Attached Memorandum entitled THE KHRUSHCHEV PURGE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-00915R000700050018-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 1997
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: July 23, 1957
• Content Type: MF

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23 July 1957
MEMORANDUM FOR: Designated Recipients 25X1 C10b
REFERENCE:
25X1 C10b SU3JECT:
Attached Memorandum entitled THE
KHRUSHCHEV PURGE
4. Attention to called to the last paragraph of e attachment
oviet" reactions to certain themes stressed ree World
`have been set out "in order tok illustrate hat hurts. " v
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25X1C10b
25X1A9a
Chief, International Communism Divisi
Counter Intelligence Staff
Distribution:
25X1A8a
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w w " -Ti _T
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THE KHRUSHCHEV PURGE
(23 July 1950
is - Ia retrospect Khruah9!v - action pattern since the death
of Stalin' is consisteni3iin one respects L. e. , his movement
toward power? His coi' lstvncy- in terms. of policy .is less clear,,
perhaps because, in his movement toward powers .he' has used
differences and. conflicts over. policy matters in such a way as
to strengthen his own position.. Nevertheless, his basic approach
seems to stem from a desire to break with the obsolete methods
of the Stalinist past and to strengthen the appeal of Commmunism
both internally (as a ruling system) and externally (as a means
of weakening., if not destroying, the enemy). His break with
the past and his approach to the future are consistent -with his
movement toward power, . The man who is to succeed a gist
like Stalin could not aspire. to this role if he were merely to copy
Stalin, Such a man must emerge with a stature and ideas of_ his
own. Khrushchev has shown that he I. willing to take great risks
In order to obtain such stature, The 20th CPSU Congress, his
secret speech, his virgin lands program, his concept of de
centralisation --these are all steps involving considerable risks.
Obviously, too,, a man on his march to power would. feet
compelled to, rationalise his gambling as being good for the USSR
and World Communisrnv It may be assumed that Khrushchev
similarly justified the June purge and probably received backing
from the Central Committee on the same ,grounds,, Thus,
Khrushehev has propelled himself into a position where he has
to show that he is good for the USSR and World Communising and
in so doing iaacarrod the greatest risk ii his career,
2, Khrushchev's struggle with his competitors in the Presidium
appears to have gone rather well from the" start. - The Malenkov-
Beria combine was broken in 1933. In 1954 Abaknmov was
executed for his role as -purger In the t" Leningrad affair, i' Early
in 1955 Malenkov stepped down as' Premier, and later In that
year Molotov relinquished his post as ]Foreign Minister after
having been castigated by a Plenum of the Central Committee in
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July.' The 20th CPSU Congress (February 1956) castigated
Molotov's and Malenkov'e policies, In the second half of .1956
Kaganovich suffered demotion from his job as Chairman of the
Important Committee of Labor and Wages. However, the
explosions in Poland and Hungary enabled Khrusbehev's
competitors to ra y and to stage a comeback, OWN4iiembesp
5arly January 1957 Molotov and Malenkov
re -emerged as influential, The December Plenum of the
CC/CPSU which discussed highly controversial economic issues
(downward revisions of the Sixth Five -Year Plana managerial
impediments and inefficiency) probably found Khrushchev at the
lowest point of his recent career, However, from the February
1957 Plenum on, following a semi on of the Supreme Soviet which
had accepted Khrushchev's industrial decentralization plane
Khrushchev rose to considerable strength backed by tremendous
publicity and probably also by the
majority of the regional
Party apparatus which was- loyal to him and found his
decentralization plan profitable.
3. It has been pointed out that Khhrushchev's competitors in the
Presidium who were felled in June by the Khrushchev-packed
Central Committee were not a homogeneous group. This is
certainly true. The popular Malenkov was his chief competitor.
Molotov and Kaganovich were "conservative" Stalinists and
probably more Inconvenient than threatening, Shepilov, a
wartime associate of Khrushchev. probably was an opportunistic
turncoat. Probably they all joined In opposition to Khrushchev on
the question of industrial decentralization which they may have
considered too dangerous a gamble. In turn they probably were
joined or supported to various degrees by other Presidium
members squally critical of Khrushchev's modus operandi.
Biilganin at one time appears to have been associated with the
"anti-Party group" but disassociated himself (possibly by
"squealing") in time to win a temporary reprieve'. Pervukhin
and' Saburovr' a actual connection with the group may have been
based on a concurrence in views rather than factional activity.
The exact line-up against Khrushchev in the Presidium sessions
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of 17, 1S and 19 June* may have been based on a loose alliance
of oppositionist elements who may even have held, as Communist
sources claim, a temporary majority, Although it will_ probabl
serer b known exactly how Uiance coagulated.
