THE STRUGGLE AGAINST PROVOCATEURS AND ESPIONAGE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-00915R000300110002-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 9, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: REPORT

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TILE, S 'RUGGLE, AGAINST.. AGENT, PRQVOQ TEURS 4P ESPIONAGE -.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
I. THE PROVOCATEUR AS A. PROVED WEAPON OF, TIIE BOURGEOISIE 1
A. Some facts from the present and past of the political police 1
B. The weaknesses of the Communist Party in the fight against
provocateurs
C. The conversion of the bourgeois dictatorship into fascism and
the increase in provocation 5
D. What obstructs the fight against provocation?
II. PROVOCATION AND ESPIONAGE IN RECENT TIMES 3
A. Intensified cldss warfare S
B. The latest methods of the political police
III. PRIMARY METHODS OF ESPIONAGE AND PROVOCATION
A.
B.
C.
Opposition groups as a basic tool
The methods of political provocation
The various forms of mnodern espionage
15
D.
The various types of provocateurs
11
E.
The recruiting methods of the police
1s
F.
Hou the police mask their provocateurs
21
G.
Industrial, espionage
IV. COMBATTING PROVOCATION
29
A.
The preventive measures used in combatting provocation
29
B.
Our attitude toward the police and judges
35
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THE STRUGGLE AGAINST !`AGENT PROVOCATEURS AND ESPIONAGE
1. THE PROVOCATEUR AS A PROVED WEAPON OF T1 BOURGEOISIE
A. Some facts from the present and past of the political police
I., Agent provocateurs are not a new phenomenon. The history of
the class struggle abounds with examples of the governing classes using
espionage and provocateurs as a systematic weapon against the revolution-
ary workers class. In England, which has the best apparatus for the fight
against the worker's movement, political provocation has grown the strong-
est roots in the history of the struggle of the governing classes against
the revolutionary .,iovement. A few years ago the English press contained a
very interesting discussion of the operating methods of the English secret
service, the "Intelligence Service." In the course of this discussion it
was recalled that as early as the great French revolution, the English
Prime Minister Pitt, who, as is well known, sought by every means to block
the ini'lux of the ideology of the French Revolution into England, established
a very widespread network of spies and provocateurs, both at home and abroad.
Pitt was.,, indeed, the founder of the traditions and working methods of the
"Intel:l..igence Service." These method, and traditions were further amplified
by the experiences of the war of 1914-1916, and especially by the prolonged
fight against the revolutionary liberation movement in the colonies.
2. The history of the Russian fighters for freedom is especially
rich in examples of political provocation. The infamous Okh.rana of Czarist
Russia made ample use of this weapon. Many of the methods later used by the
political police in all capitalist countries in their fight against the
revolutionary movement, originated in the rich arsenal of the Czarist Okhrana.
3. Azev, a classical figure in the history of political provocation,
earned international notoriety. Azev's "successful" career extended over a
period of almost twenty years, and dozens of revolutionaries were betrayed
to the police by him. Azov was at one and the same time a police agent and
a member of the Party of Social Revolution. He was the organizer of the
successful assassination of the Czar's uncle, theGrand Duke Sergius, in
Moscow, and he had previously organized the boibing assault on Minister
Plehve. In order to rehabilitate himself in the eyes of the Party, which
had begun to entertain doubts about him, he also began to prepare for the
assault on Czar Nicholas II, but he was unmasked as a police spy before he
was able to carry it out.
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~E. Degayev, likewise an agent provocateur of the Okhrana, belonged
to a.n earlier period. After he had betrayed a large number of leading revo-
lutionaries to the police, he later organized the murderous assault on Sudeykin,
the chief of the Okhrana, and under whose orders he had "worked" for years.
Starodvorskiy, a leading revolutionary, on whose head the Czarist government
had set a price of 10,000 rubles, also participated in the murder of Sudeykin.
This Starodvorskiy, who was the talk of all Europe, and even of the entire
world a the time of the murder of the Okhrana's chief, was a man who became
an apostle of the younger generation of the Russian revolutionary organization
known as the Narodnaya Wolya. But oven he was revealed to have been an agent
of the Okhrana, though this was not learned until. 25 years later, when the
October Revolution opened the secret archives of the Okhrana.
5. We do not want to cite more examples of the bestial degradation
and intellectual cleanness of the Czarist Okhrana. Nevertheless, a study of
the enormous volume of material which has been published since the October
Revolution on the activities of the Okhrana is well worthwhile. It furnishes
an insight into the bottomless abyss of dangers with which we, the Communists
in capitalistic countries, are so often faced. And this is all the more true
today, since the methods of political provocation and espionage greatly sur-
pass those of the Czarist times in perfection and technique:.
6. At the present time the agent provocateur plays a tremendous role
in the political life of the bourgeois countries. In many countries, several
groups of the bourgeoisie succeeded in recent years in bringing about a
change of government suitable to them by meens of political provocation.
We need only recall the famous "Zinov'yev Letter" in England, a forgery which
brought about the fall of the first MacDonald government. It is characteristic
of the methods of the British Intelligence Service, that MacDonald's and
Henderson's entire correspondence was carefully checked, even during their
term of off ice .
7. In the fight against the international Co>;;,,u,,list move,,ment, there
recently appeared a series of masters in the art of falsification. These
come Mostly from the groups of Russian White Guard emigres. In general, the
White Guardist emigres--those splinters of the old Russian governing classes
dispersed by the October Revolution--play .,:~n important role in the field of
international political provocation. They represent the vast reservoir from
which the political secret service and the police recruit their agents. One
can assert without exaggeration that in countries like Finland, Latvia, and
Lithuania; for example, the ap-_,parutus of t1 e political police was organized
either by White Russian emigres or by former Okhrana functionaries.
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8. Co1:Irade,s who have had opportunity to make involuntary acquaintance
with prisons a;:ld police cells in vs.rious countries, report uniformly that time
and time ag_,.in Russian White Guaraists caLie to the front in interrogations,
either as higher officiu:Ls or as leaders of the political police. The chief
of the Bombay Police, for exa:-.iple, is a Pole who emigrated from Russia.
9. It is generally known that the various imperialistic cliques, in
their c-_lr.i:a:..gn against th Soviet Union, the. first workers' country in the
world, again and again resort to the agent provocateur. The numerous forgeries
which have cropped up in recent years in various countries concerning Soviet
Russian `'secret documents"; the murder of the Soviet ar:Ibassador, Vorowskiy,
in Lausanne; and of Voykow in Warsaw, the uncovered borabiare, plot against the
Soviet embassy in 1,JJarsmr; all aim to provoke a war with the Soviet Union.
It is only "cecausc: of the consistent peace: policy of the Soviet Union that
these provocr.tory plans of the warrnonGers were foiled.
10. Soue time ago a report appeared in the international press that
Van.ek; the secretary of the Czk3choslovakian Mission in M(:,scow, had attei,::pted
to arranve the assassination of the Japanese Minister of the U.S.S.R. by an
official of a Soviet agency whom he had enlisted.. If one considcrs that this
coincided with trio r:.arcii of the J:.pancse occupation troops toward the borders
of the Soviet-, Union in. Manchuria, it becomes obvious that this was nothing
less than a provocation intend.-_A to incite an ar,aed con'lict nd to motivate
a new interven-i,ion against the U.S.S.R.
B B. The weakness of the Coru-1unis - Party in tlic f ig.ht against ao.ge .t provocateurs
1. The provocateur i.s 'he scourge of all communist parties. Tens of
thousands of political prisoners from the ranks of the Coiiiaunist parties and
of the revolutionary wor'.:crs' ..love i,lent suf cr in the prisons of the various
capitalistic countries at thu present time. It can be assl.ii:led with certainty
that a hivrh percentage of these are the victims of spies and provocateurs.
The Coiyzillnist jD rtics S"Ui:fer a ?;rcct part of their tre::'.:Gr.Ctous lo3ses as a
result of treason, proyocc:tE urs and esp'ion.u.ge. Fsnd this is b1i r~_su.'_t of
our own indifference and thourrtless"lless in the i'iCht u,.inst nrovocc tion.
In many countries where comlaunist pay,ties are i11cga.L, as for cxcu:ple in
Rumania, Hungary, Yugoslavia and the like, as well as iii the Far East and
in t1 o colonies, where the methods of the Intelligence Service a:.id s imil.ar
organizations of the capitalistic state police arc widely used, the agent
proVoc::.tuur.s strike heavy blows -,t our sister parties and at t1f.e :revolutionary
movci,.ciit. But also in Gcrman_y, and especially in countries like France and
Czechoslovakia and others; pro"socutcurs and spies against the Communist parties
lie in ai,Ibusii, ready to inflict great danaga on our movenezrt.
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2. Have the Communist parties fought with sufficient vigor against the
provocate ir Lp to now? It is unfortunately a ?act that this battle is not
waged sufficiently by the Comm nist parties, in spite o' -the onorr:lous danger
which spies and provocateurs spell for our cause. We can learn from our enemies
in this respect: How skillfully the ruling boL,.rgeoisie knows how to mobilize
so-called public opinion whenever its interests demand it! A clear example of
this is the irlpcriai_istic w~.r of 1914-1016. During the World War the bourgeoisie
press in all countries, the tool o -'L-' ca iitalistic power, worked to create a general
mental attitude for the fight aea inst espionage. Lot us recall here, for instance,
how in the Fntcnte countries at the o1::tbreai o`' -the war, German business firms
and shop were devastated by enraged masses of people under the influence of this
spy hunt. In the countries of the Central Powers, too, the: artifically stimulated
spy hunt blossomed into insani i,y. Naturally, we Conlunist s cannot m-.1-ploy the
some uiitruthi"u1 and hypocrit:i_cul means used by the capitalistic class to incite
public opinion; we shalt' never appeal to lows chauvinistic instincts, although
the bol:trgecisio does this w'ricnever it is conv;:nient. Ins-Laid we must appeal to
the class instinct, the class eo isciousness of the working riasses, in order to
bring about the alcrtncss of the masses in regard to the class cneiioy, and to
awaken a. storm of rage and protest against the base iaethods of provocation and
espiona a..e .
3. T1_e ColxALunist 1 riles wage a relentless and e::nergetic battle against
all for?::s of opport -,nism, again:.5t the in" 1.u,: cc the class -cxtr"alluous elcments
into the ~'iorkcrs ~ t'lovemonty ' he ~' LSE a 1)C7"S7_S' Cnt be btl~' Lea il'1st SGCial -F ci$rtl.
But so fay we have not fought with cn(Yui1 crierUy, porsistcncc, and consistency
against provocation a_-id c::;pio1,,0.2;e, c~.;L ixls t the foulest ,?rca.L)on which the class
eneLly, the bourgeoisie is league with its Fascist and Social Fascist agents,
employs against our rlovcia,::nt.
11.. It is necessa. y tG `,J,k:: up this battlo against provocation ir:lmed.iately.
