LETTER TO THE HONORABLE LUCIEN N. NEDZI FROM W. E. COLBY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77M00144R000600020023-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 102
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 5, 2005
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: August 13, 1975
• Content Type: LETTER

OLC 75-1221/b
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON,D.C. 20505
13 AUG 1975
Honorable Lucien N. Nedzi, Chairman
Special Subcommittee on Intelligence
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives
Washington., D. C. 20515
You may be aware of the May 30, 1975 Comptroller General report
entitled "Problems in Slowing the Flow of Cocaine and Heroin From and Through
South America." The report discusses the roles and performance of the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Drug Enforcement Administration of the Department of
Justice, and the Department of State in the U. S. Government's efforts to curb the
flow of illicit narcotics into the United States. The report concludes that since
1971:
PI
--drug seizures and arrests have increased;
--cooperation on the part of some South American countries
has improved;
--local government officials are more aware of drug abuse
problems;
--foreign narcotics enforcement groups have been more effective; and
--better information has become available on drug trafficking."
However, because of the magnitude of the problem, the Comptroller General
also concluded that large quantities of cocaine and heroin will continue to
reach the United States from South America.
The involvement of this Agency in the Federal Government's anti-drug
program began in October 1969, when former President Nixon established the
White House Task Force on Narcotics Control, and appointed the Director a
member. CIA was requested to use its existing intelligence collection resources
to provide intelligence to the other members of the Task Force. In September 1971
the President replaced the Task Force with the Cabinet Committee on International.
Narcotics Control; the Director was appointed to the Committee, and the Agency
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was assigned the responsibility of collecting and coordinating clandestine
foreign intelligence gathering related to narcotics. We have committed substantial
resources to this assignment. The Comptroller General's report is complimentary
of the Agency's performance, pointing out that: CIA has furnished the Drug
Enforcement Administration with much. useful intelligence, and that CIA originated
the major international narcotics trafficker register program (MINT), which the
report concludes should be the primary means for focusing U. S. Governmental
efforts on the major international traffickers.
The report also details the problems which hamper U. S. Governmental
efforts. One major problem (which is germane to other areas of the world as
well) is that intelligence collection activities have suffered because CIA and DEA
have disagreed on their respective intelligence roles, thereby limiting cooperation
and data sharing. Three factors related to this disagreement on intelligence roles
are cited.
a. Different objectives. CIA's primary function is to provide the
nation's policymakers with intelligence on foreign developments and
threats affecting the national security. 'Foreigners who assist the Agency
in this endeavor are also the origin of much of CIA's information on
drug traffic. The Director of Central Intelligence is charged by statute
with protecting these intelligence sources from unauthorized disclosure.
In contrast, DEA's assignment is to curb narcotics traffic by seizing
drugs and arresting and prosecuting traffickers.
b. Different modes of operation. DEA overt activities and cooperation
with local police are served by publicizing efforts and crediting local officials
for assistance. CIA must be kept out of the limelight.
c. Lack of trust. The different objectives and modes of
operation have engendered a lack of trust between CIA and DEA
employees.
The Comptroller General's report is based on information gathered largely
in late 1973. I am pleased to report that meaningful improvements have occurred
since that date, and that there have been significant achievements in the program
since the report data was compiled. Cooperation between CIA and the DEA inter-
national intelligence division is now excellent. Both parties are working together
to improve the means to collect, collate, and analyze useful intelligence information.
However, problems remain between CIA and the management levels of the enforce-
ment side of DEA, which do not, welcome CIA involvement in operations against
foreign traffickers, as they are concerned that CIA's activities could impede
prosecutions because of the necessity to protect sources and methods from discovery
procedures. We are working with DEA to resolve this problem in appropriate ways,
In closing, I want to emphasize that this.Agency is dedicated to doing
all within its a~ithority to help curb the flow of illicit narcotics into this country.
In calling upon the resources of the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control is fully aware that
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the Agency's contribution is in the area of providing leads and information
to obstruct illicit narcotics traffic and not in the area of prosecutions where
to do so would seriously jeopardize both our continued capability to provide
such support to this government-wide effort, and our overall foreign
intelligence mission.
Sincerely,
fW W. a CQ1
W. E. Colby
Director
Distribution:
Orig. - Addressee
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
- OLC/Subj. w/basic
- OLC/Chrono
1 - 0GC
1 - DDO
OLC/DR4/dlw/I (29 July 1975)
3
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON,D.C. 20505
OLC 75-1221/
13 AUG 1975
Honorable John C. Stennis, Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
You may be aware of the May 30, 1975 Comptroller General report
entitled "Problems in Slowing the Flow of Cocaine and Heroin From and Through
South America. " The report discusses the roles and performance of the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Drug Enforcement Administration of the Department of
Justice, and the Department of State in the U. S. Government's efforts to curb the
flow of illicit narcotics into the United States. The report concludes that since
1971-
11
--drug seizures and arrests have increased;
--cooperation on the part of some South American countries
has improved;
--local government officials are more aware of drug abuse
problems;
--foreign narcotics enforcement groups have been more effective; and
--better information has become available on drug trafficking ."
However, because of the magnitude of the problem, the Comptroller General
also concluded that large quantities of cocaine and heroin will continue to
reach the United States from South America.
The involvement of this Agency in the Federal Government's anti.-drug
program began in October 1969, when former President Nixon established the
White House Task Force on Narcotics Control, and appointed the Director a
member. CIA was requested to use its existing intelligence collection resources
to provide intelligence to the other members of the Task Force. In September 1971
the President replaced the Task Force with the Cabinet Committee on International
Narcotics Control; the Director was appointed to the Committee, and the Agency
0\.UTIO/,
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was assigned the responsibility of collecting and coordinating clandestine
foreign intelligence gathering related to narcotics. We have committed substantial
resources to this assignment. The Comptroller General's report is complimentary
of the Agency's performance, pointing out that CIA has furnished the Drug
Enforcement Administration with much useful intelligence, and that CIA originated
the major international narcotics trafficker register program (MINT), which the
report concludes should be the primary means for focusing U. S. Governmental
efforts on the major international traffickers.
The report also details the problems which hamper U. S. Governmental
efforts. One major problem (which is germane to other areas of the world as
well) is that intelligence collection activities have suffered because CIA and DEA
have disagreed on their respective intelligence roles, thereby limiting cooperation
and data sharing. Three factors related to this disagreement on intelligence roles
are cited.
a. Different objectives. CIA's primary function is to provide the
nation's policymakers with intelligence on foreign developments and
threats affecting the national security. Foreigners who assist the Agency
in this endeavor are also the origin of much of CIA's information on
drug traffic. The Director of Central Intelligence is charged by statute
with protecting these intelligence sources from unauthorized disclosure.
In contrast, DEA's assignment is to curb narcotics traffic by seizing
drugs and arresting and prosecuting traffickers.
b. Different modes of operation. DEA overt activities and cooperation
with local police are served by publicizing efforts and crediting local officials
for assistance. CIA must: be kept out of the limelight.
c. Lack of trust. The different objectives and modes of
operation have engendered a lack of trust between CIA and DEA
employees.
The Comptroller General's report is based on information gathered largely
in late 1973. I am pleased to report that meaningful improvements have occurred
since that date, and that there have been significant achievements in the program
since the report data was compiled. Cooperation between CIA and the DEA inter-
national intelligence division is now excellent. Both parties are working together
to improve the means to collect, collate, and analyze useful intelligence information.
However, problems remain between CIA and the management levels of the enforce-
ment side of DEA, which do not welcome CIA involvement in operations against:
foreign traffickers, as they are concerned that CIA's activities could impede
prosecutions because of the necessity to protect sources and methods from discovery
procedures. TA e are working w'_th DEA to resolve this problem in appropriate ways.
In closing, I want to emphasize that this Agency is dedicated to doing
all within its authority to help curb the :`low of illicit narcotics into this country.
In calling upon he resources of the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control is fully aware that
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 ., s
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the Agency's contribution is in the area of providing leads and information.
to obstruct illicit narcotics traffic and not in the area of prosecutions where
to do so would seriously jeopardize both our continued capability to provide
such support to this government-wide effort, and our overall foreign
intelligence mission.
Sincerely,
E. C9141
W. E. Colby
Director
Distribution:
Orig. - Addressee
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 -. -SIT
OLC/cubj.w/basic
1 - OLC/Ghrono
1 - OGC
1 - DDO
_A (29 July 1975)
STAT OLC/DFt4/dlw4
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 'NtER1~AC CONFIDENTIAL ^ SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED [~ S oN ^ _
ROUTING AN _
Legislative Counsel
7D 3 5 :HQ
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
Director
DATE
RECEIVED FORWARDED
Attached for your signature is
the letter to the House and Senate
Armed Services Committees regardi
the Comptroller General's report on
drug traffic. We have retyped the
letter, adding the clause you
suggested. -5GC and Narcog boths
agreecCTo the change.
eo e L. ary
islative Counsel
ATE
12 August 1975
AT
OFFICER'S I COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
INITIALS to whom. Draw a tine across column after each comment.)
TK
LVV -0
FORM USE PREVIOUS UNCLASSIFIED
3-62 61O EDITIONS ^ SECRET ^ CONFIDENTIAL USE ONLY
 0
UNCLASA ff"ed For
SUBJECT: (optional)
FROM:
Legislative Counsel
7D49
TO: (Officer designation, rootp nurnker, and
building)
Director
Q I-C
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
/'7 - ;J't'
RECEIVED
y
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
29 July 1975
STV
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom'
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
7 Attached for your signature is a
roposed letter to our House and
j 1) Senate Armed Services
Subcommittees on the Comptroller
General's report entitled,
"Problems in Slowing the Flow of
Cocaine and Heroin From and
Through South America, " per
the last paragraph of your letter
reproduced on page 83 of the ST
report. This has been coordinated
with Narrna_
NT
e r. cary z., ST
T
gislative Counsel
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~^^II~I~fYii~l~~~1i~~~^^^^A ^^wl~fl ^ ~~w
INTERNt
FORM 61 U USE PREVIOUS SECRET U CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED
$_62 EDITIONS _a_ ...r UEyDA~Y
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TO
FROM: &A/
DATE
f/L
SUBJECT: SUSPENSE DATE
7v
COO IDTNATF.Tm WTTTJ (flat ? mes as well as Offices):
Name Office
Name Office
ACTION REQUIRED
~ .,~,heca6
t- /4-t 7WA14C /.c/
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M
7S_/4O
24 June 1975
SUBJECT Draft Briefing Aid for the Legislative
Oversight Committees with Regard to
the GAO Report on Drug Traffic From
and Through South America
In response to your request, a draft memorandum
is hereby forwarded for your consideration. Please
feel free to call if I can be of any further assistance
in this matter.
72
Attachment: A/S
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 UNt`LASSIFIED
ARK
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
DATE
RECEIVED FORWARDED
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
26 June 1975
0 SECRET"
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whor
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.
I have a courier standing by
to deliver this letter to Senator
Percy tonight. As you know,
this is a matter of major
interest in the Chicago area
as a result of a series of news-
paper articles.
The attached has been prepared
by OGC and has been cleared,
in principle with the Depari.nlenl
of Justice and the U. S.
Attorney in Chicago and
coordinated with Ted Shackley
and of DDO. ST
In order to assure that we are
putting a positive foot forward,
I felt it was necessary to add
the last paragraph. I
recommend that you sign. the
attached letter as Acting
Director and I will supply
copies of it to our oversight
committees first thing in
the S
c in egis a. ive Couns-el.
I. Aaroved For Relea
?o i- eoiriorts"" ~j SECRET [] CONFIDENTIAL o INTERNAL
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El UNCLASSIFIED
WT
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 IMITTESA
ABRAHAM~RIBICOFF. CONN., CHAIRMAN ~~~/-/~~H(EE/N~R(Y ~M.. JACKSON. WASH.. CHAIRMAN
HENRY M. JACKSON. WASH. /~pprcrv , ,1!~ase 2005/07/13 CIA-RDP77M001 JAOP jRO AO06 F!V'LV023-2 JACOO K. JAV1TSCH.I
EDMUND S. MUSKIE, MAINE W ILLIAAI V. BOTH, JR.. DEL. SAM NUNN. GA. WILLIAM V. ROTH. JR., DE`_
LEE METCALF, MONT. BILL BROOK, TENN. LAWTON CHILES, FLA. RILL BROCK. TENN.
LOWELL P. WEICKER, JR., CONN.
JAMES B. ALLEN. ALA. JOHN GLENN. OHIO
LAWTON CHILES, FLA. HOWARD J. FELDMAN
SAM NUNN, GA. CHIEFCOUNSEL
JOHN GLENN, OHIO
RICHARD A. WEGMAN
CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR e ? ra e CHIEF COUNSEL TO THE MINORITY
!1" ?~Yi iii COMMITTEE ON EXODU.CIY~J H-9:1-t-_
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE BY HAND ,,-
ON INVESTIGATIONS
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. III, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
June 20, 1975
The Honorable William E. Colby
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. Director:
Both the Chicago Tribune and the Chicago Daily News have charged this
week that the Central Intelligence Agency, by failing to cooperate
with Federal prosecutors in Illinois, has forced the U.S. Attorney
there to drop drug charges against an employee of the C.I.A.
