ADDITIONAL COMMENTS ON RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE MURPHY COMMISSION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 21, 1975
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
SECRET .- AT TAB B
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
TRANSMITTAL SLIM
DATE
TO:
OLC Attn:
ROOM NO. BUILDING
7D49 H s.
REMARKS:
Complete package
of s
econd
submission re Murphy
Commissio
recommendations.
DCI
revised
recommendations:
1,
66, 67,
68, 73, 88, 173,
181,
and 182.
He also revised t
he l
etter at
Tab B.
F OM: ICS
ROOM NO. BUILDING
7E19 Hqs.
F I FEB 55 24 REPLACES FORM 36-8
011
WHICH MAY BE USED.
STAT
STAT
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R600600050002-2
2 1 JUL 1975
DCI/IC-75-0654
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT Additional Comments on Recommendations
of the Murphy Commission
1. Attached for your signature is a letter to the
President (TAB A) providing a second response to the NSC
memorandum of July 11, 1975, which advised the President
wished to receive comments on the recommendations of the
Murphy Commission. Unclassified replies were requested,
if possible. We did not request an extension, but the
original deadline of 21 July was extended to 30 July.
2. You responded earlier to the ten recommendations
in Chapter 7, "Intelligence," deadline for which was
17 July.
3. The enclosure to the letter at TAB A deals with
both the 16 recommendations.for which your comments were
specifically requested, plus 7 other recommendations on
which it was considered your views should be indicated.
4. The offices with primary responsibility for pre-
paring the responses were:
NSC Requested
Additions
IC
1,
27, 28,
29,
69,
88,
89
DDI
23
24
DDO
66,
72,
73,
76
71 (w/DDI)
DDA
67,
68,
162
OLC
169, 173,
180
181, 182
A/DCI (Thuermer)
56
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
 Approved for Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
5. The OLC additions resulted from your request for
comments on the need for secrecy legislation (Recommendation
173) and from a review of all the recommendations in Chapter
13,,"Congressional-Executive Relations," and Chapter 14,_
"Congressional Organization and Procedures."
.6. The following offices reviewed particular chapters
and decided no further comment on your part was necessary:
By 'DDI
Chapter 5, "International Economic Policy"
By IC:
Chapter 6' "Defense Policy" (Concern was with a
possible relation to IRAC activities.)
By 0/Comptroller: II
Chapter 11, "Budgeting and Foreign Affairs"
By DDO:.
Chapter 12, "Personnel for Foreign Affairs"
7. Since the comments on specific recommendations are
unclassified, a separate classified letter (TAB B) was prepared
outlining your views on the importance of cover to Agency
erations overseas and the problems associated therewith.
o
p
Material for this letter was provided by The STAT
Murphy. Commission was briefed on this topic, but the unclassified
report makes no mention of cover.
amuel ilson
L utenant General, USA
Deputy to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community
Attachments:
as stated
(Coordination on Page 3)'
STAT
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : Cli. RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
 STAT Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
 .Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2.
Distribution:
0.- Adsee.
1-ER
1 - DDCI
1 - Each Coordinator
1 - D/DCI/IC
1 ICS
1 _ F ICS
2 - CS/ICS
1 - IC Registry
DCI/ICS/CS
(18 Jul
DCI/IC-75-0654
STAT
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON,D.C. 20505
. DCI/IC- 75-2777
2.9 July 1975
The President
The White House
Washington, D,.C. 20500
Enclosed are my comments, as requested by NSC memorandum
of July 11, 1975, on certain recommendations of the.Commission
on the Organization' of the Government for the Conduct of
Foreign Policy (The Murphy Commission).
My reactions to the ten recommendations in Chapter 7,
"Intelligence," were provided on 17 July. The enclosed
includes my views on those sixteen recommendations in other
portions of the report on which CIA comments were specifically
requested, plus comments on seven additional recommendations
.(24, 71, 169, 173, 180, 181, and 182) on which I considered
my views might be useful.
