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November 16, 2016
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April 4, 2000
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August 24, 1950
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SECRET CONTROL 6 Approved For Release 2000/05/05: CIA-RDP78-00915R000200320001-3 ti 24 August 1950 PRESENT INTERNATIONAL SITUATION and TII)i, ROLE OF AA RICAN COI,VitUNISTS IN TUN EVENT OF W0 For your information in evaluating the attached document, the data contained therein re- pre,sent the composite observations of ten substantial and, highly rceliable informants of the FBI concerning the topics listed. All informants contacted have held or are currently occupying positions of prominence within the framework of the Communist Party. In view of those circumstances, it, is not possible to divulge their identities at the present time. SECRET CONTROL *FBI Declassification/Release Instructions on File* Approved For Release 2000/05/05: CIA-RDP78-00915R000200320001-3 Approved For Release 200Qj;Q; I40DP78-00915R000200320001-3 I. GENERAL STRATEGY AND O..T JEC`1'IVL S OF THE, SOVIET REGIME AND SATELLITE CONS UNIST PARTIES IN RECENT YEARS AND AT Pl ESEN`T . Without exception, all informants agree the ultimate Soviet objective; continues to be complete world domination. Their purpose is the overthrow of all capitalistic countries as enemies of the working class through internal or revol.u.,. tionary methods, thereby establishing and perpetuating Commu-- nism throughout the world. To further this strategy the Communists advocate the building up of Communist strength inside capitali>t.i.c countries until ouch time ' a, they are sufficiently strong to strike a blow in their own behalf as exemplifies d by the present situation in Korea. This general. strategy has worked so well its value is self-evident, obviatiri. r the necessity of any direct attack by Russia. In furtherance of this,, objective, the Soviet Regime em- ploys the tactic of sapping U. S. strength, both militarily and i;rially, through attempted conquests by Soviet Russia in countries receiving U. S. aid and assistance., thus diverting our attention to those countries and leaving the U. S. vulner- able to attack. Present concepts of the Soviet and Communist Party leaders are based upon what they consider a constant process of further economic and indu ;trial disintegration which would be facilitated by Communist inspired economic crises, mass unemployment and strikes. In effecting the over-all str te.fy ss a manly satellite., n.ations was doeig;nteed toprotecthercborders of leaving the country an inaccoesib:le as possible in the event of war. All talk of peace on the part of Soviet leaders is for the aurpo;;e of allaying suspicion. They will utilize any method which will further the i_r goal of. complete world domina-. tiers. until such time as Russia feels the world is ripe for plucking. One informant described. the tactic outlined above as " blitzkrieg, er and added that the Russian- have now entered the second phase, namely, attacks upon countries from which American Forces have been withdrawn. The present gen- era]. strategy is necessary to weaken the, United States to a point where the Soviets can attack us. This informant also stated the Soviets always have alternatives in strategy and he and another. agree that the weakening process does not preclude, the I:ossibility of sudden atomic bomb attack. The first informant fools such attacks would be considered if the Kremlin is of the opinion. the growing strength of U. S. Military Forces requires such action. The second informant claims i.mmediatr.i armed. attack would be sudden and ruthless and the Communist leaders would not hesitate to use tho atom bomb if the possibility of success was sufficiently groat to preclude re.ta:l.i.ation. A third informant refers to a secondary objective, namely, that, Russia emerge in the world Communist government as the most powerful nation. The Kremlin is not anxious for success if that victory results in a strong satellite nation. Assuming the Soviets, having won China, are now interested in shifting the action back to Europe, the next phase in the general strategy would be the g pining of Western Europe:. This gives rise to three possibilities: The activity in Kor. ea was a -trial balloon to test U. S. reaction; Russia wants all out war this year; arid. The strategy- is to involve the United States in a series of actions over wide points where the Soviets Approved For Release 2Q001057b5 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000200320001-3 ti.