1hat the strategy of the opposition was to defeat Khrus c von
political grounds before he would eliminate the leaders of the'
opposition (Malenkov-Molotov ?Kagenovich) because of their
complicity in Stalin's crim es, particularly the "Leningrad affair",
4, In a CPSU document gib' to a Western CP leader for br of
purposes on 12 July reference is made to attempts made
in January 1955 to oust Malenkov, These attempts are probably
bound up with the de-Stalinization process and may have actually
startedrliior when former Soviet Minister of State Security
Abakurnov was executed in December 1954 because of his role' in
the "Leningrad affair", I. e. , the liquidation of high-ranking Soviet
leaders** and associates of Zhdano-r. Malenkov'e chief competitor
prior to his (possibly natural) death In 1948. Klirushchev cited
Communist sources claim these three dates, (-we prefer to
crucial session took place on 19 June, On the
17 and I8 June the majority of the Prmsidium appeared jointly
In public at various social and ceremonial occasions.
so . E. g, , Politburo member and State planner Vosneseasky;
Secretary of the CC /CPS U Kusnetsov, at a1.
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the "Leningrad affair" in his "secrets" speech of February 1956
as an illustration of Stalin's t ror regime against the CPSU in
the postwar 'periodeiexculpafi the majority of the Political
Buren which did not know what Stalin was doing, and, conversely, ~-
point his finger at those who did; Malenkov, Molotov and
Kagaaovich were members of the Politburean at the time the
"Leningrad affair=' occurred, The implications could not have
been lost on them in February 1956. Khrushchv used the method
of indirect threat again in the 30 June 1956 Resolution of the CPSU
which defined the limits of the .de -Stalinisation campaign, when
he referred to a (presumably anti-Stalinist) "Leninist nucleus"
which operated already during Stalin's - lifetime, Implicitly,
again, he pointed his finger at those leaders who had not been
part of the "Leninist nucleus,"
At that time
evaluatIg the secret Khrushchev
speechrv.l ;
"There is another theory 'Which has been advanced.
It is the theory that the secret speech by Khrushchev
could be well interpreted as '& blackmail instrument to
be used against actual or potential opponents, This theory
has acquired some weight in the light of the 30 June CPSU
Resolution, which came out with the rather surprising
statement that already during Stalin's lifetime a Leninist
nucleus, existed among the CC members and ranking
Army officers--a nucleus which at various periods, for
instance during the war years, curtailed the power of
Stalin. From the reference to the ezistegice of such a
Leninist nucleus, it is possible to argue that the people
putside of this Leninist nucleus are intended to be
identified more distinctly with the Stalin era and, furtherp
are singled out to be attacked or destroyed as traitors
wbogn r t ne need ariesc s~ Th t or a ~ r sl.! at
s ittee,
zu c ev obsne s a4 %Y& a s s
or m~ in~a
his actual or potential opposition and that. in having
obtained this "leg.i'basis9 he has strengthened his power
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position. By the same token he has also alerted the
"non-Leninists" to his intentions. Thus, the question
arises of the relative strength of Khrushchev and of
the opposition, as well as the question of the possibility
that a power struggle in the CPSU leadership may
break out. "
To this evaluation may be added good evidence of a later date
which indicated that Khrushchev had not actually planned to make
out in the n Attacks on a& li
h
the speech but gave it because the. delegates to the 20th CPSU
Congress pressured for the details which had not been brought
n
X (` a at t
e Congress, This evidence(
Uo o indication that Khr shchey used his men
in the Central .Committee at the Congress in such a way that he
would be "pre soured" Into forging his blackmail weapon, io e,' , he
let himself be induced into making the speech. Given'the evidence
of Increasing and spreading opposition to Khrushchev's policies
at the end of 1956 and beginning of 195?, it would. be fair to assume
that Khrushchev felt compelled to settle the score once and for
? all and to move from the employment of blackmail to card an
actual showdown, We consid a following statement in Victor
Z orsa's article of U July in the Manchester Guardian Weekly
extremely plausible.
"The opposition. and Malenkov in,tparticular, had
got wind of Khrushchev's Intention to blame Malenkov,
either implicitly or explicitly, for arranging the
demotion and even the execution of Leningrad party
leaders in 1948-9 and wanted the matter thrashed out
in the Presidium, "
This item is plausible not only on general grounds but also by
reason of other indidattoris.
ao The announcement of the 250th 'Anniversary of sthe
Founding of Leningrad was made on 24 April by Leningrad
Pravda. So far as can be determined the 250th Anniversary
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opposition Into a corner where they had only two alternaIves,
i, e, to cease their opposition or to force a showdown, Khrushchev's
b. The official CPSU version of the June events emphasises
that the. opposition used the pretext of discussing the speeches
to be made at the Leningrad Anniversary in order to obtain 'an
extraordinary Presidium cession at which they then attacked
t a~ *godly utssuspectiz: FKhrushchav, Ia view of the fact
th al ~~p p~ concerned must h
ll r
v
`sew f
_f
actually took place in 19534 In view of Khrushchev's subsequent
and -emphatic allegations that the oppositions w afraid to face
the ' Leningradere, -the timing of the Leningrad Celebration in
April (when Khrushchev had already recouped his strength)
appears ominous.
cogn ,ant
a
e
u
the implications of the Leningrad issue, it Ir
that the opposition used this pretext or that I
the matter of ceremonial speeches as ur
opposition used this flimsy Pretexte
have tipped hand.,
hly improbable
ohbuld have made
business. If the
certainly w..R1 d
It Is therefo 'e-dubmitted that Khrushchev ma e' uve*red his
chose to fight for a lost cause, "here
was a certain type of Communist psychology operating which ;4OW 4`''`'
have directly or indirectly observed in lesser though somewhat
position was strong, He had the Central Committee on his side.
