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December 1, 1957
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Approved For Release 2000/08/27 CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 25X1A2g FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE Intelligence Aid COMMUNISM COMMUNIST PARTY CLANDESTINE ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITY 1954-1956 Distributed December 1957 Copy ~~ 236 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Co mnunist Party Clandestine Organization and Activity 1954 - 1956 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 I. Communist Party Illegal Organization,. 1 A. Two General Developments in CP Organization...... 1 B. Elements of a Clandestine Apparatus 2 C. Units Charged with Liaison Work Often Have Semi-Covert Status,ooooo0 11 II. Clandestine Activities ooa...e...q....e....a....a.... 12 A. Penetration of Other Political Parties and Mass Organizations by Legal Communist Parties ... 14 Western Hemisphere 14 B. Political Action by Illegal Communist Parties oa, 15 Europe .eaoeooeoore.oea, a 15 Far East ?, q,..,., .. e q. 0 0 0 0? 0 6 0 e? O., 0 0 0 .. a. O g 0 0? 0 17 Middle East .,,,....a,.aeae.aeae.e,+ 18 Western Hemisphere er...,,.. 18 C. Penetration of Civilian and Military Branches of Non-Communist Governments oe.e...eo,,.o..e...*.. 20 Europe o, 21 Far East .r.oe.9 e0....oo?esO.o,.oYeoO..segr.00000 22 Near EastOOa..Oa..00e.?,o.oO.9ooa 23 D. Communist Party Information Procurement go..o..oo 26.. Europe ..,....,q.a..a,..aeee..eae..e.e........... 27 Far East oo....aa.a.oo.aa?.eo,.raoo.o?e?u,..rgao. 29 Western Hemisphere ?eooaoo.?oeoaeae.eo.ea. 3.1 E. Information Procurement by International Fronts a 33 Trade Union International of Public and Allied Employees oooo,.ea?ao..oaeo.eeoS0 4o? aoaoega.aoa. 33 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 S E F. Involvement in Military Action and Preparations; Near East Oe.s......ooaeo.r.e?e..e..aweO.00...e.. North Africa ........eo..a...o.ea+OOrO...e.OOg1e. Western Hemisphere ..o.a.q?..?Oer.e..e......aaa9e 35 36 37 39 G. Sabotage 42 Europe ?..ooa?e.?o4o?eeerea o'soroa.o+oreooeoe..o.? Far East eO....0-. b...-e 4.Omea? OOOe .a.e..eo.os.0 UI Western Hemisphere o?rer.e..aearwn.oosa..r.-..eq e H. Technical Work ... O..OOe644..Ogo.0000.e00e.gO0a0? Europe aro.sou.oeo.a.wa..oaeaeoe.eo4a.oeow.e.?.ea Near East sa.e.a'a.a.eoea..e a .e.a ?..o.eo.oaoaa.o I. Security Measures and Preparations for Underground Europe ?a.aoo? aooorogaesao e.eoe.oeo.aeeoe. Far East ?.. eo.?a ? .e.oeaaa...a?+o..o..aeee9o Western Hemisphere eoe.eq.aquseaa..aee-e..o.ueaa.. 42 43 44 47 47 48 51 51 55 57 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 S E I. COMMUNIST PARTY ILLEGAL ORGANIZATION The term "illegal organization" is used to refer to: (a) Communist party organizations in countries where the Communist party is legal, but where, in accordance with tradition- al Communist party regulations and practice, the party also main- tains a clandestine or illegal apparatus to perform specific functions which must be kept from the public eye and to serve as the nucleus of an underground party organization :in the event that the political situation changes to the point where the Communist party is banned and must operate entirely underground; (b) Communist party structure in countries where the Com- munist party is outlawed and therefore its entire organization and all its activities must be clandestine and illegal. A. Two General Developments in CP Organization. Within the past few years there have been two general developments in Communist party organization. 1. There has been a concerted effort to extend the party's open organization and to reach directly and overtly as wide a segment of the population av possibe4 Par- ticularly in the period following the Geneva Conference" of July 1955 when there was a wiaespread belief among Communist leaders that a relaxed political atmosphere existed, they attempted to legalize party activities as much as possible in order to extend contacts with the masses. Considerable publicity was given to the party's professed policy of operating openly and legally. For example, in speeches and in articles in its official organ, the Chilean Communist Party emphasized the necessity of eliminating the tendency in party ranks to maintain the Party in a state of clandestinity, "which only plays into the hands of the 'enemy'". The position is maintained that the psychology of an illegal, clandestine Party hides the work and importance of the Party from the masses, and prevents it from receiving the electoral support its S E Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 S E NOF0B11k@VMIINUED CONTROL program merits. (This referred to the Party's program at the time of the municipal elections in Chile in April 1956.) While "vigilance" against the police is necessary, excessive caution is a sectarian and opportunist tendency which impedes the propagation of the historic mission of the Party. 2. Simultaneously there has been an effort in some areas to revitalize the Communist parties' clandestine apparatus. This has been manifested in some places by a reorganiza- tion of the directing organs responsible for the party's clandestine work? In other places the strengthening of the covert apparatus has become evident through reports that the party is providing for secret enrollment of party members having outstanding capacities or employed in sensitive areas of government or of private organi- zations. In other areas, attention given to persons not generally known as Communists, who work in groups or fractions in the ranks of other political parties and mass organizations, or in the parties' own front groups to exert Communist influence, to acquire infor- mation of use to the party, etc., indicates that covert methods and cadre are being used. Certain remarks made by Khrushchev at the time of the Soviet Communist Party's 20th Congress seem to have provided impetus to the reorganization of the clandestine apparatus of some Communist parties. In countries where capitalism is still strong, Khrushchev cautioned, resort to force will be neces- sary to bring about a socialist state and in such places the parties should maintain underground organizations which ultimately will be capable of leading a revolutionary struggle and taking over political power by force. The Japan Communist Party, for one example, appeared to take this as a cue to step up reconstruction of clandestine units. B. Elements of a Clandestine Aaratus. A well-developed clandestine apparatus of a Communist party in the West will have some or all of the following elements 1. The Leadership This is usually supplied by one or two high-ranking officers of the open party, plus an adminis- S E Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 trative bureau if the clandestine apparatus is of suf- ficient size to warrant it. Several national Communist parties are now in the advantageous position of having cadres whop in some instances, have had as much as thirty years of party experience, and often much of this time was spent while the party was in an underground status. Luigi Longo, formerly a leader of the clandestine apparatus of the Italian Communist Party (PCI), for example, directed the illegal organ of the Communist Youth Federation:; L'Avanauardia, as early as 1922. From the year 192'7 Longo apparently had close connection with covert Comin- tern units. In 1927 reportedly he helped institute the Italian Communist Party's "Foreign Center" in Paris where he was made responsible for youth work. In this year he also organized an "underground railroad" into and out of Italy. In 1928 he directed a "special service" for the manufacture of false documents and the arrangement for illegal travel, At this time he was also connected with the Organization Section of the PCI's Foreign Center in Paris. He possibly acquired Soviet citizenship in 1929 or 1930 and received training at the Frunze Military Academy in the Soviet Union in the early 1930's. Longo was active in the International Brigades in Spain and during World War II he was engaged in partisan war- fare in northern Italy. In the post World War II period he has held leadership positions in the open and illegal sections of the Italian Communist Party. 2. "Professional" or Reserve Cadres. In this category are found secret members of the Communist party who are of professional backgrounds or who have outstanding poten- tial because of ability or advantageous positions they may occupy. Such key positions may be in other political parties, labor unions or other large organizations. These cadres are usually kept as a reserve to perform highly confidential tasks as needed by the party or possibly by a Soviet intelligence service. They are directly under the administration of a headquarters unit of the party. Persons of this category who are in very SE T NOF INUED CONTROL Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 S E sensitive posts or who perform highly confidential work for the party never take part in normal open Com- munist party activity. Even in countries where the parties enjoy a mass status, as in France and Italy, people of this category are of importance in effecting thorough infiltration of non-Communist organizations, including government agencies. As of 1954 the French Communist Party's clandestine re- serve or "Section Hors Cadre" comprised some 3600 members and included high-ranking military, government, clerical and political leaders according to a report not corroborated. In the apparat were two members of the directing committee of the French Socialist Party, high- ranking Confederation Generale du Travail. (CGT) officers not previously identified as Communists, and functionaries of a French security service. According to an unconfirmed report of July 1955, the Dutch Communist Party (CPN) maintained a secret cadre of "professional" stature which included doctors, government officials, functionaries of the Netherlands General Press Bureau (ANP), etc. In late 1956 the Secretary General of the CPN was reported concentrating on building up a small, aggressive, tightly- knit group which could function in an illegal, clandestine or wartime situation. In Italy also according to an unconfirmed report, a system of "secret membership" was set up in connection with the 1955 membership campaign. Secret members were not issued Party membership cards and their names were inscribed in a special register for which the director of the Italian Communist Party's Central Cadre office was responsible. A special kind of Party activity was to be planned for these members since they could not participate in normal business firm, factory or street cells, Possibly included in this secret category were PCI members prominent in the "fusionist current" of the Italian Socialist Party and some PCI members active in other leftist Parties. In Panama the Communist Party (Partido del Pueblo, or PdP) in 1956 was small, suppressed and illegal; thus its status was completely different from that of the Italian, French or Dutch Communist Parties. Provision was made, Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 S E NO~IMUED CONTROL however, for a build-up of illegal reserve cadres. According to an agreement made at the Sixth Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee held 25 August through 2 September 1956, the PdP was to be reorganized "along the lines of the double clandestine principle." New members who held important positions or who possessed "'significant potential" were not to appear to be affiliated with the Party. Thus in a Pai y already in an illegal status there was provision for a reserve; adre of secret members of special qualifications who could perform highly confidential tasks as needed by the Party. 3. The_Fractions. These are the groups of secret party members who work in organizations the party is penetrating --government agencies., other political parties., mass organizations of all types including those controlled by the Communist party. Information about the methods of operation the fractions are to use in penetrating target organizations has been reported from a Near Eastern country. Here, all members of a Communist fraction In a given organization are controlled by a fraction leader. Rules for the proper functioning of a fraction are described by a Party member as follows: "According to the secret tactics of the Communist Party, a fraction can be kept strong only if its members camouflage themselves and do not reveal themselves as united members of another organization. Members of the fraction, who are all from the party cadre, must make plans in advance to disagree publicly and to argue with one another openly, but in the end they must agree publicly. "The member of the communist fraotion must always report information on the host organization to the Party, whether or not he is specifically ordered to do so. "Each member of the communist fraction must attempt to locate himself in the sensitive parts of the host organization, such as in the leadership, in T Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 T the secretariat, in the treasury, in the organization committee, or in the cadre. "The member of the communist fraction must not admit to any member of the host organ- ization that he is a Communist, and must not show any connection or friendship with. other members of the fraction. "If a member of the fraction reaches a high enough place in the host organization and is strong enough, the Communist Party will order him to make s. split in the host organization... "If the communist fraction has tried to con- trol the policy of the host'organization and has failed, the Party may order it to splinter the host organization." Information is available concerning security measures which were taken by one Communist fraction working within a trade union following restrictive measures taken by the local government after strike action. After the general strike of early January 1956 in Chile, the Com- munist fraction of the Central Un%ca de Trabajadores de Chile (CUTCh) tightened its security procedures during fraction meetings.. Only a part of the fraction met together and then for no longer than 20 minutes. The fraction was told of the place and hour of meetings by rotating liaison men. Meetings generally took place at night in houses of Party