CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE

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CIA-RDP77M00144R000800020020-3
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September 10, 1975
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September IDAed For CONGRESSIONAL RECORD 77SENATE000800020020-3 of allegedly planned political assassina- tions. Dubbed "tyrannicides," these ef- forts worked under the assumption that it is in the best interests of this country to dispose of the. leaders we feel are harmful or undesirable. Unfortunately, some have felt that, in certain cases, tyrannicide is justifiable. This, in my mind, raises certain doubts as to the morality of our foreign policy implementation. But, aside from the morality, there is the question of true national interests. Tyrannicide is. merely an attack at the at the tip of the iceberg, so to speak! What we must realize is that it does nothing to quell, satiate, or change the factors which brought about such a situa- tion. Second, there is the question of where we draw the limits. Recently, I read an editorial in the Yankton, S. Dak., Press and Dakotan which quite accurately addressed these concerns. I think it is worthy of my col- leagues' attention. I ask unanimous consent that the edi- torial be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: TYRANNICIDE: PERILOUS POLITICS As the rumors and suspicions and alle- gation that the Central Intelligence Agency, with the knowledge of American presidents, plotted or perpetrated the assassination of certain foreign heads of state, a number of commentators have questioned whether this kind of secret, "gunpoint diplomacy" is nec- essarily and always evil. Calling it not murder by tyrannicide col- lunmist John P. Roche asks: "Would it have been unconstitutional; immoral and general- ly dreadful if some American intelligence agent had put a 30-caliber slug into Hitler's skull, in, say, 1937?" On the face of it, it might appear that the 20th century would have been a far happier one had someone dispatched Herr Hitler when he first raised Nazism's ugly head. The same could be said about Torquemada and the 15th century, or Genghis Khan and the 12th century. The argument collapses, however, as soon as we consider the death of a leader like Abraham Lincoln. Yet his assassin fervently believed that he was ridding the world of a tyrant. The student who assassinated the Archduke of Austria in 1914 and precipi- tated the First World War no doubt thought of his act as heroic. Of course, neither of these "tyrannicides," nor others which have dramatically altered history, was the official act of an organized government. They were the work of fanatic Individuals. Nevertheless, it would be peri- lous if we came to believe that even in the case of Hitler we can set up a standard of morality for governments separate from that demanded of individuals in society. Yes, it can be argued that it would have been a good thing if someone had killed Hitler in 1937. Perhaps Stalin, too. But what about Mussolini? And Franco? Once em- barked on such a course, where would we stop? The assassination of Fidel Castro in 1962 or 1963 would not have changed the factors that brought him into power In the first place, any more than the assassination of President Diem of South Vietnam was of benefit to'that tragic land. And as for Adolph Hitler, there were other, nonmurderous means of dealing with him in 1937, if world statesmen had had the guts to stand up to him. One feature distinguishing the American political experiment from all others before it was that it provided a peaceful means for changing rulers. If we ever reach the point where we practice a different morality in our dealings with foreign nations than we prac- tice at hime, if we adopt "tyrannicide" as a valid, 'all if only a last resort, method of furtheril naQio a poliby, we will have as- sassins 1 is best In WITHMIAWAL OF A COSPONSOR S. I Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that my name be re- moved as a cosponsor of S. 1, a bill to codify, revise, and reform title 18 of the United States Code; to make appropri- ate amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; to make conform- ing amendments to criminal provisions of other titles of the United States Code; and for other purposes, and that all sub- sequent printing of S. 1 reflect this request. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. BAYH. I further request unani- mous consent to print in the RECORD a statement I made during the recent re- cess detailing the reasons for my deci- sion to remove my name as a cosponsor of S. 1. There being no objection, the state- ment was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: STATEMENT OF SENATOR BIRCH BAYH ON THE CRIMINAL CODE I originally joined as a co-sponsor of S-1 because I was convinced that codification of federal criminal law was needed and be- cause I believed that as a co-sponsor I would be in a better position to see to it that those sections of the draft bill with which I took exception were modified. In my statement of co-sponsorship, I made it quite clear that I could not accept some sections of the draft bill and would seek to amend it. I have now become convinced that I mis- judged the role. I could play that would be most effective in strengthening those basic civil liberties which I have stood for throughout my public