CHINESE COMMUNIST VIEWS ON SOVIET-SATELLITE RELATIONS: SEPTEMBER -- 19 DECEMBER 1956

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-00915R000600220017-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 7, 1998
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: December 19, 1956
• Content Type: REPORT

-Approved For Release 2001/07: CIA-RD. P 600220017-0
SUBJECT: CHINESE COMMUNIST VIEWS ON SOVIET-SATELLITE
RELATIONS: SEPTEMBER -- 19 DECEMBER 1956
1. Since October 1956 there have been press reports of alleged
Chinese Communist support of the Polish Communists against Moscow
dictation. Particularly since Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolt
in November, there has been intense interest in the Chinese Communist
position on the proper conduct of Soviet-satellite relations. The Chinese
attitude was eventually spelled out in detail In a 14, 000' word 28 December
statement following an enlarged meeting of the Politburo of the CCP. That
document is a major statement of what the Chinese consider proper policy
for the bloc and for other Communist parties. An interpretation dated
10 January has been forwarded separately.* It should be referred to for
a comprehensive view and appraisal of the` Chinese position.
2. Attached as supplementary background data is 'a paper which
brings together evidence available up to 19 December 1956, just before
the comprehensive Chinese statement. It constitutes the available record
of the Chinese attitude while it was evolving. and of Polish and Yugoslav
interpretations of that attitude. The evidence is of two-main types:
0-IL 2
- . _._.....o~ ..vuuuunt$c atase:ments including,
(1) A1 November comment on the key Soviet 30 October 1956
statement on Soviet-satellite relations.
(2) A.4 November Peking Peple'ss Daa editorial supporting
the use of Soviet troops in Hungary,
(3) A 14 November People's Dail,Z editorial defending the
Soviet Array ,actio1t,
(4) A 21 November People's Daily editorial commenting on
the outcome of the Polish-Soviet talks which ended
18 November.
"More on the Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat$
As An Expression of The International Communist Party Line
Far 195?"
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(5) A 6 December People's Daily comment on the Soviet-
Rumanian talks completed 3 December.
(6) The fact of the People's y reprint of Tito's 11
November Pula speech criticizing the Soviet system,.
and Soviet responsibilities for conditions in Hungary
which led to the revolt.
b. Polish and Yugoslav interpretations of the Chinese via* of
the proper method of conducting Soviet-satellite relations.
These include:
(1) Reports from Polish Communist sources by New York
Times' reporter Sydney Grusoa.
(Z) Sensitive and/or diplomatic reports of the Polish Corn?
muniits' interpretations:
(a) of alleged private statements by high Chinese Corn-
.naunists, and
(b) of the public Chinese Communist pronouncements
referred to above.
3. Caution should be exerted in accepting at face value Polish
Communist reports of alleged conversations with Mao Tse-tung or
Chou En-laI In Peking. Interpretations of the Chinese attitude as stated
by Polish and Yugoslav Communists also should not be accepted at their
face value as in fact reflecting the Chinese view? One reason is the
possibility of-confusion due to time. space and language factors; more
important, both the Poles and Yugoslavs have made an effort to portray
the Chinese as supporting them against the Kremlin and Polish Com.-
munists used Chinese quotations to argue that their own CP leaders
should allow more intellectual freedom. This portrayal seems to have
.been distorted; none of these groups got much comfort from the 28
December statement, which attacked Tito and praised the Poles chiefly
for curbing expression of anti-Soviet sentiments.
44 Where there might appear to be any conflict between the
interpretation in this attachment and. the interpretation given is the more
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comprehensive 10 January 1957 paper, the views therein should be
given more weight* as they reflect broader evidence from the Chinese
document itself and from subsequent communiques resulting from
Chou En-lai's visit to Moscow, Warsaw and Budapest in January.
In particular, and in spite of frequent references to equality in rela-
tions between Socialist states and to the necessity of avoiding "mechanical"
adaptations of the Soviet model (quoted at length in this attachment) the
Chinese Communists are believed to be opposed to "liberalization" for
the present--whether in terms of a loosening of Moscow reins on satellite
CPs or in terms of domestic policy in Hungary, Poland or the other
satellites. The essence of the 28 December statement is the urgent
necessity for (a) Bloc solidarity under CPSU direction, and (b) a return
to the basic principles of the dictatorship. of the proletariat. What their
views will be when and if stability I. thought to be achieved within the
Bloc can only be speculation. They are apparently reserving the right
.to comment in the future.
5. The Chinese decision to emphasize fundamentals such as
unity of the Communist movement and the validity of the Communist
system apparently derived from an appreciation of the developments
to which "liberalization" can lead--as shown by the Hungarian revolt-
which shook the foundations of the Communist system. Chinese opposition
to "liberalization" stemmed from the time of the Hungarian revolt. Al.
though according to Polish Communists, Mao claims to have told Moscow
in October he opposed the use of Soviet troops in Poland (New York Times,
11 January 1957), the Chinese were quick to approve Soviet Army sup-
pression of the Hungarians, and from then on, although continuing to
criticize "great nation chauvinism", Peking also warned against the
dangers of nationalism on the part of small nations. The difference in
tone of referenced paper and that of this analysis may reflect a change
in the Chicom stand between October and December.
6. With the above caveats, the attached paper should be useful
as a collection of evidence of the Chinese attitude-.October-December' 1956.
It is for U. S. government officials only. Recipients are requested to
advise the usefulness of the attached and of the 10 January paper on the
Chinese Politburo's statement, and whether a third chapter--an Later.
pretation of the effects of Chou En-lairs January 1957 visit to Moscow.
Warsaw and Budapest- -would be of interest.
4 46
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