members. Any necessary meetings during the daytime were limited to a maximum attendance of three leaders. A copy of a reappraisal or statement of self-criticism prepared in April 1956 by a sub-committee for organi- zation of a Communist Party Departmental Committee was received from a Central American country. The Party here was suppressed and illegal. The statement was particularly critical of the fractions working within the Party's own front groups. Passages of this re- appraisal read as follows: E T Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 S E "The Party binds itself to the masses through the legal organizations which, since they are not clandestine, can unite or at least maintain contact with thousands of students, workers, and women and can provide a vehicle whereby our viewpoints may be transmitted to these groups. Even the Youth Alliance, our own creation, failed. to get anywhere. Our way of thinking and our objectives must be made to reach these sectors through the Party fractions...What have our errors been in this aspect of the struggle? Since the fractions have not been working there has been no unity of action. Various groups, lacking a common denominator, have taken divergent lines. It is urgent that fractions be organized among all sectors of the.popu- lation. "We must first and foremost, as Lenin said have an organization composed in What to D. of people whose profession is revolutionary actions.. "In other words, comrades, the Party must consist of closed, clandestine units which must include only those comrades who have been thoroughly tested in the struggle, in order to avoid the blows of the enemy and prevent enemy infiltration. "But the Party must reach the masses and the people, and it can only do so through broad, legal organizations such as the Students' Federation..., the Federation of Womens' Associations..., and labor unions in general. "It is in the interplay between these two aspects that we have made serious mistakes. We have not even really understood that the ranks of the Party are composed of mili- tants, sympathizers and members of study S E Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 circles. In summary, practical tasks must be decentralized, while the management of the Party must be centralized. "Comrades must understand once and for all that when they are acting within legal organizations they must prevent 'the fear of coming out into the light' from causing them to appear suspicious or mysterious; they must not try to clandestinize the legal organization they work in. They must also avoid the use of stereotyped phraseology- that special language which characterizes Marxists-for obvious reasons." 4 Administration of Party Fractions Traditionally, the work of CP fractions has been supervised by Cadre or Organization departments at either central or regional levels of the party. Some CP's have developed more specialized units to administer CP fractions working in non-Communist organizations and. those guiding the local Communist fronts. According to one report concerning the Japan Communist Party's (JCP's) infiltration program, both the overt and covert parts of it in the 1954-1956 period were supervised by one headquarters unit of the JCP, the United Front Department (UFD), which worked to influence left-wing mass organizations and racial minority groups to form a united national front. Known JC:P members approached non-Communist political groups, trade unions, industrial and commercial concerns openly on behalf of the UFD. Covert JCP members already infiltrated in the target organizations worked behind the scenes toward the establishment of the national front. The UFD placed in influential positions in the non-Communist groups secret JCP members who, without exposing their Communist affiliation, constantly advocated the national front. A report of late 1955 from Indonesia stated that there was a Greater Djakarta Committee member in charge of a cell in Djakarta consisting of Indonesian Communist S E Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 S E Party (PKI) members engaged in four of the most im- portant. penetration operations in that area. The cell, called the Resort Gabungan (United Cell), included mem- bers of four fractions: that working in student groups; that active in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; that in the Prime Minister's Office and that in the Depart- ment of Public Works. All fraction members were secret PKI cadres and were under the direct supervision of the Greater Djakarta Committee rather than of a section committee. According to a subsequent report from Indonesia, PKI fractions were being organized in all other political parties. Fraction and sub-fraction leaders were to report to a PKI Central Committee member who was to act as a coordinator for the various fractions. A re- port of more recent date indicates that most PKI fractions will be under the immediate direction of Instruction Bureaus which have been set up within PKI Section Com- mittees. a. Military Unit. This is responsible for penetration and subtle propaganda work among armed forces personnel; for planning for adequate supplies of arms and ammunition in time of political crisis; for exploiting any political disturbances to Communist advantage and for taking over the leadership of any national rebellion against foreign "imperialists" or local reactionary authorities; for planning and directing acts of sabotage. 6. Intelligence Unit. This is usually directed by one of the party's highest ranking leaders who is in direct or indirect contact with the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB). All significant information procured overtly or covertly by the party will be channeled to him and the most outstanding reports will be passed to KGB. 7. Technics Unit. There may be several of these with each having its own special tasks, which may be the mainte- nance of safehouses, cover firms, escape routes, supplies S E Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 S E C of paper and printing equipment, etc. A repdrt from Holland in June 1954 stated that addresses of persons employed by the technical service of the Communist Party of the Netherlands had to be kept secret. Materials used by this unit were not stored at Party headquarters but in the homes of individuals. Technical units of the underground West German Communist Party (KPD) appeared to be active in the fall of 1956; with the equipment accumulated--electric mimeograph machines, inks, etc, they were printing handbills and other propaganda documents. 8. F'nl apes Unit. This unit is usually responsible for receiving covert funds from-domestic and foreign sources, for exchanging these funds and distributing them as needed. In some Communist parties this unit may be identical with the finance section of the overt Communist party, or is one segment of that section, but performs work which is kept secret from the public and from most of the party's own membership. In other Communist parties the covert finance unit may be a component of the party's covert technical apparatus. (See paragraph 2 of Section H.) For, example, a PCI officer responsible for auditing and other work in connection with the PCI's overt finances is also responsible for handling funds for the PCI supplied by the Soviet Union. These are delivered in suitcases from the Soviet Embassy in Rorne either as sterling or dollar currency. The same PCI officer, with the assistance of another PCI functionary, has the funds transferred into local currency. There are indications that the clandestine finance unit may be responsible for collating economic intelligence reports gathered through party sources and for transmit- ting these to KGB. A KGB defector testified that the same Japan Communist Party (JCP) liaison contact who received funds from KGB was used to transmit intelligence reports from JCP to KGB. In some Parties the Finance Unit may be closely associated with units known as Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R00060016001 ~-4 S E C Economic Commissions, the principal function of which is the collection of economic data. In some parties these Commissions have a covert status. C. Units Charged with Liaison Work Often Have Semi--Covert Status. In addition to the units which have been outlined here as components of a CP's clandestine apparatus, in -many cases there are CP units (or possibly a few designated party mem- bers) which are apparently placed within a CP's overt head- quarters structure even though the units and the activity they perform are rarely mentioned in any of the CP's overt publications or at open party meetings. Examples of such units are those known variously as International Depart- ments, Foreign Affairs Branches, Foreign Sections, etc., which are responsible for a CP's relations, liaison and contacts with other Communist parties, including the Com- munist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). These are counter- parts of the Foreign Section of the Central Committee of the CPSU. The existence of these Foreign Sections does not preclude contacts and meetings between party chairmen, secretaries and other high officials, and in the Stalin era at least, such contacts reduced the activities of the Sections to a more or less routine natures. By the end of 1956, however, with the growing emphasis within the world Communist movement on bilateral and multiparty contacts between Communist parties, these foreign or inter- national departments were becoming increasingly active. Party officials engaged in this work were playing a more responsible role and displaying greater initiative than they had previously. The extent to which covert CPSU directives were channeled through such units in the past is not known; evidence available in 1956 indicated that in some countries the CPSU was then utilizing high-ranking officials of the Communist parties' international or foreign departments to dispel doubts or questions concerning CPSU action. It is known that international front organization conferences and congresses and travel in connection with these events are exploited as opportunities for confidential inter-party communication. The constantly increasing number of Communist- sponsored delegations to and from Soviet-bloc countries S E T , _LOOM NOFO TINUED CONTROL Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 S E C provide additional means for transmitting sensitive communi- cations, particularly between the CPSU and non-Orbit Com- munist parties. Routine inter-party communications, however, seem to be handled by the foreign or international depart- ments of the central committees of the respective Communist parties. II. CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES Information about a Communist party's clandestine organization is usually more difficult to procure than Information about the party's covert activities. Party members are always cau- tioned not to reveal anything about the party's organization- either the open or clandestine sections of the partyhich must be protected at all costs. Structure of the underground organization is usually compartmented with each part sealed off as completely as possible from all other parts. The little that is known about current clandestine organizational structure, however, is sufficient to show that the structure or form is tailored to fit functional requirements. Since much more in- formation is available about covert activity, the rest of this study illustrates selected instances of covert action under- taken by several Communist parties during the 1954-1956 period. A comprehensive report is not attempted. Clandestine or semi-clandestine work in which the Communist parties or the front organizations were engaged fell into one of the following major categories: (a) penetration of other political parties and mass organizations by legal Communist parties (b) political action by illegal Communist parties (c) penetration of civilian and military branches of non-Communist governments (d) Communist party information procurement (e) information procurement by international fronts Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 S E (f) involvement in military action and preparations; terrorism (g) sabotage, including moderate tactics to slow down production or more violent forms of sabotage such as damage to factory machinery, rail lines, oil pipe lines, etc, (h) "technical" work: activity which involves the preparation of underground leaflets a procurement of safehouses, planning of escape routes; finance work: management of all funds procured clandestinely; procuring of funds through front organization sources, etc., for a party which is operating completely under- ground. (i) security measures and preparations for underground existence. During the period covered by this study, 1954 through 1956, greatest emphasis in Communist covert work was placed on infil- tration of other political parties, non-Communist mass organi- zations and non-Communist governments. Specific directives for this work appeared in the Cominform journal prior to the termination of that publication, An article of 27 November 1953 written by Pietro Secchia, Deputy General Secretary of the Italian Communist Party, stated: "Experience shows that we need to intensify the work of Communists outside the Party: at the enterprises, working-class meetings, in groups, in places where work- ing people go for rest and leisure, in trade unions, in co-operatives, municipal and provincial councils, in the mass organizations, as well as their activity in the organizations of our adversaries and amidst working people under their influence." A subsequent Cominf onn journal article of 13 January 1956 written by Nozaka Sanzo and entitled, "Vital Points in Resolution of Sixth National Conference of Japanese Communist Party" reads in part: "Lenin taught us that to heighten the political conscious- ness of the masses and win them over ideologically, Com- munists ought to work in mass organisations of all kinds, 13 S E Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 S E T NOFOR INUED CONTROL including reactionary organisations, if the proletarian and semi-proletarian masses belong to them." A. Penetrations of Other Political Parties and Mass Organizations by Legal Communist Parties Western Hemisphere. 