The enclosed comments are unclassified, as was requested,
but because of my interest in a particular aspect of the
material covered by the Murphy Commission in Chapter 12,
"Personnel for Foreign Affairs," I am forwarding a classified
statement by separate letter.
Respectfully,
Enclosure:
.as stated
yoV.TIOi,
Approved For Release, 2006/01/03: CIA-RDP77MO0144R000600050002-2,
55d
, 4116
 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
RECOMMENDATION (1
The defining characteristic of these tasks (of a
Presidential staff) is that they embody staff responsibilities
rather than line authority. They provide assistance to the
President, not direction to departmental officials other than
to convey Presidential instructions. There should be only one
official with line responsibility in the, White House, and
that is the President himself.
I concur. This is precisely the concept within which I
currently conduct my relationship with the White House
Presidential staffs.
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
RECOMMENDATION (23)
The Commission proposes that the Office of Export
Administration in the Commerce Department be designated
a central point of contact between the private sector
and the government for the licensing and surveillance of
trade and investment with Communist countries. Policy
guidance for that office should be centralized in the
Board of East-West Foreign Trade authorized by the Trade
Act of 1974,'and consisting of Cabinet-level officials
from each of the departments involved in export regulation.
The Board should be backed up by a working group of officials
from the same agencies.
The Commerce Department is the logical point of
contact between the private sector and the government.
The Office of Export Administration, however, will have
to be properly staffed to perform all the functions
recommended since it currently deals only with licensing.
The East-West Foreign Trade Board and its working group
already provide policy guidance in East-West trade matters.
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
 Approved For Release 2006/01/03: CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
RECOMMENDATION (24)
Representatives of the academic and business commu-
nities should be formed into technical advisory committees
to assist the Board in gauging existing foreign availability
of proposed U.S. exports, monitoring new technological
developments and establishing procedures for evaluating the
success or failure to export control process itself.
Existing technical advisory committees composed of
industry and government specialists presently perform
these functions. The addition of members of the academic'
community may be useful. Consideration might be given to
retaining government specialists along with the academic
and business. representatives to help ensure relevance and
objectivity of such committees.
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
RECOMMENDATION (27)
After a WSAG-level crisis, a crisis review group should
assess the government's performance and, where appropriate,
review and reconsider contingency plans.
I agree. Actually, in most crises involving WSAG an
intelligence 'post mortem is conducted--the exceptions being
those crises which turned out to be of little consequence and
of short duration. The intelligence post mortems examine
how the Community performed and what steps- might be taken to,
improve future performance. I believe--along with the
Commission--that a post mortem of the entire crisis management
process, and not just the intelligence performance, would also
have value in those cases of major and prolonged crises. We
in the Intelligence Community have certainly found the post
mortem process a valuable tool in evaluating our work and in
designing ways to improve it.
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
 Approved For Release 2006/01/03: CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
RECOMMENDATION (28)
Establishment of a National Security Review Committee
(NSRC) to conduct a broad review,'under the direction of the
National Security Council principals, of the U.S. worldwide
national security posture at the beginning of every new
Administration.. The review should involve the newly appointed
senior officials and draw upon the views of the relevant
departments. It should be directed by the President and his
National Security Assistant.
I see considerable merit in the concept of a National
Security Review Committee with membership as desired by the
President, and would be prepared to provide such intelligence
inputs as would be of use to a NSRC in its worldwide review
of the U.S. national security posture.
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
 "Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
RECOMMENDATION (29)
The President establish an Advisory Board on National
Defense,. composed of private citizens who are well equipped
by training and experience to bring to bear on defense questions
the views of American society, and to facilitate the communica-
tion of defense needs to the public. The Board should be
provided with a small independent staff.'
The possible need for an Advisory Board on National
Defense is not a matter within my official purview,?but I
consider that such a group, with members of established
reputation from outside the Government, could assist in
clarifying the issues and in promoting public understanding
of critical defense needs.
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
RECOMMENDATION (56)
The executive branch foreign affairs agencies should
seek adequate funding for the specific purpose of developing
more comprehensive public affairs programs.
The CIA policy on release of information is to respond
as fully as we properly can to inquiries about our affairs.
