VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77M00144R001200050009-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 13, 2005
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: July 31, 1975
• Content Type: OPEN

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RECOMMENDATION (28)
Establishment of a National.Security.Review Committee
(NSRC) to conduct a broad review, under the direction of the
National Security Council principals, of the U.S. worldwide
national security posture at the beginning of every new
Administration. The review should involve the newly appointed
senior officials and draw upon the views-of the relevant
departments. It should be directed by the President and his
National Security Assistant.
I see considerable merit in the concept of a National
Security Review Committee. with membership as desired by the
President, and would be prepared to provide such intelligence
inputs as would be of use to a NSRC in its worldwide review
of the U.S. national security: posture.
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Recommendation (1)
Section 403 of the National. Security Act of 1947 should be
amended in the form.set forth in Appendix VI to this. Report.
(Reproduced in full on following page.),F These amendments, in
summary, would:
a. Make explicit that the CIA's activities must be
related to foreign intelligence.
b. Clarify the responsibility of the CIA to protect
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
disclosure. (The Agency would be responsible for protecting
against unauthorized disclosures within the CIA, and it
would be responsible for providing guidance and technical
assistance-to other agency and department heads in
protecting against unauthorized disclosures within their own
agencies and departments.)
c. Confirm publicly the CIA's existing authority to
collect foreign intelligence from willing sources within: the
United States,, and, except -rs specified by the President in
a published Executive Order prohibit the CIA from
collection efforts within the United States directed at
securing foreign intelligence from unknowing American
citizens.
1The Executive Order authorized. by this statute. should recognize
that when the collection-of foreign 'Intelligence from persons
who are not United States citizens 'resul-ts in the incidental
acquisition of information from unknowing citizens, the Agency
should be permitted to make appropriate use or disposition of
such information. Such collection activities must be directed
at foreign intelligence sources, and the involvement of American
ci t i zer?s must be incidental.
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Note- Appendix VI of the Commission Report provides:
In Recommendation (1), the Commission proposes that
50 U.S.C. Section 403(d) be amended to read (Additions are
italicized; deletions are marked through).:
(d) For the purpose of coordinating the foreej n
intelligence activities of the several government departments and
agencies in the interest of national security, it shall he the
duty of the (Central Intelligence) Agency, under the direction of
the National Security Council-
to advise the National Security Council in matters
(1)
concerning such foreign intelligence activities of the
government departments and agencies as relate to national
security;`
(2) to make. recommendations to the National Security
Council for the"coordination of such foreign intelligence
activities of the departments and agencies of the government
as relate to the national security;
(3) to collect, correlate and evaluate foreign
intelligence relating to the national security, and provide
for the appropriate dissemination-of such foreign
intelligence within the government using where appropriat6
existing agencies and facilities:
Provided, that except as specified by the President in a
published Executive order, in collecting foreign
intelligence from United States citizens in ?he 'United
States or its possessions, the Agency must disclose-.to such
citizens that such intelligence is being ca ected_ by to "-
Agency.
Provided further, that the Agency shall have no police,
subpoena, law enforcement powers, or internal security
functions: .
Provided further, than the department- and other
agencies of the government shall continue to collect,
evaluate, correlate and disseminate departmental
intelligence:
F.
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(4) to perform, for the benefit of the existing
intelligence agencies, such additional foreign 1ne1Uq pce
services of common concern as the National Security Council
determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally;
(5) to perform such other functions and duties related
to foreign intelligence affecting the national security as
the National Security Council may from time to time direct.
(6) gto be responsible for protecting sources and
methods of foreign intelligence from unauthorized
disclosure. Within the United States, this responsibility
shall be limited a to lawful means used to protectaga n.st
disclosure b i resent or former employees, agents or
? sources of the Agency or i i persons, or employees of
persons or organizations, presently or formerly under
contract with the Agency or affiliated with it, and (b) to
providing guidance and technical assistance to other
government departments and agencies performin intejennce
activities.
