LETTER TO HONORABLE ABRAHAM A. RIBICOFF FROM W. E. COLBY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77M00144R000800140012-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 18, 2001
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: April 3, 1975
• Content Type: LETTER

^ UNCLASSIF oved FEflR
02/01/10: CIA-RDP751 00flOMFROB b>IILo012-9 ^ SECRET
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
FROM:
EXTENSION
NO.
Assistant for Information/DDA
DATE 10 June 1975 25X
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
INITIALS
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
1. OLC
Don:
7D-35, Hqs.
Y
ll
h
d
ill
ou w
reca
we
a
2.
several chats concerning your
proposed letter to Senator
ibi
ff
h
i
f
R
on t
e quest
on o
co
3'
GAO audit. I just received
from Finance today (10 June)
f
f
h
h
d
d
your
e attac
e
copy o
ra
t
t
4'
with sane minor changes and an
amended page 4 and 5. I don't
f
i
i
l
know i
th
s
s too
ate to be
5'
of any use to you or not but it
looks good to me.
6.
25X1A
7.
Att: a/s
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
FORM 610
3-62
USE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS
^ SECRET ^ CONFIDENTIAL ^ INTERNAL
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^ UNCLASSIFIED
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DRAFT:DFM:cg (3 Apr 75)
Honorable Abraham A. Ribicoff, Chairman
Committee on Government Operations
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20515
Dear Mr. Chairman:
I understand that S. 653, introduced on February 11 by Senator
Proxmire, has been referred to the Committee on Government Operations
for consideration. This bill would authorize those congressional committees
with legislative oversight of the intelligence agencies to require the General
Accounting Office to audit the accounts and operations of the intelligence
agencies. The legislation states this audit shall be conducted notwithstanding
the provision of section 8(b) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949
(50 U. S. C. 403). Because this bill would .have a serious detrimental effect
on the Central Intelligence Agency, I am taking the liberty of writing to you
to express my concern.
Section 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403)
charges the Director of Central Intelligence with protecting Intelligence
Sources and Methods from unauthorized disclosure. This responsi-
bility sterns from the realization that protection of these sources and methods
is vital to the accomplishment of CIA's mission of providing first-rate
finished intelligence to the nation's policy makers. One of the key statutory
tools assisting the Director in protecting sources and methods is section 8,
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which would be severely eroded by enactment of S. 653. Section 8(b) states:
"(b) The sums made available to the Agency may
be expended without regard to the provisions of law and
regulations relating to the expenditure of Government
funds; and for objects of a confidential, extraordinary,
or emergency nature, such expenditures to be accounted
for solely on the certificate of the Director and every such
certificate shall be deemed a sufficient voucher for the
amount therein certified. "
The importance of this section was acknowledged by Lindsay C.
Warren, Comptroller General at the time the CIA Act was before Congress.
A letter dated March 12, 1948, from Mr. Warren to the Director of the Bureau
of the Budget, addressed this confidential funds authority. Mr. Warren wrote
that while this authority provided "for the granting of much wider authority
than I would ordinarily recommend for Government agencies, generally, the
purposes sought to be obtained by the establishment of the Central Intelligence
Agency are believed to be of such paramount importance as to justify the
extraordinary measures proposed therein. " He further stated that the
"necessity for secrecy in such matters is apparent and the Congress apparently
recognized this fully in that it provided in Section 102(d) 3 of Public Law 253,
that the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. " Under
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these conditions, he stated, "I do not feel called upon to object to the
proposals advanced... "
GAO began auditing the vouchered accounts of this Agency in 1949.
This was the same audit GAO conducted of other federal agencies. In the
1950's, however, GAO instituted the comprehensive audit, the purpose of
which was to examine all agency financial transactions, as well as to evaluate
the utilization of property and personnel, and the effectiveness and economy of
the conduct of agency programs. Through negotiations between CIA and GAO,
an expanded audit by GAO was instituted in 1959, but one which fell short of the
full comprehensive audit in that it did not encompass the most sensitive agency
accounts and operations. During these negotiations, the Comptroller General
again expressed his support for Section 8.