career. During the preliminary discussions on this massive bill which runs to 735 pages, this strategy appeared to be working with some success. A dozen changes in the bill were agreed to by the Subcommittee and the Department of Jutice. But the more people I talked with around the country about this bill, the more I became con- vinced that my initial judgment that I could play the most effective role by working from the inside as a co-sponsor was wrong. For several reasons, S-1 has come to be viewed by many people as a symbol of repres- sion. In its present form, the bill does have features which are repressive. This country has just witnessed an effort by the most powerful officials in the land to violate the basic rights of individual Americans. I fear that this temptation will not pass with Watergate. As the great Justice. Louis D. Bandeis once observed, "The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well meaning but without under- standing." Those civil liberties and civil rights we cherish can be lost today or tomor- row a law at a time or a phrase at a time S 15705 through the action of men of good intention who lack understanding. - Throughout my public life I have fought to protect the rights of individual Ameri- cans. At this moment . in our history when I believe we must rededicate ourselves to the preservation of those basic rights which have kept America and Americans free, I cannot associate myself with a measure which has become.a symbol of repression to so many. While I will ask that my name be removed from the current draft bill, I fully intend to press my efforts to 'see to it that the bill is modified to take account of those sections which I have indicated I cannot support. I continue to believe that codification is a highly desirable goal, and I will work toward that end, but if my amendments are not agreed to, I will do everything I can to see to it that the bill is defeated. I would like to outline for you in some detail-first, why I believe codification is desirable, second, the changes, in the bill that we have already achieved and, third, the amendments which I will propose. WHY IS CODIFICATION NEEDED? The nearly two hundred years of Ameri- can legal history have seen us evolve from a nation bound by the judicially developed common law of Great Britain to one in which criminal sanctions, if they are to be im- posed, must be specifically enacted by the people's representatives in federal and state legislative bodies. . In the federal system, however, this legis- lative process has been one of reaction and accretion. A particular problem is observed and is regarded as serious enough to merit criminal sanctions and then a statute is enacted which addresses itself, often very narrowly, to the precise problem presented. As a result of this unsystematic process of evolution, serious gaps in the coverage of our laws exist. At the same time many of our present criminal statutes suffer from unnecessary overlap. The punishments pro- vided are often inconsistent or outmoded. A number of statutes dealing with identical kinds of conduct, yet worded differently, are interpreted in varying and frequently con- flicting fashions. Instead of a criminal code, we have de- veloped something akin to what might be termed "Collected Federal Criminal Statutes." But even that term is somewhat misleading for it cannot be properly said that the fed- eral criminal laws are collected in any one conveniently accessible place. Criminal of- fenses exist in virtually all of the fifty titles of the United States Code. One who wished to discover whether a certain type of con- duct was the object of a federal offense would have to rely on the index to those fifty titles and his own skill as a researcher in order to act with total ,certainty. While ignorance of the law ought not to constitute a general defense, it also ought not to be encouraged by the manner in which the laws are preserved. Yet, the present dis- organized scattering of criminal offenses does precisely that. Our present criminal statutes are scat- tered throughout the 50 volumes of the United States Code; they suffer from un- necessary overlap; statutes dealing with identical kinds of conduct, yet worded dif- ferently, are interpreted in varying and fre- quently conflicting fashions. A few examples: There are several dozen separate statutes in the present law which punish theft. Most commonly the distinction in their coverage Is based on the nature of the federal govern- ment's jurisdiction; Thus, one who steals a truck containing mail while it is parked on an Indian reservation may be charged with three separate crimes, I.e., theft of the mails, robbery on the Indian reservation, and the Deyer Act. These three offenses have widely Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000800020020-3 S 15706 Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000800020020-3 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SEI\ ATE September 10, 19 i .r varying iaiwLions attached to them and the choice is left to the prosecutor to charge whichever he pleases, or all three for that matter. There is no mechanism to review the prosecutor's actions; The various Watergate offenses would not have been prosecutable federally had they not hai3pened to occur in the District of Co- 'smbia.. even though the intent was clearly to disrirt and influence a Presidential