THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST LINE CURRENT PATTERNS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-00915R000300230003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 73
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 2, 2000
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 1, 1955
• Content Type: STUDY

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION
I. THE SOVIET PATTERN FOR EXPANSION THROUGH
"PEACEFUL, COMPETITIVE COEXISTENCE"
Soviet diplomacy as an arm of the CPSU (paras 1-3)
Expansionist connotation of "competition"(para 4)
Where the "Competition" operates (para 5)
Basic action principles of the new style Soviet
Diplomacy (paras 6-8)
Main objectives of the global tactic (para 9)
Expansionist purpose reemphasized (para 10)
Soviet Reassessment (para 11)
Realism and flexibility of new tactic (paras 12-14)
Role of the international class struggle (paras 15-18)
Page
II. THE COMMUNIST PATTERN FOR EXPANSION WITHIN
THE FREE WORLD: EXPLOITATION OF NEW
OPPORTUNITIES AND THE CLASS STRUGGLE 13
The new content of the global class struggle
(paras 2-23)
Industrialized countries (paras 4-9)
"Colonial and dependent" countries (para 10-23)
Armed struggle (paras 16-23).
Integration of the foreign policy of the USSP with
the tactics of the external Communist Movement
(para 24)
Mutual benefits (para 25)
Uneven adoption of the new tactical orientation
(para '6)
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B. CPSU Promulgation of "Class Struggle" Tactics 23
Reemphasis as a directive (para 30)
Reemphasis within the USSR (paras 31-32)
Class struggle injected into the policy of the
International Movement (paras 33-34)
CPSU continues to emphasize class struggle
(para 35)
Evidence that CPSU has steered Communist
Parties toward concentration on local issues
(para 36)
C. Progress in the Shift of the International
Communist Movement to Local "Class
Struggle" Issues
The reorientation of CP France (paras 39-42)
How the International Communist Movement
seeks to exploit the climate of international
detente (paras 43-45)
No relaxation of "class struggle" (para 43)
Promotion of local "detentes" (para 44)
Reorientation of the International Communist
Fronts
Youth and Women's Fronts (para 45a)
Peace Movement (para 45b)
World Federation of Trade Unions (para 45c)
Salvaging (para 45d)
D. Communist "Competition" for Uncommitted
Countries of Asia 45
Soviet cultivation of India and Burma (paras 46-47)
Reorientation of CP India (para 49)
Communist tactics for Japan (paras 50-51)
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E. Competition by Exploiting conflicts in the
Middle East 50
F. Implementation: the New Tactic in Practise 52
Shift to local issues (para 53)
Unity in action techniques (para 54)
Party building (paras 55-57)
Secret Apparats (paras 58-59)
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The leadership in the USSR has adopted a new set of tactics
for Soviet foreign policy and for the Communist Parties and fronts
in the Free World. Some of the elements in this new international
line can be traced back to the Stalin-Malenkov period, but were
not crystallized or effectively implemented until 1955. The new
line is expansionist in purpose. It is designed to relax the
vigilance and break up the defensive unity of the Free World, to
weaken anti-Communist resistance on both international and
national levels, and to strengthen the "socialist camp" by winning
the sympathy of "neutralist" countries and exploiting conflicts of
interest within the Free World.
In foreign affairs, the USSR seeks to create a general impression
that it is willing to negotiate for the peaceful solution of all issues
and strives to dispel fears of Communist state aggression. It has
negotiated some secondary issues, but has continued intransigent
on basic strategic issues. The Soviet leaders hope that the
illusion of broad Soviet reasonableness will spread and will help
to fragment the Free World. The new Soviet diplomatic tactics
are focused mainly on Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.
The Communist Parties and fronts within the Free World are
reorienting their tactics to render maximum support to the new
Soviet foreign policy and to secure maximum advantage from the
hoped-for disintegration of Cold War alignments. The Communist
Parties are reemphasizing the Marxist-Leninist principle of
"class struggle" in order to avoid confusion during the period of
extreme flexibility in Soviet diplomacy and to lay down the basis for
a shift in tactics away from outworn Cold War international issues
toward concentration on potentially more productive local issues.
The Communist Parties have taken the cue to re-emphasize "class
struggle" from policy statements of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union. They have made it clear that "peaceful coexistence"
is strictly a tactic of Soviet foreign policy--that it refers to
relations between states and not to a weakening of the "class
struggle. "
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ET
In capitalist countries, this shift appears to be taking the
form of greater stress on anti-capitalist, class-against-class
issues, and is primarily directed towards winning Socialists
and other non-Communist working-class elements. In the
nan-industrialized countries the strategy of "national liberation"
continues without basic revision.
Tactical readjustment has been necessary in such countries
as India, where the Soviet leaders have directed the CP to
support Nehru's "neutralist" foreign policy. Some Latin
American Communist Parties have perceptibly shifted away
from propaganda attacks against the United States as a state
toward attacks on specific, "class", manifestations of United
States "imperialism. "
The Soviet leaders have recently reinforced the principle
of the use of armed struggle in the strategy of "national
liberation" by encouraging the Latin American Communist
Parties to work in the direction of armed action.
New techniques for promoting "unity in action" are being.
worked out. The Communist Parties and fronts are attempting
to strengthen themselves organizationally in order to carry
out their current tasks more effectively, and to prepare them-
selves, in the long run, for eventual seizures of power.
ii
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THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST LINE:
CURRENT PATTERNS
Introduction.
This is the first in. a series of papers which will describe
and analyze the developing tactical pattern of the International
Communist Movement.
The emphasis in this series will be upon the tactics of the
Communist Movement outside the Soviet-Chinese -Satellite Orbit--
i.e. , upon the tactics of the Communist Parties and fronts within
the Free World. However, the tactics of all components of the
International Movement represent an organic whole. To maintain
proper perspective, therefore, it will always be necessary to set
forth as background an analysis of the tactics of the directing force
of the Movement, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU),
and its immediate arms: Soviet State (diplomacy) and Soviet
clandestine services.
It will be especially necessary in this first issue to chart the
direction and objectives of Soviet diplomacy as they have emerged
so dramatically during the past year.
This first paper treats broadly with the pattern of tactics
which has emerged during the period since the accession of the
Khrushchev-Bulganin leadership in February, through September
1955. The treatment includes a few developments during October
and early November which support the tentative conclusions
reached on the basis of earlier observation. It is too soon to
determine whether more recent Soviet statements indicate revisions
of the observed pattern or the emergence of a new one.
From the evidence, it would appear that the new Communist
tactical line was designed for a relatively long term. It has
involved a broad shift in the tactics and world-view of the whole
International Movement. Such shifts are not undertaken lightly by
the Soviet leaders. As a tactic, it has taken the USSR several
years to crystallize. The whole International Movement has not
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yet fully adjusted to it. It is a matter of historical record that
Soviet tactics have sometimes required relatively long periods
of internal assimilation and local adaptation. The most recent
example of this is the Latin American Communist Parties which--
under CPSU guidance--took about five years (early 1949-late 1953)
to bring the strategy and tactics of the "National Liberation"
program to the present stage of development. It is important to
keep in mind this phenomenon of lag in the development of Inter-
national Communist tactics: the "push button" view is to be
avoided.
Although the pattern appears at first glance to be a new
approach by the International Movement, it is, in fact, rooted
in the late Stalin epoch (i. e. , beginning in 1949, with significant
shifts in 1950-1951 and later). Special attention to these "roots"
will be given in future issues of the series, which will, also,
attempt to refine and specify individual themes of the current
international pattern.
It is also necessary to bear in mind that the present analysis
considers only the design--the intentions--of the International
Communist Movement, and does not attempt to balance this against
its capabilities.
As a means of testing the validity of the general hypothesis
presented here, and of eliciting specific instances of practical
execution of the new World Communist tactic, a check list is
appended. The check list is intended also as a briefing and de-
briefing guide and for sharpening the focus of coverage and
reportage on the activities and plans of various elements of the
International Communist Movement.
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I. THE SOVIET PATTERN FOR EXPANSION THROUGH
"PEACEFUL, COMPETITIVE COEXISTENCE"
1. The "new style" of Soviet foreign policy is but one of the
arms of the expansionist drive of International Communism.
The leading organ of the International Communist Movement.
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), is at the
same time the directing agency of the new style diplomacy.
"The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is
firmly and confidently leading the Soviet people
along the path of building Communism. Guided by
the all-conquering teaching of Marx, Engels, Lenin
and Stalin, it wisely and sagaciously directs the
international foreign policy of the Soviet state and
with outstanding skill organises the carrying out of
the tasks set."
(Cominform Journal, 22 July 1955,
"Historic Decisions of the July
Meeting of the C.C. of the CPSU."
Underlining supplied. )*
"The CPSU's foreign policy is based on Lenin's
premise on the struggle for peace, peaceful coexistence
and competition of socialist and capitalist systems.
The Party.... is ably combining the integrity of principle
.
with flexibility in foreign policy. "
(Kommunist No. 14, September 1955.
Underlining supplied).
The official organ of the Cominform, For a Lasting Peace,
For a People's Democracy!, is cited throughout this paper
as Cominform Journal.
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2. The other arms of the CPSU within the Free World--the
Communist Parties, national and international fronts, and
clandestine assets--have been adjusting to the requirements
of the new style diplomacy and other elements of the global
tactic.
3. The "new diplomacy" and the tactics of the Communist
Movement within the Free World are designed to complement
each other.
4. "Peaceful Competition" is the slogan by which the Soviets
have defined their new foreign policy. The expansionist con-
notation of the term "competition" is plain. The element of
competition has only recently received increased emphasis--
and, above all, been practically implemented- -within the
context of the slogan of "peaceful coexistence," under which
the Soviets have sought to establish a climate of "negotiability"*
as a means of breaking down the barriers erected against
Communist expansion during the Cold War. The establishment
of this climate is prerequisite to the launching of a full-scale,
effective competition with the United States for-the sympathies
of neutral and potentially neutral forces within the Free World,
with special reference to the "colonial and dependent" countries.
5. "Peaceful Competition" operates in a number of spheres:
--the diplomatic, where the Soviets compete with the United
States for influence over uncommitted governments within the
Free World and to break down the ties between the United States
and its allies;
By removing the obstacles to the settlement of the Austrian
problem, by pushing for "normalization" of relations with
Japan, West Germany, and Yugoslavia; by putting forward
more reasonable appearing proposals for arms reduction; by
turning back Porkkala to Finland; by agreeing to the "Summit"
Conference; by adopting better manners in diplomacy and a
more discriminating external propaganda,
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--the economic, where the USSR has intensified its drive
for trade with Free World countries, both as a means of bringing
them into greater dependence upon Communist economic resources
and trade, and as a means of gaining access to Free World material
resources needed to build up the strength of the Communist bloc;
--the "cultural", scientific, etc. , in which the Soviets not
only gain access to Free World technological assets, but are also
able to contact and influence important political and social group-
ings within Free World countries. The "exchanges" being pushed
by the USSR so strongly during the period under review, and the
easing of travel restrictions, are intended to open up the Free
World to further Soviet expansion.
6. Three basic action principles are observable in the new style
diplomacy:
a) maintenance of a general climate of negotiability;
b) maintenance of the essential strategic positions of the
Communist bloc (e. g., on Germany, disarmament);
c) exercise of pressures on specific areas of potential
disaffection or conflict of interest within the Free World
(e. g. , Egyptian arms deal).
