CONVERSATION WITH RUSS ROURKE, WHITE HOUSE STAFF, RE THE PASTORE RESOLUTION TO CREATE A SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

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CIA-RDP77M00144R000500110105-2
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September 2, 2004
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105
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January 21, 1975
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-3 yian ky~~,~. Approved For Release 2004flol A'- [ _ 7M00144R000500 21 January 1975 SUBJECT: Conversation with Russ Rourke, White House Staff, re the Pastore Resolution to Create a Select Committee on Intelligence Today I called Russ Rourke to alert him to the Pastore Resolution to create a Select Committee on Intelligence. I asked if anyone there was keeping an eye on this. Rourke said not that he was aware of. I told him it could pose problems for much of the Executive Branch since it will get into everything that has anything to do with intelligence- -CIA, FBI, NSA, etc. I said I didn't know if there were any constitutional issues involved but it might be worth checking. I also pointed out that Chairman John Stennis, Senate Armed Services Committee, had fought the Resolution in the Democratic Caucus but lost. Rourke asked what they can do about it and I replied the only possible thing would be to get a constitutional handle on it. I said another question is who will be on the Committee. I told Rourke that we are very concerned about the security aspects of the Committee's inquiry. I told Rourke we also are concerned about the reports under the Foreign Assistance Act to the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees and we are trying to get things buttoned up with these two Committees. I said all this was worth Jack Marsh's attention and even further up the line. Rourke said he would brief Marsh as soon as he returns this evening. I said I would send a copy of the Pastore Resolution over to him in the morning. 25X1A Distribution: Original - Subject 1-DA File 1 - OLC Chrono ,-'l?- Select Committee file GEO- GE L. CAR Legislative Counsel Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000500110105-2 S 982 Approved For Release 2004/10/12: CIA-RDP77M00144R CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE the CIA has been asked to play under that law. In 1970 and 1971, White House aides asked CIA to participate, in what was known as the Huston domestic intelligence plan and to provide assistance to a former agency official, F. Howard Hunt, who at the time worked for the President. Again, the question must be raised as to what White House authorization the agency was given to undertake the re- quested activities. Hunt's aid was cut off only when, in the words of the man who was then chief- assistant to the deputy director, it appeared the agency was becoming ifivol.ved in a "domestic clandestine operation." In 1971 and 1972, according to Colby, the CIA undertook physical surveillances of five Americans including, apparently, newsman Jack Anderson, "to identify the sources of (news) leaks." This appears to complement the so-called "national security" wiretaps conducted by the FBI at the direction of the Nixon White House from 1969 to 1971. Again, the agency and the White House must make clear the authority under which the CIA conducted such operations. In March 1974, Colby "terminated the do- mestic intelligence collection program (be- gun 7 years earlier) and issued specific guide- lines that any collection of counterintelli- gence information on Americans would only take place abroad and would be initiated only in response to requests from the FBI. . Was this at White House direction? And if not, could a future President reverse such a policy? The FBI situation is slightly different. There is no information as to how or why former FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover began collecting politically-tantalizing material about congressmen and other public figures. One point is clear, however-he frequently used the information to titillate Presidents, and apparently no Chief Executive or White House aide ever told him to stop. When the so-called "national security" FBI wiretaps were operating, Hoover regularly sent social and political gossip picked up from over- heard conversations to Nixon chief of staff, 11, R. Haldeman. No objection or order to stop ever came back from the Oval Office. One other presidential role in these areas needs exploration. Were agency directors ordered by the White House to cover up certain activities when called before con- gressional committees? Former CIA Director Helms, for example, when questioned by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in February 1973, was asked directly about CIA participation in a White House plan In 1969 or 1970 to coordinate domestic Intelligence activities. Helms said he could not recall- though he knew full well of his activities in 1970 Huston plan discussions. Last week he told senators he misunderstood the question. At a May 1973 hearing, Helms told senators he had no Idea that Hunt, prior to public mention of the Ellsberg break in, "was going' to be involved in any domestic activity." Of course, he did-that was why aid to Hunttt'rr stopped. Former President Nixon and his' aides kept - close watch over any congres- sional I sional ter irony that could implicate them or their assistants in Watergate. Was Helms told to mislead? If current congressional efforts to harness the intelligence community break up as a result of lack of White House cooperation, additional allegations of past wrongdoings are bound to be made because the climate both inside and outside the secret security services has changed. Strong internal agency leadership has gope. And on Capitol Hill, the ,;id staunch defenders of intelligence ac- tivities are either gone or powerless. For those interested in protecting the legit- imate functions of the intelligence commu- nity, the future looks grim-indeed black if the Ford White House fails to see that fax more is needed than a narrow blue-ribbon commission studying a very narrow set of allegations. Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I sug- gest the absence of it quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. MANSFIELD,. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for 2 minutes? Mr. PASTORE. I yield. JOINT REFERRAL OF CERTAIN COMMUNICATIONS Mr. MANSFIELD, Mr. President, I ask unanimous- consent that a communica- tion from the Federal Energy Adminis- tration transmitting a study under Pub- lic Law 93-391, be referred jointly to the Committees on Interior and Insular Af- fairs, Public Works, Commerce and Fi- nance, and that a second communication received this day from the Council on En- vironmental Quality on Land Use, pre- pared as a part of its annual report, be referred ;jointly to the Committees an Interior and Insular Affairs, Public Works, Commerce, Agriculture and For- estry. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. AUTHORIZATION FOR COMNL[TTEE ON COMMERCE `ID FILE REPORTS UNTIL MPDNIGHT TONIGHT Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Commerce be authorized to file re- ports until midnight tonight. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. QUORUM CALL Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk pro- ceeded to call the roll. Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES The Senate continued with the con- sideration of the resolution (S. Res. 21) to establish a Select Committee of the Senate to conduct an investigation and study of governmental operations with respect to intelligence activities. Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on passage. The yeas and nays were ordered. Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I sug- gest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk- will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk pro- ceeded to call the roll. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask 0110105-2 January 27, 1975 unanimous consent that the order for the quorum be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Pursuant to the previous order, the Senate will now proceed to vote on the resolution, as amended. On this question the yeas, and nays have been ordered, and clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk called the roll. Mr. YOUNG (after having voted in the negative). On this vote I have a pair with the junior Senator from Washington (Mr. JACKSON). If he were present, he would vote "Yea." If I were permitted to vote, I would vote "Nay." I therefore withdraw my vote. Mr. GRIFFIN (after having voted in the affirmative). On this vote I have a pair with the Senator from Ohio (Mr, TAFT). If he were present, he would vote "nay." If I were permitted to vote, I would vote "yea." I therefore withdraw my vote. Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce that the Senator from Washington (Mr. JACKSON), the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PELL), the Senator from California (Mr. TUNNEY), and the Senator from Indiana (Mr. HARTKE) are necessarily absent. I further announce that the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. HUDDLESTON), and the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. INo"ovi) are absent on official business. I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PELL), and the Senator from Cali- fornia (Mr. TUNNEY) would each vote "yea." Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS) is necessarily absent. I also announce that the Senator from Maryland (Mr. MATHIAS), the Senator from Idaho (Mr. MCCLURE), and the Sen- ator from Vermont (Mr. STAFFORD) are absent on official business. I further announce that the Senator from Ohio (Mr. TAFT) is absent to attend a funeral. I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS), and the Senator from Maryland (Mr. MATHIAS) would each vote "yea.." The result was announced-yeas 82, nays 4, as follows: [Rollcall Vote No. 1 Leg.] YEAS---92 Abourezk Eastland Metcalf Allen - Fannin Mondale Baker Fong Montoya Bartlett Ford Morgan Bayh Garn Moss Beall Glenn Muskie Bellmon Goldwater Nelson Bentsen Gravel Nunn Biden Hansen . Packwood Brock Hart, Gary W. Pastore Brooke Hart, Philip A. Pearson Buckley Haskell Percy Bumpers Hatfield Proxmire Burdick Hathaway Randolph Byrd, Hollings Ribicoff Harry F., Jr. Hruska Roth Byrd, Robert C. Humphrey Schweiker Cannon Johnston Scott, Hugh Case Kennedy Sparkman Chiles Laxalt Stennis Church Leahy Stevens Clark Long Stevenson Cranston Magnuson Stone Culver Mansfield Symington Curtis McClellan Tower Dole McGee Weicker Domenici McGovern Williams Eagleton McIntyre Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP77MOO144R000500110105-2 Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000500110105-2 January 27, 1975 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SEN ATE do I agree to the criticism that has been made concerning our existing commit- tees. I know that our colleagues on these committees have done their utmost to carry out the trust of the Senate. Bet: tiuse the attacks on the intelligence community persist, and because part of that attack :s directed to the existing committees. I am supporting Senate Res- ralution 21 as a way to clear the air and A the record. t When the distinguished senior Sena- I.'Or from Arkansas was chairman of the iermanent Investigations Subcommittee. is believe he established the procedure of laving closed hearings before open hear- ings were held. If I remember correctly. the di:-tinguisbed Senator from Arkansas established this procedure to protect both ais subcommittee and witnesses from ulriecessary embarrassment. It is my hope that the Senate select committee will proceed in a careful and deliberate manner. I believe the com- mittee's work. at least initially, should be li camera. Mos;~ of the Senators and staff, who are going to serve on the committee, are not thoroughly familiar with the orga- nizati ;n and functions of the intelli- gence community. Before any decision 'aft utica nearings is made, I would hope ,he niernoers and staff would have ample opportunity to do some homework. The Senators and staff who serve on ''?'he se,.ect committee are going to have s:uowiedge of a lot of matters which, if .nproterly handled, can cause our Na- hon harm. It n important that the select com- :utteee establish sensible rules in dealing 0th he intelligence community. In other words, let us get the information >ve riee d to do the job but no more. There is a reason over and above se- 'urir..y considerations for the select com- inittee to hold its meetings in camera: The, basic American idea of protecting s.rofesr:ional and personal reputations unless unlawful or unethical acts are in- volved. Alt ;u;_>h Senate Resolution 21 does not specifically make this point, I believe #,iie w, o-k of the select committee should have a its focus the National Security Arai; ) 1847. It is that act and the direc- i-!v?es r- u.ed under its provisions which gave r-gated the intelligence community to determine whether or not the 847 needs revision. id, to determine whether or not _at'e been illegal activities within e have been illegal activities, 1 believe the committee must de- ?vhet, rer these illegal activities ,,ctivit y may turn out to be some- ruite di-ferent. ttit,cciately. the select committee will stake its findings and recommendations onown to the Senate. It would be a trag- c'iy for the Nation should this document reflect anything but the best of the Sen- ate. If surgery is required. let it be per- formed only after the most caretul diag- nosis. And, if there is surgery, let us use a very sharp scalpel---not a meat ax. Mr. DOMLiNICI. Mr. President, the Central Intelligence Agency is charged with conducting the kinds of intelligence activities that are absolutely essential to preserve our free and open democratic society in the real world in which we live I say this because example after- exam- ple has shown that our Nation must re- main ever-via=ilant against the publicly stated desires of other governments to destroy our free existence. The charter establishing the CIA lim- ited it to foreign intelligence gathering. Allegations have been made that the charter has been exceeded on occasion. If correct, then much of the blame for these excesses lies with the Congress for failure to discharge its duty of congres- sional oversight. Recognizing that our Nation must have an intelligence gath- ering capacity that Congress has failed in its oversight responsibility, the ques- tion becomes: Is the creation of a select committee to investigate our intelligence operations, with all its extensive press coverage and certain leaks, the wisest method to explore and correct past wrongs and prevent future abuses? I have grave doubts. There are many possible alternatives to such a suggested select committee. One alternative that come; immediately to mi-nd is the creation of a permanent joint committee to oversee intelligence gathering by our Nation's agencies. Such an -alternative has been offered in the form of S. 32". which I have cosponsored and intend to support. However, trle realities of. our current situation dictate my reluctant support of Senate Resoultion 21, with the strong reservations mentioned previously and an admonition to my colleagues that we must not breach our national security by revealing matters of truly critical impor- tance. These hearings must not be char- acterized by a veritable food cf leaks and publicity stunts that will perma- nently jeopardize the effectiveness of our intelligence operations which serve a very legitimate purpose. We must be on our r-uard that such legislation with a commendable purpose is not c.llowed, through error or excess, to unc>ermine our c olintr is security. Mr. PACKWOOD. Mr. P -eside;it, yes- terday's Washington Post incluled an editorial by Walter Pincus entitled "'Spies' and Presidents." In speaking of the investigation before a select commit- tee to study the Federal intelligence community, Mr. Pincus declares that: No select Senate committee-not even a joint congressional committee--will get to the bottom of the U.S. intel i~=ence commu- ui ?:robfen;e. without the full arl active of President Ford and his sta T." This is lie ;oes on to say "The inquiry into intclll,.ence activities it is, inevitably lino ;,ii. wh gas. Pre:iaen(- urho~zed the ::e Ls . s to do. Because of its particular relevance to the bill we will vote on todav, I an) bring- ing this article to the attention of my S 981 colleagues. Mr. President, I ask unani- mous consent that the text of Mr. Pin- cus' editorial be printed at this point in the REcoaa. There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, gig follows: "`Xps-, " (ND PRESIDENTS (By Walter Pincus) No select Senate committee-not even a }...at caugressiolial committee-will get to t-e bottom of the U.S. intelligence com- -".pity's problems without the full and ac- tive support of President Fordand his staff. The reason is simple: such an inquiry must inevitably end up trying to find out what past Presidents and their staffs authorized these agencies to do; what formal groups, such as Ito 40 Committee, approved; and what steps, i f any, the White House ever took to stop a'iiusei; of authority or projects that were il- le =a1 on their face. Current newspaper allegations about the C-ntral Intelligence Age:lcy's domestic ac- tiaities and the CIA partial confirmation plus admission that the Federal Bureau of Iaives- tigation has collected files on members of Congress illustrate the point. i+"order CIA Director Richard Helms tied the start of that agency's domestic activities in the late 1960s to "the express concern of the President" (Lyndon Johnson), although he did not detail how this "concern" was tr i,nsmitted to him. The present CIA Direc- tor, William Colby. told a Senate subcom- mittee that, under Helms, the agency on Aug. lb, 1907 established a unit within its coun- terintelligence department "to look into the possibility of foreign links to American dis- shient elements." Two weeks later, Colby wE'nt on, the executive director of the Presi- dent's National Advisors' Commission on Civil Disorder asked how tl?e CIA might as:ist that inquiry. In setting up the commission, President Johnson's executive order had called upon all government agencies to cooperate. Colby never stated, in his prepared text, why or (I_Lder what authority Helms had established the unit prior to receipt of the commission's reruest for assistance. Colby did add, how- --r, that later the same year "the CIA ac- tivity became part of an interagency program, in support of the national commission (en disorder), among others." What that program was and who the "ct.h- era" were who received its output were not spelled. out. The only known group estab- 1is.tied at that time was one intended to work out a plan for handling disorders in Wa.sh- ln ;ton. Former participants on that incer- agency panel from the Pentagon and Justice Department don't remember CIA having been. a party. Coih9's later disclosure-that at this time the agency's Office of Security "inserted 10 agents into dissident organizations operat- ing in the Washington, D.C. area . . . to gather information relating to plans for 1euno11strations . that might endanger CIA personnel, facilities and information"- a;?allels whet this interagency group did. Wi_iatever the facts were, only information from the White House tracing establishment of such a group could shed light on how the CIA became a participant. n 1969, the CIA was asked by the White House to undertake surveillance of the Presi- de,it's broth-1-r. Donald Nixon, who, accord- inn to docu'nents from the House impeach- ment inquiry, was moving to Las Vegas where it was feared he "would come into contact wi.h crimina elements." The agency refused, the Scoot Service Act, which requires ernment agencies to cooperate in the pro- te' 'ion of t1.e President and his family, may have been the source of other such requests. Orly the White House can disclose what role Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP77MOO144R000500110105-2 Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000500110105-2 S 9$3 January 27, 1975 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE NAYS-4 kind which have any tendency to reveal the covert intelligence activities in the United Helms Talmadge full facts with respect to the following mat- States and abroad. Such other related matters as the tens or questions: (16) Scott, Thurmond William L. (1) Whether the Central Intelligence committee deems necessary in order to carry PRESENT AND GIVING LIVE PAIRS, AS Agency has conducted an illegal domestic out its responsibilities under section (a). PREVIOUSLY RECORDED-2 intelligence operation in the United States, SEC. 3. (a) To enable the select commit.. (2) The conduct of domestic Intelligence tee to make the investigation and study an.- Young, against or counterintelligence operations against thorized and directed by this resolution, the Griffin, for United States citizens by the Federal Bureau Senate hereby empowers the select com- NOT VOTING-11 of Investigation or any other Federal agency. mittee as an agency of the Senate (1) to (3) The origin a:dd disposition of the so- employ and fix the compensation of such Hartke Javits Stafford called Huston Plan to apply United States In- clerical, investigatory, legal, technical, and Huddleston Mathias Taft telligence, agency capabilities against indi- other assistants as it deems necessary or Inouye McClure Tunney victuals or organizations within the United appropriate, but it may not exceed the nor- Jackson Pell States. mal Senate salary schedules; (2) to sit and So the resolution (S. Res. 21) WaS (4) The extant to which the Federal Bu- act at any time or place during sessions, re- agreed to, as follows: reau. of Investigation, the Central Intelli- cesses, and adjournment periods of the Sen- S. RES. 21 gence Agency, and other Federal law enforce- ate; (3) to hold hearings for taking Rest sed, To establish a select committee ment or intelligence agencies coordinate their testimony on oath or to receive documentary of th Senate to conduct an investigation respective activities, any agreements which or physical evidence relating to the matters and si udy of governmental operations with govern that coordination, and the extent and questions it is authorized to investigate respect to intelligence activities and of the towhich a lack of coordination has contrib- or study; (4) to require by subpena or extent, if any, to which illegal, improper, or uted to activities or actions which are ille- otherwise the attendance as witnesses of unethical activities were engaged in by any gal, improper, inefficient, unethical, or con- any- persons who the select committee be- agency of the Federal Government or by any trary to the intent of Congress. lieves have knowledge or information con- The extant to which the operation of cerning any of the matters or questions it tion with others, with resp pect to any Intel- domestic intelligence or counterintelligence is authorized to investigate and study; (5) Lion with acting Individually respect to ny Intel- m ligence activity carried out by or on behalf activities and the operation of any other ac- to require by subpena or order any depart- of the Federal Government; be it further tivities within the United. States by the Cen- ment, agency, officer, or employee of the Resolved, That (a) there is hereby estab- tral Intelligency Agency conforms to the Leg- executive branch of the United States Gov- lished a select committee of the Senate which islative charter of that Agency and the intent ernment, or any private person, firm, or cor- may called, of the Congreal. poration, to produce for its consideration or convenience To To Sctud ud of expression, the Select Committee m for mitteee y Governmen- ($) The past and present interpretation for use as evidence in its investigation and tal c ;ieratlons With Respect to Intelligence by the Director of Central Intelligence of the study any books, checks, canceled checks; Activities to conduct an investigation and responsibility to protect intelligence sources correspondence, c via nications,ddocument, record- stuay of the extent, if any, to which illegal, and methods as it relates to the provision in papers, physical improper, or, unethical activities were en- section 102(d) (3) of the National Security ings, tapes, or materials relating to any of gaged in by any agency or by any persons, Act of 1947 (160 U.S.C. 403(d) (3)) that ". the matters or questions It is authorized to acting either individually or in combination that the agency shall have no police, subpena, Investigate and study which they or any of with others, in carrying out any intelligence law enforcement powers, or internal security them may have in their custody or under functions. ." their control; (6) to make to the Senate by or or surveillance a Fedeer ral l Go on reanment. behalf of (7) Nature and extent of executive branch any recommendations it deems appropriate any agency of the e Fed oversight of all United States intelligence in respect to the willful failure or refusal (b) The select commof el tern members of this activities. - of any person to answer questions or give the Se Ian shall cobeia ned by the P l (8) The need for specific legislative au- testimony in his character as a witness dur- dent of the e, six a be ppo the by the mere- thority to govern the operations of any Intel- ing his appearance before it