.
I also want to thank the major leader
(Mr. MANSFIELD), Senator MATHIAS on
the minority side, Senator BAKER, Sen-
ator WEICKER, and. others who did so
much of the vitally important spade work
which has brought us to this point.
I have been involved in this matter
since 1971, when I questioned Senator
Ellend er, the ,hen chairman of the
Committee on Appropriations, on the
Senate floor about expenditures for in-
telligence operations. I joined in earlier
resolutions prior to the time that I helped
in the support that has been brought to-
gether behind the Pastore resolution.
I agree, of course, with the Senator
from :Rhode Island that we need an of-.
festive intelligence operation, we heed
it operating under clear and wise ground
rules and under firm control by the Ex-
ecutive and Congress. I have been crit-
ical of the CIA and other intelligence
agencies for n any of the things they
have done that they should not have
done. There have been serious abuses.
But there also have been great accom-
plishments. There have been deeds done
by courageous and dedicated men and
women, many of whom have risked their
lives, and some of whom have lost their
lives, in service of their country.
I would just make these points for the
legislative history and for consideration
by the committee that will be carrying
on this activity:
First. If anyone needs reminding, there
have been a series of revelations over
the past decade and a half that point
not only to the Internal shortcomings of
intelligence agencies in carrying out their
assigned tasks, not only the lack of co-
ordination between their operatiols and
national policy as declared by the Pres-
ident and Congress, not only to the fail-
ure of these agencies to- communicate
with one another and with the President
and the standing: committees of Can-
gress-but, also, and more alarming-to
their power to subvert the Constitution
and threaten freedom here at home while
damaging-in the majority leader's
words-"the good name of the United
States" abroad.
Further, It must be admitted, their
power was often misused at the direction
of higher authority in the executive
branch-or with the acquiescence of
higher authorities--and with a knowing
wink or willful ignorance on the part of
many members of Congress.
Second. But the problem goes beyond
the CIA, the FBI, and other intelligence
agencies. It goes beyond foreign relations.
It goes beyond civil liberties at home.
Here the great issues of national sec-
urity and individual liberty are Inex-
tricably linked. We have to get some
perspective on ourselves, on our origins,
on our immediate past, and on our fu-
ture-as we proceed from the aftermath
of the Cold War to what appears to be
an era of interdependence in a multipo-
lar world.
The fundamental problem-as we ap-
proach the bicentennial-is to restore
constitutional government in the United
States. There has to be accountability
and responsibility. The intelligence agen-
cies must be adapted to the needs of a
constitutional democracy in our time-
or they must be eliminated.
We cannot eliminate them so we have
to do what is necessary to keep them
under control. That is a job for Con-
gress. -
Third. Therefore, as the Senate pro-
ceeds to establish the select committee,
it is important to identify three impor-
tant missions of this committee:
First of all, it Is charged with finding
the facts in cases of alleged wrongdoing,
Thus, the Pastore resolution empowers
the select committee to "conduct an in-
vestigation ... of the extent, if any, to
which illegal, improper, or unethical ac-
tivities" have been engaged in by the
intelligence agencies of the U.S. Govern-
ment. This will involve identifying in-
dividuals responsible for such activities,
as well as their respective institutions
and I cite paragraphs-1, 2, 3, 10 of sec-
tion 2.
Second, the select committee Is
charged with going one step further. It is
to consider the institutional changes
needed in the organization of the execu-
tive branch and changes needed in con-
gressional oversight mechanisms as
well-so that these abuses of power can-
not occur again I cite section 2, para-
graphs 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and especially
11, 12, and 13, of Senate Resolution 21.
Finally, the select committee is di-
rected to make a complete investigation
and study of the extent and necessity of
overt and covert intelligence activities
in the United States and abroad. I cite
section 2 of paragraph 14.
Fourth. It will be difficult for the
select committee to carry out these mis-
sions-no matter how sweeping the man-
date entrusted to it, no matter how great
its delegated powers, and no matter how
much access to secret documents and
processes is guaranteed in the words of
the Pastore resolution. -
Just how does it investigate matters
that, in their essence, depend on not
being seen? How will the select commit-
tee know when it is not getting what it
needs to know to get at the full facts?
These questions are without easy
answers, .
Section 3(a), paragraph 11 of Senate
Resolution 21 is of great importance. It
grants the members and staff of the
select committee "direct access" to any
data, evidence, information, report,
analysis or documents or papers" rela-
ting to the investiagtion in the possession,
of the intelligence agencies. -
Despite this clause, it can be predicted
that this information-in some in-
stances-will be given up with great
reluctance and, indeed, some of it already
may have been destroyed.
Further, there will be a tendency for
personnel of the intelligence agencies to
use the classification system.as a means
of avoiding full testimony before the se-
lect committee. That is, they may "tell
the truth" or provide the facts at the
"top secret" or "secret" level, but not
include information available on a given
subject at a higher level of classification.
Or they may cite law and executive or-
ders and precedents and "executive priv-
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_) 970 CONGRESSIONAL, RECORD- SENATE /anuai y 27, 1975
.iege" -,ts shields of justification for not
cuing all they know--even though they
;.re under oath.
Fifth. This problem could be greatly
.9leviated if the Senate through its select
:;cxwrrnit .ee was guaranteed the full and
active support of the Ford administra-
te ion in this inquiry. As Walter Pincus
,;ointed out in Sunday's Washington
%'ost, such an investigation must inevita-
I.ly end up questioning the, past policies
:~,nd practices of Presidents and their
, taif.
Perhaos a confrontation with the
White House and the bureaucracy is in-
evitable as the investigation proceeds.
a rom the start, there are some powerful
incentives for a cover up. The Senate
should understand this reality now.
Already we see a former Director of
Cie CIA, Mr. Helms pointing the finger
oi` responsibility at one dead President
.raid at another who is incapacitated-
artd who, so far, has managed to avoid
coming into court or before a congres-
sianal committee. This same man is
known to have destroyed documents
bearing on his tenure asDirector of the
C?A.
Further, the present Director of the
CIA in his recent report apparently
pointed to his predecessor and previous
aoministra,tions as being responsible for
acts of wrongdoing. The Senate should
be reminded that this same man had
spent his entire career on the operations
side of CIA before he became executive
director and later director. Mr. Colby at
one time directed the controversial and
perhaps dubious Phoenix program in
Vietnam, and at one time he was deputy
director for operations, DDO, in the
CIA-with, responsibility for counterin-
telLigence and domestic operations
among others.
7,-'his investigation cannot succeed
without determining the individuals re-
sponsible for illegal and improper acts-
be they in the Oval Office, the National
Security Council-and the 40 Committee
within it--the President's Foreign Intel-
ligence Advisory Board, the U.S. Intelli-
gence Board, or in the individual agen-
cies. A number of the persons involved in
past actions still serve in high positions
in I;he Government.
:_7o while the select committees' inves-
tigation must not degenerate into a witch
hunt, it cannot be a picnic, either. For
here are bound to be a lot of skeletons
in a lot of closets. Individuals and agen-
cies involved in wrongdoing or ques-
tionable practices must be identified. Or
else the American people will be ill served
by another coverup.
Some have stated that this investiga-
tion. must not be a "TV spectacular." But
it must not be conducted behind closed
doors, either. "Protecting the national
security" arguments must not stand in
the way of the American people's full
understanding of this problem, and they
must, not stand in the way of publicly
assigning responsibility for past actions.
Again, the fundamental issue is account-
ability and responsibility under a consti-
tutional system of government.
There Is no good reason why questions
of policy in the intelligence community
cannot be discussed in open hearings, and
all facts bared-except for the most sen-
sitive-that bear upon the matter : and
questions posed in Senate Resoluti n 21.
In this regard, any classification --de-
claffisification system employed sho-.ld'>e
devised by the select committee- a c^-
operation with the executive bran_h, if
possible. After all, one of the issi^:es at
stake is secrecy itself. The emi-basis
throughout should be on sharin . the
maximum amount of infovmatiou with
the public.
Seventh. In conclusion, several ele-
ments are required for a successfi:l in-
vestigation and study: A continuati->n of
aggressive investigative reporting o : the
part of the press, and I know thal will
occur; a select committee with mersibeis
and staff interested in getting al the
facts and sharing them with the Aiieri-
can people to the extent possible; the
full cooperation of the executive agen-
cies involved; sources and witnesses who
are assured of proper protection along
the way.
Again I thank the Senator .rom
Rhode Island, the majority leader, and
the many others for the magnificent
work that has brought us to this point
on this day.
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I ield
myself such time as I may require.
Mr. President, I will be very candid
with the Senate. It was my original i:eel-
ing that this matter should have been
contained within the Committee on
Armed Services which does have o,,er-
sight jurisdiction over the CIA. Bu'. in
the spirit. that this resolution has Leen
offered by the distinguished Senator
from Rhode Island, I am certainly pre-
pared to accept it, because I think that
the Senator from Rhode Island has set
the right tone for the conduct of this in-
vestigation and the subsequent cone fu-
sions to be drawn from it.
I think that some examination of the
domestic activities of our intelliger. 'e-
gathering organizations should be in-
vestigated and I think perhaps such an
investigation is overdue.
I think it is essential that agencies _n-
volved in this kind of work be proscribed
from activities that either violate their
charter, their congressional authori.'a-
tions, or militate against the individ tal
freedom of the American people.
I think, to that end, this is the in st
important thing that our committee can
do or that the select committee when it
is chosen can do.
It is my view that we can develop co,i-
structive legislation that affords su?h
proscriptions and such protections. I
would express the hope that has alrea iy
been expressed by the distinguished Se:-
ator from Rhode Island that we can co
duct our work in a responsible way,
as to preserve the confidentiality of ma-
ters that impact on the national securi :y
of the United States of America.
We must recognize that our adve-
saries and our potential adversaries ha, e
had a sophisticated intelligence-gathe:?-
ing organization, that they have an ac-
vantage over us in that they operate iri
this country in a free society, and in mc. t
respects in our operations abroad we of -
crate in closed societies, making tlh,~
gathering of significant intelligence
much more difficult proposition.
I think we do have to afford adequat
safeguards for our legitimate operations
abroad.
I am hopeful that we can observe the
need to conduct many of our delibeaia-
tions in private. I think that although
the objective set forth by the distin-
guished Senator from California is de-
sirable, that as much as possible they be
open to the public, there are going to be
times, I think, when we can elicit more
infor.w ;ticrn and more significant and
more penetrating and In-depth infor-
mation, if we go into executive session.
So I think that what we must do is
have a balanced approach here, recognize
that we have to correct abuses, recognize
that we must compel our intelligence-
gathering operations to conduct them-
selves within the purview of the law that
authorizes them, and at the same time
recognize the vital interest of the United
States from the geographic, strategic, po-
litical, tactical, economic situation that
we find ourselves in and make sure we
do not hobble ourselves and render our-
selves at such a disadvantage that we
cannot maintain the kind of internation-
al posture we need.
I might mention one other thing, Mr
President, and that is not only the neces-
sity to protect some of our agents or some
of our covert operations abroad, but also
the confidence placed In us by foreign
governments. We must, I think, be care-
ful not to embarrass foreign govern-
ments, not just friendly governments, but
perhaps some mutual governments and
some that may not appear to be so
friendly that may have supplied us some
cooperation; and I would hope we would
take care not to embarrass governments
of these countries.
With the proper care, I think it is per--
feetly correct that we embark on this
course today.
I am delighted to yield to the Senator
from California.
Mr. CRANSTON. I thank the Senator
for yielding.
On one point he mentioned,. I recog-
nize that there will have to be closed
door sessions, first, in order to get such
information, that would not otherwise be
made available, and that the committee
will need. I recognize the reason for his
amendment. I think it is quite appro-
priate.
I would like to ask one question and
make one point about it.
First, I think, as I said in my earlier
remarks just now, that the committee
must control the classification and de-
classification :process; hopefully in coor-
dination and cooperation with the ad-
ministration, but It cannot get itself into
a situation where it is unable to do cer-
tain work that it feel:; it must do.
in regard to the specific amendment
that the Senator has offered, under his
amendment how do we prevent the exec-
utive from abusing this authority?
For example, suppose they did not
;cooperate---
Mr. TOWER. If the Senator from Cali-
fornia will withhold an his question, I
was going to engage in colloquy with the
Senator from Rhode Island on this mat-
ter.
Mr. CRANSTON. Fine.
Mr. TOWER. And we will bring all
this out.
S972
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Paragraph 2 concerns me. It says:
And, number 2, disclosure outside the
committee of any information which ad-
versely affects the intelligence activities of
the United States.