elec- tion. The new code rectifies-this situation; One section of present law punishes the breaking into a vehicle or vessel of the Post Office with a maximum penally of three years, while: breaking into a post office build- ing carries a five year penalty; One provision of present law punishes making= a false statement to a government agency under some circumstances as a five year felony, yet another section adds an ad- ditional charge carrying a three year penalty if it happens to involve the Department of Housing and Urban Development; and Another provision makes it a federal of- fense to engage in a conspiracy to deprive a citizen of his rights under the Constitution, yet there is no substantive offense actually punishing one who does deprive a person of his federally guaranteed rights. There is, therefore, a clear need for codifi- cation it, order to limit the extent to which conduct is criminalized and in order to pro- vide notice as to what the criminalized con- duct is. Our criminal law represents the most serious sanction that society can inflict upon its members. That system of sanctions ought to operate under conditions of simplicity, clarity, and fairness. The very nature of the way in which current law developed argues strongly that these essential elements have been glossed over. The criminal law is not simple when only a trained and skilled individual can discover where it may be found. It is not clear when a common word, "willful" for example, has one meaning in one statute and a very differ- ent meaning in another, the difference de- pending in large part on the vagaries of the language at the time the statute was en- acted :and the meaning of the term to the particular legislators responsible for the leg- islative history. It is in some sense unfair to have vital -questions of law depend for their answer a pen the judicial circuit or district in which the prosecution is instituted as is the case with the corroboration requirement in rape cases, for example. Moreover, the system is cumbersome for the prosecutor and this leads to situation" which, white not violative of basic rights, are certainly undesirable If they can be avoided. New crimes must be squeezed into old stat- utes with the same effort as putting square pegs in round holes. A statute designed to prevent large-scale frauds through the use of the mails must be made eo fit. the offense of using stolen credit cards. A law enacted to protect blacks against "facial o-opression during the Reconstruction period iia the only one available to charge National Guardsmen alleged to have wan- tonly tacen the lives of students at Kent State. R.esaect for law naturally decreases when a jury, having heard evidence of a crime appearing to be murder, is charged by the judie in terms of an offense described as the deprivation of a civil right under color of l aw. Revision and reform then are also vital needs-w:.thin the Federal criminal structure in addition to codification. Uniformity and simplicity of approach and language lead to wider understanding of the meaning and content of the law. Elimination of anchronis- tic reciuirements and resolution of ancient and trivial differences will inevitably lead to a greater belief in Lae wisdom of the law and consequently a greater faith in the fundamental concept that this society is not only ous of laws, but of just laws as well. Codification could be at its simplest level a process of bringing our criminal statutes to- gether fn a single title of the United State Code with the ultimate goal of easy access to the jaw. But to do only this would be to deal with only one part of the problem with the federal criminal law. Since, as I have noted, there are in fact many other preblem,~ associated with our present unstructurec collection of criminal statutes, the process of codification ought also to involve the join, processes of revision and reform so as to modernize and make more fair that area o: law--the criminal code--in which ::)it,- rtos? basic liberties and values are sought to bi- preserved. Whatever may be said for o: against isolated aspects of a given effort a codification, it seems clear tiat there exist. a compelling need for the federal goverimen to operate under a rational, just and work- able criminal code and that, consequently the concept of codification and the comple- mentary aspects of revision and reform an objectives which the entire citizenry can an( should support. MODIFICATIONS AGREED TO IN THE BILL Because of the size and complexity of this - project. I determined when I decided to ado` my name as a co-sponsor in January that the first step was to instruct my staff to sit dowi. with the staff of the Criminal Laws Sub- committee, the staffs of ether interested: Senators and representatives of the Justic': Department and negotiate those change which would improve the bill, but which did: not involve major policy issues. The staff wa also directed to isolate those policy question: for presentation to the Committee Thi initial process has now been completed with the following significant modifications hav- Ing been agreed to: (1) The statute of limitations for failin,- to register under the selective services law= (5 years) begins to run at the time the dui- to register ceases (age 26) instead of bein..r indefinite; (2) There is an absolute bar to trying an - juvenile below the age of sixteen as an adul? eliminating