SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT INFORMATION AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS HOUSE GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS COMMITTEE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77M00144R000800070053-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 23, 2001
• Sequence Number: 53
• Publication Date: April 28, 1976
• Content Type: STATEMENT

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Statement by
George Bush
Director of Central Intelligence
on H.R. 169 and H.R. 12039
Subcommittee on Government Information and Individual Rights
House Government Operations Committee
April 28, 1976
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Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to have this opportunity to share with this Subcommittee
my views on H.R. 12039 and H.R. 169.
I will begin by discussing subsection 2 of H.R. 12039. This provision
would require agencies to inform "each person" who was the subject of any
warrantless or non-consensual mail intercept, electronic surveillance, or
surreptitious entry, or who was the subject of a file or named in an index
in connection with the so-called CHAOS, COINTELPRO, or "Special Service
Staff" programs. Such notice would provide persons contacted with a statement
of their right to access under the Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act
and their right to request amendment of records under the Privacy Act. It
would also provide them with the option of requiring destruction of records.
The Privacy Act applies to citizens and permanent resident aliens, and it is
presumed that H.R.. 12039 is intended to have the same scope.
It is my understanding that the testimony of the Department of Justice
will deal with the legal and practical problems which the proposed notification
procedures would raise with respect to electronic surveillance, surreptitious
entry, and the so-called COINTELPRO operation. I would like to discuss
H.R. 12039 in relation to the two Agency programs covered by the bill,
namely, the so-called CHAOS program and the mail intercept program.
Both of these programs are described in the Rockefeller Commission
Report on CIA Activities within the United States. The CHAOS program was
an effort to determine the extent of foreign influence on elements of the
American anti-war and radical left movements. As conceived, this program
was a proper foreign intelligence activity within the charter of the Agency.
Contrary to its original purpose, however, the operation in practice resulted
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in some improper accumulation of material on legitimate domestic activities.
Most of this information was gleaned from overt sources and from other
Government agencies, particularly the FBI. Only a very small fraction of
reporting on the activities of American citizens in the United States was done
by CIA. The program was terminated by order of Mr. Colby in early 1974.
The mail intercept program, which began in the early 1950's, primarily
involved the examination of mail sent to and received from the Soviet Union
and other communist countries. In most cases, the envelopes were photographed
but not opened. Mr. Colby terminated this program in 1973. The CHAOS
and mail intercept programs are distinguished from the other operations and
activities mentioned in H.R. 12039 by the fact that they were strictly collection
programs and did not involve any type of positive action against their subjects.
In my view, Madam Chairwoman, the notification procedures proposed
in H.R. 12039 raise questions of practicality, necessity, and consistency with
the spirit of the Privacy Act itself.
An Agency-initiated notification program of the individuals contemplated
in H.R. 12039 would be unworkable. Because the CHAOS program was not
designed to identify individuals, but rather to examine the possibility of
foreign connections with certain kinds of activity, most of the information
collected or maintained under the program is not complete enough to suf-
ficiently identify or locate the individuals concerned. The program resulted
in the accumulation of many names of individuals connected with such activities
without further identifying information. Indeed, the Agency does not have
identifying information on over 96 percent of the 200, 000 names referenced
in the program's indices. A name alone, even a full name, or a name
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coupled with a reference to an organization or another person, does not
identify the subject with sufficient clarity to assure proper identification.
Also, in many cases, names are incomplete or are not coupled even with
past addresses. Moreover, the relatively few addresses the Agency does
have are dated--at least two, but more usually, five to eight years old.
Therefore, even where the subject can be fully identified, there is a high
statistical probability that he has changed his address in the intervening
years. This identification problem exists to even greater degree in the
case of mail interceptions. To identify the individuals involved with any
degree of certainty would require this Agency to undertake a large-scale
domestic inquiry. Such an effort would necessarily require collecting
additional information on individuals. This would of course defeat the purpose
of this legislation and violate the recently issued Executive Order 11905.