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Response
I fully concur in the recommendation of the Cominission that
the National Security Act be amended to clarify the duties of the
Agency by inserting the word "foreign" before the word
"intelligence" at appropriate places in the Act.. In fact, this
suggestion first arose at my confirmation hearing in 1973.
I concur with the added provisions clarifying they Agency's
role in the collection of foreign intelligence from US citizens,
I have reservations about the proposal of the Commission to
amend the Act to shift from the Director of Central' Intelligence,
to the Central Intelligence Agency, responsibility for protecting
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.
The DCI, as head of the Intelligence Community, is well placed to
protect the Community's interest in sources and methods of
foreign intelligence, but CIA is less well suited to cover these
matters' as they affect other 'agencies. The proposed amendment
could be read to diminish the DCI's coordinating function in the
Intelligence Community. I believe the purpose of the Commission
in recommending the change can be carried out by retaining some
of the limitations in the proposed subparagraph. (6) but assigning
the responsibility to the Director of Central Intelligence.
In addition, changing the. wording from "protecting
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure" to -
"protecting sources and-methods of foreign intelligence from
unauthorized disclosure" eliminates terminology which is well
recognized and for which there is judicial interpretation and
precedent in several cases.
I am also concerned that subparagraph (6).may not afford
sufficient. authority to protect intelligence _sources and methods
information under the Freedom of Information Act.. That Act
exempts from its mandatory exposure 'provisions matters
"specifically exempt from disclosure by statute." Appropriate
language should be included in subparagraph (6) to make clear
that that subparagraph is an exemption statute for Freedom of
Information purposes.
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Recommendation (2)
The President should by Executive Order prohibit the CIA
from the collection of information about the domestic activities
of United States citizens (whether by overt or covert means), the:
evaluation, correlation, and dissemination of analyses or reports
about such activities, and the storage of such information., with
exceptions for the following categories of persons or activities:.
a. Persons presently or formerly affiliated, or being
-
considered for affiliation, with the CIA, directly or
.indirectly, or others who require clearance by the CIA to
receive classified information;
b. Persons or activities that pose a clear threat to
CIA facilities or personnel, provided that proper
coordination with the FBI is accomplished;
c. Persons suspected of espionage.or other illegal
activities relating to foreign intelligence, provided that
proper coordination with the FBI is accomplished..
d. Information which is received incidental to
appropriate CIA activities may be transmitted to an agency
with appropriate jurisdiction, including law enforcement
agencies.
Collection of information from normal library sources such
as newspapers, books, magazines and other such documents is not
to be affected by this order.
Information currently being maiftained which is inconsistent
with the order should be destroyed at the conclusion of the
current congressional investigations"br as soon thereafter as
permitted by law.
The CIA should periodically screen its files and eliminate`
all material inconsistent with the order.
The order should be issued after consultation with the
National Security Council, the Attorney..General, and the Director
of Central Intelligence. Any modification of the order would be
permitted only through published amendments.
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Response
I concur in this recommendation.
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Recommendation (3)
The President should recommend to Congress the establishment
of a Joint Committee on Intelligence to assume the oversight role
currently played by the Armed Services Committees.
Response
As you know, I concur in this recommehhdati.on.
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Recommendation (4)
Congress should give careful consideration to the question
whether the budget of the CIA should not, at least to some
extent, be made public, particularly i n ,view of the provisions of
Article I, Section 9, Clause 7 of the Constitutional
Response
In the past I have taken the position that this question
should be resolved by the Congress but that I could not in good
conscience recommend publication of all or part of the
intelligence budget. I believe I must now recommend that the
Agency budget and certain classified intelligence programs of the
Department of Defense remain fully classified and nonidentifiable.
I do this despite the recommendation of the Commission and its
reference to Article 1, Section 9, Clause 7, of the Constitution.-
With respect to the constitutionality of the present
procedure, a recent attempt to litigate this question did not
reach the substance; the litigant having been defeated on the
issue of standing to sue. Richardson v. United States,
418 U.S. 166 (1974). There is, however, cons iderabIe Historical
precedent for budget secrecy, going back to deviates in the
Constitutional Convention, the use of a secret fund during the
administrations of Washington and Madison, and a secret
appropriations act in 1811. Congress most recently endorsed the
secrecy of intelligence budgets in June 1974 when the Senate'
rejected an amendment to the Department of Defense Appropriations
Act of 1975 which would have required that the total budget figure
for intelligence purposes be made public. In addition, I believe
that present procedures are'fully' in accord with the Coi7sti-tution.