This baitt=e cannot be ore '.izcd as a tcriporary action, for a period of a
few weeks or months. The battle acs 1.ns t provocation and esl io,_'.ge must form a
pole nc).:t and rorl -al 1 i nc'':io l of all Coi 11 1 i t org'anizat ons As 1o &; as
eve r,ro':lt ill ...I C o r , : .unis t par ties, _LLgit.,..::.. Ue as well as i_11.e, ~.1, i s ::ot deeply
. r t
ir:Oouca tritYi fact that the L.~ttl __c a~-.iist prow tel.r? ~ and skies of the
class enc.iy is arlong the basic 'end pcrmancl::t activities of ovary party co:lrade
and of -h-,he caltire party oraniz ation, -- so long will the destructive work of
. -:l ~, lxo el:leI d..
this cvi..l in the ranks ol the Col'aur~is 1t remain 11zxchecla..
5. The ei tire pc cty, every party orb; niz,ation, every party cell, every
party ::erbur 1:lust t eke part in this fiche. The Comiiu list Dart cs ar( mass parties
of the working class, and our 1'iglxting Lacthods Eainst provocation and espionage
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aa.n ori, r be the methods of the mass struggle. In this the Con' anist parties
ch 'roii colirpiratoriai groups like the anarchists or the Russian social-
revolutionaries and other groups of their time. In order to mobilize the
masses of party comrades, the whole working class, for the battle against
this ol_d evil, one has to speak about it publicly and c--12. it to the attention
of proletarian public opinion.
6. Many comrades object to this on the grounds that public exposure
of all cases of provocateurs and spies harm the reputation of the Party. This
is entirely wrong: The reputation of the Party suffers much greater harm under
the brutalities of the police, its agents and spies who steal into the ranks
of the revolutionaries. The reputation of the Party suffers incomparably more
harm through the passivity and ineptitude of the Party in the battle against
provocation. The reputation and confidence which the Party enjoys among the
masses suffers much more Linder the systematic arrests of dozens of its best
and most active members. Every Communist recognizes the disastrous significance
of espionage activities in a factory, for example, where they are one of the
most difficult obstacles to the establishment and strengthenint of the Communist
Movement. He who understands this will certainly not attempt to save the repu-
tation of the Party by such doubtful means as the suppression of -these basic
mistakes. The prestige of the Party suffers much greater harm through the
ability of spies and provocc-.tctars to perform their clandestine tasks, often in
the boldest of raannels and for long periods of time, without encountering too
much trouble on being exposed. One single case will be c tcd here: in 1928
a certain Ja.ubert was active in the French Communist Party. He knew '_:ow to
gain the con 7 ncc of the party leadership and managed to get many important
assignments. However, reports l began to reach the Party that Jaubert was an
agent of the French police. In order to check these reports, an investigation
was started. But before our party comrades had completed their investigation,
Jaubcrt, having gotten wind of it, disappeared, taking party funds and docu-
ments with hi-.i. Thus a man who was already under investigation as a suspect,
still had. access to party funds and documents. And since then this J?_aubert
has been livi i:, a life of ease in Algiers as director of 0 state ratio station,
without bein.. bothered by anyone. The ruling classes employ the dirty methods
orice rS'
of espionage and provocation in order to weaken and uude~r '::L11',: the
revolutionary front. The Cormi-,Iparties must c.bandon their carefree atti-
tude to and provocati on i they do not want to continue to p :.V for their
cr.r. elc enrss`~ ith r, avy losses.
of bourgeois dictatorship into fascism and the increase
in rovocaLion
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1. The agent provocateur is a method of warfare used by the
bourgeois state against the Communist movement. The increase of provo-
cation is at the present time closely related to the whole system of
converting the bourgeois dictatorship into Fascism. In the resolutions
of the eleventh. Plenary Session of the E.C.C.I. (Executive Committee of
the Co.:.uur ist International) it is stated:
2. "Growing organically out of the so-called bol.irgeois democracies,
as a form of hidden dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, Fascism, the naked fore of
the bourgeois dictatorship, intensifies all tykes of suppression and subju-
gation of the workers. These methods are peculiar to the capitalistic re-
gime and are inseparably connected with the whole system of the bourgeois
dictatorship. The Fascist regime which joins forces with the remnants of
the bourgeois democracies, is predicated on, and takes definite shape with,
the destruction of the proletarian organizations, the outlawing of the
Communist Party, the organization of special military-terroristic, bourgeois
units, whether parliamentary forms are maintained or discarded.
3. Thus Fascism has "intensified all methods of suppression and sub-
jugation of the workers." It is therefore clear, that hand in hand with the
growth of Fascist,., there is also an intensified use of provocateurs and
spies, who play such an important part in the "destruction of the proletarian
organizations" and, above all, of the Communist Party. -
-. It is highly characteristic that at the present time the whole
system of political police in all the capitalistic countries is closely
connected with the criminal underworld, adopting its methods of operation.
In China the bands of the Choenchoc bandits (not identified) are very closely
connected with the police and operate hand in glove with them. In Chicago
Al Capone's infamous gang of smugglers and gangsters was for year the de
facto government of the city and worked closely with the highest levels of
the police department. Jhen a legal code is applied to the political police,
it soon becomes evident that not a single law remains unbroken.. In the
special police schools of the British Intelligence Service at Devonshire,
and in all other police schools, the students are taught to open letters
and correspondence invisibly, to forge documents, -to break into locked
rooms and sales, to commit murder quietly, and to apply all the other arts
of the criminal world as skillfully as possible. But then, as we know, the
legal code ceases to be in effect beyond the threshold of the police station.
5. Provocation is one of the methods of the class struggle. Any war,
the class war included, requires an organization for the gathering of informa-
tion from and espionage in, the enemy's camp. Moreover, it is part of the
war technique to organize various sabotage and undermining activities among
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the ranks and beliind the lines of the enemy. Political provocation a,6tempts
both: the organization of an espionage and information service and the con.m.it-
ting of acts of sabotage and undermining activities. In view of the fact that
a class war is much more intense than other kinds of war, this dangerous evil
calls for particular attention. That class warfare is indeed more intense is
attested to by the fact that prisoners of war are not killed, while the bour-
geoisie seeks the physical destruction of its prisoners. This is also evident
fro,.mi the use of torture methods, and the like."Democratic" prejudices are cor.~-
ing to the fore in the class war. The rules of class warfare are hard and
relentless. Any Corrru;:zist knows this and is fully aware of the possible con-
sequcmiccs. He who loses his courage and is deterred by provocation is no
Bolshevik. One r:iust fight against provocation and not capitulate before it.
D. What obstructs the fight against provocation?
a_. The systeriatic activities of spies and agents within the ranks of
the Cor_,;munist Parties represent the greatest obstacle to success in their fight
against provocation. It frequently happens that one of our sister parties be-
gins a fight against provocation only to find that it is mlecting definite resist-
ance from within. It is as if an invisible hand were obstructing their efforts.
There can be only one explanation for this: the obstructions are created by
thos;; wlio are involved.
2. A further obstacle in the fight against provocation is an insufficient
revolutionary stability and an inco:-,p1ctc conversion to Bolshevism:. within many
coiimunist parties. Communists ta11i m:luch about the convcrsioii of their parties
to Bolshevis-,;a. In many countries they are indeed able to cite definite results
in this regard, but a party which does not in its entirety, and on behalf of
t)re broad i.masses of the working class, wage this battle against provocation, is
by no means a Bolshevist iarty. One can argue about the subject at the top of
one's voice and still do very little tow .rd actual conversion of Bolshevism.
This is, anion; other things, also the case when carelesscless and tolerance
prevail in the fight against provocation. The manner in which the Communist
ir_mportant
Party wages the battle against provocation and espionage is also an
indication of its conversion to Bolshevi.sl-i.
3. A third obstacle in the fight against provocation, which may be
found particularly in the Comrunist parties of the Latin countries, are the
"small town" bourgeois prejudices and the "sm:1a11 town" bourgeois over-senti-
mentality. which are often still characteristic of some Coru.mt.nists. After all,
how can one: harbor suspicion against a friend and party comrade? Why should I
hurt him so deeply? We cannot suspect each other all the thus thinks
many a Communist. As long as the Communist parties have not cor:mpletely expelled
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the ranks and behind the lines of the enemy. Political provocation attempts
both: the organization of an espionage and infornation service and the con.m.it-
ting of acts of sabotage and undermining activities. In view of the fact that
a class war is much more intense than other kinds of war, this dangerous evil
calls for particular attention. That class warfare is indeed more intense is
attesteJ to by the fact that prisoners of war are not killed, while the bour-
geoisie seeks the physical destruction'of its prisoners. This is also evident
from the use of torture methods, and the like."Democratic" prejudices are cor-
ing to the fore in the class war. The rules of class warfare are hard and
relentless. Any Cormunsist knows this and is fully aware of the possible con-
sequences. He who losirs his courage and is deterred by provocation is no
Bolshevik. One iaust fight against provocation and not capitulate before it.
D. What obstructs the fight against provocation.?
1. The systematic activities of spies and agents within the ranks of
the Cola::.uiyist Parties represent the greatest obstacle to success in their fight
against provocation. It frequently happens that one of our sister parties be-
gins a fight against provocation only tc find that it is meeting definite resist-
ance from within. It is as if an invisible hand were obstructing their efforts.
There can be only one explanation for this: the obstructions are created by
those who are involved.
2. A further obstacle in the fight against provocation is an insufficient
revolutionary stability and an incor_-ipletc conversion to Bolsilevi,-a within many
corimunist parties. Communists calk much about the conversion of their parties
to Bolshevis;:. In many countries they are indeed able to cite definite results
in this regard, but a party which does not in its entirety, and on behalf of
the broad A;iasses of the working class, wage this battle against provocation, is
by no r.icans a Bolshevist party. One can argue about the subject at the top of
one's voice and still do very little toward actual conversion of Bolshevism.
This is, among other things, also the case when carelessness and tolerance
prevail in the fight against provocation. The manner in which the Coirnunist
Party wages the battle agrainst provocation and espionage is also an i?;iportant
indication of its conversion to Bolshevisil.
3. A third obstacle in the fight against provocation; which may be
found particularly in the Ccmii.unist parties of the Latin countries, are the
"small town" bourgeois prejudices and the "siall town" bourgeois over-senti-
mcntalit , which are often still characteristic of some Communists. After all,
ow can one harbor suspicion against a friend and party co.;irade? Why should I
hurt him so deeply? We cannot suspect each other all the tii.ie-- thus thinks
many a Col:;raunist. As long as the Communist parties have not completely expelled
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these narrow minded sentimentalitics and sickly sensitivities from their ranks,
they will be unable to wage an effective battle against provocation. In the
meantime, it is a fact that this spirit of tolerance is so widely spread in
many of the Communist sister parties that sometimes even comrades who have
conducted themselves unworthily before the judge or at police interrogations
are again assigned to responsible positions because they are said to be val-
uable and irreplaceable.
lE. Finally, strife between groups and factions within the parties
weakens the struggle against provocation. Factional strife within the Communist
parties is most welcome to the police. As a rule, the existence of factions
not only serves as a kind of bulwark behind which police spies can operate,
collecting information on the party, but also presents a situation which the
police will often try to exploit, through its agents, to direct the political
line of the Party.