7. In its peace line, the CPSU has specified, and has continued
to emphasize that the "relaxation of international tensions" does
not mean that "vigilance" can be reduced.
".... It is to be noted that in the Western countries all
kinds of enemies of peace and protagonists of the 'cold war'
are seeking to sow pessimism in regard to any further
relaxation of international tension and to check the fresh
wind blowing from Geneva.... All those who cherish peace
and security must continue to be vigilant in relation to the
intrigues of the enemies of peace."
(Cominform Journal, 29 July 1955).
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8. It can thus be seen that there is no real "contradiction,"
from the Communist point of view, between the "Geneva Spirit"
and the Egyptian Arms deal. They are two aspects of the new
style foreign policy. The recent Soviet efforts to saddle the
West with the blame for the failure of the Geneva Foreign
Ministers' conference shows this, and indicates how the Soviets
are skillfully capitalizing on the awkward positions which the
tactic of alternating hot and cold tends to impose on the West.
The main effect of the Soviet tactic is aimed at the countries of
Asia and Africa. Presumably, the Soviets can repeatedly appeal
for revival of the "Geneva Spirit" by additional bilateral and
secondary concessions. Such actions will again raise hopes that
will yet again be deflated in the conflict between the West and the
Communist bloc over the basic issues, upon which the Soviets
will continue to remain intransigent.
9. The global t attic which has been emerging throughout 1955
has these main objectives:
a. To roll back Western unity and strength; to diminish the
power of the United States to rally Free World unity, by
detaching uncommitted countries from the United States
(focus on Asia and Middle East), and by manipulating and
sharpening tensions between Free World countries.
b. To facilitate the build up of Communist Bloc power for
what the Soviets consider will be an eventual and
inevitable show-down with the United States.
c. To facilitate the expansion of Communist overt and covert
assets within the Free World (i.e. , the national and inter-
national Communist fronts, Communist Parties, Soviet/
Satellite espionage assets and other Communist clandestine
capabilities).
d. To refurbish Communism as an attractive goal: on a world
scale, to give the Communist system a mass appeal that is
competitive with the Free World system of "bourgeois
democracy".
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10. The aggressive, expansionist purpose of the new Tactic
of International Communism cannot be overemphasized. It is
not defensive, in the sense of being a retreat because of serious
Communist internal weakness, as some observers appear to
believe. It is a program for dynamic advance of Communist.
political economic and subversive power by new techniques; a
program which substitutes tactical astuteness for rigid dogma-
tism; which makes tactical withdrawals for strategic advantages.
11. Whenever the Soviet leaders reassess the world balance of
power and the potentialities of each side in the struggle for power,
they adopt a new set of tactics which apply in their foreign and
domestic policy and to the International Communist Movement
outside the Orbit. Such a basic reassessment seems to have led
to the change of leadership in the USSR and to the adoption of the
new style foreign policy. Neither all the factors which entered
into this reassessment, nor the relative weight which was given
to each, are known. Certainly, the ratification of the Paris
Agreements was a most important immediate factor. Others
probably included considerations of the universal danger of nuclear
warfare, the economic potentialities of the Communist bloc over
a period of continued, and more intensive, build-up. It is possible
that there was pressure within the Communist world for a revision
of the methods by which coordination of the economies and of
political controls is achieved. There have also been some signs
of a revision of Communist estimates on the stability and
potentialities of world capitalism.
12. For reasons which are riot fully apparent at this time, the Soviet
leaders approached their basic problems with a sense of realism
which was in contrast to the dogmatic subjectivism of the Stalin
period. Basically, it would seem that the Khrushchev leadership
finally decided to overcome the rigidity of the "two camp" formula
of the 1947 Cominform meeting, at least to the extent that the
rigidity of that formula was nullifying the effectiveness of Soviet
diplomacy and propaganda. The main defect of the 1947 formula
was that it had attributed to the non-Communist world a unity and
anti-Communist hostility which it did not really have, at least until
Communist military aggression and vituperation stimulated it.
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Despite indications late in the Stalin period and during the
Malenkov period that the Soviets were working towards a new
tactical formula, there was no real change in Soviet methods
until the Khrushchev-Bulganin "team" took over. The new
formula represents a systematic effort to exploit, in practical
terms, and by all available means, the "contradictions" which
Soviet propagandists had long been pointing to in the Free World,
but upon which Soviet -Satellite -Chinese policy had not been
effectively operating.
13. Soviet leaders have acknowledged that flexibility and realism
constitute the basis of the new tactics:
a. "In the Central Committee our Party has a leading organ
of a genuinely collective nature which is leading the Party
and the country along the correct path and which combines
firmness in internal and external affairs with great
flexibility and courage in defining decisions of the most
complicated tasks with Lenin-like wisdom."
(Moscow, TASS, 7 August 1955,
Underlining supplied. )
b. "We are realists," Khrushchev said in connection with
the 19 September Soviet-East German talks. "While
solving the problem in question we must soberly evaluate
existing conditions."
(Moscow, TASS, 19 September 1955)
c. "The Party solves... /its-/ tasks, guided by the Marxist
theory of revolutionary dialectics and by Lenin's admonition
to avoid stereotypy and dogmatism, to be flexible in tactics,
and always to take into account concrete conditions and
study the true picture of living reality."
(Kommunist No. 14, September 1955.
Underlining supplied. )
14. The new "flexibility" is reflected in the apparent promotion by
the CPSU of the idea of the "independence and equality" of the
Communist Parties--an idea put out in order to help the Soviets
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side-track Western attacks on International Communism. It
is an approach which may eventually lead to new methods of
coordinating the World Movement, and which may reflect
Chinese Communist influence on the CPSU. At present, there
is nothing to indicate that the CPSU has in fact weakened its
hold over the other Communist Parties. But the recognition of
other "roads to socialism" and the granting to Free World
Communist Parties of more latitude in gearing their action to
concrete local conditions, implies at least the possibility of the
development of an increased measure of local autonomy. *
15 Underlying the new style diplomacy and all other elements
of the current Soviet /Communist tactic remains the "international
class struggle, " which gives a solid ideological footing to the
"realism and flexibility". This became quite apparent in the
aftermath of the Belgrade visit, when the CPSU let it be known
that the "normalization" of relations with Yugoslavia implied no
surrender of its basic principles.** The "class war" has received
Recent emphasis on the "non-intervention" claims of the CPSU
during the Khrushchev-Bulganin visit to India are noteworthy.
For example, in being introduced to an Indian Communist
member of parliament, Khrushchev is reported to have said
that he was not interested in the man's philosophy, but only
in the fact that he was an Indian. (Washington Post, 4 Decem-
ber 1955). Again, the Central Committee of the CP India is
reported to have issued a directive that Indian Communists
should behave as Indians rather than as Communists during the
visit, and for this reason, they should not display the hammer
and sickle emblem. (Paris, AFP, 14 November 1955).
This was done by doctrinal explanations issued by leading
French and Italian Communists in rebuttal to the "hasty" and
"superficial" criticisms made publicly by the head of the pro-
Cominform CP of Trieste, Vittorio Vidali. This choice of
non-Orbit Communist Parties as the medium for the corrective
explanation is, perhaps, another instance of the CPSUts effort
to minimize its controlling role.
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increased emphasis in Soviet and CPSU policy statements and
propaganda since late 1954. A most recent example of stress
upon the theme was published in the September 1955 (No. 14)
issue of the theoretical journal, Kommunist, and in the October
Revolutionary Anniversary speech by L. M. Kaganovich:
"It is a most important task of Party propaganda to
wage a merciless struggle for the purity of Marxist-
Leninist theory and against backsliding into alien
ideological views. It is necessary constantly to expose....
/those who _/ do not recognize the theory of class struggle
and deny the direct opposition of principles between
socialism and liberalism. With the growth of the forces
of socialism the ideological struggle of Marxism against
reformism is intensified. "
(Kommunist No. 14, September 1955).
".... The October Revolution had and still has supreme
international significance. It has exerted and continues
to exert an increasingly decisive influence on the course
of world events, on the historic destiny of mankind--and
primarily of the working class.
"Imperialism itself is the stimulator of revolutions.
As class contradiction becomes more acute within each
country, so the working class and the working peasantry
rally together. There appear the country's own leaders
and organizers, who have not been imported from abroad,
as represented by the slanderers. The striking force of
the working class--the revolutionary party--is organized
and tempered in battle. Revolutionary ideas know no
frontiers; they travel throughout the world without visas
and fingerprints."
(Kaganovich- -Moscow broadcast,
6 November 1955).
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16. The CPSU expects its other external arm- -the International
Communist Movement--to play a key role in this global "class
struggle": on the one hand, it is to support the actions and the
objectives of the new style diplomacy; on the other, to exploit the
openings provided by the diplomacy. There is evidence that the
CPSU is not yet satisfied with the International Movement's
understanding of its new tasks or with its exploitation of the new
opportunities.
There is also evidence that some Communist Parties have not
begun to reap the gains which were expected from the new inter-
national tactics; that, on the contrary, the new line has resulted in
losses for them (especially, by causing confusion among the rank
and file).
17. The international "class struggle" remains the common bond
tying the diplomacy of the Communist bloc and the tactics of the
International Movement into a single, integrated program of action.
The "class struggle" principle is the very keel of the new tactics,
which are intended to be so flexible and so sensitively adjusted to
reality that without such a stabilizer, the Communist Movement
could easily go off course. It is essential that anti-Communists
keep this firmly in mind. Otherwise, the subtleties--diversions,
feints, infiltrations, flanking maneuvers, provocations, temptations,
and smoke screens --of the new Communist flexibility will certainly
obscure the motives and the methods of Communist action in
specific situations.
18. In brief, firmly anchored in the international "class struggle"
doctrine, the new style of Soviet/Communist tactics operates:
a) to sharpen the Communist attack upon the Free World
strength by refining the definition of targets and by
adjusting the attack(s) to "concrete" conditions;
b) to "depolarize" key sectors -of the Free World in order
to gain access to new assets which, at a later time, can
be reconstituted around the Communist pole.
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(Note: The 20th CPSU Congress, to be held in February
1956 should shed additional light on the Communist
program. The new international tactic will certainly be
amplified and codified, as was the Popular Front program
by the 7th Comintern Congress in 1935. It is likely that
further details will be elaborated in the Soviet "transition
to Communism" --a development which will be especially
important in the Soviet campaign of competition, material
and ideological, with the West. The October Revolution
speech by Kaganovich contained several hints as to specific
features of a program of "transition to Communism". )
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II. THE COMMUNIST PATTERN FOR EXPANSION WITHIN THE FREE
WORLD: EXPLOITATION OF NEW OPPORTUNITIES AND THE CLASS
STRUGGLE
1. During the period under review the CPSU has, as was noted
above, strongly emphasized the basic Marxist-Leninist principle
of the "class war."
2, The New Content of the Global Class Struggle. Formerly, the
CPSU carried on the international class struggle by means of all-
out, direct attack against the states of the "capitalist" world, with
concentration on the United States. The propaganda of all agencies
of the CPSU, including the agencies of the Communist governments
and the international Communist Movement abroad, was centered
upon this attack. Within the Free World, the attack was focused on
the slogan of "national independence," i. e. , independence from the
United States, which, it was charged, had enslaved the rest of the
Free World, including the other "imperialist" powers.
When the new Soviet leadership began to push the "peaceful
coexistence" tactic in terms of concrete actions, it was made clear
to the International Communist Movement that this tactic referred
to "peaceful coexistence" between states, and not a reduction of the
"class struggle," which is a bed-rock principle of Marxism-Leninism.
