PRESENT INTERNATIONAL SITUATION and THE ROLE OF AMERICAN COMMUNISTS IN THE EVENT OF WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-00915R000200320001-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 4, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 24, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

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24 August 1950
PRESENT INTERNATIONAL SITUATION
and
TII)i, ROLE OF AA RICAN COI,VitUNISTS
IN TUN EVENT OF W0
For your information in evaluating the
attached document, the data contained therein re-
pre,sent the composite observations of ten substantial
and, highly rceliable informants of the FBI concerning
the topics listed. All informants contacted have held
or are currently occupying positions of prominence
within the framework of the Communist Party. In view
of those circumstances, it, is not possible to divulge
their identities at the present time.
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I. GENERAL STRATEGY AND O..T JEC`1'IVL S OF THE, SOVIET REGIME
AND SATELLITE CONS UNIST PARTIES IN RECENT YEARS AND
AT Pl ESEN`T .
Without exception, all informants agree the ultimate
Soviet objective; continues to be complete world domination.
Their purpose is the overthrow of all capitalistic countries
as enemies of the working class through internal or revol.u.,.
tionary methods, thereby establishing and perpetuating Commu--
nism throughout the world. To further this strategy the
Communists advocate the building up of Communist strength
inside capitali>t.i.c countries until ouch time ' a, they are
sufficiently strong to strike a blow in their own behalf
as exemplifies d by the present situation in Korea. This
general. strategy has worked so well its value is self-evident,
obviatiri. r the necessity of any direct attack by Russia.
In furtherance of this,, objective, the Soviet Regime em-
ploys the tactic of sapping U. S. strength, both militarily
and ind.us i;rially, through attempted conquests by Soviet Russia
in countries receiving U. S. aid and assistance., thus diverting
our attention to those countries and leaving the U. S. vulner-
able to attack. Present concepts of the Soviet and Communist
Party leaders are based upon what they consider a constant
process of further economic and indu ;trial disintegration which
would be facilitated by Communist inspired economic crises, mass
unemployment and strikes.
In effecting the over-all str te.fy ss a
manly satellite., n.ations was doeig;nteed toprotecthercborders of
leaving the country an inaccoesib:le as possible in the event
of war.
All talk of peace on the part of Soviet leaders is for
the aurpo;;e of allaying
suspicion. They will utilize any
method which will further the i_r goal of. complete world domina-.
tiers. until such time as Russia feels the world is ripe for
plucking.
One informant described. the tactic outlined above as
"oroep.in blitzkrieg, er and added that the Russian- have now
entered the second phase, namely, attacks upon countries from
which American Forces have been withdrawn. The present gen-
era]. strategy is necessary to weaken the, United States to a
point where the Soviets can attack us. This informant also
stated the Soviets always have alternatives in strategy and
he and another. 1.nfor.ma.nt agree that the weakening process does
not preclude, the I:ossibility of sudden atomic bomb attack. The
first informant fools such attacks would be considered if the
Kremlin is of the opinion. the growing strength of U. S. Military
Forces requires such action. The second informant claims
i.mmediatr.i armed. attack would be sudden and ruthless and the
Communist leaders would not hesitate to use tho atom bomb if
the possibility of success was sufficiently groat to preclude
re.ta:l.i.ation.
A third informant refers to a secondary objective, namely,
that, Russia emerge in the world Communist government as the
most powerful nation. The Kremlin is not anxious for success
if that victory results in a strong satellite nation. Assuming
the Soviets, having won China, are now interested in shifting
the action back to Europe, the next phase in the general
strategy would be the g pining of Western Europe:. This gives
rise to three possibilities:
The activity in Kor. ea was a -trial balloon to test
U. S. reaction;
Russia wants all out war this year; arid.
The strategy- is to involve the United States in a
series of actions over wide points where the Soviets
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to use American troops.
This informant considers the latter to be the most likely
possibility.
11", GETI,1ERAL MILITA0 PERSPECTIVES TO KEEP IN MIND AS BACKGROUND
FOR. EV LUA`i'ION OF COI MUNIS'T SABOTAGE AND OPERATIONS ;i_I'ME-
DI.ATELY BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER OUTBREAK 011 WAR BETWEEN
THE SOVIET UNION AND THE U'`IITED STATES,
In tho event of conflict between the iTi.ted States and
the Soviet Union, every Communist will do everything possi-
ble to injure this country and aid the Soviets. Such a war
would be characterized as "undemocratic," "unjust," "criminal,"
"useless" and "bankerst war." The war effort would be intensely
opposed in any and all phases and the Communists would seek to
mobilize mass defeatism. In particular, infiltration of the
..stied Force would be atte nptad by various youth groups upon
Party instructions. Communist Party members would seek strate-
gic ositiono in the Armed Services in such branches as public-
ity, public relations, personnel advisement and the editorial
staffs of magazines published for the troops. They would taid
to crcat disaffection and mutinous conduct among the military.
