BRIEFS ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM 1957

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-00915R000300230008-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 2, 2000
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: January 10, 1957
• Content Type: BRIEF

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BRIEFS ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM
1957
- I -
The CCP Article
"More on the Experience of the Dictatorship
of the Proletariat"
As An Expression of the International Communist
Party Line for 1957
10 January 1957
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THE CCP ARTICLE., "MORE ON THE HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE
OF THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROL,ET.ARIAT",
AS AN EXPRESSION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST PARTY LINE FOR 1957
1. The 14, 000 word article, "More on the Historical Experience of the
Dictatorship of the Proletariat", published in Peopleis Daily of
2i December 1956 on the basis of a discussion at an enlarged CCP
Politburo session, is a symptom of the ideological and disciplinary
crisis affecting the International Communist Movement as a result of
the de-Stalinization process, the fermentation in the Satellites and the
Hungarian revolution? Reacting to and acknowledging the "setbacks"
which Communism has met "recently", the article is conceived as a
critique of Tito2s Pula speech of 11 November. Actually it is an attempt
to deal with the entire fermentation problem, and to call a halt to those
evolutionary processes which may lead to the liquidation of orthodox
Communism. The document is a forceful restatement of the fundamental
positions and aims of World Communism and a sharp warning to Tito
and the Communists of the world not to deviate from these basic concepts,
but to close ranks around the Soviet Union--the "center"--and get down
to the main priority of Communism., i? e,, ;7 "the class struggle on a world
scale". against the "imperialist camp headed by the United States?"
Although the Chinese restate their position that the center should consider
the views of all Communist Parties and States, they subordinate relation-
ship problems to the main priority,,
2, The statement coincides in most aspects with recent Soviet positions
and pronouncements which indicate considerable concern about the
effectiveness of the Western propaganda exploitation of the Stalin and the
Satellite issuas well as the rising tide of intellectual criticism of the
Soviet system and its ideological fou.nnadations4 The current Chinese
position was foreshadowed by the extremely cautious and almost reluctant
CCP statement on the Stalin issue of April 1956 and further developed at
the 8th CCP Congress? The current Soviet position, still scattered and
not codified in a single document, is a linear descendant of the 30 June
Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee which was a futile attempt to
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stem the tide of fermentation, A highly qualified observer thought that
the Chinese statement of 28 December 1956 may have been coordinated
with, if not inspired by, the Soviets, Although there is no evidence to
support this view and although CCP is perfectly capable of producing
such document on its own, it is not improbable that the Soviets preferred
to have an international position summed up by the Chinese in order to
avoid the impression of "interference" and to facilitate acceptance of the
views by the International Communist :Movement, The CPSU may also
have calculated that the Chinese would be in a better position than the
Soviets to impress Tito and other "revisionists". At the same time they
may have desired to spike rumors of Chinese support for Polish
"liberalization" trends,
3. The Chinese document is so broad in scope that it could be
characterized as the post-Hungary international Party line, It employs
occasionally the declarative-imperative in addressing all Communists,
thus following the practice used by the Cominform journal whenever the
latter made a directive statement. In any case, the CCP statement,
which is much better written and much more clearly conceived than the
ideological hackwork emanating from M oscow, should increase the
stature of the CCP? The Soviets themselves have contributed to this rise
in stature during the crisis period by playing up Chinese statements
supporting the Soviet position. Khrushchev, on 29 November, strongly
praised China as "a model for many people", thus giving advance notice
of the international significance of CCP pronouncements. In any case
the indirect method of publicizing CPSU positions through the medium
of foreign Communist statements has become an increasingly common
practice, e. g. , : publication of French Communist Maurice Thorezi
statement characterizing the use of the term "Stalinism" as an enemy
epithet; publication of Albanian leader Hoxhats sharp attack on Tito.