In other words, the Soviets are pursuing their new foreign policy
strictly as a tactic within the framework of the. irreducible "class
struggle," and they are stressing this in their Party propaganda to
prevent misunderstandings from arising within the International
Communist Movement.
3. In addition to this effort by the CPSU to give the new Soviet
diplomacy a firm ideological basis, the Communist Parties within
the Free World are also reaffirming the "class struggle" principle.
In doing so, they are reaffirming their obligation to assist the USSR
in the execution of the new diplomatic tactics and their own goals of
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eventual seizure of power. But more significantly, their
reemphasis of the "class struggle" means a more realistic
targeting of their tactics and a more effective, more intensive
search for usable allies.
4. In industrialized countries, the Communists are focusing
their attack upon the capitalist system and against the employers
as the "class enemy"; are concentrating primarily on extending
their influence over non-Communist workers (especially Socialist
and Catholic workers) by means of maximum exploitation of com-
mon immediate and concrete economic and social issues.
5. This does not mean that the Communist Parties of capitalist
countries have given up trying to fragmentize and neutralize the
capitalist class. On the contrary, this effort continues. But the
new Soviet diplomacy broadens the opportunities for exploitation
of the "contradictions" within the capitalist "class"--
a) by means of practical trade lures;
b) by the "relaxation of tension, " which encourages a
conflict of political and economic interests between
various sectors of the capitalist "class";
c) by means of a more flexible tactic towards the "colonial
and dependent" countries, which promotes the development
of conflicting interests and sympathies within the capitalist
"class" in the home country.
6. In other words, by shifting from the direct to indirect attack
upon the United States, the new Soviet tactics seeks to encourage
the emergence of frictions within the national capitalist "class ",
seeks to undermine the capitalist system as a whole, and gives the
local Communists more effective levers to aggravate these
frictions.
7. By concentrating primarily on local "class" issues (and other
purely national issues), the Communist Parties in the capitalist
countries seek not only to extend their mass influence, but also
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to aggravate the "contradictions" between sectors of the
capitalist "class" and between this "class" and the working
class.
8. To summarize, the stress on "class struggle" in capitalist
countries involves not only the employment of specifically
proletarian "class-against-class" tactics, but also, more flexible
exploitation of frictions within the capitalist "class" and more
practical utilization of allies--including, where possible,
"vacillating" allies within the capitalist "class" itself. The basic
struggle against the "class enemy" remains fixed, but the CPSU
has given the Communist Parties in capitalist countries a better
chance to gear their action to concrete local conditions--in a
sense, to "nationalize" themselves. This element of the current
international tactic has been specifically promulgated by Soviet
leaders by their emphasising "non-interference in the internal
affairs of other states" and the line that social revolutions
are purely national matters--that the CPSU does not and can not,
"export" revolution. That this is a bald-faced lie is irrelevant.
In terms of tactics, the CPSU does appear to have begun a serious
campaign to establish the "independence" of the external Com-
munist Parties in the sense of encouraging them to act upon the
objective realities of local conditions.
9. This concept is "Leninist" in origin, but it had been in eclipse
for so long under the Stalin system that it is thought of today as a
"Mao-ist" idea (a view which exists within the Communist cadre
abroad).
10. In the "colonial and dependent countries" the "class struggle"
proceeds as before on the Chinese-developed strategy of the
"national liberation" movement. This strategy depends upon
bringing to bear a "concentration of fire" upon a foreign "enemy".
It seeks to exploit conflicts of interest between the "national
bourgeoisie" (i.e. , capitalists whose interest conflict with
western policies and with foreign--non-Orbit--capital) and the
"compradore" or "pro-imperialist" capitalists. The aim, where
possible, is to enlist the "national bourgeoisie" in the local
"national liberation" movement.
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11. Because of the above considerations within the "national
liberation" strategy, the re-emphasis of the "class struggle"
in these countries cannot mean as pointed a campaign against
capitalism as it does in capitalist countries. As a leading
Indian Communist has recently specified, the attack on capitalism
in India must be indirect:
"... The _basic tasks outlined in the Party Programme
remain /despite the shift which the CPSU had dictated
for the CP India on the question of the foreign policy
of the Nehru Government_/. It is imperialism and
feudalism that continue to block the country's progress....
. . . . . . . . e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
"The success of the struggle against the policies of the
government therefore depends entirely on the extent to
which the democratic elements in general, and the
Communist Party in particular, make serious efforts
to defend the interests of all those sections of the
people who are affected by the anti-people policies of
the government--including sections of the bourgeoisie--
and in drawing sections of the ruling party itself into
these struggles. This obviously has to be on the basis
of an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal and not an anti-
capitalist programme. It
(E. M. S. Namboodiripad, New Age,
September 1955. Underlining supplied. )
12. Nevertheless, in their own eyes, the new International Tactic
opens up for the Communists of such countries as India new
opportunities for fighting the local capitalists. According to the
Indian Communists, the conflicts of interest within the ruling
"class alliance" will prevent the effective expansion of the economy
and will generate--
"innumerable conflicts at every stage--conflicts with
imperialism, with feudalism, with other sections of
the bourgeoisie and, above all, with the mass of the
Indian people."
(- -Ibid. )
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13. In India, the new Soviet diplomacy and the international line
on "class struggle" have not only relieved the Communist Party
of much of its former unproductive campaign against the United
States (as a state ) and permitted it to concentrate on the more
visible foreign "enemy" (Great Britain), but have also given the
Party more flexibility and precision in its definition of local
enemies.
In positive terms, the new line permits the Indian Communist
Party to postulate an alternative economic and social policy while
relieving it of the necessity to appear the total oppositionist, the
dog -in -the -manger, that it has been up to the present. This is
illustrated by the Party's "positive" stand on obtaining increased
economic and technical assistance from the USSR.
In local political issues--e. g. , the Goa issue--the Party has
been able to appear as more patriotic than the "bourgeois
nationalist" Government itself.
14. In brief, the new style Soviet diplomacy has had a substantial
effect on the tactics of Communist Parties in countries which the
Soviets are seeking to pull into their own bloc.
15. Meanwhile, the "class struggle" line of the International
Communist Movement f.rees the Communist Parties in "colonial
and dependent" countries to pinpoint their attacks more effectively
on the basis of objective local realities. In terms of local
propaganda, where the Communist Party has shifted somewhat
away from the attack upon the United States as a state (for example,
in Latin America: see para. 36 below), it continues to attack
concrete manifestations of U. S. "imperialism" on the local scene.
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16. Insofar as armed action constitutes the most important
"form" of the "class struggle" in the "colonial and dependent"
countries, * the international Communist line, during the period
under review, has indicated considerable flexibility.
17. On the one hand, the CP Japan has publicly disavowed its
former excesses of violence and has ostensibly disbanded its para-
military organization.
18. On the other hand, there is evidence that the CPSU is
encouraging the use of armed action in Latin America. This
development was suggested by the enthusiastic reception which
the CP Brazil gave to the publication in the Cominform Journal
(28 January 1955) of the "Theses" of the Marx-Engels-Lenin-
Stalin Institute on the 1905 Russian Revolution. The "Theses"
emphasized the importance of armed action by workers and
peasants. CP Brazil, which, it is essential to note, is the
"model" Party for Latin America, hailed the publication of the
"Theses" as a "well-spring of experience for all peoples" --a
reception which was duly recorded in the Cominform Journal of
29 April. The Party published a statement on its armed struggle
policy in March. This policy was publicly reiterated in August.
* This does not mean that the Communist Party in the "colonial
or dependent" country has no other "forms of struggle." Whether
it goes into armed uprising or concentrates on other "forms of
struggle" at any given time depends upon its own (and the CPSU's)
estimate of the revolutionary possibilities. In other words, while
armed struggle is the "supreme form" (in the words of the 1928
Program of the Comintern) of revolutionary action, its use
depends upon a complex of circumstances, as assessed by the
Communists.
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It is cleverly keyed to the question of a possible rightist military
coup against the constitutional regime: the Brazilian Communists
talk in tems of armed action to uphold the constitution. Indications
are that the immediate aim of these declarations is not military,
but "psychological": i. e. , that they are issued in the hope of
generating widespread fear for the safety of democratic liberties
and the existing constitutional system. The Communists thus hope
to facilitate the extension of their influence in the creation of the
"single democratic front of national liberation." Another objective
is to spread the belief that the local Communist Party is a firm and
patriotic defender of the constitutional regime and should therefore
be given full legal status and freedom of action. Mingled with this
aim is the Party's fear that it would be more severely repressed
if a right-wing regime came to power.
At the same time, it should be realized that such "patriotic"
declarations by a Communist Party can serve as a convenient
"legal" cover for the organization of paramilitary formations
ostensibly created solely for purposes of initiating or participating
in armed resistance to an attempted right-wing coup. According
to the terms themselves of the CP Brazil's policy, this armed
struggle would be directed toward achievement of at least partial,
temporary military-political successes. These would represent
lasting propaganda gains for the Party and would give it a strong
advantage in the drive for the establishment of the alliances
necessary for the "single, democratic front of national liberation",
which would wage a revolutionary fight for the establishment of a
"People's Democratic" regime.
19. To continue the evidences of foreign Communist encouragement
of armed action in Latin America, it is to be noted that on ZO August,
the Chinese Communist People's Daily praised the guerilla warfare
being carried on in Colombia.
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20. The most recent, and by far the strongest expression of
CPSU encouragement of armed action in Latin America, is to
be found in an article by A. Sivolobov* in the Soviet publication
International Affairs (No. 9), signed for the press on
13 September 1955. In the light of his past record, the author's
praise for armed uprisings in the past and for the current
Colombian guerilla activity is to be taken as an authoritative
directive for the Communist Parties of Latin America.
21, The foregoing does not mean that the Latin American
Communist Parties are being ordered to begin armed rebellions
in the immediate future. The Sivolobov article should be taken
as a specific reaffirmation of the 1949 Liu Shao-chi formula for
successful "national liberation struggles" to the effect that the
Communist Parties in the "colonial and dependent" countries
should always consider the possibility of armed action, "wherever
and whenever possible;"** and as a directive to the Latin American
Communists to work in the direction of eventual armed action, to
be initiated when local conditions, which they help to create, will
make armed action feasible.
22. While the CP Japan is concentrating on "legal" forms of
struggle, and the CPSU is directing the Latin American Communist
Parties to work toward armed action (and other forms of militant
action) wherever and whenever possible, there are Communist
Parties that have been carrying on armed struggle for years:
Sivolobov's writings indicate that he is a CPSU expert on the
strategy and tactics of Latin American Communist Parties.
In the article cited, he emphasizes strike action, as well as
armed action.
The qualified character of Liu's endorsement of Communist
armed rebellion must always be observed.
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Malaya, Burma, the Philippines. The Communists in these
countries have been attempting to end their armed uprisings for
the time being on conditions favorable to themselves, in order to
exploit "legal forms of struggle" more effectively. Thus far,
their conditions have not been met by the Governments, and the
armed struggle line continues to hold, although there has been a
marked decline in acts of violence. *
23. In Laos, meanwhile, sporadic fighting has continued during
1955 between the Communist-controlled Pathet-Lao (an instrument
of the Communist Ho-Chi-minh Government) and the forces of the
Royal Laotian Government, and the Communists continue to hold
their military base in two northern provinces. While they hold
these areas, they are able to frustrate a negotiated peace and the
establishment of Royal Government sovereignty therein.