It would appear on its surface to say
that if we stumbled into a matter such
as the Chilean situation, the Bay of Pigs,
or the. Lebanon incursion, notwithstand-
ing that it might appear to the Commit-
tee to be something that ought to be
dealt with in the. Congress, we should
not disclose it.
Will the Senator from Mississippi re-
assure me that that is not the purpose
of paragraph 2?
Mr. STENNIS. No. that is not the pur-
pose of paragraph No. 2. We tried to
wrap it up in such a way as require
rules of procedure In the committee
which I understand to be the feeling of
the Senator from Tennessee.
Mr. BAKER. If there appears to be
conduct by any agency of the U.S. Gov-
ernment that appears to be improper or
exceeds its jurisdiction, that would not
be limited by paragraph 2 of this
amendment?
Mr. STENNIS. This does not put a
limitation on the committee. It requires
the committee to proceed under rules,
regulations, and procedures. But these
things are still left in the hands of the
/committee.
Mr. BAKER. I thank the Senator.
Mr. STENNIS. It is a rule of the Sen-
ate by a guideline.
Mr. PASTORE. With the modifica.
tion, I am willing to accept the amend-
ment.
Mr. STENNIS. If no one else wants the
floor, can we have a vote on the amend-
ment? Will the Chair put the question?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the
Senator from Mississippi modify his
amendment?
Mr. STENNIS. Yes; by striking out the
word "specifically" in the sixth line from
the bottom.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques-
tion is on agreeing to the amendment
as modified.
Mr. CURTIS. Reserving the right to
object and I, of course, will not object.
I would like to ask a question.
Is there any penalty or enforcement
means to compel staff members of this
committee to not disclose information
that their committee directs should not
be disclosed?
Mr. STENNIS. It is a sad state of the
law, Mr. President, but I am quite doubt-
ful that we have a law that really is
drawn o cover situations of this kind.
We have the old Espionage Act of 1918,
which specifically requires there must be
an Intent to do harm to the United
States. It is a kind of wide-open proposi-
tion which is, in itself, a very strong
argument here for the adoption of this
amendment. It puts in some kind of an
obstacle. A staff member, if he violated
the rule, would violate' a Senate rule. It
would not have any criminal penalty at-
tached to it, but it would be a rule to
that extent.
I hope the committee will get a prom-
ise in advance that. no one is going to
write a book-that no staff member is
going to write a book, or a journal arti-
cle, or anything else---about things that
were disclosed to them in these proceed-
ings. I think that is a matter we have to
trust to the discretion of the commit-
tee. Under present law we have to. I be-
lieve the Senator raised a good point.
Mr. CURTIS. I certainly am for the
amendment of the distinguished Senator,
but I believe we have to rethink our posi-
tion on some of these things. Here in this
country if someone discloses a tax return,
he has violated a criminal law and can be
punished. If he discloses secrets vital to
the security of the United States, he is
apt to defend it as the right of the people
to know. We have, certainly, a right to
not only snake it a law violation to dis-
close, but there ought to be a penalty to
it.
I thank the Senator.
Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator.
If there, is no further discussion, could
we have a vote on the amendment?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques-
tion is on agreeing to the amendment, as
modified, of the Senator from Mississippi.
The amendment, as modified, was
agreed to,
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent to yield 3 minutes to
the Senator from North Dakota without
losing my right, to the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. YOUNG, Mr. President, I see no
objection to a thorough examination of
the operations of the CIA, the FBI, or any
other intelligence-gathering agency, but
I believe At can, only be done effectively,
and without great irrj my to the agencies,
by a relatively small committee and a
small staff. A big investigating committee
with a sizable staff--ono matter how well
intentioned--cannot avoid much of the
information that develops at the hearings
being leaked to the public, thereby be-
coming easily available to the intelligence
agencies of Russia and every country in
the world,
If the pending resolution involved a
much smaller committee with only a very
minimal staff, I believe the security of
this Nation could be safeguarded and the
investigation could be very helpful. I
would hope that the meetings of the com-
mittee would be open to the public. If this
were the procedure, then the public would
get firsthand information rather than
from leaks highly distorting the facts dis-
closed in the hearings.
Mr. President, I cannot help but be
deeply concerned about the future effec-
tiveness of the Central Intelligence Agen-
cy. No intelligence operation-particul-
larly involving clandestine operations in
foreign countries or involving some of
our most advanced technology, especially
in defense areas-can be publicly dis-
closed without endangering our sources
of information, the lives of those involved
in this type of intelligence operations,
and the very effectiveness of an intelli-
gence-gathering organization. Russian
intelligence agents, for example, would
only have to read our publications to
obtain information highly valuable to
them.
About 12 years ago when we had the
missile crisis In Cuba a Russian intel-
ligence agent, a high-ranking member of
the GRU, disclosed to Great Britain and
the United States a great deal of inside
information regarding how far Russia
would go in this missile crisis. He also
provided us with much other information
regarding the entire operations of the
GRU and KGB-their two major intel-
ligence-gathering agencies. A book was
published regarding the Penkovsky pa-
pers and Information which has been in
circulation for several years.
The point I am trying to make, Mr.
President, is that Penkovsky expected to
be caught and was caught. There was a 2
day trial and he was killed. Here in. the
United States there is not much of a pen-
alty for even the highest ranking intel-
ligence officer, a Member of Congress, or
anyone else for disclosing our most highly
classified intelligence. -
Mr. President, the Washington Star-
News of Sunday, January 26, 1975, pub-
lished a very good editorial on the sub-
ject of intelligence and the forthcoming
investigations entitled "The Great Intel-
ligence Exam." I ask unanimous consent
that it be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the editorial
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
THE GREAT INTELLIGENCE EXAM
This is the era of bosom-baring and the
country's numerous intelligence-gathering
organizations are not immune. As things
stand now, various committees of the House
and Senate are gearing up for investigations
of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation, the Defense In-
telligence Agency and the National Security
Agency. We hope that these investigations
will be boiled down to, at most, one select
committee in the House and Senate. We also
hope that the investigations will be skepti-
cal, thorough and responsible. A witch-hunt
born of the peculiar sensitivities left over
from Watergate would not be helpful. A
careful analysis of this country's intelligence
problems and legislation to remedy the mis-
takes and deficiencies of the past are very
surely in order. A bipartisan congressional
Investigation is especially desirable in view
of the conservative complexion of the blue-
ribbon executive panel headed by Vice Presi-
dent Rockefeller which is also looking into
CIA activities.
The difficulty, of course, is that, when it
comes to intelligence-gathering operations,
bosom-baring is a tricky procedure. The risk
is that too much public exposure of a highly
sensitive area of government will put the
whole operation out of business, and imperil
the reputations--and even the lives-of peo-
ple involved, to say nothing of the nation's
security. In the past, the congressional com-
mittees with intelligence oversight responsi-
bilities have been squeamish about inquiring
too deeply into these clandestine affairs. The
present danger is that post-Watergate zeal-
otry, inspired by news stories of a "massive,
illegal domestic intelligence operation"
mounted by the CIA a few years back, will
lead to excesses of revelation.
For our part, we remain unconvinced that
the charges have much real foundation.
From what has been revealed so far-mostly -
by CIA Director William E. Colby to a House
Appropriations subcommittee-it appears
that the agency was involved in a program of
internal surveillance of certain domestic dis-
sident groups suspected of having connec-
tions with foreign agents. CIA agents were
"inserted" in some of these organizations,
some mail between American citizens and
Communist correspondents was read, and
files-largely furnished by the FBI-were
established on some 10,000 people. In addi-
tion, Colby said, the program involved physi-
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Mr. CRANSTON- Fine.
Mr. TOWER. So that we will make it
clear what everyone means and intends;
but I think the distinguished Senator
from Mississippi has been seeking the
floor and has been very patient, so I
would like to yield to him, and then we
;a; ill take this matter up subsequently.
Mr. CRANSTON. Certainly. I thank
(,he Senator.
Mr. TOWER. I yield to the Senator
from Mississippi such time as the Sena-
tor requires.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I thank
the Senator from Texas.
At this point, at least, I certainly will
not require over 20 minutes, so we can
just limit it to that.
Mr. President, after a conference with
the Senator from Rhode Island and the
Senator from Texas, I send to the desk
an amendment to the proposed resolu-
tion and ask that it be considered now.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment will be stated.
The assistant legislative clerk read as
follows :
The Senator from Mississippi proposes an
amendment, at the end of the resolution, to
told a new section as follows-
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that further reading
of the amendment be dispensed with.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Why not let him
read it?
Mr. STENNIS. All right, I withdraw
that.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will read it in full.
The assistant legislative clerk read
as follows:
At the end of the resolution add a new
section as follows:
Sec. The select committee shall insti-
tute and carry out such rules and procedures
as it may deem necessary to prevent (1) the
disclosure, outside the select committee, of
any information relating to the activities
of the Central Intelligence Agency or any
other department or agency of the Federal
Government engaged In intelligence activi-
ties, obtained by the select committee dur-
ing the course of its study and investiga-
tion, not specifically authorized by the se-
lect committee to be disclosed, and (2) the
disclosure, outside the select committee, of
any information which would adversely af-
fect the intelligence activities of the Central
Intelligence Agency In foreign countries or
the intelligence activities in foreign countries
of any other department or agency of the
Federal Government.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
has control of the time.
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I ask the
Senator from Mississippi if he will yield
for a question on his amendment.
Mr.. STENNIS. All right, and then I
will yield 3 minutes to the Senator from
North Dakota out of my time. I yield
for a question.
Mr. :BASER. This is a question of
clarification. This amendment, of course,
is an antileak amendment. I think that
is fine. I hope we succeed. We failed
miserably in the Watergate Committee.
Our former colleague and I tried in every
way we could. It did not work.
There are some matters of sensitivity
that have not been leaked, but are still
In the Atomic Energy Committee, many
of them. In safe storage.
S 971
covered'. in any way very plainly, that
there was no prohibition on it. I do not
think this puts too much of a burden.
The Senator is opening up all of these
files.
Mr. PASTORE. No.
Mr. STENNIS. The resolution does. I
do not mean the amendment does but
the resolution opens up the files. We just
have to have a safeguard.
Mr. PASTORE. I do not think we are
meeting on our intent here. I am not op-
posed to the Senator's suggestion that
the matter of leaks should be prevented,
and that the staff should, not disclose
anything without authorization by the
committee. The only thing that bothers
me is that he is tightening up the obli-
gation and responsibility of the commit-
tee a little bit too much by using the
word ";specifically." If he left the word
"specifically" out, I think he would ac-
complish his purpose and not open it
up to debate every time there is the
question of disclosure.
Mr. STENNIS. The main point here is
to have something explicit in writing by
the committee as to rules and proce-
dures. When we nail that down explic-
itly, how it should be done, then we
cover the waterfront.
We can strike out the word "specif-
ically."
Mr. PASTORE. Will the Senator strike
it out?
Mr. STENNIS. Yes.
Mr. PASTORE. If he strikes it out, I
would accept the amendment.
Mr. STENNIS. With the understand-
ing that this still carries with it-
out by the committee itself or its mem-
bers. It just requires that such reason-
able rules and regulations as the com-
mittee may see fit be established by the
committee regarding disclosures of in-
formation that might, in the second part,
affect intelligence abroad.
But going back to the first one for just
a moment, this relates to disclosures by
those other than the committee, staff
members or anyone else that might come
in contact with this information.
In other words, the committee itself
is called on by the Senate to make these
rules and regulations.
Now, with reference to foreign intel-
ligence or intelligence activities abroad-
and that is what my plea is for here to-
day, the protection of this foreign in-
telligence-there we are trusting the
committee to write rules and procedures
to set out for themselves and staff mem-
bers regarding this foreign intelligence.
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield briefly for a question?
Mr. STENNIS. I am responding to a
question of the Senator from Rhode Is-
land.
Will the Senator restate his question
with respect to paragraph 2?
Mr. PASTORE. I was wondering if the
word "specifically" was not rather redun-
dant. If it just said "not authorized by
select committee," that would not lead
to any controversial confusion.
Naturally, the authorization would
have to be explicit. The word "specifical-
ly" for the time being, without knowing
within what context it was inserted in
anent, unless it is more explicitly ex- Mr. PASTORE. With the understand-
plained. I thought if we just said "not '-ng that the committee and only the
authorized by the Select Committee" it committee has the authority to disclose.
would be enough. I will admit that.
In other words, I do not want the com- = Mr. STENNIS. It is better to be care-
mittee to sit down and begin to write a iul here than to be sorry later. This is
bill of. particulars every time they are not directed at the committee.
going to authorize some disclosure. Mr. PASTORE. I know that.
