PROPOSED LETTER TO THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE RELATIVE TO THE USE OF POLYGRAPH BY CIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77M00144R000800130008-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 13, 2001
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: October 17, 1975
• Content Type: PAPER

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UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
INITIALS
1
3
3
4
5
6
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks:
FOLD HERE TO RETU_pk TO SENDER
D Tz
NO. 237 Use previous editions
FIL1 _M6 7
 FORM
3-62
SECRET
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
FROM:
Legislative Counsel
EXTENSION
NO.
7D35 HQ
6136
DATE
20 January 1976
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
INITIALS
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.
L t
r
I
Attached is my latest draft letter
lF16 H
to the Judiciary Committee on Senator
2?
ayh's bill to eliminate the use of the
C~
J
polygraph. It reflects the Office of
Security input reflected in Mr.
3?
Gambino's memorandum of 17 October
6
10. S psi
I
Please have it approved through
-
appropriate OS channels
Thank you
.
5.
27,
7;8 IN
77'976
JAN
281 a?s
Assistant Legislative Counse
6.
28 197 AN
3 1976
3 to 4
5 & 6: I
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4
who agreed that
6
the s atement on page 3 re
advance interview
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an
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OMS may not be completely
accurate. We do not always
touch base with the
ffi
9.
se o
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repolygraph cases. If you
gree
this can be reworded
,
,
10.
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^ (fONFIDENTIAL ^ u"sE ONIY ^ UNCLASSIFIED
 *Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000800130008-5
DRAFT: DFM: sm (20 Jan 76)
Honorable James O. Eastland, Chairman
Senate Judiciary Committee
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Senator Bayh's bill S. 1841, "To protect th =constitutional rights of
citizens of the United States and to prevent u a ranted invasion. of their
privacy by prohibiting the use of polygraph-type equipment for certain
purposes," has been referred to the ommittee on the Judiciary for consid-
eration. The bill would bar Fed~tal agencies as well as private industry
from administering examinati hs to their em to ees or
9 p y employment applicants
with a polygraph or other
strument which tests the veracity of statements.
The Central Intelligence Agency uses polygraph testing as a part of
its security screening process for applicants as well as for its reinvestigation.
program. After a judgment has been made that an applicant satisfies a manpower
need of the Agency, our Office of Security conducts an investigation to determine
whether the applicant meets security criteria. One of the later phases of
this security investigation is an interview in which the polygraph is employed.
The reinvestigation, which is conducted at approximately five-year intervals
in an employee's career, is a natural corollary to the rigid initial screening.
Its purpose is to detect any hostile exploitation or subversion of "in-place"
CIA employees. The polygraph examination during the reinvestigation is
limited only to counterintelligence questions.
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the period 1963 through mid-1974, nearly-appli.cants for staff or staff-
type positions were rejected on security grounds; of this total, over 60 percent
were rejected on the basis of information developed principally or solely
n- is-June-2.s.tatement.accomp.anying the intFo?" uction of~S 1841,
Senator, E3ayh expressed willingness to consider the need for?a limited use
of-the polygraph_in_the intelligence field. I_believe the need is clear in the
case-of the Central Intelligence Agency. The polygraph program is an
essential element of our security program? During
during polygraph interviews. In a sampling of recent records, 52 percent
of applicants who had been disapproved on the basis of information developed
during polygraph interviews had already completed all other security screening
and been provisionally approved on this basis. Without the polygraph
program, the disqualifying information on these cases would. have remained
unknown. In addition, I believe it is reasonable to presume that the program
is a significant deterrent to application for employment by unsuitable candidates,
and, more importantly, penetration attempts by foreign intelligence services.
The utility of CIA's polygraph program is not solely a function of its
part in contributing information lending to the rejection of unsuitable candidates ..
The preponderance of polygraph interview reports are favorable. Most of
these favorable reports constitute useful and comforting confirmation of other
screening procedures; the remainder represent favorable resolutions of
allegations or suspicions which otherwise could result in injustices or in
unnecessary defensive measures.
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2
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We at CIA are aware of the possibilities of abuse of the polygraph
program, and we have procedures in effect to forestall abuses and to protect
the rights of those taking the examinations. These include:
--each applicant for employment is notified at the time
of the application of the intent to use the polygraph. During
applicant processing the polygraph procedure and, examination
coverage is fully explained, and the examination is conducted
only after the applicant consents to the inter vur;,
--advance ii s with the Office of Personnel and
the Office of Medical Services determine whether a polygraph
-the a nt is notified of the privilege against self-
incrimination if a question may pertain to a violation of the
criminal law;
,4rp1,
--the general content of a l polygraph test questions is
reviewed before testing to assure that all questions relate directly
to security considerations as outlined in Executive Order 10450;
--no questions on religious thought or practices or political
affiliation of a non-subversive nature are permitted;
fry
--the -a i.s d that the examination. may be monitored
and possibly recorded to let him know there are no hidden procedures;
--there is random monitoring by a specialized supervisor to
insure that no improper questions are asked;
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3
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--polygraph records are maintained in separate files with very
strict need-to-know rules governing access;
--the polygraph examiner makes no recommendation as to the
security suitability of the person tested;
--the polygraph report is evaluated as only one element in the
total investigative report.