or in respect to b of he em li ence agencies of the Federal Govern- the willful failure or refusal of any officer or dent of tSenate from t the recommendations m off ts the the Senate upon f tSand five merit now existing without that explicit stat- employee of the executive branch of the minority the members a leader the the n Senate, t be five utory authority, including but not limited to United States Government or any person, mty members President tSenate to be on agencies such as the Defense Intelligence firm, or corporation to produce before the P by the eared m the aon of of the Senate upon Agency and the National. Security Agency. - committee any books, checks, canceled trecommendation of the minority leader The nature and extent to which Federal checks, correspondence, communications, of the of rule. For the Spurposes tands of Rules of agencies cooperate and exchange intelligence document, financial records, papers, physical graph 6 of rule XXV of the Standing Rules of information and the adequacy of any regula- evidence, records, recordings, tapes, or materials in obedience to any subpena or the Senate, service of a Senator as a mem- tions or statuses which govern such coopera- cot, chairman, sh l not chairman into account. select tion and exchange of intelligence informa- order; (7) to take depositions and other majority not members be taken into the eco tom- om- tion. testimony on oath anywhere within the tom) Teeshall (t) The e a and (9) The extent to which United States in- United States or in any other country; (W mittee shall select a chairman ch the minor- te] li ence agencies are governed by Executive to procure the temporary or intermittent sty members shall select a vice chairman and orders, rule, or regulations either published services of individual consultants, or orga- the committee shall adopt rules and prose or secret and the extent to which those Exec- nizations thereof, in the same manner and lures to govern its proceedings. The vice e utive orders, rules, or regulations interpret, under the same conditions as a standing chairman sha11 preside over meetings of the expand, or are in conflict with specific legis- committee of the Senate may procure such select committee during the absence of the la'ive authority. services under section 202(1) of the Legis- ch, sib roes and discharge such other respon- 10) The violation or suspected violation lative Reorganization Act of 1946; (9) to use sib ties as may be assigned to him by the of ( any State or Federal statute by any in- on a reimbursable basis, with the prior con-? eel u committee or the chairman. Vacancies in he membership of the select committee telligence agency or by any person by or on sent of the, Committee on Rules and Ad- si 1 not affect the authority of the remain- behalf of any intelligence agency of the Fed- malit such dinistration, epart the ment or services age of ncy; persorsonneal of use i- members to execute the functions of the eral Government including but not limited on a rei d e basis or e otherwise (10) with ct committee and shall be filled in the to surreptitious entries, surveillance, wire- the prior bpartrsabl of the chairman any ne manner as original appointments to it taps, or eavesdropping, illegal opening of the subcommittee of any committee of the San- ure made. United States mail, or the monitoring of the ate the facilities or services of any members (d) A majority of the members of the se- United States mail, of the staffs of such other Senate commit.. lest committee shall constitute a quorum for (11) The need for improved, strengthened, tees or any subcommittees of such other transaction of business, but the select or consolidated oversight of United States in. Senate committees whenever the select committee may affix a lesser number as a telligence activities by the Congress. committee or its chairman deems that such quorum for the purpose of taking testimony (12) Whether any of the existing laws of action is necessary or appropriate to enable or depositions. - - the United States are Inadequate, either in the select committee to make the investi- their provisions or manner of enforcement, to and study authorized and directed SEC. The select committee is authorized safeguard the rights of American citizens, gation and directed to leet to do everything necessary or by this resolution; (11) to have direct access appropriate to make the investigations and to improve executive and legislative control through the agency of any members of the study specified in subsection (a) of the first of intelligence and related activities, and to select committee or any of its investigatory section. Without abridging in any way the resolve uncertainties as to the authority of or legal assistants designated by it or its authority conferred upon the select com- United States intelligence and related agen- chairman or the ranking minority member saes. to any data, evidence, information, report, mittee by the preceding sentence, the Sen- Whether there Is unnecessary dupli- analysis, or document or papers, relating to ate further expressly authorizes and directs (13) the select t committee t to o .make a complete cation of expenditure and effort in the col- any of the matters or questions which it is investigation and study of the activities of lection and processing of intelligence, infer- authorized and directed to investigate and any agency or of any and all persons or nation by United States agencies. study in the custody or under the control groups of persons or organizations of any (14) The extent; and necessity of overt and of any department, agency, officer, or em- Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP77MOO144R000500110105-2 Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000500110105-2 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SF`.NATE Jalluar' 27, 1975 ou ee or one-executive branch of the United ties of the Central Intelligence Agency in E--s Government, including any depart- foreign countries or the intelligence act n- ml t, agency, officer, or employee of the ties in foreign countries of any other le- 1 ni ed -States Government having the- power partment or agency of the Federal Gove'n- ti+}r_er the laws of the United States to inves- ment. e any alleged criminal activities or to Sec. 8. As a condition for employment as :cute persons charged with crimes described in section 3 of this resolution, e.-Oh nst the United States and any depart- person shall agree not to accept any hon :rJ, agen=cy, officer, or employee of the arium, royalty or other payment for a epe :k- tl-ited States Government having the au- ing engagement, magazine article, book, or ;o-rity to conduct intelligence or surveil- other endeavor connected with the investi;:.;a- -.-nce within or outside the Unite' Stat iz will aid the select committee to pre- or any -'v-yO V1 one select commit '-e for or conduct t e person engaged by contract or oth r- investi ati g o an he - select committee un4s Ss e ^ m,nes made necessary available or i appropriate such employee or person has received an Ep- b the sell i tt . the type or security tiv rs conferred upon it by this resolution E31m :si!d s make the upon Investigation and study it clearance to be required hi the case of arty y such employee or person shall, within the it authorized by this resolution to n ciiiznittee acting through the chairman or any other member designated by him, and 1:11v be served by any person designated by :;ucn chairman or other member anywhere within the borders of the United States. The chairman of the select committee, or any ether member thereof, is hereby authorized to administer oaths to any witnesses appear- ing before the committee. fei In preparing for or conducting the investigation and study authorized and di- rueted by this resolution, the select com- niittee shall be empowered to exercise the powers conferred upon committees of the Senate by section 6002 of title 18, United States Code, or any other Act of Congress regulating the granting of immunity to witnesses. 8rc- 4. The select committee shall have au- thori,y to recommend theenactment of any now legislation or the amendment of any existing statute which it considers neces- sary or desirable to strengthen or clarify the national security, intelligence, or surveil- lance activities of the United States and to protect the rights of United States citizens with regard to those activities. Sac. 5. The select committee shall make a final report of the results of the investiga- tion and study conducted by it pursuant to this resolution, together with its findings and its recommendations as to new congres- sional legislation it deems necessary or de- sirable, to the Senate at the earliest practica- to establish a select committee of the- Senate to conduct an Investigation and study of governmental operations with respect to intelligence activities. Mr. MANSFIEL Mr. President, I wish to state, before proceeding with the dis- cussions and consideration of this resolu- tion, that insofar as the majority leader is concerned, the chairman of the Com- mittee on Armed Services, our colleague from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS) is owed a vote of thanks because throughout the years he has scrupulously endeavored, to the: best of his ability and in line with his other responsibilities, to scrutinize all activities of intelligence agencies related to the defense community. He need not yield to any Member of this body his stance as the preeminent "watchdog" of the Congress in performing this critical function t JOHN commensurate with the sensitivity of tae STENNIS. The Senate commends J OHN classified information to which such em- STENNIS for his assiduous and conscien- ployee or person will be given access by t'e tious work in this endeavor. select committee. - Mr. President, now that the select Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I m0 re committee has been approved by the Sen- to reconsider the vote by which the res, ate, the minority leader and I have di- lution was agreed to. rected a letter to the heads of agencies Mr. MANSFIELD. I move to lay that and, departments of Government most motion on the table. preeminently concerned with intelli- The motion to lay on the table w:is gence endeavors. The letter reads as agreed to. follows: SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE - CREDENTIALS The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under tl:e previous order, the Senate will now pr+-- ceed to the consideration of the moue n by the Senator from Montana (Mr. MANSFIELD) to refer all credentials and papers dealing with the New Hampshi: e election dispute to the Committee cu Rules and Administration, which tie clerk will state. The time on this deba is limited to 1 hour, to be equally d:- vided and controlled by the Senator irons Montana (Mr. MANSFIELD) and the Set. - ator from Michigan (Mr. GRzrFIN). The Senate will be in order. The clerk will state the motion. The legislative clerk read as follow.: U; the Senate such interim reports as it con- FIEL") moves that the credentials of Lou s }iders appropriate. After submission of its now Wyman and John A. Darken and all paper: linal report, the select committee shall have non file with the Senate relating to tl three calendar months to close its affairs, and same be referred to the Committee on Ruit on the expiration of such three calendar and Administration for recommendation 'nonths shall cease to exist. thereon. Sec. 6. The expenses of the select commit- Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I as): tree through September 1, 1975, under this unanimous consent that the pendlns resolution shall not exceed $750,000 of which business be laid aside temporarily, Sr amount not to exceed $100,000 shall be avail- that I may able for the procurement of the services of pcomplete roviding for the Swork on elect the vet Individual consultants or organizations tee, e, on whichich tfor Senate ate has just Such expenses shall be paid from the the has just ex - contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers pressed ed its approval. approved by the chairman of the select com- The PRESIDING OFFICER. Withou anlttee_ objection, it is so ordered. -iic. 7. The select committee shall institute Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, mar' and carry out such rules and procedures as we have order? t may deem necessary to prevent (1) the dis- The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- closure, outside the select committee, or any ator from Montana has the floor. May we nforination relation to the activities of the have order in the Senate? Central Intelligence Agency or any other department or agency of the Federal Govern- .cent engaged in intelligence activities, ob- tained by the select committee during the SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY course of its study and investigation, not GOVERNMENT INTELLIGENCE AC- authorized by the select committee to be TIVITIES disclosed; and (2) the disclosure, outside the select committee, of any information which The Senate continued with the con- would adversely affect the intelligence activi- sideration of the resolution (S. Res. 21) As you may be aware, the Senate is to con- duce; an Investigation and study of govern- ment operations with respect to intelligence activities. The scope of the Investigation is set out in S. Res. 21, a copy of which has been enclosed for your information. We are writing to request that you not destroy, remove from your possession or con- trol, or otherwise dispose or permit the dis- posal of any records or documents which might have a bearing on the subjects under investigation, including but not limited to all records or documents pertaining in any way to thematters set out in section 2 of S. Res, 21. Sincerely yours, This letter is being directed to heads of 19 separate governmental units as listed here: JANUARY 21, 1975. Honorable William E. Colby, Director, Cen- tral Intelligence Agency, and as Coordinator of Intelligence Activities, Washington, D.C. 20505. Lt. Gen. Daniel 0. Graham, Director, De- fense Intelligence Agency, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301. Honorable William B. Saxbe, Attorney General, Dept. of Justice, 9th and Constitu- tion N.W., Washington, D.C. 20530. Mr. John C. Keeney, Acting Asst. Attorney General, Criminal Div., 9th and Constitution N.W., Washington, D.C. 20530. Mr. John R. Bartels Jr., Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration, 1405 Eye S t. N. W., Washington, D.C. 20537. Honorable James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense, Room 3E 880, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301. Honorable Howard H. Callaway, Secretary of the Army. Room 3E '718, The Pentagon, Washington. D.C_20310. Hon. J. W. Middendorf, Secretary of the Navy, Room 4E 710, The Pentagon, Washing- ton, D.C. 20350. Hon. John L. McLucas, Secretary of the Air Force, Room 4E 871, The Pentagon, Wash- ir_gtbrt, D.C. 20330. Lt. Gen. Lew Allen Jr., Director, National Security Agency, Fort George G Meade, Maryland 20755. I add that the administration about the preservation of records, documents, Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP77MOO144R000500110105-2 S986 Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000500110105-2 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE January 21, 1975 therewith be paid out of the contingent fund of the House. Resolved, That the Clerk communicate these resolutions to the Senate and transmit a copy thereof to the family of the deceased. Resolved, That as a further mark of re- spect, the House do now adjourn. Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I have sent to the desk a resolution and ask for its immediate consideration. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ate will be in order. The Senator from Illinois has the floor. Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, a resolu- tion is at the desk, and I ask for its im- mediate consideration. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will state the resolution. The assistant legislative clerk read as follows: S. RES. 34 Resolved, That the Senate has heard with profound sorrow the announcement of the death of Honorable John C. Kluczynski, late a Representative from the State of Illinois. Resolved, That a committee of two Sen- ators be appointed by the Presiding Officer to join the committee appointed on the part of the House of Representatives to attend the funeral of the deceased Representative. Resolved, That the Secretary communicate these resolut as to the House of Represent- atives and t ismit an enrolled copy thereof to the famil )f the deceased. Resolved, hat when the Senate adjourns today, it ac.,ourn as a further mark of re- spect to the memory of the deceased Repre- sentative. Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, I have no objection, and I commend the Senator on his resolution. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ate will proceed to its immediate con- sideration. - The question is on agreeing to the res- olution. The resolution was agreed'to. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair appoints the Senators from Illinois (Mr. PERCY and Mr. St's;vENSON) as members of the committee required by the reso- lution. Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, with a strong sense of personal sorrow, I offer his resolution on behalf of myself and my distinguished colleague, Senator STEVENSON. We deeply regret the passing of our esteemed colleague, whose services to his country, to his `State, and to his community have been a matter of record for so many years. I yield to my distin- guished colleague. Mr. STEVENSON. Mr. President, I was much saddened to hear of Congress- man JOHN KLUCZYNSKI'S death earlier today. He has been a valued Member of the Congress of the United States and a good friend. I join with my distinguished col- league, Senator PERCY, in offering this resolution and our condolence to all members of the Kluczynski family. Mr. President, earlier today, Repre- sentative -JOHN C. KLUCZYNSKI, the dean of Chicago's congressional delegation, died. His passing is a great loss for the people of Illinois' Fifth Congressional District, the citizens of Chicago, of Il- linois, and the Nation. Congressman KLUCZYNSKI first en- tered the public service in an elective capacity in 1932 when he was elected to the Illinois House of Representatives. He served in that body for 16 years until 1948, when he ran successfully for the State senate. He resigned the State sen- ate just over a year later, in December 1949, to become a candidate for the U.S. Congress. He was elected to Congress in November of 1950, and he has been in Washington serving the people of his district ever since. Congressman KLUCZYNSKI was a Pol- ish-American of great distinction. He cut a colorful figure in local, State, and na- tional politics, but his work was the hard work of fostering the public interest. In the Congress he served on the House Public Works Committee and in recent years as chairman of the committee's Transportation Subcommittee's chair- man, Congressman KLUCZYNSKI played a large and active role in the forma- tion of our Nation's transportation pol- icy, and particularly in the building of our great Interstate Highway System. Congressman KLUCZYNSKI is to be buried Thursday in Chicago. My sym- pathies, and I am. sure those of every Senator, go out to his widow Estelle and the entire family. We shall all mourn the loss of Congressman JOHN KI,UCZYN- SKI. ORDER OF BUSINESS The :?RESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time-? Mr. MCCLELLAN. Mr. President, who has control of the time? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ators from Montana and Michigan. Mr, MAN,SF'IELI). Is time under con- trol? The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is 1 hour equally divided between the Senator from Montana and the Senator from Michigan. Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield as much time as the Senator wishes. CONTINUING AUTHORITY FOR THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS TO MAKE REPORTS DURING SES- SIONS OF THE SENATE Mr. M:CCLET.LAN. Mr. President, on behalf of myself and the senior Senator from North Dakota (Mr. YOUNG) I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Appropriations be, and it is hereby au- thorized during the 94th Congress, to re- port bills, including resolutions and joint resolutions, and to file reports during ad- journments or recesses of the Senate, on appropriation bills, including resolutions and joint resolutions, together with any accompanying notices of motions to sus- pend rule XVI pursuant to rule XL for the purpose of offering certain amend- ments to such bills or resolutions or joint resolutions, which ;proposed amendments shall be printed, Mr. President, this is the usual unani- mous-consent request agreed to at the beginning of each session of Congress, and I ask unanimous consent accordingly. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. RESOLUTION HONORING ROY WILKINS Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I send to the desk a resolution. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield as much time as the Senator wants. Mr. HUMPHREY. I thank the leader. I ask for its immediate consideration. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The resolution will be stated. The assistant legislative clerk read as follows: The Senator from Minnesota presents a resolution honoring Roy Wilkins on the oc- casion of his being named American of the Year by the American Religious Town Hall. Meeting. Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, Roy Wilkins, executive director of the NAACP, has been named "American of the Year" by the American Religious Town Hall Meeting. This is a conference of Roman Catholics, Protestants, and Jews, formed to promote tolerance and understanding among all peoples of every race and creed. They could not have chosen a bet- ter man to honor than Roy Wilkins. The Senate should take this opportunity to join in recognizing the great accom- plishments of this courageous American. Accordingly, I am today introducing, for myself and Senators BENTSEN, TOWER, MANSFIELD, HUGH SCOTT, ROBERT C.:BYRD, MONDALE, GRIFFIN, and GOLDWATER, a Senate resolution to honor the contribu- tions of this distinguished American citizen to the cause of human dignity and justice. We all know the depth of Roy Wilkins' commitment to justice, to equal oppor- tunity for all Americans, to making the democratic process work, and to what he has called "the most radical idea of the 20th century-abolition of racial segregation." We all know what a pro- found mark he- has made on the history of this country. Our paths have crossed a number of times over the years of struggle for civil rights and economic opportunity for black Americans. I worked closely with Roy on the Civil Rights Act of 1957, 1960, 1964, and 1965. As chairman of the Lead- ership Conference on Civil Rights, he served as representative and coordinator of all the civic, labor, and church organ- zations committed . - equal rights for all Americans. His en, gy, his -dedication, his pragmatism, his clear vision of what had to be done, and his realistic assess- ment of how reform could best be accom- plished, were invaluable in securing the passage of that legislation. I also have worked with Roy in th- effort to assure equal opportunity for black L.nericans and decent living conditions for those in the inner city. He has worked as hard and long to end economic discrimination as he has to end legal and political. dis- crimination. I am particularly proud that the State of Minnesota can claim Roy Wilkins as a son. He grew up in Minnesota. He grad- uated from the University of Minnesota. He began his career as a journalist and a powerful civil rights advocate in our Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP77MOO144R000500110105-2 Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000500110105-2 January 27, 1975 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE et cetera, applies as well to all agencies and subagencies concerned but not spe- cifically singled out. The task faced by the select commit- tee which the Senate has just established is to examine into the intelligence ac- tivities of the U.S. Government. No more important responsibility to the people of the Nation can be assumed by Senators than membership on this committee. What is asked of them, in the name of the Senate, is to probe fully and to as- sess completely, to understand thorough- ly and to evaluate judiciously. To the ex- tent that the intelligence agencies have acted correctly and within the law, that must be made known. If there have been abuses, they, too, must be set forth. There can be no whitewash in this inquiry; nor is there room for a vendetta. In the end, the Senate must know what has tran- spired so that it may seek to close legal loopholes if there are any. In the end, we must know so that together with the House and the President, we may move to foreclose any demeaning of the basic premises of a free society. What is at stake in the work of this committee is a resolution of doubts. What is at stake is a restoration of confidence in a large and costly and little known segment of the Federal Government. The Senate must be satisfied that the Intelli- gence community is doing the people's business, to the end that the Nation may be with assurance so advised. The Sen- ate must be persuaded that what is be- ing