Mr. STENNIS. What line is the Senator Mr. STENNIS. This is putting the
referring to? I see-it. That is before the Senate in a proper position. I think it
second paragraph. will help the committee to have the Seri-
That relates to staff members. ate go on record here in making this one
Mr. PASTORE. I know that. This whole of the gground rules, so to speak.
amendment relates to staff members. i Mr. PASTORE. Is the Senator willing
quite agree with the Senator from Mis- to delete the word "specifically."
sissippi. I hope that the staff does not Mr. STENNIS. Yes.
begin to hold news conferences. That al- Mr. PASTORE. With the modification.
ways happens. They just take this whole I will accept the amendment.
thing over. I think if there are going to r Mr. YOUNG. Will the Senator yield
minutes? I support the amendment.
3
be any news conferences, they should be t
by the chairman or the members of the Mr. STENNIS. I do not have control
committee themselves. But in the past we of the time. The Senator from Texas
Mr. S"TENNIS. Yes, I am glad to yield I Have 11au .-V 0011VW1 LLl J1ULLQ+UI- U11RU
to the Senator from Rhode Island. I want staff members fall over one another to
to state very briefly what the purpose is, see who can tell it to the press first. I
think everything should be told to the
but I. yield ld now now. . .For the purposes of the press that needs to be told to the public.
RzcoRn, would the Senator in explain- I think the public understands that.
ing his amendment, which I am going ? Mr; STENNIS. This is not to prohibit
specifically authorized"?
Mr. STENNIS. Yes.
That is on the second part, is it not?
Mr. PASTURE. Yes.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, this
amendment relates to what we ordinarily
call "leaks." It does not put any limita-
tion on the committee whatsoever.
The first part relates to matters that
are not expressly authorized or given
wondering if the word "specifically" is
not a little too tight for the committee.
If we said "not authorized by the com-
mittee," I think we accomplish the
objective.
Mr. STENNIS. What we were trying
to get at was to cover the situation where
a staff member or some other person had
this information and, since it was not
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January 27, 1975 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
cal surveillance, wiretaps and break-ins di-
rected at CIA personnel suspected of security
leaks and, in a few cases, those who were
thought to be receiving the information.
In Colby's opinion and that of his immedi-
ate predecessor, Defense Secretary James R.
Schlesinger, the CIA, in this period, may
have overstepped the strict limits of its
charter. The various acts have been labelled
as "'regrettable" or "inappropriate" or-in
the case of Colby-the result of "a miscona-
ception of the extent of the CIA's authority."
Richard Helms, who was CIA director during
most of the period of anti-war fervor, stoutly
denies any impropriety on his part. The dif-
ference in judgment reflects more than any-
thing else the change in climate in the last
two years.
But surely a large part of the problem lies
in the ambiguity of the charter of the CIA,
written by Congress in 1947. In setting up
the agency, Congress ruled that it should
have no "police, subpoena, law enforcement
powers or internal security functions" with-
in the United States-this area being strictly
reserved to the long-established FBI.
How realistic and workable- this prohibi-
tion was is sharply illustrated by the events
under investigation. Despite the prohibition
against domestic spying, the director of the
CIA was also made "responsible for protect-
ing intelligence sources and methods from
unauthorized disclosure." He was also in-
structed by Congress to "perform such other
functions and duties relating to intelligence
affecting the national security as the Na-
tional Security Council may from time to
time direct." Between. them, it can be argued
that these directives provide ample justifica-
tion for the activities being denounced as
"illegal." And the evidence - is reasonably
clear that a number of former directors be-
lieved this was indeed the case.
Clearly, the first objective of the current
investigations must be to spell out more
clearly the rules under which the CIA-and
other intelligence agencies as well-are sup-
posed to function. If all -domestic counter-
espionage is to be more severely restricted-
as seems to be the mood of the liberal major-
ity-Congress will also have to figure out hoed
the CIA Is to protect its "sources and meth-
ods from unauthorized disclosure." One ob-
-vious way, of course, would be pass a law
making it a crime for former CIA agents to
write. books. But this would not solve the
larger problem of trying to separate domestic
and foreign intelligence into neatly separate
operations.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, how
much time do I have remaining out of
my 20 minutes?
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
DoMENICI). The Senator has 2 minutes
remaining.
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I yield 10
additional minutes to the Senator from
Mississippi.
Mr. STENNIS. As I understand, that
will leave me 12 minutes.
Mr. President, may we have order?
The -PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ate will be in order. -
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, my main
plea today is for the protection of for-
eign intelligence and intelligence: sources.
I think all other matters do not add up,
in the range of importance with the
CIA's operations,, to. compare with this
collection of foreign intelligence.
I appreciate very much the sentiments
expressed on the floor of the Senate as
to the necessity for CIA and other intel-
ligence agencies, but that view is not
shared by all the people and is not under-
stood, either, by all the people. There is a
great deal of sentiment, even under-
standing sentiment, that would question
the necessity for the CIA, or the pro-
priety of having it.
Another thing, Mr. President, is that
this is not a political issue, and CIA is
not a political agency of any kind. It
serves one President after another, as
they come. It makes no difference which
party that President belongs to and has
nothing to do, with political matters.
Primariily, CIA Is a Government agency
collecting foreign intelligence of the most
highly sensitive nature.
To be effective, it must be secret. If
intelligence facts are-disclosed, they often
lose all of their value. If an adversary
merely infers that we have certain in-
telligence, often it is no longer of value.
An illustration would be work on a
code.
The purpose of gathering intelligence
is to learn intentions and capabilities.
The lrst extensive foreign intelligence
act ever passed by the Congress was in
1947. Called the CIA, it has come a long,
long way in the past 26 years. For il-
histration., we no longer argue about a
missile gap, or a. bomber gap.
In the broad and essential fields, the
CIA has done an extensive and effective
job in dealing with enemy capabilities
and intentions.
As we go through investigations, let us
keep in mind the dangers from expo-
sures. Exposures can be a matter of life
and death to Americans abroad as well as
friendly foreigners. This opinion is
strongly shared by many highly respected
persons, including Director Colby, who
have been a part of the operations and
know the facts first-hand. Friendly gov-
ernments and. friendly foreigners will
greatly reduce, if not terminate their co-
operation. and assistance. They already
have. The information flow has been
greatly reduced. Our relations with other
nations have been strained. Exposure of
sensitive facts through hearings, through
pressures, through staff members, or
through other sources, regardless of the
good intentions of the actors, comes at a
price we cannot bear.
In a time of nuclear weapons, with the
power to deliver warheads on target from
continent; to continent, we must have re-
sponiible information from many foreign
sources. Further, our ships at sea, our
military manpower scattered throughout
the world in support of many commit-
ments voluntarily made, are all in need
of the fruit of intelligence gathered'
around the world.
The President, all Presidents, have to
have this worldwide intelligence in for-
mulating foreign policies, including trade
and other economic policies formulated
with natiions around the world.
Intelligence comes from several
sources, but much of it comes from our
CIA agents abroad. In my travels, I have
found them to be excellent men, capable
and loyal, with a steady stream of highly
valuable and responsible information.
They seldom get credit for anything.
They often get blamed-but by and
large, they continue to carry on.
One purpose of my remarks today is to
say a word of encouragement to those
S979
men; to tell them they are appreciated,
and to ask them to carry on under highly
adverse conditions.
From some of this intelligence, we
make decisions in the Congress as to
military weaponry. We often save great
sums of money, because this intelligence
lets us know what weapons to avoid
building as well as what weapons are
most probably needed. Without the in-
telligence gained under the CIA direc-
tion, we would not have known of the
missiles in Cuba until they were actually
fully installed and we were directly un-
der the gun.
Indeed, U.S. intelligence, on which the
CIA sits at the top, has come along way
over - the past two decades. We have
reached the point where the SALT agree-
ment is possible, because we can now
verify what they have in being. A num-
ber of other treaties have also been pos-
sible, because of our vertification process.
Under Director Colby, I feel that the
CIA is now operating in a fine way, en-
tirely within the law. I shall do my part
in keeping it that way.
'The organic act creating the CIA needs
some amendments which tighten up the
present law. Our committee has given
some major amendments which I intro-
duced in late 1973, special attention in
1974. I assisted Senator ftoxm RE with a
similar major amendment offered by him
to the military authorization bill. It
passed the Senate with my active sup-
port and we made a strong effort at
the conference in behalf of the amend-
ment. It finally lost at conference be-
cause it was not germane, but the con-
ferees for the House supported the idea
of hearings which the House has started.
We shall continue our efforts on that
amendment and others.
We may have certain intelligence of
great value to us. But if it is known to
our adversaries that we have it, or if
they suspect that we have It, then it
turns to ashes in our hands and is of
no value whatsoever.
Illustration: Hundreds of millions of
dollars invested in electronic devices can
become valueless overnight if it be-
comes known we have such devices.
Our committee shall continue to exer-
else committee jurisdiction on legisla-
tion regarding the CIA, and also exer-
cise surveillance over its operations, and
such other activities connected therewith
as may be necessary.
We shall continue to have the Senator
from Montana (Mr. MANSFIELD), and the
Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. SCOTT),
the Democratic and Republican floor
leaders and hence representing all of
the Senators, invited to all of our meet-
ings regarding the surveillance of the
CIA. Ihave -discussed this with the Sena-
tor from Montana on last Thursday and
he expects to attend. The Senator from
Pennsylvania attended our session last
Thursday.
The CIA, of course must operate within
the law, but I want to emphasize to all
of my colleagues and to the American
people that foreign intelligence supplied
by the CIA is absolutely necessary for out
President and his close advisers, includ-
ing the top officials of all of our military,
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S 974 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
services, both those in civilian and mili-
tary positions. In modern times this In-
formation is not merely needed, it is es-
sential.
Therefore, someone has to stand up for
the CIA through foul as well as fair
weather, and make hard decisions and
take firm stands, whether popular at
the time or not. I have done that and I
propose to do just that in the future. I
shall not shirk this duty.
This does not at all mean that I pro-
pose to operate a duplicate or rival in-
vestigation with any select committee.
I will make no attempt to do that, but I
will carry out the purpose, as I have
briefly outlined it here.
I thank the Senator from Texas for
yielding this time to me.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I thank
the distinguished Senator from Mis-
sissippi for his cogent remarks.
I think it would be appropriate for
me to thank him at this time fdr the
splendid leadership he has shown in the
Committee on Armed Services. In fact,
on numerous occasions, we have looked
in depth at some activities of the CIA
and it has not been generally known
that we have. I think the Senator from
Mississippi has always measured up to
his responsibility in the highest tradi-
tion of the Senate.
Mr. President, may IY inquire how
much time I- have left?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator has 15 minutes remaining.
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I send to
the desk an amendment and ask that it
be stated.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will state the amendment.
Mr. TOWER. May I call to the at-
tention of my friend from Rhode Island
that I have now offered the amendment.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
At the end of the resolution add a new
section as follows:
"No employee of the select committee or
any person engaged by contract or other-,
wise to perform services for the select com-
mittee shall be given access to any clas-
sified information b
th
sel
t
it
y
e
ec
comm
tee
unless such employee or person has received
an appropriate security clearance. The type
of security clearance to be required in the
case of any such employee or person shall
be commensurate with the sensitivity of the
classified information to which such em-
ployee or person will be given access by the
select committee."
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, the
amendment is somewhat self-explana-
tory. However, I think we should make
some legislative history on it. What is
contemplated here is the type of Q clear-
ance which is administered by the
Atomic Energy Commission and which
the Senator from Rhode Island is so well
familiar with. I should like the Senator
from Rhode Island to comment on it at
this time if he would.
Mr. PASTORE. I have no objection to
the amendment provided I get a fur-
ther explanation of the last sentence:
The type of security clearance to be re-
quired in the case of any such employee or
person shall be commensurate with the-sen-
sitivity of the classified information to which
such employee or person will be iven access
by the select committee.
As determined by the committee.
After all, who is going to make this
determination? We are not going to have
a debate by the members of the commit-
tee every time we. get to a point where
this would apply. I am all for preserving
the classification; the Senator from
Texas knows that I am all for his amend-
ment, the spirit of it, the intention, the
objective of it. But I think we should
make clear that the determination ought
to be on the part of the committee.
When it says "sensitivity of the classi-
fied information," who is going to deter-
mine whether it is sensitive or not? We
have to say here "the type of security
clearance to be required in the case of
any such employee or person shall, with-
in the determination of the committee,
be commensurate with the sensitivity,"
and so on.
Mr. TOWER. I should be glad to ac-
cept that as a modification by the Sena-
tor from Rhode Island.
Mr. PASTORE. That is what I want. I
want the determination to be made by
the committee, if we can work out that
language.
Mr. TOWER. That suits me splendidly.
