THE CHINESE COMMUNIST POSITION ON SOVIET SATELLITE RELATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-00915R000500370002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 1, 1956
• Content Type: REPORT

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TAW
THE CHINESE COMMUNIST POSITION ON SOVIET SATELLITE
RELATIONS
1. A New York Times dispatch from Warsaw reporting a split between
Russia and China on Russia's European satellite policy has aroused specu-
lation as to whether such a disagreement exists and to what extent. This
is an attempt to document the Chinese position.
2. Under the headline "R,ed China Supports Poles Against Moscow
Dictation", the New York Times on 16 October 1956 carried a story by
Sydney Gruson claiming that Mao Tse-tung told Party First Secretary
Ochab in Peking in September that the Poles should go ahead in efforts
to obtain internal independence and develop their own social system
as the Yugoslavs have done. Gru.son told Warsaw American Embassy
officials on 18 October that his sources were two members of the Com-
munist Central Committee in Warsaw. He said he has subsequently
learned that the Chinese spokesman was Chou En-lai, and not Mao,
and that the context of the statement was a conversation on the Poznan
riots. Gruson said he was told that Chou agreed with the Polish inter-
pretation that the cause of the riots was failure to meet the just demands
of the workers, and disagreed with the Russian stand that the riots were
incited by "counterrevolutionaries". According to what the Poles told
Gruson, Chou added "Poland should not be dictated to by the Kremlin".
(Warsaw Embassy telegram 462)
Polish Intelligentsia Exploits New "Liberal" Chinese Policy Toward
Intellectuals.
3. Edmund Osmanczyk, a Polish journalist covering the United States
elections, was reported by an informant, who has furnished reliable informa-
tion in the past, to have said that the Polish "revolt" could not have taken
place without certain moral encouragement and support furnished to Poland
by the Chinese Communist Party. Osmanczyk said that before he came to
the United States (August 7, 1956), he was aware that the Polish "revolt"
would take place, but did not know when. About six months ago a Chinese
leader, whom Osmanczyk identified as the number-three man in the Chinese
Communist Party, wrote an article criticizing the one-sidedness of the
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development of Communist doctrine. He stated that China was admired
twenty-five hundred years ago for its leadership and development; this
was because there was a wise dynasty in control in China which en-
couraged discussion of idealistic and materialistic approaches. Accord-
ing to Osmanczyk, the Chinese leader said that only a discussion of
these two approaches would lead to a new synthesis which in turn would
lead to the full development of China. He said the Chinese criticized
the Stalin doctrine of one approach and stated dissenters should not
be destroyed. Osmanczyk stated the pronouncement on the part of the
Chinese established precedent for dissent. The statement by the Chinese
Communist was fully translated in the Polish press and widely circulated
in Poland.
The "progressives" of Poland adopted this idea from China. About
six months ago clubs of young "intelligentsia" were organized in Poland.
These were not strictly Communist Party clubs; however, the Communist
Party of Poland took the lead in the formation of these clubs, according
to Osman.czyk. There was free discussion on the Chinese article at these
clubs. Moscow papers slightly criticized the formation of these clubs and
the discussion of the Chinese article, Osmanczyk said. Polish authorities
justified these meetings and discussiorson the ground that they were merely
discussions of the Chinese theory. These discussions led to a sharp division
between, the Stalinists and the "progressi.ves" in Poland, according to
Osmanczyk.
The speech referred to by Osmanczyk appears to be "Let Flowers
of Many Kinds Blossom, Diverse Schools of Thought Contend!", delivered
by Lu Ting-yi on 26 May 1956, Lu is not number-three man in the party,
but he is Director of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee,
and in this instance was speaking on a policy specifically stated to have
originated with Mao Tse-tung. The policy is a recognition that China needs
top production from its intellectuals and technicians if its twelve-year
goals are to be met. In order to stimulate this production the effect of
past thought-control campaigns and drives against counterrevolutionaries
must be mitigated. The new policy purports to grant freedom to Chinese
intellectuals to advance non-Marxist, but not anti-Marxist, positions in
their writings. The policy is not nearly as liberal in its application in China
as the Poles seem to have interpreted it. In Lu's speech he specifically
condemns the ideas of Hu Feng for being counterrevolutionary and unacceptable
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even, under the new policy; yet Hu Feng is presently in jail for recommending
that the CCP ease its control of the fine arts. The Chinese intellectuals went
through a period of critical examination during the campaign against Hu Feng
in 1.955. They seem unlikely to test the limits of the new "liberal" - sounding
policy while the ideas of Hu Feng are still considered counterrevolutionary.