As you know, the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
has been holding hearings on the effectiveness and efficiency of the
Federal drug law enforcement effort. The Subcommittee has received
highly c:redih l c evidence indicating; that international heroin traffick--
in--; is increasing dramatically and that drug abuse is approaching
epiden.ie proportions. As the ranking minorityr member of the Subcommittee,
I find it e.ctra.ardinarv that Federal prosecutors attempting to control
this .1.1licit trade cannot obtain the cooperation of another Federal
agency in prosecuting individuals talking -part in a massive drug
conspiracy .
tJ -
STAT
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PAGE 2
I sincerely hone that these news accounts are inaccurate. Or, if
they are true, I would like to have a complete justification for
the policy pursued in this case.
Please provide me by June 26, 1975, with a detailed explana.tinn of
this entire case,
een consul-Led on this matter. I am primarily interested in
learning the reasons for the alleged lack of cooperation between the
C.I.A. and the Justice Department.
Sincerely,
Charles H. Percy
Ranking Minority "?ember
CHP:rrg
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I
2
DCI
DDCI
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
3
S/MC
4
DDS&T
5
DDI
_
6
DDA
7
DDO
X
8
D/DCI/IC
9
D/DCI/NI
10
GC
X
LC
X
12
IG
13
Compt
14
D/Pers
15
D/S
'I6
DTR
17
Asst/DCI
18
AO/DCI
19
20
21
22
Remarks:
To 7: Please review and, if appropriate,
call to DCI's attention.
To 11: Please take any necessary action per
last paragraph of DCI's letter reproduced on
page 83.
D// ar
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3637 (1-75) Dot*
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
Routing Slip
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UNCLASSIFIEQ
C o n t e n t s
Page
DIGEST
CHAPTER
INTRODUCTION 1
U.S. enforcement effort
in South America 1
U.S. Embassy involvement
Scope of review 3
2 OBJECTIVES, PROGRESS, AND DRUG SITUATION
IN SOUTH AMERICA 4
Progress 5
Drug situation 13
LACK OF INTELLIGENCE SHARING AND AGENCY
COOPERATION 16
Disagreement between DEA and PIA
on narcotics intelligence roles 17
Limited exchange of intelligence on
international drug traffickers 27
Lack of cooperation by the courts to
deter trafficking 31
Inadequate use of intelligence for
drug interdictions at U.S. ports 31
Lack of funds for purchasing informa-
tion 34
The register program 35
Conclusion 36
Recommendations to the Attorney
General 36
Agency actions 37
NEED FOR MORE INVOLVEMENT BY THE DEPARTMENT
OF STATE.AND ACTIONS BY HOST CQUNTRIES
AGAINST DRUG TRAFFICKERS 40
Department of State activities 40
Host country effectiveness 48
Conclusions 54
Recommendations to the Secretary of
State 54
Agency actions 54
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UNGL,
I
Pag e
MANAGEMENT AND FUNDING
56
Manpower
56
Operating funds
58
Problems with immobilizing major
traffickers
59
Lack of administrative support
63
Conclusions"
64
Letter dated March 12, 1975, from the
Assistant Attorney General for- Adminis
tration, Department of Justice
66
Letter dated February 19, 1975, from the
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Budget and Finance,- Department of State
74
Letter'~dated January 30, 1.975,,-from the
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
83
IV GAO reports on
Principal officials responsible for.
administ-6tring-'acctivitiee:;? discussed in
this report
ABBREVIATIONS
BNDD Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
BOP Bureau of Prisons'
CCINC Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
DEA Drug Enforcement Administration
GAO General Accounting Office
INS Immigration a.nd Naturalization Service
MINT Major International' Narcotics Traffickers
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T
COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS
PROBLEMS IN SLOWING THE FLOW OF
COCAINE AND HEROIN FROM AND
THROUGH SOUTH AMERICA
Drug Enforcement Administration
Department of Justice
Department of State
Central Intelligence Agency..
WHY THE REVIEW WAS MADE
U.S. authorities estimated in
1973 that
--all cocaine abused. in the
United States was grown in
South American countries, and
--about 50 percent of the
heroin reaching the United
States passed:th.rough South
or Central American countries
and Mexico. (See p. 1.)
GAO conducted a review to de-
termine U.S. efforts to stop
the flow of cocaine and heroin
from and through South America.
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
U.S. enforcement objectives in
South America are to stop co-
caine and heroin bound for the
United States. either by cutting
off the drugs or eliminating
local illicit production. U.S.
Ambassadors are responsible for
seeing that U.S. objectives are
achieved in each country. They
are supported in the drug area
by the Drug Enforcement Admin-
istration, the prime U.S. drug
enforcement agency; the Central
Intelligence Agency, the pri-
mary foreign clandestine intel-
ligence collection agency;. and
drug control committees formed
in 1971 in each country. Since
then
--drug seizures and arrests
have increased;
--cooperation on the part. of
some South American countries
has improved;
--local government officials
are more aware of drug abuse
problems;
--foreign narcotic enforcement
groups have been more effec-
tive; and
--better information has become
available on drug traffick-
ing. (See pp. 2, 4, and 5.)
However, it is unrealistic to
expect that large quantities of
cocaine and heroin will no
longer reach the United States
from South America. Delays in
progress can be expected be-
cause of the magnitude of the
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All other material on this
page is UNCLASSIFIED.
CONFIDENTIAL
problem, the difficulties in
dealing with corruption, polit-
ical instability, insufficient
equipment and trained person-
nel, and lack of effective drug
laws in South America. (See
p. 5.)
GAO found that U.S. enforcement
efforts have been hampered by
--the need for increased intel-
ligence gathering, sharing,
and cooperation among U.S.
agencies involved in drug in-
terdiction,
--the need for more aggressive
actions by the Department of
State to support drug agents
and programs,
--inadequate extradition trea-
ties or workable alterna-
tives,
--inefficient use of the judi-
cial system as a deterrent to
trafficking,
--inadequate utilization of in-
telligence to make drug in-
terdictions at U.S. ports of
entry,
--limited and ineffective ef-
fort by local enforcement
groups to combat the inter-
national drug problem,
T--the need for an increased UsE!
of resources to identify and
systematically immobilize
major traffickers, and
--problems in allocating funds
and manpower to accomplish
enforcement objectives.
Intelligence sharing and
M2ncy_cooperation
The development of foreign
na.rcotics intelligence is a
prime responsibility of certain
Drug Enforcement Administration
and Central Intelligence Agency
officers stationed overseas.
This dual responsibility for
narcotics intelligence was as-
signed by Presidential direc-
tive. (See p. 17.)
The exchange of intelligence
among all U.S. agencies-on the
movements of international drug
traffickers was limited. The
Immigration and Naturalization
Service, Bureau of Prisons, and
the State Department have in-
formation on aliens involved
with drugs. But, this informa-
tion has not been effectively
used by the Drug Enforcement
Administration to increase its
success in locating and
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immobilizing major traffickers.
(See p. 27.)
Before establishing the Drug
Enforcement Administration in
July 1973, drug agents of the
Bureau of Narcotics and Dan-
gerous Drugs, and Customs on
-foreign assignments regularly
received intelligence data on
movements of ships, auto-
mobiles, and traffickers from
the Customs Service. After
July 1973, this information
was no longer provided, since
those special agents remaining
with Customs were no longer
permitted to engage in narco-
tics activities as a primary
mission. (See p. 29.)
11 State De artment involvement
and host counter action
There is room for Embassies to
improve drug enforcement ac-
tions, and provide Embassy of-
ficials with familiarization
training in drugs, trafficking,
and enforcement activities.
(See p. 42.)
Extradition
One of the most important U.S.
goals is to immobilize traf-
fickers, either in the United
States or in other countries.
The Drug Enforcement Adminis-
tration needs to either re-
trieve violators who have fled
from the United States and
prosecute them in U.S. courts
or to have them prosecuted in
the country to which they fled.
Extradition agreements permit
the transfer of alleged crim-
inals 'from one nation to another.
In 1966, 'the- then Acting Commis-
sioner of Narcotics stated that
obtaining the extradition of
narcotics offenders had become'
a problem. Now, in 1975, this
is still the case. (See
p. 44.)
The Drug Enforcement Adminis-
tration, and the Departments of
Justice and State are consider-
ing various approaches to im-
proving extradition procedures,
such as efforts to negotiate
new treaties and the hiring of
local attorneys in various
countries to handle extradition
paperwork and procedures. New
treaties need to be negotiated
or workable alternatives found
that will provide the necessary
tools, to insure that drug traf-
fickers are immobilized. (See
p. 46.)
Judicial system
There are many barriers to
stopping the flow of cocaine
and heroin coming to the United
States--some are beyond the
control of U.S. agencies.
One is that the judicial system
is. not being effectively used
as a deterrent to trafficking.
Drug Enforcement Administration
officials said that the judi-
cial districts that adhere to
the spirit of the law in
riii
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processing drug cases are a
distinct minority and that lax
procedures and weak sentences
are the rule. (See p. 31.)
Inadequate utilization of
intelligence to make drug
interdict onsatU.S._ports
Host countr effectiveness
There have been increases in
activities by local enforcement
agencies to impede the flow of
drugs in most South American
countries. But, further prog-
ress is impeded by
--corruption and political
instability;
--lack of qualified and dedi-
cated enforcement personnel
and needed equipment;
--lack of effective laws in
some countries concerning
penalties for drug offenses
or for the destruction of
seized drugs; and
--low salaries and an inadequ-
ate reward system to motivate
local police to increase drug
enforcement efforts.
Immobilization of major
traffickers
The Drug Enforcement Adminis-
tration claims that most of its
enforcement effort should be
directed toward immobilizing
major violators. In South
America less than 50 percent
of enforcement time is directed
to this task. One of the main
reasons for this was that re--
quests from domestic regions,
not involving major violators,
required too much of the local
Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion's time. (See p. 59.)
Problems exist with the identi-
fication and systematic immobi-
lization of major traffickers.
The Drug Enforcement Adminis-
tration's Regional Office did
not retain a current listing of
those major traffickers operat-
ing within the region, and the
major traffickers being worked
in the district offices were
not always the same as those on
file in the Regional Office.
(See p. 61.)
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A solution to the problem of
focusing resources on major
narcotics traffickers has re-
cently been developed jointly
by the Central Intelligence
Agency and Drug Enforcement
Administration and approved by
the Cabinet Committee on Inter-
national Narcotics Control.
This joint program has been
undertaken :to identify and col-
lect intelligence on the major
international narcotics traf-
fickers operating throughout
the world.
These individuals are listed in
the Major International Narco-
tics Traffickers Register which
is available to the Central In-
telligence Agency and Drug En-
forcement Administration in
Washington and overseas. This
register does not include Amer-
ican citizens. (See p. 35.)
which should help slow the flow
of cocaine and heroin from and
through South America. (See
pp. 36 and 54.)
AGENCY ACTIONS AND UNRESOLVED
ISSUES ~-----------~--
GAO did not submit this report
to the Department of the Treas-
ury for written comments; how-
ever, pertinent sections were
discussed with officials of the
United States Customs Service
and their comments and sugges-
tions were considered. GAO did
submit the report to the De-
partments of Justice and State,
and to the Central Intelligence
Agency for written comments.
These agencies agreed in gen-
eral with GAO's recommendations
and provided GAO with correc-
tive actions (included in the
report) they are taking. (See
apps. I, II, and III.)
The Major International Narco-
tics Traffickers Program and
the specialized computer system
appear to be a practical means
of focusing limited resources
where they will have the great-
est impact through systemati-
cally collecting and processing
intelligence on the traffickers
of greatest priority. This in-
formation with adequate physi-
cal description can be of great
assistance to the Customs Serv-
ice in performing its interdic-
tion role. (See p. 31.)
RECOMMENDATIONS
GAO made several recommenda-
tions to the Attorney General
and the Secretary of State
The Administrator, Drug En-
forcement Administration, told
GAO on April 3, 1975, that he
plans to establish a second
regional office in South
America. GAO believes that
this will provide greater con-
trol and supervision over drug
programs, increase their effec-
tiveness, and eliminate some of
the problems noted in this
report.
Some of the problems discussed
in this report describe the
situations that existed during
1972 and 1973. Agency offi-
cials told GAO that some of
these situations no longer
exist and improvements are
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being made in others. The cur-
rent status of these findings
are discussed in the report.
MATTERS FOR CONSIDERATION
BY THE CONGRESS
This report advises the Con-
gress of efforts needed and be-
ing taken to slow the flow of
drugs into the United States
from South America and should
be useful in future hearings on
the overall drug abuse problem.
To insure that greater numbers
of major international drug
traffickers are immobilized,
there is a need for increased
intelligence, better inter-
agency cooperation, and more
realistic extradition agree-
ment. Because these areas in-
volve several agencies and past
jealousies have reduced their
effectiveness, the Congress may
wish to inquire periodically
into what is being done in
these three vital areas.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Cocaine is increasingly becoming the choice for many drug
users in the United States. Arrests and seizures involving
cocaine during 1973 were 149 and 185 percent higher than in
1970, respectively. The Drug Enforcement Administration's
(DEA's) foreign cooperated arrests during the first half
of fiscal year 1975 numbered 689 of which 236 were arrested
for cocaine. While cocaine is not physically addicting, its
high stimulant, hallucinatory and ecstatic effect combined
with the severe depression which occurs during withdrawal,
impels the abuser to seek a new high. Also, chronic use
may result in paranoid delusions or aggressive action. For
example, it is said that the heroin addict commits crime
to obtain the drugs, but the cocaine user commits crime
while under the influence of the drug.