4. Psychologically it is interesting to note that the Chinese statement
(as well as the parallel Soviet positions which it reflects) finds no other
alternative to the solution of the current crisis than to return to the
fundamental hostility of the Communist to the "imperialist" world. In
essence, the Chinese say that evolution of Communism is possible and
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permissible only when and if it contributes to the downfall of "imperialism"
and not when it involves a risk of weakening or destroying the Communist
position as has been in the case in Hungary and elsewhere? This attitude
seems to be based on fear--fear of losing one's grip and one's identity if
the tested principles of Bolshevism are relinquished. From this attitude
stems the attack on Tito and "revisionism" in general which is the main
theme of the document. It is only within the steel framework of the
"dictatorship of the proletariat" that Communism can be accomplished
internally and externally. The title of the document "More on the
Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" is symbolic.
5. As an effort to solve the crisis in intellectual terms the document,
although impressively constructed, is almost as dishonest and fraudulent
as the 30 June Resolution of the CPSU4 In essence it attempts to identify
"0libe.ralization" with the imperialist enemy and the"revssi istsu (Tito,
Kardelj, and others) as potential enemy agents, e, g. , "". , . the imperialists
and all counter-revolutionaries, bent on attacking our cause, have always
demanded that we tliberalizel, ,, they have always concentrated their
forces on wrecking the leading bodies of our cause, and on destroying the
Communist Party, the core of the proletariat.,. They have expressed
great satisfaction with the current 'instability' in certain Socialist
countries, resulting from the impairment of discipline in the Party and
state organs.," Earlier ( 7 December) they said "Anybody who cannot
correctly understand this just stand of the Soviet Union (note: on Hungary)
will inevitably fall into the trap of the imperialists' anti-Soviet instigations..
In the 28 December statement they repeat "I.r3 the present international
situation, it is of particularly great significance to defend (this) Marxist-
Leninist path opened by the October Revolution. When the imperialists
proclaim that they want to bring about 'a change of character of the
Communist world2, it is precisely this revolutionary path which,they want
to change."
The rejection of "liberalization" as an enemy plot is linked with the
(traditional) rejection of "democracy. ?1 The role of the "people" is
subordinated to the program of the proletarian dictatorship: they must
be indoctrinated and pacified but will not be permitted to change the
character of the regime.
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"Socialist democracy should in no way be pitted against the
dictatorship of the proletariat, nor should it be confused with bourgeois
democracy. The sole aim of Socialist democracy in political, economic,
and cultural fields alike, is to strengthen the Socialist cause of the
proletariat and all the working people, to give scope to their energies
for the building of Socialism; and to bring their energies into full play
in the fight against all anti-Socialist forces, If there is a kind of
democracy that can be used for anti-Socialist purposes and for weakening
the cause of Socialism, this is certainly not Socialist democracy,"
6. The process of rationalization reaches its climax when the document
ascribes the successes of the "counter-revolutionaries" in Hungary to the
fact that "in the past, a dictatorship of the proletariat had not been really
established in Hungary." (I..e . ;, "In the past. , ,the democratic rights
and revolutionary enthusiasm of the Hungarian working people were
impaired, while counter-revolutionaries were not dealt the blow they
deserved.") Not enough repression under Rakosi! This Chinese position
is significantly reflected in the statement of the Hungarian government
of 6 January., i* e. , "But the government has unmistakenly stated that
there is a dictatorship of the proletariat in Hungary" and "The Leninist
principles of the dictatorship of the proletariat must prevail now and in
the future over the anarchist and petty bourgeois tendencies.," The
Hungarian government statement followed the announcement of a meeting
in Budapest of Soviet, Hungarian, Czechoslovakian, Rumanian and Bulgarian
leaders: Chinese, Soviet and some Satellite views converge on the rejection
of "liberalization" or "democracy" outside the framework of the dictator-
ship. Control and manipulation of the "masses" remain the main
approaches to the fermentation process?
7. The document flounders also in its attempts to set the Stalin issue
straight. The bulk of the statement is devoted to this task, This may
be an expression of a Chinese view that the handling of the issue by
Khrushchev and the CPSU caused or precipitated the crisis. The
reference to the April 1956 article "On the Historical Experience of
the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" w1i?."h first dealt with the issue, may
be a subtle we -told -you-so. (It will be recalled that Chu-teh in his
greetings to the 20th CPSU Congress- ,still refe.ri d favorably to Stalin, )
4_
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"As far as basic theory is concerned, the path of the October
Revolution reflects the general laws of revolution and construction at a
particular stage in the long course of the development of human society.