He also had thenL-eningrad affair" and0 presumably. other affairs
from. the Stalin era which he could pin on the oppositio The
opposition held the' weaker position from the start, eWre
apparently .no posits a to use ' Khrusheh~t v s complicity in Stalin's
c rune so ^ pre Burn I Khrushchev control the materials
Pertaining to this issu , to the exclusion of the opposition, j The
oppasition's choice to fight the ba a ozt s of policy also is
an indication of drysm weakness. o not have realistically
expected to hold their ground against a Khrushchev-dominated
Central Committee.
U& A-VI
5Q
spectzlat why the opposition
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rL ,6~
parallel cases, :~~ often asked why Communist leaders who
had seen the handwriting on t4 wall did not take's ~actio An
time to save 'themselves o stave off a roachin doom T rvuu-
Gomnnunist leaders often refuse to face such
a situation and rationalise their attitude by saying They will not
dare --it will not happen to me, to It may be that Nalenkov and
company, in the final analysis, similarly closed their eyes to the
realities of .& s st rn which they had helped to perfect and in which
a Khrushchev j w de to power by having his men shout down any
1 opposition to his volicie se-by declaring hi op oneats
criminals 'When it) 00.
!:Politically opportune 4
,
6, It should be clear from the foregoing that, the June
events as the .climax of an intramural struggle among the Soviet
leadership in the course of which policy issues became tactical
weapons but were not in themselves the roots of the struggle. We AA_
for example, that Malenkov was more concerned with
/.the loss of his influence &maim the bore r t th
s
h h
aw
ue a a t t e
ft ~~ principle of industrial decentralisatioap
16~;?belfef is confirmed by the initial and admittedly limited
impressions gained of public reactions in the Soviet Union. Apathy
resfgnation3and cynicism were coupled with disapproval, shoc1, and
sympathy for Molotov and particularly for Malenkov~ who is still
remembered for his consumer goods program.
subscribed the view that the regime has suffered a further loss
of prestige as a result of the spectacle of open warfare among the
top chiefs. This may be precisely the reason why r1. no
retreat possible for the KhrUshchev regime, Which must Continue'
to just1fy the purge as being in the best interests of the people. of
On 21 July Pravda criticised a number of regional Soviet journals 25X1A9a
for lot pub casing sufficiently the ouster of the Malenkov-
Kaganovich-Molotov group, 25X1A8a
"The meetings devoted to the plenum are ove r, "
Pravda said, "but that does not mean that our press
should limit itself only to reports of those meetings.
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The militant task of our papers is to continue day in
and day out to clarify the decisions of the June. plenum,
clearly and in popular form to tell of the immense
victories of the Communist party and the Soviet people
during the great forty years Tsince the Bolshevik
Revolution/. York Times, July 22, 1957).
7. In the absence of a detailed study. of the exact following that
Khrushchev commands in the CPSU apparatus and, conversely, of
those elements in the bureaucracy or the Party who may still
sympathize with the ousted opposition, it is of course impossible
to state whether Khrushchev's position is actually as strong as his
victory in the June Plenum would indicate. Among the papers
attacked by Pravda on 21 July (see above) were Party organs in
the Ukraine and Bielorussiao this may indicate
opposition in areas which sho uorazally safe for Khrushchevo
The best. available estimates on Khrushchev's strength within the
CPSU apparatus indicate a loyal following of roughly 60%, of the
tot,&Q tthl estimate is correct, Khrushchevr must.reckon with
one oppo s ition within the Party and further purges y on lower
echelons will probably take placed
S,o Much speculatoa has been aired concernix% Zhukov!I, and the
Soviet Army: , One school'of thought holds that Khrushchev
rules with the help of, and possibly er preseu~ fro the Army9
which now holds a position similar t _e#cbswetli. other
school maintains that Zbukov has ao political aspir tions and that
the Soviet Arm;; will be satisfied with the iecogniti n of its
requirements concerning the security of the USSR. Still another
school holds that it would be an oversimplification o. consider
the Soviet Army a monolithic unit since it contains both elements
with political aspirations as well as non-political lernents. This
latter view probably' comes closer to the truth, . T ere is no doubt
that Zhukov is backing Khrushchev to a point of gl rification,
Nevertheless the 30 June 1956 CPS U Resolution ((ee above)
stressed the fact that the so-called Leninist nucl us was composed
of Party as well as military Is de s. and it won d be reasonable
to assume that Khru shche v
Vffi-A7 1# Jane 19S41 threatened' by
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implication certain opposition elements in the Soviet Army. With
Bulgaain's downfall reportedly imminent. it should be interesting
to watch for shifts in the Army command,, Although one should
think that Khrushchev would not risk endangering Army efficiency
through excessive purges. his view of the Soviet Army--as Implied
in certain remarks of his during his London visit - -is a traditional
Bolshevik one I. e, . that the, Army is an instrument of the Party.