5. All of these factors which make the battle against provocation
difficult for the Communist parties must be taken into careful consideration.
All Communist parties, without exception, must organize for the battle against
provocation on the broadest possible basis. Provocation is a grave threat
not only to the illegal parties, but also-for the legitimate parties in which
watchfulness is sometimes greatly reduced under the influence of an illusion
of legitimacy.
II. PROVOCATION AND ESPIONWE IN RECENT TINES
A. Intensified class warfare
There are special reasons why the battle against provocation is of
unusual significance under the present circumstances.
1. The first reason is that the class struggle has boon intensified
the world over. The bourgeoisie is fighting with increasik; viciousness and is
openly discarding all democratic traditions. Whereas the political police
previously pursued a long-range policy, it now operates with utmost brutality,
risking all and not even hesitating to sacrifice its own people. In a pre-
revolutionary period such as ours, in which the bourgeoisies, fearing a class
war, is attempting with all the means at its disposal to liquidate theCommunist
Party, provocation is a great danger.
2. A second reason is that unemploy-1ent and the misery of the masses is
increasing on all sides. Although this situation stimulates the revolutionary
mood of the masses, it also provides the police with the opportunity of
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corri_pting the weaker elements of the Party and to recruit them for the estab-
lishment of a widespread net of police spies, which inflicts serious damage to
the Communist parties.
3. It should also be noted that while the Russian Bolsheviks had
decades of experience in their illegal struggle, during which time their
implacaale class hatred hardened, the other Communist parties are compara-
tively young and often still have inexperienced leaders. This is particularly
evident in the countries under the White Terror, where the entire membership
of the party often changed in a period of three to ten months as a result of
arrests and persecution. As a result, young and inexperienced comrades, who
have not had any real Bolshevist schooling, often reach positions of leader-
ship. These people do not know how to conduct themselves when they fall into
the hands of the police. For the very reason that the leaders are often young
and inexperienced, the fight against provocation must be carried out by the
Communist parties as a whole in utmost seriousness.
1E. The fact that the working classes, under the leadership of the
Communist Party, are now approaching decisive battles, makes it our urgent
duty to organize the struggle against provocation with utmost determination.
We can well imagine how the police of all capitalistic countries will operate
against the Communist Party in the event of the outbreak of war, for example.
It is, after all, the duty of the police to prepare long before a war, gathering
exact information on all Communists and to have its spies operating undetected
within the organization. It is an open secret that the Communist International
suffers greatly from the fact that its most active members are well known to
the police.
5. For all of these reasons the fight against provocation takes on
special significance at the present time. All the experiences of the German
Communist Party, and of many others, in the struggle of recent years attest
to the importance of this question.
B. The latest methods of the political police
In order to pursue the fight against provocation successfully, it is
necessary to understand how modern police espionage and provocation operate
and under which specific conditions they perform their vile work.
In the old memoirs-literature the agent provocatours, police and other
spies were painted in the most romantic colors. This was especially the case
with the classical provocateurs of Czarist Russia, such as Azev, Zubatov, Gapon,
and others, about whom a great uunber of books have been published in all languag(
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These tales often remind us of novels of adventure. But now circumstances have
changed, and the operating methods of the Okhrana bear no more resemblance to
present-day police methods in the capitalistic countries than the pril.litive
workbench does to a modern assembly line. In the memoirs of old revolutionaries
one can often read how they cautiously looked over their shoulder, how they
fled fro.-,1 the police, how they hid, etc. While the espionage and provocation
of the Police have taken on entirely new for-is, many Communist parties are
still on a very primitive level in their defenses. In this respect the Corn_iun-
ist parties have been outdistanced by their class enei-.y.
1. In what way have the methods of the political police changed? The
prewar political police considered its primary objective to the hindering of
the activities of the Communist Party, about whose plans it was well informed,
and to do this by gaining complete insight into the Party. It is characteristic
of the modern political police that it is not content to merely understand the
objectives of the Communist Party, but rather to direct the policies of the
organizations it controls through its own people. The political police attempts
to change and corrupt the political line of the Party.
2. Secondly; the political police of all capitalistic countries has,
in the Fascist organizations, not only welcome support, but also inexhaustible
reserves of spies--volunteer espionage organizations, so to speak. This
represents an enormous strengthening of the police apparatus.
3. Thirdly, the Social Democrats through their years -long propaganda
for "the unity of the people" and with their daily class treason have deeply
demoralized many sections of the working class. Thus they have created the
psychological basis for mass espionage in the factories and for outright police
functions of the Social Democrats. While formerly the betraying of a striking
worker to the management was considered one of the most serious offenses and
bitter battles were fought in every factory against the so-called "scabs",
today a certain type of Social Democrat functionary will denounce any Communist
and have him thrown out of the plant.
4+. Fourthly, there is the fact that modern police espionage in the
ranks of t ze workers' movement can draw on the rich experience of the World
War. To the same extent that the arts of war made great progress during the
war and the years immediately following, espionage -f: ethods have also developed
tremendously. In the book "Our Secret War" by the American warmonger Johnson,
there a-re a number of descriptions of the various methods used by spies during
the war for the transmission of messages. Everything possible was used: fruit
and flower shipments, carefully wrapped in tissue paper and -racked in boxes,
while on the paper wrappings--and even on the flowers and leaves--important
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messages had been written in invisible ink. newspaper reports, advertisements,
and innocent mc.rriagc announcements also served tc inform -those for whom they
were intended. Often an eiblum or a Sor.lai's profile in an adv::rtisei:lent
actually transi:iitted iniori_iation on military positions. The holier in which
postage sta.ips were placed on letters to neutral countries also served to
tra.nsi.rib certain types of infor ration and messages. An innocent-locking, guest
at a coffee shop played unnoticed with his tooth pick on the table cloth,
leaving, actually, a chc.:iical :essage for a later guest, who, by spilling a
glass of wine, revealed fora nu,_ierrt the ;_iessage. Or here is another :_iethod
of transriitting a nessage: two guests arrive in a restaurant at different
times, sit at different tables, and have nothing whatever to do with each
other. But they wear identical hats, and on leaving each takes the other's
hat. The transmission of the i.essage has been accomplished. We still recall
how the so-called sponsorship movement flourished in all countries during the
war. These sent :Letters and gifts to the soldiers it the front. Frori German
sources it was recently learned that this sponsorship is iovenent initiated in
France was not only used but actually organized by the Gentian spy service in
order to learn the condition of the various troop units at the front. Just
these few examples indicate thc: progress :.ad.e in techniques of espionage during
the war. And these experiences and advances are now bcin; used by the bourgeoisie
against she revolutionary rove _ent .
5. Finally, it i:iust be pointed out that the police, especially those
of the i.::perialistic countries, have acquired a great deal of experience in
their fight against the national liberation. moveiaents in thc colonies.
And against this trained and experienced political police, which has
for decades built up its organization for the fi3Yit against the workers' revo-
lutionary -.iovenent, which it :proved and expanded its techniques and experience
during the war, which has the i:7ost modern technical facilities at its disposal
and is supported by the whole trei:icndous apparatus of the capitalistic governing
class,--against this political police there often stand you:.g and inexperienced
Cou uni_st parties.
A fifth and very important characteristic of present--day provocation
and espionage: is the international cooperation of the political police of all
capitalistic countries. There is literally a police international.
III. PRIMARY 1~i"ETHODS OF ESPIONAGE AND PROVC('ATION
A. Opposition groups as a basic tool
Group of both the r' Ght and the left in opposition to the Cora:iunist
? rloveraent arc usually among the i:.ost iiiportant positions penetrated for the
purpose of political provocation. Frcquunt:ly it to the groups not connected
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with the Communist Party that provide the police with infmaez s and pro-
vocateurs who work at the undermining of the Communist Party. In France,
for example, this role is played by the minor members of the so-called
Revolutionary Labor Movement. In. Brazil the police have set up their own
Trotzkyite groups in their fight against the Communist iaovement. It is
significant that in Poland Trotzky's autobiography, "thy Liife", was published
in Polish by the Wnnrsaw political police in an effort to demoralize tiie
Communist movement. Everywhere the writings of re cgades, of both right
and left, are published, not only to belabor C3ru:iunisi:i, but also to inform
against individual Coi:?:.itznists. The police officals of all countries fight
over the renegades like vultures over carrion.
B. The methods of political provocation
What does the systematic work of political provocation consist of?
1. First of all in the disorganization of the ziovement. This objective
is pursued in a variety of ways. The agent provocateur has the assignment of
bringing discredit to the political line of the Party and to the Party leader-
shi. The most divergent methods are used to this purpose. Existing discon-
tent with the Party line is inflated and the legitimate criticism of the
dissatisfied party embers is co:abined with lies and suspicions. All sorts
of rumors and slander against the party leaders and prominent party members
are circulated. As a resu,_t of such undermining of party leaders who enjoy
the well-earned respect of the labor movement, it becomes necessary to replace
these with new, inexperienced and insufficiently tested people. At the sane
tine the agent provocateurs try to use the same tochniques of lies and slander
to hold back the young people who have distinguished themselves in the revolu-
tionary struggle and to hinder their political developi_!ent.
2. Exacerbation of differences of opinion within the Party and the
forienting of factional strife wherever possible. Recently there was a violent
factional struggle in the Party of one of the Balkan countries and this was
the result: the police arrested one of the leading Co.:. munists . I ::iagine the
chagrin of the arrested leader and of the police agent who had ::ade the
arrest when the chief of the political police reprimanded tli ~. gerit, saying:
This man should not have been arrested. We know precisely what is going on in
his faction; During a factional struggle we should not keep this man in jail."
We also experienced a characteristic example of these police methods in
Hungary. In the Hungarian Co.-i_lunist Party a violent fight was waged for years
against comrade Bela Kun. This struggle took various and unusual forms. It has
now been proved beyond any doubt that it was engineered by the Hungarian police
who had determined at all. costs to bring comrade Bela Kun to discredit.
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4. Another corm,-..on method is to accuse various comrades of being police
agents and to circulate rumors that the entire Party is riddled with spies.
In this way the workers will be intimidated and kept away iron the Party. This
method is most common in those places where the Cor:L-lunist Party is illegal.
In India various Co:munist groups have for years accused each other of provo-
cation and i:-~.ade each other suspect. The same thing happened in Korea, where
the Japanese police were adept in the use of this technique.
1E. A further objective of the systematic work of the agent provocateur,
especially where the Communist Party is legal, is to lay the Party open to
prosecution by the civilian authorities by perverting the Party line and
program. In France there were numerous cases in which i mature elements of
L'Hu::ianitc wanted to publish such strongly anti-imperialistic and subversive
articles that the police would have been forced to act against the central
organ of the Party. It goes without saying, that these cases are not always
due to the iiasaturity of such party me:.fibers, but are often the deliberate
attempts of the police to provoke the Party.