Agency appropriations are an integral part of appropriations made
by law and are reflected in the Treasury's Statement and Account
of Receipts and Expenditures in compliance with the cited
provisions of the Constitution.
1 "Ho Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence -
of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account
of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shal.l..be
publis,ied from time to time."
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On the merits of the question, aside from the
constitutionality,-my belief that this budget should. remain secret
is based on the following:
a. Public disclosure of Intelligence Community budget
data, or the budgets of the individual agencies which make
up the Intelligence Community, could provide potential
enemies with considerable insight into the nature and extent
of our activities.
b. Publication of part of the budget, as suggested by
the Commission, would raise, in my view, extensive
congressional debate as to what matters were included and
what matters were not included in the published totals.,
leading to a rapid erosion of the secrecy of the portions
withheld.-
c. The same question would' immediately arise with
respect to the 'publication of the total CIA budget, a total.
Community budget; or any other figure covering
"intelligence." An immediate requirement would be levied to
explain precisely which of our intelligence activities were
covered in the published. total and which were not.. As you
know,.this is a difficult matter to determine within
classified circles due to the difficulty of determining at
what point intelligence expenditures stop and operational
expenditures begin (the radar on a destroyer; tactical air
reconnaissance on the battlefield; the reporting as
differentiated from the representational and other functions
of attaches, foreign service officers; etc.).
d. Publication of any single figure with respect to
intelligence would, in my view, quickly initiate curiosity
and investigation by the press and others as to exactly how
the figure was arrived at and what its component elements
were. This is suggested by the history of disclosure fff AEC
budget materials and related information by both the
Executive Branch and the Congress.
e. Publication of any figure with respect to
intelligence will result in questions and discussions of any
changes or trends developed in succeeding year figures. Any
change in the basis on which the figure was computed or any
change in its level will generate a demand for explanation
and tend to reveal the details of the figure and programs
supported by it.
Thus, I must recommend that the CIA budget and certain other
highly sensitive inte'iligence programs remain classified and
noni denti f iabl e
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o 'h
Recom~endation (8)
a. The Office of Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
should be reconstituted to provide for two such deputies, in
addition to the four. heads o.f the Agency';s directorates. One
deputy would act as the administrative officer, freeing the
Director from day-to-day management duties. The other deputy
should be a military officer, serving the functions of fostering
relations with military and providing the Agency with?.technical
expertise on military intelligence requirements.
b. The advice and consent of the Senate should be required
for the appointment of each Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence. .
Response -
I endorse this recommendation though.I envision its
implementation in somewhat different fashion. With the
establishment of a Deputy Director charged specifically with CIA
management and representation responsibilities, the other
(military) Deputy could most effectively perform the functions
cited in the Commission Report if he were primarily concerned
with management of those Intelligence Community responsibilities
given to me under the President's letter of November 1971.. Thus,
I would propose that the existing position of Deputy to the DCI
for-the Intelligence Community be the basis for defining the
responsibilities of the military Deputy Director. Should
expected congressional consideration of the DCI's role within the
Intelligence Community produce significant changes in.this role,
this recommendation will obviously be .affected.. While it might
be undesirable to specify this in .legislation, .I believe. that. the
Deputy Director principally concerned with management of CIA
should be both a civilian and a career Agency employee.. This
last comment in no way reflects upon the high quality of the
military Deputy Directors who have served this Agency in the
past; it merely reflects the experience that such an outsider is
normally less able to conduct the detailed management; of the
Agency contemplated by the Cornmission's recommendation than is a
career Agency employee. This is especially true in the case in
which a career Agency employee has been the Director, as in such
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situations there has been a natural tendency for management
decisions to be made by the Director rather than del gated to the
Deputy. CIA has, however, been exceedingly well served by the
high quality of a number of Deputy Directors of military
background who have made a unique c.ontrbution in intelligence
matters for which they were particularly fitted as we'll as being
excellent helpers and independent advisors to the Director,
himself.