the "murder" exception in S. 1. (3) In the treason section, the constitu - tional requirement that conviction "include the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act" is added; (4) In the treason and related crimes sec- tion, the modifier "armed" was added to thy, term "insurrection" in order to limit its scope. (5) in the constitutionally sensitive sec tion which punishes inciting the overthro~ t of the government by force. the "clear ana present danger test" was added to the statu- tory language; new language was added re quiring "active" membership in a grow;:. which the defendant specifically knows hw the intent of overthrowing the govemner-- by force or violence: and the penalty for the offense was lowered from If to 7 years. (6) The sabotage section which p:inishc one who damages certain - peciflc propert with an intent to impair the nation's abiiit,; to make war or engage in defense activities was modified. As the bill read, it include any property of the United States and an- public facility. Language was added requit- ing that the property or facility be "used if or particularly suited for Else in, the na- tional defense". (7) The grading of the offense of evadin military service was reduced from a Class 11 felony (7 years) to a Class E 13 years), ex- cept in time of war. (8) In the rape section, language w?- added barring the requirement of corrobora- tion of the victim's testimony, and prohibit ing the introduction into evidence of he vie tim's prior sexual conduct. (9) In the Ellsberg case, the governmer - attempted to convict him under the generi: theft sections of Title 18 on the theory the-.. it had a "property right" in the Pentagon Papers (aside from the value of the actual Xerox paper). Since S. 1 has sections for prosecuting the disclosure of classified in- formation, a bar to prosecution was added in the theft sections so that a person could not be prosecuted for both. (10.) The scope of the federal riot statute was reduced by eliminating the provisto:, which gave the federal government jurisdic- tion whenever the mails or a facility of inter- state commerce was used to plan or carry out a riot. In addition, the definition of riot was narrowed to require "violent and tumultous conduct causing a grave danger of injury to persons or property" by at least 10 persons. (11. In the obscenity section, the eons: f- tutional phrase requiring that the material appeal "predominantly" to the prurient in- terest was added, (12.) The section punishing disorderly cof;- duct was narrowed to eliminate the following acts from the section: (a) making a loud noise; (b) using abusive or obscene lan- gaage: and (c) soliicting a sexual act, AMENDMENTS TO S. 1. While as I have indicated, I strongly sup- port the need for codification of the criminal code, as one would expect with a project of this magnitude, there are a number of policy decisions reflected in the current draft of the bill with which I take strong exception. Ac- cordingly, I am today proposing a number of specific changes In the statutory language. The following are my specific proposals for modification of the draft bill. I do not mean that iidoption of these amendments will sat- isfy aI of my concerns. I have made sure that other Senators, with particular interests in specific areas, do plan to offer amendments covering other previsions with which I have a problem. Senators Kennedy and Matthias, for example, have developed special experience by virtue of hearings held last year by the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, Administrative Practices, and a special Ad Hoc Subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee in the wiretapping area. Senator Tunney has Indicated a particular interest in the insanity defense. Senator Burdick, as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Peniten- tiaries, has amendments to the provisions re- lating to sentencing and parole. Senator Hart has, in the past, made a number of proposals in the area of firearms control and drug abuse. Other Senators, not on the Judiciary Committee, such as Senators Javits, Cran- ston, Nelson, and Moss have offered Legisla- tion which comes within the general, purview of the federal criminal code. OFFICIAL SECRETS The sections of the Code which have drawn more public comment than any others are those relating to the control of information held by the government. This is understand- able given the abuses of government secrecy over the last decade which were without pre- cedent in our history. The sections involved are Subchapter C of Chapter 11 "Espionage and Related Offenses" and Subchapter D of Chapter 17 "Theft and Related Offenses". The current espionage laws are contained in some twelve sections of Titles 18, 42 and 50 of the U.S. Code. Generally, these laws punish anyone who obtains a broadly defined cate- gory of information relating to defense mat- ters with an intent that it be used to the in- jury of the United States or to the advan- tage cf any foreign power. (18 U.S.C. 793 and 794) These sections have not been modified substantially since their enactment as part of the Espionage Act of 1917. Information "relating to the national defense" is not spe- cifically defined. Communication of such it,- formation to any foreign government car- ries a 10 year maximum penalty. In addition, under the provisions of Section. 