5. The spies and provocateurs also try to so pervert the political
line of the Party that the i ovc_ : nt is compromised in the eyes of the workers.
In this category the anti-military agitation whi _h will awaken the antipathy
of the soldiers against the Party, etc.
6. Another method is the spreadin; of police -Fabrications about the
"Hind of Muscow" in the ranks of the revolutionary -,cve~ cnb in capitalistic
countries.
r(. A nethod political provocation often used by the police is to
provoke the Co_ mnist Party, or certain individual Cor .m_lunists, to eo snit acts
of terroris _,. The trial on the occasion of the murder of the police spy Blau
in Germany in 1919 is a well-known case;. Later, however, it was revealed that
the main dcfenden_t, the one who had murdered Blau, was actually an agent
provocateur. In Japan the police tried, through their agents, to get the
Communist Party to atteu-pt a putsch and in this way to destroy the Party.
8. Another riethod of political provocation is the deliberate twisting
of the organizational directives of the Communist Party with the purpose
of crippling; or blocking various worker's activities. Au example of this
can be taken from the experience of the Yugoslavian Cor:u::unist Party. An agent,
who had been carrying ou: regular orders from the police, altered the directives
for a mass de :,ons oration at the cri b-ical moment, with the result that the workers
arrived at widely separated locations and at different tim..ies so that the de.on-
strati.on failed.
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9. Another method used by the pclit ic,l police is - to sabotage the
efforts of the Party leaders by having its agent provocateurs delay and
block the directives of the leaders under any and all pretexts. Every direc-
tive of the Executive CorirAttec of the Cormiunist International and of the party
leadcrsh.ip rust be delayed for as long a tir.ie as possible by the agent. The
police agents carrying out these orders of the political police often do so
urdcr the cover c_? factional strife. This, too, can be illustrated by an
example fro::: Yugoslavia. A provocateur operating as a party functionary, had
the assignn nt of distributing leaflets. He clai::ied never to have received such
an assign cut. actually he had turned the entire ships-.lent of leaflets over to
the police.
10. A r.ict'rlod of provocation used primarily in A::icrica consists of or-
ga_iiziii? activities en the part of the workers which i:rust necessarily end in
fal:Lur . In America, where industrial espioi age has reached its highest
deveio;~ :grit, the police have been able to place their agents in leading posi-
tioiis In the labor I:iove ?.ent . These have the task of provoking poorly prepared
actions o--,l the mart of the workers and thereby disorganizing the :.rover:lent.
11. The ruthod of provoking clashes between -.lie workers and the police
or the ni1;_t_^.xy is a widespread and well-kl:lown technique. The first shot fra:i
the L .ob at the police is air-lost always fired by an agent provocateur. The
cheapest of all police methods, the provoking of fraternal strife in the work-
ing class, also belongs in this category. These i:icthods were used on a large
scale by the Pilsudski-Fascists in Poland, the pcliee a.e;cn.ts among the Spanish
Anarchists and the Spanish Sccic,.l Dc:::.ocr..ts, who worked within the working
class with the help of the so-callcd Pistolari to unleash a civil war. This
same r.iethcd is also widespread in the Lr;Ltin American countries.
12. The police will also often organize demonstrations, so as to be
able to seize the 1^.r.gcst possible nuribcr of active Coi:uuriists at one tir:re.
With such denonstrationa it cm be predicted that very :rcw active, aggressive
Corer unists will be absent,. It is then a simple :.ratter for the police to
break up the der:ions tration, arrest the Coi_u:unists and so inflict t'.-'c greatest
damage on the Party.
13. An old and tested r:icthod widc;iy used by the police in recent tines
is the searching of Pa:'ty hc' d uarters a.nd the homes of lead;..?:g Coni:iunists
where they "find" forged doc uu.icit s , wcarons or the like.
14. It h - 's often haD1.encd that the sli~2shod application of all. rul s
for conspiratorial work and t'ic carulcss expediting of Party directives in
illegal Co_.n.iu.zist parties ccine about as the result of police provocateurs
whose, plan it was to der.LCralizc and break up the illegal party apparatus.
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C. The various forms of modern espionage
1. It is incorrect to assume that the police depend on the overt
surveillance apparatus in its fight against the revolutionary movement. One
often hears romantic stories of how cleverly a comrade was able to cover his
tracks, how he evaded the probing eye of the police and sent ther..1 off on a
false scent, and the like. Naturally no revolutionist i:ry overlook these
siuple precautions. He -rust always see to it that no police agent is follow-
ing him; he must always look around carefully on leaving l:is home or a station
to be sure that he is not being shadowed, etc. Such precautions are not to
be overlooked, naturally, but one should bear in mind that the greatest danger
does not lie in these obvious spies. The real danger lies in the spies within
the Party. The open surveillance service plays a minor role: To use a
military figure of speech, it is like the light cavalry, while the spy and
provoc^atcu.r inside the organization is the heavy tank of the modern political
police. The overt observer is no more than an auxiliary of the provocateur,
and usually only appears just before the arrest is to be ::iadc, when the police
have just a few details left to establish. The intervention of the overt
observer often has the sole purpose of establishing an alibi for the provoca-
teur, to persuade the arrested comrade and the Party that police gathered its
evidence by outside surveillance.
2. What is the function of the surveillant? The surveillant has to
study his "Client" thoroughly and to watch his every step. He reports every-
thing he sees, usually on a daily basis. In these repots the person under
surveillance is usally referred to under an alias, which is often well-chosen.
The police survcillants are trained for their work in special schools, and
they often work under the cover of a respectable, bourgeois occupation. One
should not be so naive as to think that these surveillants are people who
tail their victims obtrusively and at all titres. Quite often these police
agents ap-u ear as street vendors, porters, newsstand proprietors, and the like,
all having their place cf business in good observation. -posts. In the instruc-
tions of the Czarist 0khrana, surveil.lants were ordered to o crate as letter
carriers and cab n -.i. irtore in keeping with the tires, survei,:lants are
ordered to appear as taxi drivers and motorcyclists rather ti. a.: posti.ien. On
the basis of such sleuthing the central office is often able to draw a graphic
picture of all the places visited by a "client" during a given period of time.
Important party connections are often discovered in this way.
It goes without saying that the police will establish a special
surveillance service to cover Party -:meeting places and the "like. For this
purpose, rooms are rented next to or opposite these places. Our party
organizations must always bear this in mind.
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These outside surveillance services are one of the oldest forms of
espionage.
3. f notb.er foimi of cspic:nagc service is rude up of a widespread net
of informers recruited from all walks of life. The police rake convenient use
of the reports gathered prom this axtcnsivc not of people "not directly involved.
No one can refuse to coopcra to with the all-powerful police. The police find
their infor2ers in the most varied walks of life: lawyers, teachers, members
of parJ_iancnt, city CoiA_1Cilmon, storekeepers, porters, ::iE:ssengers, prostitutes,
Etc. The police often recruit their spies froze _w_iong gangsters and criminals.
This is highly characteristic of Americo. It is well-known that in one of
the large Aucrican cities the district headquarters of the Soi:u_iunist Party
was located in a building one floor below thejLeadquartcrs of a notorious gang
of bootla;gers, burk.lars, cou;iterfeitcrs, etc. The district office of the
Party paid no attcntio _ to these ncig'hbors, until it became clear that the
police c..i:lp .ign ag.^.inst the Party was based on evidence athcrcd by the tenants
upstairs.
1+. The journalists of the bourgeois press also l~lay an i _lportant role
as spies. These always work is spies under their cover of their press cards.
In the illegal parties, special emphasis must be laid on waitresses and chamber
maids. Thos: solicitous people are often in the lay of the police to when they
are esrecially solicitous in pcrforuing invaluable services.
5. The polled also c iloy the foi.lowing i:ic:th,.;d to gather inforu:iation
on the revolutionaries:
A certain revolutionary was constantly surrounded by a circle of
acquaintances, who in every conceivable "innocent" way involved him in
political discussions. In such cases the police generally try to work on
the psychology of t?~.c oc:;:is to ::cly pursued and hunted person. Further, it
frequently happens ghat revolutionaries, es>ocially in "illcf;al countries,"
begin: to feel, after ye^rs 01 pursuit, a creep need for doi:ics city end
conversations with good fricnds, a:id the like. Such ucoCs aro s.iuply the
reaction of weak characters to the necessarily restluss cxistcnce. The
police receSnizes such psychological needs on the part of curtain party
ncnbcrs and tries to use their for "police purposes.
6. The police also ,:.akc as i:_uch use as they can of so-called "syu-
patl'!iz;;rs" and others close to the Party for its espionage. In many cases they
use bourgeoi lawyers called u.)on to defend arrested co.. rados . Such lawyers
arc able to w.n the cor.:fidencc of the arrested comrade by performing a number
of S1::ail services, and arc; then able to learn various details of Party organ-
ization, which are of especial importance to the police.
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(. The fact that the police have cars everywhere, ready to pick up
the careless talk of party functionaries, is attested to by the bitter exper-
iences of .:.any coi:irades. We rust fight this tendency toward unnecessary brag-
ging and babbling with all our strength on all levels of the Party. There arc
many organizations where this has taken on evil and terrifying proportions.
Many Coi.munist parties have had to suffer greatly as a result of this unfor-
givable carelessness on the part of nuc!crous Party .:.e,:.bcrs.
8. At this point we must also take note of the danger in so-called
"police cafes." In such cafes one can soi-.ietiucs find the entire Party leader-
ship present. It goes without saying that the police are not only aware of
the addresses of such cafes, but also know the habits, acquaintances, and the
hobbies of all the patrons, and that everything said in such a cafe is quickly
reported to the police.
D. The various types of provocateurs
1. The arr.-.y of police agents and provocateurs is recruited from the
most diverse cler.ients in riany different ways and carries out a great variety
of assign erts. The first type is the so-called "accidental provocateur."
He is one of those who have at one tii..e or another fallen into the clutches of
the police and have given ii-.g;cftious testi.:.ony at the police hearin;s. Such
loos;; t, alk before t ?e police cc:.r: uissioner or the exa uinin; riag i strate fora.-,s
the first steps toward betrayal and provocation for such a person. The
i.:u:cc:ic.te consequence: of this is the carrying out of police instructions, first
on a s .all, then on a larger scale. The following sequence of events, which
has been observed i:lore than once in recent tir,.es, is typical: such a newly
recruited agent from the ranks of the Party codes to the Party leaders with
the story that the police have tortured kin and he has been released only on
pronise of his cooperation-.. Ho has given his word to cooperate only in order
to gain his release, he but now regrets tha~.t pro.iioe and. cones to the
Party with his full co lsio;. Cor_,::.unist Party faders often show a thought-
less, and really cri::u..i.uaa_ toter ..ce and trust of such pco;,lo, :.?,.a:d it often
happLns that such "truly re entant" persons are entrusted with really respon-
sible party activities. There then follows a n.ontlis or even:. years-long
inforn.i.g to the police by such people who, under the cloak of their "sincere
repentance", i_.isuse the all -too generous trust of the party.