done in the name of security under a cloak of obscurity is the people's busi- ness, as defined, not by employees of a Government agency, but the people's business as defined by the Constitution and the laws duly enacted thereunder. The committee is called on, further- more, to elucidate for the Senate the relevance of the intelligence commu- nity as it now operates to the Nation's contemporary needs. We need to know what may be required, today, not what might have seemed necessary yesterday. The fact that a commission is looking into the CIA is all to the good; the re- sponsibility of that group is to the Presi- dent who created it. Its existence in no way relieves us of our responsibilities. It is appropriate and proper at any time that the Senate so determines, to inquire into any agency and, as necessary, to seek to clarify and redefine its functions and the scope of its activities. One aspect of the impending inquiry concerns covert activities. Thsee activ- ities have been acquiesced in, to say the least, by the Congress for a long time. No one should be surprised or appalled, therefore, to discover their existence a quarter of a century later. In recent years, however, the extent and necessity for them have come under question. Who sets the policy and why? What obtuse intrusions may there have been by these activities into the President's conduct of 'foreign affairs? What indifference, if any, to the laws passed by the Congress? What damage, if any, to the demeanor of the Nation? What interference in the personal lives of Americans and by whose authority and under what guidelines? What public funds have been committed and to what end? What proliferation of activities and how much overlap and duplication? It used to be fashionable, Mr. Presi- dent, for members of Congress to say that insofar as the intelligence agencies were concerned, the less they knew about such questions, the better. Well, in my judgment, it is about time that that at- titude went out of fashion. It is time for the Senate to take the trouble and, yes, the risks of knowing more rather than less. We have a duty, individually, and collectively, to know what legislation en- acted by Congress and paid for by ap- propriations of the people's money has spawned in practice in the name of the United States. The Congress needs to recognize, to accept and to discharge with care its coequal responsibility with the Presidency in these matters. The Senate has begun to address itself to these questions by approving the cre- ation of this select committee. There is a need to understand not only the pres- ent intelligence requirements of the United States but also what systems or procedures for oversight and account- ability may be required to keep them within bounds set by the Constitution, the President and the elected Repre- sentatives of the people in Congress. Wisely, I believe, a special committee for handling the investigation has been established by this action today. The scope of inquiry is far larger than can come within the purview of any single committee. Hopefully, within the select committee, the pieces-all of the pieces- can be fitted together. May I say that in- sofar as the Senate is concerned, I think this action expresses the expectation that the matter will be concentrated in this one committee. In my judgment, it would be most inappropriate for a bevy of studies of intelligence to proceed simultaneously in several others. May I say, Air. President, that this in no way conflicts with the legislative jurisdiction of the legislative committees so charged. The select committee is equipped with a bipartisan membership. The Senators who will be selected for service on this committee are no different than the rest of us. They are not tied with a blue rib- bon or a white or pink ribbon. There Is no higher or lower order of patriotism in the Senate. There are no first- and sec- ond-class Senators. Those who will serve are men of competence, understanding, and decency. They will do the job which the circumstances and the Senate re- quire of them. The committee has been equipped with full authority to study, to hold hearings and to investigate all activi- ties-foreign and domestic-of the intel- ligence agencies of the Federal Govern- ment. In the pursuit of that mandate, I have every confidence that the commit- tee will act with discretion, with re- straint and with a high sense of na- tional responsibility. There is no cause and inclination to pursue this matter as a. Roman circus or a TV spectacular. There is only the need to see to the sober discharge of very sober responsibilities. How the committee proceeds is largely up to the members of the committee. They have the authority to make their S985 rules and to define their procedures, and that would include the question of when to close or open the door to the use-of television. As I have indicated, I would not anticipate any great requirements for the latter at this time. Most emphat- ically, I would express the hope, too, that committee staff would be selected with as much concern for discretion as for other qualifications. What comes to the public from this committee and when, aught to be solely-I stress the word 'solely"-determined by the members of the committee. The Senate is entrusting this commit- tee with its deepest confidence. I know that that trust is secure and that the re- sults of the inquiry will reflect the high- est credit on this Institution. I submit to the Chair the names of those assigned to the Senate Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities and ask that they be read and I do so on behalf of the distinguished Republican leader and myself. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will read the nominations. The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:: Senators Church, Hart of Michigan, Mon- dale. Huddleston, Morgan, and Hart of Colorado. Mr. MANSFIELD. The Republicans also. The assistant legislative clerk read as follows : Senators Tower, Baker, Goldwater, Mathias, and Schweiker. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE- CREDENTIALS The Senate continued with the con- sideration of the credentials of the claim- ants to be U.S. Senator from the State of New Hampshire. The PRESIDING , OFFICER. Who yields time? Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, are we back on the regular order of business? The PRESIDING OFFICER. We are back on the Mansfield motion. The Senator from Illinois is recognized. RESOLUTION RELATIVE TO THE DEATH OF REPRESENTATIVE JOHN C. KLU'CZYNSKI, OF ILLI- NOIS Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I ask the Chair to lay before the Senate a message from the House on H.R. 97. The,PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will read the message from the House. The assistant legislative clerk read as follows: Resolved, That the House has heard with profound sorrow of the death of the Honor- able John C. Kluczynski. a Representative from the State of Illinois. Resolved, That a committee of 65 Members of the House. with such Members of the Sen- ate as may be joined, be appointed to attend the funeral. Resolved, That the Sergeant at Arms of the House be authorized and directed to take such steps as may be necessary for carrying out the provisions of these resolutions and that; the necessary expenses in connection Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP77MOO144R000500110105-2 Approved For Release 2004/10/12: CIA-RDP77M00144RO 500110105-2 January 27, 1975 . CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE least 5 years within the 8-year period ending on the date of the sale. Taxpayers meeting these two requirements may elect to exclude the entire gain from gross income' If the adjusted sales price of their reside, e is $20,000 or less. (This elec- tion can on , be made once during a tax- payer's life.t ie.) If the adjusted sales price exceeds $20 00, an election mr v be made to exclude p in of the gain baseu )n a ratio of $20,000 ov r theadjusted sales p:'ce of the residence. Fe rm 2119 (Sale or Ex.( ange of Personal F denee) is helpful it determin- ing who an eldea Additiu reporting residence after the residence the adji Addition struct on actil Puiblicat Your Ho Retire the retir be a U.f ceived e each of and (c) "retirem pensions included rents fro qualify f the retiremeht into credit. - The cr, t is 15% of the lessf f: 1. A t payer's qualifying irement in- come, or 2. $1,5: ($2,286 for a join .aturn where both taxi yers are 65 or older) minus the total of n ntaxable pensions (such as Social Security benefits or Railroad Retirement an- nuities) and earned income (depending upon the taxpayer's age and the amount of any earnings he may have). If the taxpayer is under 62, 5 ; must reduce the $1,524 figure by the amount of earned income in xcess of $900. For persons at least 62 years c but less than 72, this amount is reduced 1 one-half of the earned income in excess of 1,200 up to $1,700, plus the total amount ~ r $1,700. Persons 72 and over are not subj' . to the earned income limitation. Sched :e R is used for taxpayers who claim the reti oment income credit. The 'ternal Revenue Service will also was violated. Had the Genocide Conven- tion been in existence two decades ago those who perpetuated atrocities between 1933 and 1939 could have been brought to justice. This situation displays the same kind of inaction that was brought against those responsible for the Armenian mas- sacres even though Turkey and her Ger- man allies were defeated in World War I. There is evidence on the record that Hitler duly noted this fact when he pre- pared his program of exterminations. Documents introduced at the Nurem- berg trials contain the following state- ment made by Hitler in. August 1939 just before the invasion of Poland: What the weak western European civiliza. tion thinks about one does not matter. . I have sent to the East only my Death's head units with the order to kill without pity or mercy all men, women, and children of the Polish race and language. Only in such a way will we win the vital space we need. Who still talks nowadays of the extermina- tion of the Armenians? It is quite apparent from the previous statement that Hitler interpreted the world's Inaction on the Armenian mas- sacres as tacit consent to do as he pleased. Why should the world stop him when they have always failed in the past to show concern?? The Genocide Treaty is the document that displays the world's outrage and concern over acts of Genocide. Yet the United States has refused to sign this important document. In the interest of further international peace and safety, in the Elopes of eliminating all future crimes against humanity, I urge my cal- leagues to join me in support of the Genocide Convention accords. CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS The PRESIDING OFFICER.. The time for the conclusion of morning business having arrived, morning business is closed. S 967 Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield. Ivt'r. ? GRIFFIN. Mr. President, I ask that the time on this side be yielded to the control of the Senator from Texas (Mr. TOWER). The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk pro- ceeded to call the roll. Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Miss Pam Tur- ner, of my staff, have the privilege of the floor during the consideration of Sen- ate Resolution 21 and all amendments thereto. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. GARY W. HART). Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. TOWER. Mr. President,, I suggest the absence of a quorum.. The PRESIDING OFFICER. On whose time? Mr. TOWER. To be charged equally to both sides. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk pro- cceded to call the roll. Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, a parli- amentary inquiry. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator will state it. Mr. PASTORE. What is the pending business? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending business is Senate Resolution No. 21. Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President and col- leagues, I am not going to belabor this measure this morning by an extended explanation. As a matter of fact, I did explain it last week and I think that what we are trying to achieve is quite well understood by the Members of the Senate. I do not think we are going to have any difficulty with this resolution. As a mat- ter of fact, it is generally conceded, to be necessary, and I point up the fact that, by a vote of 45 to 7, it was approved by the Democratic Conference. As I understand it, the minority leader has stated today his selection of members of the select committee, so I construe from that that the other side is more or less amenable to-this resolu- tion. Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. PASTORE. Unless it was a gesture of futility. Mr. TOWER. It was acceptance of the inevitable, I think. Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I wish to make it abundantly clear at the out- set that the FBI, the CIA, and Military Intelligence are absolutely necessary to the security and the survival of this taxpayer he has requested that IRS com- pute his .x and he answers the questions for colug 3 A and B and completes lines 2 and 5 on hedule R-relating to the amount of his ' .,ial Security benefits Railroad Re- tireir c annuities, earnee income, and qual. ing retirement income nensions, an- nuiti( interest, dividends, an, rents). The taxpay should also write "RIC" on line 17, Form 40. NUREMBERG TRIALS ONLY REIN- FORCE NEED FOR THr ADOPTION OF THE GENOCIDE TR ATY Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. Pres. 'ent, one of the worst offenders of the crime of geno- cide before the action was outlawed by the United Nations was the Nazi's ex- termina , ion of 6 million Jews, 2 r/z.million Poles, hundreds of thousands of Czechs, Serbs, and Russians. When the Nuremberg trials convened it was decided that the Nazis could not be punished for acts of genocide com- mitted prior to 1939. The Nuremberg tribunal which tried war criminals for crimes against humanity refused to con- sider outrages occurring before the war on the grounds that no international law ain, if any, may be excluded by -axpayer when he sells his home. ly, a taxpayer may elect to defer gain on the sale of his personal within 1 year before or 1, year e he buys and occupies another .e cost of which equals or exceeds d sale price of the old residence. time is allowed if ;1) you con- new residence or (2) you were luty in the U.S. Armed Forces. 523 (Tax Information on Selling may also be helpful. ct income Credit.-To qualify for nit income credit, you must (a) Itizen or resident, (b) have re- ed income in excess of $600 in y 10 calendar ye: before' 1974, ave certain types ? qualifying income". Five type f income- anuities, interest, v dividends i line 15, Form 10, and gross SELECT . COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL INTELLIGENCE- GATHERING ACTIVITIES The PRESIDING OF'F'ICE].,. Under the previous order, the hour of 1 p.m. having arrived, the Senate will now proceed to the consideration of Senate Resolution 21, which will be stated by title. The assistant legislative clerk read as follows: A resolution (S. Res. 21) to establish a Select Committee of the Senate to conduct an investigation and study with respect to in- telligence activities carried out by or on be- half of the Federal Government. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time for debate on this resolution is limited to 2 hours, to be equally divided between and controlled by the majority and minority leaders or. their designees, with the vote to occur at 3 p.m. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I yield my time to the distinguished senior Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PAS- TORE). I suggest the absence of a quorum, with the time to be charged against both sides. Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP77MOO144R000500110105-2 Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000500110105-2 S 968 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD great Republic. Anyone who questions for a moment, anyone who should try or anyone who should even begin to imagine that the Senator from Rhode Island is trying to do anything to disrupt or to injure in any way these fine agencies, should immediately disabuse hiss mind of it. I have been connected for a long time with the workings of these agencies. I realize why they were instituted in the first place. We could not survive as a decent society without the FBI. We could never survive as a great nation in this troubled world, this sensitive world, with- out a CIA or military intelligence. So I wish to make it abundantly clear, Mr. President, that what we are trying to do is find out the abuses of the past and also of the present, to find out how it -dl started, how far it went, to remedy these abuses and make sure that in the future they will not happen; and in the final analysis, ultimately, that the confi- dence of the people wil be reaffirmed and strengthened in their appreciation and their consideration, as to the essen- tiality of these great arms of Govern- ment. Mr. President, having said that. I must in all fairness say that there have been some very serious abuses. I am not going to debate them this morning. As a matter of fact. our newspaper headlines have been replete with a dissertation of what they are. There have been charges and countercharges. There have been those vho have exaggerated some of the ,vrongs; there are those who have mini- _miiized some the wrongs. Because the su- ^ervision on the part of Congress is ,spread throughout several committees, each of which has jurisdiction in its own wvay---the Committee on Foreign Rela- -ions is absolutely interested in inteli- gence abroad; the Committee on the Armed Services is absolutely interested in military intelligence; the Joint Com- ,nittee on Atomic Energy is absolutely interested in where our nuclear weapons zre and now well they are being pro- tected and, vis-a-vis with our adver- saries, what they have and what we must have--there is no question at all about the essentiality. Th important thing here is to restore liublic confidence so that these agencies, in the final analysis, will be responsive. That is what this is all about. This is not to challenge the chairman of one committee or to challenge the chairman of another committee. We are not here to rebuke any Member of Congress for what supervision he gave or did not give. Thai; is not the question this morning. Whet we are trying to do here is create a select committee consisting of 1.1 mem- ber----6 from the majority, 5 from the minority. I know it is not going to be partisan. There is not a Member of the Senate who does not put his country before his party, or even. indeed, his own interest. If it were otherwise, that would be a blot on this great establishment. What do we do by this resolution? We create a committee of 11 members. The names have already been suggested by the minority leader of those on the part of the minority party. We know who -- SENATE January 27, 1 15 they are. I am sure they will all render fine service. We do not know yet who the members are on the majority side. I know I am not one of them; I do not want to be one of them. I made that pledge at the time that I introduced this resolution, that I was not doing it for any selfish reason; I was doing it because I thought it. needed to be done. Mr. President, having said thal.. I have nothing further. I am perfectly willing to answer any questions. It is a vc :''y sim- ple resolution. It is all speller.. out. I understand there are going to be two amendments. I am amenable ,o both amendments, with the exception that on the Tower amendment, I hope we can clarify one statement at the end where: it saris: The type of security clearance I -, be re- quired In the case of any such em s[oyee or person shall be commensurate with tiie senst-, tivity of the classified Information -o which such employee or person will be giv'n access by the select committee. I think we ought to nail that ;;own to be within the determination of tae com- mittee itself. I should like to add some language in there, in the last sentence: "within the determination made by the committee: itself." Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I wonder if I might visit with the distinguished Senator from Rhode Island. Mr. PASTORE. When the pro ,er time comes. I do not think we are t.o much in disagreement. I repeat wha I said last week when I was questione I by the distinguished Senator from Mi :dssippi, the chairman of the Comm ;,lee oil Armed Services: The jurisdiction of each committee as it now stands will continue-. There is nothing in this resolul ion that changes that one iota. I suppose that the authorization bills, when they come up, will be referred to the Comas tttee on Armed Services, there is no quest m at all about that. I suppose before dec ding the authorization the chairman will conduct some kind of hearings, not coir.petitive to the select committee; it could! be con- sonant with it, I am not opposed' to that. As a matter of fact, let us face it: We are all here trying to do the rig .t thing. Let us do it. That is about the : ize of it. Now, Mr. President, I have: here a statement by Senator HTTDDLESJON who asked me to have it inserted! in the R.Eroan, and I ask unanimous consent that that be done. The PRESIDIN.x OFFICER. Without obje~_tion, it is so ordered. SSTLT MENT B. SmATOS HUDBLF::tON I am pleased to support Senate IResolutio:n 21, which would establish a select committee on intelligence activities. I believe the creation of such a c - mrnittee is essential at this time. I believe the committee as proposed in the resolution before us will meet the needs of the Senate and our Nation in term, of struc- ture, representation and mandate, A 2ommittee such as we are abc.at to cre- ate roust touch upon the various a es, views, geographical areas and philosoph es which are a part of the Senate and our l.stion-at- large. To structure it otherwise would diminish not only the acceptance of any findings and recommendations but also the possibility of reconciling contrasting views and theories which must be accommodated. Ultimately, the report of this select com- mittee must be widely accepted by many elements of the American people. Otherwise, efforts to correct past improprieties and re- store confidence in our government's ability to conduct in an appropriate manner the very sensitive and important intelligence function, will falter. To fail to create a broadly based commi ttee would in the end be a disservice to ourselves, the Senate, our country and the American people. Testimony already taken in the Congress strongly indicates that there have been abuses and misuses of authority within the Central Intelligence Agency. Allegations of other improprieties remain unanswered. A virtual floodgate of questions and charges has been opened, engulfing our intelligence community in suspicion and uncertainty. While some of this may have been more sen- sation than substance, the facts remain that both damaging testimony and allegations of serious misconduct are before us and. that they have not been rebutted to the satisfac- tion of most members of Congress or of the American people. The floodgate cannot and should not be closed; the questions raised must be an- swered; the faith of the people in this most sensitive area of their government must be restored. If an agency has' overstepped its author- ity, if it has violated the rights of citizens whom it is supposed to serve, if it has been involved in illegal activities, if it has been utilized in derogation of its public trust, then these matters must be fully investi- gated. Corrective steps must be taken. There was an earlier time in this Nation when the agencies in question-born in a turbulent area of violentcrime half it cen- tury ago, or in the aftermath of war 25 years later-enjoyed a very different image. they were looked upon as guardians of the Nation and protectors of law-abiding citizens. But, like so many of this country's institutions in recent years, they have fallen in esteem. The intelligence community has lost its glitter. The FBI hero of the 1930's has been replaced in the public eye by a much more dui-ious character. 