783 of Title 50, it is a crime for a government employee to communicate any "classified" information to a foreign government. To the extent there Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000800020020-3 September App~-~~gd For Reel'/ILC-~7M(14.1F,p0800020020-3 is classified information which would not fall within the broad definition of informa- tion "relating to the national defense" there is, under current law, no provision which punishes its disclosure except to a foreign government or agent thereof. It is worth not- ing that the law is unsettled as to whether the publication of classified information would constitute an offense under 50 U.S.C. 783, since by virtue of Its publication It ob- viously becomes available to foreign govern- ments. This was an issue in the Ellsberg case but was never settled because of the outrage- ous government misconduct which required dismissal of that indictment. The current draft provisions of S. 1 in part codify present law, but also contain one notable expansion. Under Section 1124 a new offense is created which punishes the dis- closure of any classified information held by a government employee or government con- tractor to anyone not authorized to receive it. In my view, both the current statutes and the proposals contained in the bill are inade- quate, and, indeed dangerous. The crux of the problem is that they attempt to deal with what are two quite separate problems in the same statutory provisions. One concerns the government's quite legitimate interest in pro- tecting information relating to its military capabilities from access by potential foreign enemies. The other involves the highly sus- pect right of the government to withhold in- formation from its own citizens. Accordingly, the amendment I will offer has been drafted to separate, as much as possible, these two interests. Under my proposal, it will be an offense to transfer any classified information di- rectly to a foreign power or agent thereof with an intent to injure the United States. If the classified information so transferred is especially sensitive "vital defense secrets", which is specifically defined in the statute as relating directly to certain military capa- bilities, the offense is a Class A felony in time of war and a Class B felony otherwise. If the information is classified but does not fall within this special category, the penal- ties are substantially lowered. The more difficult question is what type of information is so essential to the security of the United States that the government can legitimately punish its disclosure by any, one, the first amendment notwithstanding. The approach of my proposed amendment in this area is two fold: first, it very pre- cisely and narrowly defines the type of in- formation covered; and second, it adopts an additional requirement taken from the Su- preme Court's decision in the Pentagon Papers case that the information's disclo- sure must pose a "direct, immediate, and ir- reparable harm to the security of the United States". The amendment defines these "vital defense secrets" as those which "di- rectly concern the operation of" (a) cryptographic information regarding the nature, preparation, use or interpre- tation of a code, cipher, cryptographic sys- tem, or other method used for the purpose of disguising or concealing the contents of a communication by a foreign power or by the United States; (b) operating plans for military combat operations; (c) information regarding the actual meth- od of operation of weapons system; (d) restricted data as defined in Section 11 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. In effect, what this amendment does is to adopt the constitutional standard which must be met before the government can im- pose a prior restraint on the publication of information as being likewise the appropri- ate standard for the criminal law. I strongly believe that in this way we can successfully balance the public right to know and the government's responsibility "to provide for the common defense". The language for this amendment has been worked out In a series of meetings with the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and a number of attorneys representing a broad cross-section of the media. Turning to the Chapter 17 offenses, there has been concern about the assertion by the government on several occasions in recent years that it had a property interest in cer- tain types of information, and therefore, that anyone who disseminated such infor- mation could be charged with the theft of government property. As I have indicated, these sections have now been modified to exclude all classified information from their coverage, unless obtained by illegal entry. In my view, however, this does not com- pletely take care of the problem. I have In mind incidents like one which occurred re- cently when the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board called in the FBI to investi- gate the disclosure of certain financial in- formation on consumer interest rates. It is inconsistent with constitutional prin- ciples to allow the government to assert a proprietary interest in information gener- ally. The amendment I will propose, there- fore, will explicity state that the govern- ment has no property interest in Informa- tion. I might note that this is a policy which is consistent with provisions of the copyright law which we adopted fifty years ago barring