These practical difficulties have serious privacy implications for the
individuals concerned. An attempt to notify subjects based on information
now available in Agency files would result in a great deal of misdirected
mail circulating through the postal system. In addition, it is likely that many
individuals may be incorrectly identified and thus be notified of the existence
of information which was in fact related to another person. Indeed we have
already confronted this problem even under existing procedures where we
are able to solicit further identifying data from persons requesting information
under the Privacy Act.
Madam Chairwoman, another question relates to the need to institute
a notification program, with all its pitfalls, to inform individuals whether or
not the Government maintains the specified records pertaining to them.
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The Privacy Act and the Freedom of Information Act already make adequate
provision for individuals to ascertain the existence of such information.
This Agency has stated on several occasions that any individual or organization
seeking to determine whether the Agency holds information pertaining to
them may contact the Agency, and such information, as is available pursuant
to the Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts, will be released. Over
9, 000 people have already done so, and this system is proving an adequate
method for interested persons to exercise their rights under the Acts.
The volume of requests is a solid indication that the public is aware of the
access specified by the Acts.
An important and desirable aspect of existing procedures is that by
responding to requests, the Agency is able to determine the current address
of the individual requester, and in those cases where it is difficult to match
existing information with a particular individual, the Agency has the
opportunity to request the additional identifying information necessary to
ascertain whether information the Agency has pertains in fact to such
individual. This mitigates the dual problem of accurate identification and
proper and discreet notification which are inherent in the procedures proposed
in H.R. 12039.
Finally, the proposed legislation would require that the person notified
be provided "the option" of requiring the Agency to destroy information
improperly maintained or of requesting amendment and correction of the
information. The Central Intelligence Agency has stated its intention to destroy
such material, including all the information which was improperly collected or
maintained under the so-called CHAOS program, when the present moratorium
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is lifted. Such destruction will, of course, be consistent with applicable law
and Presidential directives. In addition, the Agency is in the process of
reviewing all records systems to insure the information is properly held and
that it is accurate, relevant, and timely. This Agency has requested the
Privacy Commission to review Agency records systems to assure that they
are consistent with the requirements of the Privacy Act. Accordingly, it would
serve no purpose to encourage the up-dating, supplementing, or correcting
of information which is bound for destruction.
In sum, Madam Chairwoman, it is my view that the notification procedures
proposed in H.R. 12039 are impractical because it would be impossible to
identify accurately a high proportion of the individuals involved. They are
inconsistent with the spirit of the Privacy Act itself because it would be
impossible to notify properly and discreetly many of the individuals whom
we would be required to contact. And finally, the proposed notification
procedures are simply unnecessary because interested individuals can already
be informed under existing law and can be assured that records pertaining
to them which are being improperly maintained will be destroyed.
Both H.R. 12039 and H.R. 169 would amend the Privacy Act of 1974
by striking out the Central Intelligence Agency partial exemption in section
3(j) (1) . This section authorizes the Director of Central Intelligence to
promulgate rules exempting any system of CIA records from certain require-
ments of the Act. My predecessor, Mr. Colby, appeared twice before this
Subcommittee to explain the need for at least a partial exemption of the Central
Intelligence Agency from the Privacy Act in order to protect from public
disclosure sensitive intelligence sources and methods.
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As you know, the exemptions in section 3(j)(1) were permissive. The
Agency has determined that it will not avail itself of these exemptions except
to exercise an exemption for access to information relating solely to intelligence
sources and methods and to certain records relating to applicants and employees.
This narrow exemption for intelligence sources and methods is based on the
fact that the Director of Central Intelligence is required by statute to protect
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. I consider
this narrow exemption absolutely essential to the successful conduct of our
Nation's foreign intelligence program. I assure the members of this Committee,
the Congress as a whole, and the American people that the Central Intelligence
Agency is completely dedicated to the policy of the Privacy Act of 1974 that
information on American citizens and permanent resident aliens be collected
and used only for proper governmental purposes.
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Final Statement coordinated with:
STATINTL
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