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November 11, 2016
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December 16, 1997
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June 1, 1957
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Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 25X1 C3b1 25X1X7 Next 33 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Appendix The. ' list. below, name's: off icers and, other staff personnel of Soviet. Intelligence, services: ?who. have been 'exppo s ed publicly, from approximately 1942, to mid-1557, as, involved in:-espionage while functioning ostensibly as diplomatic or other official represent*- t,ives: abroad. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Diplomatic and. BELUSOV, Viktor. Second Secretary Soviet Enibas'sy, Stockholm. Involved in. the :ZARTAR.YAN espionage case. on.s;ula:,r P"o;s.itions i h TS N Fili K SL c . pp Vasyev , Y I ' Second Secretary, Soviet. Embassy, Canberra, Oct. 195Z to April 1954, RIS assignment: organize an 'illegal apparatus" in Australia; r'studyrr members of Parliament. ,and Diplomatic Corps. Left Sweden, San 1957 at request of Swedish government. DOLBIN, Gregoriy G. Coun - s:.ellor, Soviet Exabassy, Wash, x KOVALENKO, Yevgeniy V,as:ilyevich. 1946. Prior to then had served Third Secretary, Soviet Embassy, in. Japan, 1940-1944. Canberra.. State Security officer. Departed after Petrov defected, DRANKOV, Vasiliy D. Second April 1954. Secretary and Press Attache, The Hague. Target: defense and'KUDRIAVTZEV, ,Sergei. First, industrial information. Expelled Secretary, Soviet Embassy, Ottawa. in 1957. GRU officer in Canada, 1945. + FARAFONTOV, A. N. Clerk .f KULAKOV, fnu. Lieutenant Clerk, at Soviet Embassy, Ottawa, 1945. Soviet Embassy, Ottawa, 1945. Involved in espionage. '. GUBANOV, Fedor Yegorovich. Involved. in espionage. IKUTNETZOV, P. Embassy employee, Emba,s'sy Clerk, Canberra. London. Received secret. data from. State Security worker. Returned British Foreign Office wireless to_ USSR, March 1951. operator, 1952. GUSYEV, Sergey I7. Soviet 'MAKAROV, Semen Ivanovich. Clerk, Embassy doorman. G:RU officer, Third Secretary and First Secretary Ottawa, 1945 in Soviet Embassy, Canberra, 1943- 1949. First State Security Resident, Australia. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Diplomatic'.and.' Positions MASHKANTZEV, Genadi F. Employee, Soviet Embassy, Washington Expelled from US April 1957 for improper activities in. attempt to force former Air Force officer Peter Pirogov to return to USSR. MERKULOV, Alexander I. Second Secretary, Soviet Embassy, Oslo, until March 1952. A contact of Asbj.orn Suede, convicted of espionage, July 1954. MITROFANOV, Victor. Chauffeur, Soviet Embassy, Oslo. Involved in the Asbjorn Sunde espionage case. MOLEV, Vasili M. Clerk, Soviet Embassy. Involved in Soble-Albam espionage case. Departed US, Jan 1957. NOVIKOV, Nikolai V. Charge d' Affaires, Soviet Ernb,as`sy, Washington. With TOLOKON- NIKOV, directed the Gubitchev- Coplon case. X NOVIKOV, Yuri V. Second Secretary, Soviet Embassy, Washington. Involved in. Verber:- Ponger espionage case.. Declared png, .Tan 1953. OR LOV, Nikolay P. Employee, Soviet Embassy, Stockholm. In Sept 1951 expelled from Sweden for .connection with H. E. Anders.. son espionage case. Target: military data, including invasion, routes into Swedes.. OTROSHENKO, Andrey Makarovich, Colonel. Official of Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs in. Japan, 1953. Chief of Far East Intelligence for State Security. PANYUSHKIN, Aleksandr Semeno- vich. Soviet Ambassador to.. the United States, 1947-1951. A Major General ,in State Security. PAVLOV, Vitali G. Second Sec- retary, Soviet Embassy, Ottawa, 1945. Chief, of State Security legal network in Canada. PETROV, Vladimir M. Third Sec- retary and acting VOKS officer, Soviet Embas'sy, Canberra, Au:s tralia, 1951-1954. Defected April, 1954. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Diplomatic',and Consular Pos'itiobs SADOVNIKOV, Valentin veyevich. Second and later First Secretary, Soviet Embassy, Canberra. State Security Resident, April 1949 to April 1951. VINOGRA.DOV, Konstantin. Secretary, Soviet, Erba.ssy, Stockholm, 1947. Involved in Hilding Anders.son case. SHIBAYEV, Petr Andreyev.ich, Colonel. Advisor cif Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In Japan, 1951, to control CP activities and to exploit. Soviet contacts with the US Counter- Intelligence Corps. SOKOLOV, Georgiy Aleksan drovic.h. Counsellor, Soviet Embassy, Washington, 1948. Former Chief Resident, in Tokyo. In the US in. similar position. VLADYKIN, I'=.ikolai A. Coun- sellor .of Soviet Embassy., Wash- ington. Replaced PANYUSHKIN as State Security Resident in the US. 4YAKOVLEV, Anatoli Antonovich. Vice Consul .at Soviet Consulate, New York City until 1946. Re- ceived reports from Harry Gold, September 1944 until December 1946. ZHUKOV, Ivan Vas.ili.evich. Chauffeur, Soviet Embassy, Oslo, until January 1954. Involved in Asbjorn Sunde espionage case. ZUBILIN, Vassili M. Third, then TOLOKONNIKOV, Lev S. First Second Secretary, Soviet Embassy, Sec,re.tary, Soviet Ernbas,sy, Washington. Directed atomic Washington. With N. V. NOVI- espionage in the US from 1942 to KOV, directed Gubichev-Coplon 1944. ca s.e . Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 IVii1'itary,' Naval .and Air A.ttacht:1' AMOSOV, Igor A., Commander. Y IONCHENKO, N,ikolay V. , MA, Asst. NA, Washington, 1952-54. Turkey. Charged with trying to Declared png, February 1954. buy military information. Was requested to leave Turkey, May 1956.. [, ANGELOV, ' fnu. , Lteputenant. GRU liaison agent, Ottawa, E KOSHEL V, Vladimir F,, CCom- 1945. Officer on staff of MA. mander. Acting NA, Oslo, 1951. Involved in. Per Danielsen case. ASTAAFYEV, Aleksandr R., Commander. NA, Rome, October 1948 to May 1955. B UB CHIKO V, Ivan A., Colonel. Found to be engaged, in espion- .age. Expelled from the US, June 1956. EGOROV, Vikctor. Asst. MA, Soviet Embassy, Stockholm. Involved in Enborn espionage case, 1948-1951. GALKIN, fnu., Captain. officer in Canada in 1945. GRU GURSHK.OV, fnu., Captain. Driver for GRU chief, Canada, 1945. KRYLOV, Yuri P., Major. Asst. MA in, the U.S. Declared png, January 1957. KUZNE.TSOV, Anatoliy I., Major. Asst. MA, Tehran. Expelled from. Iran, March 1956. MIKI-IEYEV, Vladimir P. Employee, Soviet MA.:office, Washington, July 1954-May 195.6. Tried to procure military information from US govern?- ment officials; MOROZOV, Aleksandr D. NA and. MA, Argentina. Declared. png,, June 1954. MOTINOV, Petr, Lieu- tenant Colonel. Asst. MA. Was in }" GUDKOV, Andrey, Major. Asst. indirect contact with Canadian. Com-- MA, London. Expelled May 1954 nxunists involved in espionage in.1945. for attempted espionage. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-0091,5R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 MUitar ,' wad. Air Attaches. `( PIVNEV, Leonid, L,ieu.tki.ant Colonel, Asst. A-',-,R! Attache; Wa,shi.:T.gto i., 1950-,1954. De.. dared pr g, Ma-.,r 1954. PUP';; SHEV, Iva ., Ma, o:k?r SOKOLOY, Afanasi., Commander. NA, Oslo, 1951. Involved %n the Per Dan;,e:ls'-fi case. YEGOROV, Viktor V., Major. Asst. Ass it. MA x... S-;o :k?o.m. Irpii.- MA, Lo..-:dorm. Expe11~-,,d'a-?> 13 ?il-t?.s" for att rapt d c;sp.o--.age, 1954. ROGOV, .A atoll,. MA, C L p : . ,SFr' Da _'.s'-': ,.a, gL~-, . Exp,, :. rll~d " hover amcnt :;a-:.uar- 195 ROMANOV, Aleksai_.dx?, Majoi:. Asst. ;o OR:I7 Ca.--.ada, 1943-1945. RUDITCHEV, LY eu.a- c Comnianadex. Ass.. NA. Exp .11 .d by Da-.s':F. gov t, FF a.~?y 1957. ,SOKOLOV, f-.u. Wife: of Maj,,:,. SOKOLOV. She, was ?-.sed as a !_-awsoy-~. age-: t fol, GRU networ k, Ca.-'7.a,da, 1945. cat d ....LL E .s~orrka casfA Had 1zft Swede;? before e epos .x of t'ie case in, 1951. YERMOLA:'*Ev, Sexgey. E:,:pioyee, NA off c#, Ron-:, 1952u1955. Arr sted by.Ttal'ans in Apz-i1 1955 on charges of espionage.. ZA_ o - ~, Nikala ar, Colonel. MA, C i. f of GRU legal ne uwo -k C -aada, 1943..1945. ZAVAROUKEIN Peter. Asst. MA, Soviet Ei, Aa -. Sf:-:)ckholm. 1_iv--1ved i.n the esp=.onage case; 194': x.940. 32_ Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 VOKS,, Ptes:s,' 'Ctiltutal Attaches',and 'Uridesig'xiated'Attache's' KHARKOVETZ, Georgiy Ivano- Y PETROV, Vladimir M. (See under vich. Press Attache, Canberra, Diplomatic and Consular Positions) February 1951 to April 1954. RIS as'signi ent: to, develop PLAITKAIS, Yanis Eduardovich. agents ,among contacts in correp- Attache, Soviet Embassy, Can'oerr,a, pondent, government worker and January 1953 to April 1954., RIS diplomatic circles. assignment: work among Russian emigres. MESHEVI'lINOV, 3oris. Cul- tural Attache, Oslo, 1950-1.954. Declared png February 1954. Target: military data. MITSKEVI T CH, V. P. State Security Colonel. Head of the "intelligence group" in VOKS. T.SHER11OV, Feodor. Attache, Soviet Ernba.ssy, Stockholm. Tar- get: military and transportation info rraation. VYSSELSK ', 'fi-au. Press Attache and lat r a Third Secretary at En'..)assy in .Ca:::. erba. State Secu ?it Officer. Return-,d, to USSR in November 1950. Un.dted' Natio':es' GROMOV, Anatole. State Security Colo_ael. Used United y%Tations, cover for e.spion-.age. Also was First Secretary at Soviet Embassy, Was.-At. -.gto:.. GUBICHEV, Valenti.. UN employee. Exposed, March 194.9. Target: counter -,i -itelli- genc:e inforriiation. KOVALYOV, Aleksandr P., Secoarr.d ,Secretary, Soviet delegation to UN. Expelled from US for improper activities, including espionage, July 1954. MART YNOV, Maks im G., Colonel. Mere"ler of Soviet Military Staff to UN, 19.51-1955. Declared pr?. g in Jaaua :'y 1955. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 United. Nations' PETRO. V, Viktor Ivanov:ich. SUMSKOY, Mikhail M. UN UN employee. Target: military employee .in.1940Is.. aircraft. Dismissed from. UN, July 1956. TIT'OV, Alexander. Used UN cover for State Security activity in 1955. TASS Re~!reseiatatives' ALKAYEVA, Le '.la. Worked for Soviet Naval Intelligence, Turkey, 1942. KUDRYAVTSEV, Se.rgey. GRU functionary under TASS cover, Berlin, 1941. ANISIMOV, Viktor. Exposed as: RIS operative, 1951-1952, in Stockholm. \MEDVEDEV, fnu. Used alias, MOROZOV. GRU Colonel under TASS :cover, Ankara, 194.2. ANTONOV, Viktor`~ MIKHAYLOV, Vladimir. GRU TASS correspondent,in Australia, officer under TASS cover, Ankara, 1952-1954. RIS. target: news- 1942. paper men; members of Parlia.-,, men. NOSOV, fnu. State Security func- tionary under TASS.cover ,in Aus- C;EUGUNOV, Konstantin Alekseyz, tralia until August 1950. _v RIS agent. in the US under TASS cover. OKOR:OKOVA, Augusta. RIS agent under TASS.cover, Turkey, 1942.. JANOVICZ, Nikolai V. TASS Later was. translator and typist employee at Soviet Embassy, in. Soviet Consulate. O.s.lo. Involved. in. the Asbjorn Sunde case, exposed in 1954. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 TASS' Rep?estntatives.' ' PAKHOMOV, Ivan Mikhay- VIS -TNYAKOV, Pavel. Chief of lovich. TASS employee ,and TASS Bureau, Ankara, 1942. State Security worker in State Security.officer. Australia, arriving there June 195 0. YEOOR ' V, fnu., Captain. TASS correspondent, Tokyo. GRU PISAREV, Leo_ C. TAS.S officer. correspondent, The Nether- lands.. RIS target: military YUDIN, fnu. Alias TARASOV. and. civilian defense data. RIS. officer using TASS cover, Declared png, February 1953. Berlin, 1941. ,SAMOYLOV, Sonin. A. GRU ~ ZHEVEINOV, Nicolai. TASS Colonel. TASS correspon- functionary, Ottawa, 1945. GRU dent in Japan, date not. deter- agent. Target: Canadian Army. mine d. Quasi'-legal Repre,seait'atives DOMNITSKIY, Andrey Ivano- RASTVOROV, Yuri., Lieutenant vich, Colonel. Chief of Soviet Colonel. State Security officer Mission, Tokyo. Used this assigned to. Soviet Mission, Tokyo. position for espionage. 4 TIKHVINSKIY,, Sergey Leonidovich, KOTELNIKOV, Anatoliy Fedoro- Colonel. Chief of Soviet Mists ion .in vich, Colonel. C1ai.kf, Consular Japan, 1956-1957. He has also used Section, Soviet,s.ion, Tokyo. TASS as, cover. VASHKIN, Ivan., Colonel. Chief of State Security group at Soviet. Mission, Tokyo. - 35 - Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Russian Red C:rc`s s. BALAYAN, f:iu., Colonel. Head of t=le "intelligence group" in the Russia i Red Cross. ilas, been abroad many times under Red Cross cover. Sov;.et Delegation's' SMIRNOV, Al.dr? ,, Colo;-el. Member of Skat.; s de1egatio:1 to Japa r.. RIS o ':...c r. Trade Rc,p:L? se.-.tatives. arid C oil a i .i' ial Attaches; CHISTYAKOV, Aleksa.ndr. Ennpl oyee, Soviet Trade Mis:sion.,, 1941. Directed. Soviet agent, Anatole Eri.c,sson, who was arrest d in 1956. Targets: Russia re- fugees, Swedish ide.nti.ty docu- ments, KROTOV, Ivan I. Commercial Counsellor, Ottawa, 1943-1945. Used as 1 aison agent by GRU. KOVALIEV, N.ikolay C. Com- mercial Attache, Australia, 1952-?1954, RIS as:s.gnrnen.t: develop contacts in political and industrial cir?cles.. SEME~TOV, Semen M. Aintorg -employee, U.S. Received re- -ports re atomic e^ergy develop- ment in 1944, n. KRUTIKOV, fnu. Commercial Attache, Ga::3jerra, 1948.-1950. State Security functionary. MIROSHNIKOV, Peter. Trade Delegation official, Stockholm. Expelled from Sweden, August 1956. Targets: Soviet ,and Satellite refugees, and rada. equipme t. SOKOLOV, Doris P., Major. GRU offic-_~r L Canada in 1945. Cover positions member of Commercial Cou's e llor's.. staff. _. 36 - Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/0410 CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 25X1 C3b1 Next 32 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 La liste ci-dessous contient les noms des officiers et du personnel des services de renseignements sovietiques qui ont ete decouverts, depuis 1942 environ jusqu'a mi- 1959, comme ayant ete compromis dans des cas d'espionnage tout en remplissant ostensiblement les fonctions de re - presentants'officiels diplomatiques ou autres A 1'etranger. -27- Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Postes Diplomatigues et Consulaires AKSENOV, ,Nikolai Vassilievitch. "Deuxieme Secretaire de 1'Am- bassade sovietique, Mexico; declare persona non grata en avril 1959 pour avoir fomente une agitation ouvriere commu- niste au Mexique. (Une autre liste dit: "accuse d'espionnage"). DRANKOV, Vassili Dmitriievitch. Deuxieme Secretaire et Attache de Presse A 1'Ambassadeso- vietique, La Haye; expulse des Pays-Bas pour avoir fait deg l'espionnage et avoir essaye de corrompre un personnage officiel hollandais, janvier 1957. BELOOUSSOV, Victor Vassilievitch. DIAKANOV, Dmitri Alexeievitch. Deuxieme Secretaire de 1'Ambas- sade sovietique, Stockholm; meld a 1'affaire d'espionnage Zartarian; declare persona non grata a la suite de ses acti- vites d'espionnage contre la Suede, janvier 1957. BELOV, Nikolai Andreievitch. Conseiller a i'Ambassade sovietique, Buenos Aires; de- clare persona non grata pour activites politiques et inge- rences dans les affaires na- tionales de l'Argentine, avril 19 59 CHIBAIEIL Petr Andreievitch (Colonel),, Conseiller au Ministere sovietique des Affaires Etrangeres; au Japon en 1951 pour controler leg activites du P.C. et pour ex- ploiter les contacts sovieti- ques avec le corps de contre- espionnage americain. DOLBINE, Gregori Gr4gorievitch. Conseiller a 1'Ambassade sovie- tique, Washington, 1946; avait d'abord servi au Japon, 1940- 1944. Premier Secretaire a 1':Am bassade sovietique de Buenos Aires; declare persona non grata pour avoir foments des emeutes industrielles, avril 1959. FARAFONTOV, Alexandre N.~ Commis a 1'Ambassade sovie- tique a Ottawa, 1945; meld a l'espionnage. GOUBANOV, Fedor Yegorovitch. Commis a 1'Ambassade sovie- tique a Canberra; fonction- naire de la Securite d'Etat; renvoye en U.R.S.S., mars 1951. GOUSEV, Serguei D. Portier a 1'Ambassade sovietique a Ottawa, 1945; officier du G.R.U. JOUKOV, Ivan Vassilievitch. Chauffeur A 1'Ambassade sovie- ts ue a Oslo jusqu'en janvier 1954; me"le a l'affaire d'es- pionnage Asbjorn SUNDE. -28- Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA; RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 "QQWMMMM KISLITSINE, Filipp Vassilie- vitch Deuxieme Secretaire a i'Ambassade sovietique, Canberra, d'oetobre 1952 a avril 1954; tithe assignee par les S.R.S.: organiser un"appareil illegal" en Australie, "etudier" les membres du Parlement et le Corps diplomatique. KOVALENKO, Yevgenii Vassilievitch. Troisieme Secretaire a l'Ambassade sovietique, Canberra; fonctionnaire