As a matter of fact, if the Senator will
read that language again, I think that
would be a suitable modification.
Mr. PASTORE. The type of security
clearance to be required in the case of
any such employee or person shall, with-
in the discretion of the committee itself,
be commensurate with the sensitivity of
the classified information to which such
employee or person will be given access
to the select committee.
Mr. TOWER. I will accept that lan-
guage as a modification by the Senator
from Rhode Island.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment will be so modified. Will the
Senator send the modification to the
desk?
The amendment, as modified, is as
follows:
No employee of the select committee or
person engaged by contract or otherwise to
perform services for the select committee
shall be given access to any classified infor-
mation by the select committee unless such
employee or person has received an appro-
priate security clearance as determined by
the Select Committee. The type of security
clearance to be required in the case of any
such employee or person shall within the
determination of the Select Committee be
commensurate with the sensitivity of the I
classified information to which such em- i
ployee or person will be given access by the
select.?oinmittee.
Mr. TOWER. What is contemplated
here is a simple type of Q clearance
which is ordinarily required of Senate
employees.
Mr. PASTORE. I realize that. Every
member of the staff of the Joint Com-
mittee on Atomic Energy has Q clear-
ance andhas to have it. I think In this
particular case, where we are dealing. 10(j, pages, but his staff man does not
tivities abroad and domestically, I think
we have to have reliable people. We just
cannot afford to take a chance.
Now, I am, all for this study and this
Investigation. I repeat, I do not want to
January 27, 1975
IP misunderstood. There have been a lot
c.f mistakes and they have to be cor-
m ected. But we are not out to destroy
i itelligence-gathering.
I remember one time when I was sent
1 y President Kennedy to Moscow to wit-
ress the signing of the Nuclear Test Ban
'_Ilreaty. 1: was sitting on the porch of the
I"mbassy, together with Dean Rusk, at
t le time, and we were talking about a
1 it of measures. Finally, the Ambassador
came out and said, "I suggest you two
gentlemen take a walk and do your talk-
i ig because this place is bugged."
"This place is bugged." Now, that is
v hat the Russians are doing to us. As a
ratter of fact, they did it right down
t sere at the United Nations. They had a
bug, I think, under the American seal.
We all remember that.
Let us face it: We are In a critical
world where we are being spied upon
a yid, in order to know what they .are
d ling, we have to spy on them. There is
r o question about that. But that has
nothing to do with many of-these charges
t tat have been made.
Nobody is out to destroy the CIA. Let
u i get an understanding on this. No one
i out to destroy military intelligence. No
one is out to destroy the FBI. Let us make
it all clear.
On the other hand, this is an open
satiety. All we are saying is that there
a --e some things that have been wrong,
a?od under the pretext of either national
s'?curity or secrecy, private rights are be-
ing violated unnecessarily. That is all we
a-e trying to eliminate. That is all we are
t; ying to do. It is as simple as all that.
I am perfectly willing to accept this
a-nendment with that modification.
Mr. TOWER. The modification has
b -en accepted. The amendment has been
S4, modified.
I might say one other thing. I think
this is partially for the committee's pro-
tection. If we did not require clearance
o> some sort, it Is not impossible that an
a'ien intelligence organization could
penetrate the committee by inserting one
o, its people on the committee staff. So I
think we would want that kind of protec-
tion, because I do not think the commit-
tee would ever want to be embarrassed
b finding, having failed to require any
k-nd of clearance, that their staff had
boen penetrated.
Mr. BAKER. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. TOWER. I yield to the Senator
horn Tennessee.
Mr. BAKER. Will the Senator from
T jxas reassure me that by setting up
these requirements for classification, we
a,-e not setting up within the committee
layers of access and levels of access to in-
?crmatiort that will be available to the
committee? What I have in mind is the
possibility that the committee may de-
ci ie that there is-a requirement for secu-
ri.y beyond even the requirements for Q
cl marance, a kind of "eyes only" classi-
h,,ve that clearance,
Now, can the Senator assure me that
nc thing that is contained in this amend-
in ant will in any way deprive any Mem-
bc c of access, and his staff, if otherwise
1p., 3perly cleared?
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S 976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE January 27, 1975
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time to zero, but they might improperly with- ical and terribly secret operations of the
of the Senator from Texas has expired, hold or delay security clearances. intelligence community. They cite the
The Senator from Rhode Island has 32 Mr. PASTORE. The Senator from fact that Washington has become known
minutes. Montana just asked the question and I as a city of leaks. I suggest, though, that
Mr. PASTORE. I think we ought answered it. It is not up to any agency - critics are losing sight of the explicit con-
to get this amendment clarified further. executive; it is up to the committee. fidence in which Congress has dealt with
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr.. President, will j Mr. CRANSTnTsI 1X71- i.
v uvaxa Wi y1CLUf
Mr. PASTORE. I yield.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I understand, Mr.
President, after listening to this dPhn+.P
which has the final determinationvas to the committee vish
iLT esatoi use irss denied
who shall have access to what informa- clearance by the executive branch can
ti'on; is that correct? the committee override and decide they
Mr. PASTORE. That is correct. are going to hire that person?
Mr. MANSFIELD. No executive agency Mr. PASTORE. Well, in an extreme
shall determine directly or indirectly who case, I would have to answer the Senator
shall have access to information, in the affirmative, but I mean, after all,
Mr. PASTORE. That is correct. And I I do not anticipate that. I do not antici-
cannot be more explicit than that. ? I pate that trouble.
would like t
h
o
ave the amendment read.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will read the amendment.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
At the end of the resolution add a new sec-
tion as follows:
`No employee of the select committee or
any person engaged by contract or otherwise
to perform services for the select committee
shall be given access to any classified in-
formation by the select committee unless
such employee or person has received an
appropriate security clearance as determined
by the select committee. The type of secu-
rity clearance to be required in the case of
any such employee or person shall within the
de termination of the select committee be
commensurate with the sensitivity of the
classified information to which such em-
ployee or person will be given access by the
select committee.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from Rhode Island has 30 minutes
remaining.
Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, will,
the Senator yield?
Mr. PASTORE. I Yield,
Mr. CRANSTON. The Senator from
Rhode Island, I think, has performed a
very useful service in making plain that
the second part of this amendment is
finally in hand for decisionmaking pur-
poses of the committee.
Mr. CRANSTON.:1 did- not anticipate
it generally. I think: we might anticipate
it in regard to certain individuals who
might render invaluable service to the
committee but who might be preferred
not to be on that committee staff by one
or another of the agencies we are talking
about.
Mr. PASTORE. Is the Senator saying
to me if for some capricious; motive some
executive department refused to grant
a clearance, the question would arise,
would that put that; individual out of
commission?
Mr. CRANSTON. Saes:
Mr. PASTORE. The answer is no. The
answer is it is up to the committee to
make the determination.
Mr. CRANSTON. That is fine. I thank
the Senator.
Mr. PASTORE,. OK. Does any other
Senator wish to speak before we vote?
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President
I am
,
happy to have this. opportunity to express
my support for Senate Resolution 21,
legislation establishing a Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence Oversight.
As an original cosponsor of the resolu-
tion offered by Senators MANSFIELD and
MATHIAS, and as a strong supporter of
this legislation offered by Senator PAS-
Mr. PASTORE. That is correct. TORE, I 'believe this resolution to set in
Mr. CRANSTON. But the first part motion a responsible study of the intelli-
creates a similar problem. gence activities carried out by or for the
Mr. PASTORE. No, he added the words United States is of tremendous impor-
for the first part, too; right at the end tance.
of the first sentence he added the words committee, a ttee, a ng the cr. sating le select
"within the determination of the select com er anent sponsor irll; legi slation
committee." to establish a permanent Joint Commit-
Mr. committee." TON. I have a somewhat tee on Intelligence Oversight, let me em-
similar question to ask; it is similar, to phgsize that it is not my iriten.tion to
its implication, and I perhaps need the criticize the Services chairmen of
help of the Senator in figuring out what propriationthe Armed Services Ctee or the or the ng
to do 'abut it. ,; Committee;. or the ranking
With out
to the words "unless such minority members of those committees.
They
employee or person has received an ap- have done an admirable duties job e-
propriate security clearance," who gives carrying out the diverse duties and re-
security clearance? spibilities of leadership on those com-
Mr. PASTORE. Usually by the FBI mittees. In my view, however, the far-
and all other sensitive agencies of Gov- reaching operations of the some 60 Gov-
ernment. That is the way they do it now. texlment lligence or law agencies
law which enforcement conduct nc in-
Mr. CRANSTON. The yno function
is, how do you question I ask demand the careful scrutiny of a select
prevent, and just make committee created for that purpose and
certain, that there is no abuse of this charged with that responsibility.
by the executive branch? They would Some have argued that Congress can-
not, I assume, try to hold down the staff not be trusted to participate in the crit-
clearances, the committee or the execu- 'order in the geneses oI the highest
tive?
In our past national conflicts, during
Mr. PASTORE. The committee is going World War I, World War II, the Korean
determine ,,,!,o+, +w. ,
Lnat it is the Senate select committee, if adeauat
has been confidentiality where required.
I am proud to serve on the Joint Com-
mittee on Atomic Energy. a. rnrn?li++-
of Senate Resolution 21,'-
TORE. I believe I -am correct in saying
that, in more than a quarter century,
there has never been a security leak from
the Joint Committee, which daily deals
with what are perhaps the most sensi-
tive materials in the entire annals of
the defense establishment. It is evident,
then, that ample precedent exists for
congressional participation in such a
sensitive area. I am not impressed by
those who contend that Congress is not
to be trusted with the truth.
A balance must always be made be-
tween the requirements of a democracy
for public knowledge, and the require-
ments of its security and defense. When
a doubt arises, the people's branch of
Government must be privy to those re-
quirements and the pertinent informa-
tion required to make a balancing judg-
ment.
The outcome of the select committee
inquiry, obviously, cannot be foreseen.
I pledge my personal efforts, just as I
know the other members of the select
committee will dedicate their efforts, to
seeing that our job is done thoroughly
and that we follow the facts wherever
they lead without fear or-favor. This res-
olution charters neither a whitewash nor
a witch hunt; it does establish a select
committee to carry out a sensitive mis-
sion as fairly and as even handedly as
possible.
It is not my intention to carry out a
vendetta against the Central Intelligence
agency, or against any established intel-
ligence agency of our Government. I be-
lieve that the CIA, the FBI, and other
agencies- are necessary to the security of
our national institutions when they per-
form their proper functions.
Serious allegations have been made,
however, and it is the responsibility of the
Congress to weigh the charges, find. the
facts, and determine what remedial. ac-
tion, if any, is necessary to make sure
that an effective intelligence program is
maintained without endangering the
rights of our citizens.
Mr. President, I shall not detain the
Senate long. Everything has been said
which should be said, I believe. I am
pleased and I am gratified and enthusi-
astic about the action that I believe the
Senate is about to take. I think that it
signifies diligence and sensitivity and the
recognition of a necessary national pur-
rose. It speaks well of the viability of
this group as a great deliberative body
in support of the executive 'branch of
Government.
I have no quarrel with the CIA. I cer-
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Mr. TOWER. I do not perceive that it
would. In other words, for the protection
of the stair---
Mr. BAKER. What does the Senator
mean, he does not perceive that it would?
s it his opinion that it would or would
.sot?
Mr. TOWER. It is my opinion that it
would not.
Mr. BAKER. Does the Senator wish
:hat to be included as part of the legis-
lative history?
Mr. TOWER. As a matter of fact, the
committee itself will determine.
Mr. BAKER. Does he wish it to be a
part of the legislative history of this
amendment that it is not his under-
standing or intention as the author of
this amendment to create that situation?
Mr. TOWER. It is not my intention
to create that situation.
Mr. BAKER. And it is not his belief
that that will occur?
Mr. TOWER. It is not my belief that
it will occur. But it is my intention that
we should not have people on the staff
who would be security risks.
Mr. BAKER. We all share that con-
cern. Let us very much hope we succeed
in keeping leaks from occurring alto-
gether. I assure the Senator that this
will be the case as far as this Senator Is
concerned. But as far as I am concerned,
I cannot in good conscience see the
adoption of an amendment that will
make part of this committee privy to
highly sensitive material while other
parts of the committee, though legally,
as a practical matter might be deprived
of that information.
Mr. PASTORE. Will the Senator ex-
plain that again?