In a recent two-year period we briefed more than 16,000
persons.. This figure does not include in-depth briefings on
foreign situations given to numerous newsmen.
I do not consider my program requires expansion and
plan. to continue it at about the level of the past year
unless otherwise directed. Continuation of this program as
presently envisaged would not require any additional funding.
Approved For Release 2006/01/03.: CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
 STAT Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
 'Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
RECOMMENDATION (68)
The Under Secretary of State for Management should be
assigned direct authority for communications, including
Foreign Service reporting, and should establish a staff to
carry out this responsibility. This staff should take the
lead--with collaboration of the Bureau of Intelligence and
Research (INR), the Regional Bureaus, the Foreign Affairs
Institute (FAI), the Executive Secretariat--in making the
Embassy communications system and particularly Foreign
Service reporting more effective in scope, content and form.
In so doing it will need to make systematic studies of needs
of the many disparate users--starting with the President and
Secretary--of Foreign Service reporting, and communications
generally, and to devise ways for fulfilling those needs.
The intent of this recommendation is unclear. It appears
to confuse two different subjects: management of the technical/
administrative aspects of telecommunications transmission
facilities and the substantive aspects of Foreign Service
reporting. We have already addressed the telecommunications
issues in response to previous recommendations, and I do not
concur in this aspect of the recommendation.
I concur with the desirability for improving the scope,
content, form and overall effectiveness of Foreign Service
reporting. During recent months the Intelligence Community
has initiated actions to improve management of Foreign Service
reporting. These include: systematic national-level assessments
of the total reporting from individual overseas posts; mechanisms
to enhance substantive communications and interface between the
national-level analyst and Foreign Service reporting officer in
the field; and improved briefing and orientation of Foreign
Service officers on national intelligence needs and reporting
management.
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
RECOMMENDATION (69)
INR should work actively with such a Foreign Service
Reporting Staff, to relate Foreign Service reporting effectively
to the needs of the intelligence community, and should be staffed
adequately to fulfill this role.
I concur in part, since I agree that INR should work
actively with any Department of State staff element charged
with improving the effectiveness of Foreign Service reporting.
NSCID No. 2 assigns the Department of State primary
responsibility,. as a service of common concern, for the
collection abroad of political, sociological, economic,
scientific and technical information. In my view, attention
needs to be given both to improving Foreign Service reporting
and to clarifying the location within the department of
responsibility for coordination of its collection activities.
The USIB Human Sources Committee already is well embarked
on a program intended to enhance the responsiveness of'all
human source reporting, including that of the Foreign Service,
to the intelligence needs of the Government. Any activities
undertaken within the Department of State to improve Foreign
Service reporting should provide for an interface with the
Intelligence Community.
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
 'Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
RECOMMENDATION (71)
At many posts abroad, political and'economic sections
in the Embassies should be merged. Integrated, comprehensive
reporting and assessment which considers economic and political
issues in their close relationships are what we believe will
be most needed; a combined section would enhance the likelihood
of it being produced. It would also help to encourage FSO's
serving abroad to pay more attention to the economic aspects
of our bilateral relations.
At the same time, I would underscore the need to maintain
the specialized skills required for successful reporting in
either of these disciplines. If the Embassy political and
economic sections were to be merged, some mechanism might have
to be established to ensure enriched reporting from both
fields--not the swamping of one by the other.
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
RECOMMENDATION (72)
The Ambassador should have a full opportunity to comment
on any change in the staff complements of each agency at, his
post, and his word should carry great weight even if it is
not the determining factor. .
. Ambassadors already have, In very specific terms, the
authority and the opportunity to comment on changes in post
complement.. It has been my experience that ambassadors
exercise their authority as they consider appropriate to the
circumstances. I think that should continue to be the case.
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
RECOMMENDATION (73)
The Department of State should provide managerial and
administrative services for the entire mission.
The Department of State, to a large. extent, already
provides administrative services for the entire mission.