15
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Recommendation (9)
a. The Inspector General should be upgraded to a status
equivalent to that of the deputy directors in charge of the four
directorates within the CIA.
b. The Office of Inspector General should be staffed by
outstanding, experienced officers from both inside: and outside
the CIA, with ability to understand the various branches of the
Agency.
c. The Inspector General's duties with respect to domestic
CIA activities should include periodic reviews-of all offices,
within the United States. He should examine each office for
compliance with CIA authority and regulations as-wel.l as for the
effectiveness of their programs in implementing policy
objectives.
d. The Inspector General should investigate all reports
from employees concerning possible violations of the CIA -statute.
e. The Inspector General should be given complete access to
all information in the CIA relevant to his reviews.
f. An effective Inspector General's office will require a -
larger staff, more frequent reviews, and highly qualified
personnel.
g. Inspector General reports should be provided to the
National Security Council and the recommended executive oversight
body. The Inspector General should have the authority, when he
deems it appropriate, after notifying the Director of Central
Intelligence, to consult with the executive oversight body on any
CIA activity (see Recommendation 5). -'
Response
I concur in this recommendation.
a. The status of the Inspector General can be raised as
recommended, although I believe the other recommendations
made by the Commission with respect to the functions of the
Inspector General are more fuidamental.
5
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b. The Office of the Inspector General will be staffed
by officers of the types' described, both from inside the
Agency and from outside the Agency.
c. The Inspector General will develop a program of
periodic review of all offices within the United States as
proposed.
d. The Inspector General will investigate all reports
from employees concerning possible violations of the CIA
statute and other applicable laws.
e. The Inspector General will be given complete access,
by specific regulation to all inform ation'in CIA relevant to
his reviews>
f.- The Inspector General is now studying the
recommended expansion of his office and program, and wil'l'.
develop a specific proposal for consideration..
g. Inspector General reports will be made available to
the DISC and the recommended executive oversight body, as
recommended.
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Recommendation (13)
a. The president should instruct the Director of Central
Intelligence that the CIA is not to engage again in domestic mail
openings except with express statutory aiithori ty in time of war.
(See also Recommendation 23.)
b. The President should instruct the Director of Central.
Intelligence that mail cover examinations are*to be in compliance
with postal regulations, they are to be undertaken only in
furtherance of the CIA's legitimate activities and then only on a
limited and selected basis clearly involving matters of national
security.
Response
I concur in the` intent of this recommendation, although in
form it is directed to the President rather than the Agency. It
is fully -consistent with the instructions issued by me on
29 August 1973 and will be reflected in internal Agency
regulations as well as instructions.
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Recommendation (21)
The Commission endorses legislation, drafted vri.th
appropriate safeguards of the constitutional rights of all.
affected individuals, which would make it a criminal offense for
employees or former employees of the CIA willfully to divulge to
any unauthorized person classified information pertaining to
foreign intelligence or the collection thereof obtained during
the course of their employment.
Response
On 23 April 1975 I submitted to the Office of Management and
Budget proposed legislation in line with this recommendation.. I
had submitted similar legislation in January 1974, which was not
introduced, and I have vigorously pursued the objectives of this
proposal with the Congress, the Department of Justice, and other
interested departments and agencies since that time. It has been
evident to this Agency for.many years that existing criminal 'Law
is inadequate and provides virtually no enforceable sanctions
against disclosure of intelligence sources and methods to
unauthorized persons. This is because to prosecute under
existing law requires disclosure in open court of further
sensitive information as well as confirmation of the information.
disclosed by the person. being prosecuted.. In very recent years, -
with the Government's inability to prosecute in well known cases
of disclosure by former employees, the need for improved criminal
legislation has become evident to many outside of the
Intelligence Community. The -l egi s l ati on which I have proposed
meets, I believe, all of the standards of this recommendation
including particularly safeguards for the consititutional rights
of all affected individuals. It would permit prosecution only of
persons authorized to possess the information disclosed or who
possessed it by virtue of an association with the Government. It
specifically precludes prosecution of newsmen or other recipients
of information disclosed in violation of the lawn. .