2. Another type of agent provocateur is the inforr.ation agent. A sriall
spy of this type keeps the police infomed on all phases of the Party known
to him. Frequently such a spy becones an inportant figure in the police
intelligence network, keeping the police irifori..ed on all. the most inner
workings of the Party. Such o uc .iacr is co::.plotely ignored by the police, who
do everything possible to keep the shadow of suspicioi, far away from hi,,--I.
This, then, is the n.os-t dangerous type of provocateur. He is an unusually
good Party r.er.iber, unconditionally carries out all Party directives, fights
energetically against all types of dcviationists, and is in all respects the
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vary of courage and self-sacrifice. In truth, however, he delivers
the threads of the Party's activities into the hands.of the police day in
and day out, year in and year out, betraying not only individual Communists
but also whole organizations.
3. A special type is the theoretician in the service of the police. He
is froquer_tly not a Party ziei:ibcr, but a fellow-traveling journalist or writer
or the like, who regularly prepares reports for the police on the condition of
the revolutionary uovemcnt and i_.a kc various suggestions as to how the "eneiaios
of the state" may be coi:ibattea. The secret files of the 0khrana oponcd by the
October Revolution showed that the well-known publicist, Brzosowski, prominent
in revolutionary and literary circles of his tiuc , played such a role. Brzosowsk:
was an exceptional speaker a._.d talented writer, whose articles and writings had
a great effect on the younger generation. Later it was revealed that he was
an infoiy.ia:tion agent of the Okhranc., and that, for a ._lonthly salary of 150
rubles, he prepared regular reports Dli the revolutionary i.iovci:.cnt for the police,
and, so to speak, provided for the correct political instruction of the Okhrana.
~E. Finally there is a,iother, ._iost dangerous type of agent provocateur -
the politician. He has the tasks of deliberately falsifying and distorting the
Political lino of the Party. This type of political spy is unfortunately wide-
spread in the ranks of the Party.
E. The recruiting ue-thods of the police
1. What icthods do the police: use: in recruiting their agents and
spies? A very co.--Y-ion ucthod is the recruiting of political prisoners under
the threat of death, torture, or the like. In China, where the police con-
front each arrest Communist with the most horrible torture and terrorism, the
victi__is are given the si:.:,.11e choice of service in the secret police or death.
In riost of the capitalis-ti.c countries of Europe -- Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, the
border countries Poland, Hu~ig.ary, ctc. -- the police use corporal punish:ucit
and torture to gather t1icir inf ori-.iition frozi people of we^k character, who
frequently reveal the most i._,portant and detailed inforriation. Freely giving
infori:uiation to the police is the first step toward betrayal. Anyone who has
once started down this road can ali.iost never return.
2. There are r aily exar_ip1es in the past of people who have participated
in the revolutionary uovei:ient with grcati:st self -sacrif ice, later fell into
the clutches of the police and their can to betray the Party. Rysakov, one
of the most act .ve participants in the bo.:ibing attack on Czar Alexander II in
1881, who freely risked his own life as bomb thrower, 12 hours later gave the
police a cor..plote accounting and betrayed a riu..ber of his co-conspirators.
Karakosov, another revolutionary, who had riadc an attc..i,Yt oil the life of
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AJ.cxcndcr II with a revolver, gave the police a cor;iplcte statenert on the third
dayr of his arrest. It is well known that the Decciibrists, the leaders of the
officers' conspiracy against Czar Nicholas I in 1825, ;_ia~dc a lamentable showing
in court -- with the possible exception of Pestcl
3. Another i:cthod used to recruit provocateurs is to threaten the fLu:ili
of political prisoners with violence and t-,rrorisri. Mey.ibers of the fa-.iil.y arc
beaten and tortured in the presence of the prisozicr so ^?s to break down his
resistance. The following recently occurred in Rur.iania: when a co_.Zradc fro_.
the Youtli Move:iert was arrested, the police brought in his aged _.iother and beat
the mother in the presence of the son and the son in the presence of the mother.
But the old woman rer:iained firi.i. She spat in the face of the gendarues and cricc1.
"I am a sii:iplc working wona i and understand nothing of politics, but when you
treat people in this way, I know that you arc my cnc:iics:" However, the i-latter
often runs a di 'fercnt course; and threats against the .-Camily and children of
the prisoner beco::ics a successful police method for recruiting agents and pro-
vocatuurs. The: wives of the arrested comrades frequently play a fatal role. It
has happened that the wives, in an effort to in their husband's fre:eda:i have
inforicd the police which organizations and persons he was involved with. Nat-
urally enough, the man is not helped by this, while a nwribor of his cor:irades have
also been delivered into the hands of the police.
1+. Threats always May a decisive role i:".1 the recruiting of agents for
the espiolagc service. Oi.cc -tile police have been able to Sct their victin to
cOuproi::isc the Party by deans of `threats or couproi:iisC cad concessions, then
the victir:i is in the clutches of the police aiicl cannot easily escape again.
The threat to reveal hii:i to the Party as an inforricr 1-.ai:gs over his head like
a sword of Dai:ioclc.s, and gives the police a welcome ricans of forcing him to
continue his betrayal. Such a person is lost to the Revolutionary Movement
once and for all. This .:rcthod is very widespread, and is esoecially preferred
by tlic English Intel.li ;ei:.cc Service. The Intelligence Service usually places
its agents in circles of du'bious repute. Frequently the political police
chooses its agents fror:r -.,:.or_,[ persons who have at sonic Li the past coi:i-
mittcol a pui.,.ishable act, as for cxol ple, deserters, etc. Thu political police
produces the evidence for the bcnefit of their chosen carrdidatc r.:.nd explains:
"As long as you work for us, these docurierits will be held by us ar.d will not
becoiae -publicly know-n."
5. Those paragraphs of the law which in various cotuftrics provide for
the release of prisoners before col--.l.etion of sentence and for the suspension
of sentence as a reward for exc,.uplary conduct, are often used by the police for
the recruiting of co-workers. Often no more is required of an arrested Corn:iunist
than his signature on a paper declaring that in the future he will avoid all
further political activities. But this stater:lent in the hands of the police
serves as a lever to threaten and coerce the signer.
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el I
b. During its long experience the political police have also developed
their own 1 rivate i.icthods for obtaining public statei_iunts and co.nfessioiis
without recourse to blows or torture. To this end they use the i:iethod of
"sy: ~.,i~~."thetic", "friendly", "l" L'lu1'er " i master of this technique y
l~,torrogataon. A ,
as we have already indicated; was Zuoatov, the leader of the Czarist Okhralia,
who often spent entire days and nights with the political prisoners discussing
political questions. It is also known that at a .iueh earlier date Czar Nicholas
I had :.lade use of the sai.ie r u-thod. During the hearing of the DecLrjbri.sts, which
he personally conducted, he explained with tears in his eyes that he himself was
very ~.uch sympathetic with their philosophy of freedoi_i and he personally kissed
the-m o71. taking leave, only to instigate i:lore arrests and executions after the
prisoners had been led away.
7. In using these i:icthods the police attompt to work on the most il:ltil:la1
emotiozls an on the psychology of the prisoner. The effect is easy to ii:iagine.
There is recourse to the most terrible for,-.is of torture and terror everywhere.
The prisoner expects to be tortured and tomented during the interrogation and
now he finds instead courtesy, friendliness and even cordiality. It makes a
deep ii:ipression on the inexperienced young revolutionist that he is not tor-
tured, but instead led into political debates. He is received with a broad;
liberal gesture by the dyed-in-the-wool police co.-riissioner or interrogator,
who says: "I want to have a cordial talk with you, man to .tan. Granted there
is a wide gulf between us, but we will have to speak out. Perhaps we can find
a few points of understandi::.g."
8. During the I ukkala case in Finland, the exa i?inin; i:iagistrate struck
up a conversation with a party i.iei:iber of great integrity which went sot- ething
like this: "Natural:.'_y you can't give: any infor.:iation. I would not have expected
otherwise of you. I understand your attitude completely. I have the greatest
respect for the reasona_:behind your is ovc;i:lent and I do not want to coerce you.
But I should thick that we could talk about such general things as are to be read
in the papers every day, couldn't we?" And so there began a "friendly" conver-
sation, during the course of which the prisoner talked not only about well-
known news, but also ::ie,itioncd things which had not- yet appeared in the papers!
9. In these attei:~pts -to coax forth important stateants, a large part
is played by. discussions on "general philosophy", a method often used by refined,
higher police executioners. Police officials often succeed in luring a younger
coi:irade into the trap by assuring hill that if he tells the:.i the truth "We will
give: our word of honor that we will not hari-i a hair on -the head of any of your
friends . On the contrary, you can spare your friends a great deal of grief .
We lack only a few details to coi..ip_lcte our report." If the accused falls for
this, it does in fact happen that he and a few others are released. But anyone
who has over informed to the police will alw^.ys be at their disposal.
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10. In order to Iupc the prisoner the police will often express syupathy
and acccncy toward his fai:-,ily, perfori:n. nui,icrous services for the accuse d and his
faaily, allow visits frou:i rclatives and friends, and the like. Often attempts
are :.lade to work on the nati o_ie.1 or personal pride of the prisoner. He is told:
"You arc an unusually intelligent and capable person, but the party leadership
is conspiring against you to keep you from assuming your proper place." Various
factional differences are used for the sa.:ie purpose. Attei:ipts are often mdc
to set arrested workers against the party leadership: "You have been iiadc pawns
whale the big shots who put you ul7 to this and who arc the really guilty ones,
get off scot-free or escape with little loss."
11. A favorite and frequently used trick of the political police is to
create in the hind of the accused t11e i:apression that everythin; has already been
co:.zfesscd by someone else. For the bluffed and inexperienced co .rade the police
serve uLD a nAu. iber of tricks which can only be seen through by the experienced.
These demoralize the accused who then proceeds to spill all. This "all-knowing"
pose of the police has led i:iaa y astray. Often use is .ado of forged docu _ients
and of so-"called confessions of co-defondarrts. The secret police, naturally,
employs cxpcrt forgers with whoa. it is a sinali. natter to reproduce a Zasterful
copy of a given signature. A "personally-signed" docunont can easily confuse
anyonc.
A revolutionist .lust therefore strictly follow the rule: If you fall
into the clutches of the police, give no credence to false hopes or beliefs,
do not bccoue panicky, do not allow yourself to be bluffed; do not becorie
dciaorc.i.ized, and always on your guard.