In addition t th-e above,_in. -oxd ta_insure-that the,pulygra
exami iatton lS ogr-am -adheres-rigidly- to the established standards spot
interviews and occasional surveys have been conducted with applicants who
Ji? have competedtheir polf9r h tests In one such program, several thousand
female applicants were interviewed after their polygraph examinations. Feed-
back from these interviews was utilized to guide polygraph procedures,
but the program was finally dropped because the incidence of adverse
commentary was too low to justify its continuance.
Finally, the selection of polygraph officers is extremely discriminating
as to their qualifications, intelligence, integrity, and high character. They
are given a rigorous training program which is a continuing process to keep
them abreast of developments in their professional field.. To support this
program, CIA has maintained a vigorous research effort inquiring into new.
techniques and equipment to insure that highest standards are maintained.
The National Security Agency also collects and disseminates extremely
sensitive foreign intelligence information, and that agency has also found it
necessary to use the polygraph as part of its security progi:am. I believe the
use of the polygraph by NSA is also fully ustifiable, but I r ~fer the Committee
to NSA for the details of its program. If S. 1841 is reported `o the Senate by
the Judiciary Committee, I strongly urge the Committee to ad,i the following
877M00144R000800130008-5
amens w9v ydpP PFo I?us e2t1O2n0)/1(o2of'I'itIeDf
 Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000800130008-5
"(d) This section shall not apply to Central Intelligence
Agency and the National Security Agency."
The Office of Management and Budget has advised there is no objection
to the submission of this report from the standpoint of the Administration's
program.
Sincerely,.
W. E. Colby
Director
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5
 O'D -75`- 4/73
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1 7 O CT 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Legislative Counsel
THROUGH Deputy Director for Administration
SUBJECT Proposed Letter to the Senate
Judiciary Committee Relative to
the Use of Polygraph by CIA
REFERENCE : Request from OLC for comments on
subject letter, dated 29 September 1975
1. Pursuant to the Office of Legislative Counsel
request, the Office of Security has reviewed the proposed
letter to the Senate Judiciary Committee relative to the
use of polygraph by the Central Intelligence Agency and
other federal agencies. As a result of this review, the
Office of Security has some recommendations for changes,
which if implemented will better state the Agency's posi-
tion on the proposed bill.
2. Attached is the rewritten letter now incorporating
the Office of Security changes. The following is the
rationale for each of these changes as shown in the para-
graphs of the Original letter:
a. Paragraph 1: Grammar of last sentence seemed
to require adjustment.
b. Paragraph 2:
(1) ". . part of its hiring process."
This seems to suggest that polygraphy per se is a hurdle
for the applicant to clear rather than a technical aid to
the investigative procedure used for security screening.
(2) The first sentence of this paragraph was
expanded and a new sentence was added at the end of the
paragraph to reflect the use of polygraph in the CIA
reinvestigation program.
(3) Several changes in wording and emphasis.
OS 5 8617-A
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c. Paragraph 3:
(1) Rewording for clarity.
(2) Office of Security suggests the insertion
of an additional paragraph making reference to the positive
side of our use of polygraph rather than concentrating
exclusively on its negative functions.
d. Paragraph 4:
(1) Regarding ". . . the danger of abuse inher-
ent in the use of any instrument used to distinguish truths
from untruths." The rewording is based on the fact that
the office of Security believes that the concept of distin-
guishing true from false declarations does not stand out
by itself as inherently dangerous, and the application of
instrumentation to the process does not inherently change
that fact.
(2) Minor rewording for consistency of gram-
matical structure.
(3) "no polygraph-acquired information can
be released. . ." This paragraph could very well entice
questions relative to the release of az information from
a polygraph file. Furthermore, the stated release provision -
national security - is not entirely accurate. Under some
circumstances, criminal information could be released to
the Attorney General. For these reasons, it is suggested
that the paragraph be deleted.
Paragraph 5: Minor rewording.
f. Paragraph 6: Minor rewording.
g. Paragraph 7: This paragraph seems more a
distraction than an integral part of the argument. Unless
there are independent reasons for its inclusion, we suggest
dropping it.
Robert W. Uambino
Director of Security
Attachment
Distribution:
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 Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000800130008-5
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. . 20505
Honorable James 0. Eastland, Chairman
Senate Judiciary Committee
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Senator Bayh's bill S. 1841, "To protect the con-
stitutional rights of citizens of the United States
and to prevent unwarranted invasion of their privacy
by prohibiting the use of polygraph-type equipment for
certain purposes," has been referred to the Committee
on the Judiciary for consideration. The bill would
bar Federal agencies as well as private industry from
administering examinations to their employees with a
polygraph or other instrument which tests the veracity
of statements.