The latest indication of a basic shift away from armed struggle
consists of a Karachi broadcast of 2 December 1955 to the effect
that the Burmese Communist Party made a conditional surrender
offer coincident with the arrival of Bulganin and Khrushchev in
Rangoon. The offer was conditioned by demands that Burma
continue to resist being included in any Anglo-American
(r.resumably, military) pact; that all political prisoners would
be released; and that the Communists and other "democratic"
groups would be given full constitutional liberties.
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24. Integration of the Foreign Policy of the USSR with the Tactics
of the External Communist Movement. The close integration of
the tactics of the Communist bloc with those of the International
Movement is strikingly evident in the new Global Tactic. While
Soviet diplomacy moves to fragment Free World unity, to outflank
the United States by indirect attacks on its allies and "reserves,"
the International Movement tries to generate pressure upon Free
World governments and important sectors of the Free World elite
to accede to the Soviet foreign policy aims. Moreover, by
redirecting their tactics within Free World countries, the Com-
munist Parties and fronts undermine anti-Soviet governments and
political groupings and exploit the new opportunities for expansion
of political and organizational influence which the new Soviet
tactics open up for them.
25. Mutual Benefits. The International Movement outside the
Communist Orbit thereby gives active support to the Soviet foreign.
policy drive while building up its strength for eventual seizures of
power.
Even that which is seen as the opening of a campaign by the
CPSU to make Communism more attractive and more positively
competitive with Western ideology (e, g. , the "transition to
Communism") has a parallel in the International Communist
Movement, where a vigorous campaign is being launched against
the ideological bases of capitalism, coupled with propaganda that
the Communists do not in the least intend to impose their beliefs
on non-Communists but seek only agreement on "concrete" local
issues.
26. Uneven Adoption of the New Tactical Orientation. The shift
in the tactics of the International Communist Movement has not
(and historically, has seldom) taken place simultaneously,
uniformly or fully. It is still confined largely to the areas of
policy formulation, propaganda, and inner-Party publication,
rather than the field of specific action. A change in tactical
orientation usually requires a relatively long period of "selling"
within the movement, and a period of readjustment. As the
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shift is increasingly assimilated and adapted to specific local
conditions, it will become increasingly visible in terms of
concrete action.
27. Furthermore, the new tactical orientation probably will
not be applied in exactly the same terms everywhere. It will
be recalled that "flexibility" and realistic adjustment to local
conditions is also a part of the International program.
28. The Communist assessment of the realities of local condi-
tions will directly affect how the "class struggle" is carried on.
Reference has already been made to the broad distinction between
industrial countries and "colonial and dependent" countries. It
is further to be noted that where the Communists have been
carrying on armed struggle for "national liberation" (Philippines,
Malaya, Burma) they may continue to do so, within the require -
ments of the international Communist program. However, in
Burma especially, to continue armed struggle would seem in
theory at least to be potentially disadvantageous to the Soviet
effort to harness the Burmese Government more closely to
Communist policies,
29. The discussion which follows considers the evidence of the
promulgation of what is viewed in this paper as a reorientation
of Communist tactics on the basis of the international "class
struggle" line as a general directive; and reviews what appear
to be cases of practical implementation of this directive by
individual Communist Parties and fronts.
B. CPSU Promulgation of "Class Struggle" Tactics
30. The principle of the irreducible "class war" is, of course,
a constant in Communist propaganda. There is evidence, however,
that it has been given increased emphasis during the past year,
and that this emphasis constitutes a directive to the International
Movement to reorient its tactics during the period of "relaxation
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of international tension," when the USSR has deliberately
attempted to shift from its frontal attack against the United
States.
31. In the USSR, the stress on "class struggle" was first
observed within a broader re-emphasis of the whole body of
Marxist-Leninist doctrine and of a "creative" (i. e. , non-
dogmatic, and, by implication, non-Stalinist) approach to
Marxism-Leninism. This broad campaign, which, in
retrospect, may be seen in its initial stages in mid-1954,
was clearly discernable in discussions of Soviet literature
at the Second Writers' Congress in December 1954; in the
discussion of the priority of heavy industry (December 1954 -
March 1955); in the question of the consequences of nuclear war
for the future of Communism as compared to that of capitalism
(February - May 1955); and in CPSU statements directly bearing
upon doctrine, strategy and tactics (especially in issues of
Kommunist, January - May 1955).
I. e , , by the publication in Kommunist of an editorial reasserting
the correctness of the 1946-48 "Zhdanovist" resolutions on "purity"
in the cultural, scientific and ideological fields. An even earlier
indication may be seen in Stalin's "Economic Problems of
Socialism in the USSR" (1952), which undertook to bolster the claim
of Marxism-Leninism to be a "science" concerned with discerning
"objective" social-economic "laws." The new Soviet "Political
Economy, a Textbook," published in 1954, continued this effort.
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32. The main elements of Marxist-Leninist doctrine stressed
in these discussions were:
(1) The need to maintain "purity" of principles , and
constant "vigilance" against contamination by
"bourgeois ideology"; while--
(2) exercising "flexibility" in tactics, and while--
(3) correctly utilizing "everything really valuable in
European and American science".*
(4) The dominant role of the CPSU within the USSR and,
by extension, the dominant role of the Communist
Party in the "class struggle" in every country;
(5) The irreducibility of the international "class struggle."
33. The CPSU injected this stimulus for a revival of basic
Marxism-Leninism (with special reference to the "class war")
into the policy of the International Communist Movement. This
was observed in such instances as these:
(1) In December 1954 the WFTU launched an intensified
(i. e. , not a new) campaign against "capitalist super-
exploitation" --a drive against raising worker productivity
in capitalist countries, and a direct attack upon the very
bases of the capitalist economic system;**
Party Life #8 (May 1955).
The WFTU's campaign has been taken up by a number of
Communist Parties, e. g. , France (cf. para. 39, below);
Belgium (cf. Drapeau Rouge, 15, 16, 22 June 1955. This
represents a continuation by the CP Belgium of a campaign
in 1954).
Dr -1
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(2)
In January 1955 the Cominform Journal published the
"Theses" of the Marx-Engels -Lenin-Stalin Institute
(MELSI) on the 1905 Russian Revolution, in which
working-class leadership (in "alliance" with the
peasantry)--in contrast to "bourgeois democratic"
leadership was stressed and in which armed action
was heavily endorsed as a means of carrying out
revolution;
(3) On 22 April 1955, the Cominform Journal published an
editorial commemorating Lenin's birthday in which
unusually strong emphasis was given to the fight against
capitalism;
(4) Other issues of the Cominform Journal have continued
to reiterate the importance of the "class struggle";
of solid Marxist-Leninist education for Communists,
of the "vanguard" role of the CP, and other elements in
the overall campaign to reinforce the principles of
Marxist -Leninist doctrine.
34. Of special interest is the Cominform Journal editorial of
14 October entitled "Struggle of Working People in Cap italist
Countries for Their Vital Demands."
This editorial- -significantly- -does not mention the role of
the United States in the other capitalist countries, the alleged
"enslavement" of which was the key slogan of Communist
propaganda during the Cold War. Instead of gearing their tactics
to the issue of "American imperialism" the editorial tells the
Communist Parties of all capitalist countries (including the U. S. )
to build "working class unity" in struggle for such "concrete
demands" as "higher wages, the cessation of mass dismissals,
increased unemployment benefits, improved working conditions,
abolition of the speed up, and the end of discriminatory rates of
payment for women and young workers"
This editorial, a direct attack upon the capitalist system
("impoverishment of the working class"), stresses "unity in
action," with special reference to strike action.
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35. The CPSU, meanwhile, has continued the emphasis upon
Marxist-Leninist doctrine which was observable earlier in the
year, e, g, --
(1)
Issue No. 14 of Kommunist (signed for publication,
30 September)--the issue in which Molotov's letter
of self-criticism appeared--contained an editorial
which reasserted "the purity of revolutionary theory"
in the strongest possible terms. This editorial,
which is especially rich in doctrinal discussion, stresses
the need for the creative and realistic application of
Marxist-Leninist methods to the solution of complex
problems; avoidance of "stereotypy and dogmatism" and
the need for "flexibility" in tactics, while at the same
time insisting upon maintenance of "the unshakable
principles of Marxism-Leninism." It reaffirms Leninist
doctrine on the "further rotting of capitalism," while
warning that "it would be a mistake to think that the
tendency to rot excludes the rapid growth of capitalism."*
The implication here is that the Communists must give a
strong push to hasten the collapse of capitalism, and also,
perhaps, that the Soviets have revised somewhat their
real estimate of the staying-power of capitalism.
The editorial specifies that the "struggle of the workers
in capitalist countries and the prospects of this struggle
can be explained correctly only by adopting the view
stemming from life itself and analyzing concrete facts
from the Marxist position."
A Soviet economist, A. Kats, who was sharply attacked in
March for holding that capitalism would collapse "automatically,"
is again attacked by this editorial in the same terms--a fact
which suggests persistence of error within Soviet theoretical
circles.
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(2) The October Revolution Anniversary speech by L. M.
Kaganovich is, like the editorial in Kommunist,
extraordinarily rich in doctrinal implications. Among
many other things, Kaganovich emphasized the sharpening
of "class contradictions" within capitalist countries. He
denied that there is now, as there was after World War I,
any prospect for the "relative stabilization" of capitalism.
He said that revolutions arise from the "internal contra-
dictions" of capitalism and cannot be exported by the USSR,
and he predicted "the triumph of socialism and communism"
within the 20th century.
36. There is strong evidence that the CPSU, in addition to emphasiz-
ing, as a matter of doctrine, the priority of "class struggle" in
terms of "concrete" local conditions as the task of the Communist
Parties, has specifically steered some Communist Parties away
from concentration on broad international issues toward a more
intensive exploitation of local (class) issues, There is evidence that
the CPSU is dissatisfied with the slow response of some Communist
Parties,
(1) The Cominform Journal, in publishing articles on Latin
America has, since the Summit meeting, noticeably soft-
pedalled the issue of alleged "US imperialism" in Latin
America. What is more significant is the fact that, in
publishing accounts of policy statements and other materials
issued by Latin American Communist Parties, the Journal
has, since Geneva, deleted strong attacks against the
United States Government which appeared in the original
CP texts. The propaganda of these CPs, as it appeared
in the Journal, concentrated its "fire" on local "class"
enemies and, where America was brought in at all, tended
to concentrate on specific "class" manifestations of US
"imperialism" (e, g. , Standard Oil, "Wall Street Monopolists,"
United Fruit, etc. ) rather than on the United States as a
State.
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This editing by the Cominform Journal gains added
significance from the fact that US interests are visible
in Latin America. In other words, "US imperialism"
remains the main foreign "enemy" of the Latin American
Communists, who continue to base their tactics on the
Chinese Communist-CPSU formulas for "National Liberation"
even as the Cominform treatment implies a revision in
their propaganda tactics.
(2) This development cannot be viewed as something less
than a directive by the Cominform, for a highly reliable
source has reported that a top official of the Communist
Party in one Latin American country had recently
explicitly instructed leading Communists in a mass
organization to discontinue using the broad term "imperialism"
and instead, to use the /more specific "class" / term,
"monopoly. " In addition, he said that certain "anti -Yankee"
terms should be modified in a Party-drafted statement
which was proposed for publication by the mass organization
in the local press, where it would be read mainly by non-
Communists. There was a clear indication in his instructions
that he had received international authorization (i.e. , CPSU -
inspired authorization).