Thk x Angemsnt was maintained until 1962. Despite the urging
of the Director of Central Intelligence (Mr.' McCone) and Chairman of the
Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives (Mr. Vinson),
GAO recommended that their audit be discontinued, stating their view that GAO
did "not have sufficient access to make comprehensive reviews on a continuing
basis that would be productive of evaluations helpful to the Congress. " The
Director and Mr. Vinson reluctantly agreed. As a result of the GAO cl to
discontinue its audit, the Agency established additional internal audit and review
procedures 1teee-follow-exactly-the same p ce ures and techniques that GAO
r
The Agency Audit Staff reports directly to me through the Inspector General and
observes the same audit principles and standards as the GAO.
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I belie e an unfettered section 8b is essential, to my ability to protect
present Intellig ce Sources and Metho s, and also critical to this Agency's
ability to attract ew sources of informa on. A. foreigner who cooperates
with us may stand i danger of losing his He, should our relationship become
known. Most Ameri ns who cooperate wit. us also desire confidentiality.
We have always been a le to assure those wh assist us that no one outside CIA.
will have access to their records, and that oni the absolute minimum number
of Agency employees will now of the relationshi I believe the revelation
that non-Agency auditors co Id gain access to thei names or records might
well discourage many of these eople from future co peration, and would
certainly affect the assurance w could, in good faith, provide. We have
already lost some cooperation, du to the fear of disclo ure evoked by the
The decsion of the Comptrolle\ General to disconti\iue the audit of
Agency activities as received with con iderable reservatio within CIA.
We have always felt th t an arrangement uld be reached whi h would comport
with GAO audit requireme s and at the sam time avoid endan ring Intelligence
Sources and Methods, which I ave a statutor duty to protect. owever,
I must oppose any legislation, inc ding S. 653, \which would autho ize any
additional access to our most sensitiv records.
Sincerely,
W. E. Colby
Director
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I believe an unfettered section 8b is essential to my ability to
protect present Intelligence Sources and Methods, and also critical to
this Agency's ability to attract new sources of information. A
foreigner who cooperates with us may stand in danger of losing his
life, should our relationship become known. Most Americans who
cooperate with us also desire confidentiality. We have always been
able to assure those who assist us that no one outside CIA will have
access to their records, and that only the absolute minimum number
of Agency employees will know of the relationship. I believe the
revelation that non-Agency auditors could gain access to their names
or records might well discourage many of these people from future
cooperation, and would certainly affect the assurance we could, in
good faith, provide. We have already lost some cooperation, due to
the fear of disclosure evoked by the recent plethora of leaks and
allegations about CIA activities. In this context I believe that
the resumption of GAO audit, even if limited to the scope previously
observed, could well result in a public impression that all activities
were being reviewed by GAO. Thus the risk of damage to key Agency
relationships, both present and future, with agents, bankers, companies,
attorneys, liaison services, etc., essential to the satisfactory
execution of many Agency functions and which can be maintained only
in a climate of mutual confidentiality would be a serious concern
should there be any change in the status quo insofar as GAO audit of
Agency activities are concerned.
In conclusion, I am fully perceptive of the concerns of Congress
for effective oversight of the activities of this Agency. Audit by
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the General Accounting Office, however, is only one of several tools
available to the Congress for use in accomplishing this purpose.
For the reasons discussed above I believe the national interest would
be best served by not utilizing this particular tool. The remaining
tools available to the Congress for this purpose can be strengthened
as the Congress may desire - these tools include (a) confirmation
power of the United States Senate as it relates to evaluation of the
character and integrity of individuals nominated by the President
to serve as Director and Deputy Director of this Agency (b) oversight
of and participation in the budget review process (c) evaluation of
the quality and soundness of the principles and standards (following
GAO Principles and standards) established by the Director of Central
Intelligence for the control and use of all funds (d) evaluation
by Congressional Committees (or by the Comptroller General on their
behalf) of the Agency's internal audit processes which also follow
GAO standards and (e) general oversight activities by the Committees
of Congress with jurisdiction over Agency affairs.
Sincerely,
W. E. Colby
Director
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