It is not only the road for the proletariat of the Soviet Union, but also
the road which the proletariat of all countries must travel to gain
victory," It must have been an overriding consideration which forced
the CCP to identify itself openly with fundamental Bolshevik objectives
which clearly conflict with the two most important principles of Panch
Shila, the "peaceful coexistence" program of the Chinese government
which it. solemnly subscribed to at Bandung, April 1955, The document,
for instance, advocates revolutionary overthrow of non-Communist
governments:
!tThe proletariat under the leadership of the Communist Party,
rallying all the laboring people, takes political power from the
bourgeoisie by means of revolutionary struggle," (There is no reference
to "parliamentary" methods here.)
It advocates interference in the affairs of other nations:
"The (Communist) State, led. by the proletariat and the Communist
Party,..... firmly adheres to the principles of proletarian internationalism,
strives to win the help of the laboring people of all countries, and at the
same time strives to help them and all oppressed nations,"
It appeals to all Communists to follow these precepts:
"It is the task of all Communists to unite the proletariat and the
masses of the people to beat back resolutely the savage onslaught of
the imperialists against the Socialist world, and to march forward resolute-
ly along the path blazed by the October Revolution,"
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Nevertheless the Chinese find it now necessary to bail out the Soviet
Union, on the Stalin issue and related problems, weaving together an
intricate net of arguments which may catch the little fish swimming
about in an ocean of ideological confusion but which nevertheless is
basically composed of holes, This effort, in our opinion, is a crisis
symptom. Fundamentally at stake in the controversy over the Stalin
issue is the validity of the Soviet system which Stalin represented,
The 30 June Resolution of the CC/CPSU tried already--and in vain--
to separate Stalin's "mistakes" and their consequences from the
validity and success of the Soviet system. The Chinese try it again;
only more so? Why? Because the validity and "superiority" of the
Soviet system proves the validity and "superiority" of Communism
as a whole. Admission. of inherent defects would be tantamount to
an admission of the failure of Communism and would serve only to
disintegrate the international movement and the power position of its.
leaders,, "The very fact of the advance of the Soviet Union in revolution
and construction is a great accomplishment--the first paean of
victory of Marxism-Leninism in the history of mankind.," Currently
the Soviet system is not only saddled with the onus of the Stalin issue
but also with the action in Hungary; it is under fire from the West
and. from Western Comm~an.ists, The intelligentsia at home has been
affected,
In our opinion the Chinese effort at maintaining and strengthening
the myth of Soviet superiority and Soviet leadership has been motivated
by this selfish interest in, the ultimate victory of Communism. At
this juncture, Chinese and International Communism cannot afford a
deterioration of the Soviet position in the Communist world and in the
world as a whole, (if the document was indeed coordinated with the
Soviets, the Soviets could have used the same argument, }
8, in this context the document reaffirms that the basic conduct of
all Communist Parties must be patterned after the Soviet model "since
the basic path of the Soviet Union in revolution and construction was
correct" and is "generally applicable.,,
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9, Having thus redefined the fundamental validity of the concept of
the 'tsingle road to socialism", reaffirmed the fundamental "correct-
ness" of the Soviet system, and reestablished the class struggle against
imperialism as the main priority, the document procedes to relegate
the Stalin issue and related problems to a secondary level. In essence
their formula is:
a. StalinQs accomplishments outweigh his mistakes, serious as
they were.
b. Although it is important to correct his "mistakes", at the
moment it is equally if not more important to stop the dangerous
"revisionist" trend which has developed in the course of events
beginning with the 20th CPSU Congress.
C? "De -Stalinization" is a propaganda term invented by "the
Western bourgeoisie, and the right-wing social democrats."
De-Stalinization is not involved in this process of correcting
Stalin's mistakes? If there was such a thing as "Stalinism"
it was identical with "Communism and Marxism-Leninism"..
d4 "Those comrades who made similar mistakes under his
(Stalin's) influence" should not be labelled as Stalinists and
"we... should not treat them as enemies" because this "will
not help them learn the lesson they should learn."
e. Finally, since the issue is an intra-Party issue it must be
subordinated to the main issue, i.e.., the struggle against
imperialism.