The most recent confirmation of this thesis was given in an
article in the 11 November 1955 issue of the Journal by Dionisio
Encina, the General Secretary of CP Mexico. While Encina
emphasizes specific "class" aspects of "U.S. imperialist"
influence in "all Latin American countries," he specifies that
"Yankee imperialists" are the "main enemy" of the "peoples
of Latin America. It
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(3) Leaders of a West European CP recently have told
their Party to concentrate on local "class" issues,
primarily to break down Socialist and other non-
Communist worker resistance to the Communist
drive for "working class unity in action." The
circumstances of this instruction strongly indicate
CPSU direction.
(4) In addition to these positive indications that the CPSU
has been telling the Free World Communist Parties
to concentrate on local (primarily upon "class struggle,"
anti-capitalist) issues, a number of Communist Parties
have shifted in this direction. In these cases, to be
discussed below, there is no direct evidence of CPSU
"guidance"; but it is fair to assume that they represent
specific CP reactions to a general Soviet line of
reorientation.
C. Progress in the Shift of the International Communist Movement
to Local "Class Struggle" Issues
37. The most pronounced reorientation of tactics by a Free
World Communist Party in response to the CPSU line on localizing
(or "nationalizing") the attack by shifting to "class struggle"
issues has occurred in France. Evidence of a similar shift has
appeared in some other "capitalist" countries (e. g. , West Germany,
Belgium, Holland, Canada, and Italy), although to a generally less
marked degree. To some extent, Communist Parties in many
"colonial and dependent" countries have also shifted to exploitation
of specific local issues (and in some cases, to anti-capitalist
issues as well), but such CPs are more circumscribed in this by
the nature of their basic tactics, which prescribe getting the support
of the local "national bourgeoisie" (i. e. , native capitalists whose
interests conflict with the interests of Western or western-
orientated capitalists) and which therefore complicate the promul-
gation of specifically anti-capitalist aspects of the "class struggle"
tactics.
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38. The fact that it was the CP France which first markedly
shifted* towards "class struggle" in Western Europe may be
explained by the fact that France has been the testing ground
for Communist tactical shifts ever since 1934. In other words,
the reorientation of the CP France, which began in January
with the launching of a major campaign aimed against the
capitalist system and which has been manifest in many forms
ever since, is here viewed not as an isolated local adjustment
to specific conditions in France but as a prototype development
in a general reorientation of the International Communist
Movement,
39, The Reorientation of CP France (PCF), Secretary General
Maurice Thorez launched the PCF Campaign against French
capitalism at a Central Committee meeting in January, when he
attacked the "relative and absolute impoverishment" of the
working class under capitalism. ** This doctrinal principle has
continued to be asserted on all possible occasions in the CP press.
In May, Francois Billoux*** reported to a Central Committee
meeting that there was some confusion within the Party over the
.identity of the "main enemy." It is "capitalism, the employers,
The KPD in West Germany was even more noticeably pre -
occupied with trade union and "united working class action"
at its Congress 28-30 December 1954 than it had been since
1950, and has not been noticeably behind the CP France in
its emphasis on "class struggle,"
** Cahiers du Communisme, March 1955,
(Considered by most observers to be a "hard-liner" within
the Party leadership, )
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OC'li.
the bourgeois state," he declared. * A "study conference"
was held on the subject of "capitalist super-exploitation" in
May. This conference was staged by Economie et Politique,
whose editor, Eugene Dumoulin, said that it was incorrect to
speak of "productivite a 1'americaine," as formerly, and
that the correct term should be "capitalist productivity. "**
This underlines the Communist shift in emphasis away from
the United States as a state and toward the basic class
enemy.
In June, the French Communist labor confederation, CGT,
scrapped its "constructive" Economic Program, adopted in 1953.
The reason given for action was that the program had tended to
dilute the "class struggle" --to "disorient our comrades in the
face of the attacks of the adversary."*** A more strongly anti-
capitalist program was adopted in its place.
In autumn of this year the PCF has approached the question
of French North Africa largely on the basis of local and "class"
terms of reference.
LtHumanitt, 12 May 1955. Underlining supplied.
Economie et Politique, June 1955.
L'Humanite, 13 June 1955.
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It has been observed* that in publishing an important
policy statement issued by Party Organization Secretary Marcel
Servin on 31 Aagust, the Party's mass circulation paper,
L'Humanite, deleted almost all of his anti-American remarks.
On the other hand, in the periodical France Nouvelle , whose
audience is much smaller and consists almost entirely of
Communist cadres, these anti-American statements were
published. The discrepancy in treatment shows that--
a) the CP deliberately concentrates on local issues so far
as the Party rank-and-file and the mass audience is
concerned, calculating that the-anti-American line had
little mass appeal, especially during a period when the
Communists were trying to amplify the illusion of
"relaxation" generated by the Summit meeting;
b) the CP reaffirms to its cadres that the United States
remains the main enemy of world Communism despite
the shift in the methods and tactical directions of the
Communist attack.
In its mass propaganda the CP continued during September
to soft-pedal (not to abandon completely) the anti-American issue.
This was especially noticeable at the L'Humanite festival at
Vincennes on 4 September.
40. While noting the CP's unusual focus on principles of "class
struggle," some observers have tended to interpret it in purely
local terms (primarily as the Party's attempt to counteract the
progressive economic and social program of Mendes-France).
France Nouvelle, 3 September and L'Humanite, 31 August 1955,
T
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This view appears to be too narrow, and it is significant
that Thorez has recently ascribed a much broader and more
basic reason for the concentration. In a speech at the opening
of -the Central Party School, 10 October, he reviewed the basic
nature of the CP as the "vanguard" in the "class struggle" and
said this:
"In its persistent efforts to disseminate the theory
of scientific Socialism in the working-class movement,
our Party, since the beginning of this year, has once
more had to firmly draw the attention of its members
and the whole proletariat to certain fundamental laws
of capitalist economy. It especially recalled the law
according to which the relative and absolute impoverish-
ment of the working class is the inevitable result of
capitalist accumulation, of the concentration of capital,
of the formation of big trusts which seize all the wealth
of the country. " (Cominform Journal, 21 October 1955.
Underlining supplied).
Continuing, Thorez cited strike action as a major expression
of class struggle.
"In engaging in vast strike actions against the
employers, the working class is precisely at this very
moment showing that it is conscious of the need to fight
against the lowering of its standard of living, for less
meagre wages and less inhuman conditions of work."
(Ibid. Underlining supplied).
Then he defined the correct relationship between action based
on economic demands and the need to raise this to a higher level
of political consciousness--the need to overthrow the "bourgeoisie."
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"At one and the same time Marxists combat the
view of those who see only the political struggle and
deny the importance of the economic fight of the
proletariat, and the opinion of those who over-estimate
the role of economic struggle and disregard the
significance of the political struggle, the struggle for
the final objective of the working class, for Socialism.
"The economic fight of the proletariat is highly
important, but it cannot abolish the laws of capitalism
and free the workers from exploitation and privation.
It is aimed at the effects of capitalism and not at the
fundamental cause of the proletariat's poverty, that is
the capitalist mode of production.."
(Cominforni Journal, 21 October 1955.
Underlining supplied. )
In describing the "allies" the Party would need, Thorez paid
particular attention to the "working peasants, " (An intensified
effort to get peasant support has been noted in the Party's press,
and especially concerned a Central Committee meeting in October,
at which Thorez said that the "theory of the pauperization of the
working class" also applied to the agricultural workers. )
The Communist position on "the struggles of the colonial
peoples against imperialism," Thorez said, with primary reference
to French North Africa, was also gaining support among "broader
social strata of the population," which also represent allies.
The French Communists seek strength on two levels: the
"united front of the working class and also the unification of the
democratic and national forces, of which proletarian unity of
action is the cementing force."
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PIQ
OF
01
41. By refocusing its tactical concentration of effort, the
CP France is trying to reduce anti-Communism and anti-
Sovietism within the Socialist Party and non-Communist
trade unions. United Front appeals for joint action on a
"minimum program" were issued to the Socialists in the
cantonal elections last spring and on numerous occasions
since then.
Recently, the CP has further broadened its appeal for
unity in the forthcoming elections to include "republicans"
as well as Socialists. In a speech to the Central Committee,
Thorez
"recalled that there is every condition in many
provinces.. , to unite Communists and Socialists,
and that the Communist Party is ready to propose
without hesitation a fighting alliance to all other
republicans in order to obtain a majority in a
number of constituencies. "*
He said,
"'Socialists and Communists have agreed to include in
their electoral program the minimum program of the
national committee of struggle, vigilance, and defense
of the lay school, which will probably be approved by
other parties too. "
Despite "differences" which have existed between the
Communists and their prospective allies, Thorez said that
agreement could be reached on immediate objectives and
reiterated the Party's
"readiness to support any step forward, any measure
favorable to the working class and the people, any
initiative serving the cause of peace, freedom, and
national independence. "
* Moscow, TASS, 4 November 1955.
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T
42. To summarize, the CP France has made a major tactical
shift toward concentrated exploitation of local issues. Primarily,
it seeks to exploit working class social and economic issues, not
only to weaken French capitalism, but also to gain access to and
increase its influence over non-Communist workers. The Party
evidently hopes to repeat its performance of 1934-35 and achieve,
through pressure from below and the openings furnished from
above by the new Soviet foreign policy, a broad "popular front"
built upon a "united front" of workers and peasants. Such a
movement would seek to force the government to adopt a pro-
Soviet foreign policy and would eventually be in a position to take
over state power.
How the International Communist Movement Seeks to Exploit the
Climate of International Detente
43. On the one hand, Communist Parties are generally specifying
that the "relaxation of international tensions" does not signify a
relaxation of the "class struggle" (in terms either of anti-capitalism
or of "national liberation.") e. g. - -
Canada: "Peaceful coexistence does not take away from the
right of peoples to change their governments by their
majority, democratic action, but presupposes that right."
The idea that "peaceful coexistence"must include the maintenance
of the status quo is "imperialist propaganda."
(Leslie Morris, National Affairs Monthly,
February 1955),
France: "The action of Communists in capitalist countries,
for the defense and emancipation of the working class, the
support which they give to the movement of liberation of
colonial peoples, has no connection with the problems posed
by peaceful coexistence, that is to say, with establishment
of peaceful relations between states, whatever their regime."
(Pierre Courtade, L'Humanite
30 September 1955. Italics in
original).
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Belgium: Jean Terfve in Comrnunisme No. 2, 1955,
expresses views practically identical with those above--
"peaceful coexistence" does not mean maintenance of
the "status quo" in the colonies or in the capitalist
countries.
Cuba: ". . . The achievement of peace agreements
cannot mean that the oppressed peoples, the peoples of
the colonial and semi-colonial world, would renounce
the struggle for their independence and accept--on the
sacrificial altars of co-existence between the socialist
world and the capitalist world--the yoke of oppression.
Neither is it possible to expect that the working class of
Italy or France, for example, postpone or set aside
their legitimate yearnings to establish socialism in their
respective countries.
It is one thing for the great states with antagonistic
regimes to co-exist; and it is another, very distinct thing
that the peoples would silence their protests and stop
seeking their emancipation.