+.,.~RET CONTROL q.q0.f;qqt 0001-3 Approved For ek a ZOO/ lA 7~ r. 4.9 to use American troops. This informant considers the latter to be the most likely possibility. 11", GETI,1ERAL MILITA0 PERSPECTIVES TO KEEP IN MIND AS BACKGROUND FOR. EV LUA`i'ION OF COI MUNIS'T SABOTAGE AND OPERATIONS ;i_I'ME- DI.ATELY BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER OUTBREAK 011 WAR BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE U'`IITED STATES, In tho event of conflict between the iTi.ted States and the Soviet Union, every Communist will do everything possi- ble to injure this country and aid the Soviets. Such a war would be characterized as "undemocratic," "unjust," "criminal," "useless" and "bankerst war." The war effort would be intensely opposed in any and all phases and the Communists would seek to mobilize mass defeatism. In particular, infiltration of the ..stied Force would be atte nptad by various youth groups upon Party instructions. Communist Party members would seek strate- gic ositiono in the Armed Services in such branches as public- ity, public relations, personnel advisement and the editorial staffs of magazines published for the troops. They would taid to crcat disaffection and mutinous conduct among the military. Intervention in industry, with special attention to bottleneck: industries, and production of vital war materials may be expected in the form of strike and slowdowns. According to one informant, the first objective in any sabotage operation would be to halt the flow of replacement -par. t ;, particularly in the electrical and electronics field. Communist Party leaders have stated that mE mbor$ must be pulled out of so--called "prickle" plants and placed in heavy industry. The Communists would also sock to antagonize the civilian population against the war effort and possible war controls by emphasizing as grievances the food shortages, housing prob- lems, high prices and similar inconveniences. It is not unlikely that efforts would be made to impair the nation's financial structure. by whispering carnpa,igns to start "runs" on banks and like institutions. Diversionary tactics, such as race riots, may be designed to divide central aims. III. SUM RRRY OF CO IUNIST UNDERGROUND APPARATUS AND PLANS FOR LEADERSHIP IN 21EOT OF WAR. INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN COMMUNIST OFFICIALS ON MOVES TO E :PECT BY GOVERNMENT ON OUTBREAK OF WAR The informants generally agree the Communist Party will go underground in the event of war. They expect the Govern- ment to round up all known Party members and possibly outlaw the Party itself. However, the informants disagree as to the action to be taken against the Party leadership. One inform- ant believes those constituting the leadership will remain at liberty, having been placed in secret locations afforded by other members, many of whom are not believed to be known to the authorities. The Party contemplates the continuance of substantially the same leadership upon the outbreak of any conflict. Party members have been questioned concerning their resources for harboring members of the Party leadership in the event of an emergency. This informant was so approached in 1947 and was also asked if he would be in a position to serve: as courier between members 'of the Party leadership who might be compelled to go underground. Contrarily, a second informant believes there exists dual apparatus of leadership in the Communist Party from the national S.tCIIET CONTROL Approved For Release 2000/05/05: CIA-RDP78-00915R000200320001-3 p, oOOs40~5~r05c; I1ClgrAP78nQt095R000200320001-3 Appppq~zRqje~ h leadership would stop into action when the existing leader- ship stopped functioning in whole or in part. Either the de- cision of the Supreme Court upholding the conviction of the eleven Conmm.rni of leaders or a war between the Soviet Union and the United States, whichever comes fig t, would auto- matically determine "Dl-Day" for the Communist Party to go completely underground. On a national, district and section basis, there is a wide secret mail drop, telephone and tele- gram communications system. There are also available secret printing presses and supplies in hiding places for the use of the Party when it goes underground. A third informant, is in complete agreement with the second informant. In the mid-193O1s this informant reports arrangements were effect d. for dual. leadership throughout the Party in the event of an emergency. Arrangements also wore rnaclo for district organizers to hide out and possibly escape to