The Central Intelligence Agency uses polygraph
testing as a part of its security screening process
for applicants as well as for its reinvestigation pro-
gram. After a judgment has been made that an applicant
seems to fit a manpower need of the Agency, our Office
of Security conducts an investigation to determine wheth-
er the applicant meets security criteria, one of the
later phases of this security investigation is an inter-
view in which the polygraph is employed, A medical
examination is also a part of the screening procedure,
and for the well-being of the applicant this is completed
prior to the polygraph interview on the possibility that
a polygraph test might be contraindicated for medical
reasons. The reinvestigation is a natural corollary
to the rigid initial screening. Its purpose is to detect
any hostile exploitation or subversion of "in-place"
CIA employees.
In his June 2 statement accompanying the introduction
of S. 1841, Senator Bayh expressed willingness to consider
the need for a limited use of the polygraph in the intel-
ligence field. I believe the need is clear in the case of
the Central Intelligence Agency. The polygraph program
is a highly productive element of our security program,
as some sample statistics may help to illustrate: In an
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 Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000800130008-5
analysis we conducted of the period 1963 through mid-
1974, we found nearly pplicants for staff or
staff-type positions were rejected on security grounds;
of this total, over 60% were rejected on the basis of
information developed principally or solely during
polygraph interviews. In a sampling of recent records,
we found that 52% of applicants who had been disapproved
on the basis of information developed during polygraph
interviews had already completed all other security
screening and been provisionally approved on. this basis.
Without the polygraph program, the disqualifying infor-
mation on these cases would have remained unknown and
these unsuitable individuals would have gained access
to some of the U.S. Government's most sensitive infor-
mation. In addition, I believe it is reasonable to
presume that the program is a significant deterrent
to application for employment by unsuitable candidates,
and, more importantly, penetration attempts by foreign
intelligence services.
The utility of CIA's polygraph program is not solely
a function of its part in contributing information lend-
ing to the rejection o.f'unsuitable candidates. The
preponderance of polygraph interview reports are favor-
able. Most of these favorable reports constitute useful,
and comforting, confirmation of other screening proce-
dures; the remainder represent favorable resolutions of
allegations or suspicions which otherwise could result
in injustices or in unnecessary defensive measures.
We at CIA are aware of the possibilities of abuse
of the polygraph program, and we have procedures in
effect to forestall abuses and to protect the rights
of those taking the examinations. These include:
--each applicant for employment is notified
at the time of the application of the intent to
use the polygraph. During applicant processing
the polygraph procedure and examination coverage
is fully reviewed, and then the examination is
conducted only after the applicant consents to
the interview;
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 Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000800130008-5
--advance interviews with the Office of
Personnel and the Office of Medical Services
determine if information has been developed as
a result of their screening procedures that
might preclude the advisability of conducting
a polygraph interview;
--the applicant is notified of the privilege
against self-incrimination if a question may per-
tain to a violation of the criminal law;
--the general content of all polygraph test
questions is reviewed before testing to assure
that all questions relate directly to security
considerations as outlined in Executive Order
10450;
--the applicant is told that the examination
may be monitored and possibly recorded to let
him know there are no hidden procedures;
--there is random monitoring by a specialized
supervisor to insure that no improper questions
are asked;
--polygraph records are maintained in sep-
arate files with very strict need-to-know rules
governing access;
--the polygraph examiner makes no recommenda-
tion as to the security suitability of the person
tested;
--the polygraph report is evaluated as but
one element in the total investigative report.
In addition to the above, in order to insure that
the polygraph examination program adheres rigidly to the
established standards, spot interviews and occasional
surveys have been conducted with applicants who have
completed their polygraph tests. In one such program,
several thousand female applicants were interviewed
after their polygraph examinations. Feedback from these
interviews was utilized to guide polygraph procedures,
but the program was finally dropped because the incidence
of adverse commentary was too low to justify its continu-
ance.
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : Cho-RDP77M00144R000800130008-5
 Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000800130008-5
Finally, the selection of polygraph officers is
extremely discriminating as to their qualifications,
intelligence, integrity, and high character. They are
given a rigorous training program which is a continuing
process to keep them abreast of developments in their
professional field. To support this program, CIA has
maintained a vigorous research effort inquiring into
new techniques and equipment to insure that highest
standards are maintained.
The National Security Agency also collects and
disseminates extremely sensitive foreign intelligence
information, and that agency has also found it necessary
to use the polygraph as part of its security program.
I believe the use of the polygraph by NSA is also fully
justifiable, but I refer the Committee to NSA for the
details of its program. If S. 1841 is reported to the
Senate by the Judiciary Committee, I strongly urge the
Committee to add the following amendment to proposed
section 246 of Title 18:
"(d) This section shall not apply to
Central Intelligence Agency and the National
Security Agency."
The Office of Management and Budget has advised
there is no objection to the submission of this report
from the standpoint of the Administration's program.
Sincerely,
W. E. Colby
Director
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