According to U.S. authorities, all cocaine abused in
the United States comes from the Andes Mountain area in
South America, where it is cultivated. South America, to
a lesser extent, is also an indigenous source for marihuana,
heroin, and various hallucinogenic drugs. However, enforce-
ment effort in South America is mainly directed toward cocaine
and the use of South America as a transshipment point for
European and Asian heroin.
DEA estimated that more than 50 percent of the heroin
seizures in the United States during 1973 passed through
Latin America, on its way to drug users in the United States.
DEA officials indicated that this had. decreased during 1974.
Several factors make South America a very attractive place
for drug transactions, including (1) South America's ex-
panding role in international commerce and travel, (2) the
political climate, (3) the number of inhabitants that have
ethnic and family ties to Europe and Asia, and (4) its
history of contraband smuggling activities.
U.S. ENFORCEMENT
EFFORT IN SOUTH AMERICA
To achieve its objectives of stopping the flow of
drugs as close to the source as possible, the former Bureau
.of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (.NDD) established a regional
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office in South America in January 1972.' Before that time
enforcement effort in South America had been coordinated by
BNDD's Mexico regional office. On July 1, 1973, BNDD, along
with the office for Drug Abuse Law Enforcement, the Office
of National Narcotics Intelligence, and drug enforcement
personnel from the Bureau of Customs were merged to form
DEA in the Department of Justice.
DEA has responsibility for U.S. drug enforcement pro-
grams in South America. As of: January 31, 1975, 32 of DEA's
2,086 agents were stationed in South America, either in the
regional office or one of 11 district offices. For fiscal
year 1976, DEA requested about $151 million. The 1974 and
1975 budget is divided into the following areas:
Appropriation
Budget activity 9 975_
(000 omitted)
Law enforcement:
Criminal enforcement $ 81,004 $ 96,044
Compliance and regulation 9,078 10,776
State and local assistance 10,188 11,475
Intelligence 5,516 9,461
Research and development 6,491 6,734
Executive direction 222 510
Total $112,499 $135,000
U.S. EMBASSY INVOLVEMENT
In 1971, U.S. Embassy involvement in drug law enforce-
ment increased in many countries as a result of the
President's directive establishing t.h.e Cabinet Committee
for International Narcotics Control to coordinate activities
of curtailing and eventually eliminating the flow of illegal
narcotics and dangerous drugs into the United States. To
complement the Washington effort, drug control committees
have been formed in some foreign nations to stop illicit
drug trafficking. The committees are responsible for coordina-
ting and guiding U.S. anti-drug activities in their respective
countries. The committees' first task was to develop plans
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outlining, among other topics, the (1) host country's
influence on the U.S. drug problem, (2) U.S. goals and
objectives to counteract this influence, and (3) specific
steps to achieve these goals and objectives.
Committees have been formed in various countries in
South America and action plans have been developed. In some
countries full-time drug coordinators have been assigned.
Committee membership usually includes representatives from
the Department of State, DEA, Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), Agency for International Development, and the United
States Information Service. To assist in gathering and
analyzing pertinent data, a subcommittee on Narcotics In-
telligence was established in some countries.
Because of national concern, GAO has provided the Con-
gress with several reports over the-past few years on drug
enforcement. A list of some of these reports is included
as appendix IV.
SCOPE OF REVIEW
We reviewed U.S. efforts to stem the flow of illicit
drugs from South America and examined the programs and ef-
forts being made by DEA, Department of State, and CIA to
confront the problem. Our review was made at:
--DEA's Washington, D.C. headquarters and South
America regional offices;
--U.S. Embassies in 10 countries in South America;
--Department of State, Washington, D.C.; and
--CIA headquarters, Langley, Virginia, and CIA Stations
in South America.
We examined DEA, CIA, and Department of State documents;
and DEA, CIA, Department of State, and other agencies' files
on drug control activities. We also discussed the illicit
drug situation. in South America with numerous agency officials.
Photographs and maps in this report were supplied by
DEA unless otherwise indicated.
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CHAPTER 2
OBJECTIVES, PROGRESS, AND
DRUG SITUATION IN SOUTH AMERICA
The U.S. strategy of reducing drug abuse consists of
various programs in the areas of law enforcement and control,
treatment and rehabilitation, education and training, and
research. Success, if obtained, will be the result of a
balanced effort in these areas.
U.S. objectives in Sout':Z America are to identify and
disrupt major drug distribution organizations operating
through or from there. Prime emphasis is directed toward
heroin and cocaine systems, with secondary emphasis directed
toward marihuana or dangerous drugs. Under DEA's Geographical
Drug Program important drug producing and distributing coun-
tries have been divided into geographical areas by drug or
drugs for concentrated intellingence gathering and enforce-
ment effort. Latin America, including Mexico, Central, and
South America, is one of the six principal drug trafficking
networks so designated. This area has been identified for
concentrated activity dealing with heroin and cocaine.
As of September 1.973, 52 major heroin and cocaine
traffickers had been identified by the South American regional
office for priority enforcement effort. Regional officials
stated that in order to achieve their overall goal they must
--improve intelligence gathering,
--improve flow of intelligence among U.S. agencies,
--encourage improvement. in local drug enforcement
through training and equipment grants,
--obtain major traffickers for trial in the United
States when local laws and judicial systems are not
adequate,
--encourage improvement: in local laws and judicial
systems,
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--foster cooperation among the various South American
countries,
--encourage increased participation of other local
agencies (customs, military, etc.) in drug control,
and
--overcome administrative and personnel problems.
Progress has been made although it has been slow. In
most South American countries there has been an increase in
local drug enforcement efforts which can be attributed largely
to U.S. influence. Many countries established narcotics en-
forcement groups to combat the increasing international drug
problem and some countries even revised or changed their
laws to increase the penalties for drug cultivation, use,
or trafficking.
The local drug enforcement unit in one country has been
in existence for four years, whereas, another country's drug
unit only became operational in 1973. In one country, three
local enforcement agencies have each formed narcotics enforce-
ment units. Other similar units have been formed throughout
South America.
The laws in some countries have been revised or changed
to make the use or trafficking of drugs less desirable. For
example, on October 17, 1973, one country unanimously adopted
a new narcotics law which culminates various diplomatic moves
and overtures by the U.S. mission seeking more stringent laws.
In another country, the drug law has been revised to include
penalties of from 8 to 12 years for drug trafficking.
There have been arrests of drug traffickers, seizures
of drugs, and extradition and expulsion of drug traffickers
to the United States for prosecution. For example, DEA
reports the arrest of 14 high-level traffickers during fiscal
year 1973.
However, it is unrealistic to expect within the near
future that large quantities of cocaine and heroin will no
longer reach the United States from South America. Some of
the delays in progress can be expected because of difficulties
5
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Cocaine is an ,~!4caiold corltarned Ir! i i .riroxylon cocci Lamark., ol, I.
region. Here, on steep (erraeect is It-gaily cultivated Fcr .1F
LASSI FLED
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The coca plants are harvested from two to six times a year by stripping the leaves from the
plant.
7
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:er the leaves have been removed from the plant, they are dried in the sun before shipment.
elatively small amount is exported to the United States where the leaves yield flavoring ex-
c:ts for an expanding beverage industry and cocaine is used for medical purposes.
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In Soul :h America, the coca leaf is chewed for refreshment and relief from fatigue, much as
North Americans once chewed tobacco. The ancient custom of coca-chewing is illustrated by
a pot from the Mochica Culture that dates from 600 to 800 A.D.
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'i'he coca leaf is converted to coca soaste it a large nu iit)er car prii i.tive or mobile laboratories.
TheGe laboratories have small production cat>acities, nakiaq bate ies of coca paste of about
two to three kilograms at a time.
fly ; illicit iaboratorv had an estimated precUd On a ijdcliy of iuu pounds of cocaine per
1m-nth.
.I L.A.S I F; to
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Coca leaves and cocaine hydrochloride. The cocaine paste (above to left) is converted to the
crystalline cocaine. and smuggled into the United States. Above right is an unusual crystalline
form of cocaine; below, cocaine (nickname "snow") as it normally appears on the illicit market.
Abusers in the United States generally inhale it ("snort"), or inject it into the body after mix-
ing the crystalline powder with heroin.
N(' 11
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in dealing with corruption, political instability,
insufficient equipment and trained personnel, and lack of
uniform laws in South America.
DRUG SITUATION
Coca ine
The majority of coca leaves are grown in two countries
(see pictures and map on pp. 6 to 12) with limited growth
in three other countries. This use of coca dates back to
the time of the Incas and today tea made from the leaves
is very common. Because the yield of cocaine is about
1 kilogram to 100 kilograms of leaves, production of coca
paste (the first processing step in the production of
cocaine) is usually in laboratories close to the small
coca farms located along the Andes. The paste is then
moved. to major processing laboratories in three countries.
Small amounts also move to four other countries with cur-
rent data indicating that these latter routes may be ex-
panding in overall importance. The paste is converted in
small laboratories to cocaine hydrochloride, the finished
product, which usually requires two simple chemical pro-
cesses. In some cases the coca paste is changed to cocaine
base in intermediate laboratories closer to the growing
areas. In one country, a November 1973 U.S. Embassy study
indicated that laboratories had produced 770 to 880 pounds
of cocaine. The agent in charge in another country estimated
that from 550 to 1,100 pounds are either produced or trans-
shipped to the United States each month. In July 1973,
68 pounds of cocaine were found in a load of bananas aboard
a ship in Baltimore, Maryland, which had recently arrived
from South America.
Heroin
While several small illicit poppy fields have been
located in three countries in South America, its involvement
with heroin has been basically as a transshipment point for
European-produced, and to a lesser extent, Asian-produced
heroin. (See map on p. 14.) Large seizures of from 36 to
136 pounds have been made in three countries and the major
cocaine and contraband routes on the west coast have also
been used to move heroin. A current situation developing
is the exchange of cocaine in Europe (where demand is
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growing) for heroin to be shipped to the United States.
A major trafficker, now serving a 20-year sentence in
New York for heroin conspiracy, handled large volumes of
heroin via contraband routes from one South American country,
across to the Pacific Coast through two other South American
countries and various Caribbean Islands to the United States.
After the trafficker's arrest and the arrest of various
associates, traffic in heroin appeared to decrease.
Marihuana and hashish
The main source of marihuana is in one country, with
smaller crops in most other South American countries. The
marihuana grown in South America is usually locally consumed
and marihuana abuse seems to be the,major drug problem in
South America, except for the high use of coca by the Indians
living in the growing areas and to a lesser extent by those
living in several. cities. While there is little data avail-
able on South American production of hashish, shipments have
been seized in two countries.
Hallucinogens
LSD and other hallucinogens found among certain groups
or communes in South America have usually come from the
United States and are not considered an important problem
at the present time. However, many varieties of plants
indigenous to South America, when ingested, cause LSD-type
effects and in some cases have not been placed on the con-
trolled substance list, making them a potential target for
future importation and abuse. Also, a DEA agent stated
that a drug firm in one country is producing ergotamine,
which is a basic precursor used in the production of LSD.
Other dangerous drugs
Amphetamines and barbiturates are abused by local
citizens; however, there is little effort to control over-
the-counter sales and there are no indications that South
America is being used to supply dangerous drugs to the
United States. However, several countries have the in-
dustrial capacity to do so and may increase production if
the United States is successful in. stopping the traffic from
other countries.
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LACK OF INTELLIGENCE SHARING AND AGENCY COOPERATION
DEA has established a number of programs to obtain
information on drug trafficking routes and methods used in
South America and during fiscal year 1973 a total of 54 traf-
fickers were arrested in South America of which 19 were high-
level (class I) traffickers. (For fiscal year 1974, a total
of 168 South American traffickers were arrested, of which
48 were class I.) In each of the countries we visited, how-
ever, agents and other officials expressed concern over the
lack of good intelligence on the size and nature of traffic
in specific regions and on the location of drug conversion
laboratories.
The effectiveness of enforcement effort--making important
arrests and seizures--depends upon the quality and quantity of
information (intelligence) that is available to those making
enforcement decisions. While some arrests and seizures are
made cold (without intelligence), the arrest of a major drug
trafficker is usually the result of long and tedious hours of
gathering and analyzing information., In South America, infor-
mation gathering is even more important, since most countries
lack effective drug and customs law:, and sufficient profes-
sional and well-trained enforcement personnel to work the
streets and borders on a regular basis.
Intelligence is obtained from a variety of sources using
several techniques such as informers, undercover buys, and
surveillance, Also, other agencies may already have valuable
information that, if made available,, could be very useful. At
the time of our review, the South American regional office had
implemented several intelligence probes to obtain additional
information. However, we found that intelligence activities
were not effective because:
25X1
--Data available on the :movement of international traf-
fickers was not systematically obtained from or pro-
vided to all agencies involved.
25X1
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--Additional funds were needed for purchasing informa
?tion.
--Data was not developed on dangerous drugs.
DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN DEA AND CIA ON
NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE ROLES
The development of foreign narcotics intelligence is a
prime responsibility of certain DEA and CIA officers stationed
overseas. This dual responsibility for narcotics intelligence
was assigned to DEA and CIA by Presidential directive.