any copyright to the govern- ment. At the same time, the amendment would protect under separate sections a few, very specialized categories of materials in- cluding: information submitted in patent applications; certain "trade secrets" volun- tarily submitted to government agencies: some types of confidential financial data on private individuals and corporations: and grand jury minutes. The amendment also adds a similar bar to prosecution under the related offense of defrauding the govern- ment contained in Chapter 13. Under present Federal decisional law, the defense of entrapment, like other defenses, raises an issue of the accused's guilt or in- nocence. Thus, a successful claim of entrap- ment results in an acquittal on the theory that the accused is innocent of the crime charged. This is true in spite of the fact that the accused may have committed the proscribed acts with the forbidden intention. In fact, such an acquittal is the consequence less of the accused's Innocence than of the government's wrongdoing, for It is conceived to be contrary to the congressional intent to convict one who might not have com- mitted the offense without the active and energetic promptings of the government. The defense of entrapment has an "origin- of-intent" emphasis. It seeks to determine whether it was the strength and persistence of the government's urging or the accused's own pre-existing criminal intention which gave rise to the conduct constituting an offense. The defense has, therefore, come to require both that: (a) the government has engaged in activities beyond the reasonable limits of those artifices or stratagems neces- sary to produce evidence of criminality, and that (b) the accused was not predisposed In fact or by reason of his past conduct to engage in the prohibited conduct. These twin elements of inducement and predispo- sition, when joined, form the presently recognized basis for the entrapment defense. The proposed amendment changes the existing law by giving principal significance to the inducements of the government. En- trapment Is continued as a defense to a crime, but the question of the accused's predisposition is removed and the issue is framed rather in the objective terms of whether persons at large who would not otherwise have- done so would have been encouraged by the government's actions to engage in crime. S 15707 CONSPIRACY The purpose of this amendment is to at- tempt to substantially narrow the present law of conspiracy. The exact origin of con- spiracy theory in the common law appar- ently is not known. While it first received legislative recognition as early as 1305, it did not reach full maturity until the 17th" century, when the criminal law experienced perhaps its 'greatest growth, largely at the hands of the infamous Star Chamber. The modern crime of conspiracy has been defined as "so vague that it almost defies definition". This factor has resulted in widely varying definitions of the elements of this crime. The first part of my amendment would ex- plicitly reject the controversial doctrine laid down in Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1949). The effect of the Pinkerton doc- trine is that mere membership in a con- spiracy is sufficient not only for criminal liability as a conspirator but also for all specific offenses committed in furtherance of it. I believe that while conspiracy law is needed, particularly in organized crime and civil rights offenses, it can be a dangerous Instrument, and should be carefully con- trolled. Some have argued for the complete abolition of the offense. I am unwilling to go this far, but I am convinced that a modifi- cation of the Pinkerton doctrine is necessary to keep the offense under reasonable control. The second part of this amendment would add to the general conspiracy statute, Sec- tion 1002, the requirement that in order to involve a particular defendant in a con- spiracy charge he be guilty of some specific conduct which is "substantially corrobora- tive" of his intent to engage in one of the criminal objectives. of the conspiracy. This part of the amendment is an attempt to narrow what I believe is the over-breadth of the conspiracy laws by requiring a more substantial overt act than does present law by requiring a more substantial overt not in order for the government to bring an in- dividual within the conspiracy net. Both of these recommendations follow those of the Brown Commission. CRIMINAL SOLICITATION There is, at present, no federal law of general applicability which prohibits an un- successful solicitation to commit a crime, although a few statutes define specific of- fense which contain language prohibiting solicitation such as 18 U.S.C. 201 that pro- hibits soliciting the payment of a bribe. The problem with this offense is its inherent overbreadth. All it requires is one person asking another if he is interested in commit- ting any criminal act. In my view, actions which come close to being criminal are adequately covered by the reach of the attempt provision which encompasses conduct that goes beyond "mere preparation" for the commission of the crime, and by the broad sweep of the con- spiracy statutes. The Brown Commission was concerned by the scope of the solicitation provision -and limited It to. felonies only where the defendant engaged in a specific "overt act". While this is a possible com- promise position, I believe the crime of solicitation should be eliminated entirely from the Code. IMPAIRING MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS BY FALSE STATEMENT Section 1114 of the Bill which punishes the "impairing of military effectiveness by false statement" likewise raises serious first amendment concerns. This section punishes conduct if, in time or war, an Individual "with the intent to aid the enemy or to impair, interfere with, or obstruct the ability of 'the United States to engage in war or defense activities, communicates a state- ment of fact that is false, concerning: (1) losses, plans, operations, or conduct of the Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000800020020-3 S 1 57085 Approved For Release 2001/09/0 ?