Some managerial and administrative services, which could
impinge upon the authority of a department or agency.head
to manage his own functions and personnel, should not be
supplied by the Department of State but should be left
to the responsible
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
 STAT Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
RECOMMENDATION (88)
A "Global Systems Critical List of Problems and Opportunities"
be authorized by act of Congress to be prepared by an organization
such as the National Academy of Sciences.
While fully sympathetic with the desirability of careful
forward planning, I have some doubts as to the likely value
of such a list. The normal program and budget process will,
in the future, call for five-year projections, and there are
existing staffs and mechanisms for forward projections (e.g.,
National Estimates, Policy Planning Staff, etc.). I fear
that a formal listing would become somewhat. rigid and artificial
and not accomplish the laudable objective sought.
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
 'Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
RECOMMENDATION (89)
The President should create a Council of International
Planning (CIP), modeled in structure on the Council of
Economic Advisers (CEA), to serve him directly and in a
manner of his choosing in the planning of foreign policy.
I would be prepared to support fully whatever mechanism
the President establishes to assist him in planning foreign
policy.
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
 'Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
RECOMMENDATION (162)
The FSI program should be expanded to handle the principal
language and foreign affairs training for all agencies. Its
name should be changed to Foreign Affairs Institute (FAI) to
recognize the broader mission.
I do not, concur in the proposal that the FSI expand its
program to handle principal language and foreign affairs
training for all agencies, if the intent is that.other
agencies will be prohibited from using their own resources.
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
 'Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
RECOMMENDATION (169)
The Congress should adopt, by concurrent resolution, a
statement that a national commitment--meaning a promise to
assist a foreign country, government or people by the use of
the armed forces or financial resources of the United States,
either immediately or upon the happening of certain events--
results only from affirmative action taken by the Legislative
and Executive, Branches of the United States Government by
means of a treaty, statute, or concurrent resolution of both
Houses of Congress specifically providing for such commitment.
The rationale underlying this recommendation relates to
those matters for which the Congress shares constitutional
responsibility. The Commission recognizes that in the
future, as in the past, the Executive Branch must conduct
United States relations with other countries and that the
President in fulfilling his constitutional responsibilities
must have the flexibility to meet international demands of
increasing complexity.
STAT
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
RECOMMENDATION (173)
We propose that the Congress consider legislation estab-
lishing a comprehensive system for classification based on the
following guidelines:
a. The mandatory classification, in one of several
degrees.of classification, of specified types of
information. relating principally to the national
defense and the sources and methods of intelli-
gence.
b. The mandatory exemption from classification of
other specified types of information, relating
principally to U.S. actions in violation of U.S.
law.
c. The discretion, lodged in appropriate officials.,
to classify or exempt from classification all
other information on the basis of specified
criteria which balance the need for secrecy
against the potential value of disclosure.
d. A comprehensive system of automatic downgrading
and declassification.
e. The application of specified sanctions to persons
violating the terms of the system, including
criminal penalties for the unauthorized release
of properly classified information, and significant
administrative sanctions applicable to over-
classification.
f. The availability .of legal process to resolve any
questions arising from classification decisions.
I concur with this recommendation which, in proposing
mandatory classification for information relating principally
to sources and methods of intelligence,* would reinforce my
existing statutory responsibility as set forth in the National
Security Act of 1947, to protect intelligence sources and
methods from unauthorized disclosure.
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
 - Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
However, the downgrading and declassification of informa-
tion which is "born classified" by statute, should be determined
by the Federal officer responsible for implementing the mandatory
statutory classification and not by an automatic downgrading and
declassification system.
The application of criminal penalties to the unauthorized
release of such information is strongly endorsed. However,
the legal process applied to resolving questions about such
statutory classification should provide for an in camera
court review-whether the classification was a reasonable
act, i.e., not arbitrary or capricious. This would ensure
that the responsibility lodged by statute for determining
classification in the first instance is not transferred
to the Judiciary.
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
 -Approved For Release 2006/01103 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
RECOMMENDATION (180)
In the Commission's view, a Joint Committee on National
Security should be established. It should perform for the
Congress the kinds of policy review and coordination now
performed in the executive branch by the National Security
Council, and provide a central point of linkage to the
President and to the officials at that Council. In addition
it should take responsibility for Congressional oversight of
the Intelligence Community.