1. Paraguay. After the failure of political alliance with the Liberal Party in May 1955, the Communist Party of Paraguay tried to increase its infiltration of other mass organizations, including labor unions and other political parties. Certain secret Communist Party , members who were used as penetration agents in other parties were identified by local security services. The penetration program had been successful to a certain degree, as of about mid-1956. in the Colorado Party, the dominant conservative political organization of Paraguay, Communists had achieved penetrations at middle levels. For instance, the former president of one of the Colorado Party units in Asuncion was believed by Paraguayan authorities to be a Communist. 2. The United States. At a convention of the Underground National Committee of the Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA) in the latter part of 1953, it was decided that an extensive infiltration by Communists and sympa- thizers should be made into existing major political parties and organizations with special emphasis on the Democratic Party, with the aim of gaining leadership posts from which to influence policy. In certain areas of the United States Communists would infiltrate the Republican Party. In the latter part of 1955 the CPUSA leadership was about to initiate a project whereby "colonizers" were to be established in the South so that CPUSA would have a nucleus of Coimnunists, unidentified as such, throughout the labor movement in the southern states. These people would be available for future underground assignments if CPUSA needed their services. Direction 14 S E T NOFO BD CONTROL Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 25X1A2g Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 and the latter's student organizations, for example, the Sindicato Espanol Universitaria., In July 1956 a Partido Comunista de Espana (PCE) leader designated as PCE's immediate objective the lending of moral and material encouragement to all political or parapolitical organizations of a clandestine and opposition nature, including the most extreme monarchists. The PCE was to concentrate chiefly on the c'hristian Democrat group supported by high ecclesiastics and a large section of the Spanish ,piddle class. The Party was to give special attention to government officials in the middle salary scale, intellectuals, and university students,.all of whom PCE regarded as "having more time to think than to spend money". The PCE's official view as of July 1956 was that it was easier and more practical to disrupt the existing order than to organize a large Communist faction, because Spain was then ready to awake from her lethargy but was not prepared to adopt a Communist alternative to the Franco regime. The Communists might ,aim strength if the regime were overthrown by violence, in this case the Communists could establish themselves in a more favor- able position, although under the auspices of some other political group. The POE wanted a campaign to damage and divide the present regime but not under the Communist banner, since the Party wanted to avoid any outward traces of Communist intervention in a possible political change in Spain. The PCE regarded a political evolution of a rightist tendency, which would not be alarming to the average Spaniard, as an essential prerequisite for the definite establishment of Communism in Spain. The PCE was willing to submit to a leadership which was neither Communist, socialist nor even republican in order to gain positions from which it could later launch its bid for power. In 1956 the PCE was especially eager to arrive at an agreement with the Basque Nationalists. The PCE believed that the Basque Nationalists were very active in support of the labor unrest in northern Spain earlier in 1956 16 S Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 S E and that their influence was supreme in the Northern provinces which were the most fertile grounds for a revolt against the regime. A second tactical objective of the PCE was a campaign among the working classes to shake off their lethargy and to develop an industrial transformation even though this had to be done in the name of the official trade unions. A third tactical objective of the PCE was the organization of Juntas for Economic Protection. By the summer of 1956 these had been established in 276 Spanish firms, and although the majority were not Communist inspired, 24 of them were run by Party members who, although not having backgrounds as prominent Communists, were obtain- ing outstanding results, Far Ea 1. Singapore. One of the reasons for progress of Communist influence in Singapore was the fact that the. Communists achieved infiltration and strong influence in the best- organized, most dynamic political party, the Peoples' Action Party (PAP). Leading officials of the Government of Singapore denounced the PAP as the instigator and director of Chinese student disorders. The PAP's program had come to be identical in most respects with that advocated by the international Communist party line, PAP leaders were also key figures in the extremist labor unions which were responsible for major strikes in Singapore.* 2, Malaya. In early 1956 the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) was reported to have directed some of its followers to enter political, labor and educational organizations as individuals, maintaining only secret ties with the Communist Party. The Communist plan apparently required that members enter these organizations and follow os- tensibly individual tactics. Each Communist was to build up a strong following and advance himself within * For these reasons several of PAP' s left-wing leaders were arrested and imprisoned in August 1957. 17 S E Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 S E NOFQB U6?7n UED CONTROL the penetrated organization by hard work, winning of friends and procuring votes by merit. Once he attained a position of prominence, he could then begin to exert Communist influence. Middle East Pakistan. Three Communist functionaries in late Sep- tember 1955 were drafting a new thesis covering proposed operational techniques for the Communist Party of Pakistan (CPP) to utilize during its illegal status. The thesis was to reciommend,that all Party members seek outlets for Party-directed political activity by gaining foot- holds wherever possible in established, legal, political organizations, including the Muslim League. The thesis adopted recommendations sent to the CPP in April 1955 by the General Secretary of the Communist Party of India. Even prior to this, however, the student fraction of the CCP was reported to have infiltrated successfully the Muslim Student's Federation and the Lahore Committee of that Federation had elected a Communist as its secretary. As of late November 1956 Communists in East Pakistan had succeeded in building an extensive and efficient organization within the East Pakistan Awami League (EPAL). Responsible for Communist influence over the EPAL was the Communist fraction within EPAL's central leadership. In addition to their prominent position in EPAL, Communists were then still in control of EPAL's closest ally of the moment, the Ganatantri Dal. Western HemiZhere 1. Pe . As of October 1956 the Partido Comiunista Peruano PCP) was planning to continue to concentrate its main energies on the penetration and control of the Partido Accion Popular (PAP) because this party had received much support from the laboring class and because the PCP considered that the PAP leader, Fernando BELAUNDE Terry, was the political figure least likely to attach himself to the reactionaries. A PCP campaign was under way to support the PAP and PCP was also forming groups of workers S E Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 S E C (presumably secret PCP members and sympathizers) to try to assume certain directing posts of the PAP. A somewhat earlier report from Peru stated that although PCP members were affiliating with other political parties, they would continue to receive Communist indoctrination through intimate meetings of small groups of Communists. Such groups would consist mostly of people of the same profession so that similarity of interests could serve as cover, 2. Guatemala. By late 1955 Guatemalan Communists had de- cided that in the future they would not oppose activities of the various anti-Castillo groups which were both inside and outside Guatemala, but that they would use them by guiding them discreetly, through penetration agents, along lines most beneficial to the Communist movement. In early January a Guatemalan Workers' Party (PGT, Co munist) cell in Guatemala City discussed in- filtrating the Sisniega Otero political movement. Plans were made whereby a group of persons not known to be connected with the Communist Party would present Sisniega with a set of proposals towards the achievement of which Sisniega's group would work. The first proposals would be limited to a series of demands on the Govern- ment for a more tolerant political atmosphere, for ? the raising of salaries and lowering of prices. Later, when the Sisniega movement had gained momentum, the Communists in it would demand freedom for political prisoners, return of exiles and freedom for the establish- ment of opposition political parties, including the PGT. About the first of February 1956 leaders of the PGT exiled in Mexico sent directives to PGT underground leaders in Guatemala. Among these were instructions pertaining specifically to PGT penetrations of non- Communist organizations: "Abstain from defending the points of view and slogans of the Party in order to avoid being suspected. 19 S E Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013 "4 S E C "The members of the Party who are not well known, preferably sympathizers, should affiliate with or join anti-Communist' organizations or committees in order to be above any suspicion. "Infiltrate into the anti-Communist parties, especially those closest to the government, as many unknown Party members as possible. "Those Party members who have already in- filtrated the anti-Communist parties should provoke discussions within the anti-Communist parties. "When discords or conflicts develop within or be- tween anti-Communist parties, do not favor in any manner whatsoever any faction but maintain an absolute impartiality and try as much as possible to accentuate the conflict and bring about the dissolution of the party. "Try in every manner possible to increase the number of Party members working for government agencies, especially the Ministries and executive offices. "Maintain conflicts and divisions among those groups striving to re-establish unions, always giving preference to those groups of Catholic orientation." C. Penetration of Civilian and Military Branches of Non-Communist Governments. Numerous reports of 1955 and early 1956 show that the Com- munist parties wanted to extend and improve their work among armed forces personnel in non-Orbit countries, and some indicate that the parties wanted their members to take advantage of training offered by the military services. Penetration of civilian agencies also received emphasis. As previously mentioned, in several areas provisions were SE Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 S E NOFO INUED CONTROL made whereby especially well-qualified (or well-placed) government employees were recruited and retained as secret party members. Communist penetration at high levels of government ministries controlling information and propa- ganda was of great value in gaining strong influence in both Egypt and Syria. Europe 1. Finland. The Finnish Communist Party was reported in November 1955 to be keeping close watch on the activities of the Reserve Officers' League, the Reserve Non-Com- missioned Off icers? League and the Comrade Support Or- ganization, which is composed of former SS men (Finns who volunteered for service on the eastern front in the German elite corps). Party instructions issued prior to 15 December 1955 reportedly contained the following provisions concerning the subject of military training for Finnish Communists in the armed forces: "...when party members, or the children of member families, are called into the army they will be instructed to obtain all possible training that the army offers. They must not try to avoid assignment to a noncommissioned officer school but should, through exemplary deportment, attempt to win such appointments. The same applies to officer school. In fact, such youths who appear to have the educational prerequisites for officer training must actually apply for it. The youth must be instructed to make voluntary application also to all possible courses, such as communications, radio-telephone training, etc." 2. West Germa v. SED/KPD leaders assumed that many young people of West Germany would prefer service in the army to difficult working conditions in certain industries, for example in the mining industry. The Party was there- fore making provisions for direct contact with Army- SE T NOF TINUED CONTROL Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 S E personnel by reinfiltrating as volunteers members who were formerly non-commissioned or officer personnel in the Army. Far East 1. Indonesia. The Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) imple- mented plans for systematic infiltration of the Army,and as part of this plan, PKI worked to place its members in positions vacated by over-age soldiers who were being discharged. It was also trying to recruit new members among rank and file. The intensive penetration campaign called for fraternization by individual PKI members with Army and police personnel. Low level penetration was being accompanied by efforts to exert influence at Army General Staff level. The greatest concentration of Communist penetration in the Indonesian Army was centered among non-commissioned officer personnel in the Djakarta area. Although there apparently had not been extensive infiltration at the General Staff level of Army headquarters by the end of 1956, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Suryadarma, had leftist leanings, and his wife was a known Communist. Military command posts of Indonesia's several military districts were filled by non-Communists, but secondary levels of the district commands were infiltrated in some cases. The deputy to the military commander in North Sumatra, Major Macmour, supplied arms in January 1957 to several hundred plantation workers who were members of a Communist-controlled labor union. Town command posts in some places were rather solidly under Communist control. For example, the Djakarta Town Commander, Major Dachjar, was a puppet of his Chief of Staff, Major Marsudi, who was pro-Communist. In early 1957 Communists were concentrating on pene- trating one Army division, the Siliwangi Division, which they believed to be the last block to military control of all Java. At least two regimental officers of the division, one of whom was a regimental commander, were S E C Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 S E T NOF INUED CONTROL Communists who were trying to exert influence on the division commander, Suprajogi. 