Until 1969, BNDD had the primary responsibility for col-
lecting and analyzing foreign narcotics information. In 1969,
CIA was requested directly by the Executive Office of the
President to use its foreign intelligence resources to support
the U.S. international narcotics control program. With the
formation of the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics
Control (CCINC) in 1971, CIA was assigned the responsibility
for collecting and analyzing international narcotics intelli-
gence by clandestine means.
On July 27, 1972, the President issued Executive Or-
der 11676, establishing within the Department of Justice an
Office of National Narcotics Intelligence. The order assigned
the Director of ONNI responsibility for developing and main-
taining a National Narcotics Intelligence System in conjunc-
tion with Government measures for (1) restricting the illegal
flow of narcotics from abroad, (2) strengthening domestic law .
enforcement activities of Federal, State, and local agencies
in the narcotics area, and (3) initiating programs for drug
abuse prevention, education, treatment, and rehabilitation.
Issuance of the Executive order was followed by an appropria-
tion request which the President transmitted to the Congress
specifying that the mission of Narcotics Intelligence is "to
coordinate the determination of narcotics intelligence re-
quirements and the collection, analysis and dissemination of
narcotics intelligence from both overseas and domestic
sources."
This responsibility was transferred to DEA by Reorgani-
zation Plan #2 which created DEA on July 1, 1973. Under this
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Guidelines in South America
The blocked material is
classified as indicated.
All other material on this
page is UNCLASSIFIED.
Various documents obtained in different embassies in
South America outlined basically the same structure as pre-
sented above, stating that the CIA will coordinate all intel-
ligence activities related to narcotics suppression, and that
all intelligence activities and informants will be cleared
through them. However, these documents are not clear on just
what constitutes useful intelligence or how it will be ob-
tained or disseminated.
While we have information on the number and activities of
DEA agents in South America, CIA officials would or could not
provide specific information on the number of their men as-
signed or time spent in gathering drug intelligence. However,
from various documents and discussions it was apparent that
CIA had played an active role.
DEA/CIA relationshipcauses
~ oblems-Tor bot
h.Kenc s
A review of CIA narcotics intelligence on Latin America
revealed the intelligence reporting not only gives specific
actionable leads for DEA enforcement action but also an over-
all picture of major narcotics trafficking throughout Latin
America. There have also been a number of major arrests and
seizures based on CIA intelligence. Better investigative
followup of CIA intelligence by DEA should be possible when
the intelligence analysis capability of DEA is strengthened.
Based on an evaluation of DEA files and through discussions
with DEA and CIA agents and officials, the following problems
were identified.
1. CIA is precluded through legal restriction from con-
ducting foreign intelligence operations against U.S.
nationals. This also applies to narcotics intel-
ligence. At times, DEA has expressed concern be-
cause CIA does not assist in collecting intelligence
in cases involving narcotics traffickers who are
American citizens.
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2. There are legal restrictions on using CIA intelligence
in the enforcement process and because it concen-
trates on clandestine collection, CIA must protect
sensitive intelligence scurces and methods.
3. DEA, because of inherent short-term limitations of
an enforcement approach and a lack of or inability
to effectively use trained intelligence officers
overseas, has not oeen able in the past to exploit
intelligence leads provided by CIA as effectively
as it would like to. Th.s is improving as the in-
telligence collection and analysis; resources of DEA
are expanded.
Local enforcement agencies were reluctant to work
with DEA because of its relationship with CIA.
6. There is a need for an increased effort by both CIA
and DEA officers overseas to share and exchange
techniques and information on a regular basis.
Problems arise because of
dif ferent DEAand-CIA approaches
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DEA officials disagree-on
what~DEA andCIA-roles should be
While all DEA officials agreed that CIA could provide
valuable information, DEA enforcement division officials
stated DEA should be given complete authority for drug intel-
ligence with CIA reverting to its role of providing assistance
when requested. Intelligence division officials stated that
until DEA can fully develop and refine its own capability in
foreign countries, CIA should retain its current responsibil-
ity but that more specific guidelines should be issued. The
DEA administrator agreed that CIA should continue in its pres-
ent capacity, stating that it would be several years before
DEA could develop sufficient expertise to take over. He also
stated that it would be necessary to meet with both DEA and
CIA field agents and officials to overcome any problems and
to insure that they are cooperating fully.
DEA
DEA intelligence officials told us in October 1974 that:
--The CIA mandate to take the lead in collecting narco-
tics intelligence does not conflict with DEA's mandate
to coordinate the determination of narcotics intelli-
gence requirements and the collection, analysis, and
dissemination of narcotics intelligence from both
overseas and domestic sources.
-While conflicts have arisen in some areas, as a whole
the cooperation between the two agencies has been ex-
tremely close and mutually beneficial. Individual
agents, special agents in charge, and even regional
managers do not have the entire picture of this cooper-
ation in every instance. Numerous investigations by
BNDD and DEA have been initiated and jointly followed
to conclusion as a result of this cooperative effort.
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or CIA association in any manner with a DEA
investigation, have a vital impact on the final out-
come of prosecutions. Thus, the conflict is not just
""a long-term intelligence collection approach versus
a short-term police-oriented methodology," as CIA puts
it. The conflict is "usable versus unusable drug in-
telligepce." To overcome this conflict, new guidelines
for DEA/CIA coordination are now being formulated.]
--In reality, there are long-term advantages from impoo
menting a dual, clandestine, intelligence collection
approach used by CIA and the enforcement approach pur-
sued by DEA. CIA has the capability to acquire the
difficult and most protected information from which DEA
enforcement operations can evolve. The development of
the International Intelligence Division in DEA, which
includes regional intelligence units, should improve
interagency cooperation. DEA intelligence officers
will form the working-level linkage between the infor-
mation produced by CIA collectors and the needs of DEA
enforcement officers. Through the newly developed DEA
regional intelligence units, CIA information can be
collated, analyzed, and processed in a form most mean-
ingful to enforcement officers. Many of the issues are
procedural questions which unavoidably develop from the
working-level doctrinal differences between DEA and CIA
professional methods of operation. They are not, how-
ever, problems of sufficient gravity to have an impor-
tant impact on the success of the U.S. international
narcotics control program. [Note: The Department of
Justice told us that DEA is also establishing the ca-
pability to acquire difficult and protected information
from which DEA enforcement operations can evolve. Once
established, DEA's capability can be more accurately
targeted to mesh with enforcement action and support
]
prosecution.
--CIA and the DEA International Intelligence Division
have substantial resources to establish a coordinated
program of intelligence exchange. An important amount
of narcotics intelligence concerning Latin America,
has already been shared between the two agencies in
Washington and overseas. A large effort has been made
to develop the working-level framework of procedures
to insure this exchange on an ongoing basis.
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--There is a great potential for increased effectiveness
of U.S. antinarcotics programs in Latin America because
of the present complementary relationship of DEA and
CIA objectives. DEA officers will be concentrating
primarily on enforcement actions and upgrading the host
government narcotics control program. The CIA objec-
tive is collecting intelligence for use by DEA and the
Embassy Narcotics. Control Committee. CIA does not con-
duct. intelligence collection operations against Ameri-
can citizens trafficking in narcotics overseas but in-
telligence reports that are actionable 'in enforcement
terms are disseminated rapidly to DEA for followup.
DEA and CIA have worked together to establish an effi-
cient system for exchanging such intelligence, includ-
ing collection requirements, in a matter of hours if
necessary.
--DEA intelligence and enforcement officers engage in
followup enforcement action and analysis of CIAintel-
ligence to the extent that the present available man-
'power permits. Many CIA intelligence reports give an
overview of specific narcotics trafficking networks
and their activities which makes available timely de-
scriptive material to DEA for developing enforcement
operations. It is expected that the increased allo-
cation of DEA manpower and resources to intelligence
activity in Latin America will. increase its capability
to exploit CIA intelligence more thoroughly, leading
to enforcement action against major traffickers.
--Some of the complaints originally raised by CIA and DEA
people about each other result: from their early contact
over the differences in methodology and doctrine. How-
ever, these irritants have been resolved in the field
and at the headquarters level by developing new pro-
cedures.
State Department officials told us on February 19, 1975,
that guidelines in this area, insuring the establishment of
an effective system for sharing intelligence, have been pre-
pared and distributed to all concerned and appropriate over-
seas posts.
The Department of Justice told us that it agrees with
our observation that the dual DEA/CIA responsibility relating
to narcotics intelligence has created problems and that only
limited cooperation existed between the two agencies in 1973.
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However, it said that after the creation of DEA in July 1973,
many of the problems were resolved because of closer coopera-
tion between the agencies and that these cooperative efforts
continue on a daily basis.
LIMITED EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE
ON INTERNATIONAL DRUG TRAFFICKERS
South American countries have long been involved in all
types of smuggling activities and many have been havens for
criminals of all types. Combine this with corruption and the
lack of effective laws, regional cooperation, and adequate
communications. South America then emerges as a very attrac-
tive place for drug activities. Drug traffickers understand
and exploit these weaknesses, moving back and forth among
countries with relative ease on legal or illegal citizenship
documents. Also, many traffickers travel to the United States
or are fugitives from U.S. courts.
Because of ineffective extradition laws and the difficul-
ties encountered by DEA in having traffickers prosecuted in
South America, one of DEA's main objectives is to find some
way to get traffickers to the United States for trial on drug
conspiracy charges. Since most countries will expel third-
country nationals, it is also to DEA's advantage to have them
arrested when they are not in their own country. To accom-
plish this, DEA needs, but has not been receiving, current and
continuous data on the movement of these individuals.
Information available from other
a enccies not bb 9 fully tiled
The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), Bureau
of Prisons (BOP), and the Department of State have information
concerning aliens who are involved with drugs. INS has a sys-
tem to monitor the entry of aliens, including a lookout sys-
tem, to identify the entry of individuals wanted by other
agencies. BOP prepares a computer list showing aliens re-
leased from prison and deported, and the Department of State
has a lookout book in each embassy to identify and deny visa
requests from undesirables.
Several agents and the Regional Director in South America
told us that DEA was not receiving information from INS, BOP,
and the Department of State on the movement of drug traf-
fickers. They stated that drug traffickers had been denied
visas in some cases but that DEA was not informed of this
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action. If DEA had been involved they may have requested
the Department to grant the visa and then arrested the viola-
tor when he entered the United States. For example, when a.
trafficker applied for a visa the DEA agent was informed and
was able to follow the trafficker to obtain additional in-
formation. Also, officials indicated that drug violators
with open warrants have been deported from the United States
on false document charges before DEA was informed or was able
to make an arrest.
Of 395 aliens deported by INS in fiscal year 1973 for
drug violations, 57 were deported to countries included in
our review. We obtained a computer list from BOP showing the
aliens released from prison during fiscal year 1973; 25 were
deported--to South America.. We were informed that the old
Bureau of Narcotics in the Treasury Department did receive
information on aliens released from prison and.deported, but
that this information is no longer received. Agents believe
this data would be very helpful, since many violators return
to their homeland and enter drug trafficking again. For ex-
ample, a major trafficker serving a prison term for a 100-
kilogram cocaine case was released and deported. When he
reappeared in South America, it was the local enforcement
agency that informed DEA-of his whereabouts.
DEA agents and officials agreed that more could be done
to obtain and use information from other agencies but also
cautioned that because of the presence of local employees in
visa offices, care must be exercised in disseminating traf-
ficker lists or blanket requirements for data on individuals.
We were told that DEA had established a formal agreement with
INS to share information. Both agencies designated liaison
in March 1974 to implement the agreement.
The Department of -Justice informed us on March 12, 1975,
--DEA agrees that the intelligence exchange among INS,
BOP, and DEA is limited and s:aould be increased. BOP
has expressed its concern in drug trafficking matters
and has agreed to make available to DEA's office of
intelligence a list of aliens released from its facili-
ties for deportation. No problems are anticipated in
implementing this procedure in the immediate future.
--The operational agreement between INS and DEA, com-
pleted-on November 29, 1973, provided in general terms
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fora free and full exchange of information between
the two agencies.
--Further progress in cooperation is being achieved
through establishing and activating the multiagency
El Paso Intelligence Center. The Center is currently
operating under the leadership of a DEA Director and
an INS Deputy Director. Presently, plans call for
the Center to provide a complete intelligence picture
of drug trafficking between Mexico, Central America,
South America, and the United States. Raw intelligence
data will be gathered from concerned agencies within
the Department and through cooperation with other ap-
propriate agencies.
--Developing procedures and requirements, in consonance
with the cooperative arrangements between DEA, BOP,' and
INS, and the current efforts of the'Center, will pro-
vide a viable base for the 'ultimate attainment of"
worldwide, interagency exchange of information.
Loss of Customs data
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LACK OF COOPERATION BY THE
COURTS TODETER TRAFFICKING
There.are many barriers to stopping the flow of cocaine
and heroin into the United States, and some of these barriers
are beyond .the control, of U.S. agencies having this respon -
sibility.
One such major barrier is that the judicial system is not
cooperating to become an effective deterrent to traffickers.
DEA officials told us that the judicial districts that adhere
to the spirit of the law in processing drug.cases are a dis-
tinct minority and that lax procedures and weak sentences are
the rule.