This formula is a departure from the previous pattern, In our
opinion it presages the outlawing of Party and non-Party elements which
are "misinterpreting" the significance of the "de-Stalinization'' line and
are pushing for "liberalization". The following statement of the
Hungarian Party paper, as quoted by an AP despatch from Budapest,
8 January, appears to support our interpretation.
"There is no truce with the Hungarian counterrevolutionaries?
Our fight against them will now be pressed on a political basis, and we
-? -
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"will concentrate on isolating and destroying the anarchists, the
petty bourgeoisie and all those with a false outlook. This fight
will?be pressed where these hostile elements try to disguise
themselves as Marxists and proclaim slogans about democratiza-
tion 'and de-Stalinization. " (Underlining supplied)
10. The main switch in the treatment of the Stalin issue by the Chinese
is the return to the subjective factors as an explanation of the Stalin
phenomenon, It will be recalled that the secret Khrushchev speech
of 25 February used this method while the 30 June Resolution emphasized
the objective factors (historical, political, etc.) in the attempt to explain
Stalin away,
The Chinese now say:
"Nevertheless, these objective conditions alone would not have been
enough to transform the possibility of mistakes into their actual com-
mission,. Lenin, working under conditions which were much more
complicated and difficult than those encountered by Stalin, did not
make the mistakes that Stalin made. Here, the decisive factor is
the ideological condition. A series of victories and the eulogies he
received in the latter part of his life turned his head. He deviated
partly, but grossly, from the dialectical materialist way of thinking
and fell into subjectivism.. ;'etc. , etc.
The return to the Khrushchev formula is further dramatized by the
fact that the Chinese repeat almost verbatim Khrushchevts famous dictum
"We cannot say that these were the deeds of a giddy despot, He considered
that this should be done in the interest of the Party; of the working masses.
in the name of the defense of the revolution's gains. In this lies the whole
tragedy! "
The Chinese state, "This tragedy lies in the fact that, at the very
time when he was doing things which were mistaken, he. believed they
were necessary for the defense of the interests of the working people
against the encroachments by the enemy. "
From the point of view of the defense of the Soviet system the
subjective explanation of Stalin may have appealed to Khrushchev and
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12. This. position is the springboard from which the Chinese launch
their attack on "revisionism, " indirectly attacking Titoist views and
Polish press statements (without, however, naming names). (Tito
and Kardelj are singled out by direct attack in connection with their
current attacks on "Stalinist" elements in the leadership of various
Parties and in reference to their "revisionist" views on Hungary.)
The'f-evisionist trend" is identified with the "interests of the imperialists, "
and portrayed almost like a fad.. The fundamental principle of the
dictatorship of the proletariat is raised in its stead,
"So if people reject the fundamental Marxist-Leninist principles
regarding the dictatorship of the proletariat, if they slanderously
dub these principles 'Stalinism' and 'doctrinairism' simply be-
cause they have perceived the mistakes committed by Stalin in
the latter part of his life and those made by the former Hungarian
leaders, they will be taking the path that leads to betrayal of
Marxism-Leninism and away from. the course. of the proletarian
revolution. "
Borba, in its first (7 January) comment on the Chinese statements,
expressed--as we believe, correctly "regret that /this Chinese news-
paper/ has failed to contribute toward a fruitful elucidation of the prob-
lems facing socialism at present, as might have been expected from such
an important and, in experience, so rich .a party as the Chinese Party.
Nevertheless, Borba, otherwise apparently bewildered by the firmness
of the Chinese, hastened to agree with the Chinese on their views on.
the "nature and dictatorship of the Proletariat. "" Without making too
much out of the raising of an ideological spectre such as the proletarian
dictatorship, it is nevertheless our opinion that there are bloc-wide policy
implications. involved (see the recent tightening in Hungary) which may
lead to the gradual liquidation of elements carrying the seeds of ""lib-
eralization" in order to deny the West any assets towards what the Chinese
fear may lead to the disintegration of orthodox Communism. Chinese
insistence on the paternalistic aspects of the dictatorship (which Stalin
is accused of having violated) indicates, on the other hand, that the
policy of meeting the basic needs of the right-thinking people will con-
tinue. In our mind this policy takes the form of a slogan: Think right--
eat right. If the~Policy y should be implemented by'-the CCP also,'
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may now appeal again to the Chinese. The "objective" explanation
obviously brings in questions relating to the validity of the system.