2. a a.. Tabulation of known Japan Communist Party (JCP) operations against the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) shows that the following JCP subversive activities were directed at the SDF in the period January to August 1955 a. four cases of JCP intelligence operations b. 68 cases of JCP propaganda and agitation c. 16 cases of JCP-inspired obstructive demon- strations d. 60 cases of infiltration into the SDF e, 13 cases of operations to win over SDF personnel Ten persons who were confirmed JCP members and 29 suspected members were found in the SDF. As a means of penetrating some Ground Self-Defense garrisons, the JCP organized and administered economic study circles. The JCP anticipated considerable success for its penetration efforts through the use of these circles and claimed to have enlisted as sympathizers in one garrison more than two percent of the personnel within a one-year period. Near East Egypt. The infiltration of Communist sympathizers or secret Communist party members into goverment positions was one of the major factors causing the Egyptian Govern- ment to draw progressively closer to the Soviet bloc. These persons continually exerted every influence to move Egypt into the Soviet orbit and to stimulate con- ditions within Egypt which would permit the growth of Communism. Control over a few key government positions was greatly significant since governmental control over 23 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 S E C economic and cultural activity in Egypt is highly concentrated. The Minister of National Guidance, Fathi Radwan, responsible for supervision over all media of communication--press, radio, etc.-probably was an example of Communist pene- tration. Whatever his actual status was, Communist Party member, sympathizer, or fanatic nationalist, his actions played into the hands of those who wanted Egypt firmly within the Soviet bloc. In November 1950 Radwan was elected to the governing body of the World Peace Council, the Communist-dominated international "peace" movement. After 1952 he :Wade an apparent effort to disassociate himself from "peace" activities, especially on the international level. It has been reliably reported that direction for all Commmunist activity in Egypt was provided by a few leaders of the local "peace partisan" movement. In the past Radwan was closely connected with these persons. Inflammatory propaganda heard over the Egyptian State Broadcasting Company (over which Radwan ultimately had charge) was frequently of such nature that Communist undertones were unmistakable. 2. Iraq. The Communist Party of Iraq (CPI) had very few members in the Iraqi Armed Forces. These were, however, among "educated" NCO's and privates--i.e., those NCO's and privates who were graduates of elementary schools. Such men were to be found ii Communications, Electrical Engineers, Mechanical Engineers, and Artillery Branches of the Army, and in its School of Military Industry; in the Air Force and at the Ministry of Defense. The CPI was reportedly less interested in officers of the Armed Forces (possibly because the CPI considered these men not susceptible to recruitment), and never had more than a few members at the officer level. The CPI may have succeeded in recruiting one or two officers at the Ministry of Defense but it failed in attempts to recruit unit commanders. The CPI formerly directed its activities in the Iraqi Armed Forces through a Military Committee. This Corn- 24 S E Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 SEA mittee was isolated from all other national committees of the Party and was attached directly to the Central Committee, Harold 'Uthman, who became Secretary General of the CPI in June 195, considered this direct tie, a security hazard and reportedly dissolved the Military Committee. The CPI's organization within the Iraqi Armed Forces in the early part of 1956 reportedly was directed by one member of the Central Committee, He conducted his business with Party organizations within the Iraqi Armed Forces through messengers. One member of each of the Party's four regional Branch Committees was responsible for the CPI organization in military units in his territory and reported directly to the responsible Central Committee member, The Party organization in each branch of the army (i.e., artillery, signal corps, engineers) had a leader who was responsible to a chief organizer for the Party organization in the Iraqi Army, The Party organization in the Air Force was compartmented from that in the Army and its leader reported directly to the appropriate member of the Central Committee, 3, Syria, Since early 1955 about a dozer. Syrian Army officers have been reported as Communists. Most con- spicuous of these was Captain Burhan Qassab Hasan, Chief of the Syrian Army's Information and Education Office. From this position it was possible for him to exercise general censorship of the press during periods of tennsion. In early 1956 there was evidence of a Communist organi- zation within the Syrian Army, the leader of which was in personal contact with Khalid Bakdash, Secretary General of the Syrian Communist Party, Details of this organi- zation are not known. Two reports stated that the Syrian Communist Party had instructed its members to join the Army. According to an estimate of January 1956, 6,000 Communist volunteers had enlisted. Some of these were of NCO and officer categories. By the 25 S E C Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 S E C early part of 1956 the Syrian Deuxieme Bureau from the chief downwards-reportedly had strong leftist leanings. Reports of April and September 1955 indicated that the Syrian Communist Party was focusing its infiltration effort toward the NCO training center near Latakia; reportedly the Party was trying to reach those NCO?s who had contact with large numbers of enlisted men. Traditionally, the Communist parties have been instruments of information procurement. To support their political, labor and economic programs efforts have been made to collect all available data pertinent to these three fields of activity and each party member automatically was expected to report all information of interest to the party. Accordingly, to a large degree, information procurement carried out by the non-Orbit Communist parties in the 1954-1956 period was directed toward background political information, including biographic and public opinion surveys, and economic and industrial information. Much of the data collected appears to have been of unclassified nature. During the Stalinist period, both major Soviet intelligence services benefited from the foreign Communist party informa- tion procurement programs. In periods of extreme need (during World War II in the United States and Canada, for exampl4 whole groups of Communist party members or trusted sympathizers worked to acquire data about Soviet intelligence targets. Such action took place despite Soviet intelligence restrictions inhibiting use of members of foreign Communist parties in espionage. Evidence available in the 1954?1956 period indicated that Soviet intelligence continued to benefit from foreign Com- munist party and front group acquisition of political, economic and industrial data. Soviet intelligence still appeared to be working with certain trusted CP leaders in the exploitation of Communist party information, facilities 26 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 and personnel. There were indications that questionnaires or "guides" circulated by higher bodies of certain Com- munist parties and by certain international front organi- zations were of Soviet origin. The questionnaires requested detailed and copious information pertaining to government, industry, political coloring of the population, labor laws, etc. There are several indications that the Soviets may be relying on certain Communist parties and front organizations for talent-spotting services. At least one international front and one national Communist party are showing special interest in the development of correspondents for their respective publications. In the case of the international front, the Soviet representative to the executive body of a trade union international of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) is particularly desirous of developing worker correspondents in western countries. The Japan Communist Party (JCI') has been showing interest in the development and training of news correspondents. It is apparently true that the JCI? news organ, Akahata, had poor news coverage in certain fields, but with the Soviets establishing an official mission .in Japan with the restoration of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Japan, it is possible that revitalizing of the JCP's overt news reporting system may have stemmed from a Soviet requirement. The Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB) is =Without doubt expanding its legal networks in Japan and needs help in spotting persons with the proper ideological motivation and the ability to report on intellir gence targets. Europe 1. Italy. According to a report of July 1955, the Italian Communist Party (PCI) Economic-Political Institute pre- sented the PCI Directorate with a detailed study on the activity of United States firms in petroleum develop- meat in Central Italy (Abruzzi) and Sicily. An uncon- firmed report stated that the study was made at the request of the Soviet Embassy in Rome. 27 SE Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 S E j1oF fuED CONTROL 25X1X7 The Economic Studies Office of the PCI` was asked in January 1956 to prepare itineraries and programs for a group of Polish technicians visiting Italy who wanted to visit all the Montecatini industrial plants. Among the Polish technicians there were to be some representa- tives of the Polish Intelligence Service who would col- lect as much data as possible on the plants. The Economic Studies Office of the PCI was urged to assist in this information procurement project. Of more immediate interest to the PCI itself were rumor collecting offices ("raccolta voci") which, according to unconfirmed reports, were set up in 1956 some time prior to August and attached to the Press and Propa- ganda Commissions at each Federation headquarters. These were to remain in operation for a temporary period only and were to collect all rumors concerning the various currents within the Party, dismissals, resignations, deviations, etc. Rumors circulating both inside and outside the Party were to be noted, In Brig, Switzerland in late 1955 a physical search on the person of Francesco Scotti, Italian C oimrunist Party functionary, revealed two written requests from the Chinese Legation in Bern for information on journalists affiliated with Corriere de la Sera, an independent, pro-government Milan daily newspaper. Scotti admitted having visited the Chinese Legation and subsequently was 25X1X7 25X1X7 and permitted to enter Italy. Scotti was then a member of the Foreign Section of the Italian CP and was responsible for liaison with the Chinese Communists. 2. West Germany. The Department for Federal, State and Communal Policy was, until the banning of the Communist Party in West Germany, that department ixaediately responsible for Party policy with respect to action taken by the federal, state and local government agencies. It also guided the activities of Party members employed Possibly this was the Economic Studies Office of the CGIL, the Communist controlled trade union. S E Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 SE in local, state or federal government offices. Some of the specific functions of this Department involved procurement and/or exploitation of information, including (a) collection of information pertaining to communal problems caused by the United States and/or other outside armed forces; (b) collection of data concerning unemploy- ment, sanitation', welfare, schools and refugee affairs; (c) furnishing the Mass Agitation Department with inf or- mation for political exploitation; (d) organizing communal delegations to visit the German Democratic Republic; (e) initiating a program aimed at establishing contact between communal representatives of East and West Germany. Far East 1. Indonesia. A somewhat comparable but much more com- prehensive questionnaire was sent to all section and provincial committees of the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) after the fourth plenary session of the Central Committee of that Party in August 1956. It was entitled, "Working Guide for all Secoms and Provcoms" and contained questions pertaining to government offices and personnel in the provinces, local government regulations and decisions, and the members and actions of people?s councils. The "guide" also contained questions about political parties and labor organizations in all areas. Time limits were specified for the completion of each portion of the questionnaire and instructions about methods of procuring the information of each category were provided. Although these questionnaires were directed toward overt information, the results would have been of obvious value to any intelligence service. One part of the PKI questionnaire which pertained to other politi- cal parties in Indonesia:., specifically requested that the Party member be objective and not color his reply 25X1X6 by adding opinion. 