'thus, the need for a full investigation of the tide of current charges goes beyond the obvious requirements of discipline within the government: it goes to a restoration of confidence in a segment of government that, more than any other, must hold the pub- lic's confidence. No nation can gamble with its security. Indeed, the guarantee of that security is perhaps the most fundamental of all govern- mental responsibilities. Without it, all else can quickly fade. National security arrangements, defense and foreign policy strategies, and dec;aions regarding a host of other issues rely upon intelligence. In fact, there are few who would argue that we could.do without intelligence gathering activities-especially in wha': ap- pears to be an increasingly complex and uncertain world. Furthermore, the very nature of sins.: ac- tivities requires that they be closely held and carried out with a certain degas -e of secretiveness and confidentialit v. But, the agencies involved in such c.ctiv- ities, like Caesar's wife, must be above re- proach-not just because of their special status and charge but also because actions which involve them in suspicion and ques- tion tend to impair if not destroy their abil- ity to function. There are those in this body who have fol- lowed closely the activities of the CIA and other agencies with intelligence respon:;ibil- Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP77MOO144R000500110105-2 Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000500110105-2 January 27, 1975 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE ities-the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Federal Bu- reau of Investigation, and the Secret Service, For that reason, we should certainly make the best -use of these persons; we should build upon their knowledge and experience. At the same time, I believe we could bene- fit from new and fresh perspectives which could bring to such review an inquiring ap- proach which might not only develop new ideas but also do much to insure a positive public response to the ultimate findings and recommendations. I do, consequently, support establish- ment of a special committee to- review in- telligence operations in this country. I also think, however, that our intent and deter- mination to insure a broadly representative committee must be made clear. To accommodate the representation of the various views, I proposed in the Democratic Conference that we consider an 11-member body, rather than a smaller one. While this is an admittedly rather large committee, in this particular case, I believe that it is re- quired. Many Committees have some juris- dictional claim over Intelligence activities. Interest and concern over this matter goes far beyond the jurisdictional bounds of com- mittees, encompassing, I would imagine, every member of the Senate, Views on the subject vary widely. Furthermore, I believe that the special committee must have broad authority, as the resolution contains. It must be em- powered not only to investigate possible il- legal activities and abuses In the intelli- gence community, but also to review the mandates of the agencies concerned; to study the role of_ intelligence in today's world and to make recommendations regarding the type of structure which can best meet the intel- ligence objectives which are deemed neces- sary and proper. Some may perceive the proposal before us as fraught with implications of sensational- ism and headline hunting-an approach which we clearly cannot.aford and which we would be irresponsible to permit. Our de- termination on that point, too, should be made clear. But in this year-so soon after Watergate-we cannot leave in doubt the operations and activities of agencies Involved in such sensitive and significant endeavors. We must instead place our important intel- ligence-gathering activities on a sound and viable basis. In this case, skeletons in the closet are likely to haunt us not only at home but also abroad, not only bn security issues but also in domestic politics. They must be laid to rest. - The alternative is to let matters ride, to permit a series of well-intentioned but over- lapping investigations proceed, to divide ef- forts at a time when prompt and comprehen- sive action is needed. Thus, the preferable course, it seems to me is the creation of a special committee (1) broadly representative of the various Con- gressional concerns on intelligence (2) dedi- cated to a thorough investigation of ques- tioned activities and current intelligence op- erations and a reexamination of the role of intelligence operations in our society, and (3) charged with the responsibility of making recommendations to the Senate as expediti- ously as possible regarding both necessary corrective actions and the future structure, authority and relationships within the in- telligence community. I believe Senate Resolution 21 will accom- plish this and that adoption of it would be a right move in the right direction. Mr. PASTORE. I now yield to my dis- tinguished colleagues from California. Mr. CRANSTON. I thank the Senator very much for yielding. I want first to thank the Senator from Rhode Island for his magnificent lead- ership in this matter. Without his help we would not have accomplished as much as we have so swiftly in this very impor- tant matter. The efforts of the Senator from Rhode Island have manifested a quality of greatness. I also want to thank the major leader (Mr. MANSFIELD), Senator MATHIAS on the minority side, Senator BAKER, Sen- ator WEICKER, and. others who did so much of the vitally important spade work which has brought us to this point. I have been involved in this matter since 1971, when I questioned Senator Ellend er, the ,hen chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, on the Senate floor about expenditures for in- telligence operations. I joined in earlier resolutions prior to the time that I helped in the support that has been brought to- gether behind the Pastore resolution. I agree, of course, with the Senator from :Rhode Island that we need an of-. festive intelligence operation, we heed it operating under clear and wise ground rules and under firm control by the Ex- ecutive and Congress. I have been crit- ical of the CIA and other intelligence agencies for n any of the things they have done that they should not have done. There have been serious abuses. But there also have been great accom- plishments. There have been deeds done by courageous and dedicated men and women, many of whom have risked their lives, and some of whom have lost their lives, in service of their country. I would just make these points for the legislative history and for consideration by the committee that will be carrying on this activity: First. If anyone needs reminding, there have been a series of revelations over the past decade and a half that point not only to the Internal shortcomings of intelligence agencies in carrying out their assigned tasks, not only the lack of co- ordination between their operatiols and national policy as declared by the Pres- ident and Congress, not only to the fail- ure of these agencies to- communicate with one another and with the President and the standing: committees of Can- gress-but, also, and more alarming-to their power to subvert the Constitution and threaten freedom here at home while damaging-in the majority leader's words-"the good name of the United States" abroad. Further, It must be admitted, their power was often misused at the direction of higher authority in the executive branch-or with the acquiescence of higher authorities--and with a knowing wink or willful ignorance on the part of many members of Congress. Second. But the problem goes beyond the CIA, the FBI, and other intelligence agencies. It goes beyond foreign relations. It goes beyond civil liberties at home. Here the great issues of national sec- urity and individual liberty are Inex- tricably linked. We have to get some perspective on ourselves, on our origins, on our immediate past, and on our fu- ture-as we proceed from the aftermath of the Cold War to what appears to be an era of interdependence in a multipo- lar world. The fundamental problem-as we ap- proach the bicentennial-is to restore constitutional government in the United States. There has to be accountability and responsibility. The intelligence agen- cies must be adapted to the needs of a constitutional democracy in our time- or they must be eliminated. We cannot eliminate them so we have to do what is necessary to keep them under control. That is a job for Con- gress. - Third. Therefore, as the Senate pro- ceeds to establish the select committee, it is important to identify three impor- tant missions of this committee: First of all, it Is charged with finding the facts in cases of alleged wrongdoing, Thus, the Pastore resolution empowers the select committee to "conduct an in- vestigation ... of the extent, if any, to which illegal, improper, or unethical ac- tivities" have been engaged in by the intelligence agencies of the U.S. Govern- ment. This will involve identifying in- dividuals responsible for such activities, as well as their respective institutions and I cite paragraphs-1, 2, 3, 10 of sec- tion 2. Second, the select committee Is charged with going one step further. It is to consider the institutional changes needed in the organization of the execu- tive branch and changes needed in con- gressional oversight mechanisms as well-so that these abuses of power can- not occur again I cite section 2, para- graphs 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and especially 11, 12, and 13, of Senate Resolution 21. Finally, the select committee is di- rected to make a complete investigation and study of the extent and necessity of overt and covert intelligence activities in the United States and abroad. I cite section 2 of paragraph 14. Fourth. It will be difficult for the select committee to carry out these mis- sions-no matter how sweeping the man- date entrusted to it, no matter how great its delegated powers, and no matter how much access to secret documents and processes is guaranteed in the words of the Pastore resolution. - Just how does it investigate matters that, in their essence, depend on not being seen? How will the select commit- tee know when it is not getting what it needs to know to get at the full facts? These questions are without easy answers, . Section 3(a), paragraph 11 of Senate Resolution 21 is of great importance. It grants the members and staff of the select committee "direct access" to any data, evidence, information, report, analysis or documents or papers" rela- ting to the investiagtion in the possession, of the intelligence agencies. - Despite this clause, it can be predicted that this information-in some in- stances-will be given up with great reluctance and, indeed, some of it already may have been destroyed. Further, there will be a tendency for personnel of the intelligence agencies to use the classification system.as a means of avoiding full testimony before the se- lect committee. That is, they may "tell the truth" or provide the facts at the "top secret" or "secret" level, but not include information available on a given subject at a higher level of classification. Or they may cite law and executive or- ders and precedents and "executive priv- Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP77MOO144R000500110105-2 Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000500110105-2 _) 970 CONGRESSIONAL, RECORD- SENATE /anuai y 27, 1975 .iege" -,ts shields of justification for not cuing all they know--even though they ;.re under oath. Fifth. This problem could be greatly .9leviated if the Senate through its select :;cxwrrnit .ee was guaranteed the full and active support of the Ford administra- te ion in this inquiry. As Walter Pincus ,;ointed out in Sunday's Washington %'ost, such an investigation must inevita- I.ly end up questioning the, past policies :~,nd practices of Presidents and their , taif. Perhaos a confrontation with the White House and the bureaucracy is in- evitable as the investigation proceeds. a rom the start, there are some powerful incentives for a cover up. The Senate should understand this reality now. Already we see a former Director of Cie CIA, Mr. Helms pointing the finger oi` responsibility at one dead President .raid at another who is incapacitated- artd who, so far, has managed to avoid coming into court or before a congres- sianal committee. This same man is known to have destroyed documents bearing on his tenure asDirector of the C?A. Further, the present Director of the CIA in his recent report apparently pointed to his predecessor and previous aoministra,tions as being responsible for acts of wrongdoing. The Senate should be reminded that this same man had spent his entire career on the operations side of CIA before he became executive director and later director. Mr. Colby at one time directed the controversial and perhaps dubious Phoenix program in Vietnam, and at one time he was deputy director for operations, DDO, in the CIA-with, responsibility for counterin- telLigence and domestic operations among others. 7,-'his investigation cannot succeed without determining the individuals re- sponsible for illegal and improper acts- be they in the Oval Office, the National Security Council-and the 40 Committee within it--the President's Foreign Intel- ligence Advisory Board, the U.S. Intelli- gence Board, or in the individual agen- cies. A number of the persons involved in past actions still serve in high positions in I;he Government. :_7o while the select committees' inves- tigation must not degenerate into a witch hunt, it cannot be a picnic, either. For here are bound to be a lot of skeletons in a lot of closets. Individuals and agen- cies involved in wrongdoing or ques- tionable practices must be identified. Or else the American people will be ill served by another coverup. Some have stated that this investiga- tion. must not be a "TV spectacular." But it must not be conducted behind closed doors, either. "Protecting the national security" arguments must not stand in the way of the American people's full understanding of this problem, and they must, not stand in the way of publicly assigning responsibility for past actions. Again, the fundamental issue is account- ability and responsibility under a consti- tutional system of government. There Is no good reason why questions of policy in the intelligence community cannot be discussed in open hearings, and all facts bared-except for the most sen- sitive-that bear upon the matter : and questions posed in Senate Resoluti n 21. In this regard, any classification --de- claffisification system employed sho-.ld'>e devised by the select committee- a c^- operation with the executive bran_h, if possible. After all, one of the issi^:es at stake is secrecy itself. The emi-basis throughout should be on sharin . the maximum amount of infovmatiou with the public. Seventh. In conclusion, several ele- ments are required for a successfi:l in- vestigation and study: A continuati->n of aggressive investigative reporting o : the part of the press, and I know thal will occur; a select committee with mersibeis and staff interested in getting al the facts and sharing them with the Aiieri- can people to the extent possible; the full cooperation of the executive agen- cies involved; sources and witnesses who are assured of proper protection along the way. Again I thank the Senator .rom Rhode Island, the majority leader, and the many others for the magnificent work that has brought us to this point on this day. Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I ield myself such time as I may require. Mr. President, I will be very candid with the Senate. It was my original i:eel- ing that this matter should have been contained within the Committee on Armed Services which does have o,,er- sight jurisdiction over the CIA. Bu'. in the spirit. that this resolution has Leen offered by the distinguished Senator from Rhode Island, I am certainly pre- pared to accept it, because I think that the Senator from Rhode Island has set the right tone for the conduct of this in- vestigation and the subsequent cone fu- sions to be drawn from it. I think that some examination of the domestic activities of our intelliger. 'e- gathering organizations should be in- vestigated and I think perhaps such an investigation is overdue. I think it is essential that agencies _n- volved in this kind of work be proscribed from activities that either violate their charter, their congressional authori.'a- tions, or militate against the individ tal freedom of the American people. I think, to that end, this is the in st important thing that our committee can do or that the select committee when it is chosen can do. It is my view that we can develop co,i- structive legislation that affords su?h proscriptions and such protections. I would express the hope that has alrea iy been expressed by the distinguished Se:- ator from Rhode Island that we can co duct our work in a responsible way, as to preserve the confidentiality of ma- ters that impact on the national securi :y of the United States of America. We must recognize that our adve- saries and our potential adversaries ha, e had a sophisticated intelligence-gathe:?- ing organization, that they have an ac- vantage over us in that they operate iri this country in a free society, and in mc. t respects in our operations abroad we of - crate in closed societies, making tlh,~ gathering of significant intelligence much more difficult proposition. I think we do have to afford adequat safeguards for our legitimate operations abroad. I am hopeful that we can observe the need to conduct many of our delibeaia- tions in private. I think that although the objective set forth by the distin- guished Senator from California is de- sirable, that as much as possible they be open to the public, there are going to be times, I think, when we can elicit more infor.w ;ticrn and more significant and more penetrating and In-depth infor- mation, if we go into executive session. So I think that what we must do is have a balanced approach here, recognize that we have to correct abuses, recognize that we must compel our intelligence- gathering operations to conduct them- selves within the purview of the law that authorizes them, and at the same time recognize the vital interest of the United States from the geographic, strategic, po- litical, tactical, economic situation that we find ourselves in and make sure we do not hobble ourselves and render our- selves at such a disadvantage that we cannot maintain the kind of internation- al posture we need. I might mention one other thing, Mr President, and that is not only the neces- sity to protect some of our agents or some of our covert operations abroad, but also the confidence placed In us by foreign governments. We must, I think, be care- ful not to embarrass foreign govern- ments, not just friendly governments, but perhaps some mutual governments and some that may not appear to be so friendly that may have supplied us some cooperation; and I would hope we would take care not to embarrass governments of these countries. With the proper care, I think it is per-- feetly correct that we embark on this course today. I am delighted to yield to the Senator from California. Mr. CRANSTON. I thank the Senator for yielding. On one point he mentioned,. I recog- nize that there will have to be closed door sessions, first, in order to get such information, that would not otherwise be made available, and that the committee will need. I recognize the reason for his amendment. I think it is quite appro- priate. I would like to ask one question and make one point about it. First, I think, as I said in my earlier remarks just now, that the committee must control the classification and de- classification :process; hopefully in coor- dination and cooperation with the ad- ministration, but It cannot get itself into a situation where it is unable to do cer- tain work that it feel:; it must do. in regard to the specific amendment that the Senator has offered, under his amendment how do we prevent the exec- utive from abusing this authority? For example, suppose they did not ;cooperate--- Mr. TOWER. If the Senator from Cali- fornia will withhold an his question, I was going to engage in colloquy with the Senator from Rhode Island on this mat- ter. Mr. CRANSTON. Fine. Mr. TOWER. And we will bring all this out. S972 Approved For Release 2004/10/12: CIA-RDP77M00144R000500110105-2 CONGRESSIONAL :RECORD -? SENATE January 2.7, 197-5 Paragraph 2 concerns me. It says: And, number 2, disclosure outside the committee of any information which ad- versely affects the intelligence activities of the United States. It would appear on its surface to say that if we stumbled into a matter such as the Chilean situation, the Bay of Pigs, or the. Lebanon incursion, notwithstand- ing that it might appear to the Commit- tee to be something that ought to be dealt with in the. Congress, we should not disclose it. Will the Senator from Mississippi re- assure me that that is not the purpose of paragraph 2? Mr. STENNIS. No. that is not the pur- pose of paragraph No. 2. We tried to wrap it up in such a way as require rules of procedure In the committee which I understand to be the feeling of the Senator from Tennessee. Mr. BAKER. If there appears to be conduct by any agency of the U.S. Gov- ernment that appears to be improper or exceeds its jurisdiction, that would not be limited by paragraph 2 of this amendment? Mr. STENNIS. This does not put a limitation on the committee. It requires the committee to proceed under rules, regulations, and procedures. But these things are still left in the hands of the /committee. Mr. BAKER. I thank the Senator. Mr. STENNIS. It is a rule of the Sen- ate by a guideline. Mr. PASTORE. With the modifica. tion, I am willing to accept the amend- ment. Mr. STENNIS. If no one else wants the floor, can we have a vote on the amend- ment? Will the Chair put the question? The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Mississippi modify his amendment? Mr. STENNIS. Yes; by striking out the word "specifically" in the sixth line from the bottom. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques- tion is on agreeing to the amendment as modified. Mr. CURTIS. Reserving the right to object and I, of course, will not object. I would like to ask a question. Is there any penalty or enforcement means to compel staff members of this committee to not disclose information that their committee directs should not be disclosed? Mr. STENNIS. It is a sad state of the law, Mr. President, but I am quite doubt- ful that we have a law that really is drawn o cover situations of this kind. We have the old Espionage Act of 1918, which specifically requires there must be an Intent to do harm to the United States. It is a kind of wide-open proposi- tion which is, in itself, a very strong argument here for the adoption of this amendment. It puts in some kind of an obstacle. A staff member, if he violated the rule, would violate' a Senate rule. It would not have any criminal penalty at- tached to it, but it would be a rule to that extent. I hope the committee will get a prom- ise in advance that. no one is going to write a book-that no staff member is going to write a book, or a journal arti- cle, or anything else---about things that were disclosed to them in these proceed- ings. I think that is a matter we have to trust to the discretion of the commit- tee. Under present law we have to. I be- lieve the Senator raised a good point. Mr. CURTIS. I certainly am for the amendment of the distinguished Senator, but I believe we have to rethink our posi- tion on some of these things. Here in this country if someone discloses a tax return, he has violated a criminal law and can be punished. If he discloses secrets vital to the security of the United States, he is apt to defend it as the right of the people to know. We have, certainly, a right to not only snake it a law violation to dis- close, but there ought to be a penalty to it. I thank the Senator. Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator. If there, is no further discussion, could we have a vote on the amendment? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques- tion is on agreeing to the amendment, as modified, of the Senator from Mississippi. The amendment, as modified, was agreed to, Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to yield 3 minutes to the Senator from North Dakota without losing my right, to the floor. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. YOUNG, Mr. President, I see no objection to a thorough examination of the operations of the CIA, the FBI, or any other intelligence-gathering agency, but I believe At can, only be done effectively, and without great irrj my to the agencies, by a relatively small committee and a small staff. A big investigating committee with a sizable staff--ono matter how well intentioned--cannot avoid much of the information that develops at the hearings being leaked to the public, thereby be- coming easily available to the intelligence agencies of Russia and every country in the world, If the pending resolution involved a much smaller committee with only a very minimal staff, I believe the security of this Nation could be safeguarded and the investigation could be very helpful. I would hope that the meetings of the com- mittee would be open to the public. If this were the procedure, then the public would get firsthand information rather than from leaks highly distorting the facts dis- closed in the hearings. Mr. President, I cannot help but be deeply concerned about the future effec- tiveness of the Central Intelligence Agen- cy. No intelligence operation-particul- larly involving clandestine operations in foreign countries or involving some of our most advanced technology, especially in defense areas-can be publicly dis- closed without endangering our sources of information, the lives of those involved in this type of intelligence operations, and the very effectiveness of an intelli- gence-gathering organization. Russian intelligence agents, for example, would only have to read our publications to obtain information highly valuable to them. About 12 years ago when we had the missile crisis In Cuba a Russian intel- ligence agent, a high-ranking member of the GRU, disclosed to Great Britain and the United States a great deal of inside information regarding how far Russia would go in this missile crisis. He also provided us with much other information regarding the entire operations of the GRU and KGB-their two major intel- ligence-gathering agencies. A book was published regarding the Penkovsky pa- pers and Information which has been in circulation for several years. The point I am trying to make, Mr. President, is that Penkovsky expected to be caught and was caught. There was a 2 day trial and he was killed. Here in. the United States there is not much of a pen- alty for even the highest ranking intel- ligence officer, a Member of Congress, or anyone else for disclosing our most highly classified intelligence. - Mr. President, the Washington Star- News of Sunday, January 26, 1975, pub- lished a very good editorial on the sub- ject of intelligence and the forthcoming investigations entitled "The Great Intel- ligence Exam." I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: THE GREAT INTELLIGENCE EXAM This is the era of bosom-baring and the country's numerous intelligence-gathering organizations are not immune. As things stand now, various committees of the House and Senate are gearing up for investigations of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Fed- eral Bureau of Investigation, the Defense In- telligence Agency and the National Security Agency. We hope that these investigations will be boiled down to, at most, one select committee in the House and Senate. We also hope that the investigations will be skepti- cal, thorough and responsible. A witch-hunt born of the peculiar sensitivities left over from Watergate would not be helpful. A careful analysis of this country's intelligence problems and legislation to remedy the mis- takes and deficiencies of the past are very surely in order. A bipartisan congressional Investigation is especially desirable in view of the conservative complexion of the blue- ribbon executive panel headed by Vice Presi- dent Rockefeller which is also looking into CIA activities. The difficulty, of course, is that, when it comes to intelligence-gathering operations, bosom-baring is a tricky procedure. The risk is that too much public exposure of a highly sensitive area of government will put the whole operation out of business, and imperil the reputations--and even the lives-of peo- ple involved, to say nothing of the nation's security. In the past, the congressional com- mittees with intelligence oversight responsi- bilities have been squeamish about inquiring too deeply into these clandestine affairs. The present danger is that post-Watergate zeal- otry, inspired by news stories of a "massive, illegal domestic intelligence operation" mounted by the CIA a few years back, will lead to excesses of revelation. For our part, we remain unconvinced that the charges have much real foundation. From what has been revealed so far-mostly - by CIA Director William E. Colby to a House Appropriations subcommittee-it appears that the agency was involved in a program of internal surveillance of certain domestic dis- sident groups suspected of having connec- tions with foreign agents. CIA agents were "inserted" in some of these organizations, some mail between American citizens and Communist correspondents was read, and files-largely furnished by the FBI-were established on some 10,000 people. In addi- tion, Colby said, the program involved physi- Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP77MOO144R000500110105-2 Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000500110105-2 January 27, 1975 CONGRESSIONAL, RECORD -SENATE Mr. CRANSTON- Fine. Mr. TOWER. So that we will make it clear what everyone means and intends; but I think the distinguished Senator from Mississippi has been seeking the floor and has been very patient, so I would like to yield to him, and then we ;a; ill take this matter up subsequently. Mr. CRANSTON. Certainly. I thank (,he Senator. Mr. TOWER. I yield to the Senator from Mississippi such time as the Sena- tor requires. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Texas. At this point, at least, I certainly will not require over 20 minutes, so we can just limit it to that. Mr. President, after a conference with the Senator from Rhode Island and the Senator from Texas, I send to the desk an amendment to the proposed resolu- tion and ask that it be considered now. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated. The assistant legislative clerk read as follows : The Senator from Mississippi proposes an amendment, at the end of the resolution, to told a new section as follows- Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with. Mr. MANSFIELD. Why not let him read it? Mr. STENNIS. All right, I withdraw that. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will read it in full. The assistant legislative clerk read as follows: At the end of the resolution add a new section as follows: Sec. The select committee shall insti- tute and carry out such rules and procedures as it may deem necessary to prevent (1) the disclosure, outside the select committee, of any information relating to the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other department or agency of the Federal Government engaged In intelligence activi- ties, obtained by the select committee dur- ing the course of its study and investiga- tion, not specifically authorized by the se- lect committee to be disclosed, and (2) the disclosure, outside the select committee, of any information which would adversely af- fect the intelligence activities of the Central Intelligence Agency In foreign countries or the intelligence activities in foreign countries of any other department or agency of the Federal Government. Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? has control of the time. Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I ask the Senator from Mississippi if he will yield for a question on his amendment. Mr.. STENNIS. All right, and then I will yield 3 minutes to the Senator from North Dakota out of my time. I yield for a question. Mr. :BASER. This is a question of clarification. This amendment, of course, is an antileak amendment. I think that is fine. I hope we succeed. We failed miserably in the Watergate Committee. Our former colleague and I tried in every way we could. It did not work. There are some matters of sensitivity that have not been leaked, but are still In the Atomic Energy Committee, many of them. In safe storage. S 971 covered'. in any way very plainly, that there was no prohibition on it. I do not think this puts too much of a burden. The Senator is opening up all of these files. Mr. PASTORE. No. Mr. STENNIS. The resolution does. I do not mean the amendment does but the resolution opens up the files. We just have to have a safeguard. Mr. PASTORE. I do not think we are meeting on our intent here. I am not op- posed to the Senator's suggestion that the matter of leaks should be prevented, and that the staff should, not disclose anything without authorization by the committee. The only thing that bothers me is that he is tightening up the obli- gation and responsibility of the commit- tee a little bit too much by using the word ";specifically." If he left the word "specifically" out, I think he would ac- complish his purpose and not open it up to debate every time there is the question of disclosure. Mr. STENNIS. The main point here is to have something explicit in writing by the committee as to rules and proce- dures. When we nail that down explic- itly, how it should be done, then we cover the waterfront. We can strike out the word "specif- ically." Mr. PASTORE. Will the Senator strike it out? Mr. STENNIS. Yes. Mr. PASTORE. If he strikes it out, I would accept the amendment. Mr. STENNIS. With the understand- ing that this still carries with it- out by the committee itself or its mem- bers. It just requires that such reason- able rules and regulations as the com- mittee may see fit be established by the committee regarding disclosures of in- formation that might, in the second part, affect intelligence abroad. But going back to the first one for just a moment, this relates to disclosures by those other than the committee, staff members or anyone else that might come in contact with this information. In other words, the committee itself is called on by the Senate to make these rules and regulations. Now, with reference to foreign intel- ligence or intelligence activities abroad- and that is what my plea is for here to- day, the protection of this foreign in- telligence-there we are trusting the committee to write rules and procedures to set out for themselves and staff mem- bers regarding this foreign intelligence. Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield briefly for a question? Mr. STENNIS. I am responding to a question of the Senator from Rhode Is- land. Will the Senator restate his question with respect to paragraph 2? Mr. PASTORE. I was wondering if the word "specifically" was not rather redun- dant. If it just said "not authorized by select committee," that would not lead to any controversial confusion. Naturally, the authorization would have to be explicit. The word "specifical- ly" for the time being, without knowing within what context it was inserted in anent, unless it is more explicitly ex- Mr. PASTORE. With the understand- plained. I thought if we just said "not '-ng that the committee and only the authorized by the Select Committee" it committee has the authority to disclose. would be enough. I will admit that. In other words, I do not want the com- = Mr. STENNIS. It is better to be care- mittee to sit down and begin to write a iul here than to be sorry later. This is bill of. particulars every time they are not directed at the committee. going to authorize some disclosure. Mr. PASTORE. I know that. Mr. STENNIS. What line is the Senator Mr. STENNIS. This is putting the referring to? I see-it. That is before the Senate in a proper position. I think it second paragraph. will help the committee to have the Seri- That relates to staff members. ate go on record here in making this one Mr. PASTORE. I know that. This whole of the gground rules, so to speak. amendment relates to staff members. i Mr. PASTORE. Is the Senator willing quite agree with the Senator from Mis- to delete the word "specifically." sissippi. I hope that the staff does not Mr. STENNIS. Yes. begin to hold news conferences. That al- Mr. PASTORE. With the modification. ways happens. They just take this whole I will accept the amendment. thing over. I think if there are going to r Mr. YOUNG. Will the Senator yield minutes? I support the amendment. 3 be any news conferences, they should be t by the chairman or the members of the Mr. STENNIS. I do not have control committee themselves. But in the past we of the time. The Senator from Texas Mr. S"TENNIS. Yes, I am glad to yield I Have 11au .-V 0011VW1 LLl J1ULLQ+UI- U11RU to the Senator from Rhode Island. I want staff members fall over one another to to state very briefly what the purpose is, see who can tell it to the press first. I think everything should be told to the but I. yield ld now now. . .For the purposes of the press that needs to be told to the public. RzcoRn, would the Senator in explain- I think the public understands that. ing his amendment, which I am going ? Mr; STENNIS. This is not to prohibit specifically authorized"? Mr. STENNIS. Yes. That is on the second part, is it not? Mr. PASTURE. Yes. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, this amendment relates to what we ordinarily call "leaks." It does not put any limita- tion on the committee whatsoever. The first part relates to matters that are not expressly authorized or given wondering if the word "specifically" is not a little too tight for the committee. If we said "not authorized by the com- mittee," I think we accomplish the objective. Mr. STENNIS. What we were trying to get at was to cover the situation where a staff member or some other person had this information and, since it was not Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP77MOO144R000500110105-2 ao~~~Y '~rYr~YI~V.YIYIt~W~WY1WYi~~NWYYY11,rYY~11~1~i Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000500110105-2 January 27, 1975 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE cal surveillance, wiretaps and break-ins di- rected at CIA personnel suspected of security leaks and, in a few cases, those who were thought to be receiving the information. In Colby's opinion and that of his immedi- ate predecessor, Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger, the CIA, in this period, may have overstepped the strict limits of its charter. The various acts have been labelled as "'regrettable" or "inappropriate" or-in the case of Colby-the result of "a miscona- ception of the extent of the CIA's authority." Richard Helms, who was CIA director during most of the period of anti-war fervor, stoutly denies any impropriety on his part. The dif- ference in judgment reflects more than any- thing else the change in climate in the last two years. But surely a large part of the problem lies in the ambiguity of the charter of the CIA, written by Congress in 1947. In setting up the agency, Congress ruled that it should have no "police, subpoena, law enforcement powers or internal security functions" with- in the United States-this area being strictly reserved to the long-established FBI. How realistic and workable- this prohibi- tion was is sharply illustrated by the events under investigation. Despite the prohibition against domestic spying, the director of the CIA was also made "responsible for protect- ing intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." He was also in- structed by Congress to "perform such other functions and duties relating to intelligence affecting the national security as the Na- tional Security Council may from time to time direct." Between. them, it can be argued that these directives provide ample justifica- tion for the activities being denounced as "illegal." And the evidence - is reasonably clear that a number of former directors be- lieved this was indeed the case. Clearly, the first objective of the current investigations must be to spell out more clearly the rules under which the CIA-and other intelligence agencies as well-are sup- posed to function. If all -domestic counter- espionage is to be more severely restricted- as seems to be the mood of the liberal major- ity-Congress will also have to figure out hoed the CIA Is to protect its "sources and meth- ods from unauthorized disclosure." One ob- -vious way, of course, would be pass a law making it a crime for former CIA agents to write. books. But this would not solve the larger problem of trying to separate domestic and foreign intelligence into neatly separate operations. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining out of my 20 minutes? The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DoMENICI). The Senator has 2 minutes remaining. Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I yield 10 additional minutes to the Senator from Mississippi. Mr. STENNIS. As I understand, that will leave me 12 minutes. Mr. President, may we have order? The -PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ate will be in order. - Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, my main plea today is for the protection of for- eign intelligence and intelligence: sources. I think all other matters do not add up, in the range of importance with the CIA's operations,, to. compare with this collection of foreign intelligence. I appreciate very much the sentiments expressed on the floor of the Senate as to the necessity for CIA and other intel- ligence agencies, but that view is not shared by all the people and is not under- stood, either, by all the people. There is a great deal of sentiment, even under- standing sentiment, that would question the necessity for the CIA, or the pro- priety of having it. Another thing, Mr. President, is that this is not a political issue, and CIA is not a political agency of any kind. It serves one President after another, as they come. It makes no difference which party that President belongs to and has nothing to do, with political matters. Primariily, CIA Is a Government agency collecting foreign intelligence of the most highly sensitive nature. To be effective, it must be secret. If intelligence facts are-disclosed, they often lose all of their value. If an adversary merely infers that we have certain in- telligence, often it is no longer of value. An illustration would be work on a code. The purpose of gathering intelligence is to learn intentions and capabilities. The lrst extensive foreign intelligence act ever passed by the Congress was in 1947. Called the CIA, it has come a long, long way in the past 26 years. For il- histration., we no longer argue about a missile gap, or a. bomber gap. In the broad and essential fields, the CIA has done an extensive and effective job in dealing with enemy capabilities and intentions. As we go through investigations, let us keep in mind the dangers from expo- sures. Exposures can be a matter of life and death to Americans abroad as well as friendly foreigners. This opinion is strongly shared by many highly respected persons, including Director Colby, who have been a part of the operations and know the facts first-hand. Friendly gov- ernments and. friendly foreigners will greatly reduce, if not terminate their co- operation. and assistance. They already have. The information flow has been greatly reduced. Our relations with other nations have been strained. Exposure of sensitive facts through hearings, through pressures, through staff members, or through other sources, regardless of the good intentions of the actors, comes at a price we cannot bear. In a time of nuclear weapons, with the power to deliver warheads on target from continent; to continent, we must have re- sponiible information from many foreign sources. Further, our ships at sea, our military manpower scattered throughout the world in support of many commit- ments voluntarily made, are all in need of the fruit of intelligence gathered' around the world. The President, all Presidents, have to have this worldwide intelligence in for- mulating foreign policies, including trade and other economic policies formulated with natiions around the world. Intelligence comes from several sources, but much of it comes from our CIA agents abroad. In my travels, I have found them to be excellent men, capable and loyal, with a steady stream of highly valuable and responsible information. They seldom get credit for anything. They often get blamed-but by and large, they continue to carry on. One purpose of my remarks today is to say a word of encouragement to those S979 men; to tell them they are appreciated, and to ask them to carry on under highly adverse conditions. From some of this intelligence, we make decisions in the Congress as to military weaponry. We often save great sums of money, because this intelligence lets us know what weapons to avoid building as well as what weapons are most probably needed. Without the in- telligence gained under the CIA direc- tion, we would not have known of the missiles in Cuba until they were actually fully installed and we were directly un- der the gun. Indeed, U.S. intelligence, on which the CIA sits at the top, has come along way over - the past two decades. We have reached the point where the SALT agree- ment is possible, because we can now verify what they have in being. A num- ber of other treaties have also been pos- sible, because of our vertification process. Under Director Colby, I feel that the CIA is now operating in a fine way, en- tirely within the law. I shall do my part in keeping it that way. 'The organic act creating the CIA needs some amendments which tighten up the present law. Our committee has given some major amendments which I intro- duced in late 1973, special attention in 1974. I assisted Senator ftoxm RE with a similar major amendment offered by him to the military authorization bill. It passed the Senate with my active sup- port and we made a strong effort at the conference in behalf of the amend- ment. It finally lost at conference be- cause it was not germane, but the con- ferees for the House supported the idea of hearings which the House has started. We shall continue our efforts on that amendment and others. We may have certain intelligence of great value to us. But if it is known to our adversaries that we have it, or if they suspect that we have It, then it turns to ashes in our hands and is of no value whatsoever. Illustration: Hundreds of millions of dollars invested in electronic devices can become valueless overnight if it be- comes known we have such devices. Our committee shall continue to exer- else committee jurisdiction on legisla- tion regarding the CIA, and also exer- cise surveillance over its operations, and such other activities connected therewith as may be necessary. We shall continue to have the Senator from Montana (Mr. MANSFIELD), and the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. SCOTT), the Democratic and Republican floor leaders and hence representing all of the Senators, invited to all of our meet- ings regarding the surveillance of the CIA. Ihave -discussed this with the Sena- tor from Montana on last Thursday and he expects to attend. The Senator from Pennsylvania attended our session last Thursday. The CIA, of course must operate within the law, but I want to emphasize to all of my colleagues and to the American people that foreign intelligence supplied by the CIA is absolutely necessary for out President and his close advisers, includ- ing the top officials of all of our military, Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP77MOO144R000500110105-2 Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000500110105-2 S 974 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE services, both those in civilian and mili- tary positions. In modern times this In- formation is not merely needed, it is es- sential. Therefore, someone has to stand up for the CIA through foul as well as fair weather, and make hard decisions and take firm stands, whether popular at the time or not. I have done that and I propose to do just that in the future. I shall not shirk this duty. This does not at all mean that I pro- pose to operate a duplicate or rival in- vestigation with any select committee. I will make no attempt to do that, but I will carry out the purpose, as I have briefly outlined it here. I thank the Senator from Texas for yielding this time to me. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Mis- sissippi for his cogent remarks. I think it would be appropriate for me to thank him at this time fdr the splendid leadership he has shown in the Committee on Armed Services. In fact, on numerous occasions, we have looked in depth at some activities of the CIA and it has not been generally known that we have. I think the Senator from Mississippi has always measured up to his responsibility in the highest tradi- tion of the Senate. Mr. President, may IY inquire how much time I- have left? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 15 minutes remaining. Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I send to the desk an amendment and ask that it be stated. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will state the amendment. Mr. TOWER. May I call to the at- tention of my friend from Rhode Island that I have now offered the amendment. The legislative clerk read as follows: At the end of the resolution add a new section as follows: "No employee of the select committee or any person engaged by contract or other-, wise to perform services for the select com- mittee shall be given access to any clas- sified information b th sel t it y e ec comm tee unless such employee or person has received an appropriate security clearance. The type of security clearance to be required in the case of any such employee or person shall be commensurate with the sensitivity of the classified information to which such em- ployee or person will be given access by the select committee." Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, the amendment is somewhat self-explana- tory. However, I think we should make some legislative history on it. What is contemplated here is the type of Q clear- ance which is administered by the Atomic Energy Commission and which the Senator from Rhode Island is so well familiar with. I should like the Senator from Rhode Island to comment on it at this time if he would. Mr. PASTORE. I have no objection to the amendment provided I get a fur- ther explanation of the last sentence: The type of security clearance to be re- quired in the case of any such employee or person shall be commensurate with the-sen- sitivity of the classified information to which such employee or person will be iven access by the select committee. As determined by the committee. After all, who is going to make this determination? We are not going to have a debate by the members of the commit- tee every time we. get to a point where this would apply. I am all for preserving the classification; the Senator from Texas knows that I am all for his amend- ment, the spirit of it, the intention, the objective of it. But I think we should make clear that the determination ought to be on the part of the committee. When it says "sensitivity of the classi- fied information," who is going to deter- mine whether it is sensitive or not? We have to say here "the type of security clearance to be required in the case of any such employee or person shall, with- in the determination of the committee, be commensurate with the sensitivity," and so on. Mr. TOWER. I should be glad to ac- cept that as a modification by the Sena- tor from Rhode Island. Mr. PASTORE. That is what I want. I want the determination to be made by the committee, if we can work out that language. Mr. TOWER. That suits me splendidly. As a matter of fact, if the Senator will read that language again, I think that would be a suitable modification. Mr. PASTORE. The type of security clearance to be required in the case of any such employee or person shall, with- in the discretion of the committee itself, be commensurate with the sensitivity of the classified information to which such employee or person will be given access to the select committee. Mr. TOWER. I will accept that lan- guage as a modification by the Senator from Rhode Island. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be so modified. Will the Senator send the modification to the desk? The amendment, as modified, is as follows: No employee of the select committee or person engaged by contract or otherwise to perform services for the select committee shall be given access to any classified infor- mation by the select committee unless such employee or person has received an appro- priate security clearance as determined by the Select Committee. The type of security clearance to be required in the case of any such employee or person shall within the determination of the Select Committee be commensurate with the sensitivity of the I classified information to which such em- i ployee or person will be given access by the select.?oinmittee. Mr. TOWER. What is contemplated here is a simple type of Q clearance which is ordinarily required of Senate employees. Mr. PASTORE. I realize that. Every member of the staff of the Joint Com- mittee on Atomic Energy has Q clear- ance andhas to have it. I think In this particular case, where we are dealing. 10(j, pages, but his staff man does not tivities abroad and domestically, I think we have to have reliable people. We just cannot afford to take a chance. Now, I am, all for this study and this Investigation. I repeat, I do not want to January 27, 1975 IP misunderstood. There have been a lot c.f mistakes and they have to be cor- m ected. But we are not out to destroy i itelligence-gathering. I remember one time when I was sent 1 y President Kennedy to Moscow to wit- ress the signing of the Nuclear Test Ban '_Ilreaty. 1: was sitting on the porch of the I"mbassy, together with Dean Rusk, at t le time, and we were talking about a 1 it of measures. Finally, the Ambassador came out and said, "I suggest you two gentlemen take a walk and do your talk- i ig because this place is bugged." "This place is bugged." Now, that is v hat the Russians are doing to us. As a ratter of fact, they did it right down t sere at the United Nations. They had a bug, I think, under the American seal. We all remember that. Let us face it: We are In a critical world where we are being spied upon a yid, in order to know what they .are d ling, we have to spy on them. There is r o question about that. But that has nothing to do with many of-these charges t tat have been made. Nobody is out to destroy the CIA. Let u i get an understanding on this. No one i out to destroy military intelligence. No one is out to destroy the FBI. Let us make it all clear. On the other hand, this is an open satiety. All we are saying is that there a --e some things that have been wrong, a?od under the pretext of either national s'?curity or secrecy, private rights are be- ing violated unnecessarily. That is all we a-e trying to eliminate. That is all we are t; ying to do. It is as simple as all that. I am perfectly willing to accept this a-nendment with that modification. Mr. TOWER. The modification has b -en accepted. The amendment has been S4, modified. I might say one other thing. I think this is partially for the committee's pro- tection. If we did not require clearance o> some sort, it Is not impossible that an a'ien intelligence organization could penetrate the committee by inserting one o, its people on the committee staff. So I think we would want that kind of protec- tion, because I do not think the commit- tee would ever want to be embarrassed b finding, having failed to require any k-nd of clearance, that their staff had boen penetrated. Mr. BAKER. Will the Senator yield? Mr. TOWER. I yield to the Senator horn Tennessee. Mr. BAKER. Will the Senator from T jxas reassure me that by setting up these requirements for classification, we a,-e not setting up within the committee layers of access and levels of access to in- ?crmatiort that will be available to the committee? What I have in mind is the possibility that the committee may de- ci ie that there is-a requirement for secu- ri.y beyond even the requirements for Q cl marance, a kind of "eyes only" classi- h,,ve that clearance, Now, can the Senator assure me that nc thing that is contained in this amend- in ant will in any way deprive any Mem- bc c of access, and his staff, if otherwise 1p., 3perly cleared? Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP77MOO144R000500110105-2 s Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000500110105-2 S 976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE January 27, 1975 The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time to zero, but they might improperly with- ical and terribly secret operations of the of the Senator from Texas has expired, hold or delay security clearances. intelligence community. They cite the The Senator from Rhode Island has 32 Mr. PASTORE. The Senator from fact that Washington has become known minutes. Montana just asked the question and I as a city of leaks. I suggest, though, that Mr. PASTORE. I think we ought answered it. It is not up to any agency - critics are losing sight of the explicit con- to get this amendment clarified further. executive; it is up to the committee. fidence in which Congress has dealt with Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr.. President, will j Mr. CRANSTnTsI 1X71- i. v uvaxa Wi y1CLUf Mr. PASTORE. I yield. Mr. MANSFIELD. I understand, Mr. President, after listening to this dPhn+.P which has the final determinationvas to the committee vish iLT esatoi use irss denied who shall have access to what informa- clearance by the executive branch can ti'on; is that correct? the committee override and decide they Mr. PASTORE. That is correct. are going to hire that person? Mr. MANSFIELD. No executive agency Mr. PASTORE. Well, in an extreme shall determine directly or indirectly who case, I would have to answer the Senator shall have access to information, in the affirmative, but I mean, after all, Mr. PASTORE. That is correct. And I I do not anticipate that. I do not antici- cannot be more explicit than that. ? I pate that trouble. would like t h o ave the amendment read. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will read the amendment. The legislative clerk read as follows: At the end of the resolution add a new sec- tion as follows: `No employee of the select committee or any person engaged by contract or otherwise to perform services for the select committee shall be given access to any classified in- formation by the select committee unless such employee or person has received an appropriate security clearance as determined by the select committee. The type of secu- rity clearance to be required in the case of any such employee or person shall within the de termination of the select committee be commensurate with the sensitivity of the classified information to which such em- ployee or person will be given access by the select committee. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator from Rhode Island has 30 minutes remaining. Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, will, the Senator yield? Mr. PASTORE. I Yield, Mr. CRANSTON. The Senator from Rhode Island, I think, has performed a very useful service in making plain that the second part of this amendment is finally in hand for decisionmaking pur- poses of the committee. Mr. CRANSTON.:1 did- not anticipate it generally. I think: we might anticipate it in regard to certain individuals who might render invaluable service to the committee but who might be preferred not to be on that committee staff by one or another of the agencies we are talking about. Mr. PASTORE. Is the Senator saying to me if for some capricious; motive some executive department refused to grant a clearance, the question would arise, would that put that; individual out of commission? Mr. CRANSTON. Saes: Mr. PASTORE. The answer is no. The answer is it is up to the committee to make the determination. Mr. CRANSTON. That is fine. I thank the Senator. Mr. PASTORE,. OK. Does any other Senator wish to speak before we vote? Mr. BAKER. Mr. President I am , happy to have this. opportunity to express my support for Senate Resolution 21, legislation establishing a Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Oversight. As an original cosponsor of the resolu- tion offered by Senators MANSFIELD and MATHIAS, and as a strong supporter of this legislation offered by Senator PAS- Mr. PASTORE. That is correct. TORE, I 'believe this resolution to set in Mr. CRANSTON. But the first part motion a responsible study of the intelli- creates a similar problem. gence activities carried out by or for the Mr. PASTORE. No, he added the words United States is of tremendous impor- for the first part, too; right at the end tance. of the first sentence he added the words committee, a ttee, a ng the cr. sating le select "within the determination of the select com er anent sponsor irll; legi slation committee." to establish a permanent Joint Commit- Mr. committee." TON. I have a somewhat tee on Intelligence Oversight, let me em- similar question to ask; it is similar, to phgsize that it is not my iriten.tion to its implication, and I perhaps need the criticize the Services chairmen of help of the Senator in figuring out what propriationthe Armed Services Ctee or the or the ng to do 'abut it. ,; Committee;. or the ranking With out to the words "unless such minority members of those committees. They employee or person has received an ap- have done an admirable duties job e- propriate security clearance," who gives carrying out the diverse duties and re- security clearance? spibilities of leadership on those com- Mr. PASTORE. Usually by the FBI mittees. In my view, however, the far- and all other sensitive agencies of Gov- reaching operations of the some 60 Gov- ernment. That is the way they do it now. texlment lligence or law agencies law which enforcement conduct nc in- Mr. CRANSTON. The yno function is, how do you question I ask demand the careful scrutiny of a select prevent, and just make committee created for that purpose and certain, that there is no abuse of this charged with that responsibility. by the executive branch? They would Some have argued that Congress can- not, I assume, try to hold down the staff not be trusted to participate in the crit- clearances, the committee or the execu- 'order in the geneses oI the highest tive? In our past national conflicts, during Mr. PASTORE. The committee is going World War I, World War II, the Korean determine ,,,!,o+, +w. , Lnat it is the Senate select committee, if adeauat has been confidentiality where required. I am proud to serve on the Joint Com- mittee on Atomic Energy. a. rnrn?li++- of Senate Resolution 21,'- TORE. I believe I -am correct in saying that, in more than a quarter century, there has never been a security leak from the Joint Committee, which daily deals with what are perhaps the most sensi- tive materials in the entire annals of the defense establishment. It is evident, then, that ample precedent exists for congressional participation in such a sensitive area. I am not impressed by those who contend that Congress is not to be trusted with the truth. A balance must always be made be- tween the requirements of a democracy for public knowledge, and the require- ments of its security and defense. When a doubt arises, the people's branch of Government must be privy to those re- quirements and the pertinent informa- tion required to make a balancing judg- ment. The outcome of the select committee inquiry, obviously, cannot be foreseen. I pledge my personal efforts, just as I know the other members of the select committee will dedicate their efforts, to seeing that our job is done thoroughly and that we follow the facts wherever they lead without fear or-favor. This res- olution charters neither a whitewash nor a witch hunt; it does establish a select committee to carry out a sensitive mis- sion as fairly and as even handedly as possible. It is not my intention to carry out a vendetta against the Central Intelligence agency, or against any established intel- ligence agency of our Government. I be- lieve that the CIA, the FBI, and other agencies- are necessary to the security of our national institutions when they per- form their proper functions. Serious allegations have been made, however, and it is the responsibility of the Congress to weigh the charges, find. the facts, and determine what remedial. ac- tion, if any, is necessary to make sure that an effective intelligence program is maintained without endangering the rights of our citizens. Mr. President, I shall not detain the Senate long. Everything has been said which should be said, I believe. I am pleased and I am gratified and enthusi- astic about the action that I believe the Senate is about to take. I think that it signifies diligence and sensitivity and the recognition of a necessary national pur- rose. It speaks well of the viability of this group as a great deliberative body in support of the executive 'branch of Government. I have no quarrel with the CIA. I cer- Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP77MOO144R000500110105-2 Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000500110105-2 January 27, .X 975 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE Mr. TOWER. I do not perceive that it would. In other words, for the protection of the stair--- Mr. BAKER. What does the Senator mean, he does not perceive that it would? s it his opinion that it would or would .sot? Mr. TOWER. It is my opinion that it would not. Mr. BAKER. Does the Senator wish :hat to be included as part of the legis- lative history? Mr. TOWER. As a matter of fact, the committee itself will determine. Mr. BAKER. Does he wish it to be a part of the legislative history of this amendment that it is not his under- standing or intention as the author of this amendment to create that situation? Mr. TOWER. It is not my intention to create that situation. Mr. BAKER. And it is not his belief that that will occur? Mr. TOWER. It is not my belief that it will occur. But it is my intention that we should not have people on the staff who would be security risks. Mr. BAKER. We all share that con- cern. Let us very much hope we succeed in keeping leaks from occurring alto- gether. I assure the Senator that this will be the case as far as this Senator Is concerned. But as far as I am concerned, I cannot in good conscience see the adoption of an amendment that will make part of this committee privy to highly sensitive material while other parts of the committee, though legally, as a practical matter might be deprived of that information. Mr. PASTORE. Will the Senator ex- plain that again? Mr. BAKER. Yes. Assume for a mo- raent that the committee, in its dis- cretion, according to the amendment that the Senator from Rhode Island pro- posed and Senator TOWER accepted, adopts some classification beyond, say, a Q clearance. We all know there are some classifications beyond a Q clear- ance. Suppose the Senator's personal staff or select committee staff comes to him and says, "I cannot gain access to that last communication Director Colby sent to us because the committee says we have to have an XQI clearance as well as a Q clearance." I want to be sure that 1, as a member of the committee, or anyone else as a member of the com- mittee, will not be thus deprived of ac- cess to any information that comes be- fore that committee. Mr. PASTORE. His amendment only has to do with staff members. The Sena- tor is saying he does not want to he deprived. If a member of his staff or anyone on that staff that he may be re- sponsible for the committee engaging does not get the clearance from the com- mittee that he must have, he cannot get the information. Tcere is nothing wrong with that, be- cause he is the one who determined that he could not get it. Mr. BAKER, Mr. President, as long as 1 am assured, which is the only thing I sought, that the concern that I ex- pressed was not the intention of the author of the amendment, I will be sat- isfied I do not want to be deprived, legally or effectively, of any information. that comes before this committee. If there are 10,000 pages of classified material. I cannot read it, and the Senator cannot either, or it is unlikely that he is going to be able to. I think I have that assurance. If the Senator from Texas will express his un- derstanding that this will not be used as a device to deprive any of us of inform a- tion, then I am perfectly pleased with it. Mr. TOWER. It was the intention of the Senator from Texas to establish what he thinks is the minimum requirement that we can establish; that is, some sort of clearance fof people. I noted a moment ago that it is conceivable that If we re- quired nothing, the committee staff could be penetrated by an alien intelli- gence-gathering organization. I think this would be particularly true of clerical help. I think that the professional staff that Is likely to be engaged will probably be people who will have no difficulty getting any kind of clearance they need. It is not my intention to proscribe or to hobble the action of any Senator on the com- mittee. Mr. BAKER. Whose authority will be required to gain the clearance, that of the full committee or the chairman and vice chairman? Mr. PASTORE. By vote of the com- mittee. Mr. TOWER. I should say the commit- tee has to meet and make its ground rules pursuant to the guidelines laid down here. Mr. BAKER. Is that the Senator's intention? Mr. TOWER. That is my ir_rention,. Mr. PASTORE. May we have the amendment read again? Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, one fur-, ther question, if I may: It has been neces- sary, In my experience, to enlist one's personal staff, legislative assistant, or anyone else, to help in a compilation or ordering of the information at hand. :1 fully agree that then they should be re- quired to have whatever clea"ante Is required, and be fully investigated. But I hope there is nothing in this amend- ment that would prevent an application for clearance of personal staff, and that on obtaining that clearance, they would, in fact, be subject to the same rules as committee staff. Mr. PASTORE. That is correct c. We do that on the joint committee now. The Senator from Missouri has had members of his staff who have Q clean nce look at some of our classified information. They are ,entitled to do it, with the per- mission of the committee itself. Every person who looks at classified information has to be cleared. We should be clear about that. Mr. SYMINGTON, Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. TOWER. I yield to the Senator from Missouri. Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank my able friend from Texas. As I understand it, whoever is cleared, whether he be on the staff or off the staff, is cleared for the information. He is- cleared for the Information on the basis of the nature of the clearance that 8911-5 he receives. It would be up to the Senator in question to decide whether he was violating the rules of the Senate if he was on the committee and at the same time discussed any matter with somebody who did not have the proper clearance. Am I correct in that? Mr. BAKER. Absolutely. Mr. PASTORE. That is right. No one disputes that. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will tie Senator yield for a question? Mr. PASTORE. Yes. Mr. STENNIS. I believe the Senator from Missouri was talking about some- one who was not on the committee staff. I would not think that anyone who was not responsible to the committee would have access to this information. Mr. PASTORE. Oh, no- Mr. SYMINGTON. May I say in an- swer to my able friend, the Senator from Mississippi, I was discussing this matter with the distinguished senior Senator from Tennessee on the basis of his staff ; and the Senator is entirely correct, and if he is on the committee-and I read he was on the committee-then it would be his problem to see that the people on his staff were cleared to receive the informa- tion on the basis of their clearance, and did not receive it if they did not have adequate clearance. Mr. PASTORE. Provided they got the permission of the committee. Mr. STENNIS. It would be a comcolt- tee responsibility. Mr. PASTORE. That is why I am tc cit- ing there "by the determination of the committee." Mr. BAKER. I entirely agree with tnat. Does the Senator from Texas? Mr. TOWER. The determination is to be made by the committee, that is the difference. Mr. BAKER. And it can be made for security classification for personal staff as well as staff-- Mr. TOWER. Not for personal staff. I think for any information that the Sen- ator gives to his personal staff, he has the personal responsibility to determine whether that staff member has an ade- quate clearance. My own personal policy is that nobody handles classified docu- ments on my staff unless they have clearance. Mr. BAKER. That is the essence of my question. The answer to the question to the Senator from Texas is- Mr. PASTORE. We are confusing a very simple thing. Let us get it plain. No one can look at classified information unless they have clearance. Mr. TOWER. Right. Mr. PASTORE. If a personal staff member of any member of the commit- tee has that clearance, he or she can be entitled to that classified information only if the committee gives permission. Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, that is my understanding. . Mr. PASTORE. That is the rule of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy now. I cannot say it more clearly than that. Mr. BAKER. Is that correct? Mr. TOWER. That Is correct, and the policy will be set by the committee, I see no reason why a majority of the com- mittee cannot work it out satisfactorily. Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000500110105-2 January 27, 1975 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - S]ENATE tainly have no quarrel with the Senate I pledge, as well, that the public's right Armed Services Committee or its distin- to know is second only to national sur- guished chairman. This resolution, how- vival, and that when we are finished with ever, is drafted so that it extends far be Z' the private portion of these hearings yond the CIA, to the entire intelligence there will be a public disclosure, a public apparatus of this country. Some of my declaration including the good and bad, colleagues may be interested to know recent and in. the past. there are 60 agencies of the U.S. Gov- It is a terrible time we are in. We have ernment that conduct some sort of Intel- not had a President who has completed ligence or law enforcement responsibility. his term, In it sense, since President Ei- There are 16 agencies of the Government senhower. These are turbulent times conducting intelligence operations other when we have set about the business of than the CIA and the DIA, Defense In- investigating ourselves do the point where telligence Agency, and the FBI, which sometimes I think we are devouring our have a combined budget of over a billion public officials, our leaders. dollars a year. The intelligence of the When I permit myself the luxury of Federal Government is an enormous thinking that, sometimes. it also dawns business. on me that the investigation has been I became concerned about this matter pretty productive, and we have got to do in the course of Watergate. The stories this one, too, not because we are bent on which have appeared in the press and political cannibalism, but because it has been related by others to me since that to be done. time have done nothing to allay that i believe, Mr. President, that it will be concern. It is important, I believe, that done, and done effectively. we have a thoroughgoing investigation to I pledge r yy efforts in that respect determine whether or not the agencies and I serve notice? as well, that I will de- involved in the intelligence activities of vote every ounce of my energy to seeing the Government are complying with the that we find all the facts and pursue requirements of the law. them, wherever they lead us. But maybe-just maybe, Mr. Press- It is far too late In my political career dent-there is one other thing that we to worry about whom :f might hurt or need to do to reassilre not only Congress who might be injured. but the people of this country, and that Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, will the is to make sure that the intelligence corn- Senator yield? munity and, of course, to some extent Mr. PASTORE. Have we voted on the the law enforcement community, is un- amendment? der somebody's control. They are not au- The PRESIDING, OFFICER. The ques- tonomous entities within a representa- tion is on agreeing to the amendment of tive democracy, as I am sometimes the Senator from Texas, as modified by tempted to suspect, the Senator from Rhode Island. We are not talking about a Republican The amendment was agreed to. national administration or a Democratic. Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, will the I rather suspect that some of the prac- Senator from Rhode Island yield to me? tices that we see discussed in the public Mr. PASTORE. How much time will forum began a long time ago, and maybe the Senator require? included activiti i es go ng all the way back, possibly, to the Eisenhower administra- tion, the Kennedy administration, and the Johnson administration. I think, Mr. President, one of the major undertakings of this committee ought to be to talk to the last surviving ex-President we have and to examine the records that are available to us to determine whether or not the President of the United States knows what is going on in the CIA, the DIA, and the FBI. I want to be reassured in that respect, and I confess I am not now. I suppose we would run into the questions of our friendly adversaries on executive privi- lege and executive powers with respect to those Presidential powers. I know for- mer President Harry Truman declined to grant certain information after he left office, but I think we ought to try. We ought to find out not whether the CIA, for instance, was engaged in domestic surveillance, but whether somebody was running the show. I know Congress was not running the show; and I want to be relieved of that shuddering fear I have that the White House was not, either. So I pledge, if I am a member of this committee, that I will conduct it as dis- creetly and privately as I can commen- surate with my responsibility. I pledge that we will be careful to preserve our legitimate intelligence in- terests. S977 Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. PASTORE. I yield to the Senator. Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration. The PRESIDING OFFICER, The amendment will be stated. The legislative clerk read as follows : At the end of the resolution add a new sec- tion as follows: SEC. 7. As a condition for employment as described in Section 3 of this Resolution, each person shall agree not to accept any honorarium, royalty or other payment for a speaking engagement,. magazine article, book, or other endeavor connected with the investi- gation and study undertaken by this Com- mittee. Mr. PASTORE. I will accept this amendment, Mr. President. . The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques- tion is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Oregon. The amendment was agreed to. Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I send up another amendment for the purpose of colloquy. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated. The assistant legislative clerk read as follows: On Page 4, line 4, Insert after the word "agency" the following: "or any Committee or Subcommittee of the Congress." On Page 5, line 13, insert after the word "agencies" the following: "or any Commit- tees or Subcommittees of the Congress" Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I would like to ask the Senator from Rhode Island a question because I may with- draw the amendment after I have the record made on the problem that con- cerns me so greatly. As a member of the Rules C it omm - Mr. TOWER. A couple of minutes, tee, I am aware that we have brought Mr. PASTORE. Ala right, before us the requests from various com- Mr. TOWER. Since I have -run out of mittees and subcommittees in the Senate time. fnr thn h?Ar, ._.+ +..........._ a_ -- - ? sn01 W11'r- t.rr.. The Internal Security Subcommittee Mr. TOWER,. I have an amendment of the Committee on the Judiciary, dur- here which I will either offer or not offer. ing the presentation of their budget re- It is copied directly out of the resolutions quest on February 27, 1974, indicated that authorized the select committee for that they kept records on various people the Watergate investigation. in this country which they gathered It simply says: through intelligence activity. They had The minority members of the select com- files, names of people that could be con- mittee shall have one-third of the profes- sidered as suspicious, and other such sional staff of the select committee (includ- characteristics as they indicated to our ing a Minority counsel) and such part of the committee. clerical staff as may be adequate. My only point is that I realize that this Mr. PASTORE. Why not leave that to is not a matter of one Senate committee the committee:' investigating other subcommittees or I think- committees where we have the word Mr. TOWER, The Senate resolution re- "investigation" on page 2 of our resolu- quires 30 percent, I believe. tion today, however, we have some vari- Mr. PASTORE. Yes. ous generalities as to what this commit- Mr. TOWER. If the Senator from tee's authority may include. Rhode Island will simply assure me the A prime responsibility is that it can minority will get adequate staffing- look into, of course, any agency which is Mr. PASTORE. It will be up to the carrying out intelligence or surveillance committee itself. I will not have any au- activities on behalf of any agency of thority over the committee. the Federal Government. Mr. TOWER. I think an undertaking I would like to ask the Senator from by this side of the aisle would be honored Rhode Island if he considers that the by the majority on the committee. language is broad enough, on page 2, Mr. PASTORE. All right, so I under- lines 8 and 9, to include the reviewing of take it, the activities of the Internal Security Mr. TOWER. I thank my friend from Subcommittee of the Committee on the Rhode Island. Judiciary of the U.S. Senate, as it might Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP77MOO144R000500110105-2 Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000500110105-2 S x)75 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE January 27, 1975 "' 18 Whether new te.gisiation or an The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ate to surveillance activities or gather- amendment to any existing legislation shoa::d amendment is withdrawn. ing of intelligence. be enacted to strengthen the national sel Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, will 1determine. E. Well, I mean, if they rity, intelligence or surveillance activities of so I do not see how that is theuntted:3rates.? the Senator yield? I would like to ask apt to happen. The House already dis- one question of the Senator from. Texas banded that committee. I hope we do it Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. President, *t lie regarding his amendment. here in the Senate, as well. But this is amendment adds to section 2, beginn' ng I assume that it was not his intention a far-reaching authority. on. page 3, one more paragraph, to insi.re that the amendment would be used to If they so choose to do it, I would say that the Senate further expressly an, h- deny a member of the select committee that they could, but I would not want to orizes and directs the select committee to stence classthe ification knowledge of designation the or a existenc- of a of amend the present resolution as it now make a complete investigation with -e- staff stands. spect to the following matters, or ques- fied program. I ask that in light of the Ur. HATFIELD. Would the Senator tions. It adds the que:-tion of whet ter fact that many documents and pro-- have any objections to the latitude and there needs to be any bill introduced or grams bear a classification that is actu- scope of this committee being interpreted any amendment to strengthen the na- ally higher than the secret which, itself, to include some review or investigation tional security, intelligence or surveil- classified. of activities of the Internal Security Sub- lance activities of the United States. Mr TOWER. May I say to the Senator. committee, to see how it is collecting I am aware, as the Senator from Rh )de from California I believe we have already data? Island knows, that section 4 on page 10 answered that question. It would dy Mr. PASTORE. Well, if they have done of the bill authorizes the select comt.;it- the committee to on. It a what be an things as had as the CIA or FBI, if it is tee to recommend the enactment of any to ee tt required. ta mine whl bk up so determined, I do not see why any new legislation or the amendment of my of elecom cle al cematter for the Senate committeeshould be immune. existing statute which it considers needs- internal housekeeping is should e laid down. itte . But I beliethe ve the uid matte committee would be 1. mean, we have got to treat ourselves sary for these purposes. t ,its we expect to treat everybody else. But I want to be assured that the qi ,.es- laid I mentioned as a Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I am tion will be answered by the committee, want to theory e protected. I ago that as a very happy to hear the Senator say this, and to know that in case there wa:: no wwaars case be a foreign theory ileeago-that per- because it would seem to me if we are forthcoming legislation that there would organization, in the absence -g any in- basically concerned about the abridge- be a definite and definitive answer as to organizat n h as one Part, could ment of civil rights of our citizens whether this question had been reviewed telligence clearing its people into part, t, could through the action of gathering Intel_ and answered by the committee in its tee stn-o and actually eento ou the com- ligence, and so forth, of executive agen- recommendation. tee staff That would be of cte the Coble cies, we should be doubly concerned Mr. PASTORE. I would suppose so, mittee. That would the committee melee about the procedures used by one of our otherwise this whole investigation w?luld em mass ant whose sponsorship that per- own subcommittees of the U.S. Senate. a onull ther words, if nothing was found son was. I think we should have that i, for or one, , am not satisfied with with the answers 1 received from the chief clerk and nothing was wrong, and natur Illy, protection. In addition to that fact, the country of that subcommittee as he appeared of course, they had given a bill of en- dorsement, we would have to change should have that protection. I believe we before would our like Rules to think it Committeeis. understood nothing by legislation. have a public responsibility to make sure z bs that the resolution certainly carribs with h On the other hand, if certain autht ?rity that the people that we put in these staff it enough authority for that committee was exceeded or the agencies went be- positions are going to be people whose under this resolution to look into these yond the parameters of the present c=zar- sense of discretion and loyalty are be- activities of the Internal Security Sub- ter and got us mixed up in Laos, got us yond question. committee. if someone brings that issue mixed up In Chile, got us mixed up in Mr. CRANSTON. I admire the Sen- up before the committee. Cambodia and other parts of the world., ator's efforts to cut off such dangers. Mr. PASTORE. Or any other com- where they had no authority without Since there is no law that gives the Exec- mittee. the consent of Congress, in that par ?icu- utive the power of clearance or denial of Mr. HATFIELD. Or any other com- lar case, thecommittee would come `pack clearance, - since that Is done by Execu- niittee. but this one committee is already and make a recommendation, if they tive order, whatever rules the committee involved. would find it necessary to do so. writes will govern what happens in this Mr. PASTORE. But that is not the I would hope, without encumbering area. thrust. I want to make it clear, not the this with duplicate language, tha . we Mr. TOWER. This is correct. It is the thrust ofthis resolution, but it would be would understand that these are let-isla- committee's baby. encompassed in it because it is broad in Live words of art when it says the select Mr. CRAtNSTON. I thank the Senator. scope. committee shall have authority to re:om- M . PASTORE. Well, let us see if we - Mr. HATFIELD. I understand, but I mend lation. the They have enactment the of any authority. I new egiswould cannot put the baby to sleep. I suggest owns not want to if we are one anxious our hope that they would exercise it. the absence of a quorum. to n vubcgmmthe ees, i f executive aageenncy,, aMr BARTLETT. Will the Senator Mr. TOWER. Will the Senator with- investigate the That Yield? hold that for a minute and yield to me" it why I am raising the question. Cone Mr. PASTORS. What the Se-,aloe Mr. PASTORS. Lyield. ;acs e should look at its own intelligence wants to do is to say that they have to Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, in the Fri- gaMr. PASTORE. That is also. make a recommendation one way or the day, January 24, issue of the Arizona Re- Mr. HATFIELD. HATFIELTFIELD. Th Mr. at President, right.esident, I with- other. public, William P. Maloney, Jr., a former M Mr. BARTLETT I am saying, if I may ambassador to Ghana and a good Deln- eir my a ESDING say to the Senator from Rhode IE land, ocrat who insists that CIA regulation is The PRESIDING OFFICiLR. The that they shall make a determinati_sn of king overdue, he states that: amendi r. BAR is ZZE ?'withdrawn. whether or not there is legislation n ,eciled In the approaching investigations, it is im- 14I. Mr. Island President, will to strengthen the national securit.'. in- portant to keep two things in mind: That ti i?he Senator from Rhode Isla yi yield to telligenee or surveillance activities that competent intelligence branch is essential use 2 minutes? to our survival and that the CIA, with all its Mr. PASTORE. I yield 2 minutes to they shall make that determinatba n. Is faults, is one of the best, if not the very best, the. Senator assuring me that the % will organizations of its kind around. So let u4 ile w`' eriatOr. make that determination in det-tome not throw the baby out with the ball]., Mr_ BARTLET I . Mr. President:. I call whether or not they will avail them -elves up my amendment. of the authority of section 4? I ask unanimous consent that his letter The PRESIDING OFFICER, The Mr. PASTORE. I would hope so. I in the Arizona Republic be printed at this amendment will be stated. would hope so. point in the RECORD. The legislative clerk read as follows: Mr. BARTLETT. With that assurance There being no objection, the letter ordered to be printed in the RECORD, To Section 2 add a new subsection as f61- from the Senator Rhode Island, I was follows: 1CJWs: withdraw my ~M &9MI~AF. ~+'~~9A~^n~eR`~~gi4R7iM~m?gAe?+t4q?nare:s , r Ewa"tia~eN'e ..-. .. ,rte., ~agtM~N "' Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP77MOO144R000500110105-2 Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000500110105-2 S980 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE January 27, 1975 right to know what its Government Is doing and why. If the events of the past 2 years are to provide the momentum to help fashion any changes in the way we conduct our Government, they should at the very least underscore the necessity for public accountability-in this case, account- ability to the Congress for the proper and judicious administration of intelli- gence gathering agencies and the assur- ance that those activities are subject to the restraint of law as they impinge upon the free exercise of our constitutional rights. If the select committee is to carry out this mandate, it must not be impeded in any way in its investigations. The committee should explore still un- answered questions about the use of in- telligence agencies in the Watergate incident and any other instances where agencies exceeded their authority. The committee should examine the existing laws and procedures for review of their implementation and recommend necessary changes. Finally, the work of the committee should serve as a basis for restoring pub- lic confidence in the integrity and quality of our intelligence agencies. In the December hearings before the Intergovernmental Relations Subcom- mittee, Senator- BAKER testified that as a member of the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities he was told at one point in his investigation that the CIA would supply no further in- formation to the Watergate committee but instead would supply all of the in- formation to their regular oversight committees. Senator BAKER went on to say: That effectively ended the Watergate Com- mittee's inquiry into CIA involvement. Based on the explanation by Senator MANSFIELD and Senator PASTORE on the day Senate Resolution 21 was introduced, there should be no question about the right and the authority of this commit- tee and its staff to obtain any informa- tion which in any way affects or relates to the intelligence activities of the Gov- ernment. As the able majority leader stated so well: it should be made clear that this committee will only be able to perform its function effectively if the provisions of this resolution are liberally construed by com- mittees and by the agencies which are the subjects. of its investigation. Nothing should be able to be used as a bar to a - thorough investigation- neither the system for classifying na- tional secrets nor the provisions of the National Security Act itself. I am confident that the members of this committee will use this authority judiciously with the utmost concern for preserving and improving the institutions they are charged to examine. It has taken us a long time to reach this important point but the effort prom- ises to bring forth fruitful and construc- tive change. Mr. PACKWOOD. Mr. President, early last week the Senate determined to take an active role in the Investigation of al- leged misconduct by the CIA and the FBI. Legislation was offered to establish a Watergate-like select committee to thoroughly examine these allegations and determine their validity. We-are go- ing to vote on that legislation this after- noon and I intend to support it. In addition to the CIA and the FBI, the select committee will also review the activities of the other Federal intelli- gence gathering agencies, including the National Security Council and the De- fense Intelligence Agency. However, the main focus will be on the heretofore largely unknown activities of the Cen- tral. Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of - Investigation. For the last 2 months, the newspapers have been replete with -Stories of CIA involvement in Watergate-related in- trigue in.. violation of the CIA's legisla- tive mandate to restrict all intelligence gathering activities to foreign countries. Further, we have been informed that the FBI: was actively and illegally wiretap- ping civil rights leaders and other poli- ticians at the 1964 Democratic Conven- tion. Who, Mr. President, sanctioned these wiretaps? Who suggested to the ;CIA that they assist E. Howard Hunt with his masquerade for the purpose of clandestinely breaking into the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist-a pat- ently illegal act? Who put together the Huston plan to infiltrate dissident groups for the purpose of gathering in- formation on them? These are questions that need to be answered and I trust that in the course of the select committee's investigation they will be. - Mr. President, the collection and cata- loging of information on individuals- without their knowledge or consent-has always been abhorrent to the American people. It is, at a minimum, a violation of the constitutional right to privacy as guaranteed by the fourth amendment and, at maximum, a threat to one's lib- erty and freedom of expression. In the context of these recent revelations, we hear the phrase "police state" bandied about and I am disturbed by it. A de- mocracy is founded on the principle that the Government is for the people, not against them. Consequently, as the elected Representatives of the American people and their interests, it is incum- bent upon the Congress to act quickly to insure that this unwarranted intru- sion into the private lives of U.S. citizens has stopped and will not recur. The re- sponsibility is ours and the response must be ours as well. Mr. President, Included within the pur- view of the select committee's inquiry is "The extent and necessity of overt and covert intelligence activities in the United States and abroad." I have al- ready expressed my deep concern for unmonitored intelligence gathering op- erations within the United States, par- ticularly those conducted by the CIA, but I would also like to remark briefly on the need for some congressional knowledge of and input into the foreign intelligence activities. Up to this time, the Congress has gen- erally had very little knowledge of CIA operations in a foreign country unless something goes wrong and a great deal of adverse publicity results. Witness the Bay of Pigs fiasco and the toppling of the Allende government in Chile. While I do not dispute the need for secrecy in their overseas intelligence operations, I would be interested to know if the CIA operates solely under the direction of the National Security Council and/or the President. Correspondingly, have the members of the current congressional subcommittees on intelligence oversight more often than not simply been pre- sented with a fait accompli rather than consulted during the initial decision- making process? I do not think this is at all clear and it should be. I have indicated my support for a permanent Joint Congressional Commit- tee on Intelligence Oversight whici should, in theory, enjoy a more compre- hensive oversight capability than ha: been the case with the current subcom- mittees in the House and Senate. Giver that reality, however, exactly what wil that oversight capability include? And more importantly, given the congres- sional track record on sensitive informa. tion leaks, can the security of intelligent( information imparted to the oversigh committee be guaranteed? These are veri serious questions in my mind and I hop( that the select committee will includ( them in its inquiry. Mr. President, I believe that the nee( for the creation of a select committee t( investigate the Federal intelligence com- munity has been amply documented. strongly endorse its enactment. Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, : rise in support , of Senate Resolution 2: creating a Select Committee to Investi gate Intelligence Activities. At the outset, I want to state that thi intelligence community has served th Nation loyally and ably. Moreover, want to take this opportunity to salut, the dedicated, hard working men an( women of the intelligence communit whose work goes largely unheralded be cause of the climate in which they mus work. Production of useful intelligence b guide the Nation's policy makers in mak ing decisions relies upon. the efforts o thousands of persons who do their wort in a painstaking and careful way. While agent operations are importan to the Nation, they constitute a ver; small proportion of the total intelligent effort. Agent operations have bee) glamorized in novels and movies. Mos of us enjoy this kind of entertainment but the image that emerges is very fa from reality. The truth of the matter is that th production of intelligence requires th painstaking work of many specialist who carefully analyze Information fro many sources. Most of the work is fa from glamorous and very far from Janie Bond. Under the political climate now pre vailing, I suppose a select committee wa inevitable. I would have preferred tha the Senate inquire Into intelligence ac tivities through the existing committee and subcommittees that have responsi bilities for intelligence. In supporting Senate Resolution 21 I want to make it clear that in no wa: Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP77MOO144R000500110105-2 Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000500110105-2 Wily 27, 19 i 5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE i;3A REGULATION LONG OVERDUE former diplomat, I have followed re- ant news on alleged involvement of the CIA do+aestic affairs with sneclal concern. Cle:>.rly, congressional oversight and appro- :riate regulation of the agency are long over- 4 e. A recent hest seller on the subject, "The lA and the Cult of Intelligence" by Mar- ;;tetti & Marks, the accuracy of which is cner:lly recognized, makes a compelling ..+se in this regard. 