... Now when a period has begun in which Washington,
London, and Paris are disposed to co-exist with Moscow with-
out threats or atomic fears, we Communists shall continue
with our struggle. We shall demand better wages and living
conditions for the working class, land for the peasant,
industries for the nation. We shall persist in raising the
glorious banner of socialism. The gentlemen who yesterday,
before all that, were wont to speak of 'agents of Moscow,'
will walk with their tail between their legs. And those who
take the position that we should give up the workingman's
wages and national sovereignty as a 'token of guarantee' of
co-existence shall have to shut up in the long run, because it
is no longer possible to go on confusing things which are not
identical. "
(--RESPUESTAS del Partido Socialista
Popular, published by the Press Dept.
of the National Committee of the P. S. P.
(CP Cuba). Havana, 22 August 1955. )
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Italy: General Secretary Togliatti scorns those "who
seriously think it possible to assert that consolidation of
the detente means that the Communist and Socialist
movement has to retreat, that it has to allow itself to be
swept aside, and that it has even to abandon some of its
positions," as well as "those who declare that there will
no longer be any necessity to talk of revolutions, that
there should no longer be any revolutionary movements--
and all this will be the result, presumably, of the
relaxation of international tension," The CP Italy, he
says, continues to "stand for the profound socialist trans-
formation of our society" and to rely "on the strength and
unity of the working masses,"
(Cominform Journal, 7 October 1955).
44. At the same time, a number of Communist Parties* have
specifically stated that they expect the climate of international
detente to lead to local detente --i. e. , they hope that removal
of fear of the Soviet aggressive threat will reduce local anti-
Communism; will give them increased freedom of action by
leading to a relaxation of governmental pressures upon the Party;
and will open up new roads of access to non-Communists.
Including the CP Netherlands (cf. De Waarheid, 3, 20 August
1955. ) Even prior to the "Summit" Conference, according to
a report from a usually reliable source, the General Secretary
of the CP Mexico was telling his party that a relaxation of
tension would mean an end to severe anti-Communism and
would give the CPs general freedom of action.
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For example, an article in the Italian Communist
newspaper l'Unita , of 18 August, said that certain "cold
war advocates" are--
"now trying to draw a distinction between the internal
and international situation. To them an international
move to ease tensions is acceptable, but what is not
acceptable is the thought of considering new relations
at home with the Communists and their allies.;'
Aside from weakening anti-Communist measures of the
Government, the primary problem of the CP Italy is how to
break down Christian Democratic opposition to Communism,
and in this connection, Deputy Chairman Luigi Longo made
a statement in Unita on 18 August which showed how the
Communists wished to translate the international detente
into a local detente with Catholic workers:
"When we refer to a possible dialogue with the Catholics,
we don't ask anyone to renounce their belief in the world
beyond--if they have any--or their preference for this or
that philosophic, political or social system; we only ask
those who say that they condemn the present social
injustices and misery, to cooperate with us, to unite
their efforts to ours, in order that all difficulties be
overcome. "
In other words, the Italian Communists seek a broad
tactical alliance on the basis of working class interests, without
regard to the basic ideological conflict between Marxist
materialism and Christian idealism.
"With our demand for an opening to the Left, /Longo
continued/ we don't ask for the installation of a political
monopoly. We only ask for the opening of a wider political
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and social cooperation among all popular forces. In
present conditions, the opening to the Left does not
necessarily mean opening towards the /Nenni/
Socialists or the Communists, or towards both, in
the sense of their cooperation with the Government.
It means much less. It simply means a policy that
will bring an end to all government and management
discriminations, a policy which will support the social
relations among the people of the world... "*
The "Opening to the Left" is a slogan invented by Nenni
in an effort to break down Christian Democratic
opposition to Socialism. It has appealed to a number
of Christian Democratic leaders who believe that the
"Opening to the Left"--or "Operation Nenni"--would
not only enable them to form a stable coalition
government but would also lead to a rupture between
Nenni and the PCI. The picture is further complicated
by a division of opinion within Nenni's ownparty over
the question of participation with the Christian Democrats
versus the alliance with the Communists. Rumors have
persisted in Italy that Nenni would eventually break with
the `PCI--rumors which have met with consistent denials
by Nenni. Most recently, he has said that "unity between
the PCI and PSI is the permanent -precondition for the
conquest of democracy, " and has reaffirmed that his
party is "first of all faithful to the doctrine of revolutionary
Marxism, to the practice of the class struggle, and to
principles of proletarian internationalism. "
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45, Reorientation of the International Communist Fronts.
The major International Communist Fronts are also attempting
to use the opportunities afforded by the "relaxation of tensions"
to expand their influence and to break down anti-Communism
on the part of organizations and individuals within their particular
fields of action. These efforts are notable for their realistic
adjustment to specific local conditions, their appeal to the interests
of special groups, and their clever exploitation of the "Geneva
Spirit" to promote an impression of reasonableness and tolerance.
To a remarkable degree, the tactics of the international
fronts are similar to those of the new Soviet diplomacy: multi-
pronged approaches and flanking maneuvers to fragmentize the
"opposition," to undercut their positions, and to "depolarize"
and detach sectors of the opposition from the influence of anti-
Communism.
(a) Youth and Women's Fronts. The International Union of
Students (IUS), World Federation of Democratic Youth
(WFDY), and, to a somewhat lesser extent, the Women's
International Democratic Federation (WIDF), have
launched energetic expansion programs. Self-criticisms
for failings of a sectarian nature have been more pointed
than ever before within the IUS and WFDY, and both
have intensified their efforts to improve their appeal to
non-Communists by exploiting specific vocational,
avocational, and regional issues. More and more
specialized meetings and conferences are being held or
are being planned; more specialized propaganda materials
are being published; an ambitious program for training
leaders in special fields has been decided upon by the
WFDY. The IUS and WFDY have been trying to regain
their former Yugoslav affiliates.* The WFDY has
The Communist International Organization of Journalists (IOJ)
has most recently adopted this same policy. (Sofia broadcast,
19 October 1955).
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resolved to try to win back former affiliates in
Scandinavia, and is planning'to adopt the IUS tactics
of broadening its appeal to non-Communist organiza-
tions by admitting a new category of "associate
membership." The WFDY has said that the international
detente should lead to an end of the "Cold War" with the
non-Communist youth organizations* and that a joint
meeting be held of the different international youth
organizations. Organizationally, the WFDY has decided
to enlarge its headquarters staff in order to facilitate
the expanded activities. The IUS Council meeting in
August voted to reestablish its Colonial Bureau to
facilitate expansion into colonial areas, A. further IUS
measure to broaden its influence --the decision in 1954
to include high school student organizations--paid off
in the Singapore student riots of May 1955.
(b) The Communist "Peace" Mo vement . The World Peace
Council continues to promote Soviet foreign policy
positions and to try to extend its influence to elements
which had been repelled by the "old style" Soviet diplomacy
and propaganda. The Peace Movement has played up the
fact that its last (Helsinki) Congress was much more
"broadly representative", i. e. , attracted many more non-
Communists, than were earlier Congresses. The Helsinki
proceedings were marked by avoidance of clearly
identifiable anti-American virulence, by a definite effort
to put forward the peace movement as a "positive" rather
than a merely negative force, and by an attempt to create
the impression of broad ideological tolerance.
It is of interest to note that the local "Peace" organiza-
tion in one European country-has recently been reorganized
as part of the effort to blur the pro-Communist character
of the movement, and to "broaden" its appeal as a
genuinely "patriotic" and positively "peace -loving" organiza-
tion.
* Budapest broadcast, 9 November 1955.
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(c) The World Federation of Trade Unions has been
making a more serious effort than formerly to establish
contact with the anti-Communist confederations, ICFTU
and IFCTU. Like the WFDY, IUS, and IOJ, the WFTU
has rescinded its former position on Yugoslavia. It has
a leading role, along with the national CPs, in fomenting
social and economic disturbances, and in promoting
"working class unity" through the exploitation of "concrete"
local "class" demands.
Most recently, WFTU Chairman Di Vittorio published
an article in the Cominform Journal, arguing that the
international detente had created new possibilities for
detente between the WFTU and its anti-Communist counter-
parts. * He hinted that the WFTU would even more
definitely reorient its tactics to achieve "working class"
issues. In the action of the French CGT in scrapping its
"constructive" Economic Program of 1953 (an action which
seems to have had direct Soviet approval), there is further
evidence of such a "class struggle" reorientation. And in
the editorial of Kommunist No. 14, there is a still further
suggestion of this:
"With the growth of the forces of socialism
the ideological struggle of Marxism against
reformism is intensified... It is a question
of ideological influence on those representa-
tives of the labor movement who, being
subjectively faithful to the cause of socialism
are trying to conciliate Marxism with reformism,
since for reasorr of insufficient Marxist training,
they show hesitation of ideas." (Underlining
supplied. )
The Executive Bureau of the WFTU later issued a declaration in
the same sense (Pravda, 16 October 1955).
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This apparently is a barb aimed at Communist
labor leaders who have "economist" or "reformist"
tendencies, rather than at the "right-wing socialist"
labor leaders.
(d) Salvaging. Possibly as a result of the rapprochement
with Tito, a wartime front organization, the All-Slav
Congress, appears to have been reactivated. This
development would parallel the campaign for the
repatriation of Soviet and Satellite emigrees, which,
in turn, parallels a trend noted among Communist
Parties towards the rehabilitation of expellees and
defectors. The efforts of the IUS and WFDY to regain
former affiliates is also in line with this development.
It would appear that the International Movement is
dredging up whatever new or discarded assets it can in
order to expand.
D. Communist "Competition" for Uncommitted Countries of Asia
46. A key element in the new style Soviet diplomacy is the effort
being made to detach Asian countries from the influence of the
United States. This drive operates at several levels, with the
main effort being directed toward India and Burma.
The CPSU had been taking a progressively more favorable
view of India and Burma for some time, a fact which became
increasingly evident during late 1954 (after the publication of the
Chou-Nehru Declaration of the "Five Principles" in June). In
his foreign policy speech of 9 February 1955, Molotov set the
stage for an intensification of the effort to pull India and Burma
still further away from the West by declaring that, despite the
fact that these countries were basically capitalist, they were
pursuing a "peace" policy abroad --i. e. , a policy favorable to
the Communist Bloc.
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The Soviets have continued this tactic by such means as the
plan to erect a Soviet steel mill in India, the red-carpet
receptions given to Nehru and U Nu on their visits to the USSR,
and now, by the visit of Bulganin and Khrushchev to India,
Burma, and Afghanistan.
47. As has been repeatedly stressed throughout this study, the
new style Soviet foreign policy in its entirety is well within the
framework of the Marxist-Leninist international "class struggle."
The Soviet cultivation of India and Burma, as part of this global
warfare, is to be viewed as a tactical maneuver to weaken the
"capitalist camp" by detaching important segments. As a
French Communist has recently pointed out* in rationalizing the
Communist position on North Africa, Stalin had characterized
such "struggles" as that of the Emir of Afghanistan and that of the
"merchants and bourgeois intellectuals" of Egypt for independence
as "'objectively revolutionary"' because such a struggle"' weakens,
disintegrates and undermines imperialism"' **
48. The Communist position on such questions, according to
Stalin, is that they must be viewed" 'not... in isolation, but on. , .
a world scale. " *** This is a theme which has received notable
attention in recent Soviet statement (e. g. , especially in the form
of the slogan of "proletarian internationalism").
Cahiers du Communisme, September 1955.
Citing Stalin, The National Question.
Stalin citing Lenin, Collected Works, XIX, 287.
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49. Reorientation of CP India. The Communist Party of India
was obliged to make a special adjustment to the newly intensified
Soviet cultivation of Nehru for his foreign policy, which the
Soviets have evidently concluded is "objectively revolutionary."