Intervention in industry, with special attention to
bottleneck: industries, and production of vital war materials
may be expected in the form of strike and slowdowns.
According to one informant, the first objective in any
sabotage operation would be to halt the flow of replacement
-par. t ;, particularly in the electrical and electronics field.
Communist Party leaders have stated that mE mbor$ must be pulled
out of so--called "prickle" plants and placed in heavy industry.
The Communists would also sock to antagonize the civilian
population against the war effort and possible war controls
by emphasizing as grievances the food shortages, housing prob-
lems, high prices and similar inconveniences. It is not
unlikely that efforts would be made to impair the nation's
financial structure. by whispering carnpa,igns to start "runs" on
banks and like institutions. Diversionary tactics, such as race
riots, may be designed to divide central aims.
III. SUM RRRY OF CO IUNIST UNDERGROUND APPARATUS AND PLANS
FOR LEADERSHIP IN 21EOT OF WAR. INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN
COMMUNIST OFFICIALS ON MOVES TO E :PECT BY GOVERNMENT
ON OUTBREAK OF WAR
The informants generally agree the Communist Party will
go underground in the event of war. They expect the Govern-
ment to round up all known Party members and possibly outlaw
the Party itself. However, the informants disagree as to the
action to be taken against the Party leadership. One inform-
ant believes those constituting the leadership will remain at
liberty, having been placed in secret locations afforded by
other members, many of whom are not believed to be known to
the authorities. The Party contemplates the continuance of
substantially the same leadership upon the outbreak of any
conflict. Party members have been questioned concerning their
resources for harboring members of the Party leadership in the
event of an emergency. This informant was so approached in
1947 and was also asked if he would be in a position to serve:
as courier between members 'of the Party leadership who might
be compelled to go underground.
Contrarily, a second informant believes there exists dual
apparatus of leadership in the Communist Party from the national
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leadership would stop into action when the existing leader-
ship stopped functioning in whole or in part. Either the de-
cision of the Supreme Court upholding the conviction of the
eleven Conmm.rni of leaders or a war between the Soviet Union
and the United States, whichever comes fig t, would auto-
matically determine "Dl-Day" for the Communist Party to go
completely underground. On a national, district and section
basis, there is a wide secret mail drop, telephone and tele-
gram communications system. There are also available secret
printing presses and supplies in hiding places for the use
of the Party when it goes underground.
A third informant, is in complete agreement with the
second informant. In the mid-193O1s this informant reports
arrangements were effect d. for dual. leadership throughout the
Party in the event of an emergency. Arrangements also wore
rnaclo for district organizers to hide out and possibly escape
to Mexico. Small printing shops and weekly newspapers were
purchased to insure a continuous flow of propaganda. Distri..
bution thereof was to be made by.rrrail and by leaving l.itera--
turce in public places. During the period in question, import-
ant communications between the national office of the Communist
Party and district officers were handled through business
mailing addresses which wore changed about every three months.
Operating funds were placed in the custody of reliable Party
member. s so that they would not be subject to confiscation by
the Government. In 1941 this informant was advised that
couriers were being utilIzod and mail communications were being
reduced to a m:inirnum.
A fourth informant statod underground preparations by
the Party in World War IT were conducted on the theory that a
complete shadow leadership was to be developed. Public loaders
in an office became more figurehead, while the actual leader-
ship was underground. Thera was also set up a substitute
leadership to be used in event of apprehension of the present
leaders. Branch meetings were no longer hold and gatherings
wore confined to throw to five meraborr , the general principle
being to spread the connections o s much as possible so that
apprehension of any one line would not destroy the chain of
conspiracy. The primary philosophy behind these tactics is to
maintain the core of l ea.dership in spite of any closing of Party
offices and publications.
A fifth informant stated that during 1948 and 19 ,9, con-
siderable emphasis was placed by the Communist Party on the
ferma,t-ion of a "group captain system" under which the entire
membership of the Communist Party was broken down into units
of three to five in.dividuc.ls, each functioning under a group
captain. The purpose in to doing was to eliminate the possi-
bility of any substantial number of members being picked up
at any one time.
A sixth informant stated that in his opinion the Common--
iot Party, as an entity, would. never underground but the
"hard core" of professional revolutionists would do so. This
group would number possibly 450 and would constitute the real
danger to this country. They would be in charge of sabotage
and other efforts to provide aid to Russia, would meet sec-
retly and would act only under orders.
In 1947, according to a seventh informant, a complete
survey was made: by the Party of the major industrial centers
in the United States, including the strategic points to be
captured or destroyed in the event of war. The survey was
double chocked in 1948 and this informant was told by Com-
munist Party officials that similar surveys were made in every
industrial city in the United States.