Given his precariously balanced position between the needs of the
consumers (which he, promises to satisfy) and Army requirements
on heavy industry,;, Khrushchev may yet be forced, by circumstance
into an Army purge, if and when the Soviet military press too
hard for their objectives,
It should be remembered that Khrushchev until now has used the
de -Stalinisation issue largely as it pertained to crimes committed
by Stalin against the Party,. (Thus he brought the Malenkov
group to its knees,) He has not used as yet the issue of the crimes
committed by Stalin against the Army, t, ee the pre -World War
II executions of Soviet military leaders such as Marshal
Tukhachevsky, et alo It may be speculated that he holds the issue
in reserve in order to turn it against opposition or recalcitrant
Army elements, After all. Stalin in the postwar period, as a
qualified observer noted, surrounded himself with his Marshals as
"symbols of authoritarian power," and guilt by' mach association
could be established. Conversely, opposition elements in the
Army, should they desire to move in on the CPSU, could well
.turn the issue against Khsushchev, _ MIkoy&n ,~ Shvernik whoa
reportedly, supported Stalin.and his purge. Yeshov,- in 1937-38
when thousands of Red Army officers were liquidated.
The crux of the matters s e4 lies in Khrushchev's
ability to balance out requirements of the domestic economy and
Soviet Army requirements, This is not an easy bala04l'reg W:t.
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9. On the whole, 'Khrushchev' a position is not as firm as it may
appear. - His acts following the - June Plenum indicate that his main
concern now L. with the consolidation of his position and the
build'-up of personal support in, order to strengthen his position.
ao The trip to Czechoslovakia seems to have had no other
purpose than to impress his . home audience with the support
he received personally.
b. The unprecedented advance briefings of Free World CP
leaders prior to the July 3 CPSU communique were apparently
made in order to ensure rapid CP expressions of support
for the purge.
c. The pattern of the purges?f liberals" and pro-Titoists in.
Rumania and Bulgaria has boon--rather shrewdly--analyzed
as "more a matter of personnel than of policy" and it has
been pointed out that "the leaders fin the Satellites 7 on whom
Khrushchev believes he can count may be shielded regardless
of their affinity for Stalinist ideas and their tough unyielding
attitudes toward domestic problems,." (See Flora Lewis'
excellent piece* "Khrushchev Reshapes Policy on Satellites",
New York Times, Section 4, page 4. 21 July 1956. j
d. There are also indications that the Khrushchev regime
desires some gesture of support from the West. It would be
fair to conclude that the regime could turn such gestures into
propagandistic political capital,
It should also be considered that in the fluid post-Stalin
atmosphere in the USSR a "purge" may not take its course as
envisaged. A strong indicator in this respect will be the fate
of Bulganin who has been reliably seep orted on his way out. If he
should prove to be stabled a strengthening of 'Khrushehev's
opposition could be assumed,
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100 Khrushehev has not yet acquired
sufficient strength to launch new experiments with his "peaceful
coexistence" tactic. Although he has portrayed his "victory" as
the triumph of the policy enunciated at the 20th CPSU Congressv
he is making clear that he is against excessive liberalization
("revisionism") as well as obsolete Stalinist methods
("dogmatism" ), He still draws a firm ideological demarcation
line against Titoism. / and has stated that Soviet foreign policy
cannot be expected to change. Internally he is re -emphasizing
the priority of heavy industry. Externally he is again advocating
the united front with "progressive" parties. In brief, his
positions, for the moment, are reaffirmations of the Khrushchev
line which has been observable since 1955.
11 During Khrushchev's consolida i per the Soviets will
continue to react sensitive) a ' ie sio om 5 1? JulY the
1
Soviet press and radio. retied angrily to the following themes
which appeared in.tie West,
as Purge indicates internal discord.
ba June Plenum decisions indicate weakness of the regime;
are manifestation of crisis in leadership and must lead to
the weakening of the unity of the Socialist camp,
c. Soviet system is undergoing stresses and strains;
weakness and crisis of the Soviet system. .
d. Purge was characteristic of Soviet system; the CCICPSU
is an arena for a struggle for powers
A
USSR is a dictatorship run by a handful of people,
Art Y:
f, Exposure and removal of- the. . anti-Party group was the
work of one man.