However, it was the weakness of Khrushchev's subjective analysis
which contributed greatly to the ensuing confusion in Communist ranks.
What kind of a system is it which permits a. Stalin to operate? The
Chinese, in defense of the system, go even so far as to say that "the
Party lacked experience in leading the State; the new system was not
sufficiently consolidated to be able to resist every encroachment of
the influence of the old era, etc. "
In any case, if the current Chinese line on Stalin is representative
of the Soviet line--and we shall present evidence to this effect later--
it seems clear that Communism as an ideology is still hurting at its
very core and is twisting strenuously to shake off the issue of Stalin
and its effects on the validity of the Soviet system.
Other falsifications evident in the Chinese document are the attempts
to shift the period of Stalin's "mistakes" to the "latter period" of his life
and to present his "crimes" as "mistakes". The lack of any reference
to the famous term "Cult of the Individual" seems significant, In the
upgrading of Stalin, he is now described as "after all a staunch Com-
munist, " and "implacable foe of imperialism. 11
11. Linked with the relative upgrading of Stalin is the effort to down-
grade what the Chinese term the "present anti-doctrinaire tide". In
essence they say Stalin's mistakes--.and "doctrinairism" was one of
their "gravest consequences"--must continue to be corrected. "Doc-
trinairism" in simplest terms is the mechanical application of funda-
mental Marxist-Leninist principles and the Soviet model without proper
emphasis on local conditions and national characteristics. However,
they imply fermentation resulting from the attack on doctrinairism has
gone dangerously far,
"In the present anti-doctrinaire tide, there are people in our
country /u.nderlining supplied! and abroad who, on the pretext of
opposing the mechanical copying of Soviet experience, try to deny
the international significance of the fundamental experience of the
Soviet Union and, on the plea of creatively developing Marxism-Leninism,
try to deny the significance of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism."
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14. There follow, some of the indications showing a dose coincidence
of the Soviet and Chinese positions. The evidence is obviously incom-
plete and has been selected at random.
a. Khrushchev's statements. at the Kremlin New Yearts Eve
Party are authoritatively reported to have been along the fol-
lowing line: He denied any division into Stalinists and anti-
Stalinists saying they were all Stalinists when it came to defending
the Soviet Union and Communism against imperialistic enemies.
Stalin, had made many mistakes which they had been the first
to acknowledge and. were endeavoring to correct but Stalin had
been a great revolutionary and staunch defender of the cause
of Marx and Lenin and on balance his services outweigh his
errors and mistakes.
The coincidence is striking, particularly. in the use of the
adjective "staunch" and in the reference. to Stalin's role as foe
of imperialism.
b. Some news reports credited Khrushchev with a statement
admitting some sort of. co--responsibility of Soviet leaders for
Stalin's mistakes. Although unconfirmed the reports are not
implausible. Following the Chinese (and his own) upgrading of
Stalin it should now be possible to admit some co-responsibility
since, after all, Stalints achievements outweigh- his mistakes.
c. Soviet and Chinese positions on "Revisionism" coincide.
(1) Issue #61 (January) of the Soviet magazine Questions
of'Philo.sophy attacked a "series of instances" where there
has. been "wholesale rejection of all of Stalin's. theoretical
propositions, including correct ones." In this context, the
article further attacks bourgeois. propaganda which has
"influence on/certain part of the Soviet people, particularly
among youth" which is evident from certain statements. which
cast doubt on the "socialist character of our democracy. tr The
article also apologized for having in previous issues "rejected
the necessity for daily leadership" of cultural activity.
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40
this would indicate a significant shift: the 8th CCP Congress still
advocated. "leniency toward counter-revolutionaries,"
13, In the final section the document renews its call for Communist
unity, in the face of the imperialist threat, insisting however, that this
unity be based on the principle of equality- -a principle which Stalin is
accused of having grossly violated, The Chinese Communists have
offered two formulas for relations between Communist states and parties.