The CPI observed the Soviet shift in January and February
1955, and subjected its line on the Nehru Government to close
scrutiny. The discussion, which appears to have been somewhat
unsettling, concluded with a new formulation of Party policy in
June.
Briefly, the CP decided (a) to give general support to Nehruts
"neutralist" foreign policy, while (b) maintaining pressure to keep
that policy oriented in favor of the Communist Bloc; (c) to support
such domestic policy proposals of the Government as increased
India's independence of Great Britain and the United States. The
Party made it clear that it would continue to work for the eventual
overthrow of Indian capitalism and for the establishment of a
"People's Democracy. " It saw, in the Soviet diplomacy, not only
a means of directly advancing the cause of world Communism, but
also, a lever which, if properly used by the CP itself, could result
in the fragmentation and destruction of the ruling bourgeoisie of
India.
It is also interesting to note that the CPI, thanks to the
abatement of direct Soviet attack upon the United States, found it
possible in the June resolution practically to ignore the issue of
"U.S. imperialism" --an issue which had little appeal in India in
any case and which had irritated a substantial faction within the
Party which prefers to concentrate the attack upon the remaining
elements of British influence.
The CPI has a delicate problem facing it: how to select the
issues on which it will support the Government, and exactly how
far to go in specific detail; and, while exploiting local tensions,
how to balance this action against the Soviet desire to maintain
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and strengthen Nehru's "independence." In practice, this is
no easy task, and there is evidence that it has not been solved
completely in such matters as the Kanpur strikes, the Goa issue,
and the states reorganization controversy.
The CP India has seriously embarassed the Government
in the Goa issue. It gained by being more "nationalist" than the
nationalists, but its action also, should have somewhat opened
Nehru's eyes to the true character of Communist "collaboration"
with governmental policy.
50. Communist Tactics for Japan. In line with its effort to
demonstrate Soviet reasonableness and in what was probably
intended as a first step in the direction of detaching Japan from
U. S. influence, Molotov initiated informal negotiations for the
"normalization" of relations with Japan in December 1954-
January 1955. That the Soviets were aware of the need for
substantial preparation before such a result could be seriously
contemplated, has been evident from the slow pace of the
negotiations and the Soviet refusal to make any important conces-
sions. From their point of view, it has been sufficient to hold
up the bait before the Japanese in order to promote internal
frictions within Japan- -frictions which the Japanese Communist
Party will foster and exploit, and which the Communists hope
will eventually lead to the installation of a pro-Soviet regime.
been
51. The CP Japan (JCP) appears to have/ alerted to the Soviet
intentions before they were formally put into motion. * In any
case, a JCP New Year's Statement** indicated that a considerable
tactical shift had been decided upon prior to the delivery of
Molotov's note to the Japanese Government (25 January).
According to some Japanese press sources, the JCP began its
readjustment to the new Soviet tactics following the publication
of the Soviet-Chinese Declaration of October 1954 (i. e. , the
declaration issued with the visit of the Khrushchev delegation
to Peking).
* * Akahata, 1 January 19 5 5.
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mlv~
The new tactical line of the JCP emerged in the form of
specific actions. Examples are the progressive emergence of
Party leaders from underground existence, "unity" tactics in
the February elections, measures designed to create the
impression that the Party has disbanded its paramilitary
organization, and policy statements (e. g. , an analysis of
Communist tactics in the elections and decisions of the 6th
National Council meeting). This tactical line,
(a) bases itself squarely on the "class struggle", with
the necessary adjustment to the "dependent"
condition of Japan;
(b) recognizes that its past policies have been "sectarian"
and "adventurist" as a result of over-estimating its
own strength and under -estimating the strength of the
"enemy";
(c) sets for the Party the tasks of making itself popular
once more and of building its mass and internal
strength from the ground up.
The JCP will seek to exploit every possibility for promoting
frictions within the "bourgeois" "class enemy" and for enlisting
popular support. It seeks to re-establish itself as a "lovable"
Party, as Nosaka Sanzo was trying to do before the CPSU stopped
him in 1950.
In policy terms, the Party hopes to generate sufficient
pressure from below for the replacement of pro-Western govern-
ments by "neutralists" and progressively, pro-Communist
regimes, and eventually, to establish a "People's Democratic"
regime.
To do so, it works to create a broad "Democratic United
Front for National Liberation" based on a united working-class
front and the worker-peasant alliance. The latter will be built
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by maximum exploitation of basic local economic and social
issues and of the issue of "national independence" from the
United States (the issue upon which the Party hopes to destroy
the unity of the capitalists and to gain the support of the
"national bourgeoisie").
E. Competition by Exploiting Conflicts in the Middle East.
52. In the Middle East, the main effort of the Communist Parties
is directed toward promoting and exploiting conflicts of interest
among the "imperialist" countries, as well as regional frictions,
such as the Arab-Israeli, Greek-Turkish. For example, CPs
in both the Arab countries and in Israel blame the U. S. for the
tense Arab-Jewish situation. The Lebanese CP charges that
the "clique of big landlords and capitalists" serving "the imperialists"
has sold out Lebanese resources to "American Zionist companies"
and also seeks to exploit fear of Turkish aggression under the
Turko -Iraqi Pact.** The Israeli CP has recently*** decided to
"intensify the struggle against the policy of the Israeli Government
which is striving to conclude an anti-Soviet military agreement
with the United States, and to follow a policy of peace and national
independence." The "Anglo-American Monopoly" is blamed for
Details of the new tactical line of the JCP, and of its attempt
to put this line into action cannot be included in the current
paper. A subsequent report in the series will describe them
more fully.
Lebanese CP statement dated June 1955. Underlining supplied.
District conferences of the ICP as reported in Warsaw broad-
cast, 15 October 1955.
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Arab-Israeli tension, and Egypt's purchase of Czech arms is
pictured as simply a reaction against "the pressure of those who
want to force her to join the Turkish-Iraqi bloc." There is reason
to believe, however, that the arms deal provoked some rank and
file resentment within the Israeli CP.
In Egypt, meanwhile, with the advent of closer Egyptian-
Orbit relations, the main local Communist organization (Unified
Communist Party) was reported to have adopted recently a new
line of attacking individual leaders, but not the Government as
a whole.
The CP Greece has seen in the complicated tension over
Cyprus a development which "has removed the clouds from many
minds"* and which works to the Communist benefit in promoting
sentiment for a broad movement for the overthrow of the present
Government and the removal of American influence. Such a
movement should be promoted "from below" and also, "from
above," by the creation of "committees of unity and struggle"
locally and of "a common committee of all the parties and popular
groups." The CP sees an opportunity to rally a substantial
movement on the limited issue of a new foreign policy, and even
for the detachment of "ranks of the /Marshal Papagos/ Rally who
recently have been orienting themselves toward patriotic views on
questions of foreign policy.." The Cyprus imbroglio, the CP says,
has demonstrated "the rottenness" of Greek-Turkish friendship.
* Zachariades article on "Free Greece" Radio, 21 September 1955.
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.,
F. Implementation: The New Tactic in Practice
53. It is not possible, within the scope of the present, general
analysis, to attempt to describe in detail the various methods by
which the International Communist Movement can implement
the new policies in practical terms. Also, as has been explained,
not only has the Movement not yet fully assimilated the new line,
but it has not had enough time to develop local programs implementing
it. It is possible here only to indicate some of the methods of
implementation which have been observed in recent months, leaving
for future reports in this series the task of covering the subject
more fully.
First of all, it is to be noted that, simply by shifting its
propaganda away from the broad issue of anti-Americanism and
toward a fuller exploitation of local issues, the Communist Party
can be regarded as implementing, in a practical way, the new style
of Communist tactics.
A number of examples of this, and of further practical action
by the Communist movement,have already been mentioned above,
viz:
(a) The attempt of the CP France to establish unity in
action with Socialists on such specific local issues as
trade union action, lay education, anti-colonialism in
the North African countries, and in local election agree-
ments.
(b) The attempt of the CP Italy to break down Christian
Democratic and right-wing socialist opposition by
minimizing ideological disagreement and appealing to
non-Communists on the basis of "concrete" local and
"class" interests.
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RET
(c) The decision by CP Japan to begin to build mass
strength from the ground up and to re-establish
itself as a Japanese organization; JCP participation
in the February elections, with efforts to make local
deals with non-Communists.
(d) A sharpening of the tactical exploitation of "concrete"
local issues by CP India.
(e) The practical efforts of the international Communist
fronts to broaden their appeal to non-Communist:
appeals for joint action on limited issues, provisions
for winning back former affiliates and for gaining
new adherents on the basis of limited acceptance of
Communist policy positions; organizational measures
taken for expanding the work of the international
fronts; concentration on "working class demands" by
the WFTU.
(f) The plan of the CP Greece to create "unity committees"
for broad action on the basis of opposition to the
Government's foreign policy.
To these may be added other practical measures for carrying
out the new Communist tactics: (a) unity of action techniques;
(b) organizational measures; (c) clandestine action.
54. Unity in Action Techniques. Examples of practical measures
adopted by the Communist Movement in recent months to broaden
the scope of Communist influence and to break down anti-Communist
resistance include the following:
(a) The Leipzig "Conference of European Workers Against
German Rearmament." This conference was held
under covert WFTU sponsorship in April. It addressed
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an "Open Letter" to the anti-Communist ICFTU and
IFCTU, as well as to the WFTU itself (!) calling for
a joint meeting to "consider jointly how to ward off
the misery and the disaster which threatens the
working masses." At its May meeting, the Executive
Committee of the WFTU duly adopted the decisions of
the Conference as "its own," and stated that the WFTU
would "do everything in its power" to promote the
calling of a joint conference of the three international
labor organizations.
(b) "Revolving strikes" in France. The PCF and its
trade union confederation, the CGT, have been fomenting
a series of short (24 hour or less) strikes in single
plants. Such "revolving strikes" are aimed at increasing
militant activity on the part of all workers without the
disadvantages and reprisals inherent in bigger strikes.
Such a method enables the Communists to test and to
stimulate worker unrest without excessive commitment,
thus conforming to the principle spelled out in 1952 and
reaffirmed this year that Communist trade union action
must take into account uneven levels of militancy from
place to place and at different times.
(c) On Z3 July, the KPOe's political front party, "People's
Opposition" decided to release its affiliates in order to
broaden the scope of Communist-inspired "unity." The
title "opposition" was deemed too negative and out-of-date,
now that the party's stand on neutrality is presumably
shared by everybody. A liaison committee was set up by
the organizations which constituted the Peoples' Opposition
in order to broaden the scope of its appeal.
For similar reasons, the KPOe front, Democratic
Union, announced on 8 July that it was changing from a
society into a political party pledged to "ensure for our
fatherland all the benefits of a clearly defined neutrality,"
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(d) Direct, positive appeal to individual non-Communists.
The CP Costa Rica (PVP) has sent a letter of transmittal
accompanying copies of its pamphlet "Let us Fight for
this Plan against the Crisis" to individual non-Communist
Costa Rican leaders. The substance of the letter reads
as',follows:
"We take the liberty of sending to the entity which
you represent the pamphlet "LET US FIGHT FOR THIS
PLAN AGAINST THE CRISIS", in which we analyze the
economic situation through which the capitalist world is
passing, and we propose measures which would be
capable of opposing the crisis which has already begun
to affect our country.
" We are sure that the reading of this pamphlet will
reveal that there exist many coinciding points of view
among the different classes existing in the country,
determined to save our Country from the evils which
threaten her and which make practicable our opinion
that the formation of a NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC
FRONT is urgent and possible.