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Recommendation (22)
The CIA should not undertake physical surveillance (defined
as systematic observation) of Agency employees, contractors or
related personnel within the United States without first
obtaining written approval of the Director of Central
Intelligence.
Response
I concur in this recommendation, but note that the
requirement for the Director's prior written approval would apply
to some activities by the Agency which the Commission did not
find objectionable. These include surveillance of Agency
employees in operational situations for their protection or to
detect counters urvei 1 lance, surveillance of individuals who may
be carrying substantial sums of money, or surveillance during the
routine investigations mentioned in the response to
Recommendation 18. Thus, I believe that the. intent of' this
recommendation can best be met by adoption of detailed internal
procedures, whi ch define those situations in which DCI: approval
for surveillance is required and those in which authority can be
delegated to the Director of Security or other subordinate
levels.
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Recommendation (23)
In the United States and its possessions, the CIA should not
intercept wire or oral communi ca ti onsl or otherwise engage in
activities that would require a warrant if conducted by a law
enforcement agency. Responsibility for such activities belongs
with the FBI.
Response
This recommendation suggests the prohibition within the US
and its possessions of two kinds of activity which raise
different considerations.' The first is the interception of wire
or oral communications, and the second is "activities that would
require a warrant if conducted by a law enforcement agency." The
latter is understood,to mean, unauthorized entries onto premises
and all conduct other than the interception of wire or oral
communications which would amount to a search or seizure.
I concur in the recommendation that CIA not engage in
"activities that would require a warrant if conducted by a law
enforcement agency." Since the Agency has no law enforcement
functions, its use within the US of unauthorized entry or other
methods which amount to a search or seizure is beyond its legal
authority. Cases where.the Agency's legitimate interests may
call for such activities are infrequent and should he handled by
the FBI upon- CIA's request (see Recommendation 19).
In regard to the recommendation that CIA be prohibited from
intercepting wire or oral communications within the US, I concur-
that responsibility for such activities belongs with the FBI. I
recommend, however, that CIA be authorized to support such FBI
activity in cases involving foreign intelligence approved by. the
Attorney General.
.lAs defined in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act,
18 U.S.C. Secs. 2510-20.
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In regard to.possible intercept of communications in the
course of equipment testing or the training of operators, see
response to Recommendation 28.
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Recommendation (24)
The CIA should strictly adhere to established legal
procedures governing access to federal income tax information.
Response
I concur in this recommendation. Agency regulations on
liaison with the Internal Revenue Service will be revised to
clarify the limits and procedures in dealing with the Service and
for obtaining income tax information.
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Recommandation (27)
I n accordance with its present guidelines, the CIA should
not again engage in the testing of drugs on unsuspecting persons.
Response
I concur in this recornmendati on, which reflects directives
issued by me on 29 August 1973.
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Recommendation (28)
Testing of equipment for monitoring conversations should not
involve unsuspecting persons living within the United States.
Response
While I endorse the intent of the Commission in raking this
recommendation, I believe it is so simple in form as to pose
serious difficulties as a guide for actual testing. practice..
Many types of radio receivers for the collection of foreign
intelligence are developed and tested by the CIA, and our
personnel are trained in their operation. By their very nature,
these receivers are sensitive enough to monitor inadvertently
some US conversations in test situations and virtually nothing
can be done to prevent this. Adequate acceptance and suitability
testing of these systems requires that they be tested in
realistic circumstances, and, inevitably some conversations will
be monitored, though no identification is made of the
participants. The building of' large scale simulated
communications systems for test purposes would be expansive and
impractical.