,As an example, from July 1973 to. March 1974, DEA con-
ducted.a study, of all persons arrested at Los Angeles Inter-
national Airport in the act of smuggling cocaine from South
America. Of 17 persons arrested during that period,,9 had
been tried by June 1974. Of the 9 tried, only 4 received
prison sentences, the stiffest of which was 18 months (one
for .1 year and two for 6 months). Two were deported, two were
given suspended sentences, and one fled the jurisdiction of
the court. One of the persons given a 6-month sentence had a
history of narcotics arrests and at the time of his arrest for
smuggling cocaine was on parole following an arrest for dis-
tributing heroin.
In another instance, a judge in Miami released a fugitive
..on his own ;recognizance,. The fugitive had been brought from
South America to Miami en route to Pittsburgh where he was to
stand trial. in a similar instance, a fugitive released on
his own. recognizance once more fled the country where he pro-
ceeded to again smuggle cocaine into the United States and
threaten a DEA agent with death and, not surprisingly, the
foreign liaison raised questions about the. seriousness of
U.S. intentions.
INADEQUATE USE OF INTELLIGENCE FOR
DRUG INTERDICTIONS AT U.S. PORTS
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Officials in Washington stated that requested intelligence
funding was increased in fiscal year 1975 by over $420,000;
however, with the increase in agents, the per agent amount re-
quested has decreased by 10 to 15 percent per man-year.
THE REGISTER PROGRAM
An important new development which has the potential to
overcome many of the problems concerning the collection of
narcotics intelligence and interagency cooperation is the
implementation of the major international narcotics traf-
ficker'(MINT) Register Program which was proposed by CIA and
the Foreign Intelligence Subcommittee of the Cabinet Commit-
tee on International Narcotics Control (CCINC). It was ap-
proved by the Cabinet Committee and developed by the par-
ticipating ageiic"ies including Customs.
The concept of the MINT Register Program is to identify.
and accord the highest priority to intelligence collection
and enforcement action against the leaders of large-scale
narcotics trafficking organizations throughout the world. It
is an effort to focus the limited resources of the U.S. Gov_
ernment where they will have the greatest impact. Experience
of the past few years has shown that a major factor contribut-
ing to the disruption of the flow of illicit narcotics into
the United States has been the immobilization of a relatively
small number-of persons who play a major role in the interna-
tional narcotics traffic--the small group of major traffickers
immobilized a few years ago that disrupted the France/Latin
America connection.
CIA and DEA have jointly identified and compiled basic
data on major international narcotics traffickers in Latin
America, Europe, the Near East and East Asia. This inventory
was formally approved by the CCINC Working Group and was des-
ignated as the MINT Register. This Register contains the
names of approximately 250 persons who are regarded by DEA
and CIA as the principal active international narcotics traf-
fickers at this time.
DEA and CIA field representatives have each been in-
structed to make the MINT Register Program their top priority
effort. Th?i's.is a Foreign Intelligence Subcommittee project,
and is evolving into the working foundation of cooperation
between DEA and CIA. It is also becoming a mechanism for
systematic and efficient intelligence sharing between DEA and
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CIA and other participating agencies. MINT target
personalities are jointly evaluated to determine operational
priorities, strategy, and division-of labor. CIA has devel-
oped a special computerized information retrieval system to
manipulate and analyze intelligence concerning individuals on
the MINT Register. Intelligence from DEA and CIA will jointly
be input into the system and the output produced will be used
by DEA and CIA personnel in Washington and overseas.
In every country we visited t:ze common problem centered
around the need for better intelligence. Not only did DEA
agents lack data on the overall production and transshipment
of drugs in the various countries, but they lacked data on
specific drug traffickers and the location of processing
laboratories. Even with these very obvious needs, we found
that intelligence efforts by DEA and CIA were undermined by
disagreements over individual objectives, responsibilities,
and authority; intelligence previously available from Customs
was no longer being developed; no effective system had been
established for sharing intelligence among DEA, INS, BOP,
Customs, and the Department of State on the movement of inter-
national traffickers; and, the South American region had
limited funds for purchasing intelligence.
While certain of these problems will be difficult to
solve, we believe that DEA, through an increased awareness
of the situation and improved management, should be able to
overcome them.
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL
We recommend that the Attorney General in cooperation
with CIA take the necessary action to insure that:
--Respective drug intelligence roles are defined clearly
as to specific objectives and targets; methods and
procedures used, if any; and type and frequency of
their reporting.
--Agents are cooperating and exchanging information at
the working levels through personal discussion with
individuals involved,, and that regular meetings between
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headquarters intelligence units, and representation
of counterparts at important agency meetings and
seminars are held.
--Individuals on the MINT Register become the top prior-
ity targets for intelligence collection and enforce-
ment operations. The MINT Register should continue
to be the primary basis of CIA and DEA cooperation,
including joint use of the information retrieval
system for intelligence gathering and enforcement
purposes. Efforts to explore broader Federal par-
ticipation in this effort should be undertaken.
Also, within the Department of Justice and in cooperation with
other appropriate agencies, DEA should:
--Establish procedures with the United States Customs
Service, BOP, and INS to exchange necessary intelli-
gence, information on major traffickers, and data on
false documentation cases.
--Review the need for increased funds to solicit and
obtain intelligence data.
--Increase emphasis on the gathering of intelligence
concerning dangerous drugs.
AGENCY ACTIONS
We did not submit this report to the Department of the
Treasury for written comments; however, pertinent sections
were discussed with officials of the U.S. Customs Service and
their comments and suggestions were considered. We did sub-
mit this report to the Departments of Justice and State, and
to the CIA for written comments.
The Administrator, DEA, told us on April 3, 1975, that
he plans to establish a second regional office in South
America. GAO believes that this will provide greater control
and supervision over drug problems, increase their effective-
ness, and eliminate some of the problems noted in this report.
Department of Justice
In general, the Department found our report to be accu-
rate and agreed with its basic recommendations (see app. I.)
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Concerning the recommendation on the immobilization of
major traffickers and use of the MINT Register, the Depart-
ment said that:
--The MINT Register is viewed by DEA as essentially a
listing of major foreign violators as compiled under
DEA's Geographic Drug Enforcement Program.
--The Register will be useful. for collating information
on major violators.
--According to a CIA estimate, DEA would provide about
85 percent of the input data to CIA's computerized
information retrieval system (MINT Computer System).
--This system would be competitive with and, to a large
extent, duplicate DEA's computer system.
--The MINT Computer System would be less responsive to
DEA's needs than DEA's own system because (1) the MINT
Computer System's programing reflects CIA operational
needs rather than DEA enforcement needs, (2) DEA would
not have direct access to it, and (3) the MINT Computer
System would not include or make reference to U.S.
citizens or joint domestic international operations.
Negotiations are now underway between DEA and CIA to
resolve these problems, and CIA informed us on
April 18, 1975, that DEA will eventually incorporate
the basic MINT Register in its own computer system
thus overcoming any duplication of DEA's existing
programs. In the meantime, CIA is storing the MINT
data in its computerized retrieval system because DEA
estimates it will be 3 to 6 months before its own
computer system is ready to accept the information.
Central Intelligence A enc
The CIA agreed with our recommendations (see app. III)
and said that:
--"In our opinion, U.S. agencies involved in the anti-
narcotics effort can take a real measure of satisfac-
tion from the job done so far. At the same time, we
agree with the conclusion 1 * * that there is a need
for better intelligence. We have and will continue to
work towards improving DEA-?CIA cooperation and we see
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the MINT Register Program as one of the best available
management tools to reach this end.
concur in the recommendations *
--"W
* *
and
suggest
e
that these recommendations be discussed
and
carried
.forward under the aegis of the CCINC. *
* *
''* * * There is statutory prohibition against CIA en-
-
gaging in law enforcement activities, * * * there is
the legal problem which can arise when intelligence
clandestinely gathered by CIA abroad is used in U.S.
criminal prosecution. In this instance there is a
separate statutory mandate on the Director of Central
Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and
methods from unauthorized disclosure. Thus, a good
case against a drug trafficker may have to be dis-
,missed because CIA cannot respond to the defendant's
request to identify sources or methods used to collect
the intelligence that pertains to his particular case.
---"Regarding the specific recommendation that the respec-
tive drug intelligence roles be clearly defined, we
suggest that once the DEA Intelligence Division has
established its proposed overseas regional and district
level intelligence offices, the question of-division of
responsibility between DEA and CIA overseas will be far
easier to define. CIA supports DEA's plan to expand
its intelligence collection capability. However, until
this stage is operational, CIA will continue its active
role abroad in the collection of clandestine intelli-
gence against the foreign narcotics target."
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NEED FOR MORE INVOLVEMENT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND
ACTIONS-BY HOST COUNTRIES AGAINST DRUG TRAFFICKERS
DEA's success in stopping the flow of drugs from' a=nd/or
through a specific country depends greatly on the cooperation
and help provided by the Department of State and the foreign
government. Our work in South America was directed toward
determining the extent of cooperation among DEA, the individ-
ual embassies, and the foreign governments.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE ACTIVITIES
In 1971, recognizing the need for better international
cooperation, the President established CC-INC to formulate and
coordinate Federal Government: policies for eliminating the
illegal flow of narcotics and dangerous drugs into the United
States from other countries. The Secretary of State serves
as chairman, and membership includes the Attorney General;
Secretaries of Defense, Treasury, and Agriculture; U.S. Rep-
resentative to the United Nations; and Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency. A working group within the Cabinet Com-
mittee is composed of assistant secretary-level personnel from
each member agency. This group supports the Cabinet Committee
and consists of eight functional subcommittees; Legal and
Treaties, Intelligence, Law Enforcement, Public Information,
Training, Program Review, Treatment, and Research:and Develop-
ment.
A subcommittee was also established to coordinate narcot-
ics control-activities among interested agencies and depart-
ments and for other duties. The Chairman is the Deputy Senior
Advisor to the Secretary of State.
The Cabinet Committee has specific responsibility for
formulating and coordinating all policies of the Federal Gov-
ernment relating to curtailing and eventually eliminating the
flow of illegal narcotics and dangerous drugs into the United
States from abroad. To the maximum extent permitted by law,
Federal officers and Federal departments and agencies are to
cooperate with the Cabinet Committee in carrying out its
functions under this directive and shall comply with the poli-
cies, guidelines, standards, and procedures prescribed by the
Cabinet Committee. The Cabinet Committee is to
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--develop comprehensive plans and programs for
implementing these policies;
--insure that all diplomatic, intelligence, and Federal
law enforcement programs and activities of interna-
tional scope are properly coordinated;
--evaluate all such programs and activities and their
implementation;
--make. recommendations to the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget concerning proposed funding of
such programs; and.
--report to the President, from time to time, concerning
the foregoing.
It directs U.S. international drug control efforts toward in-
terdicting narcotic drugs, particularly.heroin.and its precur-
sors. To accomplish this interdiction, the Cabinet Committee
assigned highest foreign priority to. improving the collection,
analysis, and use of drug trafficking., information and to up-
grading the quality of host country drug.law enforcement.
The Cabinet Committee requested narcotic control plans
from U.S. Embassies in countries thought to be involved in
producing, consuming, or transiting illicit .hard drugs. These
plans include a description of the drug situation, statement
of goals, estimated costs, priorities, and a general time-
table. They are reviewed by the Department of State's re-
gional Interagency Narcotics Control Committee, the Cabinet
Committee's working subcommittees, and finally, by the Cabinet
Committee. When the plans are approved they serve as a basis
for opening discussions with host governments for-negotiating
bilateral control plans.
DEA agents working in South America are assigned to DEA's
South American regional office; however, as attaches of the
various embassies, agents are also responsible to the various
ambassadors and to key personnel in the embassies' drug pro-
gram. In all the countries we visited, drug committees had
been organized, drug action plans had been prepared, and em-
bassy involvement in drug matters generally had a very favor-
able impact; however, some DEA agents felt that their efforts
were hampered from the lack of a more aggressive stand by th,e
Department in support of DEA agents and programs. We also
noted that workable extradition treaties or alternatives,
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which would improve DEA's chances of immobilizing international
narcotic traffickers, had not been developed or negotiated.
Sub port Erov ded by
embassy oTTicials
Embassy drug committees were formed to encourage host
governments to increase drug interdiction, to develop an
atmosphere for enforcement cooperat:Lon, and to gather drug
intelligence. Also embassy officials, in order to protect
U.S./host country relationships, exercise control over the
way in which DEA agents, assigned to their countries, per-
form their duties. In some cases embassy officials have
found it necessary to restrict DEA drug enforcement efforts
which they believed would have had a detrimental effect on
the U.S./host country relationship. Such restraining in-
fluence is in the purview of the role and responsibility of
the embassy to avoid endangering the long-term enforcement
effort in the host country.
For example, DEA requested that: agents be located in
two major cities of a country for over 2 years without suc-
cess. As a result of the host government's request, DEA's
agent was assigned to the capital city. Embassy officials
supported this action because agents assigned to the two
cities would have to work closely with the local police in-
stead of the Federal police as currently done in the capital
city. Because conflict already-existed between the Federal
and local police, this would increase the tension. Thus,
DEA's only permanent agent in this country (as of February
1975) continues to operate from the capital city where there
is limited drug activity or opportunity to develop intelli-
gence, and the two major drug centers are not receiving ade-
quate coverage. The DEA agent stated that the Federal police
have indicated to him that they would favor DEA agents in the
two major cities and he could not understand why the embassy
was against it. A CIA officer stated that the Chief of the
Federal Police informed him that he was not concerned about
where the DEA agent was assigned. E:e added that, in his
opinion, the problem was that the embassy was reluctant to
discuss the matter with the host government.