g. Doubt that democratic procedures were employed in the
treatment of the anti-Party group,
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THE KHRUSHCHEV PURGE
(23 July 1957)
1, In retrospect Khrush vp action pattern since the death
of Stalin is consistent in one respect, l ? eo , his movement
toward power, His cans stetscy in terms of policy is less clear,
perhaps because. in his movement toward power, 'he* has used
differences and. conflicts over policy matters in such a way 'as
to strengthen his own position, Nevertheless, his basic approach
seems to steno from a desire to break with the obsolete methods
of the Stalinist past and to strengthen the appeal of Communism
both internally (as a ruling system) and externally (as a means
of weakening, if not destroying, the enemy), His break with
the past and his approach to the future are consistent with his
movement toward power, The mays who is to succeed a giant
like Stalin could not aspire to this role if he were merely to copy
Stalin, Such a man must emerge with a stature and ideas of his
own, Khrushchev has shown that he is willing to take great risks
in order to obtain such stature,, The 20th CPSU Congress, his
secret speech, his virgin lands program, his concept of de
centralization ? -these are all steps involving considerable risks.
Obviously, too9. a man on his march to power would feel
compelled to. rationalise his gambling as being good for the USSR
and World Communism, It may be assumed that Khrushchev
similarly justified the June purge and probably received backing
from the Central Committee on the same grounds, Thus.
Khrushchev has propelled himself into a position where he has
to show that he is good for the USSR and World Communism, and
in so doing incurred the greatest risk. In his career,
2. Khrushchev's struggle with his competitors in the Presidium
appears to have gone rather well from the start,, The Malenkov-
Beria combine was broken in 1953. In 1954 Abakumov was
executed for his role as .purger in the "Leningrad affair." Early
in 1955 Malenkov stepped down as' Premier, and later in that
year Molotov relinquished his post as Foreign Minister after
having been castigated by a Plenum of the Central Committee in
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July, The 20th CPSU Congress (February 1956) castigated
Molotov's and Malenkov's policies? in the second half of .1956
Kaganovich suffered demotion from his job as Chairman of the
important Committee of Labor and Wages. However, the
explosions in Poland and Hungary enabled Kb;w bichev's
tIt /~. -
competitors to ral%y and to stage a comeback, ovember .
195641 rly January 1957 Molotov and Malenkov
re -emerged as influential, The December Plenum of the
CC/CPSU which discussed highly controversial economic issues
(downward revisions of the Sixth Five -Year Plan, managerial
impediments and inefficiency) probably found Khrushchev at the
lowest point of his recent career, However, from the February
1957 Plenum on, following a semi on of the Supreme Soviet which
had accepted Khrushchev's industrial decentralization plan.
Khrushchev rose to considerable strength backed by tremendous
publicity and probably also by the majority of the regional
Party apparatus which was loyal to him and found his
decentralization plan profitable.
3. It has been pointed out that Khrushchev's competitors in the
Presidium who were felled in June by the Khrushchev-packed
Central Committee were not a homogeneous group. This is
certainly true. The popular Malenkov was his chief competitor.
Molotov and Kaganovich were "conservative" Stalinists and
probably more inconvenient than threatening. Shepilov, a
wartime associate of Khrushchev, probably was an opportunistic
turncoat. Probably they all joined in opposition to Khrushchev on
the question of industrial decentralisation which they may have
considered too dangerous a gamble. In turn they probably were
joined or supported to various degrees by other Presidium
members equally critical of Khrushchev's modus operandi.
Bulganin at one time appears to have been associated with the
"anti-Party group" but disassociated himself (possibly by
"squealing") In time to win a temporary reprieve, Pervukhin
and Saburov's actual connectiomm with the group may have been
based on a concurrence in views rather than factional activity.