In my view, the guidelines for testing of equipment in the
US established by us in August 1973 meet the purposes of"Ehe
Commission's recommendation and serve as a more realistic quide
to such activities. These provide that testing of intelligence
equipment may be undertaken in the United States provided that no
use of the information collected shall in any way abrogate the
rights of US citizens as guaranteed under the Constitution n of the-
United States. If it is essential to test equipment on an
American communications system or other establishment, this may
be done provided that no recordings of the material.are retained
or examined by any element other than the original test.
engineers. In this context the original test engineers
constitute the engineers under contract to perform the tests and
the Agency technical officers supervising the activity.,
Knowledge derived from the tests that relates to equipment
performance but maintains anonymity of the data source may be
exchanged with other elements of the Agency.
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Recommendation (29)
A civilian agency committee should be reestablished to
oversee the civilian uses of aerial intelligence photography in,
order to avoid any concerns over the improper domestic use of a
CIA-developed system.
Response
I concur in this recommendation and urge that. it be
accomplished speedily. I should note here that--contrary to the
statement in the Commission's Report--a proposed agreement for
continuing support in this' area of the Environmental Protection
Agency was not concluded because of that Agency's law enforcement
responsibilities.
41
a?
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IV. AMENDMENTS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947
Summa y of Issues
The Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Council
were created by the National Security Act of 1947, the larger purpose
of which was to consolidate the armed serves into what became the
Department of Defense. The Act contains many ambiguities and uncer?-
tainties concerning the powers and duties of the CIA and NSC. For
this reason, proposals are. being considered to mend the Act to make
these powers and duties more explicit.,
S p cificIssues Relatirgto Amendment of the National Security Act
of 194K
1. Section 402 (a): Membership of the NSC
The function of the NSC is to "advise the President with
respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies
relating to the national security..." (emphasis added) But as
William Watts noted in his testimony before the House Select Committee
on October 30th,
(T)he National Security Council as presently
constituted has no statutory representative, other than
the president, who can speak to domestic considerations
and concerns. In a world where foreign policy in many
areas is also domestic policy (oil and grain are obvious
examples), this is, in my view, a serious but correctable
weakness. It places an unfair burden on the president,
since only he can take fully into account the domestic
consequences of foreign policy actions.
Mr. Watts suggests, therefore, that this section be amended to
add the Secretary of the Treasury as a statutory member of the NSC.
In support of this proposal, it may be argued that the NSC,
as presently constituted, cannot promote the integration of domestic
and foreign policies because none of its members has an institutional
interest in promoting domestic considerations. Although no official
can adequately represent the entire gamut of domestic interests,
the macro-economic responsibilities of the Secretary of the Treasury
give him a broader perspective on domestic policy concerns than
any of his Cabinet colleagues.
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Further, adding the Secretary of the Treasury to the NSC would
be a recognition of the increasing importance of international economic
policy, and the shifting emphasis in security policy from military
strength to questions of resource allocation and market control. The
intelligence community has been criticized for not putting sufficient
emphasis on economic issues. This weakness might be corrected by
giving the Secretary of the Treasury a statutory'voice in directing
intelligence collection and evaluation efforts.
In opposition to this proposal, it may be argued that presidents
have frequently asked domestic officials to participate in NSC meetings
whenever appropriate. Every president has re-shaped the NSC to fit his
own style of decision-making, and this flexibility should not be reduced
by unnecessary changes in the formal membership of the NSC. The NSC
is essentially an advisory body to the president; the more the Congress
specifies its membership and activities, the greater the likelihood
that presidents will find it uncongenial and ignore it.
2. Section 402(b): Functions of the NSC (.""
In Sections 402(a) and 402(b), the Congress provided that the
NSC is to advise, to assess and appraise, to consider policies, and to
make recommendations to the President. There is no explicit statement
that the NSC is to have any operational authority.
Section 402(b) does provide, however, that the NSC shall perform
"such other functions as the President may direct..." and Section 403(d)
provides that the CIA shall perform its services, functions and duties
"under the direction of the National Security Council..."
