LETTER TO MR. JAMES M. FREY FROM GEORGE L. CARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77M00144R000600110036-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 26, 2005
• Sequence Number: 36
• Publication Date: July 24, 1975
• Content Type: LETTER

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON,D.C. 20505
Mr. James M. Frey
Assistant Director for Legislative Reference
Office of Management and Budget
Washington, D. C. 20503
Dear Mr. Frey:
0ni
Enclosed is a proposed report to Chairman Price, House
Committee on Armed Services, in response to a request for our
recommendations on H.R. 1267, a bill "To provide for disclosure of
information by executive departments to committees of Congress "
Advice is requested as to whether there is any objection to the
submission of this report from the standpoint of the Administration`s
program.
Sincerely,
SIGNED
George L. Cary
Legislative Counsel.
Distribution:
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OLC: DFM: cg (24 Jul 75)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
W AS H I NGTON, D. G . 20505
Honorable Melvin Price, Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515
This is in response to your request for our comments on II.R. 1267,
a bill which would amend certain statutory authorities regarding Central
Intelligence Agency reporting to Congress. Each of the four proposed
amendments would require the Agency to provide to various congressional
committees information which is now available only to the committees which.
presently oversee Agency activities.
The Central Intelligence Agency was established by the National
Security Act of 1947 to coordinate the intelligence activities of the United
States, to correlate, evaluate and disseminate foreign intelligence, and to
perform other functions and duties related to intelligence, and affecting
the national security. Secrecy is critical to the successful performance of
certain of these functions. Congressional recognition of this fact is reflected
in section 102 (d) (3) of the National Security Act of 1947, charging the
Director of Central Intelligence with responsibility for protecting intelligence
sources and methods, and in certain other complementary authorities and
exemptions provided for in the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.
It is also reflected in the special intelligence oversight procedures adopted
by Congress, concentrating responsibility and controlling access to sensitive
intelligence information. Under these procedures, the Armed Services and
Appropriations Committees of both Houses currently exercise specific CIA
oversight. The 93rd Congress designated the Foreign Relations and
International Relations Committees, in addition to the regular oversight
committees, to receive reports of this Agency's non.--intelligence gathering
activities.
I have supported legislation which would convert CIA's. reporting
procedures to a statutory requirement. However, H.R. .1267 would go far
beyond this. It would expand reporting requirements to such an extent and
fragment jurisdiction among so many committees and subcommittees that the
oversight process itself would be weakened. Furthermore, as a by-product
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of the oversight arrangements proposed in the bill, much sensitive information
concerning both substantive intelligence and this Agency's operations would.
be widely disseminated throughout Congress. As a result, the essential
secrecy of much of this information would be jeopardized. Recent experience
shows clearly that the wider and more uncontrolled the access to sensitive
information, the greater the chance for either inadvertent or purposeful
disclosure.
In my view, two of the key interests to be reconciled in adjusting this
Agency's relationship with Congress are the need for effective congressional
oversight, and the need for protecting the secrecy of sensitive intelligence infor-
mation. I am opposed to H.R. 1267 because--far from serving either---it would
obviate each of these important objectives.
My position has always been that the Central Intelligence Agency will
work with Congress in any way Congress chooses to organize itself
to exercise its responsibility for oversight and appropriations. In view of the
mutual advantage to be gained from effective oversight processes, I urge the
Committee to reject proposals which would proliferate and fragment oversight
responsibilities. Consistent with the responsibility imposed upon me by the
National Security Act of 1947, I urge Congress, in effecting any change in
oversight, to take steps to protect intelligence sources and methods from
unauthorized disclosure. Limiting oversight to the minimum number of committees
necessary for effective oversight would contribute substantially to the protection
of these assets.
The Office of Management and Budget has advised there is no objection
to the submission of this report from the standpoint of the Administration's
program.
Sincerely,
W. E. Colby
Director
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