The exact line-up against Khrushchev in the Presidium sessions
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of 17, 18- and 19 June* may have been based on a loose alliance
of oppositionist elements who may even have held, as Communist
sources claim, a temporary majority. Although it will probably
never be known exactly how the alliance coagulated, At
4s-aubmitte~
ohm* the strategy of the opposition was to defeat Khrushebev on
political grounds before he would eliminate the leaders of the
opposition (Malenkov -Molotov -Kaganovich) because of their
complicity in Stalin's crimes, particularly the "Leningrad affair"
~1C.4f.t
4o In a CPSU document given to a Western CP leader for briefing
purposes on 12 July reference is made to attempts made y sc' t Yr
4r January 1955 to oust Malenkov. These attempts are probably
bound up with the de-Stalinization process and may have actually
started., asI4er when former Soviet Minister of State Security
Abakumov was executed in December 1954 because of hie role in
the "Leningrad affair", i. e. , the liquidation of high-ranking Soviet
leaders** and associates of Zhdanov, Maleakov'e chief competitor
prior to his (possibly natural) death in 1948. Khrushchev cited
Communist sources- claim these e
three dot so -W io
the crucial session took place on 19 June, On the
17 and 18 June the majority of the Presidium appeared jointly
in public at various social and ceremonial occasions,
ee , E. g, , Politburo member and State planner Vosnesensky;
Secretary of the CC /CPSU Kusnetsov, et al,
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the "Leningrad affair" In his "secret" speech of February 1956
as an illustration of Stalin's terror regime against the CPSU in
the postwar period, xculpat g the majority of the Political
Bureau which did not know what Stalin was doing, and. conversely,, -
point-his f nger at those.who did,,. Maleakov. Molotov mid
Kagaaovich were members of the Pelitbisreau at the time the
"Leningrad affair" occurred. The implications could not have
been lost on them in February 1936. - Khrushchev used the method
of indirect threat again in the 30 June 1936 Resolution of the CPSU
which defined the limits of the .do -Stalinisation campaign. when
he referred to a (presumably anti-Stalinist) "Leninist nucleus"
which operated already during Stalin's' lifetime, Implicitly,
again, he pointed his finger at those leaders who had not been
part of the "Leninist nucleus,, "
At that time evaluatia,- the secret Khrushchev
speech; A
"There is another theory which has been advanced,,
It is the theory that the secret speech by Khrushchev
could be wolf interpreted as a blackmail instrument to
be used against actual or potenti&l opponntso This theory
has acquired some 'weight in the light of the 30 June CPSU
Resolution, which came out with the 'rather surprising
statement that already during Stalin's lifetime a Leninist
nucleus existed among the CC members and ranking
Army officer s - -a nucleus which at Various periods, for
instance during the war years, cartatled the power of
Stalin. From the reference to the ecistenci of such a
Leninist nucleus, it is possible to argue that the people
outside of this Leninist nucleus are intended to be
identified more distinctly with the Stalin era and, further
are singled out to, be attacked or destroyed as traitors
4~ &%-
gin i v a ec sh T os efts thAt
UP et.
swe e~e o~~ae3ae a s s m his a
ctual or ote opposition and that, in. having
obtained this legal basis, he has stre sed his power
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position. By the' same token he has also alerted the
non-Leninists to his intentions,, Thus, the question
arises of the relative strength of Khrushchev and of
the opposition, as well as the question of the possibility
that a power struggle in the CPSU leadership may
break out. "
To this evaluation may be added good evidence of a later date
which indicated that Khrushcher had not actually planned to make
the speech but gave it because the. delegates to the 20th CPSU
Congress pressured for the details which had not been brought
out in the o n attacks on Stalin at the Congress. This evidence
~-.4"'1 dication that Khrushchev used his men
in the Central Committee at the Congress in such a way that he
would be "pressured" into forging his blackmail weapon, i.e.. he
let himself be induced into making the speech. Given 'the evidence
of increasing and spreading opposition to Khrushchev's lbolicies
at the end of 1956 and beginning of 1957, it would. be fair to assume
that Khrushchev felt compelled to settle the score once and for
all and to move from the employment of blackmail towards an
actual showdown, .* 'ie "the following statement in Victor
Zorza's article of U July in the Manchester Guardian Weakly
extremely plausible. -
"The opposition, and Malenkov in particular. had*
got wind of Khrushehev's intention to blame Malenkov,
either implicitly or explicitly. for arranging the
demotion and even the execution of Leningrad party
leaders in 1948-9 and wanted the matter thrashed out
in the Presidium,"
This item is plausible not only on general grounds but also by
reason of other indications,
a, The announcement of the 254th -Anniversary of the
Founding of Leningrad was made on 24 April by Leningrad
Pravda. So far as can be determined the 250th Anniversary
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actually took place in 1953Q In view of Khrushchev'a subsequent
and- emphatic allegations that the opposition w afraid to face
the Leningraders I ? the timing of the Leningrad Celebration in
April (when Khrushchev had already recouped his strength)
appears ominous,
b. The official CPSU version of the June events emphasizes
that the opposition used the pretext of discussing the speeches
to be made at the Leningrad Anniversary in order to obtain an
extraordinary Presidium session at which they then attacked
the 'allegedly unsuspecting Khrushehev. In view of the fact
that all parties concerned must have been fully cognizant of
the implications of the Leningrad issue. It it i hly improbable
that the opposition used this pretext or that 1 s uld have made
the matter of ceremonial speeches an urgent business. If the
opposition had used this flimsy pretext, they certainly w.iold
have tipped their hand.
It is therefore submitted that Khrushchev maneuvered his
opposition into a corner where they had only two alternatives,
i. e. , to cease their opposition or to force a showdown. Khrushchev's
position was strong. He had the Central Committee on his side.
He also had the'Leningrad affair" and, presumably, other affairs
from the Stalin era which he could pin on the opposition. The
opposition held the weaker position from the start. They were
apparently In no position to use' Khrushcheyr's complicity in Stalin's
crimes, (We Fresunnefthat Khruohchev controls the materials
pertaining to this issue, to the exclusion of the opposition.). The
opposition's choice to fight the battle on grounds of policy also is
an indication of . weakne ss. They could not have realistically
expected to hold their ground against a Khrushchev-dominated
Central Committee.