&-8DP7jj 1D01t4R0008 jP?egB ? 10, 1915 CONGRESSIONAL L 5 military f)rces of the United States, of an associate nai,ion, or of the enemy; (2) civil- ian or mil tary catastrophe; or (3) any other matter of fact that, if believed, would be likely to affect the strategy or tactics of the military forces of the United States or would be likely co create general panic or serious disruption". The first amendment problem here is the danger of political prosecutions. This danger was recognized by Justice Holmes and Brandeis in their dissent in Pierce v. - United States which affirmed the convic- tions of Socialist Party members in 1920 who distributed some 5,000 copies of an anti-war leaflet. The present version of the bill adopts the Holmes-Brandeis view that convictions under this section can only be sustained if the statements were, in fact, false and not expressions of opinion. The amendment that I am offering today, however, would go be- yond this and require that the government show, as an element of the offense, that the defendant specifically knew that the infor- mation in this category was false when he communicated it. The government must have the abilit v, in time of war, to apprehend individuals who are knowingly publicizing 'false infoem.ation concerning military mat- ters, but the reach of the statute must be carefully circumscribed because of its close- ness to rights protected under the first amendment. I believe that this amendment will provide such protections. IMPAIRING MILITARY - EFFECTIVENESS Section 11.12 of the proposed bill punishes as a felony anyone who "in reckless disre- gard of the risk that his conduct might im- pair, interfere with, or obstruct the ability of the United. States or an associate nation to prepare for or to engage in war or defense activities, he engages ill conduct (which) damages, tampers with, contaminates, defectively makes, or defectively repairs ... any property which (is) used in, or is par- ticularly suited for use in, the national de- fense." Although this does not depart from present 1. w, it has the potential for vast abuse in unstable times. I do not believe that reckless conduct should constitute a serious criminal offense when it involves property, even if that property can some- how be rolated to the national defense. Ac- cordingly. I will move to strike this section in its entirely. If sabotage is intentional, it will be punist,ed. under Section 1111. In addition, there are provisions in Chapter 17 of the bill which punish as a Class A misdemeanor the destruction of government property. OBSTRUCTING A GOVERNMENT FUNCTION BY --S'HYSICAL INTERFERENCE This section again raises serious First Amendment concerns. As the bill now reads, it is a Class A misdemeanor for a person to "intentio:aally obstruct, impair, or pervert a government function by means of physical interference or obstacle." One of the most fundamerrtal and cherished rights under the First Amendment is, of course, the right of peaceable assembly. Accordingly, any criminal offense which touches on this right must be closely circumscribed. The amendment I am recommending would add two additional clauses to this section. The first would pro- vide a defense that would require the court to affirmatively determine that the physical interference charged was not a lawful assem- bly protected under the First Amendment. The second would narrow the definition of "interference" to require that the conduct disrupts an "essential" government function for a prolonged period, and in a "substan- tial" way.. INTERCEPTING CORRESPONDENCE Several witnesses before the Criminal Laws Subcommittee also raised questions touching on the first amendment with regard to Sec- tion 152:! of the draft code which punishes anyone who intentionally "intercepts, opens, or reads private correspondence without prior consent. Although this section was designed only to cover actual tampering with the mails, the use of the terns "reads" is overly broad. Accordingly, my amendment would limit the offense to one who "intercepts or opens private correspondence in transit." DEMONSTRATING TO INFLUENCE A JUDICIAL PROCEEDING This is still another section of the bill which raises serious Srst amendment con- cerns. The judicial process should, of course, be protected from undue influence. These protections must not, however, be allowed to infringe on the protected right of assembly. The draft of Section 1328 cur- rently penalizes as a Class B misdemeanor one who "with intent to influence another person in the discharge of his duties in a judicial proceeding, pickets, parades, dis- plays a sign, uses a sound amplifying de- vice, or otherwise engages