The Polish intellectuals, according to Osmanczyk, apparently have taken
the Chinese policy at its face-value and have used it to justify their criticism
of the regime.
In Supportin,g 30 October USSR. Statement on Relations with Satellites,
Chinese Emphasize Mutual Equality, Call Certain Polish and Hungarian
Popular Demands "Proper" and Deplore "Bourgeois Chauvinism"
4. On 30 October, after Gomulka had become Party First Secretary
in Poland and the Hungarian revolt had begun, Radio Moscow broadcast
the official Russian position on relations with the satellites. The principles
of peaceful coexistence, friendship, equality of states, and cooperation
were reaffirmed, but the Warsaw Treaty was described as "an important
foundation for mutual relations between the Soviet Union and the People's
Democracy. " The statement also warned against "undermining the
foundations of the people's democratic order" in Hungary. Referring
again to Hungary, the policy statement recognized "the necessity of
eliminating serious shortcomings in the field of economic building, of
the further raising of the material well-being of the population and of
the struggle against bureaucratic distortions in the state apparatus, "
5. On 1 November the Government of the People's Republic of China
issued an official comment on the statement issued by the Government
of the USSR.. The following significant points appeared in the PR.C
statement:
a. The Chinese Government considers the Soviet declaration to
be correct,
b. The Socialist countries are all independent and sovereign
states whose mutual relations should be established on the
basis of the five principles (mutual respect for sovereignty
and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-intervention
in. each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit,
and peaceful coexistence). At the same time Socialist countries
are united by the common ideal of socialism and the spirit of
proletarian internationalism.
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C. Mistakes have been made in. mutual relations of Socialist
countries.
d. "As a result of these misunderstandings and estrangement,
a tense situation has sometimes occurred which otherwise
would not have occurred. The handling of the 1948-49 Yugo-
slav situation and the recent happenings in Poland and
Hungary are enough to illustrate this." The official
New China News Agency corrected this paragraph the
same day by interchanging the words "misunderstandings"
and "estrangement" and, most significantly, by deleting
the words "and Hungary".
e. The demands of the people of Poland and Hungary for
strengthening democracy, independence and equality
and for raising the material well-being of the people
are "completely proper".
f. "Because of the unanimity of ideology and aim of struggle,
it often happens that certain personnel of Socialist countries
neglect the principle of equality among nations in their mutual
relations. Such a mistake, by nature, is the error of
bourgeois chauvinism. Such a mistake, particularly the
mistake of chauvinism by a big country, inevitably results
in serious damage to the solidarity and common cause of
the Socialist countries. "
This reference to the mistake of "bourgeois chauvinism" by certain
personnel is interpreted by the American Embassy in Warsaw as originating
in an alleged incident reported by Mrs. Gruson, who apparently learned of
it from the Polish Central Committee sources mentioned above. This is
the report (Embassy telegram 658):
"During a conversation between Mao Tse-tung, Mikoyan
and Ochab at Peking festivities /September 1956, 8th CCP
Congress/, Ochab explained that, as a result of nationalistic
feeling in Poland, the Polish people could not be expected to
continue to permit orders to be given them and their govern-
ment from abroad. Thereupon Mikoyan said obscenely, 'Who
gives a damn for people's wishes?'. This cynicism shocked
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and displeased Mao Tse-tung and Ochab...It was presumably
Mikoyan, not Molotov or Khrushchev, that the Chinese had in
mind in the November 1 reference to Socialist leaders who
disregard equality of nations and commit the error of
bourgeois chauvinism. "*
Chinese Welcome Soviet Actions in Hungary
6. The Peking People's Daily commented on the Soviet military sup-
pression of the Hungarian. revolt in a 4 November editorial entitled
"Celebrate the Great Victory of the Hungarian People". In this editorial
the Polish situation was not mentioned but the Soviet line was followed
in a dogmatic fashion relatively rare in Chicom pronouncements. Excerpts
from the editorial follow:
a. "A successful. restoration of counterrevolutionary rule in
Hungary would mean a serious threat to the countries from
the imperialist aggressive forces. "
b. "It is quite clear that the Hungarian people have won their
victory with the help of the Soviet Union. The stand of the
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reported another version of an incident involving
Mao Tse-tung and Mikoyan at the 8th CCP Congress. (The report
as a whole contains much information which is not considered reliable
and is included herein only for the record.) Prior to the opening of
the plenum, Mao sent various Soviet experts and instructors back
to the USSR.. At a grand reception, Mao decorated these Soviets
and expressed his deep regret that he was obliged to send them
home, as the present difficult situation in the Soviet Union would
not permit him to rob that country of their valuable assistance.