54 kspeculat why the opposition
chose to fight for a lost caius~
s belies that there
was a certain type of Communist psychology operating which
.,directly or indirectly observed in lesser though somewhat
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parallel cases. ftenk
lwwp~ why Communist leaders who
had seen the handwriting on the wall did not take action in
time to save themselves or to stave off approaching doonn. 1rvrrr
Communist leaders often refuse to face such
a situation and rationalise their attitude by saying," They will not
dare --it will not happen to me, " It may be that Malenkov and
company, in the final analysis, similarly closed their eyes to the
realities of a system which they had helped to perfect and in which
a Khrushchev can ride to power. by having his men shout down any
opposition to his policies aad7%w by declaring his opponents
criminals when it is politically opportune', er't 4- 0 ' 10r
b, It should be clear from the foregoing that-wri_couaidi the June
events Wthe climax of an intramural struggle among the Soviet
leadership in the course of which policy issues became tactical
weapons but were not in themselves the roots of the struggle. ?91 W*u rr{
for example, that Malenkov was more concerned with
the loss of his influence among the bureaucrats than with the
principle of industrial decentralisation.
Gur belief is confirmed by the initial and admittedly limited
impressions gained of public reactions in the Soviet Union, Apathy,
reslgnatiou,and cynicism were coupled with disapproval, shoe and
sympathy for Molotov and particularly for Malenkov1who is st'
membered for his consumer goods program. We are imifia&&W
ecc = that the regime
" is has suffered a further loss
of prestige as a result of the spectacle of open warfare among the
top chiefs. This may be precisely the reason why#bese-4. no
retreat ossible for the Khrushchev regime, which must continue
to justify the purge as being in the best interests of the people.
On 21 July Pravda criticised a number of regional Soviet journals
for not publicizing sufficiently the ouster of the Malenkov-
Kaganovich -Molotov group.
"The meetings devoted to the plenum are over, "
Pravda said, "but that does not mean that our press
should limit itself only to reports of those meetings,
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The militant task of our papers is to continue day in
and day out to clarify the decisions of the June plenum.
clearly and in popular form to tell of the immense
victories of the Communist party and the Soviet people
during thereat forty years since the Bolshevik
Revolution/ . " "+
(New York Times, July t 19570
7. In the absence of a detailed study. of the . exact following that
Khrushchev commands in the CPSU apparatus and. conversely, of
those elements in the bureaucracy or the Party who may still
sympathize with the ousted oppositiono it is of course impossible
to state whether Khrushchev's position is actually as strong as his
victory in the June Plenum would indicate. Among the papers
attacked by Pravda on 21 July (see above) were Party organs in
the Ukraine and Bielorussia. At=th 2- -1
nj its may indicate
opposition in areas which should normally be' safe for Khrushchevo
The best ,available estimates on Khrushchev's strength within the
CPSU apparatus indicate & 'loyal following of roughly 60% of the
totale thi , estimate is correct. Khrushchev must. reckon with
s om vop Ooi' ion within the Party and further purges on lower
echelons will probably take place;
8o Much speculaton has been aired concerning hukov% and the
Soviet Armyi One school of thought holds that Khrushchev
rules with the help of, and possibly apressure from th im
.
which now holds a position similar to
A tk
Reicle-49ir O 'oil school maintains that Zhukov has no political aspirations and that
the Soviet Arm; will be satisfied with the recognition of its
requirements concerning the security.of the USSR. Still another
school holds that it would be an oversimplification to consider
the Soviet Army a monolithic unit since it coat$ins both elements
with political aspirations as well as non-political elements. This
latter view probably comes closer to the truth*. There is no doubt
that Zhukov is backing Khrushchev to a point of glorification.
Nevertheless the 30 June 1956 CPS -1 Resolution (see above)
stressed the fact that the so-called Leninist nucleus was composed
of Party as well as military leaders. and it would be reasonable
to assume that Khrushchev alwea in June 195 threatened by
Or
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implication certain opposition elements in the Soviet Army. With
Bulganin's downfall reportedly immineat, it should be interesting
to watch for shifts in the Army command, Although one should
think that Khr ihchev would not risk endangering Army efficiency
through excessive purges, his view of the Soviet Army--as implied
in certain remarks of his during his London visit--is a traditional
Bolshevik one I. e. , that the. Army is an instrument of the Party.
Given his precariously balanced position between the needs of the
consumers (which he promises to satisfy) and Army requirements
on heavy industry, Khrushchev may yet be forced. by circumstance
into an Army purge, if } and when the Soviet military press too
hard for their objectives.