in a demonstra- tion in, on the grounds of, or after notice of potential violation of this section, within 200 feet of . a courthouse or another building occupied by a person engaged in the discharge of judicial duties." The amendment I offer will require a specific finding by the court that the con- duct involved was not protected under the First Amendment and, in addition, would require a showing by the government that the conduct did, in fact, pose a serious threat to the integrity of the judicial process. CRIMINAL CONTEMPT In the comomn law, a judicial officer had virtually unlimited power to punish sum- marily any person in his courtroom whose conduct he did not like. The Congress has imposed some restraints on this power, as in Section 401 of Title 18 passed in 1831, but it remains today a glaring exception to normal due process requirements. Section 1331 codifies current law In limiting sum- mary contempt power to a maximum penalty of six months. The draft also im- poses restrictions on consecutive sentences. While it is obviously necessary for a judi- cial officer to be able to exercise some con- trol over those who are participating in the judicial process, there is an obvious danger in such unbridled power. Accord- ingly, the amendment I am recommending would restrict summary contempt to an infraction (five days). Several other sub- sections of Chapter 13 including 1333-Re- fusing to Testify or to Produce Informa- tion; 1334-Obstructing a Proceeding by Disorderly Conduct; and 1335-Disobeying a Judicial Officer, seem to adequately cover serious disruption of the judicial process. The amendment also has the salutary re- sult of interposing an impartial tribunal between the offending defendant and the offended judge prior to the imposition of an extended jail term. This was an atlernative solution suggested by the Brown Commis- sion. In addition, the amendment I am recom- mending to the Committee would adopt language from Mr. Justice Black's opinion in In Re McConnell and require that the government show there was, in fa: t, an. "actual obstruction of justice." REP USING TO TESTIFY BEFORE CONGRESS The lawful committees of the Congress must, in order to properly fulfill their pub- lic duties, have the right to compel testi- mony. History has shown us, however,thai on a few occasions this power can be sub- ject to abuse. The draft provisions of the cade. raise the penalty for such refusa:. JC- from a misdemeanor, as in current law, a Class E felony. Because of the possibility of abuse, I do not believe that this increase is justified. Thus, the amendment I will propose will reduce this offense to a Clans A misdemeanor. SIGMUND ARYWITZ, IN MEMORIUM Mr. TUNNEY. Sigmund Arywitz Nvat known as Siggy. He was beloved in California as a per- suasive crusader for human rights ape: personal dignity for all Americans. He spoke with gentle voice but with booming convictions on America and the principles of individual freedom and self- worth on which the Nation stands. Siggy shall be sorely missed. As executive secretary for the Los An- geles Federation of Labor since 1967, he fought for the right of working men and women to get, what he called, "their fair share of the economic system." But he was more than a forceful labor leader. Siggy was a person of cultivated taste and exceptional insight, into all the ele- ments that join to strengthen the com- munity and unify our society. He had great wisdom and compassion, and tireless energy, and he gave selflessly of his time and his talents not only to the labor movement, but to the communit, at large. I enjoyed his vigorous advocacy, ad- mired his drive and his intellect, and I was shocked at his unexpected death or? Tuesday. Siggy was born in Buffalo, N.Y., took his degree from university there, served with the Army in World War II, then settled In California. From 1949 to 1959, he was a director for the Pacific Region of the Interna- tional Ladies Garment Workers. He then became a labor commissioner for Cali- fornia until he became the executive sec- retary of the Los Angeles Federation, sec- ond only in size to the one in Los Angeles. From time to time, he and I disagreed, and I shall always respect his unfailing civility and meticulous attention to detail when he argued for his views. Sigmund Arywitz invariably was forth- right and always incisive. Organized labor has lost a great advo- cate; California and the Nation have lost a vigorous champion for social progress: and those of us who knew him have lost an esteemed friend. FORECLOSURE RELIEF PROGRAM DEFICIENCIES Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, th Congress has passed and, on July 2, 1975, the President .signed into law the Emer- gency Homeowners' Relief Act. That act contained a mechanism for providing emergency payments to homeowners faced with foreclosure! due to unemploy- ment. As the author and original sponsor of legislative proposals to provide fore- closure relief to citizens faced with thc threat. of the loss of their homes, I anx- iously awastted HUD's first report to congress under the act, That report has now arrived, Mr. President, and it is truly disappointing. HUD has failed to implement the fore- closure relief program. And, Mr. Presi- dent, it now appears it reasonable pos- sibility that it may never be irr. plemented. Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA- P7'TI 00144R000800020020-3