25X1X6 testified that KGB officers, in evaluating reports received from Japan Communist Party elements, took into consideration the fact that they were slanted.) The prominence given in the questionnaire to information about government regulations also suggested that it may have originated 29 SE Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 S E with an intelligence service of an Orbit country. Soviet intelligence services frequently have relied upon foreign Communist parties to supply operational infor- mation of this nature. Also, the plan or outline of the questionnaire follows in general the outline of a KGB headquarters letter to a field representative known to have been used in some instances. the information targets, the degree of urgency, and instructions as to how the information could be procured. 2. Japan. In February 1956 certain JCP functionaries were forwarding to a member of Ambassador Malik's delegation in London reports on domestic public opinion regarding the Japan-Soviet talks about the re-establishment of diplomatic relations. The contents of the report included. (a) information obtained at meetings held in Japan on internal attitudes and conditions regarding the restoration of Japan-Soviet diplomatic relations; (b) Prime Minister Hatoyar?_a's policies, obtained from newspapers and politi- cians; (c) views expressed by Kazami Akira's group re- garding Socialist Party activities in connection with the Japan-Soviet negotiations. The information was compiled, edited into a monthly review entitled "News on the Restoration of Japan-Soviet Diplomatic Relations", and forwarded to London with one copy in English and one. in Japanese.* In July 1956 one JCP Regional Committee requested the units under its command to make a study of the House of Councillors election campaign. A questionnaire or "guide" was provided for the use of Party units as- signed to collect the data. According to the guide, subjects to be covered were, for example, number of JCP votes by district, names of JCP supporters, criti- cism of JCP candidates, questions pertinent to the financing of the election campaign and interference from "outside elements". Probably the reports were prepared in a journalistic style in order to appear innocuous and overt. Similar reporting procedures have been employed in the past by the French Communist Party. 30 SE Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 S i MINUED CONTROL Western Hemisphere 1. Brazil. Over a two-year period the Communist Party of Brazil compiled detailed information on the extent of the United States' participation in the Brazilian economy. The results of this effort were tabulated in a report prepared in four copies in approximately Jan- uary 1956. One copy was sent to Moscow for the use of persons planning Soviet economic policy with respect to Brazil; the remaining three were retained by the Party for its own use. The report contained detailed information on the finances and organization of United States firms in Brazils as well as the identities of Brazilian political figures who invested in these companies. The bulk of the material used in the report was gathered from United States economic publications and from the Diario i is , publication of the Brazilian Government. 2. MexjCO. A report of October 1956 stated that a general survey of all factories and industries was to be conducted by the Partido Comunista Mexicano (PCM) over a period of several months. Jorge Saldivar, organization sec- retary of the PCM Federal District Committee, issued a blanket order to all Party cells under his jurisdiction to furnish detailed information on all factories and industries operating in their immediate vicinity. Such information was to be furnished on all factories regard- less of size. The reason given was that the survey would facilitate future PCM penetration of these factories or industries. The following specific instructions were issued to all PCM cells in the Federal District area in connection with this survey: a. List the address of each shop, factory, or industry located in the general vicinity of the cell's operating area. b. Give in detail the type of work each employee is doing in factory or industry. Title of 31 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 worker? Number of hours he works each week? Salary? c. State whether workers in each factory or industry are unionized. If so, to which union do they belong? Political affiliation of each union? d. Give the type of management of each factory or industry. Is management native, foreign, or mixed? Political ideology of each member of management personnel? e. State the capital structure of each factory or industry. Is capital native, foreign, or mixed? Proportions? f. Give detailed information on any social or political group that has attempted. to make overtures to the employees of each factory or industry. g. Outline worker's most urgent problems. For example, does he have an adequate water supply, is there sufficient electricity in his living area, are the streets near his home paved, are there adequate shopping facilities, is there adequate schooling? h. Give particulars on any other information that appears to be pertinent. 3. The United States. In late 1955 the Communist Party of the United States set up an Economic Commission headed by Victor Perlo which worked covertly. The Commission was to make a complete survey of the economic situation in the United States which ostensibly would serve as a basis for the Party's policies in the 1956 elections.* Elizabeth Bentley and other Communist defectors in the United States have testified concerning Victor Perlo's effective role in secret CPUSA apparats which procured information for the Soviets. 32 S E Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 In late 1956 certain CPUSA leaders showed considerable interest in the announcement by certain United States Senators that when Congress convened in January 1957 they would take steps to curb filibusters by trying to change Senate procedure rules. All CPUSA districts were instructed to advise national headquarters immediately of the reaction of Negro, trade union, agricultural, religious and other non-Communist organizations to the proposal. E, Information Procurement by International Fronts Trade Union International of Public and Allied Earoloyee_. Excerpts from a questionnaire originating with an inter- national front organization illustrate that these Communist bodies also serve as information procurement agencies. The front organization involved was the Trade Union Inter- national of Public and Allied Employees. (TUI/PAE), an organ of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), The questionnaire was dated 6 June 1956 and one recipient was the Professional Trade Union of Telecommunications Employees and Allied Branches of Chile. The stated purpose of the questionnaire was to obtain facts which would permit this TUT to make a study of the legal position of Government employees. The letter of transmittal accompanying the questionnaire pointed out that the TUI/PAE expected that certain questions could be answered easily and rapidly; therefore it requested that some answers be submitted by letter without delay; answers to other questions which pre- sented difficulties or required more time were to be sent in later. One of those which it anticipated could be an- swered immediately was question 3 under section B. "Questionnaire: Statute on Personnel A. Existence of Reg u1a_ti ons 1. Is there a law or statute for personnel of public services in your country compiling basic legal provisions establishing their legal position? 33 S E C Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160OIZ-4 2. Instead of legislative provisions are there one or several collective agreements? 3. Is the statute or collective contract applicable to all workers of the public services? Indicate the categories to which it applies. 4. Which are the non-benefiting categories of each and which are desirous of being included? 5. Are there specifications defining the relations of the workers and officials of the public services with the State? B. Their Contents 1. If there exists a special preamble, indicate the most important principles and ideas. LNumbering is as in original paragraph 2 is missing/ 3. Does the statute or collective agreement contain paragraphs on: the authorization or denial of trade union rights? On the right to strike. On the right of trade unions to represent their memberships before administrative tribunals? Are there provisions or restrictions on the exercise of civil rights and on the democratic liberties of public service personnel? Is the Statute applied without distinction as to race, age, sex, or nationality'? 4. Does the statute or collective agreement establish the creation of commissions or similar organs charged with examination of matters which affect personnel and for insuring the application of the terms of the statute? 5. How are these organs composed and in what manner are their members designated? 34 S E -C Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 S E C Do they have a consultative character or do they have power of enforcement? D. The Validity of the Statute as a Legal Base Do there exist infractions of the statute on the part of State organs? What actions have the personnel taken in the trade unions or other bodies to defend the statute or any of its parts? In this respect what is the mission discharged by legal institutions such as administrative tribunals? What have been the judgments handed down by these tribunals?" Although answers to these questions primarily would aid the agitation-propaganda program of the WFTU, some of the answers would also be of value to a foreign intelligence service which wanted to place.'deep cover agents in government positions and needed to know how such agents would be protected by local laws. At the founding conference of the TUI of Public and Allied Employees a Committee was set up called the United Action Committee to Win and Defend Trade Union Rights. The TUI/PAE attempted to present the United Action Committee as an independent group composed of both ICFTU and 4TFTU components. Actually the United Action Committee was purely an instrument of the WFTU-controlled TUI/PAE, Some communications obviously initiated by the TUI/F'AE itself were sent out under the name of United Action Committee. For instance, a question- naire almost identical with the one just quoted appeared in at least one non-Orbit country under the name of the United Action Committee. F. Involvement Jn Military Action Preparations Terrorism The Communist parties, in line with established practice, have tried in almost every area where there was an organized Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 national liberation or resistance movement to assume the leadership or these forces. According to revolutionary theory, Communists are obliged to provide coordination, leadership and correct orientation for all liberation forces, especially in places where these have achieved ''mass" status. If such movements tend to disintegrate, Communists must conduct appropriate agitation-propaganda to rally popular support and revitalize them. Training for most of these paramilitary forces appears to be given locally, frequently by non-Communist elements of the resistance organization. In Syria, following Israeli and Anglo-French military action against Egypt, the Central C onmittee of the SyrianCosnmunist Party encouraged Communist Party members to enroll in popular resistance organizations being armed and trained by the Syrian Government for emergency defense of the country. In one unconfirmed case, however, young Communists received training behind the Iron Curtain for future paramilitary action in their own country. In 1956 at a school in Poland known as the Lazne Jesenik School, 450 young Greeks between the ages of 18 and 21 were undergoing training in guerrilla warfare and tactics for future partisan activities in Greece. Instruction was given by Greek and Czech Communists; the majority of the students were children kidnapped in 1949 who received intensive schooling in Communist ideology and tactics. Near East Syria. The Central Committee for the Support of Egypt was a national resistance organization set up in August 1956 at the instigation of the Egyptian government and financed by it. Leadership of this Committee was strongly left-wing; some reports even stated that the leader of the Syrian Communist Party, Khalid Bakdash, was a member of it. Possible Communist utilization of this Committee was indicated in the account of its establishment of popular defense organizations. These were issued Czech submachine 36 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4. guns and participants received military training. Although ostensibly organized for resistance to external aggression, their training, as noted by a Western observer in Damascus, was more along lines of "mob training and fighting techniques of the Communists" than actual military training for defense of the country. A Syrian Army officer long reported as a Communist and arrested in connection with Communist participation in riots in Aleppo in February 1956, allegedly was involved in the supervision of this training. North Africa Algeria. For several months after the outbreak of the national rebellion in Algeria in November 1954, the Algerian Communist Party (ACP) held back and gave little significant support to the movement. By.June 1955, how- ever, it was more directly participating, At this time the ACP's membership was largely Arab, but French elements were most significant in its leadership. Propaganda in support of the rebels was disseminated, forged docu- ments for rebel use were being prepared by clandestine cells of Communist activists, and modest amounts of other material aid were being provided. According to a Com- munist Party statement, refugees were being sheltered and certain acts of sabotage were committed in collabo- ration with other nationalist elements. By the beginning of 1956 the ACP was strongly agitating on behalf of the liberation movement and was strengthening its efforts to promote a united front between nationalists and "pro- gressive Europeans". The ACP-in accordance with Communist teachings--conceived its role in the movement as that of unifier, coordinator, and eventually controller. An article in a March 1956 issue of the ACP's Liberty which is published clandestinely stated: "the Communists support... armed patriots whoever they may be who promote liberation, whether