It is presently being considered whether the NSC should be an
advisory or operational body. If it is concluded that the NSC should
only be an advisory body to the President, it may be recommended that
this section be amended by (1) eliminating the reference to "such other
functions..., or (2) specifying that these other functions shall not
include authorizing or directing operations or activities not undertaken
primarily or solely for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence.
If it is concluded that the NSC should remain involved in covert
action operations but that the final responsibility must rest on the
President, it may be recommended that this section be amended to provide
that the NSC shall direct no operational activity without the explicit,
personal and written approval of the President. Such a provision
might duplicate the requirement for presidential approval imposed by
the Foreign Assistance Act Amendments of 1974, but it would specify
that the NSC is to have no operational authority independent of the
President.
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3 . Sections 403(a) and 403(b): --The Director-and De uty Director
"~-
of Central Intel 1 i dence
Section 403(a) provides that either the Director or D ty
Director, but not both, may be nominated from among "com is oned
officers of the armed forces, whether in an active or r ed status."
Section 403(b) contains various provisions concerning t e status. of
a cor,~;;issioned officer occupying either position.
Traditionally, either the DCI or his Deputy has been a com issioned
officer. It may be concluded that this is undesirable because y
military official, whatever his intentions, must inevitabl e influenced
by his years of experience in the armed forces. It ma recommended,
therefore, that the separation of the CIA from the military be enforced
by repealing Section 403(b) and amending Section 403(a) to require
that both the DCI and his Deputy be civilians.
4. Section 403(.-): DCI authority to fire CIA employees
"i-
Section 403(c) provides that, notwithstanding any other Dr-Ivi
sion of law,
The Director of Central Intelligence may, his
terminate the employment of any offi or
discretion
,
employee of the Agency whenever he shall deem s h termina-
tion necessary or advisable in the interests of the
United States....
It may be concluded that this authority is too broad and that
CIA employees should enjoy the rights of other government employees
to the fullest extent possible.
If so, it may be recommended that this section be am ed
to provide that (1) the DCI's discretionary authori, is ited to
cases in which employees are fired for security rea onl, (2) in such
cases, the employee shall have the right to appeal the President
for reconsideration and reinstatement; and (3) befo,e acting on such
an appeal, the President shall have the advice and recommendation of
the Attorney General.
5. Section 403(d)-__ The intelligence funct' ns of the CIA
Section 403(d) provides that th- C shall undertake various
functions related to intelligence. 'ro als have been made to specify
that the CIA shall only undertake programs related to foreign intelli-
gence.
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The DCI, Mr. Colby, supported such an amendment in testimony
before the House Armed Services Committee on 22 July 1974.
I fully support 'this c &rr'g"e. While I believe the
word "intelligence" alone i n e original Act was generally
understood to refer orgy foreign intelligence, I concur
e Agency's role to foreign
that this limitation Q,~
intelligence should b' made crystal clear to its own
employees and to the-public. I hope that this amendment
will reassure any of our fellow citizens as to the Agency's
true and only purpose.
6. Section 403(d)` NSC direction of the CIA
Section 403(d) provides that the CIA shall perform specified
functions "under the direction of the National Security Council."
On the basis of its hearings and investigation, it may be
decided that the relationships among the President, the NSC, and the
CIA should be clarified by amending this section to provide that the
CIA's activities shall be undertaken at the direction of the Presi- '''
dent, upon the recommendation of or after consultation with the National
Security Council.
for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the
Government..."
evaluate intelligence relating to the national security and provide
7. Section 403(d)(3):_ Intelli ence_collection by the CIA
Section 403(d)(3) provides that the CIA shall "correlate an
There is no explicit provision in this section or elsewhere
in law which authorizes the CIA to collect intelligence.
Whatever the original intention or expectation, however, the
CIA has been involved in intelligence gathering since its creation.
This fact may be acknowledged by amending this section to provide
that t: he CIA shall "collect" as well as "correlate and evaluate"
intelligence. 11
8. Section 403(d)(3): Domestic activities of the CIA
Section 403(d)(3) provides that the CIA "shall have no
police, subpena, law-enforcement powers, or internal-security
functions."