'rhe:le is enough blame to taint all In- a ved, not only the agency itself but recent :`ministrations and especially a pliant and ;.tllible Congress. Additionally, the agency 6'erar-as under a vague grant of powers 'nch fails to define what is "domestic" and >'.rat is "foreign," let alone providing guld- or what falls in either category when .naives legitimate intelligence operations. But in the approaching investigations, it intrrortant to keep two things in mind: +at a competent intelligence branch is es- otitia. to our survival, and that the CIA, filth .il of its faults, is one of the best, if =,,t the very best, organizations of its kind .rn in -I, So. let's not throw the baby out with the oiopefully, in the coming months both _;r domestic freedom as well as the struc- :?re end role of this excellent organization gill be strengthened. Mr SCHWEICKER. Mr. President, I -oukl like to commend the distinguished Majority and minority leaders for their k: cisi ae action in moving to establish a sleet Senate committee to investigate lie recent charges involving various or- snizntions within the U.S. intelligence ,pmniunity. I had introduced my own =,isl_ lion in this area, Senate Resolu- ion 6. cosponsored by my colleague from Tiscoiisin (Mr. PROXMIRE), and I am leased that the Senate has decided to save forward with a similar proposal. I think it is appropriate to empha- e four points in connection with this. first, this Nation vitally needs an effec- Lee intelligence service. No one disputes at., and I am confident no one in this dy would support any action which f.suld undermine the effectiveness of Ov ernment organizations performing xgitilaiate, necessary, intelligence func- ',nns. In the 14 years I have served in ie Il Luse and Senate, I spent 10 years a member of the Armed Services Com- z.i.ttee, both in the House and here in the donate, and that experience convinced nc of the necessity for an effective in- 3,Iige?ace organization. But second, and equally important, it the responsibility of the Congress to ",line legitimate intelligence activities, nd to establish guidelines which the ex- : Ativa branch must follow in conduct- it telligence activities-and then. to ,e that these guidelines are enforced. he intelligence community, like every aier sector of our free society, must sczaject to the rule of law-and In i.:.t, because of the unique nature of i telli.gence activities, It is fundamental the integrity of our free institutions uit tie intelligence community respect =_,y rule of law. tlni;,rtunately, the Congress has not " on ',s vigilant in this area as it should e aeen. Despite nearly 200 legisla- ;ic proposals, no major legislation re- :,rdii g our intelligence community has cn passed since 1949, when the original (A enarter was amended. In the inter- vening years, the statutory authority of the CIA has apparently been modified and expanded by a series of secret ad- ministrative actions, Executive orders, and National Security Council actions. As a result, the CIA now has a "secret charter" which may be vastly different from the original statute passed by Con- gress-and even those Members of Con- gress with oversight responsibilities for CIA cannot say with confidence what is in the secret charter. I hope the select committee will focus a major inquiry in this area, and will untangle the various provisions of the secret charter and in- sure that our basic intelligence author- ity is embodied in a new statute, passed by Congress, rather than. in a series of secret documents. In a free society, the entire concept of a "secret charter" is an intolerable contradiction in terms and must not be permitted. Third, there are numerous indications that the intelligence community-and particularly the CIA-has expanded its functions into nonintelligence. areas, creating a shadow government, dupli- cating and even superseding the activi- ties of other Government agencies. I re- cently disclosed an unclassified, CIA con- tract proposal, asking American firms to conduct industrial espionage against our NATO allies and others, to determine their future plans in the area of ground transportation. Certainly we have a legi- timate Government interest in this area, but it should be pursued openly, by the Department of Transportation or Com- merce, rather than covertly by the CIA. And in response to my disclosure, Our NATO allies said they would be happy to share information of this nature with our Government and in fact, are now doing so, thus eliminationg any need for CIA activity. I hope the select commit- tee will explore intelligence community activities in this area, to determine to what extent a shadow government has in fact been created, pursuing nor- mal Government functions in secret, simply to avoid congressional oversight and accountability. Finally, I think it should be empha- sized that the CIA represents only about 15 percent of the entire U.S. intelligence effort. Recently, this has been the most visible 15 percent, in view of press dis- closures, but certainly no responsible congressional evaluation in this area can take place without inquiry into all facets of the U.S. intelligence community. My bill specifically authorized inquiry Into all intelligence agencies, and I would hope the select committee bill adopted today will have similar broad authority. Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President. the reso- lution before the Senate is the product of long and thoughtful concern over the role of intelligence agencies in a demo- cratic society. Nearly 20 years ago, the distinguished majority leader urged the Senate to adopt a related measure to exercise its responsibility for the activi- ties of our Nation's intelligence com- munity. Since the adoption of the National Se- curity Act, there have been more than 200 attempts to establish separate and broadly based intelligence oversight committees for the Congress. S979 Today, with the leadership of the dis- tingutsli,cd senior Senator from Rhode Island ? ad the esteemed majority leader, and the many other Members of this body who have labored for this change, we can take a vitally significant step by the creation of a Senate Select Commit- tee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. This select committee is similar in many respects to a proposal offered by Senators MANSFIELD and MATIrIAS which was referred to the Committee on Gov- ernment Operations. The Subcommittee on Inter governmental Relations, which I chair,-held hearings on December 9 and 10 on that and other proposals to strengthen congressional oversight of in- telligence activities. While we will continue to explore the tong-range congressional needs for a more permanent oversight mechanism, it is essential that we have a select com- mittee study what has gone before us and to measure past activities of our intelli- gence agencies against the laws which authorized them. For many years now we have been given constant assurances by the Central Intelligc nce Agency and other intelli- gence agencies that they have been forthcoming to the Congress through the appropriate channels such as the present oversight committees. Unfortunately, events of the past few years, and more particularly of the past few weeks, ap- pear to suggest that there is an instinct on the part of these agencies to withhold information from the Congress to protect themselves. In the past, proposals from the Con- gress, from scholars and from Presiden- tial task forces have been met with little more than indifference. Certainly public opinion and opinion in the Congress have changed. In recent years we have seen alarming evidence that the FBI has spied On Con- gressmen and on domestic political groups. The President has acknowledged that the CIA mistakenly became involved in dome tic surveillance. We have had evidence of military agents spying on civilians on behalf of an agency created by Department of Defense directive. The list goes on. The creation of a select committee to explore these allegations and activities as well as the Overall activities and re- sponsibilities of the entire intelligence community represents an objective re- sponse by the Senate to difficult and complex circumstances. It is not a call for a witch hunt. It is an assumption of responsibility. This i, an undertaking of the greatest importance. It is one which has the strong support of most of the Members of this body. It is a sential that this select commit- tee begin now to obtain answers to the many gt,:.stions which have been raised in the short run about the recent dis- closures and allegations and in the long run about the authority and functions cf all of our intelligence gathering agencies. The committee should address the question of how we can balance vital national security needs with the public's Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP77MOO144R000500110105-2 S 982 Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000500110105-2 ' CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE January 27, 1975 the CIA has been asked to play under that law. In 1970 and 1971, White House aides asked CIA to participate in what was known as the Huston domestic intelligence plan and to provide assistance to a former agency official, E. Howard Hunt, who at the time worked for the President. Again, the question must be raised as to what White House authorization the agency was given to undertake the re- quested activities. Hunt's aid was cut off only when, in the words of the man who was then chief assistant to the deputy director, it appeared the agency was becoming involved in a "domestic clandestine operation." In 1971 and 1972, according to Colby, the CIA undertook physical surveillances of five Americans including, apparently, newsman Jack Anderson, "to Identify the sources of (news) leaks." This appears to complement the so-called "national security" wiretaps conducted by the FBI at the direction of the Nixon White House from 1969 to 1971. Again, the agency and the White House must make clear the authority under which the CIA conducted such operations. In March 1974, Colby "terminated the do- mestic intelligence collection program (be- gun 7 years earlier) and issued specific guide- lines that any collection of counterintelli- gence information on Americans would only take place abroad and would be initiated only in response to requests from the FBI. . Was this at White House direction? And if not, could a future President reverse such a policy? The FBI situation is slightly different. There is no information as to how or why former FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover began collecting politically-tantalizing material about congressmen and other public figures. One point is clear, however-he frequently used the information to titillate Presidents, and apparently no Chief Executive or White House aide ever told him to stop. When the so-called "national security" FBI wiretaps were operating, Hoover regularly sent social and political gossip picked up from over- heard conversations to Nixon chief of staff, H. R. Haldeman. No objection or order to stop ever came back from the Oval Office. One other presidential role in these areas needs exploration. Were agency directors ordered by the White House to cover up certain activities when called before con- gressional committees? Former CIA Director Helms, for example,' when questioned by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in February 1973, was asked directly about CIA participation in a White House plan in 1969 or 1970 to coordinate domestic intelligence activities. Helms said he could not recall- though he knew full well of his activities in 1970 Huston plan discussions. Last week he hold senators he misunderstood the question. At a May 1973 hearing, Helms told senators he had no idea that Hunt, prior to public mention of the Ellsberg break in, "was going to be involved in any domestic activity." Of course, he did-that was why aid to Hunt ;.topped. Former President Nixon and his ides kept a close watch over any congres- sional testimony that could implicate them or their assistants in Watergate. Was Helms told to mislead? if current congressional efforts to harness the intelligence community break up as a result of lack of White House cooperation, additional allegations of past wrongdoings are bound to be made because the climate both inside and outside the secret security services has changed. Strong internal agency leadership has gone. And on Capitol Hill, the old staunch defenders of intelligence ac- tivities are either gone or powerless. For those interested in protecting the legit- imate functions of the intelligence commu- nity, the future looks grim-indeed black if the Ford White House fails to see that far more is needed than a narrow blue-ribbon commission studying- a very narrow set of allegations. Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I sug- gest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the rail. The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for 2 minutes? Mr. PASTOR,E. I yield. JOINT REFERRAL OF CERTAIN COMMUNICATIONS Mr, MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a communica- tion from the Federal Energy Adminis- tration transmitting a study under Pub- lic Law 92-39:L, be referred jointly to the Committees on Interior and Insular Af- fairs, Public Works, Commerce and Fi- nance, and that a second communication received this day from the Council on En- vironmental Quality on Land Use, pre- pared as a part of its annual report, be referred ;jointly to the Committeess on Interior and Insular Affairs, Public Works, Commerce, Agriculture and For- estry. The. PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. AUTHORIZA'r.[ON FOR COMMITTEE ON CO]vIM11RCE TO FILE REPORTS UNTIL MII?NIGHT TONIGHT Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Commerce be authorized to file re- ports until midnight tonight. The PRESIDING On'ICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.. Mr.. MANS.F:[ELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum The PRESIDING OFFICER. Th.e clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk ? pro- ceeded to call the roll. Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call. be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES The Senate continued with the con- sideration of the resolution (S. Res. 21) to establish a Select Committee of the Senate to conduct an investigation and study of governmental operations with respect to intelligence activities. Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas a:nd nays an passage. The yeas and nays were ordered. Mr. PAS TORE. Mr. President, I sug- gest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk pro- ceeded to call the roll. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Pursuant to the previous order, the Senate will now proceed to vote on the resolution, as amended. On this question the yeas and nays have been ordered, and clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk called the roll. Mr. YOUNG (after having voted in the negative). On this vote I have a pair with the junior Senator from Washington (Mr. JACKSON). If he were present, he would vote "Yea." If I were permitted to vote, I would vote "Nay." I therefore withdraw my vote. Mr. GRIFFIN (after having voted in the affirmative). On this vote I have a pair with the Senator from Ohio (Mr. TAFT). If he were present, he would vote "nay." If I were permitted to vote, I would vote "yea." I therefore withdraw my vote. Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce that the senator from Washington (Mr. JACKSON), the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PELL), the Senator from California (Mr. TUNNEY), and the Senator from Indiana (Mr. HARTKE) are necessarily absent. I further announce that the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. HUDDLESTON), and the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. INOUYE) are absent on official business. I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Rhode Island (Ml'. PELL), and the Senator from Call- fornia (Mr. TUNNEY) would each vote "yea." Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS) is necessarily absent. I also announce that the Senator from Maryland (Mr. MATHIAS), the Senator from Idaho (Mr. MCCLURE), and the Sen- ator from Vermont (Mr. STAFFORD) are absent on official business. I further announce that the Senator from Ohio (Mr. TAFT) is absent to attend a funeral. I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS), and the Senator from Maryland (Mr. MATHIAS) would each vote "yea." The result was announced-yeas 82, nays 4, as follows: [Rollcall Vote No. 1 Leg.] YEAS-82 Abourezk Eastland Metcalf Allen Fannin Mondale Baker Fon.g Montoya Bartlett Ford Morgan Bayh Garn Moss Beall Glenn Muskie Bellmon Goldwater Nelson Bentsen Gravel Nunn Biden Hansen Packwood Brock Hart, Gary W. Pastore Brooke Hart, Philip A. Pearson Buckley Haskell Percy Bumpers Hatfield Proxmire Burdick Hathaway R.aiidolph Byrd, . Hollings Ribicoff Harry F., Jr. Hruska Roth Byrd, Robert C. Humphrey Schweiker Cannon Johnston Scott, Hugh. Case Kennedy Sparkman Chiles Laxalt Stennis Church Leahy Stevens Clark Long Stevenson Cranston Magnuson Stone - Culver Mansfield Symington Curtis McClellan Tower Dole McGee Weicker Domenici McGovern Williams Eagleton McIntyre Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP77MOO144R000500110105-2 Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000500110105-2 January 27, 1975 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE do I agree to the criticism that has been made concerning our existing commit- tees. I know that our colleagues on these committees have done their utmost to carry out the trust of the Senate. Because the attacks on the intelligence community persist, and because part of that attack is directed to the existing committees, I am supporting Senate Res- olution 21 as a way to clear the air and set the record. When The distinguished senior Sena- tor from Arkansas was chairman of the Permanent Investigations Subcommittee, I believe he established the procedure of having closed hearings before open hear- ings were held. If I remember correctly, the distinguished Senator from Arkansas established this procedure to protect both his subcommittee and witnesses from unnecessary embarrassment. It is my hope that the Senate select commis;tee will proceed in a careful and deliberate manner. I believe the com- mittee's work, at least initially, should be in camera. Most of the Senators and staff, who are going to serve on the committee, are not thoroughly familiar with the orga?- nization and functions of the intelli- gence community. Before any decision on open hearings is made, I would hope the members and staff would have ample opportunity to do some homework. The Senators and staff who serve on the select committee are going to have knowledge of a lot of matters which, if hnpropperly handled, can cause our Na- tion harm. - It is important that the select com- mittee establish sensible rules in dealing with the intelligence community. in other words, let us get the information we need to do the job but no more. There is a reason over and above se- curity considerations for the select com- mittee to hold its meetings in camera: The basic American idea of protecting professional and personal reputations unless unlawful or unethical acts are in- volved. Although Senate Resolution 21 does not specifically make this point, I believe the work of the select committee should have as its focus the National Security Act of 1947. It is that act and the direc- tives issued under its provisions which have created the intelligence community as we Know it today. Using the act of 1947 as a frame of reference, I believe the select committee should have two prime objectives: First, to determine whether or not the act of 1947 needs revision. Second, to determine whether or not there have been illegal activities within the intelligence community. If = here have been illegal activities, then t: believe the committee must de- termine whether these illegal activities constitute a pattern or are merely aber- rations. of aetimes what may appear to be an illegal. activity may turn out to be some- thing quite different. Ultimately, the select committee will make its findings and recommendations known to the Senate. It would be a trag- edy for the Nation should this document reflect anything but the best of the Sen- ate. If surgery is required, let it be per- formed only after the most careful diag- nosis. And, if there is surgery, let us use a very sharp scalpel-not a meat ax. Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, the Central Intelligence Agency is charged with conducting the kinds of intelligence activities that are absolutely essential to preserve our free and open democratic society in the real world in which we live. I say this because example after exam- ple has shown that our Nation must re- main ever-vigilant against the publicly stated desires of other governments to destroy our free existence. The charter establishing the CIA lim- ited it to foreign intelligence gathering. Allegations have been made that the charter has been exceeded on occasion. If correct, then much of the blame for these excesses lies with the Congress for failure to discharge its duty of congres- sional oversight. Recognizing that our Nation must have an intelligence gath- ering capacity that Congress has failed in its oversight responsibility, the ques- tion becomes: Is the creation of a select committee to investigateour intelligence operations, with all its extensive press coverage and certain leaks, the wisest method to explore and correct past wrongs and prevent future abuses? I have grave doubts. There are many possible alternatives to such a suggested select committee. One alternative that comes immediately to mind is the creation of a permanent joint committee to oversee intelligence gathering by our Nation's agencies. Such an alternative has been offered in the form of S. 327, which I have cosponsored and intend to support. However, the realities of our current situation dictate my reluctant support of Senate Resoultion 21, with the strong reservations mentioned previously and an admonition to my colleagues that we must not breach our national security by revealing matters of truly critical impor- tance. These hearings must not be char- acterized by a veritable flood of leak,, and publicity stunts that will perma- nently jeopardize the effectiveness of our intelligence operations which serve a very legitimate purpose. We must be or our guard that such legislation with s commendable purpose is not allowed through error or excess, to undermine our country's security. Mr. PACKWOOD. Mr. President, yes- terday's Washington Post included ar editorial by Walter Pincus entitle( "'Spies' and Presidents." In speaking o" the investigation before a select commit- tee to study the Federal intelligence community, Mr. Pincus declares that: No select Senate committee-not even e joint congressional committee-will get tx the bottom of the U.S. intelligence commu- nity's problems without the full and activF support of President Ford and his staff." Thi; is because, he goes on to say, "The inquir~ into intelligence activities must iuevitabIl find out what past Presidents: authorized th' agencies to do. Because of its particular relevance t( the bill we will vote on today, I am bring- ing this article to the attention of ml 5981 colleagues. Mr. President, I ask unani- mous consent that ' the text of Mr. Pin- cus' editorial be printed at this point in the RISCORD. There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: "STIES" AND PRESIDENTS (By Walter Pincus) No select Senate committee-not even a joint congressional committee-will get to the bottom of the U.S. intelligence com- munity's problems without the full and ac- tive support of President Ford and his-staff. The reason is simple: such an inquiry must inevitably end up trying to find out what past Presidents and their staffs authorized these agencies to do; what formal groups, such as the 40 Committee, approved; and what steps, if any, the White House ever took to stop abuses of authority or projects that were il- legal on their face. Current newspaper allegations about the Central Intelligence Agency's domestic ac- tivities and the CIA partial confirmation plus admission that the Federal Bureau of Inves- tigation has collected files on members of Congress illustrate the point. Former CIA Director Richard Helms tied the start of that agency's domestic activities in the late 1960s to "the express concern of the President" (Lyndon Johnson), although he did not detail how this "concern" was transmitted to him. The present CIA Direc- tor, William Colby, told a Senate subcom- mittee that, under Helms, the agency on Aug. 15. 1907 established a unit within its coun- terintelligence department "to look into the possibility of foreign links to American dis- sident elements." Two weeks later, Colby went on, the executive director of the Presi- dent's National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorder asked how the CIA might assist that inquiry. in setting up the commission, President Johnson's executive order had called upon all government agencies to cooperate. Colby never stated, in his prepared text, why or under what authority Helms had established the unit prior to receipt of the commission's request for assistance. Colby did add, how- ever, that later the same year "the CIA ac- tivity became part of an interagency program, In. support of the national commission (on disorder), among others." What that program was and who the "oth- ers" were who received its output were not spelled out. The only known group estab- lished at that time was one intended to work out a plan for handling disorders in Wash- ington. Former participants on that inter- agency panel from the Pentagon and Justice Department don't remember CIA having been a party. Colby's later disclosure-that at this time the agency's Office of Security "inserted 10 agents Into dissident organizations operat- ing in the Washington, D.C. area . . . to gather information relating to plans for demonstrations . that might endanger CIA personnel, facilities and information"- paarallels what this interagency group did. Whatever the facts were, only informs ion from the White House tracing establishment of such a group could shed light on how the CIA became a participant. In 1969, the CIA was asked by the White House to undertake surveillance of the Presi- dmt's brother, Donald Nixon, who, accord- ih:.g to documents from the House impeach- ment inquiry, was moving to Las Vegas where it was feared he "would come into contact with criminal elements." The agency refused, but the Secret Service Act, which requires government agencies to cooperate in the pio- tection of the President and his family, may have been the source of other such requests. Only the White House can disclose what role Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP77MOO144R000500110105-2