When the plenum opened, Anastayas Mikoyan, who with Edward Ochab
had participated as a guest, immediately tried to reprimand Mao for
such a move, but Mao retorted that China's ancient culture was not
in need of Russian help. Mao's remarks reportedly caused Mikoyan
to leave for the USSR two days before the closing session of the
plenum. Ochab originally had planned to visit Moscow upon com-
pletion of his stay in China, but after these events, Mao advised
Ochab agai nst such a plan and even put a Chinese plane at Ochab's
disposal.
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Soviet Union toward the Hungarian events has been the
just stand of proletarian internationalism. "
C. "The importance of the great friendship of the Soviet
Union for the peoples of Socialist countries has been
gloriously proved once more in the Hungarian events.
Some people underestimate the immense importance of
Soviet friendship, the spirit of internationalism of the
Soviet people, the necessity for solidarity among all
Socialist countries, the necessity of the Warsaw Treaty,
the need to hold fast to the principle of proletarian
internationalism and seriously propagate internationalism
among the people's of all countries to overcome the
tendency to national chauvinism. The shocking recent
events in Hungary should serve as a grave lesson to
such people. "
7. On the basis of Chicom statements from 1 to 5 November, the
American Consulate General in Hong Kong on 6 November, drew the
following conclusions:
"a) While the Chicoms may have approved the liberalization
of relations of the Soviet Union with the Satellites, it is unlikely
that this support ever went beyond the bounds of the Soviets own
policy; even if it did, Peiping immediately and fully adapted itself
to changes in Soviet policy;
b) Main motivations of this Chicom policy are the determination
to maintain the solidity of its alliance with Moscow and assist in
preventing any sapping of international Communist strength; fear
that the Hungarian developments might influence the Chinese people
and threaten the regime's internal stability are secondary factors;
c) While the Chicoms will continue to set their present course
on internal matters, the Hungarian incident has made even more
remote than before the possibility that Peiping would gravitate
towards a Titoist position of greater independence within the bloc;
d) The changing tenor of these commentaries and close timing of
the last two editorials point towards close Moscow-Peiping liaison. "
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ranks. will pass shortly because of the inevitability of world progress toward
Communism. Another possible interpretation, given the elliptical and
backwards way often adopted by Communists, is that in the mention of
these dates, just before the Polish-Soviet talks, the Chinese are gently
reminding the Soviets that a stern stand toward the Polish leaders in
disregard of the national aspirations of the people of the satellites
could prove costly to the world. Communist movement.
Chinese Describe Soviet-Polish Agreements as a "Model" for Relations
B
etween Socialist States
10. The Chinese expressed great satisfaction' with the outcome of the
Polish-Russian talks which ended 18 November. U. S. Ambassador
Bohlen commented on the basis of the Polish-Soviet communique that
"the Poles appear to have obtained the most they could reasonably have
hoped for at a relatively low price. " (Moscow Embtel 1272)
In a People's Daily editorial2l November, the Chinese emphasize
that the talks "reflected fraternal relations of mutual respect, confidence,
and assistance among the Socialist countries and essential principles
guiding relations between Socialist countries put forward in the October 30
declaration of the Soviet Government, namely full equality, respect for
territorial inviolability, respect for national independence and sovereignty
and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. It
(In an Izvestia editorial on the talks, the Russians emphasized
that there can be no antagonism between Socialist states, and added:
"The conclusion which emerges from the Polish-Soviet talks is the
need to strengthen the friendship between the Socialist countries in
every way possible. Moreover, the exchange of experiences in the
building of Socialism is of great importance. ")
The People's Daily further states that the "significance" of the
talks extends far beyond the recognition of the necessity of maintaining
the Warsaw Pact. The editorial lists as "an important international
aspect" of the talks the "vivid example they provide of proper relations
between Socialist countries. These have to conform to the principles
In an interview with a Polish reporter during his visit to Vietnam,
Chou En-lai commented on the joint statement made after the Polish-
Soviet talks as follows: "I consider the statement a very good one.