F. How the police mask their provocateurs
1. One of the ;_...Uatest difficulties in the fight against provocateurs
lies in the skill with rich the police i.-,ask their handiwork. It is far from
easy to expose an agent provccatcur or even to detect him. One often hears
the following arCui_ient: this man cannot be suspected of ccpionaGe' Why,
he has been in jail for any years himself! Or: this uc: i c,m-root be in contact
with. the police. Why, for years he has had full knowlodgc of all kinds of
ill caal activities and the police has never yet intervened in any way: Neither
of these two arguments is watertight. The police arc often able to recruit a
man for their service by gra itiug h.ii:i a reduction in a long sentence.
2. nothcr cxai:xle of masking a provocateur is to arrange a successful
jail break or to allow a nur.:bcr of genuine co:- ro.dcs to be released or to have
their scntc-aces reduced together with the a e'_it.
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To shcw,, just how skillfully the police can provi do cover for their
p.rovoca -,_ rs we will take another exa.ipie f.ron the history of Czarist Russia.
D g yev, the notorious spy of the Okhrana r.ientioned bef ore, once net Vera
Fi_gner in IQaarkov. During thecourse of the conversation he learned where
she lived and at what tines she was accustomed to go out. He asked her if
she felt safe froia the police, and she answered "As long as I do not see that
inforucr M.: rkulov, the police will not discover Two weeks later Vera
Figr_er did meet the notorious PMIerkulov on the street as she was leaving her
house and was quickly arrestec:d. For a long time the Party was fir~:ily con-
vinced that Merkulov had betrayed Figner. Not until r:iuch later was it learned
that the meet jug with Merkul.ov had been arranged by the police iii order not to
reveal that Degayev was a provocateur.
,3- One frequently hears a comrade arguing as follows: "The police
know nothing, of my activities, or they would have arrested '.:.e long ago." This
is co :~pl.etely 'false! The police do not resort to arrest ii- -aediately they
learn soi ething, but only when it best suits their purpose. Churchill des-
cribes a characteristic episode of this type in military intelligence in his
memoirs. The British secret service was aware of all details of the German
military espionage network in England for years prior to the war. In spite of
this not one of the spies was arrested, for the simple reason that it is easier
to check on the activities of a known spy than to first locate a new spy.
.,j, which
Further, it was then ,possible to arrest the entire network Li one swoo,
is exactly what happened just before the outbreak of the war, when the German
high conu:iand was in no position to build u~p another espionage system quickly.
One should not forget that the police will not resort to arrests until the
entire natter has been uncovered and it has all the threads in liar d. This takes
a great deal of time.
4. It is very important to know how the provocateur escaped from jail.
Nc is rule .sea together i.t'.r othe pr prisoners, as we stated previously,
or the police stage a successful jail break. It is very naive to accept with-
out question every successful jail break. The bourgeoisie does not build its
jails so that one can escape from then. In Yugoslavia aprcvocaAeur "escaped"
from a jail three tines at great risk. At the third brea k, there was even
shooting. For a long time he was accepted in the Party as a good and genuine
comrade . And yet lie was a spy of the worst sort! Instructions found in the
secret files of the Okhraria advise against allowing provocateurs "to escape"
because this metho(1 had become too well known and no one believed the jail
breaks any r.iore. One should therefore not accept all escapees at face value,
but should investigate the incident thoroughly to crake sure that it was not
engineered with the help of the secret police.
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5. The old method of giving apolitical, prisoner a provocateur for a
cclli:~atc is well known. In addition the police se the prison doctor, the
prison chaplain, etc., who will try to steer the prisoner into political
discussions. For the sane reason the prison guard will often play the part
of a radical, freedom-loving good fellow. In many cases this same prison
guard, who with great "oziiability" arranges for the correspondence of the
coirade with the outside, first brings these letters to the prison director
or to the political police. All of these things ::lust be kept in mind.
6. One riust also re::iei ber that a modest and Simi ie i:ianner of living
is no sufficient reason for assuming that the party concerned is not a spy.
Even the instructions to the Czarist Okhrana include a detailed rule that no
agent provocateur should make the slightest change in his manner of living
after entering on service wi bli the police. It happens, naturally, that a spy
may err in this respect and so be easier to recognize. But this does not
happen in the case of the cxpcricnecd, trained and careful provocateur. The
provocateur is usually in contact with a police: official, whoi: he :ieets from
tii1c to time in a secret place. He does not work under his real name, but
under an alias which is not even kn? wn to his collaborators among the police.
Usually spies working under the same police division and in the same organiza-
tion do not know each other. Thus it often happens that one spy will defend
some provocative plan or other, while a second spy is quietly pleased to have
a confecler ate in the Party.
'(. In order to protect its agents against discovery the police will
often circulate runors to the effect that this or that honorable party ::.ember
is in contact with the police. The Social Fascists play particularly Dean
role in this respect. In very recent times the Social Fascist party leader-
ship in one of the "cl.ei_aocratic" countries of Europe tried to de::ioralize one
of our sister parties by st irti:..; a whispering campaign against various party
leaders. This tecYpiquc: :f making the cost trusted party functionaries suspect
is used very frequ`.i:1y. Eve:.: the nee:.ory of deceased comrades is slandered
for the same purpose. After the murder of the YuCoslav Co:_s::unists, Djuro
Djakovic and Niko Hecii_:ovic, the police spread the rumor that these comrades
had told all under torture. That this was a vicious slander, has now been
proved. After the murder of the secretary of our Chinese sister party, too,
the Nanking police spread the lie that he had revealed ma::y important things.
8. The police will also calmly sacrifice i:linor agents, when necessary,
in order to protect those agent provocateurs who are more valuable to then.
For c:xa::lple, when there have been a large nuiiber of arrests, and the Party is
frantically searching for the traitor, the police will often so arrange matters
that one of their minor, less important agents is exposed. It is like a gone of
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chess: onn.c sacr'i.ficCs a paw1r iii Order to Save: the queen. Quite often the
police II-11 carry this natter of "exposing" even to their spies, who then
play the role of a repentant police agent, or one who has been syi:lpathetic
toward tl.c Coi:miu11ist Party. .ld still, many coy-.trades are Misled by such
maneuvers o' the police.
9. In ills' al parties thu police will often arrest one party func-
tionary ?_.Ptc r mother i1 crccr -to free the way for one of their spies--or even
a whole Sroup of spies---to the Co,.~tral Co liiittee.
1.0. During class arrests the police will often let several. Ccr,rades
ai:iong the leaders at lark, in order to keep a close check on the further
operations of the cr ganizatio 1. At the sac this iicthocl serves to
conceal their provocateur.
11, 1, spectacular type of political provocatiol:i is the so-called
"Drcvoca.---i-ve diversi : " This plays an ii:iportant part in the fight of the
bourgcoisi: a ainst the workers' i:lovemert. F.,r this purpose a revolutionary
1:lovei:icr_t of several persons is foxl:ied as a nucleus for others. There was a
police1?:icf's strike in En6lai:cl in 1920, a iaovc:: erlt against pay cuts, as well
as the scarlen's strike in Iilvergordon in Septei::bor 1931. The British govern-
rlcnt was no 1_ittl: concerned over such actions by its 100-percent-loyal police
force. But the I:.itelligcnce Service had a solution. A new, radical police-
men's union was formed. In a short tii:ie the Ii t clligencc Service was able to
launch a. second strike it:. which only the radical el.c_.ents participated. The
strike was crushed and tl:ic participa .ts were forced out of tl.ie police service;.
12. Another frccju ntly used i:lethod is to continue sending correspondence
to overseas rci resontatives in the name of a corx.iittce for rlonths after the
coi_n:littcc has been dissul..ved or i:ioved. Such deceptive maneuvers are well known
fro1: the tii:io of ih: ti. J. war . For exa i:iplc, British Naval Intclligcnce sent
Cut ::1C;SSaGCs in C^dC , that the Gernans hack. cracked the code being used.
Naturally, -!;hest ,,'ere not genuine but -thc lT ry col:~:1and
CjrT.~a. 11~va~ .~ at
first thought thc}r were . Such falsified radio mcssag1ayed an i _lportant
part in the battle at th2 Sko.gcrak. On the other side of tI picture, the
Geri_ans captured 20 French spies proecedi, r; to GerL.iany by way of Switzerland,
learned all their secret channels of coi:a:ra icaticn, and f ')r i:lonths continued
to scr_d "espionage rcr orts" in their nai..i: s .
13. Sonic years ago the Japanese police almost coi:;p1.etely eliminated a
revolutionary organization in that country, but for a long was able to
coilti-nuc contact with the overseas representatives of the organization in its
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name. As soon as the Jm ancse police were satisfied that they could learn no
uuie from these overseas agents, they lured them back into the country where
they were arrested the minute they stepped over the border.
All -these are useful examples of provocative (livers ion as used by
our class enemies.
G. Industrial espionage.
1. Espionage in industrial plants is. one of the sharpest weapons in the
hands of the bourgeoisie at the present stage of the proletarian class war.
Factory espionage finds its rlost fertile ground for growth and development in:
the deprivation of the worker's rights in the capitalistic industrial plant, the
increasing misery of the ::.asses in capitalistic society, the demoralization of
the workers through social democracy. The weakness of the red workers' coun-
cils, the weaknesses of the Communist industrial l.love.:lcnt in general, ::lake it
easy for the:: enemy to set his bands of spies on the -revolutionary workers.
2. Against the growing revolutionary mood of the workers and the
increasing influence of the Communist factory cells, the bourgeoisie mounts,
among other things, a widespread net of factory spies. Hand in hand with the
police, the industrialists often fors... complete espionage coils in each branch
of the factory. This is the coi.n:lon method in fascist Italy. Chiang Kai-shek
has clone the same in China. In Italy the entire fascist workers' union move-
ment is nothing more than a vast organ for industrial espionc e. The bourgeoisie
uses special care, of course, to give this kind of protection to its war indus-
trJ, the chemical industry, the railroads, etc., against Communist contamination.
3. We will discuss here only the most frequent forms of industrial
espionage. The first of these is the open police surveillance. The se-called
"plant police" are Crra;iiz d in the factory with the purpose o,).f chcelcing on
the workers in every way. Even the fire protection service in the factory
is often given the sideline of spying on the workers.
4. Next we have the spies at the service of the owner or z?:anager. The
whole administrative apparatus of directors, division supervisors, bosses, etc.,
are generally made a part of the factory spy system. In the Rumanian oil fields,
which are the property of American capitalists, the spy services arc under the
direction of reliable American bosses, to state just one example.
5. The apparatuses of the reforL.i st trade unions and of the Social
Fascist Party play tremendous role in this type of factory espionage. The re-
formist factory council is li.cc "a child at hone" in the offices of the factory
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It is as important to the reformists as it is to the i:ianagers to
repress the revolutionary riovement. In intimate consultation with ~.ainagei_ient
they work out the methods to be used in countering the revolutionary mood of
the workers.
5> The young, proletarian author Willi Bredel graphically portrays the
espiona e operating methods of the reformist factory council in his novel
"Mc.scl:i-ncnf..brik IN.u.K.". The chairman, and an active mother of the factory
council act as spies under the direct supervision of the factory nanagerient.