Mr. BAKER. Yes. Assume for a mo-
raent that the committee, in its dis-
cretion, according to the amendment
that the Senator from Rhode Island pro-
posed and Senator TOWER accepted,
adopts some classification beyond, say,
a Q clearance. We all know there are
some classifications beyond a Q clear-
ance. Suppose the Senator's personal
staff or select committee staff comes to
him and says, "I cannot gain access to
that last communication Director Colby
sent to us because the committee says
we have to have an XQI clearance as
well as a Q clearance." I want to be sure
that 1, as a member of the committee, or
anyone else as a member of the com-
mittee, will not be thus deprived of ac-
cess to any information that comes be-
fore that committee.
Mr. PASTORE. His amendment only
has to do with staff members. The Sena-
tor is saying he does not want to he
deprived. If a member of his staff or
anyone on that staff that he may be re-
sponsible for the committee engaging
does not get the clearance from the com-
mittee that he must have, he cannot get
the information.
Tcere is nothing wrong with that, be-
cause he is the one who determined that
he could not get it.
Mr. BAKER, Mr. President, as long
as 1 am assured, which is the only thing
I sought, that the concern that I ex-
pressed was not the intention of the
author of the amendment, I will be sat-
isfied I do not want to be deprived, legally
or effectively, of any information. that
comes before this committee. If there
are 10,000 pages of classified material. I
cannot read it, and the Senator cannot
either, or it is unlikely that he is going
to be able to.
I think I have that assurance. If the
Senator from Texas will express his un-
derstanding that this will not be used as
a device to deprive any of us of inform a-
tion, then I am perfectly pleased with it.
Mr. TOWER. It was the intention of
the Senator from Texas to establish what
he thinks is the minimum requirement
that we can establish; that is, some sort
of clearance fof people. I noted a moment
ago that it is conceivable that If we re-
quired nothing, the committee staff
could be penetrated by an alien intelli-
gence-gathering organization. I think
this would be particularly true of clerical
help.
I think that the professional staff that
Is likely to be engaged will probably be
people who will have no difficulty getting
any kind of clearance they need. It is not
my intention to proscribe or to hobble
the action of any Senator on the com-
mittee.
Mr. BAKER. Whose authority will be
required to gain the clearance, that of
the full committee or the chairman and
vice chairman?
Mr. PASTORE. By vote of the com-
mittee.
Mr. TOWER. I should say the commit-
tee has to meet and make its ground
rules pursuant to the guidelines laid down
here.
Mr. BAKER. Is that the Senator's
intention?
Mr. TOWER. That is my ir_rention,.
Mr. PASTORE. May we have the
amendment read again?
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, one fur-,
ther question, if I may: It has been neces-
sary, In my experience, to enlist one's
personal staff, legislative assistant, or
anyone else, to help in a compilation or
ordering of the information at hand. :1
fully agree that then they should be re-
quired to have whatever clea"ante Is
required, and be fully investigated. But
I hope there is nothing in this amend-
ment that would prevent an application
for clearance of personal staff, and that
on obtaining that clearance, they would,
in fact, be subject to the same rules as
committee staff.
Mr. PASTORE. That is correct c. We do
that on the joint committee now. The
Senator from Missouri has had members
of his staff who have Q clean nce look
at some of our classified information.
They are ,entitled to do it, with the per-
mission of the committee itself.
Every person who looks at classified
information has to be cleared. We should
be clear about that.
Mr. SYMINGTON, Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. TOWER. I yield to the Senator
from Missouri.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank my able
friend from Texas.
As I understand it, whoever is cleared,
whether he be on the staff or off the
staff, is cleared for the information. He
is- cleared for the Information on the
basis of the nature of the clearance that
8911-5
he receives. It would be up to the Senator
in question to decide whether he was
violating the rules of the Senate if he
was on the committee and at the same
time discussed any matter with somebody
who did not have the proper clearance.
Am I correct in that?
Mr. BAKER. Absolutely.
Mr. PASTORE. That is right. No one
disputes that.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will tie
Senator yield for a question?
Mr. PASTORE. Yes.
Mr. STENNIS. I believe the Senator
from Missouri was talking about some-
one who was not on the committee staff.
I would not think that anyone who was
not responsible to the committee would
have access to this information.
Mr. PASTORE. Oh, no-
Mr. SYMINGTON. May I say in an-
swer to my able friend, the Senator from
Mississippi, I was discussing this matter
with the distinguished senior Senator
from Tennessee on the basis of his staff ;
and the Senator is entirely correct, and
if he is on the committee-and I read he
was on the committee-then it would be
his problem to see that the people on his
staff were cleared to receive the informa-
tion on the basis of their clearance, and
did not receive it if they did not have
adequate clearance.
Mr. PASTORE. Provided they got the
permission of the committee.
Mr. STENNIS. It would be a comcolt-
tee responsibility.
Mr. PASTORE. That is why I am tc cit-
ing there "by the determination of the
committee."
Mr. BAKER. I entirely agree with tnat.
Does the Senator from Texas?
Mr. TOWER. The determination is to
be made by the committee, that is the
difference.
Mr. BAKER. And it can be made for
security classification for personal staff
as well as staff--
Mr. TOWER. Not for personal staff. I
think for any information that the Sen-
ator gives to his personal staff, he has
the personal responsibility to determine
whether that staff member has an ade-
quate clearance. My own personal policy
is that nobody handles classified docu-
ments on my staff unless they have
clearance.
Mr. BAKER. That is the essence of my
question. The answer to the question to
the Senator from Texas is-
Mr. PASTORE. We are confusing a
very simple thing. Let us get it plain. No
one can look at classified information
unless they have clearance.
Mr. TOWER. Right.
Mr. PASTORE. If a personal staff
member of any member of the commit-
tee has that clearance, he or she can be
entitled to that classified information
only if the committee gives permission.
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, that is my
understanding. .
Mr. PASTORE. That is the rule of the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy now.
I cannot say it more clearly than that.
Mr. BAKER. Is that correct?
Mr. TOWER. That Is correct, and the
policy will be set by the committee, I see
no reason why a majority of the com-
mittee cannot work it out satisfactorily.
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January 27, 1975 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - S]ENATE
tainly have no quarrel with the Senate I pledge, as well, that the public's right
Armed Services Committee or its distin- to know is second only to national sur-
guished chairman. This resolution, how- vival, and that when we are finished with
ever, is drafted so that it extends far be Z' the private portion of these hearings
yond the CIA, to the entire intelligence there will be a public disclosure, a public
apparatus of this country. Some of my declaration including the good and bad,
colleagues may be interested to know recent and in. the past.
there are 60 agencies of the U.S. Gov- It is a terrible time we are in. We have
ernment that conduct some sort of Intel- not had a President who has completed
ligence or law enforcement responsibility. his term, In it sense, since President Ei-
There are 16 agencies of the Government senhower. These are turbulent times
conducting intelligence operations other when we have set about the business of
than the CIA and the DIA, Defense In- investigating ourselves do the point where
telligence Agency, and the FBI, which sometimes I think we are devouring our
have a combined budget of over a billion public officials, our leaders.
dollars a year. The intelligence of the When I permit myself the luxury of
Federal Government is an enormous thinking that, sometimes. it also dawns
business. on me that the investigation has been
I became concerned about this matter pretty productive, and we have got to do
in the course of Watergate. The stories this one, too, not because we are bent on
which have appeared in the press and political cannibalism, but because it has
been related by others to me since that to be done.
time have done nothing to allay that i believe, Mr. President, that it will be
concern. It is important, I believe, that done, and done effectively.
we have a thoroughgoing investigation to I pledge r yy efforts in that respect
determine whether or not the agencies and I serve notice? as well, that I will de-
involved in the intelligence activities of vote every ounce of my energy to seeing
the Government are complying with the that we find all the facts and pursue
requirements of the law. them, wherever they lead us.
But maybe-just maybe, Mr. Press- It is far too late In my political career
dent-there is one other thing that we to worry about whom :f might hurt or
need to do to reassilre not only Congress who might be injured.
but the people of this country, and that Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, will the
is to make sure that the intelligence corn- Senator yield?
munity and, of course, to some extent Mr. PASTORE. Have we voted on the
the law enforcement community, is un- amendment?
der somebody's control. They are not au- The PRESIDING, OFFICER. The ques-
tonomous entities within a representa- tion is on agreeing to the amendment of
tive democracy, as I am sometimes the Senator from Texas, as modified by
tempted to suspect, the Senator from Rhode Island.
We are not talking about a Republican The amendment was agreed to.
national administration or a Democratic. Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, will the
I rather suspect that some of the prac- Senator from Rhode Island yield to me?
tices that we see discussed in the public Mr. PASTORE. How much time will
forum began a long time ago, and maybe the Senator require?
included activiti
i
es go
ng all the way back,
possibly, to the Eisenhower administra-
tion, the Kennedy administration, and
the Johnson administration. I think, Mr.
President, one of the major undertakings
of this committee ought to be to talk to
the last surviving ex-President we have
and to examine the records that are
available to us to determine whether or
not the President of the United States
knows what is going on in the CIA, the
DIA, and the FBI.
I want to be reassured in that respect,
and I confess I am not now. I suppose we
would run into the questions of our
friendly adversaries on executive privi-
lege and executive powers with respect
to those Presidential powers. I know for-
mer President Harry Truman declined to
grant certain information after he left
office, but I think we ought to try. We
ought to find out not whether the CIA,
for instance, was engaged in domestic
surveillance, but whether somebody was
running the show. I know Congress was
not running the show; and I want to be
relieved of that shuddering fear I have
that the White House was not, either.
So I pledge, if I am a member of this
committee, that I will conduct it as dis-
creetly and privately as I can commen-
surate with my responsibility.
I pledge that we will be careful to
preserve our legitimate intelligence in-
terests.
S977
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. PASTORE. I yield to the Senator.
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I send
an amendment to the desk and ask for its
immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER, The
amendment will be stated.
The legislative clerk read as follows :
At the end of the resolution add a new sec-
tion as follows:
SEC. 7. As a condition for employment as
described in Section 3 of this Resolution,
each person shall agree not to accept any
honorarium, royalty or other payment for a
speaking engagement,. magazine article, book,
or other endeavor connected with the investi-
gation and study undertaken by this Com-
mittee.
Mr. PASTORE. I will accept this
amendment, Mr. President.
. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques-
tion is on agreeing to the amendment of
the Senator from Oregon.
The amendment was agreed to.
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I send
up another amendment for the purpose
of colloquy.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment will be stated.
The assistant legislative clerk read as
follows:
On Page 4, line 4, Insert after the word
"agency" the following: "or any Committee
or Subcommittee of the Congress."
On Page 5, line 13, insert after the word
"agencies" the following: "or any Commit-
tees or Subcommittees of the Congress"
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I
would like to ask the Senator from Rhode
Island a question because I may with-
draw the amendment after I have the
record made on the problem that con-
cerns me so greatly.
As a member of the Rules C
it
omm
-
Mr. TOWER. A couple of minutes, tee, I am aware that we have brought
Mr. PASTORE. Ala right, before us the requests from various com-
Mr. TOWER. Since I have -run out of mittees and subcommittees in the Senate
time. fnr thn h?Ar, ._.+ +..........._ a_ --
- ? sn01 W11'r- t.rr.. The Internal Security Subcommittee
Mr. TOWER,. I have an amendment of the Committee on the Judiciary, dur-
here which I will either offer or not offer. ing the presentation of their budget re-
It is copied directly out of the resolutions quest on February 27, 1974, indicated
that authorized the select committee for that they kept records on various people
the Watergate investigation. in this country which they gathered
It simply says: through intelligence activity. They had
The minority members of the select com- files, names of people that could be con-
mittee shall have one-third of the profes- sidered as suspicious, and other such
sional staff of the select committee (includ- characteristics as they indicated to our
ing a Minority counsel) and such part of the committee.
clerical staff as may be adequate. My only point is that I realize that this
Mr. PASTORE. Why not leave that to is not a matter of one Senate committee
the committee:' investigating other subcommittees or
I think- committees where we have the word
Mr. TOWER, The Senate resolution re- "investigation" on page 2 of our resolu-
quires 30 percent, I believe. tion today, however, we have some vari-
Mr. PASTORE. Yes. ous generalities as to what this commit-
Mr. TOWER. If the Senator from tee's authority may include.
Rhode Island will simply assure me the A prime responsibility is that it can
minority will get adequate staffing- look into, of course, any agency which is
Mr. PASTORE. It will be up to the carrying out intelligence or surveillance
committee itself. I will not have any au- activities on behalf of any agency of
thority over the committee. the Federal Government.
