BRIEFS ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM 1957 - II - NEW INFORMATION ON KHRUSHCHEV'S ATTACK ON STALIN AAT 20TH CPSU CONGRESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-00915R000500130009-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 13, 2000
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: March 11, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

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BRIEFS ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM
1957
- II -
New Information on Khrushchev's
Attack on Stalin at 20th CPSU
Congress
11 March 1957
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SUBJECT: New Information on Khrushchev's -Attack on Stalin at 20th
CPSU Congress,
1. The following information was received from a highly sensitive source:
a. Circumstances of Khrushchev's secret speech on Stalin.
who claims to have received his
information from Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev, recently
offered the following explanation of developments. at the 20th
Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), held
in Moscow in February 1956. When the Congress convened, the
Soviet leaders had no intention of admitting that Stalin had been
responsible for numerous, crimes. They realized that there was
considerable dissension throughout the Soviet Union as a result
of Stalin's policies. However, they hoped that over a period of
time discontent would gradually disappear. During the Congress,
several altercations arose among the delegates, many of whom
accused one another of being. responsible for the murder or the
disappearance of the Soviet officials who had been purged during
Stalin's regime. The delegates insisted that the leaders of the
CPSU provide a complete explanation of what had transpired under
;Stalin's rule. The situation became so tense that the Congress was
temporarily adjourned, and the Presidium of the Central Committee
of the CPSU met in an all-night session to decide what action should
be taken. A majority finally decided that a report of Stalin's crimes
should.be made to the delegates. Khrushchev predicted that such a
report would give rise to numerous difficulties. He was selected
to deliver the report, because anumber of his subordinates had
been the victims of Stalin's atrocities. It was, therefore, be-
lieved that the delegates would feel that he was sympathetic to
their complaints.
b. Existence of a second speech on Stalin's foreign policy.
In addition to this report on Stalin's crimes, which was later
made public, Khrushchev delivered another secret report to
high-ranking officials of the CPSU, the USSR Foreign Ministry,
and the Soviet intelligence agencies. The second report, which
dealt with the error's in Soviet foreign policy, has not yet been
made public.
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2. Concerning the decision to make the special report on Stalin. The
information in.1,;.'a,,.above checks: with. reports received from other
sources on the circumstances of the secret Khrushchev speech on Stalin on
the night of 24-25 February 1956.
as It was reliably reported that General Secretary Gollan of CP
Great Britain was told by Soviet leader Ponomarev during the
period late May-early July that the decision to make the
Khrushchev attack was: not taken 4 until the 'Gongre ss was already
in session; that the release of Stalin purgees prior to the Congress '
had stimulated pressure for further investigations; that during the
Congress, the delegates had expressed dissatisfaction with the
adequacy of the open-session speeches by Khrushchev and Mikoyan;
and therefore, the Central Committee had made an "emergency
decision" that Khrushchev shouldrnake a special report on Stalin.
b. The leading Secretary of the'Belgian CP, Ernest Burnelle,
'following his visit to Moscow, reported to Party members that
the open criticisms of Stalin at the 20th CPSU Congress had caused
so much surprise and emotion it was then decided to give the secret
report on Stalin. According to Burnelle, the Khrushchev speech had
not been drafted prior` to the Congress, and was an improvised
presentation of data designed to show that the open criticisms of
Stalin were well-founded,
c,, In addition, Dutch Party leader Paul De Groot has stated that, in his
opinion, the open attack had been launched by Mikoyan without
Khrushchev `s consent, or that Khrushchev was consulted, but did not
realize the consequence's. According to De Groot, the Mikoyan speech
caused such a stir that the delegates forced Khrushchev to deliver
his closed-session attack on Stalin. Whether De Groot deduced this
on his own or was so advised by the Soviets is not known.
3, Ambassador Bohlen has reconstructed the circumstances in a similar
manner:
a. The general decision to launch a frontal attack on Stalin was made
well in advance of the 20th Congress.
b? But the Khrushchev' special report itself may not have been planned
in advancem
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"It may well be, It Bohlen observed, "that although the Party leadership
thought that the generalized criticism of Stalin by Khrushchev in his report
to the Central Committee, and the somewhat sharper attacks by Mikoyan
and Pankratova, would be sufficient to lay the foundation for the necessary
revision of Soviet writings, the delegates to the Party Congress were not
satisfied with these explanations and that further justification for the de-
thronement of Stalin was considered necessary: "
4... Other circumstantial indicators that the Khrushchev speech was hastily
drafted, possibly while the 20th Congress was in session, as the non-Soviet
CPs have been told, include the following:
a., The first part of the speech is painstakingly documented; the
latter portion is less so..
Khrushchev, in the speech, said: "Not long ago, only several days
before the present congress, we.... ,interrogated the investigative
judge Rodos., , " (Underlining supplied.)
c. As the foreign CPs complained, the speech was notably devoid of
an adequate "Marxist analysis" of the reasons for Stalin's rise
and reign.: This "explanation" was not produced until 30 June..
A well thought-out attack would have at least made an effort to
give it a decent foundation. The numerous holes in the Khrushchev
story, which Communists and non-Communists outside the Bloc
have pointed out, also mark it as a hastily prepared document.
5 The existence of a second secret Khrushchev report. is plausible, The
information set out in paragraph 1. b, concerning a second secret report by
Khrushchev on Stalin's "errors" in foreign policy is plausible, Most observers
noted the relative lack of treatment of Soviet foreign policy in the version of
the report which has been publicized,
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