One of these makes systematic reports on the revolutionary workers. Willi Breclel
presents the following characteristic fact in his novel: the hero of the story,
a coL:n_iuinist, notes on the first day of his arrival in the factory that the
social democratic functionaries in the shops deliberately start political
discuss ions with the Coon.iunists so that, in the course of the discussion they
can, through loud talk and comments about "agents of Moscow", make the super-
-visors aware of the Cor_uiunits.
7. Just how c",-)only the social fascists pursue their espionage could be
observed during the Prussian pleboscite of iLu.Lgust 1931. In order to determine
which social democratic workers were following the appeal of the Communist
Party in opposing the social democratic bureaucracy, the social democrats set
up observation posts outside of the polls to observe the "untrustworthy" cle?-
ments.
B. It is a fact that in many c_~.:i.Luijist parties the most confidential
party decisions during times of stress within the party will come to the atten-
tion of the social democrats and will often appear in their press. There can
only be one explanation for this: these bits of irifori.atioln find their way to
renegades, in contact with some Communist Party iner,ber. Often, when small
groups of renegades leave the Party, they will leave one or ;.lore of their
members behind in the ranks of the Party, so that they will have sources of
information and also, a means of undermining from within. The Lovestone group
in the United States ;:-Lade a tremendous effort in this direction.
9. The so-called private detective offices play an important part in
industrial espionage. This has reached its highest develop:.ient in the United
States, the country which has become the classical example of industrial espion,
age. In America ::Zany of these detective firms have taken over surveillance in
many large industrial cor. plexes , becoming in effect large cola crci al trusts with
branch offices in many places. Large espionage firms such as Pinkerton's,
Sherman Burns and the like have their own press and publications, have their
own staff of writers in their service and direct an army of agents which is
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conscrvc.tivcly estimated at ~ 3 ,OOO i.ien. Their advertisements frequently
ccvc:r an entire page of newspapers like the New York Times. They report a
taxable income of 50 million dollars a year and p- -,.y a quarter of a million
dollars in taxes. The detective bureau does anything and takes on all
conceivable assignments. From the industrial they will accept assignments
for the disorganization and breaking of strikes while at the same time they
accept assigni:icnts from trade unions for the protection of "scabs." (sic)
From the insurance cor,i anies, with whom the in 0strialiStS have policies for
protection against losses through strikes, the detective agcncies accept
assignments for the prevention of strikes in the factories concerned. But
it can also happen that a. manufacturer, during a business slump, would just as
soon collect for strike losses from his insurance coi:ipany, and at such a time. he
rarely orders a strike froi:i such a detective agency! It has boon revealed
little by little that the largest American corporations, such as United States
Steel, etc., make use of the services of those detective agencies.
a. Ti,.csc espionage firms do not always call thei.iselvcs detective
agencies. They send thousands of copies of their circulars to the factory
managers, circulars in which they appear under a great variety of titles:
%Decial Office for Personnel Services", "Association for the Education of
Workers in the Spirit of Americanism'", "Organization for Industrial Peace",
"Bureau f ' r Rational Mcinagement", and many others.
b, Here is a typical quotation from ^ circular in which one of
these firms offers its services:
"We co;:,x:,it ourselves to:. 1. Organize a union in your plant and
guarantee thereby that no str .ko will occur. 2. If a union is established,
in your business, we undertake to make this union incapable of striking"within
60 drys by underriining it with factional strife and personal intrigues.
c. The work "_ng _i thoss of the espionage f iri::s arc all pretty much
alike. The functions of these agcncics are described in more or loss veiled
newspaper ads. The agent selected then gets orders to take a job in the par-
ticular company which has "placed an order" for the firm's services, or perhaps
in a company that has been selected by the detective agency to be the victim of
its next extortion. The agents arc given highly detailed instructions on how
they can gain the confidence of the workers and how they can penetrate leading
positions in the local labor unions. Generally several agents will be working
in the same plant without knowing each other. They are required to make daily
reports at some cover address concerning their conversations and related matters
such as now acquaintances and contacts, In these reports, naturally, they do
not sign t ouselves with the name used in the factory, but with soon appropriate
alias.
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10. Any .weakness on the part of the Communists in the factories is the
source of the most serious danger. This is especially true now that the bour-
geoisie is trying by all means at its disposal to drive the Cor_c_iunists out of
the factories and to isolate them. The primary tool in this campaign is the
factory spy. It is therefore of the greatest importance that the Communist
Party develop techniques for the unmasking of spies in the factory and to
coi_.bat industrial espionage. It will not be possible for us to r:.iaintain,
strengthen and broaden our Cor.r.unist cells in the factories unless we can
recruit mass support for the c r:.batting of industrial espionage.
11. Communists still have to learn how to organize their activities
in the factories. Many Coneeunists, in countries where our movement is legal,
maintain that they have no right to conduct illegal activities in the fac-
tories. This is beside the point, since it is not 'necessary to openly declare
that one i.s the leader of a Communist party cell. A r_meuber of our French
sister party, who had been ordered to take cover to avoid arrest, proudly
declared: "I am no coward and I will not hide from the police:"
12. Here is another example of the thoughtlessness and rashness pre-
vailing in. the attitude of ::.any Communist circles. In one of our legal fra-
ternal parties, the central organ of the party puol.i.shed New Year's wishes to
all of the party cells over a complete and accurate list of the names and
addresses of all party members, so that the police acquired a complete list
of all party cells.
13. The first duty of CoiL;i:rur:ists in the struggle: against factory
espionage, therefore, is the careful organization of all illegal activities.
In many legal parties--to say nothing of the illegal parties --the mien bership
varies greatly. Large nui::hers of new people cone into the party. Before
the police send a novice into action, they give him intensive training and
even have their own schools to teach the strategy and tactics of the opponent.
After all, when an 18 or 19 year old worker comes into the Party, how can he
proceed properly to avoid mistakes without proper trainiAj?
l4. The Communists must therefore instruct their AireIibers and organize
courses on the organization of illegal work in the factories. Every case of
espionage which is discovered must be described to our factory comrades in
great detail so that they may avoid the same mistake and to protect our
factory cells from arrest. Every failure must be exai:rined closely to make
sure that no element of espionage entered in. We must circulate special,
highly appealing publications describing factory espionage. The most effec-
tive measure against industrial espionage, of course, is and remains the
organization of a great mass movement in industry, a movement which unfor-
tunately has not yet been achieved by the Communist Party. When we Communists
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now
succeed in iiiobilizin; factory opinion against spies and inforr.rers, a rioo
Which has bcc_n weakened in recent tires as a result of the dei:iorali_zing influence
of the social democrats, and to base this feeling oil a well organized mass i.iove-
i:lent, then we shall have dealt industrial espionage a heavy blow.
IV. COMBATTING PROVOCATION
Mary Coi.;r.:unists ii-.la; ine the struggle against provocation and espionage
to be exclusively, or prii:larily, a repression of individual informers or
spies. Such a concept is completely wrong. iL largo nui:foer of preventative
measures arc necessary to make the developiient of treachery or espionage
i :.,,possible. Our attention reiust be focussed on these in our struggle against
provocation.
A. The preventive ricasu.res used in combatting provocatioi.i i:.iust take three
f orris :
1. First: The proper combination of legal and illegal activities. The
proper groundwork in organizing party work makes the penetration and dcvelopr:ic nt
of provocation difficult frog: the outset.
2. Secondly: The setting up and faithful adherence to conspiratorial
methods, in order to assure secrecy of confidential decisions and documents,
of subversive i-m fibers and addresses, etc.
3. Thirdly: Detailed instruction for the behavior of comrades when
arrested concerning their attitude toward judges and the police.
4. The foremost and r_iost ii.iportant rieans of coi:ibatting provocation is
a genuinely popular character in the revolutionary novei:lent. A successful
fight against provocation aad espionage is best founded on the following grin--
ciplcs: a genuine participation of all party ueLiburs in the political activity
of the party; a well considered decision on all party rusoiutions the develop-
ment of self -criticis,.i rcgarding errors corii:littcd on the part of those coru:Lit-
tin6 tlicr:i; the political criticise, of each ,-Jcr_four, his operating methods and
the results of his efforts throughout the entire organization.; the development
of a collective attitude in the party concerning the ca;Dabili.ties, courage
and revolutionary trustworthiness of cve;ry party i:iember as well as of the party
functionaries; the constant promotion of initiative in party life. But in those
parties, where, on the other hand, a purely r:iechanical carrying out of party
directives is allowed to suffice, where all initiative is lacking, where the
"clique:" psychology prevails, and where political judgci.ient of party members is
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expressed in such torus as "a good friend" or "a Good fellow",, in these places
the Ground is ripe for blind acceptance, uncritical assumptions, the mutual
covering of mistakes and neglect. In the unhealthy atmosphere of such a
just-between-us attitude there grew up in the Russian Socialist Revolutionary
Party such classical examples of provocation as the previously mentioned
Azev, who managed to betray countless comrades to the police. The revolutionary
organizations must coribat espionage and provocation through an effective and
tireless mass struggle, mobilizing the working masses in opposition to the
fighting ::)ethods of the class enemy, and applying all post experience and
improvements in this defense.
5. Unfortunately, the provocation of Bia-Torbagy in Hungary, which
led to the establishment of special courts, did not lead to a popular opposi-
tion on the part of the Communist Party. In this case, too, it was the duty
of the Communists to mobilize not only the proletariat; but all working groups
against the provocation. Every similar case of provocation should be the
starting point for an increasingly broad and popular propaganda effort to
promote a muss hate of the class enemy and his vile i_.ethods.
In this struggle against .provocation and espionage it is essential to
achieve the proper balance between legal and extra-legal work. A Good bom-
bination of legal and illegal methods makes the work of the provocateur more
difficult and facilitates his unmasking.
6. "In many countries, including the most advanced," wrote Lenin in
his Childhood Diseases, "the bourgeoisie plants it provoc,atours in the Co'm-
munist Party, and it will continue to do so in the future. One of the means
of coi:.battin1 this is the proper combination of legal and illegal activities."
Concerning one of the greatest provocateurs in the Bolshevik party,
Malinovskiy, Lenin wrote:
"He betrayed dozens and dozens of the best and most dedicated con: rades .
The fact that he did not succeed in doing even more was due to the 'fact that
we had a proper balance between legal and extra-legal activities. In order
to win our trust, Malinovskiy was forced to assist in the publication of our
legal newspaper. This paper was able to combat the opportunism of the Men-
sheviks by teaching the elei_:e ~ is of Bolshevisi_m, with the concurrence of the
Czarist police ...lzt the same tine he was betraying dozens of our best people
to the police, Malinovskiy was forced to cooperate in the recruiting of thou-
sands of now Bolsheviks through the legal press."