Mr. TOWER. I think an undertaking I would like to ask the Senator from
by this side of the aisle would be honored Rhode Island if he considers that the
by the majority on the committee. language is broad enough, on page 2,
Mr. PASTORE. All right, so I under- lines 8 and 9, to include the reviewing of
take it, the activities of the Internal Security
Mr. TOWER. I thank my friend from Subcommittee of the Committee on the
Rhode Island. Judiciary of the U.S. Senate, as it might
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S x)75 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE January 27, 1975
"' 18 Whether new te.gisiation or an The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
ate to surveillance activities or gather- amendment to any existing legislation shoa::d amendment is withdrawn.
ing of intelligence. be enacted to strengthen the national sel Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, will
1determine. E. Well, I mean, if they rity, intelligence or surveillance activities of
so I do not see how that is theuntted:3rates.? the Senator yield? I would like to ask
apt to happen. The House already dis- one question of the Senator from. Texas
banded that committee. I hope we do it Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. President, *t lie regarding his amendment.
here in the Senate, as well. But this is amendment adds to section 2, beginn' ng I assume that it was not his intention
a far-reaching authority. on. page 3, one more paragraph, to insi.re that the amendment would be used to
If they so choose to do it, I would say that the Senate further expressly an, h- deny a member of the select committee
that they could, but I would not want to orizes and directs the select committee to stence
classthe ification knowledge of designation the or a existenc-
of a of
amend the present resolution as it now make a complete investigation with -e- staff
stands. spect to the following matters, or ques- fied program. I ask that in light of the
Ur. HATFIELD. Would the Senator tions. It adds the que:-tion of whet ter fact that many documents and pro--
have any objections to the latitude and there needs to be any bill introduced or grams bear a classification that is actu-
scope of this committee being interpreted any amendment to strengthen the na- ally higher than the secret which, itself,
to include some review or investigation tional security, intelligence or surveil- classified.
of activities of the Internal Security Sub- lance activities of the United States. Mr TOWER. May I say to the Senator.
committee, to see how it is collecting I am aware, as the Senator from Rh )de from California I believe we have already
data? Island knows, that section 4 on page 10 answered that question. It would dy
Mr. PASTORE. Well, if they have done of the bill authorizes the select comt.;it- the committee to on. It a what be
an
things as had as the CIA or FBI, if it is tee to recommend the enactment of any to ee tt required. ta mine whl bk up
so determined, I do not see why any new legislation or the amendment of my of elecom cle al cematter for the
Senate committeeshould be immune. existing statute which it considers needs- internal housekeeping is should e
laid down. itte . But I beliethe ve the uid matte committee would
be
1. mean, we have got to treat ourselves sary for these purposes. t
,its we expect to treat everybody else. But I want to be assured that the qi ,.es- laid I mentioned as a
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I am tion will be answered by the committee, want to theory e protected. I ago that as a
very happy to hear the Senator say this, and to know that in case there wa:: no wwaars case be a foreign theory ileeago-that per-
because it would seem to me if we are forthcoming legislation that there would organization, in the absence -g any in-
basically concerned about the abridge- be a definite and definitive answer as to organizat n h as one Part, could
ment of civil rights of our citizens whether this question had been reviewed telligence clearing its people into part, t, could
through the action of gathering Intel_ and answered by the committee in its tee stn-o and actually eento ou the com-
ligence, and so forth, of executive agen- recommendation. tee staff That would be of cte the Coble
cies, we should be doubly concerned Mr. PASTORE. I would suppose so, mittee. That would the committee melee
about the procedures used by one of our otherwise this whole investigation w?luld em mass ant whose sponsorship that per-
own subcommittees of the U.S. Senate. a onull ther words, if nothing was found son was. I think we should have that
i, for or one, , am not satisfied with with the
answers 1 received from the chief clerk and nothing was wrong, and natur Illy, protection.
In addition to that fact, the country
of that subcommittee as he appeared of course, they had given a bill of en-
dorsement, we would have to change should have that protection. I believe we
before would our like Rules to think it Committeeis. understood nothing by legislation. have a public responsibility to make sure
z bs
that the resolution certainly carribs with h On the other hand, if certain autht ?rity that the people that we put in these staff
it enough authority for that committee was exceeded or the agencies went be- positions are going to be people whose
under this resolution to look into these yond the parameters of the present c=zar- sense of discretion and loyalty are be-
activities of the Internal Security Sub- ter and got us mixed up in Laos, got us yond question.
committee. if someone brings that issue mixed up In Chile, got us mixed up in Mr. CRANSTON. I admire the Sen-
up before the committee. Cambodia and other parts of the world., ator's efforts to cut off such dangers.
Mr. PASTORE. Or any other com- where they had no authority without Since there is no law that gives the Exec-
mittee. the consent of Congress, in that par ?icu- utive the power of clearance or denial of
Mr. HATFIELD. Or any other com- lar case, thecommittee would come `pack clearance, - since that Is done by Execu-
niittee. but this one committee is already and make a recommendation, if they tive order, whatever rules the committee
involved. would find it necessary to do so. writes will govern what happens in this
Mr. PASTORE. But that is not the I would hope, without encumbering area.
thrust. I want to make it clear, not the this with duplicate language, tha . we Mr. TOWER. This is correct. It is the
thrust ofthis resolution, but it would be would understand that these are let-isla- committee's baby.
encompassed in it because it is broad in Live words of art when it says the select Mr. CRAtNSTON. I thank the Senator.
scope. committee shall have authority to re:om- M
. PASTORE. Well, let us see if we
-
Mr. HATFIELD. I understand, but I mend lation. the They have enactment the of any authority. I new egiswould cannot put the baby to sleep. I suggest
owns not want to if we are one anxious our hope that they would exercise it. the absence of a quorum.
to n vubcgmmthe ees, i f executive aageenncy,, aMr BARTLETT. Will the Senator Mr. TOWER. Will the Senator with-
investigate the That Yield? hold that for a minute and yield to me"
it why I am raising the question. Cone Mr. PASTORS. What the Se-,aloe Mr. PASTORS. Lyield.
;acs e should look at its own intelligence wants to do is to say that they have to Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, in the Fri-
gaMr. PASTORE. That is also. make a recommendation one way or the day, January 24, issue of the Arizona Re-
Mr. HATFIELD. HATFIELTFIELD. Th Mr. at President, right.esident, I with- other. public, William P. Maloney, Jr., a former
M Mr. BARTLETT I am saying, if I may ambassador to Ghana and a good Deln-
eir my a ESDING say to the Senator from Rhode IE land, ocrat who insists that CIA regulation is
The PRESIDING OFFICiLR. The that they shall make a determinati_sn of king overdue, he states that:
amendi r. BAR is ZZE ?'withdrawn. whether or not there is legislation n ,eciled In the approaching investigations, it is im-
14I. Mr. Island President, will to strengthen the national securit.'. in- portant to keep two things in mind: That ti
i?he Senator from Rhode Isla yi yield to telligenee or surveillance activities that competent intelligence branch is essential
use 2 minutes? to our survival and that the CIA, with all its
Mr. PASTORE. I yield 2 minutes to they shall make that determinatba n. Is faults, is one of the best, if not the very best,
the. Senator assuring me that the % will organizations of its kind around. So let u4
ile w`' eriatOr. make that determination in det-tome not throw the baby out with the ball].,
Mr_ BARTLET I . Mr. President:. I call whether or not they will avail them -elves
up my amendment. of the authority of section 4? I ask unanimous consent that his letter
The PRESIDING OFFICER, The Mr. PASTORE. I would hope so. I in the Arizona Republic be printed at this
amendment will be stated. would hope so. point in the RECORD.
The legislative clerk read as follows: Mr. BARTLETT. With that assurance There being no objection, the letter
ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
To Section 2 add a new subsection as f61- from the Senator Rhode Island, I was follows:
1CJWs: withdraw my
~M &9MI~AF. ~+'~~9A~^n~eR`~~gi4R7iM~m?gAe?+t4q?nare:s , r Ewa"tia~eN'e ..-. .. ,rte., ~agtM~N "'
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S980
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE January 27, 1975
right to know what its Government Is
doing and why.
If the events of the past 2 years are to
provide the momentum to help fashion
any changes in the way we conduct our
Government, they should at the very
least underscore the necessity for public
accountability-in this case, account-
ability to the Congress for the proper
and judicious administration of intelli-
gence gathering agencies and the assur-
ance that those activities are subject to
the restraint of law as they impinge upon
the free exercise of our constitutional
rights.
If the select committee is to carry out
this mandate, it must not be impeded in
any way in its investigations.
The committee should explore still un-
answered questions about the use of in-
telligence agencies in the Watergate
incident and any other instances where
agencies exceeded their authority.
The committee should examine the
existing laws and procedures for review
of their implementation and recommend
necessary changes.
Finally, the work of the committee
should serve as a basis for restoring pub-
lic confidence in the integrity and quality
of our intelligence agencies.
In the December hearings before the
Intergovernmental Relations Subcom-
mittee, Senator- BAKER testified that as a
member of the Senate Select Committee
on Presidential Campaign Activities he
was told at one point in his investigation
that the CIA would supply no further in-
formation to the Watergate committee
but instead would supply all of the in-
formation to their regular oversight
committees. Senator BAKER went on to
say:
That effectively ended the Watergate Com-
mittee's inquiry into CIA involvement.
Based on the explanation by Senator
MANSFIELD and Senator PASTORE on the
day Senate Resolution 21 was introduced,
there should be no question about the
right and the authority of this commit-
tee and its staff to obtain any informa-
tion which in any way affects or relates
to the intelligence activities of the Gov-
ernment.
As the able majority leader stated so
well:
it should be made clear that this
committee will only be able to perform its
function effectively if the provisions of this
resolution are liberally construed by com-
mittees and by the agencies which are the
subjects. of its investigation.
Nothing should be able to be used as
a bar to a - thorough investigation-
neither the system for classifying na-
tional secrets nor the provisions of the
National Security Act itself.
I am confident that the members of
this committee will use this authority
judiciously with the utmost concern for
preserving and improving the institutions
they are charged to examine.
It has taken us a long time to reach
this important point but the effort prom-
ises to bring forth fruitful and construc-
tive change.
Mr. PACKWOOD. Mr. President, early
last week the Senate determined to take
an active role in the Investigation of al-
leged misconduct by the CIA and the
FBI. Legislation was offered to establish
a Watergate-like select committee to
thoroughly examine these allegations
and determine their validity. We-are go-
ing to vote on that legislation this after-
noon and I intend to support it.
In addition to the CIA and the FBI,
the select committee will also review the
activities of the other Federal intelli-
gence gathering agencies, including the
National Security Council and the De-
fense Intelligence Agency. However, the
main focus will be on the heretofore
largely unknown activities of the Cen-
tral. Intelligence Agency and the Federal
Bureau of - Investigation.
For the last 2 months, the newspapers
have been replete with -Stories of CIA
involvement in Watergate-related in-
trigue in.. violation of the CIA's legisla-
tive mandate to restrict all intelligence
gathering activities to foreign countries.
Further, we have been informed that the
FBI: was actively and illegally wiretap-
ping civil rights leaders and other poli-
ticians at the 1964 Democratic Conven-
tion. Who, Mr. President, sanctioned
these wiretaps? Who suggested to the
;CIA that they assist E. Howard Hunt
with his masquerade for the purpose of
clandestinely breaking into the office of
Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist-a pat-
ently illegal act? Who put together the
Huston plan to infiltrate dissident
groups for the purpose of gathering in-
formation on them? These are questions
that need to be answered and I trust that
in the course of the select committee's
investigation they will be. -
Mr. President, the collection and cata-
loging of information on individuals-
without their knowledge or consent-has
always been abhorrent to the American
people. It is, at a minimum, a violation of
the constitutional right to privacy as
guaranteed by the fourth amendment
and, at maximum, a threat to one's lib-
erty and freedom of expression. In the
context of these recent revelations, we
hear the phrase "police state" bandied
about and I am disturbed by it. A de-
mocracy is founded on the principle that
the Government is for the people, not
against them. Consequently, as the
elected Representatives of the American
people and their interests, it is incum-
bent upon the Congress to act quickly
to insure that this unwarranted intru-
sion into the private lives of U.S. citizens
has stopped and will not recur. The re-
sponsibility is ours and the response
must be ours as well.
Mr. President, Included within the pur-
view of the select committee's inquiry is
"The extent and necessity of overt and
covert intelligence activities in the
United States and abroad." I have al-
ready expressed my deep concern for
unmonitored intelligence gathering op-
erations within the United States, par-
ticularly those conducted by the CIA, but
I would also like to remark briefly on the
need for some congressional knowledge of
and input into the foreign intelligence
activities.