"We should feel very pleased to receive the points
of view of that entity concerning this, as well as sugges-
tions relative to dii cbng the common efforts toward the
achievement of the unity of the national forces."
55. Party Building. Communist Parties are always concerned
with strengthening themselves internally, and this has been a
major preo cupation for several years. Since the 19th CPSU
Congress in 1952, the main theme in the Communist internal
organizational effort has been that of activating the entire
membership. After Stalin died, the principle of "collective
leadership" at all levels of the Party became the principal device
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for accomplishing this result. Instead of a chain of individual
bosses, the Communist Parties everywhere began stressing
the active participation of all responsible functionaries in planning,
discussing, and executing Party work. At the cell level, this
principle was intended to get all the cell members into active
work for the Party--to generate enthusiasm, to make the rank-
and-file commit themselves to the effective carrying out of tasks,
and to make them contribute to the Party's knowledge of the
realities of local conditions by opening up candid discussions of
concrete problems. Other devices connected with "collective
leadership" and with the general drive to activate the Party (such
as, stimulation of criticism from below; changes in Party
structure; new ideas in the communication of instructions from
the center ; etc.) have been observed throughout the International
Movement. While too complex to be discussed in the present
paper, these devices have continued to be advocated during the
current period.
56. It is still too early to discern in detail new developments in
Communist Party organizational practices, that can be directly
linked with the emergence of a new International tactic.
57. However, a preliminary examination of current CP
organizational practices reveals a number of developments which
may suggest a general trend:
(a) Recognition of basic weaknesses. A number of Communist
Parties (Colombia, Japan, Pakistan) have sharpened
their focus on the realities of their internal struggle. They
have ceased trying to rationalize internal weaknesses;
have subjected their respective conditions to sharply critical
analyses; and have concluded that they need to rebuild them-
selves "from the bottom up" as CP Japan has put it.
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(b) Salvaging. Some Communist Parties (notably CP Japan,
but also CP Iraq) have decided to rehabilitate disaffected
and purged former members. (CP Japan has recently
claimed that over 2, 000 such members have been salvaged. )
(c) Reassignment of "weak" members. The CP USA, has
indicated that some of its inactive members should be
reassigned to "mass work," In other words, it estimates
that many Communists lack the courage to carry out
assignments for the CP openly, but that they can be used
profitably and in accordance with their own desires in
penetration of non-Communist organizations.
(d) Revision of Party Statutes. The CPs outside the Orbit
have been gradually revising their statutes to make them
correspond to changes made in the statutes of the CPSU
in 1952. The main purpose of such revisions is to 'write
the activation drive into statutory terms (mainly by
expanding and redefining the duties of Party members;
but also by emphasizing "collective leadership" and
changes in meeting procedures, disciplinary measures,
etc. )
(e) Structural changes to stimulate activation of the entire
Party and to improve supervision. For example, the
CP Finland has reduced the size of its city committee in
Helsinki and has established a general body (apparently,
a kind of "aktiv") of all the heads of base organizations
within the city. Moreover, in line with the long-observed
effort of Communist Parties in capitalist countries to
strengthen their factory cells, the Trade Union Section
of the District will now supervise all factory organiza-
tions within the District directly. As of last report,
these practices are being extended to all other cities in
Finland.
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(g)
(f) Tightening up "mass CPs . One CP--the Indonesian--
which had greatly expanded its membership by a
massive recruitment drive, in which the emphasis was
placed upon development after recruitment, has been
making efforts to tighten up internally. In February,
Secretary General Aidit called for intensified efforts
to turn the rather amorphous Communist movement
into a real CP. Training and close supervision are key
elements in this drive.
Membership expansion: putting the CP forward. In
capitalist countries where the CP is very small, it-is
indicated that intensified--but selective--recruitment
and holding drives are under way. For example, the
Executive of the British CP in March "boldly and
frankly placed the issue of fluctuation in membership
as a key problem that must be solved... "** The Party
decided that, in addition to "a big sustained recruitment
drive," practical steps would have to be taken to keep
hold of existing members, chiefly by closer control and
supervision. Too many Communists, it was said,
think strictly in terms of working inside the Labor Party
and the trade unions. This represents a "danger of
submergence of our Party in the general labour move -
ment" and must be overcome. Party members must
"work in Party organizations" rather than devote their
whole time to"mass" work. The Party must make itself
* Kehidupan Partai, February 1955.
** National Organiser John Gollan, in?Cominform Journal,
Z4 June 1955.
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"visible" in order to raise the level of "broad united
work" from limited immediate issues to generate
convictions that only a "socialist" revolution can solve
the basic problems of the country. The CPUSA has
adopted similar views. *
(h) Purges and Discipline. Whenever the international
line changed, CPs everywhere face problems of keeping
discipline over Party members who, for one reason or
another, disagree with the new tactic. Occasionally,
disagreement is so basic that important functionaries
must be purged. The present shift in tactics contains
a potential for significant tensions to develop within a
number of CPs, primarily in terms of dissatisfaction
among extreme left-wingers and militants who take their
doctrine seriously and who may have trouble accepting
the CPSU synthesis of a "soft" foreign policy and a
"class struggle" ideology. It is too early to tell how
strong such tensions may become, and it is entirely
possible that the synthesis may be generally acceptable
(especially if the CPs push a salvaging drive). Among
the major CPs, tensions already exist in India, and may
become more critical as the CP tries to implement its
current line in practical terms. There have been few
important purges during the current year, but the CP
Uruguay ousted its Secretary General Eugenio Gomez
Chiribao in July on a variety of charges. The most
pertinent of these were that he was dictatorial, that he
resisted CPSU direction, and that he sabotaged the
Party's effort to apply Mao-ist broad "united front"
tactics. It is by no means clear that his ouster had any
direct connection with the adoption of a new international
tactic.
* Party Voice No. 7--1955.
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(i)
Organizational changes in the International Fronts.
A few of the organizational measures adopted by the
major international Communist fronts to extend their
influence have already been mentioned (para. 45)--e, g.
the use of "associate membership" in the WFDY and
IUS as a means of gaining initial access to non-
Communist groups, as well as the expansion of the
WFDY headquarters staff. To these it is worth adding
a measure taken by the WFTU which may be interpreted
as part of an effort to base its work more solidly on
local conditions, The WFTU has reduced its central
training program and .has indicated that it will concen-
trate on regional or national programs. * Such a change,
while it may have been dictated by other factors, would
certainly be in line with the over-all drive of the Com-
munist Movement to localize and specialize its activities.
5 8. Secret Apparats. It appears that the Soviet Intelligence
services are taking advantage of the opportunities which the current
climate affords for more aggressive recruitment operations, and
that they are making increased use of Communist Parties for support
(e. g. , spotting agents among front groups).
59. A. number of CPs which are subject to varying degrees of
repression have also indicated that they are making an effort to
strengthen the clandestine cadre network which directs and
coordinates the "legal" activities of the Party. The Parties in
Greece, Pakistan, and Iran have called for an expansion and
strengthening of their underground apparats. In an organizational
report calling for a radical improvement in the methods and
organization of its permanent "clandestine apparatus," the CP
Colombia has done the same. This apparatus appears to combine
WFTU Circular, 21 October 1955.
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~~~wrT
51-
not only the underground cadre network but also an intelligence
network and "self-defense" units (i. e. , strong-arm squads).
Finally, the CP Japan has been reported to have more fully
segregated its organization for secret activities from the "legal"
Party.
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THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST LINE:
CURRENT PATTERNS
A CHECK LIST
Information on the following subjects is important for checking
the hypotheses presented in this paper and for following the prac-
tical implementation of current Communist tactics on the national
level. Especially helpful is information bearing on the question of
change in Party policy and practice.
1. Basic tactical orientation.
a. Focus of the CP attack: indications (policy
statements, inner-Party discussion) of shift
in Party's definition of its main enemy and
of potential allies.
b. Terms and intensity of promotion of "class
struggle" issues; shift in CP propaganda and
action toward exploitation of purely local
issues.
c. Shift in CP propaganda and doctrinal treat-
ment of the United States as a state -- pre-
Summit, post-Summit, and post-Foreign
Ministers Conference; comparison of treat-
ment of the United States with treatment of
other "imperialist" powers
d. Terms of CP treatment of local capitalists.
e. Developments in CP policy on armed struggle.
f. What national or international historical pre -
cedents are being cited in Party policy formu-
lations as applicable or inapplicable to current
tactics? (Any observable distortions of historical
fact in this connection are of interest, )
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g. Exploitation of Soviet foreign policy line by
the local CP to bring an end to repression of
the Party by the government.
2. CP approach to non-Communists
a. Terms of CP appeal to non-Communist organ-
izations for joint action: specific indications
that the CP seeks collaboration strictly on the
basis of limited local issues; appeals to Social-
ists on the basis of common doctrinal heritage;
proposals for "exchange of experience " and
liaison with Socialist organizations.
b, Specific examples of new "unity-in-action"
techniques (e. g. , realistic limitation of im-
mediate objectives in strike actions).
c , Revival of dormant front organizations; crea-
tion of new fronts (especially on the basis of
limited local issues and specialized interests);
indications of special efforts to avoid public
identification of fronts with established Communist
policies .
d. Selective Communist approaches to individual
businessmen and other influential individuals.
e. CP measures to ensure doctrinal and organi-
zational integrity in dealing with non-Communist
organizations and individuals. (E. g. , what types
of action are currently being cited as examples
of "sectarianism, " "revisionism, " etc. ? What
practical measures are being taken to overcome
deviationist tendencies?)
3. Clandestine activities.
a. Indications of increased Soviet/ Satellite utiliza-
tion of local Communist assets for intelligence
and/or other purposes (e. g. , to establish contact
with non-Communist officials and influential
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individuals in order to facilitate East-West trade
deals;. to generate sentiment for changes in policy,
etc ; to obtain background and/or control informa-
tion on such target individuals; to serve as cut-outs
and couriers for communication with such targets).
b. Indications of increased Soviet/Satellite support
for CP leaders and collaborating non-Communists
(e, g. , business favors; provision of information
which they can exploit in their own interest; intro-
ductions to other influential individuals, financial
aid, etc.).
4. Organizational policies.
a. Organizational readjustments to the current inter-
national line (redistribution of cadres, creation
of new posts, structural changes; revised methods
of controlling work of cadres in non-Communist
organizations).
b. Cadre policies: salvaging; purging "left-wingers"
and weak functionaries; utilization of inactive
members in "mass work;" utilization of purgees
and defectors; application of "collective leader-
ship" principles; recruitment and training policies
in general.
c. Indications of increased coordination of the Com-
munist movement on a regional basis.
d. Indications of changes (or continuation of past
practices) in CPSU direction of the local CP;
evidence that CPSU direction is being geared
to better understanding of local realities (e. g. ,
systematic collection of data on local conditions
and Party problems for transmittal to CPSU
and international fronts).
e. Increased separation of clandestine apparats from
the CP organization which carries on "legal" work.
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5. Support by national Communist assets for the objectives
of international Communist fronts (e. g. , facilitating
contacts between the international fronts and former
affiliates and potential affiliates; other measures taken
to swing target organizations toward collaboration with
the international Communist fronts); conversely, indica-
tions that the national CP may be taking over functions
heretofore handled by the international fronts (e. g. ,
closer CP control over local affiliates of the international
front; use of trainees of the WFTU central school to train
local trade union cadres)..
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