GAO TASK FORCE DRAFT PAPER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77M00144R000600020005-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 5, 2005
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: October 30, 1975
• Content Type: MF

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3 0 OCT 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: Hubert Lacey
SUBJECT: GAO Task Force Draft Paper
I believe the initial draft of the Task Force paper should be reorganized.
I believe the following outline for the, paper would be more suitable:
This short section should include the type of information
included. in the first two pages of the present introductory section,
i. e. the nature of the assignment, how and why it was levied, a
sketch of how the Task Force went about its business, any notable
problems encountered, and the fact that the following sections
reflect our conclusions.
This section should include a brief discussion of the history
of GAO relationships with CIA-. It should discuss the nature of the
audit GAO now conducts of other Government agencies, stressing
the comprehensive, program scope of their present audit. The
paper should then discuss what this audit would mean to CIA.
Frank Quinn discussed this at a couple of the meetings--what we
might expect from the GAO audit. Be emphasized they would not
examine every pay slip or travel voucher, but that they would he
looking for duplication in the major technical programs, such as any
duplication between NPIC and IAS. Although some discussion of
the conceptual audit options would be worthwhile at this point, it
is my belief that any limitations on the GAO audit will be limitations
on the type of information to which they have access (e. g . , we may
be able to withhold the names of cooperating foreigners). I cannot
foresee that they would conduct anything but a comprehensive
program audit. In this connection it seems to me that there is an
additional option not mentioned in section 3 of the present paper.
Option 3 is a "full scope fiscal audit" but the description of this
section indicates it will not really be "full scope," as key data will
be excluded from GAO purview. The other option would be a true
"full scope fiscal audit," an audit with no overall program evaluation
but with complete access to all internal fiscal documentation.
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III. This section would be the real guts of the paper. It
should lead off by stating the :kind of information in paragraph 3
on page 1 and paragraph 2 on page 4, namely that the Task Force
concludes that certain CIA activities are simply not compatible with
the GAO audit and that: the DCI must categorically refuse to permit
these activities. We must then produce a comprehensive list of all
of these activities, which will be integrated into this section. In
the present paper this data is presented as Exhibit A, and this list
includes only "representative examples of "verboten" activities.
I believe this list is the essence of what the Task Force was asked to
provide, and a representative list just won't do. The Task Force
should discuss each item in this list and reach agreement that each
cannot be undertaken by GAO. I believe this is what the Director
expects from the Task Force.
IV. In addition to those activities which would be destroyed
by a GAO examination, even if there were no leaks, the Task
Force views certain Agency information as so sensitive that the
Director should attempt: to preclude GAO examiners from gaining
access to this material.- The information in the fourth paragraph on
page 1 should be included in this section. Here again the Task
Force must set forth a list of all items we feel the Director should
attempt to keep from GAO. This list might include items such as the
identities of secret agents and Americans who deal with us only if their
confidentiality is insured, in contrast to items such as actual contact
with secret agents or Americans which .would be part of the list
provided under section 3. The Task Force should discuss each of
these items and reach agreement that they must be included in this
list. We might also seek some Office of Security inputs on this point.
V. This section should detail the procedures of GAO access
that the Director should propose, such as, hypothetically, GAO review
will only take place at CIA buildings, no raw materials are to be
removed from these buildings, proposed guidelines for content and
control of GAO reports, and a mechanism to dissolve CIA-GAO dis-
putes, such as the senior review panel proposed in the first paragraph
of page 4 of the present paper. I think this mechanism needs full
discussion by the Task Force. My own guess is that this might be
handled better by a single official, such as the DDA, rather than
a panel.
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Those are my recommendations for the organization and content of
the Task Force paper. One question I have not resolved in my own mind
and I have not addressed in these remarks is what treatment we give in
the paper to the very valid point made in the last sentence on page 3. .I
am not certain where this point should be made in the paper and how it
should affect our recommendations as to the specific items included in
the two lists I propose,
MMMD
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - OLC Subject
1 - OLC Chrono
OLC: DFM: sk (30 Oct 75)
.Assi unsel
25X1
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