Mexico. Small printing shops and weekly newspapers were purchased to insure a continuous flow of propaganda. Distri.. bution thereof was to be made by.rrrail and by leaving l.itera-- turce in public places. During the period in question, import- ant communications between the national office of the Communist Party and district officers were handled through business mailing addresses which wore changed about every three months. Operating funds were placed in the custody of reliable Party member. s so that they would not be subject to confiscation by the Government. In 1941 this informant was advised that couriers were being utilIzod and mail communications were being reduced to a m:inirnum. A fourth informant statod underground preparations by the Party in World War IT were conducted on the theory that a complete shadow leadership was to be developed. Public loaders in an office became more figurehead, while the actual leader- ship was underground. Thera was also set up a substitute leadership to be used in event of apprehension of the present leaders. Branch meetings were no longer hold and gatherings wore confined to throw to five meraborr , the general principle being to spread the connections o s much as possible so that apprehension of any one line would not destroy the chain of conspiracy. The primary philosophy behind these tactics is to maintain the core of l ea.dership in spite of any closing of Party offices and publications. A fifth informant stated that during 1948 and 19 ,9, con- siderable emphasis was placed by the Communist Party on the ferma,t-ion of a "group captain system" under which the entire membership of the Communist Party was broken down into units of three to five, each functioning under a group captain. The purpose in to doing was to eliminate the possi- bility of any substantial number of members being picked up at any one time. A sixth informant stated that in his opinion the Common-- iot Party, as an entity, would. never underground but the "hard core" of professional revolutionists would do so. This group would number possibly 450 and would constitute the real danger to this country. They would be in charge of sabotage and other efforts to provide aid to Russia, would meet sec- retly and would act only under orders. In 1947, according to a seventh informant, a complete survey was made: by the Party of the major industrial centers in the United States, including the strategic points to be captured or destroyed in the event of war. The survey was double chocked in 1948 and this informant was told by Com- munist Party officials that similar surveys were made in every industrial city in the United States. SEc.ET CONTROL Approved For Release 2000/05/05: CIA-RDP78-00915R000200320001-3 MCRET CONTROL Approved For Release 2000/05/05: CIA-RDP7 n~v~n(?l7L fIPO A(00320001-3 7 7 i ~Jl1 IV. POSSIBLE MEANS OF ORGANIZED AND Sl< ON`?~ NEOU ESPIONAGE DURING FIRST STAGES OF POSSIBLE WAR WITH USSR The, informants generally agree that one of the means of organized sabotage is the program of industrial. concentration, which is one of Communist infiltration in essential industry with the motive of using these members for agitation, slow downs: and strikes. This, program, according to one informant, is emphasized at all Party meetings and handed down to members at each subsequent meeting. It is al o possible that there would be individual and isolated iris tames of sabotage by zealots among the Party members who have not been taken into the confidence of the leaders. Among the zealots would be the so-called "trigger-happy boys" or tho;e ra'1ical indiviclu.als of a tempermental nature. However, there is a diver. 7ity of opinion among the informants concerning other means of committing sabotage which may be utilized by the Party, as in- dicat;ed below. The same informant stated there would be an apparatus for sabotage which would be used on. a large scale and not for "petty jobs." If the major program breaks down, resort then will be had to a program. of petty and spontaneous sabotage in order to cripple plants and, destroy public morale. Another informant stated that organized or spontaneous sabo- ta go to be expected during the first stages of war would be minor if not completely ni:L. However, as the war progresses and, the Communist Party is not successful. in its efforts to develop a mass public objection to the war, the danger of sabotage, both by individuals and groups, would become more probable. This informant also stated that esp:i.onage, comprising the gathering of information concerning ii dustrie ;, docks