It should be remembered that Khrushchev until now has used the
de -Stalinization issue largely as it pertained to crimes committed
by Stalin against the Party,. (Thus he brought the Malenkov
group to its knees.) He has not used as yet the issue of the crimes
committed by Stalin against the Army. i. e, , the pre -World War
II executions of Soviet military leaders such as Marshal
Tukhachevsky, et al It may be speculated that he holds the issue
in reserve in order to turn it against opposition or recalcitrant
Army elements. - After all, Stalin in the postwar period. as a
qualified observer noted, surrounded himself with his Marshals as
"symbols of authoritarian power." and guilt by such association
could be established, Conversely, opposition elements in the
Army, should they desire to move in on the CPSUo could well
turn the issue against Khrushchev, Mikoyanand Shvernik who,
reportedly. supported Stalin.and his purger. Yeshov, in 1937-38
when thousands of Red Army officers were liquidated.
The crux of the matter ~..la-suarldp lew? lies in Khrushchev's.
ability to balance out requirements of the domestic economy and
.
Soviet Army requirement. This is not an easy balaar7 .sag 24t
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9. On the whole D Khrushchev's position is not as firm as it may
appear,- His acts following the June Plenum indicate that his main
concern now is with the consolidation of his position and the
build-up of personal support in order to strengthen his position,
ao The trip to Czechoslovakia seems to have had no other
purpose than to impress his home audience with the support
be- received personally,
b, The unprecedented advance briefings of Free World CP
leaders prior to the July 3 CPSU communique were apparently
made in order to ensure rapid CP expressions of support
for the-purges
c. The pattern of the purge s7f liberals" and pro -Titoists in_
Rumania and Bulgaria has been--rather shrewdly--analyzed
as 'more a matter of personnel than of policy" and it has
been pointed out that "the leaders An the Satellites! on whom
Khrushchev believes he can count may be shielded regardless
of their affinity for Stalinist ideas and their tough unyielding
attitudes toward domestic problems," (See Flora Lewis'
excellent piece "Khrushchev Reshapes Policy on Satellites".
New York Times. Section 4.' page 4. 21 July 1956, y
d0 There are also indications that the Khrushchev regime
desires some gesture of support f rom- the We sto It would be
fair to conclude that the regime could turn such gestures into
propagandistic -political capital.
It should also be considered that in the fluid post-Stalin
atmosphere in the USSR a "purge" may not take its course as
envisaged. A strong indicator in this respect will be the fate
of Bulganin who has been reliably up orted on his way out. If he.
should prove to be stable. a strengthening of Khrushchev's
opposition could be assumed.
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140 da=ela:iaeatt~rha Khrushchev has not yet acquired
sufficient strength to launch new experiments with his "peaceful
coexistence" tactic.' Although he has portrayed his "victory" as
the triumph of the policy enunciated at the 20th CPSU Congress,
he is making clear that he is against excessive liberalization
("revisionism") as well as obsolete Stalinist methods
("dogmatism" ), He still draws a firm ideological demarcation
line against Titoism, and has stated that Soviet foreign policy
cannot be expected to change. Internally he is se -emphasising
he priority of heavy industry, Externally he is again advocating
the united front with "progressive" parties, In brief, his
positions. for the moment, are reaffirmations of the Khrushchev
During Khrushchev's co s
i veried theS is will
~
continue to react sensitive] ' Pe y the
a e r r in
- JuI I o
Soviet press and radio reacted angrily to the following themes
which appeared in the West,
as Purge indicates internal discord,
bo June Plenum decisions indicate weakne s s of the regime;
are manifestation of crisis in leadership and must lead to
the weakening of the unity of the Socialist camps
c, Soviet system is undergoing stresses and strains;
'weakness and crisis of the Soviet system,
line whit h has been observable since 1955,
d, Purge was characteristic of Soviet system; the CC/CPSU
is an arena for a struggle for power.
e. USSR is a dictatorship run by a handful of people.
f. Exposure and removal of the gatl?Party group was the
work of one man,
g, Doubt that democratic procedures were employed in the
treatment of the anti-Party group.
11
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h, Malenkov challenged Khrushchevos dictatorship.
i. The average Soviet citizen had no intimation of develop-
mentse was not told the truth,
j, Suggestions that a change in Soviet foreign policy can be
expected; conclusions that the Soviet Union will make
concessions to the West; suggestions that the USSR is seeking
to increase its influence in Asia by sensational measures and
that USSR is trying to alienate Japan from the West; suggestions
that the Arabs are concerned about Shepilovts removal; Soviet
policy is not connected with Shepilov. personally.
k. Czechoslovakia Party leaders are bitter enemies of
Khrushchev; suggestions that the trip to Czechoslovakia would
result in a purge there.
1. The Soviets were particularly enraged about the treatment
given the purge in the Danish press, . Some of the Danish press
reactions were;
(1) Skepticism that anything good will come of the upheaval.
(23 The present regime will continue to pursue the
ob jec Yes it had in common with Molotov and company.
and
Zia.
(3). Skepticism on how Khrushcbeev would be able to
reconcile the policy of "torpedoing capitalism" with "peace-
ful coadstence'l?
.(4) Possiblity of new explosions in the Kremli e
(5). Sympathy for the once free Czech people but not for
Czech leaders who may be on their way out.
(6). Grateful appreciation of NATO which protects free
people from developments such as occur in the East.
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