armed groups of the National Front (FLN),. groups directed by the Communists, Fighters of Liberty, the National 37 SE II flJUED CONTROL Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Algerian Movement (MNA), or isolated combatants.... We will do everything to unify and coordinate their actions." The ACPts intention ultimately to lead the revolutionary movement became clear in June 1955. Paul Caballero, secretary of the ACP, was arrested on 20 June 1955 in Algiers, in application of a judgment of the Court of Appeals condemning him to a year in prison and a large fine for action threatening the security of the state. At the time of his arrest, he had on his person docu- ments concerning the deliberations of the Political Bureau and the Central Committee of the ACP. These documents brought out the intention of the ACP to assume the leadership of the rebel movement with the support of the Moslem nationalist masses. In June 1955 it was announced at the ACPts Oran Committee meeting that the ACP had put armed groups into action in the Aures. Extensive reporting appeared in the Algerian press during October 1956 concerning the uncovering of Communist "technical" cells working within the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN). According to the ;press, some of these cells were responsible for the manufacture and storing of explosives; some stored Communist propaganda tracts, and still others prepared false identity docu- ments for the rebels or produced photographs of rebel fighters to be used on such documents. In the latter part of 1955 the Confederation Generale du Travail (CGT, Communist controlled labor federation) was serving as "cover" for certain French Communist Party activities in France. Film sessions were being organized by the CGT for showing to North African workers in France. The films had been produced during the Indo- china war to teach sabotage techniques to Viet Mmnh fighters. Also, Communist militants in France, aided by CGT unions, were assembling North African militants in order to trans- fer them to the Aures where they could join the rebels. believed that all .elements 25X1 X7 of the French Communist Party's technical apparatus which 38 S E NOFO CONTROL Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 formerly worked to support the Viet Minh had been performing services on behalf of the Algerian rebels. Following the roundup of workers in an underground printing plant, it was found that all French Communists involved had worked for the Viet Minh until approximately the spring of 1955, then had been transferred to work for the Algerian rebel cause. Western Hemisphere 39 S wim INUED CONT ' T Brazil* Discovery of a Communist Party arms cache, seizure of a Party document setting forth the basic principles to be followed by Communists in carrying out revolutionary action in Brazil and specific mention in a Party speech of the formation of armed guerrilla bands indicate that military action received some con- sideration by the Brazil Communist Party. Two documents in Portuguese were confiscated, one of them entitled, "Conventional Warfare and Guerrilla Warfare", found in the possession of a member of the Central Committee of the Brazil Communist Party who left it when he fled from the police, and another entitled "Combatting Tanks in Street Fighting". The f ollouing pertinent passages appeared in the first documents,"Conventional Warfare and Guerrilla Warfare",: "Whatever may be the developments in the international situation (peace or war), the outlook of the establishment in our nation of a popular revolutionary government is closely linked with the establishment of a popular revolutionary army. Fundamentally, the basis of a popular army is the arming of the masses. It may be said that the new People's army is being formed among us at present within the struggles of the masses of Brazilian workers against hunger, exploita- tion, and police violence in urban and rural regions, by the resistance of the majority of the nation against the colonization of Brazil, and by the imminent threat of another imperialist war. On the other hand, in a ROL Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 ONTINt3ED CONTROL country like ours, in which the Armed Forces have such strong traditions of fraternization and even active participation in popular inde- pendence movements, for the republic and against imperialism, the inestimable contribution which the nation expects and should receive from its Armed Forces must be taken into account, whether the contribution be by the cadre or by the support of the great masses of soldiers and sailors in the struggles of the working masses, or be it by the adhesion of entire units, men and material, to the patriotic struggle, "An intense, constant and tireless effort toward organization is fundamental and necessary in order to fight under these conditions. Every fighter must have a knowledge of the economic and social situation of his country and his region. He must be linked with the struggles of the people and must have a clear concept of the objectives to be reached and the prospects which face the nation. Besides this, he must study and work toward the goal of a full command of military science---not only that of the ruling power but, above all, of proletarian military science ...He must also have assimilated the ex- periences and the initiatives characteristic of popular struggles." A Communist Party arms cache which was uncovered in Nilopolis, State of Rio de Janeiro, on 22 January 1956 contained four machine guns and other arms. It was believed that the location was used for training Party militants in the use of arms and guerrilla warfare. .Specific mention of the formation of guerrilla bands was made in a speech given before the Central Committee in February 1955. Since the 'lrazil Communist Party was not known to have any guerrilla groups at that date, it is probable that the speech was intended to prepare rank and file members psychologically for this type of action in case the Party decided on its use. 40 S E C Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 S 2. Colombia. The guerrilla movement here was re- ferred to sympathetically by the Cominform journal of 8 July 1955; Colombian workers were described as marching in the forefront of the country's fighters. The article described the Colombian peasants as fighting heroically and the national bourgeoisie as increasingly anxious about the "endless concessions made by the govern- ment to United States monopolies to the detriment of the national economy". The article stated that a broad democratic front of national liberation was being formed. At the 19th Plenum of the Colombian Communist Party on 25 August 1956, Party leaders reportedly determined that the guerrilla movement needed "unif'ied direction and correct orientation" which should be provided by a (Communist-controlled) Co-ordinating Board. One of the leaders present. commented that the armed movement had been sustained because of guidance provided by Communists who have always aided the peasants." He also stated that the cause of the guerrilla movement had been harmed by some units which had engaged in banditry. The Com- munist leadership had been wrong in condoning and even defending this type of action since it had alienated some popular support of the guerrilla movement. "Every guerrilla who steals from peasants loses his orientation and becomes of service to the Colombian government." Another Communist leader attending the Plenum commented that in some localities the guerrilla movement had dis- integrated and that it had to be reorganized. He proposed that a national meeting be called in which the guerrilla leaders take part; that the preparation for this meeting be based on material to be prepared by the National Executive Committee of the Communist Party and passed to the guerrillas for their study. It should be dis- cussed so that at the meeting all participants could arrive at clear concepts of the proper direction required for the armed movement. The leader proposed! that sub- sequently a national commission or command be named which would have the mission of orienting and co-ordinating all activities, of the guerrilla movement in Colombia? 41 TINUED CONTROL sw~ Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013 4 SE 3. French West Indies. Here Communist agitation in con- nection with demands for sugar cane workers was developed to the extreme and in some places assumed. the aspects of terrorism. In late February 1956 the sugar mills of Guadeloupe had almost stopped operating because of terrorist activities and impossible labor demands made by Communists. When the harvest began the Communists went into the fields, worked actively to create an in- terest in the concessions they requested, and urged the workers to strike. Acts of intimidation by the Communists and failure of the police to protect the workers resulted in almost complete work stoppage. In Martinique at the height of the sugar cane strike in April 1956 Communist Party and Confederation Generale du Travail (CGT) leaders organized shock troops of approximately 200 men. These were divided into groups of twenty and were paid by the Communist Party of Martinique. The men were armed with truncheons and machetes and were urged to burn the sugar crop and to intimidate non- striking workers. G. Sabotage In countries where law and order prevailed there were few reports of Communist party-directed sabotage until 1956. Since then there have been reports indicating that a few CP's have been giving attention to sabotage, particularly that which will halt production in large industrial firms, in mines, in oil refinery installations and on oil tankers. In areas where there was a chaotic political situation, Communists either independently or in collaboration with other nationalist or dissident elements planned or committed acts of sabotage. Europe 1. Norway and Denmark. At a meeting of Scandinavian Com- munist leaders in Stockholm in November :L956 when many aspects of Communist activity in Scandinavian countries were discussed, it was resolved that the Danish and 42 S E Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 ONTINUED CONTROL Norwegian Communist Parties would initiate sabotage activity in their respective countries. These areas were determined to be the most appropriate because of the connection of these two countries with NATO. Under the guidance of unidentified functionaries of the Finnish Communist Party, the Norwegian and Danish Parties were to enter upon a program to include the slowing down or halting of production of war goods, and preventing shipments and deliveries of war goods.* West Germ= v. A report of July 1956 related several instances of sabotage either in metallurgical plants or in mines of West Germany. In one factory oil pressure pipes of a moulding machine, a key element in the die casting process, were forcibly removed. In the same plant locks and instruments in a new generator installation were repeatedly broken at short intervals. There was evidence in this case that mem- bers of the illegal Communist youth organization were implicated. At a mine shaft installation foreign objects were thrown into the transmission gears of two conveyer belts, resulting in the loss of 700 tons of coal. In this case there was evidence that the secretary of the :Local Communist Party district was ultimately responsible. Similar acts of sabotage occurred repeatedly at another mine; local authorities believed they were perpetrated by an illegal Communist group calling itself the "Com- munist Party Youth Factory Group". Far East 1. Burma. On the occasion of the visit of Khrushehev and Bulganin to Burma in early December 19 5., the burma Communist Party (BCP) distributed literature stating the BCP's desire for peace and unity and demanding that * Although this meeting of Scandinavian Communist leaders (as well as a subsequent inter-Scandinavian Communist meeting) has been confirmed, no further information about proposed sabotage action has been received. 43 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160043-4 S E ~ED C 0 ~NTMR C~ the Government open negotiations to end the insurrection and to grant the BCP legal status as a political Party. Despite these public protestations, however, the BCP was simultaneously resorting to violence and sabotage. On 5 December 1955 Burma Communists blew up the pipe- line which supplies 20 million gallons of water daily to Rangoon. Upon the expiration of the government?s amnesty offer on 31 March 1956, the Burmese press reported that Communists blew up several bridges on railroad lines leading out of Rangoon. Six more bridges were allegedly blown up by Burmese Communists on 3-4 April 1956. 2, South Vietnam, Numerous incidents of sabotage took place immediately preceding and during the National Constituent Assembly elections on 4 March 1956, but the effect of violence on the outcome of the elections was slight. Reports indicated that the Viet Minh and dissident elements were active in practically all provinces of Free Vietnam, with voting localities the most common targets. Grenades were thrown in or near voting booths in many villages; there were several reports of small- arms fire in the vicinity of voting places and two or three reports of mortar shells falling in town areas. Additionally, ballot boxes were stolen or burned and several acts of arson were committed against government and private buildings. Statistics of 14 March 1956 indicated that Viet Minh and dissident violence accounted for nine killed, about a score wounded and ten persons kidnapped or missing. Western Hemisphere 1. Brazil. Several incidents appearing to be acts of sabotage attributable to Communists occurred in January 1957 in Brazilian ports. According to press reports an explosion on 13 January in Maranhao State on the ship Iuanema resulted in the loss of 600 barrels of kerosene and aviation gasoline and the sinking of the ship. On the afternoon of 17 January the tanker Amapa of the Petrobas (Brazilian petroleum monopoly) fleet was partially destroyed in Guanabara Bay. An explosion occurred on SE Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 S E the ship after oil, brought from a refinery in Rubatao, Sao Paulo, had been unloaded to deposits of the Atlantic Refining Company at Rio de Janeiro. The ship was partially destroyed. On 22 January a large fire broke out on the Saboa docks, Santos while the world's largest tanker, the Universe Leader, was unloading oil. According to the press report, the fire began at a nearby anchorage for fishing boats and spread quickly over the oily marsh to oil pipelines. Through the alert action of the Universe Leader crew, the oil line was withdrawn and the ship was moved away from the dock. The partially charred body of a young militant Communist was found afterwards in a small fishing boat in an estuary near the fire, where he had apparently been trapped when the fire spread suddenly as a result of the pipe line explosion. In his pockets were found a quantity of matches and rags which analysis showed to have been gas-soaked. The damage to the pipe line was estimated at several million cruzeiros. The young Communist involved, Raymundo Nonato de Oliveira,. had attended Communist-sponsored youth and student congresses at Bucharest and Warsaw in August and September 19,50, At Oliveira.' s. funeral, two Communists who spoke declared that Oliveira was not the first nor the last "Brazilian patriot to die as a hero, in keeping with the line taken by the Brazilian Communist press which presented the incidents as "imperialist sabotage" of the Petrobras fleet. For example, in the 19 January 1957 issue of Voz er ria, Brazilian Communist weekly', is found the head- line, "Washington Conspires Against Petrobras". 