As for states, the larger nation should avoid "great-nation chauvinism";
the smaller should avoid "nationalism." As for parties, their relations
should aim at "unity", through recognition of "equality" and "genuine,
not nominal exchange of views." In practice,, however, there can be
more equality between equals or near-equals, such as the USSR and
China, than between non-equals, such as the USSR and Albania. The
distinct although indirect attacks in the CCP statement of 28 December
on Polish liberalization trends, as well as Polish-Yugoslav collusion,
suggest again that the Chinese Party concept on "equality" is a realistic
one. In toto, we feel that the Chinese desire to subordinate in this
period of setbacks, all intra-Party and antra-Bloc problems to the
overriding priority: defense of the Socialist camp.
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(2) Party Life, the monthly journal of CPSU; was reported
on 5 January to have attacked the CPUSA for attempting
"open revision of Marxism--Leninism. " It labeled this
attempt as dangerous. (Note: CPUSA is currently plagued
by a factional struggle of right-wingers, desiring to re-
organize the CPUSA as a political association, against the
orthodox leadership.)
The article also. coincides with the Chinese view on
the dictatorship of the proletariat. "They have come out
against the dictatorship of the proletariat and against a
party of the Leninist type. Instead they propose to create
a mass association of Communist propaganda and they
openly state that socialism is a matter for the remote
future, "
d. A Pravda article by Ponomarev (4 January) reviewing the
Hungarian uprising placed unusual emphasis on the alleged
organization of the uprising by the U. S. and stated that this
initiated a general attack on World Communism and the unity
of the Soviet Bloc in particular. This coincides with the Chinese
statement which characterized the "Hungarian affair of October
1956" as "the gravest attack launched by them (Note: the im-
perialists led by the US) against the Socialist camp since the
war of aggression they carried on in Korea", and that among
the causes imperialism "played the main and decisive part."
e. The same Pravda editorial, in drawing "lessons from
Hungarian events" firmly stressed the need for adherence to
the forms of orthodox Marxism-Leninism and the dictatorship
of the proletariat.
f. A TASS report on the Soviet-East German talks of 7 January
adopted the Chinese position on the single road to Socialism which
makes allowance for national characteristics but stresses, common
fundamental aims and objectives.
g. Finally, although not conclusively, it is generally agreed that
Malenkov's star has been rising since November 1956, His presence
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at the Soviet-Satellite meeting in Budapest which ended on 4 January
confirmed previous rumors that his position exceeds the scope of
his Ministry. We are not prepared to link the relative upgrading
of Stalin's heir, Malenkov, to the relative upgrading of Stalin or
to the question of a power struggle, and merely note the coincidence.
15. In sum, if the Chinese statement can indeed be construed as an
expression of Soviet thoughts and as a common platform for the Com-
munist Parties to unite on, what will it accomplish with its call for
unity and blunt return to orthodox Bolshevist modus operandi?
At this writing it appears that such a position could create dilemmas
rather than solutions. The "peaceful co-existence" tactic, reaffirmed
as a valid line for Bloc relations with the free world on a governmental
level as late as the January Soviet-East German talks, could hardly be
maintained without adjustment and compromise of these relations.
The militant posture of the Chinese and Soviet positions, primarily
directed at the internal enemy number one, i, e., fermentation, may
yet have an effect on the operations of international Communism outside
the Bloc. To what extent the "Chinese" views (which will probably be
adopted by non-Bloc Communist Parties) will be effective in aiding
them in liquidating "fermentation" is an open question, The Yugoslavs,
although taken aback by the pro-Soviet attitude of the document, claim
that it is progress to have their views'kliscussed." They may have a
point. While attacking fermentation and "liberalization", the document
also gives it publicity. That it will stop the well-developed fermentation
in CPs in Western Europe is questionable. Its effect on CPs in the
Far East, Middle East and Latin America may, however, be considerable
and increase the orientation of CPs in these areas towards the CCP which,
however, could serve the common interests of CPSU and CCP.
16. At the beginning of 1957 international Communism, hurting from the
setbacks received in 1956, assumes a hostile, militantly defensive posture.
The further development of the international line which in our opinion
is so clearly spelled out in the CCP article of 28 December, will depend
on external events.
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000300230008-5