and Armed Forces, would be a daily cone:inning; matter and a constant tack for every Communist. All in- formati..on so obtained would be relayed to Conunu.nist Party leaders and then forwarded to top Soviet, contacts. A -third informant stated the Party undoubtedly has an organiza- tion set up to commit acts of organized sabotage but such a plan would be hampered if the Party is o,rtlawed, probably requiring s that as a re- sult formation of a new plan. This informant believes, (referred to sult of the survey made; of ind.ustri_al cities in 19417 in Caption III) facilities which are considered vital and subject to sabotage arc known to the Party. .A fourth informant stated sebot: ge would be handled only by the "prof r. evolutionists" or those who are trained and trusted. This informant had no knowledge of any schools in Russia sot up for the sole. purpose of training r-,splonage and sabotage agents. In the opinion of this informant, two-thirds of the Communist :Party member. ship would cease their activity in the event of war and would do nothing to assist Russia or deter the United States in the war effort. It is believed -there would bc. a concerted caepaign among the professional groups in following their instructions to carry out acts of sabotage and to recruit others for this purpose in plants producing war materials. In 1945 and again in 19,9, during a series of lectures on Marxism, sabotagee was briefly discussed with a select group in- cluding a fifth informant, all of whom were members of the Commun- ist Party Educational.. Commission. Great secrecy surrounded those se; sions and the identities of those present were not permitted to be made known to one another. Each class member was expected to pass along the training he receiveed during subsequent classes in which the member would preside. The material used was derived from a book dealing primarily with sabotage committed during the Spanish Civil_ War. Members were advised that small action groups of two or three persons should operate against such key points as water works, tunnels, communication and power cables, railroad control tower and. witching points, power plants and public util.- ities. Instructions concerned the, type of utilities to be MOP ?T CONTROL Approved For Release 2000/05/05: CIA-RDP78-00915R000200320001--3 SECRET 0'~~T T Approved For Release 2000/05/05 : CIS,-R'P78-00915R000200320001-3 ? sabotaged rather than the actual Means by which the sabotage was to be accomplished. l,Jhile in Moscow in 1928, C,a sixth informant advised he was permitted to examine material pertaining to physical sabotage with evaluation of, the most important phases of sabotage and the methods by wh:i_ch they might be accomlali hod. The informant now recalls that emphasis was placed on the sabotaging of ships, munition actorie; s, fuel 1 inesr, transformers, lines of communi- cation and ammunition depots. It was suggested that telephone ex-- changes, as one of the most vital points in any community, should be out of operation or physically captured , if possible. It was believed radio stations were susceptible to surprise attacks and sudden seizure and the use of such facilities for broadcasting propaganda would result in a tremendous demoralization of any com?- muni t.y. Sabotage plans have always emphasized the study of those industries which would disrupt the economic life of the community aril. military activities. Cara.fu.J. consideration was devoted to the chemical field and in the late 1920's and early 1930's efforts were initiated to organize chemists and other scientists. Those in the chemical field could do much to paralyze the United States in the event of war with the Soviet Union and could inform the Soviets of American discoveries. During 1927 to 1930, Communists endeavor. ed to place, members in the Armed. Forces where disruptive action would be most effective a.n time of war and would appear to ho spontaneous and not neces- sarily identified as Communist inspired or directed. The Communists t primary duty was to create dissatisfaction by magnifying petty grievances and organizing campaigns concerning them. Members were instructed to di >cusca con.stontly those conditions which aroused the greatest an tra.gonism among servicemen and to attempt to insti-, gate a . condition under which military discipline ceased to exist. Points of concc:;ntration:i in the order of their importance were the Panama C,.nal, Hawaii and the Army posts around American port cities. During this period, it was wall known among Communist Party functionaries that selected Party loaders were members of the Russian Secret Poiico. It was also general kn.ow,rl ed r:e among the Party leadership that the secret police maintained within ttsolf an apparatus for liquidating; Communists who loft the, movement and whose knowledge rn:i ght prove embarrassing and dangerous. This ap- paratus is bo1 ~v ;d' to be quito axtansive: both inside and outside ~the?.r~tri:lcs 'of.. ,the.