It solves the outstanding problems between Poland and the USSR? be-
tween the two governments and two parties. The statement will play
an important role in the relations between fraternal socialist countries
and constitutes a model for them.:"
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"of full equality, respect for territorial inviolability respect for national
independence and sovereignty, and noninterference in each others' domes{Lic
affairs. "
The editorial goes on to state that proper relations between Socialist
countries "must conform to the principles of solidarity and friendship, mutual
aid and mutual benefit, and unity to help their economic progress and their
opposition to imperialist aggression. But the establishment of these principles
does not, in itself, preclude the possibility of mistakes violating them. There
were mistakes in the past, there are now, and mistakes will also not be entirely
avoided in the future. The question, therefore, is how to deal with such errors. .
In future relations between Socialist countries, if only the bigger nations pay
more attention to avoidin the mistake of big nation chauvinism (this is the main
thing--NCNA), and the smaller nations avoid the mistake of nationalism (this
is also essential- -NCNA), friendship and solidarity based on equality will
undoubtedly become consolidated and will advance. "
This appears to be a difference in emphasis from the Soviet statement
emphasizing unity and solidarity. Possibly the Chinese may feel that the
principles of unity, socialist solidarity and proletarian internationalism
should be followed on the basis of the principles of full equality, respect for
territorial inviolability, respect for national independence and sovereignty,
and noninterference in each others domestic affairs.
Soviet Rumanian Talks: Do the Chinese Prefer Polish-Soviet Agreements
As a Model?
11. Soviet-Rumanian talks were held in Moscow in early December and a
joint communique was issued 3 December stressing the identity of the two
positions on the assessment of international affairs. The Rumanians did not
get as many concessions from the Russians on conduct of their internal affairs
as the Poles did; for example the Polish-Soviet communique contains restric-
tions on the movement of Soviet troops in Poland, subjects the Soviet troops
to Polish law, and prohibits the Soviet forces from interfering in the internal
affairs of the PPR, while the Rumanian-Soviet statement mentions none of these.
In commenting on the Soviet-Rumanian communique, People's Daily
on 6 December praised the unanimity of outlook in international relations
and said the talks reaffirmed the principles on which the relationship among
Socialist countries is based, Thse were enumerated as follows: complete
equality; respect for each other's territorial integrity, independence, and
state sovereignty; and noninterference in each other's internal affairs. Here
the Chinese appear to be restating their emphasis on "mutual equality" among
Socialist states as a basis for unity, in contrast to the current Russian em-
phasis on "solidarity".
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The editorial further said: "The Chinese people sincerely greet
the achievements of the Soviet-Rumanian talks and consider these
friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Rumania as exemplary
of the relations of all Socialist countries. The more rampant the
enemy becomes, the more our solidarity should be strengthened,
The Chinese thus claimed on 6 December to consider the rela-
tions between the Soviet Union and Rumania to be a model for mutual
Socialist relations. In mid-November, the Chinese said the very
different relations between the Soviet Union and Poland were a model
for mutual Socialist relations. Since the two model relationships do
not appear equally cognizant of "mutual equality" among Socialist
states, the two Chinese pronouncements appear somewhat contra-
dictory. This apparent contradiction may be explained by the above
underlined statement. If the Chinese considered the "enemy" to be
more "rampant" in early December than in mid-November, they may
have considered Soviet-Rumanian relationship stressing solidarity to
be more appropriate in view of the increasing seriousness of the
situation.
Khrushchev Praises CCP for Valuing "Solidarity'-"
13, N. S. Khrushchev spoke at a Chinese Embassy reception for a
visiting National People's Congress delegation in Moscow 29 November.