2, Chile. A report originating with a member of the Communist Party of Chile set forth the overt Communist Party line with regard to sabotage and other forms of violence: "The Communist Party of Chile (PCCh) condemns the use of explosives and other arms for any attempt at sabotage or coups d?etat. The PCCh believes 45 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 that the only way to put an end to the situation of hunger and misery, injustice, and the domination of imperialist monopolies and the oligarchy, is through the formation of a powerful movement of popular unity, to bring about a new form of government. Terrorist tactics were discredited by the PCCh more than 25 years ago, and the anarcho- syndicalist proponents of direct action are no longer active. No member of the PCCh is now being instructed in sabotage tasks. The PCCh hopes some day to govern and does not want to destroy that which would be of use to it." This professed attitude toward sabotage would have been expressed by many Communist parties in Western countries which were trying to work overtly, as well as covertly, to gain influence through greater membership and through collaboration with other leftist parties for certain goals. According to other reports from Chile, no mention was made in the Communist cells of sabotage or of preparations for sabotage, because this would have caused many new members to desert, and because of the risk of spreading the belief that Communism was a school of terrorism. Rather, the Party believed that members with the proper degree of fanaticism react automatically in their think- ing at the proper time (in case of war, for example) in terms of the necessity of struggling against the enemies of the Soviet Union. Otherwise Communists limit themselves to "legal sabotage" manifested as agitation against foreign exploitation and incitement erf the workers to strike. Observers in the area who have a close knowledge of Communist Party affairs have stated that while it is possible that certain PCCh functionaries who have been trained behind the Iron Curtain. may have received in- struction in sabotage, it was kept as a closely-guarded secret in view of PCCh1s policy and tactics during the period under discussion. NONO TINUED CONTROL Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 H. Technical Work Administrative and technical work of a Communist party's underground apparatus is performed by a clandestine unit usually referred to as the Technical Apparatus. Sometimes this is subdivided into specialized subsections which have exclusive responsibilities, such as the finance section responsible for procurement and distribution of funds. Work performed by a technical apparatus may include such activities aso procuring safehouses and hideouts; arranging escape routes; acquiring official documents and forms, as blank birth certificates and residence certificates; publishing covertly Communist propaganda sheets and underground news- papers; operating laboratories which can produce false docu- ments, photographs, etc.; or it may produce explosives, grenades or other materials which Communists either intend to use themselves or to supply to other elements of a national liberation movement. Europe 1. Greece--Crete. A Greek Communist Party (KKg) functionary who served as liaison between Is illegal mechanism in the Athens-Piraeus area and that in Crete, was arrested in late December 1955 during a regular baggage check of passengers arriving in Piraeus. He was found carrying current copies of illegal publications of the KKE and of the Greek Communist Youth (EPON). Also in his pos- session was a brochure entitled, "Notes on Our Work in the Provinces", which had no date but probably applied to the situation prevailing in November-December 1955. The first part of the section on organizational work concerned Communist cells ("enlightenment detachments") which would provide direction for work in mass organi- zations; this was followed by a discussion of the for- mation and work of the mass organizations themselves. Then a portion of the text applied specifically to the covert technical cells: "Completely separate from the above organi- zational work, a well-fortified illegal technical and publishing mechanism must be 47 SE Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 formed. For this purpose we need two to three good safehouses without political taint where we can install a typewriter, mimeograph machine and whatever else we need to print proclamations, hand bills..,etc. Thus we will supply our organization with propaganda material beyond that which the members of our organization will create (manuscripts, handbills with carbon paper, rubber or linoleum stamps, etc.). This mechanism must not be allowed to interfere with our other projects. To secure financial means for our publication work, we must develop our financial work (membership dues, financial sponsorships, etc.)." 2. Italy. The only elements of the Italian Communist Party's (PCI) clandestine section which were identified as active in the 1954-1956 period were those engaged in "technical work." This included the following tasks: a, providing safehouses and clandestine escape routes out of Italy for Communists seeking refuge behind the Iron Curtain; be establishing and maintaining a number of hideouts for the use of high-ranking Party officers which could be used in case of emergency; c. receiving funds of Soviet origin, making exchanges of currency as needed and distributing these funds from secure places; d. maintaining a supply of printing and duplicating machines in various locations for clandestine publications in case the Party found need for these. Near East 1. Egypt. In the period, 5-7 February 1956, thirty-nine members of the Egyptian Communist Party were arrested by Egyptian police. Two printing presses, three mimeo- SE C NOFCC ED CONTROL Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 graph machines and a large amount of type and paper were seized. All the equipment was new and of excellent quality. Later in February other Egyptian Communists engaged in clandestine propaganda activity were arrested. In contrast to propaganda tracts published earlier in a language of fairly high standard, those confiscated by Egyptian security authorities in February 1956 were written in a low-type, colloquial Arabic, presumably in order to reach a broader section of the population. 2. Iran. In connection with operations carried out by Iranian security authorities against the Tudeh Party (Communist), a number,of arms caches were uncovered between September 1953 and October 1955. Twenty members of a covert technical apparatus engaged in the manufacture grenades were arrested and interrogated in the fall of 1955. An executive committee consisting of three engineers, all Tudeh Party members, directed the work of the apparatus, with one, the leader, responsible for the distribution of grenades and payment of expenses, the second in charge of "technical matters", and the third responsible for the preparation of chemicals. Most of the work of this apparatus was carried out in two legal and open workshops owned by individuals who were Tudeh Party members. The.cylinders and bodies of the grenades were made in the shops, but assembling, loading and caching were carried out elsewhere. In one shop (actually a lathe workshop, to be called here Shop No. 1) all preliminary steps were taken, including the preparation of casts and molding equipment. In this shop presses and equipment for making cartridges were constructed. Every few days one of the lathe operators in this shop received from the apparatus' leader ten grenade shells can which he did the boring and molding. Eventually the shop changed hands, with one Tudeh member buying it from another (although possibly Tudeh funds were used to purchase it), and the shop was subsequently used by leaders of the apparatus for the manufacture of grenade shells. The original owner of Shop No, 1 (Musavi) was at first L9 SE Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 not a Tudeh Party member, but was recruited into the Party after a trial period of five or six months. Then a member of the technical apparatus (whose alias was Rubik) asked for and obtained employment in Musavi"s shop. About a month after this occurred, Musavi was told by the Tudeh Party that a certain engineer would contact him. The latter was one of the committee of three which directed the technical apparatus. Then on his behalf another individual contacted. Musavi and instructed him to make preparations "with the help of the workers and under the supervision of Rubik" for constructing presses and equipment for making cartridges. Of incidental interest is the fact that one member of this apparatus, a partner of the last owner of Shop No. 1, was also involved in the procurement of infor- mation needed by Party leaders. This person previously had transferred his citizenship from Iranian to Soviet with the concurrence and knowledge of the Tudeh Party. The second shop participating in the work of this ap- paratus was manned by five or six Tudeh members, one of whom, Jandaqi, was designated as chief of the shop. The shop contained a press, a drill press and other machinery for constructing grenades. Jandagi was re- cruited for this work as follows: prior to the uprising of 19 August 1953, an unemployed Tudeh Party member (Hoseyn) suggested that he and Jandagi set up a work- shop together. Jandaqi agreed, and along with one of Hoseyn?s acquaintances, they rented a workshop. The acquaintance of Hoseyn turned out to be Abumal? Fathi, the leader of the technical apparatus. Iranian authorities apparently believe that Jandaqi entered into the venture innocently. The chiefs of the two shops alternated in delivering grenade bodies to a representative of the Tudeh military organization whom they met at a predesignated time and place on a road leading out of Tehran. These two technical workers admitted having delivered a total of 10,500 grenades to the Tudeh military organization. 50 o TINUED CONTROL Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 S' O;QJW TINUED CONTROL 1, Security Measures and Preparations for Under raun~_ Dpi sterice Traditionally the Communist parties established security procedures which permitted careful watch over the entire party membership. New members were carefully checked to prevent infiltration of hostile or bourgeois elements,, During intensified recruiting drives the barriers have been lowered somewhat with the checking of new members de- f erred until party organs responsible for this work could find time to carry it out. At no time, however, according to regulations, was a party member allowed to hold a party office no matter how minor until he was thoroughly checked. The higher a party functionary progressed, the more care- fully he was scrutinized for possible connection with anti- Communist persons or organizations. In theory at least a permanent investigation procedure was maintained with each party member carefully watched, either for ideological deviation or for evidence of connections the party did not approve. The preponderance of emphasis in Cominform journal articles during the period 1952 to April 1956, calling upon the Communist parties to exercise "revolutionary vigilance:", was directed against the danger of the "infiltration of imperialist agents." Proper regard for revolutionary vigi- lance, according to the Cominf orm journal, entailed the following measures., (a) assure that the party conducts an adequate education program to improve the ideological understanding of the average party member; (b) provide for the expression of criticism and self-criticism; (c) carry out verification of membership (investigate the loyalty of each party member thoroughly); (d) observe principles of democratic centralism and control from below; (e) improve existing party control systems or organize new ones. As in the case of most instructions emanating from a national Communist party pertaining to security regulations, most of the articles in the Cominform journal concerning proper security practices appeared after a violation had occurred. Europe 1. Spain. Here the Party was illegal and severely suppressed. 