State Department officials told us on February 19, 1975,
that a request for the approval of the assignment of four
more agents in this country is now pending with the Foreign
Ministry.
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Other examples of restraints were noted in our visits.
In one country, embassy officials claimed that they were re-
ceiving good cooperation from the host government on drug
matters while the agent in charge felt that more pressure was
needed to improve cooperation and drug enforcement. The em-
bassy in another country has also been against assigning an
additional agent. When the district office in a third coun-
try was first opened, the Ambassador opposed DEA activities
and indicated that the CIA should handle source, intelligence,
and covert aspects of drug enforcement on a contract basis for
DEA. Subsequently, DEA became operational in this country and
through Department of State assistance, enforcement efforts
have increased. In December 1973, DEA was successful in-ob
taining custody of nine major violators from the police in
this country.
We also found that embassy officials assigned to drug
matters had received little drug or enforcement familiariza-
tion. In most embassies the position of drug coordinator is
part-time and is usually held by the Deputy Chief of Mission
or a political officer. In South America none of the part
time drug coordinators had received any drug familiarization
training nor have the two full-time coordinators assigned to
two countries.
Embassy officials feel that sometimes DEA agents pose a
real threat to country relations because they lack foreign
service experience, they encourage publicity, and their en-
forcement activities must be coordinated with host-country
officials causing conflicts within the host government. They
stated that DEA agents were often not mission oriented and
usually were not willing to balance enforcement efforts with
the overall objectives of the mission. In two countries the
Deputy Chiefs of Mission felt that the agents' first respon
sibility'should be to the embassy and not to DEA's regional
office.
DEA officials told us in October 1974 that since GAO's
review:
"DEA feels support received from the Department of
State has improved considerably and continues to
improve. DEA at present feels no reason to com-
plain about the quality of the support it receives
from the Department of State."
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The Department of State told us on February 19, 1975,
that agents are being directed to assume a participating role
in drug control committees at the present time, and that the'
training for key embassy officials :ias been accomplished and
will be part of a continuing program for the future. It also
said that the Department of State and DEA have held two con-
ferences in Latin America to provide the "general orientation
training" needed for embassy officers who carry specific.re-
sponsibilities in the drug enforcement program abroad.
The Department of Justice stated on March 12, 1975, that
"In recent months, we have noted a significant improvement in
our relations with the State Department because Embassy offi-
cials have gained additional confidence in [DEA's] profes-
sionalism."
Extradition
In 1966, the then Acting Commissioner of Narcotics stated
that obtaining the extradition of narcotic offenders had be-
come a problem. In 1975 this was still the case. While new
extradition treaties have been negotiated with some countries,
difficulties still arise as a result of language and proce-
dural differences. In South America 3 of the 10 countries we
visited had new treaties with the United States, while the
others had treaties dating as far back as 1873. Also, drug
offenses are not specifically mentioned in some of these old
treaties so extradition can only be sought if the drug offense
constitutes a crime and is punishable under the laws of both
the demanding and surrendering state.
In one country, a new treaty was negotiated in 1972; how-
ever, no drug traffickers have been extradited to the United
States under the new treaty because of various problems. As
of November 13, 1973, local courts refused five consecutive
extradition requests. The reasons for the denials include,
but are not limited to, the following:
1. The overt acts listed in the indictment occurred
before the September 1972 signing of the extradi-
tion treaty regarding narcotics.
2. The country's judicial officials are of the im-
pression that once a defendant is arrested, any
conspiracy involving this individual is ended,
negating the. U.S. :legal theory of a continuing
conspiracy.
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The Department of Justice said that:
"The Toscanino case represents a solitary depar-
ture from a long line of authorities holding that
the manner in which a defendant is brought before
the court does not give the defendant the right
to question the jurisdiction of the court to try
him.. See e.g., Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519
(19:52); United States v. Caraamiiao.,.468 F. 2d 1370.
(5thCir. 1972); Taylor v. Alabama, 465. F.. 2d 376
(5th.Cir. 1972); United States v. Cotten, 471 F.
2d 744 (9th Cir. ,cert. den. -M-U.S. 967
(1973). The decision in Toscanino was brought
about by Toscanino's allegations of unconscion-
.able behavior, on. the part of United States and
[host country] authorities in effecting his ex-
pulsion to the United States. It is doubtful
that such allegations will be made in many such
cases or, more importantly, that a defendant
could prove such charges. Thus, Toscanino should
not pose a ,serious hindrance to the government's
attempts to obtain jurisdiction over third coun
try nationals."
Another situation that adds to the. problem of obtaining
the extradition of nationals is the granting of dual citizen-
ship. As.Po.inted out in our report, B-175425, December 31,
1974 (see app. IV), U.S. citizens, or citizens of any other
country, with Mexican parents are considered Mexican citizens
regardless of their place of birth. DEA believes that at
least 250 fugitives on drug charges.ar.e living in Mexico and
are still. participating in drug acitivities.
New approaches and improvements
being considered
Th.e.De'partments of Justice and State are considering
various ways to improve extradition procedures or to find
alternatives. In addition to undertaking various evaluations
of current treaties and negotiating several new ones, con-
sideration is being given to using local attorneys to prepare
the paperwork and represent the United States at host country
hearings; DEA has established an objective to increase the
use.,of third-country expulsions..
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Efforts to evaluate treaties now in force and to negotiate
new ones have only been done on a limited basis. We found
that even the new treaties are not fully adequate. For ex-
ample, wording should be thoroughly reviewed and evaluated
from the standpoint of both the U.S. and the host countries'
legal systems.
One U.S. treaty uses the word conspiracy which fits
current U.S. drug laws but when translated and considered
in the host country courts,, it may take on a completely dif-
ferent meaning. The U.S. :interpretation relates to two or
more individuals involved in an illegal act, while the local
courts have limited their concept to "gangstering" or crimes
of a continuing nature. The number of individuals involved
is important, too, since the U.S. law requires two or more
while some countries in South America stipulate three or more.
While officials of DEA and the Department of State have
recommended and approved using local attorneys to represent
the United States in extradition cases, the Department of
Justice, which has final authority, questions the need for and
the use of local attorneys. Their primary objections are:
1. Under the treaty agreements the surrendering country
is to provide the needed legal counsel.
2. Supervising the -work ofd foreign attorneys would be
extremely difficult.
DEA and State Department officials pointed out that if local
representation would improve their chances of obtaining the
extradition of major violators it. should be available if
needed.
HOST COUNTRY EFFECTIVENESS
Since establishing embassy drug control committees and
coordinators, there have been increases in drug interdiction
activities by local enforcement agencies in almost all South
American countries. This interaction and exchange of ideas
and data between U.S. and local enforcement groups has re-
sulted in establishing local narcotics enforcement units and
revisions to laws concerning the cultivation, use, and traf-
ficking of drugs. However, our review showed that further
progress in South American countries was being impeded by:
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if ied as indicated.
All other material on this
page is UNCLASSIFIED.
--Corruption and political instability in many South
American countries.
--Lack of interest, qualified individuals, equipment, and
incentive among local officials and enforcement per-
sonnel.
--Lack of effective laws in some South American countries
concerning penalties for drug production, possession,
use, or shipment.
--Lack of effective procedures for destroying seized
drugs.
--Lack of'appeal to all possible host country agencies;
customs, military, etc.
Corrup-tion-,and political instability
Some South American countries have difficulties with
either corruption or political instability. The U.S. drug
enforcement teams have no control or influence concerning
these factors; however, their enforcement efforts are greatly
affected by corruption and instability. In one country, cor-
ruption has been reported in the three drug enforcement agen-
cies. The customs service of that country has been reported
to be directly involved in the flow of contraband and narcot-
ics. In addition, the judiciary is considered corrupt and
inept. After being arrested, it is very easy to buy one's
way out of jail. DEA documents disclosed "pay-offs" to
judges of up to $65,000.
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Political instability is a problem for many South American
countries. A new leader in power is constantly bombarded by
national and international problems. But the international
drug situation is not viewed as a major problem. In fact, in
one case a major drug trafficker was released as a result of
amnesty granted to "political prisoners" as part of the presi-
dential inauguration.
The Department of justice informed us on March 12, 1975,
that corruption and political instability are common problems
in many Latin American countries and are rarely affected by
outside action. These problems serve as a challenge to the
professionalism of DEA agents, who must learn to cope with and
work around them. DEA agents are frequently successful even
where these problems exist. Moreover, the problems are often
relative in time; that is, temporary instability in a given
country may fade as political and economic factors settle into
a more permanent mode. In two countries, the corruption prob-
lem virtually ceased after it was publicly exposed and severe
corrective action was taken. DEA recognizes, however, that it
is less effective and is hampered in countries where extensive
corruption does exist.
Locals lack interest, incentive,
qualm !-personnel, an-a equipment
We found that local enforcement efforts had been greatly
reduced in some countries because of little interest among
high-level government officials, insufficient incentive for
law enforcement personnel to become involved in drug interdic-
tion, and a lack of qualified enforcement personnel and ade-
quate equipment to perform enforcement activities.
Little interest
In some South American countries, the high-level
government officials lacked both interest and knowledge of
the local and international drug problem. These officials
viewed the local situation as not serious and the interna-
tional situation as a U.S. problem. This was particularly
true in three countries. In certain other South American
countries, the lack of interest was due to their existing
political instability.
The Department of Justice informed us on March 12, 1975,
that a major effort is being made by U.S. missions in South
America to raise the level of awareness and interest of local
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governments in international drug matters. So far, DEA is
pleased with the success of this effort. The Department be-
lieves that past apathy, so common towards narcotic problems
in South America, is changing to an attitude of responsibility
and concern.
Insufficient incentive
Throughout South America, the seizure of illegal contra-
band by local enforcement personnel results in a reward. This
reward. is normally a percent of the value of seized goods when
sold.. However, there is no reward system established for the
seizure of drugs; thus, there is no incentive for local en-
forcement groups to devote their time to drug interdiction..
This was a problem in each country visited. The narcotics.co-
ordinator in one country said he believed the effectiveness of
the local enforcement group in the drug area would be greatly
improved if a reward system was established for drug seizures.
This problem and the problem of low police salaries- were dis-
cussed in our report to the Congress, B-175425, December 31,
1974. (See app. IV.)
Lack of qualified personnel
The interdiction efforts of local enforcement groups were
also affected by inexperienced or untrained personnel. We
found instances in four countries where the personnel assigned
to narcotic units had either no training or insufficient
training to adequately perform their jobs. For example, in
one country, the supervisors of Technical Judicial Police have
a mandatory 2-year rotation policy from division to division.
in some cases, the expertise obtained in one division is of
limited value in subsequent assignments.
In one country, one of the three enforcement agencies in-
volved in interdiction is'highly political and with each
change in power, there is about a 70 to 80 percent turnover
of drug personnel. While this agency has the legal authority
to investigate and prosecute narcotics and dangerous drug
cases, the frequent change in personnel has greatly affected
their enforcement efforts.
Lack ofeguiEment
The lack of equipment such as automobiles, two-way
radios, and boats, had a major impact on the interdiction
efforts of local groups in five countries. The Embassy Drug
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Committee in one country believed a major shortcoming of the
local unit was the lack of equipment. They stated that the
locals could not be expected to p:ovv:ide much beyond manpower,
and if the United States wanted serious efforts in narcotics
interdiction, they would have to provide substantial re-
sources.
In another country there was a firm and growing convic-
tion that the requests for U.S. equipment were not being
processed fast enough. U.S. congressional officials who
visited this country in January 1973, indicated that they
believed that cooperation programs were not moving ahead fast
enough because of bureaucratic delays by the United States
when foreign governments requested equipment to aid them in
their battle against narcotics traffic. There is normally a
very long leadtime on vehicles and a 4- to 6-month leadtime
on other items. The Department of State told us on Febru-
ary 19, 1975, that it had moved the funding authority from
the Agency for International Development to the Office of the
Senior Advisor for International Narcotics and that progress
had been made in reducing allocation delays through this
centralization of administrative function.
Lack of effective laws
We found that there were no uniform and effective laws
in some South American countries concerning the penalties for
drug production, possession, use,, or shipment. Each country
had its own unique set of laws and regulations and according
to DEA, in some instances these :laws contained loopholes
which would allow international drug traffickers to avoid
prosecution. In addition, as explained on page 47, conspir-
acy, an important element in developing cases in the United
States, is complicated because of its definition. Thus,
major traffickers are often able to avoid prosecution as
long as they remain in countries which have ineffective laws.
Lack of effective procedures
of d destruction
We found that there was a lack of effective procedures
for destroying seized drugs. In one country, the final dis-
position of seized narcotics was unknown. The DEA agent in
charge never witnesses they destruction of drugs and those
cases in which drugs were seized have never come to trial;
therefore, the location or existence of the evidence is un-
known. The Deputy Chief of Mission said he believed the local
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newspaper articles, which indicated that the evidence had
disappeared.