The manner in which Congress organizes itself to conduct
congressional oversight of the Intelligence Community is
essentially a matter for the Congress to decide. However, I
am concerned over the proliferation of access to sensitive
intelligence information. The Commission, by stipulating
that the proposed joint committee would not substitute for
the regular legislative and investigative functions of the
present standing committees in each House, would add an
additional committee without resolving the issue which
concerns me--to reverse the present trend toward increasing
proliferation of access to sensitive information. In my
view, the need is to establishea single small select joint
.committee with a clearly defined role to include a review of
covert action programs and with exclusive authority of
access to sensitive information involving the-sources and
methods of intelligence.- It would seem appropriate that
oversight of Agency management, functions and operations be
limited to such a committee and to such appropriations
subcommittees as may be necessary to consider and oversee
the Agency's budget.
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
 -Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
RECOMMENDATION (181)
The Commission recommends that the Joint Committee be
vested with the following specific,jurisdictions and authorities:
a. Receipt, analysis and referral (along with any
recommendations it may consider appropriate)
of reports from the President under the War
Powers Act.
b. Receipt and review of analytic products of the
intelligence community.
c. Oversight (in conjunction with the executive
branch) of the system of information classifica-
tion discussed above.
d. Establishment and maintenance of facilities and
procedures for storage and handling of classified
information and materials supplied to the
Congress.
e. Establishment of a code of conduct to'govern the
handling by Committee members of classified or
sensitive information.
Parts a and c are outside of my purview.' I concur in
parts b, ,d and e.
Approved For Release 2006/01/03: CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
RECOMMENDATION (182)
We propose that the Joint Committee:
a. Consider the creation of a statutory system
of information classification, and (if
intelligence oversight is assigned to it),
b. Be granted authority for annual authorization
of funds for the intelligence community.
My comments on Recommendation (173) apply to part a. above.
In the past I have taken the position that questions such
as those raised in this recommendation should be resolved by
the Congress,,but I cannot in good conscience concur in the
recommendation of part b. above.
The recommendation contemplates an annual authorization to
appropriate funds for the activities of CIA, a requirement which
does not exist under current law (Central Intelligence Agency
Act of 1949). Such a new annual authorization-requirement would
carry with it the' same security problems as an open budget for
the CIA.
I firmly believe that the CIA budget and certain classified
intelligence programs of the Department of Defense should
remain fully classified and non-identifiable. The present
system of review of the Intelligence Community budget requires
hearings before oversight committees to explain the budget,
a procedure I support. The proposal would add the requirement
of moving an authorization bill through the entire legislative
process. Resulting public disclosure could provide potential
enemies with considerable insight into the nature and extent
of our activities. Even a one-line item figure in an authoriza-
tion bill, without further revelation, could result in questions
and discussions of changes or trends developed in succeeding
year figures and generate a demand, for explanations eroding
necessary secrecy.
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
 'Approved For Release 2006iO +-RDP77MOO t44R000600050002-2
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
25X1
Washington, D. C. 20500
Dear Mr. President:
The President
The White House
DCI/IC 75-2778
29-July 1975
References are the recommendations of the Commission on
the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign
.Policy (The Murphy Commission) and the unclassified views on
certain of those recommendations which I forwarded separately.,
5X1
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
Approved For Release 2006% RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
 r
'Approved For Release 2006/0,
RDP77 M 00144R000600050002-2
25X1
Respectfully,
3
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000600050002-2
tSECfET
 'Approved For Release 2006/0110 l: F C SP77M00144R000600050002-2
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1-ER..
1 - DCI
1-DDCI
1 - Each Coordinator
1 - CS/ICS
1 - D/DCI/IC
1 - AD/DCI/IC
1 - IC Registry
1-DD
DDO
CS/ICS:
Revised:
WEColby:= (29 July 75)
hcd:2lJu175
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 :,7,7M00144R000600050002-2
25X1