51 S E Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 S E C It was divided into cells or groups of three members each, only one member of which was in contact with one member of the next higher group of three. Great care was taken to keep all Party activity as secret as possible. Spanish Security authorities in September 1.955 discovered a Communist Party mail drop which contained. instruction sheets addressed to chiefs of troikas and a document entitled, "New Rules of Conduct for Militants", outlining specific security measures to be followed by Party members. Pertinent portions of the regulations are quoted here since they are typical of instructions issued by Party leaders in several areas where the Party was completely underground, "Upon enrollment in the Party, a militant must adopt a fictitious name to be used in dealings with his regular contact. The name must not be his true name nor an exotic, unusual, one, but a common, religious name such as Manuel or Juan which will be changed as often as neces- sary and will be used only within the Party.... "A militant?s domicile and place of work must not be known to his associates in the Party, not even to his regular contact.... "A militant must lead a normal life so that neighbors, friends, relatives and fellow workers will have no suspicion that he is a member of the Party. If any associates should. become suspicious, it is imperative that the militant go to Mass frequently and seek admission into Catholic rightist centers or Falangist groups, even if he is a military man. These steps are to be taken with the concurrence of the regular contact, who will have consulted his superiors. "A militant should not regularly carry on his person any compromising papers, nor should 52 S E Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 he have them in his house unless the house is used for archives or serves some similar purpose. "If two militants meet by chance in the street neither should greet the other. Three reasons for this are that if one of them should be accompanied he would have to introduce his companion to the other militant, and this should be avoided; secondly, it must not be known that a militant is acquainted with Party members; and thirdly, if one militant is be- ing followed, the other might be discovered if they were to greet each other. "A militant should continue to cultivate friend- ships outside the Party, but no friendships can exist between Party members.... "Every comrade must terminate all indiscretions, and can discuss any matter pertaining to the Party only with his regular contact...-.6 "Meetings among comrades in cafes, bars, taverns, inns, etc.,.. will cease.... "Militants must try to be punctual at all appoint- ments and should not wait even five minutes past the appointed time. Meetings should always be held on the street or outdoors and should be held in a different place each time. "Party members will refrain from comment if a comrade has been released from prison, has been seen at liberty, is being pursued or is in hiding. A militant will make no comment about these matters which would reveal that he is cognizant of such affairs." 2. West Germany. Since 1951 the West German Communist Party (KPD ) anticipated illegality and spent con- 53 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 S E siderable time planning for underground existence.* Because of the demoralizing effect the prospect of illegality held for the average party functionary and rank and file member, the Party openly adopted the attitude )that a ban was ridiculous_ and impossible; Iiit un~Ter?too~c __/__ relatively few organizational measures implement plans, prior to the actual banning in August 19566 Underground preparations which were carried out to varying degrees in various localities concerned the following specific measures: (a) provision of adequate personnel and operational safeguards to insure continuation of the most important internal activities of the Party; (b) establishment of a system of reliable lodgings, safe havens and meeting places throughout the Federal Republic; (c) arrangements for facades for local Party headquarters and for cover employment for Party function- aries; (d) expansion of the existing organizations for the transport of training and agitation material over the border from East Germany into West Germany and for the distribution of this material within the Federal Republic. In 1955 KPD tried to circumvent confiscation of its property by transferring ownership titles to dummy companies or to individual Party members. Two days before the actual banning of the Party on 17 August 1956, Party workers conferences were called on short notice in the individual counties.of one state directo- rate. At these meetings, the first secretaries discussed the anticipated outlawing of the Party, issued security instructions and gave notice that members should be ready for illegal activity later. Shortly after 17 August 1956, in accordance with plans made previously, KPD began the formation of illegal Party units. In one City Section underground cells were to be patterned after the traditional "troika" or group of three. In each troika only the leader was in contact with one person of the next higher grouping. * In this planning KPD drew heavily on the experiences of the illegal West German Communist youth organization, 54 S ,JQWMIMMINUED CONTROL Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 The plan for organization in City Sections appeared to vary since in another Section, under the top troika, there were to be five persons in each cell or group, At least in one case, for the City Section Directorate there was to be a "second" or reserve directorate to take over the administration of the work in case any- thing happened to the first directorate. In one West German town a local rifle association, established purposely to facilitate the Party's illegal activity, was to be used as a meeting place? Collection of dues was to be made, but receipts, in the usual form of membership fee stamps, were not to be issued. In one City Section "toto" slips ("totozettel") marked' according to amounts received were being issued. In some localities illegal Party leaflets appeared shortly after the banning. Party work in large industrial con- cerns was to be given priority; it was also considered important for KPD members to join sport clubs and al- lotment holders organizations and for them to gain in- fluence in the non-Communist trade union federation, the Deutscher Gewerkschafts-Bund. Delegations of Party members to participate in training courses in the Soviet Zone were to be continued. For security reasons KPD planned to use a very limited number of highly trusted people. Recognition signals used shortly after the Party was banned also were of a traditional form.* functionaries identified themselves at meeting places by showing a piece of torn newspaper which matched the piece held by the other Party functionary. Far East 1. Indonesia. Prior to the first national elections which were held in September 1955 a vigorous membership campaign was initiated by the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) beginning about March of that year and was directed mainly toward front organizations, Having taken new members in wholesale fashion from trade unions and other front groups, it was decided that screening and 55 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 S E weeding out of undesirable elements was necessary, In June 1955 the PKI established a control commission under the supervision of the three-member Secretariat. By August 1955 subordinate bodies had been set up to conduct investigation of members and candidate members at the provincial level. 2. Japan. The Japan Communist Party's (JCP) Police Counter- measures Department, set up in mid-November 1954, had organized Police Countermeasures Operations Sections in the Tokyo area by July 1955, with the district police, the Metropolitan Police Board and the Public Security Investigation Agency as major targets. As of July 1955 district and target operations leaders had been designated and code names, communications codes and instructions disseminated. Lists of personnel of the target organi- zations were to be compiled which would include home addresses and would designate areas in which the police agents worked. The objective'of Police Countermeasures personnel was to determine police action against the JCP. If other JCP members accused Police Countermeasures personnel of being "enemies" or of suspicious activities, the latter were to refrain from giving explanations re- garding their status or from talking about their missions. Party members, other than those connected with the Police Countermeasures Department, who maintained contact with the police were to be investigated and reported. The JCP Police Countermeasures Department was first reported to have been set up directly under the JCP?s Organization Bureau, but later was reported to have been placed immediately under the JCP Central Committee. A report concerning JCP activities of May 1956 showed that the JCP was willing to engage to a limited extent in counterespionage operations which would expose American intelligence operations in order to free the Party from one of its obstacles. One Prefectural Committee reportedly made the following decision: "Action is to be taken in regard to the 56 S E C Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 S E espionage activities of the American Intel- ligence Agency toward the Party. If the American Intelligence Agency makes another attempt in the future to develop informants among the Party members in this area, the Party will have the Party member concerned accept their offer, and have him arrange for the time, date and place to meet the American Intelligence Agent. The Party member asked to be an informant of the American Intelligence Agency will immediately report this infor- mation regarding the rendezvous to the District Committee. The District Cc nittee will dispatch Party members to the scene of rendez-, vous and pick up the American Intelligence Agent at the scene, take pictures of the scene for evidence. With these pictures, the Party will conduct a protest struggle together with other Democratic organizations in this area in an effort to expose the espionage network of the United States. While publicizing their scheme to the general public, strong protests will be filed with the Japanese Government and the United States authorities." Western Hemisphere 1. Argentina. Security violations by Partido Comunista Argentino (PCA) members prior to the spring of 195.5 had, resulted in Party information reaching government authorities in spite of warnings from PCA's Security Committee that constant vig lance be maintained. In the spring of 1955 an "underground movement" reportedly was activated which was to be responsible for detecting police agents. An unconfirmed report of December 1956 stated that there was a subsection of PCA's Military Section which was responsible for the infiltration of national and local police. (Possibly this was the PCA unit referred to in the March 1955 report as the "underground movement".) 57 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Despite the stepping up of security measures in 1955, it was reported in October 1956 that new members joining the PCA were subjected to very little processing. Usually the new members were recruited by PCA members who supplied some information on their backgrounds. Persons who joined the Party without previous contact with members were rarely questioned about their backgrounds. Before a member was given any responsibility, however, a careful study was made of his activities. 2. C,' 1 e. Following the arrests of several trade union leaders-including some Communists-in early January 1956, the Partidc Comunista de Chile (PCCh) in Santiago undertook a series of precautionary measures to protect its leaders and to assure the continuance of Party activity. Certain Party leaders were withdrawn from "circulation" with some Party functionaries designated to serve as "liaisons" (presumably to serve as contact with the leaders in hiding). Two bookstores were designated as liaison points. El Siglo, the Communist daily newspaper, was to be approached only in case of emergency. Party liaisons were appointed to serve as contact with the parties allied with the PCCh in the Frente Nacional del Pueblo. Among precautionary measures to be taken were: (a) sus- pension of all semi-clandestine organizational tasks of the regional, communal and central commissions; (b) temporary suspension and clandestine reorganization of all Communist cells; (c) the designation of certain persons as clandestine liaison between the Central Committee and El Siglo; (d) the use of pseudonyms by all editors of El Siglo, who had been in the habit of signing articles with their true names, 3. Paraguay. A confidential document of the Paraguayan Communist Party (PCC) announced that Party leaders were aware that certain persons expelled from the Party were maneuvering within the rural labor organizations in order to obtain secret Party documents and to learn about the activities of the Party leaders. For these reasons it has been resolved to name a Commission for Political Investigations within the entire Party. The document called the attention of Party members to the fact that 58 S E C NOFOR,N CONTROL Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 S E " within its ranks there were "anarchist-oppartunists,, traitors, sellers of political secrets to the enemies of democracy and Paraguay". Twenty-nine members of the new Commission were named in the document. Party leaders in each zone and group were requested to facilitate the work of the investigation commission. 4. Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA) . In 2,955 CPUSA issued instructions that review commissions be established in every major district of the Party, for protecting the Party's security. By the end of 1955 review commissions for the most part had replaced the security apparatus of the CPUSA underground, the primary function of which was to detect FBI methods of penetration. These commissions were to develop the practice of vigilance in order to detect the "enemies" within the Party's ranks. In order of priority and importance the Party was to uncover the following enemieso (1) FBI penetration agents who infiltrated into positions of leadership; (2) the informant or stool pigeon who informed for the FBI or any other organization; (3) anti-Communist groups; (4) renegades, such as Trotskyites. Not only was the security problem to receive careful attention from within the Party, but it was to be attacked from without" openly: how the entire system of informers functioned was to be exposed to-workers and Party members. Additionally, trade union members were to be taught how "stool pigeons" work for employers and against trade unions. 59 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RQPOU-00915R000600160013-4 Approved For ReleaseT~~~'15R000600160013-4