In two countries, the opposite situation existed. For
example, the President of one country signed a decree'dated
May 10, 1973, providing for public destruction of confiscated
drugs. This decree allowed for retaining a sample for judi-
cial purposes with the remainder, to be destroyed promptly
thereafter. On June 20, 1973, government officials began
the public destruction of the illegal drugs by dissolving
175 kilograms of cocaine and pouring it down`a drain. In
another country, the DEA agent in charge has witnessed on
several occasions public destruction of seized drugs. How-
ever, in most other South American countries, Embassy Drug
Committee officials have been unable to determine the final
disposition of confiscated drugs.
Lack of-a2.peallto all possible
host countr a encies
Although efforts have been made to involve local enforce-
ment agencies in controlling the flow of drugs, we generally
found. that little effort had been made in South America to
encourage participation of all possible host'country agencies.
Cocaine and heroin usually pass through a number of coun-
tries on their way to the United States. Therefore, every time
they cross a border or pass through a port of entry, interdic-
tion could occur. Likewise, traffickers usually move or oper-
ate in more than one country and could expose themselves to
local emigration officials.
In addition,. cocaine and heroin'poppies'are usually grown
in remote areas which might be visited by other agencies of
the local government, such as military, agriculture, or mining
.officials.
'We believe that there is a potential in most South Ameri-
can countries to get other agencies involved in locating
sources of drugs, identifying traffickers and interdicting the
flow of drugs to the United States. One way of creating an
interest by other agencies in.wanting to participate in drug
programs is to send U.S. advisory teams to explain the problem
and how they can help. We noted that theU.S.Customs Service
has advisory teams available which could be used to provide
information and assistance to all local customs agencies. We
believe that teams from other U.S. agencies, such as the
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military and agriculture, could be formed to provide this
service in South America.
CONCLUSIONS
Success in stopping the flow of drugs from and through
South America depends greatly on the actions of the Depart-
ment of State and various host governments. We found that
the Embassies have responded to the President's directive to
increase drug efforts; however, there is still some room for
improvement. We also found that efforts for improving extra-
dition procedures or finding workable alternatives when com-
pared with the importance and size of the task at hand were
limited.
Host governments have increased their drug enforcement
interest and efforts; but corruption, political instability,
ineffective laws, and limited resources have limited them.
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE
SECRETARY OF STATE
We believe that, in light of the President's directive,
the Secretary of State should encourage the Embassies to im-
plement actions or increase efforts to
--encourage the preparation and use of effective drug
laws, including drug destruction procedures, throughout
South America;
--develop a program acceptable to host countries for re-
warding foreign police officers for drug trafficking
information leading to meaningful arrests and/or sei-
zures; and
--establish a working committee of Departments of Justice
and State specialists to evaluate, develop, and imple-
ment workable extradition treaties or alternatives.
AGENCY ACTIONS
The Departments of Justice and State generally agreed
with our conclusions and recommendations. (See apps. I
and II.) In addition, the Departments have provided us with
actions taken' or being taken; we have included their comments
in the applicable sections of this report.
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Concerning our recommendation on extradition the
Department of Justice told us on March 12, 1975, that it
agrees a committee of extradition experts from the Depart-
ments of State and Justice should be formed to insure the
extradition of narcotic traffickers to the United States.
It also stated that
"there is no question that difficulties have arisen
from time to time with South American countries re-
garding the interpretation and implementation of
extradition treaties. Two examples of such diffi-
culties are the proper interpretation to be given
the word 'conspiracy,' as used in such treaties, and
the degree of assistance officials of signatory
governments should afford each other in processing
extradition requests."
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CHAPTER 5
MANAGEMENT AND FUNDING
Since the supply of drugs for most abusers in the United
States comes from other countries, enforcement efforts
ultimately lead to these countries. Of DEA's 2,086 agents
at January 31, 1975, only 162 were stationed outside the
United States; 32 of these were in South America. In effect,
about 1,900 DEA agents in the United States (referred to as
domestic agents) were developing cases that, in many in-
stances, ultimately required police work in a foreign country.
Add to this the drug efforts of the many other Federal, State,
and local enforcement groups, and the task facing foreign
police or U.S. agents becomes enormous.
In many countries, especially those that are highly
developed, the local enforcement clroups can generally provide
the assistance required; however, we found that in South
America these groups were not capable of, or in some cases
not even interested in, responding to this need. We also
found that along with limited manpower and funding, the ef-
fectiveness of DEA agents was reduced by the. lack of
--a system to assign priorities to requests from
domestic regions,
--accurate and complete data on major traffickers, and
--administrative support.
On January 31, 1975, 32 agents were assigned to DEA's
regional office or to one of its 11 district offices in
South America. Each district office consisted of from one
to four agents. In two district offices, the number of
assigned agents did not appear to be commensurate with the
area of responsibility. One office had one agent with the
responsibility for all of the country, an area of approxi-
mately 3.3 million square miles.
It had been determined to be a transshipment point
for heroin and cocaine because of its numerous seaports
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and the Amazon River. Even without this large, area to
cover, it is very difficult for one agent to operate of
fectively. When he is out on a case or,working with the
locals, he has no one to back him up or . to handle the
day-to-day operations of the district office. Also, since
the district office is so far from the major ports and
population centers where most drug cases.occur, the need
for other agents in these locations is very apparent. As
of January 1975, there was still only one permanent agent
assigned to this country.
One office, as of January 1975, still had only two
agents with responsibility for four countries and part of
the Caribbean Islands. Because of the numerous islands and
unguarded seaports, the agent in charge believed his
geographical area of responsibility was far too large to be
effectively patrolled by two agents. For example, as of
December 1973, the agents have only been to three locations
once, and even though ` the region is known for drug activity,
the agents have spent insufficient time.there. One district
office has received some help. Since the inception of this
office in November 1971, temporary agents have spent 570 days
working the district. While this has helped reduce workload,
the permanent agents have not had time to develop a full
understanding of the situation or to develop the lasting
ties with the local enforcement groups that are necessary.
A similar situation existed in another district office.
A proposed suboffice at one seaport was delayed 10 months
due to a lack of manpower and funds. The importance of this
suboffice related to the region's reputation as a haven for
major violators and cocaine processing laboratories. DEA
officials opened the office in May 1974. Also, in March
1973 an additional agent had been authorized for another
country but was not assigned until January 1974.
Officials at DEA headquarters.said that the lack of
manpower was a major problem in South America. However,
they were hopeful that additional staff could be added in
fiscal year 1975.
The Department of Justice told., us. on March 12, 1975,
that the Department of State has been particularly helpful
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in facilitating the rapid expansion of DEA's work force in
Latin America during the past 3 years. This increase in
staff has been largely responsible for the inroads DEA has
made in immobilizing South American trafficking networks.
However, Justice also said that as DEA places intelligence
personnel overseas, DEA believes moire support should be
forthcoming from the State Department.
OPERATING FUNDS
The allocation of operating funds has also apparently
hindered DEA's achieving its enforcement objectives in
South America. The 11 district offices receive monthly
operating funds ranging from $333 in two countries to
$3,000 in two other countries. A complaint from several
district offices was the lack of sufficient funds to carry
on normal operations. For example, a specific problem
mentioned was the poor and expensive telephone communica-
tions. The telephone represents a vital link between the
different offices but because of the cost it must be used
sparingly.
Additional problems caused by a shortage of operating
funds occurred in two district offi--es. In both of these of-
fices, agents did not have the funds to rent vehicles when
investigations entailed travel to the interior of the coun-
try. As a result, the agents remained in town and requested
the local enforcement agencies to perform the necessary work.
The agents in another office could not leave their offices
to carry out investigations dlue to a lack of operating funds.
An investigation on one island scheduled for July 1973 had
to be delayed because of insufficient funds for transporta-
tion and lodging.
As discussed in chapter 3, the lack of DEA funds to
purchase intelligence has also seriously affected the en-
forcement capabilities of the district offices.
Headquarters officials agreed that limited operating
funds have had a major impact on the enforcement efforts
of their South American agents. However, they believed
the situation would improve in fiscal year 1975 with an
increase in the region's operating budget.
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PROBLEMS WITH IMMOBILIZING
MAJOR TRAFFICKERS
DEA's geographical drug program sets forth criteria for
assigning drug traffickers a priority of I, II, III, or IV
depending on their level of drug activity. It was DEA's
intention that about 70 percent of its enforcement resources
be directed toward the arrest and prosecution of class I, II,
or III violators,'and that current, accurate, and complete
data be maintained and reported for evaluating the success
and needs of the program. While arrests of major violators
in South America had increased, we found that the large number
of requests from domestic regions and the lack of data and
files on major violators hindered further success of this
program.
No_ stem for_assigningTpriorittles
to requests from domestic regions
We were informed that in South America less than 50 per-
cent of enforcement time was directed toward immobilizing
major violators. In two countries only about 10 and 15 per-
cent was spent on major traffickers. One of the main reasons
for this was that there was no system requiring domestic re-
gions to establish priorities for requests sent to foreign
regions. This was particularly true in the one district of-
fice where approximately 70 percent of the workload involved
domestic assist requests. A high percentage of time--40 to
50 percent--was also spent by other district offices on assist
work.
Although the one district office had identified the
immobilization of major traffickers as its primary objective,
the agents did not have time to perform the research and
prepare the. paperwork necessary for gaining approval of
class I or II traffickers by headquarters, and the office
was-able. to spend only 15 percent of its enforcement time
investigating these individuals. The remaining 85.percent
was,spent on requests from domestic regions, targets of
opportunity, normal administrative workload, and assist
work requested by local enforcement agencies.
During October 1973, the district office received more
than 45 requests for action and 13 requests for domestic
region agents and/or informers to engage in operations.
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The agent in charge of one district office informed
us that while some of these cases did involve major viola-
tors operating in South America, many did not. Also, he
stated that with this many :requests and only three agents
and himself, it was impossible to coordinate the use of
domestic agents and informers with the three local enforce-
ment groups and provide sufficient: cover and backup for the
agents when the drug buy or deal was being made.
DEA officials in Washington informed us that in most
countries, especially Europe, U.S. agents are happy to
receive assistance requests because local enforcement groups
are able to help in the information-gathering process and
case development. However, local enforcement groups in
South America do not usually have the capability, desire,
and in some cases, the integrity to perform needed enforce-
ment efforts. This situation creates additional workload
for U.S. agents resulting in less efforts aimed at local
major violators.
The DEA Los Angeles regional office told us that all their
requests for foreign assistance were screened and approved by
various assistant regional directors in charge of enforcement
groups, but that these assistants had little information on
South American operations to determine the importance of their
requests for assistance. Their main basis was knowing the
level of the trafficker's involvment in Los Angeles. One as-
sistant stated that Los Angeles agents traveling to South
America are not being given adequate support by the South
American agents, which seemed to substantiate the statement
made above by the agent in charge in one district office.
At the South American regional office, our review
indicated only limited screening of assist requests by DEA
headquarters in Washington, D.C. For example, when re-
quested to pay a domestic region's informer for his assist-
ance in two domestic-region requested investigations made in
one country, the South American regional director stated that
his resources were geared to investigating class I and
class II violators and these two investigations would have
limited priority and would not justify the reward requested.
We also found there was not sufficient knowledge about
domestic requests made to the South American regional office
to determine the justified priority.
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Some domestic requests involve the travel of agents/
informers to South American countries. These requests
require clearances from the local governments before im-
plementing an operation. An official at DEA headquarters
stated that the necessary clearances usually are obtained
in 95 percent of the cases. However, in the remaining
cases problems may arise. For example, the agent(s) may be
on his way before an operations approval. This situation
presents a danger to: (1) the operation, (2) the: agent/
informer, and (3) DEA's position in the country. On July 25,
1973, the agent in charge of one district office communicated
the following complaint:
"* * * It appears that domestic offices are
conducting investigations and making seizures
involving [a country] and working informers
here without advising us.. I'm not opposed to
domestic offices making cases however, I find.
it embarrassing when an investigation has been
in progress for several weeks * * * without
informing the district office."
Lack of data/files
on maj_orwiolators
Our review disclosed major problems with the identifica-
tion and systematic immobilization of major traffickers.
The regional office did not retain a current listing of
E-TTY
those major traffickers targeted for priority effort within
the region, and.the major traffickers being worked in the
district offices did not always agree with those on, file in
the regional office.
In addition, we found the list of major traffickers at
the regional office was not in agreement with the geographical
drug program listing of major traffickers from Washington.
While the geographical listing included the names of all
approved class I and class II violators in the South American
region, the regional office's listing omitted some of these
names and included names of individuals not formally, designated
as-major violators. The reason given for this situation was
the lack of adequate manpower to maintain a current and ac-
curate listing.
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In addition, the geographical drug program system
provides for lists to be maintained of the major violator
assigned to regional offices and the major violators appre-
hended in that region. Because the December 31, 1973, lists
for comparison and analysis were unobtainable we were unable
to evaluate the effectiveness of the major violator interdic-
tion program in South America..
In the district offices, we found that the list of major
violators being investigated was not always in agreement with
that on either the geographical drug program or the regional
office listing. In addition, the agents in one district office
were not aware of the major violators included in the region's
list for their area. The regional director requested from each
district office, on June 12, 1.973, an immobilization work
plan on each major trafficker operating within their district.
At the time of our visit in November 1973, several districts
had submitted partial plans; however, one district office
had to contact the regional office to verify their list of
major traffickers before they were able to respond. Other
district offices had not or had only partially responded be-
cause (1) they had insufficient time and/or resources to
research and submit the necessary paperwork, or (2) their
files were not up to date or cross-indexed to permit retrieval
of specific information for work plans. (See pp. 62 and 63.)