In his remarks complimenting the Chinese Communists, Khrushchev
made the following statement:
"The Chinese say: We are bound by ties of unbreakable friend-
ship with the Soviet Union, we in fraternity with the CPSU and
other communist and workers parties have used and will use
the experience of our Soviet friends, of the whole international
workers movement. This shows that the CCP highly values the
international solidarity of the working people, the fraternal
solidarity of communist and workers parties, and consistently
applies the principles of proletarian internationalism, "
The Chinese do highly value the principles of solidarity and
proletarian internationalism, but Khrushchev neglects to mention
that the Chinese have been emphasizing that solidarity must be based
on the principles of equality, respect for territorial inviolability, respect
for national independence and sovereignty, and noninterference in domestic
affairs,
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Big Nation Chauvinism
14. The principle of vigilance against "big nation chauvinism" was
first stated in the 1 November policy statement of the Chinese Com-
munist Government. It was not restated until after a meeting of the
CCP Central Committee held 10-15 November. This was the second
Central Committee meeting held since the 8th Congress of late Sep-
tember. On the agenda of this meeting were three points, first of
which was the current situation in Egypt, Poland and Hungary. Liu
Shao-chi reported on the subject to the Committee. Mao Tse-tung
summed up the work of the meeting, according to an NCNA release,
but his statement was not published. The press release did state
what was apparently the main point of the meeting, that Mao "demanded
that the whole Party resolutely oppose great-Han (Chinese race)
chauvinism on the question of nationalities, and the great-nation
chauvinism in international relations. "
This set the line, and the policy has been restated several
times since:
a. Chou En-lai said at a reception in Hanoi 20 November that
China would determinedly and thoroughly eradicate great-
nation chauvinism, just as Chairman Mao had said.
b. In the joint statement issued by Chou En-lai and Pham van
Dong following the Hanoi talks, both nations pledged to
avoid the mistake of chauvinism in international relations.
In commenting on the results of these talks, People's Daily
viewed the anti-chauvinism clause with favor and added:
"Because China is one of the big countries of the world,
our people should be particularly alert to guard against
great nation chauvinism. "
c. A 21 November People's Daily editorial on the significance
of the Soviet-Polish talks, quoted above, stated that in future
relations between Socialist countries, "if only the bigger
nations pay more attention to avoiding the mistake of big
nation chauvinism (and this is the main thing--NCNA) and
the smaller nations avoid the mistake of nationalism (this
is also essential--NCNA), friendship and solidarity based
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on equality will undoubtedly become consolidated and will advance. "
This is the first time since the 1 November statement that "big
nation chauvinism" was mentioned directly in relation to Soviet
policy toward the Satellites,
d. Marshal Lo Jui-ching, Minister of Public Security and com-
man.der- in- chief of the Public Security Forces, told delegates
to the national conference of People's Liberation Army public
security activists on 26 November that all coastal defense units
of the PLA should resolutely oppose "big nation chauvinism",
respect the people of other nations, and adopt a friendly attitude
toward them.
e, Premier Chou En-lai, in a speech in Cambodia 27 November,
said: "We are resolutely opposed to chauvinism by any nation,
especially great-nation chauvinism. China is determined to
prevent the mistake of great-nation chauvinism in its relations
with other countries, and strictly adhere to the Five Principles
of Peaceful Coexistence. " Note: this is the first instance in
which the term "great-nation chauvinism" was applied to rela-
tions with a non-Socialist state. Chou En-lai later used the
term in a similar vei3 in a speech in Burma.
The term "chauvinism" was defined for the domestic Chinese
audience over the Home Service 11 December, Chauvin was said to have
"wanted to use force to expand the influence of his own country". The
broadcast said that since then, "people state that chauvinism is ridiculous,
blind, extremely narrow patriotism and nationalism. " Chauvinism was
further described as an ideological viewpoint of the bourgeoisie. It may
be noted that, although ideologically bourgeois, the term has not been
applied to bourgeois countries by the Chinese. It has only been used in
reference to relations between Socialist states, or to the relations of a
large Socialist state with. smaller neighbors.