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7. An important necessity for success is the avoidance of an excessive
centralization in illegal party work. This is particularly true of the coun-
tries of the " W,-Thite Terror". It frequently happens that a large nuriber of
illegal activities, such as the operation of a printing press, contacts with
larger organizations, and the like, are in the hands of a single comrade. A
strict separation of functions is an absolute necessity in illegal party
work, so that the arrest of one person does not result in the crippling of
party activities in various sectors. A comrade who directs the party's efforts
in a certain field Lust not at the same tine know all about the entire illegal
apparatus.
8. Further, a thorough checking of all rieribers Y.-must be set up. Such
a thorough check must be undertaken especially if the comrade is to hold a
responsible position, a position which will brin him in contact with various
fields of illegal activity, such as illegal publications, printing presses,
code keys, and the like. The sa.:ie holds for comrades who are to be active in
colonial, anti-military, and similar work. Any personal feelinig, ste~:u_iing from
a superficial or friendly feeling in the selection of people for such work must
be rejected as bourgeois and un.roletarian. Every such investigation must includ,
a thorough study of his strength of character, a testing in combat, his
personal courage, a study of his living habits, of his friends and acquain-
tances, his family, etc., etc. A member who has not yet been in the Party
long enough to be ;,Tell known, of whom one is not yet certain, should rather
be assigned legal, or semi-legal activities than sent somewhere where he
could endanger the entire plan as a result of a false step.
10. This, of course, is all the more true of those lands where the
White Terror is strongest, such as Yugoslavia, China, and the like. The co,_i-
riunist parties must subject all of their leading personalities to the closest
kind of examination in the light of tiie foregoing points. One must bear in
mind in this connection, that the communist parties also have, in addition
to the old, tested cadre of functionaa.ries, a cadre which has begun to thin
under the blows of the police, a cadre of very young functionaries. Under
the conditions of sharpened class warfare and terror to which the communist
parties are now exposed, the make-up of the active party cadre changes very
fast. Young party members can often rise to loading positions within a year.,
and not all persons whoa:: the party Lives great responsibility are as thoroughly
investigated as our goal requires.
11. Under present circutastances, the con:: _iunist parties must make
caution a i eneral rule in respect to certain comrades whenever a more or less
serious case of suspicion arises, even when there is no direct evidence to
support such a suspicion. Circumstances are seldom so favorable that a party
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i-i~-i~i~~~.G-~GiGiGGWrT IL
car:.g gather all the necessary evidence to make a case against a provocateur.
Without these precautions the communist parties will continue to experience
unpleasant surprises and the police will find their work easier. The history
of the revolutionary movement in Czarist Russia is full of cases where cer-
tain party functionaries were suspected of being provocateurs and party
commissions, after long interrogation, investigation; hearings, etc., still
came to the conclusion that there was insufficient evidence against the accused
sand that the charges were groundless. But later, when the archives of the
Okhr.c.na were opened by the October Revolution, it was revealed that a Great
number of those previously accused had indeed been in the service of the
police. We should learn from this, that each case wherein a seemingly trust-
worthy and tested party member is accused, requires the most careful handling
and a thorough-going investigation.
13. It is also necessary that an especially established board should
investigate all aspects of every arrest. In this respect it is necessary to
get in contact with the arrested person as quickly as possible to establish
whether or not he can recall any suspicious circur_mstances. An investigation
of the family and other persons in the neighborhood of the arrested comrade
can often reveal important links in the circumstances leading to the arrest.
It is unfortunately a fact that too many comrades still consider such arrests
with an almost fatalistic air. It must become an inviolate rule in all
revolutionary organizations that every such arrest be thoroughly investigated
in all directions so that no unexplained detail remains.
2.4. In each case of an arrest the leaders of the Party must be
informed as quickly as possible of the intervention of the police. In this
way further arrests, house searches, and other police traps can be avoided.
It will then also be possible to avoid the arrest of comrades still at liberty
in the case of ill considered testimony on the part of the arrested person.
Penetration of the class enemy into the ranks of the Party can be localized by
changing living quarters, meeting places and other addresses.
15. The most important rules for coribatting provoc< io:l, rules which
must be carried out systematically, can be summed up as follows:
a. A thorough analysis of all arrests, investigation and co:i-
parison of all events and circumstances connected with the arrests.
b. A detailed analysis and checking of the activities of all
party functionaries as to correctness of the political and organizational line.
Increased vigilance in all cases of distortion and perversion of the party line.
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ani-
c. Careful analysis of the activities and formal suggestions
initiated by the person under suspicion during a given period of time.
d. Extreme caution vis-a-vis persons exhibiting an abnormal
curiousity, who try to push themselves into positions of responsibility, who
want to know all the details of the Party's illegal activities.
e. Special attention and extraordinary caution in all cases of
non-coi.1 _iunist behavior on the part of certain Communists in their personal
life (drunkenness, peculation, dissipation, sexual deviation, and the like).
f. A continuing and strict accounting of all money spent by
the Party. Where there is an unsystematic and careless handling of funds,
there will be a fertile ground for the penetration of moral deviation and
provocation.
g. The party schools must conduct courses on the fight against
provocation and on the most elementary techniques of illc~ggnl activity. These
courses should be based not only on the long experience of the Russian Bolshe-
viks, but also on the more recent experiences of our sister parties in the
various capitalistic countries and in the colonies. In this connection there
should be a distribution of descriptive and agitational mass literature on the
methods and cunning of the police, together with concrete examples of how
provocation is to be conbatted. Brochures describing typical cases of unex-
pected arrests, betrayals, and provocation should be circulated.
h. The fight against provocation should also be waged in the
press with the most widespread distribution possible of the pictures of
unmasked provocateurs, together with personal descriptions of known spies,
just as is now being done by the German Communist Party.
J. In the fight against industrial espionage it is very im_Zpor-
tant to mobilize the sentiments of the workers against the tricks of the fac-
tory spy. A. mass action on the part of all the workers in a factory, of
a given section of the plant, and the forceable ejection of the spy from the
plant is not a bad idea. Nor is a mass boycott of the spy. By these means
it is often possible to make the spy quit, in addition to which, the fact
that all the workers avoid hii.i will .rake his efforts :.such more difficult and
far less productive. Further, he will feel uncomfortable in the factory and
will soon choose to leave. In any case the organization of the masses will
form a decisive link in the fight against factory espionage.
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J. No Cer.iiiiunis t party can ree lect : Eakin careful preparations
against the possibility of bcina- forced to ;o u:idertzrou d on short notice,
and to anticipate a sudden attack by the state or by the police.
Another group of rules applies to the matter of i::rprovea techniques
for ill;:ua1 activities and of practical organization. We will illustrate
this with an uxar:ipl, of military espionage fro?r.-, the iaperi .1 i_sti c world war.
A far:nous cspionat c school; which the G? man high cor.::iai had set up i i
Antwerp during their occupation, ;gave; the sty dens the followinL; instructions
as to how they were to conduct thenselves in their "work".
"Do not show too .:such curiosity while collcctin- innforriation.
"Practice facial expressions which will give you an air of indifference
anc' u.,i: ;:,ortance .
"Do not discuss confidential r.:attc rs on trains or in cafes.
"Do not reveal your knowled."e of foreign languaEes. This si~.ipli.fies
eavesdropping on ccnvc:rsations.
''P7ever let papers, envclols, newspapers, hotel and business receipts
and the like lie around. Don't put thci.i in waste baskets either, even if
they are torn into small pieces.
"Always organize r.iccti~;.[;s with people you :rust contact at great
distance frog:, your own and froi:l his livinL; quarters. If possible, a train
ride of several hours duration should be required. With fatigue, and especially
after a night ride, the client will have less resistance and will often reveal
a great deal.
"It is better to lcc.r.i, five or six facts, even thouEJh they are small
hundred opinions." lend so forth.
and uni-.lportant, than a
16. The revolutionary; too, t ust follow ccrta:i:, rules, the more so in
these tires. The revolutionary of today works and lives unccr the threrat of
police terror and of cajitalis:,ic class justice, of provocation and of espionage.
He .:lust always be on guard, must avoid loose talk, caiinut be careless, r,:ust
exercise self-discipline --.id know how to restrain hii:.self.
In the carrying out of cojnfidential, conspirutoria ~iwor by the
proceed with c^.utio:n; delibcrLJtion and c",re, always being; Y the
revolutionary goal. He must constantly be on guard a~air_st distraction,
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loos talk .~.nd curiosity. He L: ust develop a number of strict rules in
rcg,~rc'. to his daily life and in his contacts with persons and things. These
rules include the following:
a. Only tell those who must know and not those who Merely want
to know. This is especially necessary for the underC;round, since not all will
be able to resist talking under duress.
b. l revolutionist 1-.1-List not talk loosely, r. ust not speak un-
necessarily. Avoift speakin. about Party Liatters in public, where t:lany people
are present, such as in cafes, on trans, on the streets, etc.
c. Only ask about thi.ni;s that concern you, about what you
d. Use caution in writing letters, speaking over the tclel;horie.
Utters arc read, telephone wires arc taj pe(i.
e.
Carry nothing unnecessary on your person.
f.
Look around you.
Notice who is following you, observing you.
G.
Avoid affectotiori!
Do not act with cc nspicuous secretive-
noss, but be natural in everything you do.
h. Avoid careless anc' thou_;Yless acts. Every deed, every step
should be well thought out .
i. Adapt your u:ionner of l.ivin ; to the enviroiti:ient in which you
arc operatin;. And so forth.
B. Our attitude toward the police and judges
Finally, soriethinfU on our .attitude toward the police an' toward
judges, 1. Every Cor-:i.iunist party, every conspiratorial organization must
work out rc uiatioi1S on how one is to act toward the tioliCC and toward
judg :s, eslecially for the trai iin of its young ricmburs . The general rule
for any Coi:x-iiu ist is: say nothin". This, naturally, O'.ocs not :.:can that one
should answer each and every q_ucstion with "I refuse to answer.* Tactics
under inferno ration riust be r_iu cis. i_iore elastic. But the tacncral rule remains :
no statel.iont on cQL:iradus, no new ?iaE:ies, no a"dresscs, no sini le fact which
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coul.dr be used a3air_st the Party, its or ;ans, or curtain members of its
ors _.b;~zations. In no case should there be any clarification or in_for:_.ation.
Ore should catcooricaily deny all knowledge, even in face to face encounters
with the ant provccateur or the police spy. Anyone, who in the slightest
respect breaks these necessary rules, oust be put out of the Party.
2. Thus, if the police h-_vo r:aterial proof aCair.s t you. that you are
a rtc4:;tx:r of the Party, you ,:lay not give any additional i..for:iation. In this
respect o:,e trust not allow hinself to be led into discussions, not even on
such see.:tingly hamless natters as political philosophy and the like. Only
in those cases where the police have no u::aterial proof that you are a rterioer
of the Party; and they accuse you of hei_rug a Coral unist, _ay you t:lake sone
logical, explanatory stateicnt to turn aside the accusation---but even then
it r,,--y only concern yourself alone.
3. There is a seco_ ci rule which one ..iust bear in ::.ind: if you should
be ".x'"c'L`c