The failure to maintain and organize data on major viola-
tors and their associates has also created problems in respond-
ing to domestic office requests for background information on
suspected drug traffickers. valuable time must be spent
searching the files, and local enforcement effort is impeded.
An official at DEA headquarters told us that in some instances
more information is available in Washington on a specific
trafficker than is available in the district office where the
individual is assigned for priority effort.
DEA officials told us in October 1974 that:
--Since the GAO review, the South American region has
corrected this deficiency through the regional in-
telligence unit. A current list of major traffickers
now maintained at. the regional level has been reconciled
with headquarters and distric{: office lists.
62
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--They cannot avoid some instances where more information
is available in Washington on a specific trafficker than
is available in the field. Given the frequent movement
of traffickers and the volume of scattered references
to important traffickers, the only viable alternative
would be virtually to reproduce headquarters files at
each district office--a patent impossibility. However,
there are no instances known in South America of cases
not being effectively or aggressively pursued because
of lack of information on headquarters files. Sum-
maries of pertinent information are routinely made
available.
The Department of Justice told us on March 12, 1975,
that it should be remembered that foreign and domestic
classification criteria for major violators differ in several
areas, and that domestic requests for foreign assistance
almost always involve major domestic traffickers. The Depart-
ment said that, although the points that the domestic regions
did not provide sufficient background information on particular
requests and the domestic regions did not always obtain the
necessary clearance from host countries represented serious
problems at. the time of the our review; corrective action taken
since then has resulted in satisfactory resolution of the prob-
lems. The Department also said that discrepancies between the
regional and district offices in listing major traffickers have
now been reconciled.
LACK OF ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT
Our review showed that a lack of adequate secretarial
support created filing problems in the regional and five dis-
trict offices. In each of these offices, a number of files
had not been cross-indexed to the major violator name files.
This situation generally impeded local enforcement efforts
and necessitated extensive work when a domestic office re-
quested background data on suspected drug traffickers.
One district office lacked cross-indexing (case files
had not been indexed to name files) for 85 percent of its
files. The `agent in charge stated that local enforcement
efforts were hindered, particularly on the research and
paperwork required to solicit headquarters' approval to
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UNCLASSIFIED
classify an individual as a major drug trafficker. Before
the BNDD and U.S. Customs merger, the office had two secre-
taries-. In November 1973, there was only one secretary for
the four DEA agents.
In another district office, the agents were without
secretarial support from DEA's inception to November 19, 1973-.
During this 4 1/2-month period, the necessary paperwork was
both typed and filed by the agents. At the time of our
review, at least 25 percent of investigative reports were
still on tapes or in note foram. A similar situation existed
at another district office where there was no secretarial
support from November 1971 to April 1972. The agent in
charge believed there was a 1-year backlog in filing and
cross-indexing of files.
The Department of Justice told us on March 12, 1975-,
--it agreed that more secretarial help is required to
support the district offices and to free the agents
from those clerical tasks which reduce their enforce-
ment effectiveness;
--in fiscal year 1975, DEA plans to assign additional
personnel, both agents and clerical support, to
South America; and
--the number assigned, however, may still be inadequate
and requests for additional personnel for fiscal year
1976 do not look encouraging-.
CONCLUSIONS
Although South America has seen large increases in the
enforcement efforts of U.S. and local enforcement agencies,
the overall effectiveness of these efforts has been reduced
by management and funding problems. We believe the lack
of a system for assigning priorities to requests from domestic
regions has plagued and hindered the successfull accomplish-
ment of South American enforcement goals. This was partic-
ularly true when (1) requester for foreign assistance did
not contain sufficient data for an adequate determination
of its importance in light of DEA'S other objectives, and
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(2) there was a lack of understanding and procedures involving
foreign operations requiring travel.by domestic agents or in-
formers. Also, the failure of regional and district offices
to retain, share, and communicate data on major violators
has resulted in each office working toward accomplishing
its own objectives without the needed coordination for
accomplishing regional goals. We do not believe that DEA
can effectively evaluate the success of its major violator
efforts in South America without preparing, analyzing, and
using the lists of major violators assigned and apprehended
as provided by the geographical drug program system.
We further believe there was a problem in DEA's alloca-
tion of manpower in South America to adequately cover the
areas of responsibility. Also, there was an apparent problem
in DEA's allocation of funds for accomplishing enforcement
objectives. We recognize that prudent management dictates
that allocations of manpower must be based on DEA's overall
needs and should be consistent with overall U.S. goals and
objectives in each individual country. We do believe, however,
that when agents are assigned they should be given adequate
support and sufficient funds to effectively carry out their
assignment. We believe the overall effectiveness of en-
forcement efforts is reduced when agents must spend time per-
forming clerical tasks because there is a lack of secretarial
support to provide this necessary service
The Departments of Justice and State have told us of
actions taken or being taken which have been included in
each of the above sections. Because of these actions we are
not making recommendations in these areas.
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APPENDIX I UHCLA I r APPENDIX I
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530
March 12, 1975
Address Reply to the
Division Indicated
and Refer to Initials and Number
Mr. Victor L. Lowe
Director
General Government Division
United States General Accounting Office
Washington, D.C. 20548
Dear Mr. Lowe:
This letter provides our comments on the draft
report titled, "Barriers to Greater Progress in Stemming
the Flow of Cocaine and Heroin From and Through South
America." In general, we find the GAO draft report to
be accurate and we are in basic agreement with its
recommendations. Although we have reservations on
minor matters of fact and interpretation, we do not
feel they affect the overall tenor or recommendations
of the report. Several of the matters we believe
should be called to your attention are discussed below.
Some problem areas identified in the report, while
valid at the time the study was undertaken in 1973, are
no longer valid either because circumstances have changed
or because corrective action has been taken. Among
these are:
[See GAO note 2, 1. State Department Involvement (pages 6 and 7).
p. 73,E In recent months, we have noted a significant
improvement in our relations with the State
Department because Embassy officials have
gained additional confidence in the Drug
Enforcement Administration's (DEA) pro-
fessionalism. The Department of State
has been particularly helpful in facilitat-
ing the rapid expansion of DEA's workforce
in Latin America during the past 3 years.
This increase in staff has been largely
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APPENDIX I APPENDIX I
The Department has no objection to transmittal of the
classified information in the proposed report to the appro-
priate congressional committees, individual members of the
Congress and executive agencies.
We appreciate the opportunity. to comment on this draft
report. Should you have any further questions, please feel
free to contact us.
Sincerely,
Glen E. Pommereni
_
Assistant Attorney General
for Administration
1. Deleted comments pertain to material deleted from
the final report.
2. Page references in this appendix may not correspond
to pages of the final report.
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APPENDIX II UNCLASSIFIED . APPENDIX II
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520
February 1:9, 1975
Mr. J. Kenneth Fasick
Director
International Division
U.S. General Accounting Office
Washington, D. C. 20548
Dear Mr. Fasick:
I am replying to your letter of January 15, 1975
addressed to the Secretary, which forwarded copies
of your Draft Report: "Barriers to Greater Progress
in Stemming the Flow of Cocaine and Heroin From and
Through South America"?
The enclosed comments have been prepared by the
Senior Adviser to the Secretary and Coordinator
for International Narcotics Matters.
We appreciate having had the opportunity to
review and comment upon your Draft Report.
cere:ly yours,
Don C. Eller
Acting Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Budget
and Finance
Enclosure:
Comments.
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APPENDIX II V APPENDIX II
The blocked material is
classified as indicated.
All other material on this
page is UNCLASSIFIED.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE COMMENTS ON GAO DRAFT REPORT:
"Barriers to Greater Progress in Stemming the Flow
of Cocaine and Heroin From and Through South America"
[See GAO note 1, p. 82.1
~~''!!nn~~ 1n75
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APPENDIX III UNCLASSIFIED APPENDIX III
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
January 30, 1975
The Honorable Victor L. Lowe, Director
United States General Accounting Office
Washington, D. C. 20548
Dear Mr. Lowe:
Thank you for giving us the opportunity by your
letter of December 17, 1974, to comment on the proposed
report to the Congress, "Barriers to Greater Progress
in Stemming the Flow of Cocaine and Heroin From and
Through South America." Our comments, which are made
solely in the interest of accuracy and balance, are
enclosed.
We appreciate the recognition in the report of
the Agency's positive efforts to stem the flow of
illicit narcotics to the United States from abroad,
the Agency resources devoted to this effort, and of
the resolution of most of the early problems.
This Agency has absolutely no objections to
transmittal of the classified information in the
proposed report to the appropriate congressional
committees, individual members of the Congress, and
executive agencies. However, we would appreciate
being advised when the final report is transmitted
so that we can make whatever report is deemed ap-
propriate to those committees in the Congress which
have oversight of this Agency.
Sincerely,
. -E. Colby
Director
Enclosure
83
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See GAO note 2,
p. 87.]
UNCLASSIFIED APPENDIX III
SUBJECT: CIA COMMENTS ON GAO DRAFT REPORT
"Barriers to Greater Progress in Stemming the Flow
of Cocaine and Heroin From and Through South America"
General
In our opinion, U.S. agencies involved in the anti-
narcotics effort cart take a real measure of satisfaction
from the job done so far. At the same time, we agree
with the conclusion on page 50 of the draft GAO report
that there is a need for better intelligence. We have
and will continue to work towards improving DEA-CIA
cooperation and we see the MINT Register program as
one of the best available management tools to reach-
this end.
We concur in the recommendations on pages 50 - 51.
We suggest that these recommendations be discussed and
.carried forward under the aegis of the CCINC. The GAO
report does not, however, address two significant points
which we believe have a direct bearing on the ability of
CIA to support DEA. First, there is the statutory
prohibition against CIA engaging in law enforcement
activities. Second, there is the legal problem which
can arise when intelligence clandestinely gathered by
CIA abroad is used in U.S. criminal prosecution. In
this instance there is a separate statutory mandate on
the Director of Central Intelligence to protect intelL
-ligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.
Thus, a good case against a drug trafficker may have to
be dismissed because CIA cannot respond to the defen-
dant's request to identify sources or methods used to
collect the intelligence that pertains to his particular
case.
Regarding the specific recommendation that the
respective drug intelligence roles be clearly defined
we suggest that once the DI3A Intelligence Division has
established its proposed overseas Regional and District
level intelligence offices, the question of division of
responsibility between DEA and CIA overseas will be far
easier to define. CIA supports DEA's plan to expand its
intelligence collection capability. However, until this
stage is operational, CIA will continue its active role
abroad in the collection of clandestine intelligence
against the foreign narcotics target.
84
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APPENDIX IV UNCLASSIFIED APPENDIX IV
GAO REPORTS ON DRUG ENFORCEMENT
B-number Date
"Efforts to Prevent Dangerous Drugs 8-175425 4-17-72
from Illicitly Reaching the Public"
"Efforts to Prevent Heroin from I1- B-164031(2) 10-20-72
licitly Reaching the United States"
"Heroin Being Smuggled Into New York B-164031(2) 12- 7-72
City Successfully"
"Difficulties in Immobilizing Major B-175425 12-21-73
Narcotics Traffickers"
"Identifying and Eliminating Sources B-175425 6- 7-74
of Dangerous Drugs: Efforts Being
Made, But Not Enough"
"Efforts to Stop Narcotics and Dan- B-175425 12-31-74
gerous Drugs Coming From and Through
Mexico and Central America"
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UNCLASSIFIIED
 APPENDIXpr ved For Release 13 L/ S 1 E1D7M00144R000600ffl -j
V
PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE FOR ADMINISTERING
ACTIVITIES DISCUSSED IN THIS REPORT
Tenure-of office
From To
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
UNITED STATES:
Edward M. Levi
William B. Saxbe
Robert H. Bork, Jr. (acting)
Elliot L. Richardson
Richard G. Kleindienst
Richard G. Kleindienst (acting)
John N. Mitchell
ADMINISTRATOR, DRUG ENFORCEMENT
ADMINISTRATION:
John R. Bartels, Jr.
John R. Bartels, Jr. (acting)
DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND
DANGEROUS DRUGS (note a):
John E. Ingersoll
Feb. 1975 Present
Jan. 1974 Feb. 1975
Oct. 1973 Jan. 1974
May 1973 Oct. 1973
June 1972 Apr. 1973
Feb. 1972 June 1972
Jan. 1969 Feb. 1972
Oct. 1973 Present
July 1973 Oct. 1973
Aug. 1968 July 1973
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SECRETARY OF STATE:
Henry A. Kissinger
William P. Rogers
SENIOR ADVISOR TO THE SECRETARY AND
COORDINATOR FOR INTERNATIONAL
NARCOTICS MATTERS:
Ambassador Sheldon B. Vance
Ambassador William J. Handley
Harvey R. Wellman (acting)
Nelson G. Gross
Sept. 1973 Present
Jan. 1969 Sept. 1973
Apr. 1974 Present
May 1973 Mar. 1974
Feb. 1973 May 1973
Aug. 1971 Jan. 1973
IED
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2
APPENDIX V
Tenure of office
---Tenure To
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTOR:
William Colby Sept. 1973 Present
a/Effective July 1, 1973, BNDD and other Federal agencies
involved with drug enforcement merged to form the new DEA.
All BNDD functions were transferred to DEA.
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