de la Securi- te d'Etat; quitta apres la defection de PETROV, avril 1954. KRILOV, Lev Vladislavovitch. Premier Secretaire a 1'Am- bassade sovietique, Caracas; intervint de fawn agressive contre la detention d'un employe de 1'Ambassade que 1'on soupronnait d'activites politiques illicites; de- clare persona non grata, join 1952. KOUDRIAVTSEV, Serguei Mikhailovitch. Attache de Presse, Ankara, 1942; Premier Secretaire a 1'Am- bassade sovietique d'Ottawa; officier du G.R.U. au Canada, 1945. Servit a Vienne, 1952- 1955. Arriva a Bonn, Alle- magne de l'Ouest, comme Ministre-Conseiiler le 20 decembre 1955; partit en septembre 1957? KOULAKOV, (prenom inconnu) (Lieutenant). Commis a 1'Ambassade sovietique a Ottawa, 1945; mete a l'espionnage. KOUROTCHKINE, Nikolai Ivanovitch. Troisieme Secre- taire a 1'Ambassade sovie- tique a Washington; declare persona non grata pour acti- vates d'espionnage et pour avoir essaye d'acheter des publications militaires clas- sifiees, Juin 1958. MAKAROV, Semen Ivanovitch. Commis, Troisieme Secretaire et Premier Secretaire a l'Am- bassade sovietique, Canberra, 1943-1949; etait le premier Resident de la Securite d'Etat en Australie. 11 doro- MACHKANTSEV, Genadii Fe witch. Employe a 1'Ambas- sade sovietique, Washington; expulse des E.U. pour action intempestive en essayant de forcer un ancien officier d'aviation (Petr Pirogov) a retourner en U.R.S.S., avril 1957. MASLENNIKOV, Nikolai. Deuxieme Secretaire a 1Am- bassade sovietique, Varsovie; la presse polonaise signalait le 30 mai 1957 que le gouverne- ment polonais 11avait declare persona non grata pour actions incompatibles avec le statut diplomatique. -29- Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 UMMTIMMMMM~ MERKOULOV, Alexandre Ivano- PANIOUCHKINE, Alexandre Semono- vitch. Deuxieme Secretaire witch. Ambassadeur sovietique a l1Ambassade sovietique, aux Etats-Unis, 1947-1951;Major Oslo, jusquren mars 1952; General dans la Securite d'Etat. contact d'Asbjorn SUNDE, Nor- vegien convaincu d'espionnage PAVLOV, Vitalii G. Deuxieme Se- en juiliet 1954. cretaire a 1'Ambassade sovieti- que, Ottawa, 1945; chef du reseau MITROFANOV Victor Y. legal de la Securite d'Etat au Chauffeur d 1'Ambassade sovie'- Canada. tique, Oslo; mile a l'affaire d'espionnage d'Asbjorn SUNDE. PETROV, Vladimir Mikhailovitch. Troisieme Secretaire et fonc- MOLEV, Vassili. Mikhailovitch. tionnaire de V.O.K.S. A 1'Am- Commis a l'Ambassade soviets- bassade sovietlque, Canberra, que; Washington; male a 1'af'ai- Australie, 1951-1954; fit re d"espionnage SOBLE-ALBAM; defection en avril 1954. quitta les E.U. en janvier 1957.' SADOVNIKOV, Valentin Matveievitch. NOVIKOV Nikolai Vassilievitch. Deuxieme et plus tard Premier Charge d'affaires a 1'Ambassade Secretaire a 1'Ambassade sovie- sovietique, Washington; dirigea, tique, Canberra; Resident de la de,concert avec TOLOKON'XKOV, Securite d'Etat, avril 1949 a l'affaire GOUBITCHEV-COPLON. avril 1951. NOVIKOV, Youri Vassilievitch. SOKOLOV, Georgi Alexandrovitch. Deuxieme Secretaire a 1'Ambas- Conseiller a 1'Ambassade sovie- sade sovietique, Washington; tique de Washington, 1948; me"le a l'affaire d'espionnage ancien Resident en chef a Tokyo; VERBER-PONGER; declare persona occupe aux E.U. un post semblable. non grata en janvier 19530 TOLOKONNIKOV, Lev Sergueievitch. ORLOV, Nikolai P. Employe a Premier Secretaire a 1'Ambas- 1'Ambassade sovietique a sade sovietique a Washington; Stockholm; expulse de Suede en dirigea de concert aver N.V. rapport avec l'affaire d'espion- NOVIKOV l'affaire GOUBITCHEV- nage H.E. ANDERSSON,septembre COPLON. 1951; objectif; donnees militai- res y compris routes d'invasion VINOGRADOV, Constantin. pour penetrer en Suede. Secretaired 1'Ambassade sovie tii3ue de Stockholm, 1947; OTROCHENKO, Andrei Makarovitch .mile a l'affaire d'espionnage (Colonel). Officiel du Ministe- Hilding ANDERSSON. re sovietique des Affaires Etran- gares au Japon, 1953; chef du service des renseignements en Ex- treme Orient pour la Securite d' Etat -30- MMOMMPM Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 VLADIKINE, Nikolai Alexeievitcho Conseiller a l'Ambassade sovietique Washington; remplaca PANIOUSHKINE comme Resi- dent de la Securite d'Etat aux E.U. YAKOVLEV, Anatoli Antonovitch. Vice-Consul au Consulat sovie- tique de New York jusqu'en 1946; recut les rapports de Harry GOLD de septembre 1944 a decembre 1946. ZOUBILINE, Vassili Mikhailovitch. Troisieme, puis Deuxieme Secre- taire a 1Ambassade sovietique, Washington; dirigea 1'espionnage atomique aux E.U. de 1942 a 19440 -31- Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Attaches Militaires, Navals et de 1'Air ALIABIEV, Mikhail Sergueievitch. Attache Militaire A. 1'Ambassade so- vietique de Caracas; in- tervint de fagon agressive contre la detention dun employe de l'Ambassade qua etait soupgonne d'activites politiques illicites; de- clare persona non grata, juin 1952. AMOSSOV, Igor Alexandrovitch (Capitaine de Frigate). Attache Naval adjoint a 1'Ambassade sovietique, Washington, 1952-1954; de- clare persona non grata en fevrier 1954 pour activates d'espionnage en vue de 11ac- quisition de renseignements sur les navires et 11equipe- ment de la marine americaine. ANGUELOV,Pavel N. (Lieutenant) Membre du personnel de 1'Atta- che Militaire a 1'Ambassade Sovietique d'Ottawa, 1945; agent de liaison du G.E.U. ASTAFIEV, Alexandre Romano- vitch (Capitaine de Frigate) Attache Naval a l'Ambassade sovietique, Rome, octobre 1948-mai 1955 BOUBTCHIKOV, Ivan