Up to this time, the Congress has gen-
erally had very little knowledge of CIA
operations in a foreign country unless
something goes wrong and a great deal
of adverse publicity results. Witness the
Bay of Pigs fiasco and the toppling of
the Allende government in Chile. While
I do not dispute the need for secrecy in
their overseas intelligence operations, I
would be interested to know if the CIA
operates solely under the direction of the
National Security Council and/or the
President. Correspondingly, have the
members of the current congressional
subcommittees on intelligence oversight
more often than not simply been pre-
sented with a fait accompli rather than
consulted during the initial decision-
making process? I do not think this is at
all clear and it should be.
I have indicated my support for a
permanent Joint Congressional Commit-
tee on Intelligence Oversight whici
should, in theory, enjoy a more compre-
hensive oversight capability than ha:
been the case with the current subcom-
mittees in the House and Senate. Giver
that reality, however, exactly what wil
that oversight capability include? And
more importantly, given the congres-
sional track record on sensitive informa.
tion leaks, can the security of intelligent(
information imparted to the oversigh
committee be guaranteed? These are veri
serious questions in my mind and I hop(
that the select committee will includ(
them in its inquiry.
Mr. President, I believe that the nee(
for the creation of a select committee t(
investigate the Federal intelligence com-
munity has been amply documented.
strongly endorse its enactment.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, :
rise in support , of Senate Resolution 2:
creating a Select Committee to Investi
gate Intelligence Activities.
At the outset, I want to state that thi
intelligence community has served th
Nation loyally and ably. Moreover,
want to take this opportunity to salut,
the dedicated, hard working men an(
women of the intelligence communit whose work goes largely unheralded be
cause of the climate in which they mus
work.
Production of useful intelligence b
guide the Nation's policy makers in mak
ing decisions relies upon. the efforts o
thousands of persons who do their wort
in a painstaking and careful way.
While agent operations are importan
to the Nation, they constitute a ver;
small proportion of the total intelligent
effort. Agent operations have bee)
glamorized in novels and movies. Mos
of us enjoy this kind of entertainment
but the image that emerges is very fa
from reality.
The truth of the matter is that th
production of intelligence requires th
painstaking work of many specialist
who carefully analyze Information fro many sources. Most of the work is fa
from glamorous and very far from Janie
Bond.
Under the political climate now pre
vailing, I suppose a select committee wa
inevitable. I would have preferred tha
the Senate inquire Into intelligence ac
tivities through the existing committee
and subcommittees that have responsi
bilities for intelligence.
In supporting Senate Resolution 21
I want to make it clear that in no wa:
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Wily 27, 19 i 5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
i;3A REGULATION LONG OVERDUE
former diplomat, I have followed re-
ant news on alleged involvement of the CIA
do+aestic affairs with sneclal concern.
Cle:>.rly, congressional oversight and appro-
:riate regulation of the agency are long over-
4 e. A recent hest seller on the subject, "The
lA and the Cult of Intelligence" by Mar-
;;tetti & Marks, the accuracy of which is
cner:lly recognized, makes a compelling
..+se in this regard.
'rhe:le is enough blame to taint all In-
a ved, not only the agency itself but recent
:`ministrations and especially a pliant and
;.tllible Congress. Additionally, the agency
6'erar-as under a vague grant of powers
'nch fails to define what is "domestic" and
>'.rat is "foreign," let alone providing guld-
or what falls in either category when
.naives legitimate intelligence operations.
But in the approaching investigations, it
intrrortant to keep two things in mind:
+at a competent intelligence branch is es-
otitia. to our survival, and that the CIA,
filth .il of its faults, is one of the best, if
=,,t the very best, organizations of its kind
.rn in -I,
So. let's not throw the baby out with the
oiopefully, in the coming months both
_;r domestic freedom as well as the struc-
:?re end role of this excellent organization
gill be strengthened.
Mr SCHWEICKER. Mr. President, I
-oukl like to commend the distinguished
Majority and minority leaders for their
k: cisi ae action in moving to establish a
sleet Senate committee to investigate
lie recent charges involving various or-
snizntions within the U.S. intelligence
,pmniunity. I had introduced my own
=,isl_ lion in this area, Senate Resolu-
ion 6. cosponsored by my colleague from
Tiscoiisin (Mr. PROXMIRE), and I am
leased that the Senate has decided to
save forward with a similar proposal.
I think it is appropriate to empha-
e four points in connection with this.
first, this Nation vitally needs an effec-
Lee intelligence service. No one disputes
at., and I am confident no one in this
dy would support any action which
f.suld undermine the effectiveness of
Ov ernment organizations performing
xgitilaiate, necessary, intelligence func-
',nns. In the 14 years I have served in
ie Il Luse and Senate, I spent 10 years
a member of the Armed Services Com-
z.i.ttee, both in the House and here in the
donate, and that experience convinced
nc of the necessity for an effective in-
3,Iige?ace organization.
But second, and equally important, it
the responsibility of the Congress to
",line legitimate intelligence activities,
nd to establish guidelines which the ex-
: Ativa branch must follow in conduct-
it telligence activities-and then. to
,e that these guidelines are enforced.
he intelligence community, like every
aier sector of our free society, must
sczaject to the rule of law-and In
i.:.t, because of the unique nature of
i telli.gence activities, It is fundamental
the integrity of our free institutions
uit tie intelligence community respect
=_,y rule of law.
tlni;,rtunately, the Congress has not
" on ',s vigilant in this area as it should
e aeen. Despite nearly 200 legisla-
;ic proposals, no major legislation re-
:,rdii g our intelligence community has
cn passed since 1949, when the original
(A enarter was amended. In the inter-
vening years, the statutory authority of
the CIA has apparently been modified
and expanded by a series of secret ad-
ministrative actions, Executive orders,
and National Security Council actions.
As a result, the CIA now has a "secret
charter" which may be vastly different
from the original statute passed by Con-
gress-and even those Members of Con-
gress with oversight responsibilities for
CIA cannot say with confidence what
is in the secret charter. I hope the select
committee will focus a major inquiry in
this area, and will untangle the various
provisions of the secret charter and in-
sure that our basic intelligence author-
ity is embodied in a new statute, passed
by Congress, rather than. in a series of
secret documents. In a free society, the
entire concept of a "secret charter" is an
intolerable contradiction in terms and
must not be permitted.
Third, there are numerous indications
that the intelligence community-and
particularly the CIA-has expanded its
functions into nonintelligence. areas,
creating a shadow government, dupli-
cating and even superseding the activi-
ties of other Government agencies. I re-
cently disclosed an unclassified, CIA con-
tract proposal, asking American firms to
conduct industrial espionage against our
NATO allies and others, to determine
their future plans in the area of ground
transportation. Certainly we have a legi-
timate Government interest in this area,
but it should be pursued openly, by the
Department of Transportation or Com-
merce, rather than covertly by the CIA.
And in response to my disclosure, Our
NATO allies said they would be happy
to share information of this nature with
our Government and in fact, are now
doing so, thus eliminationg any need for
CIA activity. I hope the select commit-
tee will explore intelligence community
activities in this area, to determine to
what extent a shadow government
has in fact been created, pursuing nor-
mal Government functions in secret,
simply to avoid congressional oversight
and accountability.
Finally, I think it should be empha-
sized that the CIA represents only about
15 percent of the entire U.S. intelligence
effort. Recently, this has been the most
visible 15 percent, in view of press dis-
closures, but certainly no responsible
congressional evaluation in this area can
take place without inquiry into all facets
of the U.S. intelligence community. My
bill specifically authorized inquiry Into
all intelligence agencies, and I would
hope the select committee bill adopted
today will have similar broad authority.
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President. the reso-
lution before the Senate is the product
of long and thoughtful concern over the
role of intelligence agencies in a demo-
cratic society. Nearly 20 years ago, the
distinguished majority leader urged the
Senate to adopt a related measure to
exercise its responsibility for the activi-
ties of our Nation's intelligence com-
munity.
Since the adoption of the National Se-
curity Act, there have been more than
200 attempts to establish separate and
broadly based intelligence oversight
committees for the Congress.
S979
Today, with the leadership of the dis-
tingutsli,cd senior Senator from Rhode
Island ? ad the esteemed majority leader,
and the many other Members of this
body who have labored for this change,
we can take a vitally significant step by
the creation of a Senate Select Commit-
tee to Study Government Operations
with Respect to Intelligence Activities.
This select committee is similar in
many respects to a proposal offered by
Senators MANSFIELD and MATIrIAS which
was referred to the Committee on Gov-
ernment Operations. The Subcommittee
on Inter governmental Relations, which I
chair,-held hearings on December 9 and
10 on that and other proposals to
strengthen congressional oversight of in-
telligence activities.
While we will continue to explore the
tong-range congressional needs for a
more permanent oversight mechanism, it
is essential that we have a select com-
mittee study what has gone before us and
to measure past activities of our intelli-
gence agencies against the laws which
authorized them.
For many years now we have been
given constant assurances by the Central
Intelligc nce Agency and other intelli-
gence agencies that they have been
forthcoming to the Congress through the
appropriate channels such as the present
oversight committees. Unfortunately,
events of the past few years, and more
particularly of the past few weeks, ap-
pear to suggest that there is an instinct
on the part of these agencies to withhold
information from the Congress to protect
themselves.
In the past, proposals from the Con-
gress, from scholars and from Presiden-
tial task forces have been met with little
more than indifference. Certainly public
opinion and opinion in the Congress have
changed.
In recent years we have seen alarming
evidence that the FBI has spied On Con-
gressmen and on domestic political
groups. The President has acknowledged
that the CIA mistakenly became involved
in dome tic surveillance. We have had
evidence of military agents spying on
civilians on behalf of an agency created
by Department of Defense directive. The
list goes on.
The creation of a select committee to
explore these allegations and activities
as well as the Overall activities and re-
sponsibilities of the entire intelligence
community represents an objective re-
sponse by the Senate to difficult and
complex circumstances. It is not a call
for a witch hunt. It is an assumption of
responsibility.
This i, an undertaking of the greatest
importance. It is one which has the
strong support of most of the Members
of this body.
It is a sential that this select commit-
tee begin now to obtain answers to the
many gt,:.stions which have been raised
in the short run about the recent dis-
closures and allegations and in the long
run about the authority and functions
cf all of our intelligence gathering
agencies.
The committee should address the
question of how we can balance vital
national security needs with the public's
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE January 27, 1975
the CIA has been asked to play under that
law.
In 1970 and 1971, White House aides asked
CIA to participate in what was known as the
Huston domestic intelligence plan and to
provide assistance to a former agency official,
E. Howard Hunt, who at the time worked for
the President. Again, the question must be
raised as to what White House authorization
the agency was given to undertake the re-
quested activities. Hunt's aid was cut off
only when, in the words of the man who was
then chief assistant to the deputy director,
it appeared the agency was becoming involved
in a "domestic clandestine operation."
In 1971 and 1972, according to Colby, the
CIA undertook physical surveillances of five
Americans including, apparently, newsman
Jack Anderson, "to Identify the sources of
(news) leaks." This appears to complement
the so-called "national security" wiretaps
conducted by the FBI at the direction of the
Nixon White House from 1969 to 1971. Again,
the agency and the White House must make
clear the authority under which the CIA
conducted such operations.
In March 1974, Colby "terminated the do-
mestic intelligence collection program (be-
gun 7 years earlier) and issued specific guide-
lines that any collection of counterintelli-
gence information on Americans would only
take place abroad and would be initiated only
in response to requests from the FBI. .
Was this at White House direction? And if
not, could a future President reverse such a
policy?
The FBI situation is slightly different.
There is no information as to how or why
former FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover began
collecting politically-tantalizing material
about congressmen and other public figures.
One point is clear, however-he frequently
used the information to titillate Presidents,
and apparently no Chief Executive or White
House aide ever told him to stop. When the
so-called "national security" FBI wiretaps
were operating, Hoover regularly sent social
and political gossip picked up from over-
heard conversations to Nixon chief of staff,
H. R. Haldeman. No objection or order to
stop ever came back from the Oval Office.
One other presidential role in these areas
needs exploration. Were agency directors
ordered by the White House to cover up
certain activities when called before con-
gressional committees? Former CIA Director
Helms, for example,' when questioned by the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee in
February 1973, was asked directly about CIA
participation in a White House plan in 1969
or 1970 to coordinate domestic intelligence
activities. Helms said he could not recall-
though he knew full well of his activities in
1970 Huston plan discussions. Last week he
hold senators he misunderstood the question.
At a May 1973 hearing, Helms told senators
he had no idea that Hunt, prior to public
mention of the Ellsberg break in, "was going
to be involved in any domestic activity."