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IV. POSSIBLE MEANS OF ORGANIZED AND Sl< ON`?~ NEOU
ESPIONAGE DURING FIRST STAGES OF POSSIBLE WAR WITH USSR
The, informants generally agree that one of the means of
organized sabotage is the program of industrial. concentration,
which is one of Communist infiltration in essential industry with
the motive of using these members for agitation, slow downs: and
strikes. This, program, according to one informant, is emphasized
at all Party meetings and handed down to members at each subsequent
meeting. It is al o possible that there would be individual and
isolated iris tames of sabotage by zealots among the Party members
who have not been taken into the confidence of the leaders. Among
the zealots would be the so-called "trigger-happy boys" or tho;e
ra'1ical indiviclu.als of a tempermental nature. However, there is
a diver. 7ity of opinion among the informants concerning other means
of committing sabotage which may be utilized by the Party, as in-
dicat;ed below.
The same informant stated there would be an apparatus for
sabotage which would be used on. a large scale and not for "petty
jobs." If the major program breaks down, resort then will be had
to a program. of petty and spontaneous sabotage in order to cripple
plants and, destroy public morale.
Another informant stated that organized or spontaneous sabo-
ta go to be expected during the first stages of war would be minor
if not completely ni:L. However, as the war progresses and, the
Communist Party is not successful. in its efforts to develop a
mass public objection to the war, the danger of sabotage, both by
individuals and groups, would become more probable. This informant
also stated that esp:i.onage, comprising the gathering of information
concerning ii dustrie ;, docks and Armed Forces, would be a daily
cone:inning; matter and a constant tack for every Communist. All in-
formati..on so obtained would be relayed to Conunu.nist Party leaders
and then forwarded to top Soviet, contacts.
A -third informant stated the Party undoubtedly has an organiza-
tion set up to commit acts of organized sabotage but such a plan
would be hampered if the Party is o,rtlawed, probably requiring
s that as a re-
sult formation of a new plan. This informant believes,
(referred to
sult of the survey made; of ind.ustri_al cities in 19417 in Caption III) facilities which are considered vital and subject
to sabotage arc known to the Party.
.A fourth informant stated sebot: ge would be handled only by
the "prof ession.al r. evolutionists" or those who are trained and
trusted. This informant had no knowledge of any schools in
Russia sot up for the sole. purpose of training r-,splonage and
sabotage agents. In the opinion of this informant, two-thirds of
the Communist :Party member. ship would cease their activity in the
event of war and would do nothing to assist Russia or deter the
United States in the war effort. It is believed -there would bc. a
concerted caepaign among the professional groups in following their
instructions to carry out acts of sabotage and to recruit others
for this purpose in plants producing war materials.
In 1945 and again in 19,9, during a series of lectures on
Marxism, sabotagee was briefly discussed with a select group in-
cluding a fifth informant, all of whom were members of the Commun-
ist Party Educational.. Commission. Great secrecy surrounded those
se; sions and the identities of those present were not permitted to
be made known to one another. Each class member was expected to
pass along the training he receiveed during subsequent classes in
which the member would preside. The material used was derived
from a book dealing primarily with sabotage committed during the
Spanish Civil_ War. Members were advised that small action groups
of two or three persons should operate against such key points as
water works, tunnels, communication and power cables, railroad
control tower and. witching points, power plants and public util.-
ities. Instructions concerned the, type of utilities to be
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? sabotaged rather than the actual Means by which the sabotage was
to be accomplished.
l,Jhile in Moscow in 1928, C,a sixth informant advised he was
permitted to examine material pertaining to physical sabotage
with evaluation of, the most important phases of sabotage and the
methods by wh:i_ch they might be accomlali hod. The informant now
recalls that emphasis was placed on the sabotaging of ships,
munition actorie; s, fuel 1 inesr, transformers, lines of communi-
cation and ammunition depots. It was suggested that telephone ex--
changes, as one of the most vital points in any community, should
be out of operation or physically captured , if possible. It
was believed radio stations were susceptible to surprise attacks
and sudden seizure and the use of such facilities for broadcasting
propaganda would result in a tremendous demoralization of any com?-
muni t.y.
Sabotage plans have always emphasized the study of those
industries which would disrupt the economic life of the community
aril. military activities. Cara.fu.J. consideration was devoted to
the chemical field and in the late 1920's and early 1930's efforts
were initiated to organize chemists and other scientists. Those
in the chemical field could do much to paralyze the United States
in the event of war with the Soviet Union and could inform the
Soviets of American discoveries.
During 1927 to 1930, Communists endeavor. ed to place, members in
the Armed. Forces where disruptive action would be most effective
a.n time of war and would appear to ho spontaneous and not neces-
sarily identified as Communist inspired or directed. The Communists t
primary duty was to create dissatisfaction by magnifying petty
grievances and organizing campaigns concerning them. Members were
instructed to di >cusca con.stontly those conditions which aroused
the greatest an tra.gonism among servicemen and to attempt to insti-,
gate a . condition under which military discipline ceased to exist.