Alexandro- vitch (Colonel). Attache Militaire adjoint a 1'Ambas- sade sovietique, Washington; expulse des E0Ufl pour avoir ete me"le a des activates d'espionnage, juin 1956. EGOROV (YEGOROV), Victor V. (Commandant) Attache mils- taire adjoint a 1'Ambassade sovietique, Stockholm,; mele a l'affaire d'espionnage ENBOM, 1948-1951. ERMOLAEV (YERMOLAYEV) Serguei. Adjoint a 1'Attache Naval a 1'Ambassade sovietique, Rome, 1952-1955; arrete par les Italiens en avril 1955 sous 11inculpation d'espionnage; declare persona non grata pour conduite incompatible avec le statut diplomatique, mai 1955. GALKINE,(prenom inconnu) (Capitaine). Offieier du G.R.U. au Canada en 1945. GOUDKOV, Andrei Fedorovitch. (Commandant).Attache Militai- re adjoint a 1'Ambassade sovietique, Londres; expulse pour avoir essaye d'espionner, mai 19544 GOUR C_HKOV (prenom inconnu) (Capitaine). Chauffeur du chef du G.R.U. au Canada, 1945. ION.CHENKO, Nikolai Vassilievitch (Lieutenant Colonel). Attache Militaire (une source dit: Attache Militaire adjoint) a 1'Ambassade sovietique, Ankara; demanda a quitter la Turquie a la suite de ses efforts pour ach.eter des renseignements militaires, mai 1956. -32- Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 KOCHELEV, Vladimir Fegorovitch (Capitaine de Fregate). Attache Naval suppleant a 1'Ambassade sovietique, Oslo,. 1951; me"le a 1'affaire d'espion- nage Per DANIELSEN. KRILOV, Youri Pavlovitch (Commandant). Attache Militaire ad,oint a 1'Am- bassade sovietique a Washington; declare-persona non grata, janvier 1957, pour avoir a chete des ins- truments electroniques et pour avoir essaye d'acheter des renseignements militai- res secrets. KOUZNETSOV, Anatolia. Ivanovitch (Commandant). Attache Militaire adjoint a 1'Arnbassade sovietique a Teheran; expulse d'Iran pour activites d'espionnage, mars 1956. LiSHTCHINE,Mikhail Nikolaie- vitch. Commis au bureau de 1'Attache Naval, Consulat General d'Istanbul; expulse de Turquie, septembre 1957, pour activites d'espionnage et pour avoir essaye d'ob- tenir des renseignements sur des etablissements de defense MALIKOV, Alexei. Chauffeur d eol'Attache Naval au Consu- lat General~d'Istanbul; declare persona non grata pour activites d'espionnage, septembre 1957. MARLAGUINE7Alexandre Mikhailovitch (Capitaine). Attache Naval adjoint au ConsulatbGeneral sovietique d' Istan1 1; somme de quitter la Turquie dans les 48 heures pour activates d'espionnage et pour avoir essaye d'obte- nir des renseignements sur des etablissements de defense, septembre 1957. MIKHEIEV, Vladimir Petrovitch. Employe au bureau de 1Atta-. the Militaire a l'Ambassade sovietique de Washington, juillet 1954-mai 1956; essaya de se procurer des renseigne- ments militaires par 1'in- termediaire d'officiels du gouvernement americain. MOROZOV, Alexandre nitriievitch (Capitaine). Attache Naval et Attache Militaire adjoint a 1'Ambassade sovietique de Buenos Aires; declare persona non grata pour activites d'espionnage, juin 1956. MOTINOV, Petr Semenovitch (Lieutenant Colonel). Atta- che Militaire adjoint a 1'Am- bassade sovietique a Ottawa; etait en contact indirect avec des communistes canadiens metes a 1'espionnage en 1945. PIVNEV, Leonid Yegorovitch (Lieutenant Colonel). Attache de l'Air adjoint a 1'Ambassa- de sovietique a Washington, 1950-1954; declare persona, non grata pour activites d'es- pionnage visant a obtenir des renseignements militaires clas- sifies, mai 1954. -33- Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 "QIAL POUPISHEV, Ivan Vassilievitch (Commandant). Attache Militaire adjoint (une source dit: Attache de 1'Air adjoint) a 1'Am- bassade sovietique a Londres; declare persona non grata pour espionage, mai 1954. REMISSOV, Nikolai Matveievitch (Capitaine). Attache Naval adjoint a 1'Ambassade sovietique A Mexico; declare persona non grata pour avoir fo- mente des e'meutes de tra- vailleurs communistes au Mexique, avril 1959. ROGOV, Anatolia Vladimiro- vitch (Lieutenant Colonel). Attache Militaire a 1'Am bassade sovietique a Copenhague, essaya d'obte- nir des renseignements militaires de faCon 1114- gale ;aexpulse (pas offs- ciellement declare persona non grata) par le gouve'rne- ment danois en janvier 1957 ROMANOV, Alexandre I. (Commandant). Assistant au chef du G.R.U. au Canada, 1943-1945. SMIRNOV, Serguei Sergueievitch. Assistant a 1'Attache Militaire a 1'Ambassade sovietique, Copenhague; somme de quitter, le Danemark pour avoir essaye d' obtenir des renseignements secrets sur les defenses da- noises, octobre 1957. SOKOLOVA(prenom inconnu). Epouse du commandant Boris SOKOLOV; servit d'agent de liaison pour le reseau du G.R.U., Canada, 1945. SOKOLOV, Afanasi S. (Capitaine de Fregate). Attache Naval a 1'Ambassade sovietique a Oslo, 1951; mele a 11affaire Per DANIELSEN. SOLOVOV, Alexandre. Attache Militaire adjoint A 1'Ambas- sade sovietique a Rome; de- clare persona non grata pour espionnage, mai 1958. SOUKHATCHEV, Georg i' . Niconoro- vitch. Interprete'au bureau de 1'Attache Militaire A 1'Ambassade sovietique de La Haye; declare persona non grata pour avoir essaye d'ob- tenir des renseignements mili- taires, janvier 1958. TCHERNOV Leonid Ivanovitch ROUDITCHEV, Mikhail Kouzmitch (Colonel). Attache Militaire (Capitaine de Corvette). adjoint A 1'Ambassade sovie- Attache Naval adjoint a 1'Am- tique, La Haye (rune liste donne bassade sovietique A Copen- son poste comme etant: At-tache~ hague; essaya d'obtenir des Militaire et de 1'Air); declare renseignements militaires de persona non