Of course, he did-that was why aid to Hunt
;.topped. Former President Nixon and his
ides kept a close watch over any congres-
sional testimony that could implicate them
or their assistants in Watergate. Was Helms
told to mislead?
if current congressional efforts to harness
the intelligence community break up as a
result of lack of White House cooperation,
additional allegations of past wrongdoings
are bound to be made because the climate
both inside and outside the secret security
services has changed. Strong internal agency
leadership has gone. And on Capitol Hill, the
old staunch defenders of intelligence ac-
tivities are either gone or powerless.
For those interested in protecting the legit-
imate functions of the intelligence commu-
nity, the future looks grim-indeed black if
the Ford White House fails to see that far
more is needed than a narrow blue-ribbon
commission studying- a very narrow set of
allegations.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I sug-
gest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the rail.
The second assistant legislative clerk
proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for the
quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield for 2 minutes?
Mr. PASTOR,E. I yield.
JOINT REFERRAL OF CERTAIN
COMMUNICATIONS
Mr, MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that a communica-
tion from the Federal Energy Adminis-
tration transmitting a study under Pub-
lic Law 92-39:L, be referred jointly to the
Committees on Interior and Insular Af-
fairs, Public Works, Commerce and Fi-
nance, and that a second communication
received this day from the Council on En-
vironmental Quality on Land Use, pre-
pared as a part of its annual report, be
referred ;jointly to the Committeess on
Interior and Insular Affairs, Public
Works, Commerce, Agriculture and For-
estry.
The. PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
AUTHORIZA'r.[ON FOR COMMITTEE
ON CO]vIM11RCE TO FILE REPORTS
UNTIL MII?NIGHT TONIGHT
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the Committee
on Commerce be authorized to file re-
ports until midnight tonight.
The PRESIDING On'ICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered..
Mr.. MANS.F:[ELD. Mr. President, I
suggest the absence of a quorum
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Th.e clerk
will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk ? pro-
ceeded to call the roll.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call. be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY
GOVERNMENTAL INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES
The Senate continued with the con-
sideration of the resolution (S. Res. 21)
to establish a Select Committee of the
Senate to conduct an investigation and
study of governmental operations with
respect to intelligence activities.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I ask for
the yeas a:nd nays an passage.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. PAS TORE. Mr. President, I sug-
gest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for the
quorum be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Pursuant to the previous order, the
Senate will now proceed to vote on the
resolution, as amended. On this question
the yeas and nays have been ordered, and
clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk called
the roll.
Mr. YOUNG (after having voted in the
negative). On this vote I have a pair with
the junior Senator from Washington
(Mr. JACKSON). If he were present, he
would vote "Yea." If I were permitted to
vote, I would vote "Nay." I therefore
withdraw my vote.
Mr. GRIFFIN (after having voted in
the affirmative). On this vote I have a
pair with the Senator from Ohio (Mr.
TAFT). If he were present, he would vote
"nay." If I were permitted to vote, I
would vote "yea." I therefore withdraw
my vote.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce
that the senator from Washington (Mr.
JACKSON), the Senator from Rhode Island
(Mr. PELL), the Senator from California
(Mr. TUNNEY), and the Senator from
Indiana (Mr. HARTKE) are necessarily
absent.
I further announce that the Senator
from Kentucky (Mr. HUDDLESTON), and
the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. INOUYE)
are absent on official business.
I further announce that, if present and
voting, the Senator from Rhode Island
(Ml'. PELL), and the Senator from Call-
fornia (Mr. TUNNEY) would each vote
"yea."
Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the
Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS) is
necessarily absent.
I also announce that the Senator from
Maryland (Mr. MATHIAS), the Senator
from Idaho (Mr. MCCLURE), and the Sen-
ator from Vermont (Mr. STAFFORD) are
absent on official business.
I further announce that the Senator
from Ohio (Mr. TAFT) is absent to attend
a funeral.
I further announce that, if present and
voting, the Senator from New York (Mr.
JAVITS), and the Senator from Maryland
(Mr. MATHIAS) would each vote "yea."
The result was announced-yeas 82,
nays 4, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 1 Leg.]
YEAS-82
Abourezk
Eastland
Metcalf
Allen
Fannin
Mondale
Baker
Fon.g
Montoya
Bartlett
Ford
Morgan
Bayh
Garn
Moss
Beall
Glenn
Muskie
Bellmon
Goldwater
Nelson
Bentsen
Gravel
Nunn
Biden
Hansen
Packwood
Brock
Hart, Gary W.
Pastore
Brooke
Hart, Philip A.
Pearson
Buckley
Haskell
Percy
Bumpers
Hatfield
Proxmire
Burdick
Hathaway
R.aiidolph
Byrd, .
Hollings
Ribicoff
Harry F., Jr.
Hruska
Roth
Byrd, Robert C. Humphrey
Schweiker
Cannon
Johnston
Scott, Hugh.
Case
Kennedy
Sparkman
Chiles
Laxalt
Stennis
Church
Leahy
Stevens
Clark
Long
Stevenson
Cranston
Magnuson
Stone -
Culver
Mansfield
Symington
Curtis
McClellan
Tower
Dole
McGee
Weicker
Domenici
McGovern
Williams
Eagleton
McIntyre
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January 27, 1975 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE
do I agree to the criticism that has been
made concerning our existing commit-
tees. I know that our colleagues on these
committees have done their utmost to
carry out the trust of the Senate.
Because the attacks on the intelligence
community persist, and because part of
that attack is directed to the existing
committees, I am supporting Senate Res-
olution 21 as a way to clear the air and
set the record.
When The distinguished senior Sena-
tor from Arkansas was chairman of the
Permanent Investigations Subcommittee,
I believe he established the procedure of
having closed hearings before open hear-
ings were held. If I remember correctly,
the distinguished Senator from Arkansas
established this procedure to protect both
his subcommittee and witnesses from
unnecessary embarrassment.
It is my hope that the Senate select
commis;tee will proceed in a careful and
deliberate manner. I believe the com-
mittee's work, at least initially, should be
in camera.
Most of the Senators and staff, who
are going to serve on the committee, are
not thoroughly familiar with the orga?-
nization and functions of the intelli-
gence community. Before any decision
on open hearings is made, I would hope
the members and staff would have ample
opportunity to do some homework.
The Senators and staff who serve on
the select committee are going to have
knowledge of a lot of matters which, if
hnpropperly handled, can cause our Na-
tion harm.
- It is important that the select com-
mittee establish sensible rules in dealing
with the intelligence community. in
other words, let us get the information
we need to do the job but no more.
There is a reason over and above se-
curity considerations for the select com-
mittee to hold its meetings in camera:
The basic American idea of protecting
professional and personal reputations
unless unlawful or unethical acts are in-
volved.
Although Senate Resolution 21 does
not specifically make this point, I believe
the work of the select committee should
have as its focus the National Security
Act of 1947. It is that act and the direc-
tives issued under its provisions which
have created the intelligence community
as we Know it today.
Using the act of 1947 as a frame of
reference, I believe the select committee
should have two prime objectives:
First, to determine whether or not the
act of 1947 needs revision.
Second, to determine whether or not
there have been illegal activities within
the intelligence community.
If = here have been illegal activities,
then t: believe the committee must de-
termine whether these illegal activities
constitute a pattern or are merely aber-
rations.
of aetimes what may appear to be an
illegal. activity may turn out to be some-
thing quite different.
Ultimately, the select committee will
make its findings and recommendations
known to the Senate. It would be a trag-
edy for the Nation should this document
reflect anything but the best of the Sen-
ate.
If surgery is required, let it be per-
formed only after the most careful diag-
nosis. And, if there is surgery, let us use
a very sharp scalpel-not a meat ax.
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, the
Central Intelligence Agency is charged
with conducting the kinds of intelligence
activities that are absolutely essential to
preserve our free and open democratic
society in the real world in which we live.
I say this because example after exam-
ple has shown that our Nation must re-
main ever-vigilant against the publicly
stated desires of other governments to
destroy our free existence.
The charter establishing the CIA lim-
ited it to foreign intelligence gathering.
Allegations have been made that the
charter has been exceeded on occasion.
If correct, then much of the blame for
these excesses lies with the Congress for
failure to discharge its duty of congres-
sional oversight. Recognizing that our
Nation must have an intelligence gath-
ering capacity that Congress has failed
in its oversight responsibility, the ques-
tion becomes: Is the creation of a select
committee to investigateour intelligence
operations, with all its extensive press
coverage and certain leaks, the wisest
method to explore and correct past
wrongs and prevent future abuses? I
have grave doubts.
There are many possible alternatives
to such a suggested select committee.
One alternative that comes immediately
to mind is the creation of a permanent
joint committee to oversee intelligence
gathering by our Nation's agencies. Such
an alternative has been offered in the
form of S. 327, which I have cosponsored
and intend to support.
However, the realities of our current
situation dictate my reluctant support
of Senate Resoultion 21, with the strong
reservations mentioned previously and
an admonition to my colleagues that we
must not breach our national security by
revealing matters of truly critical impor-
tance. These hearings must not be char-
acterized by a veritable flood of leak,,
and publicity stunts that will perma-
nently jeopardize the effectiveness of
our intelligence operations which serve a
very legitimate purpose. We must be or
our guard that such legislation with s
commendable purpose is not allowed
through error or excess, to undermine
our country's security.
Mr. PACKWOOD. Mr. President, yes-
terday's Washington Post included ar
editorial by Walter Pincus entitle(
"'Spies' and Presidents." In speaking o"
the investigation before a select commit-
tee to study the Federal intelligence
community, Mr. Pincus declares that:
No select Senate committee-not even e
joint congressional committee-will get tx
the bottom of the U.S. intelligence commu-
nity's problems without the full and activF
support of President Ford and his staff." Thi;
is because, he goes on to say, "The inquir~
into intelligence activities must iuevitabIl
find out what past Presidents: authorized th'
agencies to do.
Because of its particular relevance t(
the bill we will vote on today, I am bring-
ing this article to the attention of ml
5981
colleagues. Mr. President, I ask unani-
mous consent that ' the text of Mr. Pin-
cus' editorial be printed at this point in
the RISCORD.
There being no objection, the editorial
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
"STIES" AND PRESIDENTS
(By Walter Pincus)
No select Senate committee-not even a
joint congressional committee-will get to
the bottom of the U.S. intelligence com-
munity's problems without the full and ac-
tive support of President Ford and his-staff.
The reason is simple: such an inquiry must
inevitably end up trying to find out what past
Presidents and their staffs authorized these
agencies to do; what formal groups, such as
the 40 Committee, approved; and what steps,
if any, the White House ever took to stop
abuses of authority or projects that were il-
legal on their face.
Current newspaper allegations about the
Central Intelligence Agency's domestic ac-
tivities and the CIA partial confirmation plus
admission that the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation has collected files on members of
Congress illustrate the point.
Former CIA Director Richard Helms tied
the start of that agency's domestic activities
in the late 1960s to "the express concern of
the President" (Lyndon Johnson), although
he did not detail how this "concern" was
transmitted to him. The present CIA Direc-
tor, William Colby, told a Senate subcom-
mittee that, under Helms, the agency on Aug.
15. 1907 established a unit within its coun-
terintelligence department "to look into the
possibility of foreign links to American dis-
sident elements." Two weeks later, Colby
went on, the executive director of the Presi-
dent's National Advisory Commission on
Civil Disorder asked how the CIA might assist
that inquiry.
in setting up the commission, President
Johnson's executive order had called upon all
government agencies to cooperate. Colby
never stated, in his prepared text, why or
under what authority Helms had established
the unit prior to receipt of the commission's
request for assistance. Colby did add, how-
ever, that later the same year "the CIA ac-
tivity became part of an interagency program,
In. support of the national commission (on
disorder), among others."
What that program was and who the "oth-
ers" were who received its output were not
spelled out. The only known group estab-
lished at that time was one intended to work
out a plan for handling disorders in Wash-
ington. Former participants on that inter-
agency panel from the Pentagon and Justice
Department don't remember CIA having been
a party. Colby's later disclosure-that at this
time the agency's Office of Security "inserted
10 agents Into dissident organizations operat-
ing in the Washington, D.C. area . . . to
gather information relating to plans for
demonstrations . that might endanger
CIA personnel, facilities and information"-
paarallels what this interagency group did.
Whatever the facts were, only informs ion
from the White House tracing establishment
of such a group could shed light on how the
CIA became a participant.
In 1969, the CIA was asked by the White
House to undertake surveillance of the Presi-
dmt's brother, Donald Nixon, who, accord-
ih:.g to documents from the House impeach-
ment inquiry, was moving to Las Vegas where
it was feared he "would come into contact
with criminal elements." The agency refused,
but the Secret Service Act, which requires
government agencies to cooperate in the pio-
tection of the President and his family, may
have been the source of other such requests.
Only the White House can disclose what role
Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP77MOO144R000500110105-2