Yugoslavs Use Chinese Statement
in Their Quarrel With the Russians
15, The official Yugoslavian Communist Party daily, Borba, on
26 November, cited the Chinese statement of 1 November decrying
"big-nation chauvinism" in replying to the 23 November Pravda attack
on Tito's views. The significance of this appears to be that the Yugoslavs
are trying to bring the Chinese into their own doctrinal disagreement with
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Russia because they feel the Chinese agree with them (the Yugoslavs),
The Chinese have refrained from commenting on the dispute, but they
did publish, without comment, the text of Tito's 11 November speech at
Pula in which Tito blamed the Soviet leaders for developments in Hungary
and criticized the Soviet system. The Chinese dispatch summarizes
both favorable and unfavorable comment on the speech by Communist
leaders and publications in other countries.''`
The sections of the Chinese statement emphasized by Borba
were (a) that the demands of the people of Poland and Hungary for the
strengthening of democracy, independence, and equality and for the
raising of the material prosperity of the people are quite proper; and
(b) that the error of big nation chauvinism will inevitably lead to the
causing of serious damage to the solidarity and the common cause of
the socialist countries. Borba emphasized that every honest fighter
for socialism who realistically views events will have to agree with
these statements.
Yugoslav Claims Chinese Support For "Equality" Doctrine
16. In a confidential speech to the November 1956 Asian Socialist
Conference, Yugoslav observer Bakaric commented on the Chinese
reaction to the Yugoslav-Russian declaration whichfollowed Tito's
June 1955 visit to Moscow. According to a usually reliable source,
Bakaric said the Chinese Communist Party was the first to request
Yugoslavia to explain and clarify the principles laid down in the
declaration, and to give a full acount of the negotiations. The declara-
tion, which emphasized the principle of equality between the Yugoslav
and Russian parties, was fully agreed to by the Chinese Party according
to Bakaric. Bakaric said that it was unfortunate that the Chinese never
made public their adherence to the Russian-Yugoslav declaration.
Bakaric did not elaborate further on the Chinese position.
In a press conference, is Madras, Chou sidestepped the issue
in reply to a question, claiming he had not read Tito's speech
or Pravda's comment.
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Peking Prints Entire Text of Tito's Critical Pula Speech
17. Peking newspapers on 12 December printed the full text of the
speech criticizing the Soviet system made by Tito at Pula on 11 November.
The speech was printed without comment, but both favorable and unfavorable
comments by Communist leaders and publications in other countries were
printed. Within the bloc, only Hungary had previously published the full
text. Poland had printed the key elements of the speech without distortion.
The rest of the bloc, including the USSR., has printed only distored sum-
maries or selected passages designed to support the Kremlin's position.
Belgrade has been publicly challenging the bloc to print the full text.
Reactions to publication of the speech:
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lication of the speech was considered there (by whom not
stated) as a possible indication. that the Chinese leaders might
be considering a change of attitude on Hungarian developments.
He cited reports that the harsh comments made in. Asian non-
Communist countries against the role of Soviet tanks in the
Hungarian situation came as a surprise to officials close to
Premier Chou En-lai during the latter's visit to India. The
article said that an official statement clarifying China's posi-
tion on the problem of relations between the USSR. and other
Communist countries was expected in two or three days.
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In any case, the line has been too firmly drawn for the Chinese
to change their policy on Hungary without consulting Moscow.
An unverified report that Chou En-lai may go to Moscow for
talks with the Soviet leaders on Hungary was broadcast by the
Press Trust of India 19 December. The report quoted a cor-
respondent of the "Times of India" who credited "certain
observers" with the belief that "while the Chinese support the
Russians on Hungary, they are not in full agreement with
them. If this be so, then Chou will be able to quote Asian
reaction in support of any plea he might make for a further
liberalization of Soviet policy and at a faster pace. "
b. By the Yugoslavs- -Smole, the chief editorialist on the Yugo-
slav paper Borba, commented 12 December to a U. S. Embassy
officer on the Chinese publication of the Pula speech. Smole
said the most significant and hopeful feature is that the Chinese,
even after a three week delay, finally published Tito's Pula
speech. He thought the hesitation and delay, plus publication,
indicated that the Chinese are not automatically swallowing the
Soviet line whole, but that it is still too early to determine the
Chinese attitude towards the Hungarian situation. Smole inter-
preted Chinese publication of Tito's speech as a sign that the
Chinese are exerting a restraining force on the Soviets. He
also stated that China had played an important role in assisting
the establishment of the Gomulka regime in Poland. (Belgrade
Embassy telegram 854)
The Embassy telegram indicated that the last remark referred
to Gr.uson's story in the New York Times mentioned in paragraph
one.
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