grata en janvier fagon illegale; expulse du, 1958, pour avoir cherche a Danemark, fevrier 195'74 obtenir des renseignements sur les etablissements navals. -34- Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/ 4 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 .in ZABOTINE, Nikolai (Colonel). Attache Militaire.A 1'Am- bassade sovietique A Ottawa; chef du reseau du G.R.U. au Canada, 1943-1945. ZAVAROUKHINE, Petr. Attache `Militaire adjoint A l'Ambassade sov etique a Stockholm; mele a 1'affaire d'espionnage ENBOM, 1946-1948. ZENINE, Vassili 8ergueievitch (Capitaine). Attache N:Lval adjoint (une source dit: Attache Naval:),;& l'Ambassade sovietique as La Haye; declare persona non grata:pour avoir essaye d'abtenir des._renseignements sur des eta blissements navals, janvier-1958. -35- Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Re re entants'de VOKS? Attaches de Presse Attaches u ure s, et tac es non des1gnes CHALKHAROV", Khairoulla. Attache a l'Ambassade sovie- tique A Bangkok; declare persona non grata sous'l'in- culpation de s'etre livre a des activates dangereuses A la paix et a la securite de la nation et a des acti- vites subversives dans lps domaines du travail, les milieux etudiants, jour- nalistes et politiques, octobre 1958. KHARKOVETS, Georgi Ivano- vitch. Attache de Presse A 1'Ambassade sovietique a Canberra, fevrier 1951- avril 1954; assignation des S.R.S.: former des agents parmi les contacts dans les cercles diplomatiques, les employes'du gouvernement, et les correspondants. KOUZNETSOV, Pavel Stepano- vitch. Attache a 1'Ambas- sade sovietique A Londres; recut des donnees secretes par l'intermediaire d'un sans-filiste du Bureau des Ai acres Etran46res,britan- eclare persona n que, 1953; declare' .non grata pour espionnage, 1952. MECHEVITINOV, Boris S. Attache Culturel a l'Ambas- sade sovietique a Oslo, 1950- 1954; declare persona non grata pour avoir essaye d'obtenir des donnees mili- taires, fevrier 1954. MITSKEVITCH, V.P. Colonel de. la Securite d'Etat; chef du "groupe des renseignements" dans V . O. K. S. MONAKHOV, Constantin Petro- witch. Secretaire Culturel A 1'Ambassade sovietique a Buenos-Aires; declare persona non grata pour avoir fomente des emeutes industrielies, avril 1959. PETROV, Vladimir M. (Voir Postes diplomatiques et consulaires). PLAITKAIS, Yanis Edouardovitch. Attache a 1'Ambassade sovie- tique a Canberra, janvier 1953- avril 1954; assignation des S.R.S.: travailler parmi les emigres russes. TCHERNOV, Feodor. Attache A 1'Ambassade sovietique a Stockholm; objectif: renseigne- ments militaires et de trans- ports. -36- Approved For Release 194 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 VISSELSKI, Alexei Vladimiro- vitch. #ttache de Presse et plus tard Troisi6me Secretaire ~. l'Ambassade sovietique a Canberra; officier de la Securite d'Etat; renvoye en U.R.S.S. en novembre 1950. Organisation des Nations Unies GROMOV,. Anatoli Borisovitch. Colonel de la Securite d'Etat; se servit de 1'O.N.U. comme couverture pour espion- nage; fut aussi Premier Secre- taire A 1'Ambassade sovieti- que a Washington. GROU,CHA, Vladimir Arsentievitch. Premier Secretaire de la Dele- gation sovietique A 11O.N.U. Somme par le gouvernement americain de quitter le paysa la suite d'efforts pour obtenr des documents confidentiels concernant un rapport' sur la suppression de la revolte, hongroise par 1'U.R.S.S., avril 1957. GOUBITCHEV, Valentin Alexeievitch. Employe a 11O.N.U. D couvert en mars 1949; objectif: renseignements de contre-espionnage. GOURIANOV, Alexandre .Constantinovitch. Attache A la delegation sovietique A 1'O.N.U.1 declare persona non grata a la suite du role qu'il joua dans la "re defection" de cinq matelots sovietiques, avril 1956. KOVALEV (KOVALIOV) Alexandre Petrovitch. Deuxieme Se- cretaire . la De1e~ation so- vietique A 1'O.N.U:; expulse des E.U. pour activates in- tempestives, y compris es- pionnage, fevrier 1954. MARTINOV Maxime Gre gorievitch (Colonel. Conseiller de 1'Etat-Major militaire sovie- tique A 1'O.N.U.; declare persona non grata pour acti- vites d'espionnage, fevrier 1955. PETROV, Victor Ivanovitch. Traducteur au secretariat de 1'O.N.U.; expulse de 1'O.N.U. pour avoir essaye d'obtenir des renseignements sur l'aviation militaire, juillet 1956. SOUMSKOI, Mikhail Mikhailovitch. Employe A 1'O.N.U. daps les annees 1940. TITOV, Alexandre Semenovitch. Se servit de 1'O.N.U. comme couverture pour ses activites de la Securite d'Etat en 1955- -37- -- For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 ~~HAlPLT TOURKINE, Nikolai Fedorovitch. Troisieme Secretaire A la Delegation sovietique a 1'O.N.U.; declare persona non grata A la suite de son role dans la "re-defection" de cinq matelots sovietiques, avril 1956. YEKIMOV, Constantin Pav7Lovitch... Deuxieme Secretaire A la Delegation sovietique A 11O.N.U.; declare persona non grata-&.