Points of concc:;ntration:i in the order of their importance were the
Panama C,.nal, Hawaii and the Army posts around American port cities.
During this period, it was wall known among Communist Party
functionaries that selected Party loaders were members of the
Russian Secret Poiico. It was also general kn.ow,rl ed r:e among the
Party leadership that the secret police maintained within ttsolf
an apparatus for liquidating; Communists who loft the, movement and
whose knowledge rn:i ght prove embarrassing and dangerous. This ap-
paratus is bo1 ~v ;d' to be quito axtansive: both inside and outside
~the?.r~tri:lcs 'of.. ,the.-Communist Party and has developed the, mechanism
for continued operations under any conceivable conddition. In 1928
or 1929, the head of this apparatus chiefly interested in the
possibility of securing blank American passports and directed that
every effort be made to pln co members in the State Department for
this purpose.
The Soviet Government and its apparatus charged with sabotage
and espionage would not hesitate to sac~rificce the lives of American
Communists in the interest of the Soviet Union, according to this
:informant. Most responsible American Communists would regard respect
and consideration for their own lives by the Soviet Union as an
unpardonable weakness.
V. SUT iE POSSIBLE [JNFORESEENT EFFECTS OF ,SOVIET RUTHLESS PHILOSOPHY
ON MILITARY CALCULATIONS, ESPECIALLY RANGE OF BOMBERS WITH
ATOMIC BOMBS ,
All informants agree that Soviet philosophy is notoriously
ruthless, based upon the principle that the, end. justifies any means
and, accordingly, the Soviet Government would not hesitate to de-
liver atom bombs upon any target even though such an attack
involved suicide missions. The basic philosophy of Russia is the
of human. lives on a large scale, if necessary, to
roach a goal.
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According to one informant, not only would thorn be suicide
p1 ancs with atom bombs, but the; wmi i also be ?a large-scale
attack: of saa.icidc pa.ra.troopcr, carrying mall bombs or other de-
structivo d.cvires, who could bc, a s i^ tad by Communist Party members
if Successful in landing. Practic.+.lly cvery Russian child is be-
l.ic vod by the informant to be trained in the art of paratrooping.
Another informant statcd the Soviets are sufficierat:tly ruth-
les,s to anyone, inclucling American Communi?ts, s1zco the
hitter arc used only to further 'the cause.' The Soviets would
attempt cona.acst of countries bordering, the Un:iitcd States to
oli.minatc; possible ;:,uppor. t therefrom be for. c striking at the United
Stator ~.a.s t}ac: rain objective.
Once having decide-,`1 she is, strong enough to wage war with
Am r.ic a, R.a.z;ssa.c:a, aacco:rdi-.n? to a thir. d informant, will use any and
every mean,, at her disposal. to win the war. This r:1ay include
bactorio.l.og.ical warfare, if required to successfully complete the
conqu.eS't.
A fourth informant made; the; ob~:,erve..t1on that practice plane
flights havo been made fro-,q lvhar.nnansk to Sibe.,ria, tho same distance;
as from Ru$sia to Now "fork. Thero also e=xists the po ,sibility of
importing :atom bombs and transporting them to strategic points to
bo detonated by remote: control or by individuals willing to sa.cri-
f:i..cc themselves. No consideration of humanity would hinder the,
Soviet, Union in any way.
VI. RELATIONSHIP OF CIVILIAN DE FENS AND CORRECT EVALUATION OF
POSS:I:i3.[,E, SOVI1?,'I.' ATTACK 1 :H1D BY UNDERCOVER AGENTS
IN TUD]) COUNTRY,
T}icy informants, agree th=.:at Communist groups would operatee, against
any civilian def. c:::ensc; organization. Since :infiltration always has
boon one of the primary strategic weapons of they Party, there is
no reason to believe such tactics would not be applied to a civil-
ian defense organization as an cff: active means of impeding its
c,ff.orts. During World War. II, Communist Party mombors were active
in the civilian defcnse. pr?o ,rams. An. ostimatod 20,000 devotod mem-
bers of the Communist Party, comprising the core of the Party, are
willing to follow -implicitly the instructions of the Soviet Govern-
r1ont.
The theory was advanced that there are not sufficient under-
ground agents in this country to effectuate a succossful_ internal
surprise attack. Theroforo, a war would be initiated by a Russian
surprise attack, of.ther by airplane or submarine. The informants
rocornmondod that Anc rica proparo a complete civilian defense
mechanism. which could bF.. mobilized at a morncnt's notice. One in-
formant advised a program of educating the American people so that
there will be a realistic understanding and alertness to surprise
attacks.
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