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On the basis of the Rockefeller Commission report and the
Congressional investigations, it may be concluded that this section
requires clarification. It may be recommended, therefore, that the
section be amended to provide that the CIA shall engage in no activi-
ties within the United States except:
1. to conduct personnel investigations and protect
the security of its facilities;
2, to provide foreign intelligence information
to other federal departments and agencies only upon the
written, public request of the Attorney General or the
Secretary of the Treasury, and
3. to solicit information voluntarily from
United States citizens and residents.
Mr. Colby has indicated support for such an amendment.
It may also be recommended that:
1. the above limitations are not meant to imped
the lawful activities of the CIA at its headquarters and
other offices within the United States,
any domestic activities undertaken pursuant
2
.
to (1)-(3) above shall be subject to the laws of the United
States, and
3. the CIA shall submit an annual report to the
Congress describing and providing the statutory basis for
all domestic activities undertaken pursuant to (1)-(3)
above.
9. Section 403(d)(3): Protection_of intelligence sources
and methods ------ _
Section 403(d)(3) provides that the DCI "shall be responsible
for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
disclosure."
The CIA has argued that this provision imposes an important
responsibility upon the DCI without giving him the necessary auth3rity.
In his 1974 testimony before the House Armed Services Committee
Mr. Colby stated:
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Under existing law, the Director is responsible
for developing such internal administrative controls as
are possible and appropriate to protect against unauthorized
disclosures, but if such a disclosure is identified, his
only recourse beyond internal disciplinary action, including
termination of an employee, would be to report the matter
to appropriate authorities for examination df possible
legal action....
...I am of the personal opinion that additional
legislation is required on this subject to improve our
ability to protect intelligence sources and methods against
unauthorized disclosure.-.the specifics of my recommendations
on this subject are still under active consideration within
the Executive Branch, so that an appropriate Executive
Branch recommendation can be made to the Congress.
For these reasons,.it may be recommended that some new authority
must be provided to enable the DCI to meet his responsibility under
this section.
On the other hand, it may be recommended that no additional
authority be provided to the DCI, or even that this provision be
repealed. It is unclear what kinds of information are encompassed
by "intelligence,sources and methods" and whether the DCI's authority
is limited to information in the custody of CIA or to information
held throughout the intelligence commmunity. Instead of attempting
to clarify the provision, it may be recommended that it be eliminated
as a possibly contentious issue which is unnecessary for the protection
of intelligence information.
10. Section 403(d 4): _"Additional services of common concern"
Section 403(d)(4) provides that the CIA shall perform
for the benefit of the exjfstingintelligence
agencies, such additional services Of common concern as
the National Security Council determines can be More
efficiently accomplished centrall .
It may be determined that :tf e provisions of Section 403(d)(4)
are unnecessary and that this secti n be repealed.
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11. Section 403(d)(5): "Such other functions and duties"
Section 403(d)(5) provides th t the CIA shall perform
such other functions ann;d duties related to
intelligence affecting the natio;ial security as the
National Security Council may from time to time
di rect. '
It is this provision which the CIA has cited as its statutory
authority for conducting covert actiion operations.
If the HSC and SSC believe; that the CIA should not engage in
any covert action programs, they rpay recommend that this section be
amended to provide that no activi?ies undertaken pursuant to this
section shall be for the purpose of influencing, determining, or
otherwise affecting the policies officials, programs, organizations,
or actions of any foreign gover rnent or entity.
If the HSC and SSC con dude that covert actions should not
be prohibited by law but that they should be considered and approved
more systematically than at p esent, they may recommend that this
section be amended to provide that any such functions and duties are
to be undertaken only upon tl? specific, written direction of the
President, upon the recommendation of or after consultation with the
National Security Council.
The HSC and SSC may also recommend that any activities under-
taken by the CIA under the uthority of this section shall be reported
to the Congress under the same reporting requirements established
by the Foreign Assistance ~ct Amendments of 1974. Such a provision
might be redundant, but itlcould be felt to minimize the possibility
of major CIA activities escaping Congressional notice. Mr. Colby
has expressed his general upport for such a reporting requirement.
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