-Communist Party and has developed the, mechanism for continued operations under any conceivable conddition. In 1928 or 1929, the head of this apparatus chiefly interested in the possibility of securing blank American passports and directed that every effort be made to pln co members in the State Department for this purpose. The Soviet Government and its apparatus charged with sabotage and espionage would not hesitate to sac~rificce the lives of American Communists in the interest of the Soviet Union, according to this :informant. Most responsible American Communists would regard respect and consideration for their own lives by the Soviet Union as an unpardonable weakness. V. SUT iE POSSIBLE [JNFORESEENT EFFECTS OF ,SOVIET RUTHLESS PHILOSOPHY ON MILITARY CALCULATIONS, ESPECIALLY RANGE OF BOMBERS WITH ATOMIC BOMBS , All informants agree that Soviet philosophy is notoriously ruthless, based upon the principle that the, end. justifies any means and, accordingly, the Soviet Government would not hesitate to de- liver atom bombs upon any target even though such an attack involved suicide missions. The basic philosophy of Russia is the of human. lives on a large scale, if necessary, to roach a goal. Approved For Release 200 1/Q ,~[Q l DP78-00915R000200320001-3 SECRET CONTROL Approved For Release 2000/05/05: CIA-RDP78-00915R000200320001-3 According to one informant, not only would thorn be suicide p1 ancs with atom bombs, but the; wmi i also be ?a large-scale attack: of saa.icidc pa.ra.troopcr, carrying mall bombs or other de- structivo d.cvires, who could bc, a s i^ tad by Communist Party members if Successful in landing. Practic.+.lly cvery Russian child is be- l.ic vod by the informant to be trained in the art of paratrooping. Another informant statcd the Soviets are sufficierat:tly ruth- les,s to anyone, inclucling American Communi?ts, s1zco the hitter arc used only to further 'the cause.' The Soviets would attempt cona.acst of countries bordering, the Un:iitcd States to oli.minatc; possible ;:,uppor. t therefrom be for. c striking at the United Stator ~.a.s t}ac: rain objective. Once having decide-,`1 she is, strong enough to wage war with Am r.ic a, R.a.z;ssa.c:a, aacco:rdi-.n? to a thir. d informant, will use any and every mean,, at her disposal. to win the war. This r:1ay include bactorio.l.og.ical warfare, if required to successfully complete the conqu.eS't. A fourth informant made; the; ob~:,erve..t1on that practice plane flights havo been made fro-,q lvhar.nnansk to Sibe.,ria, tho same distance; as from Ru$sia to Now "fork. Thero also e=xists the po ,sibility of importing :atom bombs and transporting them to strategic points to bo detonated by remote: control or by individuals willing to sa.cri- themselves. No consideration of humanity would hinder the, Soviet, Union in any way. VI. RELATIONSHIP OF CIVILIAN DE FENS AND CORRECT EVALUATION OF POSS:I:i3.[,E, SOVI1?,'I.' ATTACK 1 :H1D BY UNDERCOVER AGENTS IN TUD]) COUNTRY, T}icy informants, agree th=.:at Communist groups would operatee, against any civilian def. c:::ensc; organization. Since :infiltration always has boon one of the primary strategic weapons of they Party, there is no reason to believe such tactics would not be applied to a civil- ian defense organization as an cff: active means of impeding its c,ff.orts. During World War. II, Communist Party mombors were active in the civilian defcnse. pr?o ,rams. An. ostimatod 20,000 devotod mem- bers of the Communist Party, comprising the core of the Party, are willing to follow -implicitly the instructions of the Soviet Govern- r1ont. The theory was advanced that there are not sufficient under- ground agents in this country to effectuate a succossful_ internal surprise attack. Theroforo, a war would be initiated by a Russian surprise attack, of.ther by airplane or submarine. The informants rocornmondod that Anc rica proparo a complete civilian defense mechanism. which could bF.. mobilized at a morncnt's notice. One in- formant advised a program of educating the American people so that there will be a realistic understanding and alertness to surprise attacks. SECRET CONTROL Approved For Release 2000/05/05: CIA-RDP78-00915R000200320001-3