-la suite du role qu'il joua dans 1'enlevement par un per. russe dune enfant nee'americaine octobre 1956. Representants de TASS ALKAIEVA, Leila. Travailla pour le service des rensei- gnements navals sovietiques en Turquie, 1942. ANISIMOV Victor.. Decou ventcomme etant agent des S.R.S., 1951-1952, a Stockholm. ANTONOV, Victor Nikolaievitch. TASS.correspondant en Austra- lie, 1952-1954; objectif des S.R.S.:journalistes, membres du Parlement. JEVEINOV, Nicolas I. Fonc- tionnaire de TASS, Ottawa, 1945; agent du G.R.U.; objectif: 11armee canadienne. KOUDRIAVTSEV, Serguei Mikhailovitch. Fonctionnai re du G.R.U. sous couverture de TASS, Berlin, 1941. MEDVEDEV (prenom inconnul. Se servit du nom d'emprunt: MOROZOV; officier du G.R.U. (Colonel) sous couverture de TASS, Ankara, 1942. MIKHAILOV,Vladimir. Officier du G.R.U. sous couverture de TASS, Ankara 1942. NOSSOV, Fedor Andreievitch.. Fonctionnaire de la Securite d'Etat sous couverture de TASS en Australie jusqu'en aout 1950. OKOROKOVA, Augusta Vasilievna. Agente des S.R.S. sous cou venture de TASS, Turquie, 1942; fut plus tard traductrice et dactylo au Consulat sovietique. PAKHOMOV, Ivan?Milchailovitch. Employe de TASS et function- naire de la Securite d'Etat en Australie ou it arriva en juin 1950. PISSAREV, Lev.Constantinevitoh. Correspondant de TASS a La Haye; declare persona non grata pour activites visant a obtenir des renseignements sur les defenses militaires et civiles, fevrier 1953? -38- Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/248DP78-00915R000700260037-6 SAMOILOV, Constantin Petrovitch. Colonel du G.R.U.; corresFondant de TASS au Japon a une date indetermineeo TCHOUGOUNOV,,Constantin Alexeievitcho Agent des S.R.So' aux E.U0 sous couver- ture :die.. TASS. TROUCHINE, Youri Fedorovitch. Representant de TASS A Bangkok ; declare persona non grata sous 11inculpation de s?etre livre A des activites dangereuses Ala pa.ix et a la.:sedurite de la nation et a des activites subversives dari's les domaines ,du travail, dans les milieux etudiants, journalistes et politi.ques,: octobre 1950. VISHNIAKOV, Pavel. Chef du bureau de TASS A Ankara, en 1942; officier de la Securite d'Etat. YANOVITCH, Nikolai V. Employe de TASS a l'Ambassade sovie- tique a Oslo; me"le a l'affai- re Asbjorn SUNDE, decouvert en 1954. YEGOROV (EGOROV),Yevguenii Semenovitch (Capitaine). Correspondant de TASS a Tokyo; officier du G.R.U. YOUDIIE.(prenom inconnu). Nom d'emprunt TARASSOV; officier des S.R.S. sous couverture de TASS, Berlin 1941. Representants Quasi-L4gaux DOMINITSKII, Andrei Ivanovitch (Colonel). Chef de la Mission sovieti(4ue a Tokyo; se servit de ce poste come couverture pour faire de L!espionnage. KOTELNIKOV, Anatoli. Fedorovitch (Colonel). Chef de la: Section.consulaire, Mission sovietique, Tokyo. RASTVOROV, Youri Alexandrovitch (Lieutenant Colonel). Officier de la Securite d'Etat assigns a la Mission sovietique a Tokyo; fit defection en 1954. TIKHVINSICI, Serguei Leonidoyitch (Colonel). Chef de la Mission sovietique au Japon, 1956-1957; ii s'est aussi servi de TASS comme couverture. VACHKINE Ivan'Alexeievitch (Colonel;. Chef du groupe de la Securite d'ttat a la Mission sovietique a Tokyo. -39- Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release '(4 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Croix-Rouge Russe BALAIANE.(prenom inconnu)' (Colonel). Chef du "groupe des renseignements" dans la Croix Rouge russe; a voyage a 11e- tranger bien des This sous couverture de la Croix Rouge. Delegations Sovietigues SMIRNOV, Andrei (Colonel). Membre de la Delegation sovie- tique de patinage au Japon; officier du R. I. S0 Representants de Commerce et Attaches Commerciaux IVACHOV,Vassili Gre gorie- witch. Employe 4 la Mission Commerciale sovietique a Buenos ;fires; declare persona non rata pour avoir fomente des emeutes indus- trielles, avril 1959. KHISTIAKOV, Alexandre. Employe de la Mission de Commerce sovietique A Stockholm, 1941; dirigea l'agent sovietique, Anatole ERICSSON, qui fut arrete en 1956; objectifs: refugies russes, papiers d'identite suedoiso KOVALIEV, Nicolai Gregorie- vitch. Attache Commercial a l'Ambassade sovietique, Canberra, 1952-1954; assi- gnation des S.R.S0: former des contacts dans les cercles politiques et industrielso KROTOV, Ivan Ivanovitcha Conseiller commercial a l'Ambassade_sovietique a Ottawa, 1943-1945; servit d'agent de liaison pour le G.R.U. KROUTIKOV, Fedor Andreievitch. Attache Commercial a 1'Ambas- sade sovietique, Canberra, 1948-1950; fonctionnaire de la Securite d'Etat4 MIROCHNIKOV, Petr SergueieP witch. Officiel de la Dele- gation Commerciale sovieti- que a Stockholm; expulse' de Suede pour activites contre les refugies sovietiques et satellites et pour avoir cherche a obtenir des ren- seignements sur les instru- ments a radar, aot1t 19560 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24.? CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 SEMENOV, Semen Markovitch. SOKOLOV, Boris P,(Comnandant). Employe de Amtorg aux E.U.; Officier du G.R.U. au Canada recut des rapports sur le ezi. 1945; poste de couverture: developpement de 1'energie membre du personnel du bureau atomique en 1944, du Conseiller CommerciL, I . l'Ambassade sovietique a Ottawa. -C- Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24 CIA-RDP78-00915R000700'160037-6 .Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 25X1 C3b1 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R 00700260037-6 Next 24 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Appendix loop-ad OLUBLI The list below names officers and other staff personnel of Soviet intelligence services who have been'exposed publicly, from approximately 1942 to mid-1957, as involved in espionage while functioning ostensibly as diplomatic or other official representatives abroad. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA- '15R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Diplomatic and Consular Positions BELUSOV, Vietor. Second Se . . Soviet Embassy, Stockholm. Involved in the ZARTARYAN espionage case. Left Sweden, Jan 1957 at request of Swedish government. DOLBIN, Gregoniy G. Counsellor, ov d- Embassy Wash 9 6. Prior to th had served In Japan, 1940-1944. DRANKOV, Vasiliy D. Second Seey 1!,. and Press Attache, The Hague. Target: defense and industrial information. Expeiled57. i FARAFONTOV, A.N. Clerk at Soviet Embassy, Ottawa, 1945. Involved in espionage. GUBANOV, Fedor Yegorovich. Embassy Clerk, Canberra. worker. Returned to USSR, March 1951. GUSYEV, Sergey D. Soviet Embassy doorman. GRU officer, Ottawa, 1945. KISLYTSYN Filipp Vasilyevich. Second MASHKANTZEV, Genadi F., Employee, Soviet Embassy, Washington. Expelled from US April 1957 for improper activities in attempt to force former Air Force officer Peter Pirogov. to return to USSR. MERKULOV, Alexander I. Second Secy.r- Soviet Embe'ssy, Oslo, until March 1952. A contact of Asbjorn Sunde, convicted of espionage, July 1954. MITROFANOV, Victor . Chauffeur, Soviet Embassy, Oslo. Involved in the Asbjorn Sunde espionage case. MOIEV, Vasili M. Clerk, Soviet Embassy, Involved in Soble-Albam espionage se. Departed US, Jan1.A1957. NOVIKOV, Nikolai -7 Charge d'Affaires, Soviet Embassy, Washington. With TOLOKONNIKOV, directed the Gub3hev- Coplon case. Secy., Soviet Embassy, Canberra, Oct,."- 1952 to April 1954. RIS assignment: organize an "illegal apparatus" in Australia; "study" members of Parliament and Diplomatic Corps. Third ich il Y i V . yev as y KOVA~j K0, evgen Se ;# viet Embassy, Canberra. officer. Departed after Petrov defected, April 1954. KUDRIAVTZEV, Sergei. First Sec , Soviet Embassy, Ottawa. GRU officer in Canada, 1945. j ev're n amt, KULAKOV, fnu,., LC Clerk, Soviet Embassy, Ottawa, 1945. Involved in espionage. KUTNETZOV, P. Embassy employee, London. Received secret data from British Foreign Office wireless operator, 1952. MAKAROV., Semen vovich, Clerk, Third Secy. and First Sect Soviet Embassy, Canberra, 1943-1949. First -O-Resident,, Australia. is t NOVIKOV, Yuri V. Second Se Y.,aoviet Embassy, Washington. Involved in Verber-Ponger espionage case. Declared png, Ja 1953. ORLOV,, Niko P. EmPtoyo eep et Embassy, Stockhollk . In Sep 51 expelled from Sweden for connection with H.E. Andersson espionage case. Target: military data, including invasion routes into Sweden. OTROSHENKO, Andrey Makarovich, Colonel. Official of Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Japan, 1953. Chief of Far East Intelligence for PANYUSHKIN, Aleksandr Semenovich. Soviet Ambassador to the United States, 1947-1951. A Major General in PAVLOV, Vitali G. Second Secy~> Soviet Embassy, Ottawa, 1945. Chief cE W legal network in Canada. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved-For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Military. Naval and Air Attaches AMOSOV, Igor A., Commander. Asst. NA, Washington, 1952-54. Declared png, Feb 1954. ANGELOV, fnu., Lt. GRU liaison agent, Ottawa, 1945. Officer on staff of MA. ASTAFYEV, Aleksandr R, Commander. NA, Rome, October 1948 to May 1955. MOTINOV, Petr Semenovich, Lt. Col. Asst. MA. Was in indirect contact with Canadian Communists involved in espionage in 1945. i PIVNEV, Leonid, Lt. Colt Asst Air Attache, Washington, 1950-1954. Declared png, May 1954. BUBCHIKOV, Ivan A., Colonel. Found to be engaged in espionage. Expelled from the US, June 1956. EGOROV, Viktor. Asst. MA, Soviet Embassy, Stockholm. Involved in Enbom espionage case, 1948-1951. GALKIN, fnu., Captain. GRU officer in Canada in 1945. GURSHKOV, fnu., Captain. Driver for GRU chief, Canada, 1945. GUDKOV, Andrey, Major. Asst. MA, London. Expelled May 1954 for attempted espionage. IONCHENKO, Nikolay V., MA, Turkey. Charred with trying to buy military info ~rti" a `1044 requested to leave Turkey, KOSHELEV, Vladimir F., Commander. Acting NA, Oslo, 1951. Involved in Per Danielsen case. KRYLOV, Yuri P., Major. Asst. MA in the US. Declared png January 1957. KUZNETSOV, Anatoliy I., Major. Asst. MA, Tehran. Expelled from Iran, March 1956. MIKHEYEV, Vladimir P. Employee, Soviet MA office, Washington, July 1954-May 1956. Tried to governmentrofficialsitary . from US MOROZOV, Aleksandr D. N and Asst. MA, Argentina. Declared png, June 1954. PUPYSHEV, Ivan, Major. Asst. MA, London. Expelled by British for attempted espionage, 1954. ROGOV, Anatoli. MA, Copenhagen. Expelled by Danish government in January 1957. ROMANOV, Aleksandr, Major. Asst. to GRU chief in Canada, 1943-1945. RUDITCHEV, Mikhail, Lt. Comdr. Asst._jA. Expelled by Danish government, Febk 957 SOKOLOV, fnu. Wife of Major SOKOLOV. She was used as a liaison agent for GRU net- work, Canada, 1945 SOKOLOV, Afanasi, Commander. NA, Oslo, 1951. Involved in the Per Danielsen case. YEGOROV, Viktor V., Major. Asst. MA in Stockholm. Implicated in Enbom case. Had left Sweden before exposure of the case in 1951. YERMOLAYEV, Sergey. Employee, NA office, Rome, 1952-1955. Arrested by Italians in April 1955 on charges of espionage. ZABOTIN, Nikolay, Colonel. MA, Chief of GRU legal network in Canada, 1943-1945. ZAVAROUKHIN, Peter. Asst. MA, Soviet Embassy, Stockholm. Involved in the Enbom espionage case, 1946-1948. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 D bmatyicda _ sue g eP?9s29 o8s/24 : CIA-RD 7 0091 rl PETROV, Vladimir Mt Third Sete: and acting VOKS officer, Sov bassy, Cgnbeera, Australia, 1951-1954. Defected April, 1954. SADOVNIKOV, Valentina-iyeyevich. Second and later First Sec-n S viet Embassy, Canberra. esident, Aril 1949 to 1 `' April 195 . SHIBAYEV, Petr Andreyeyich, Colonel. Advisor of Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In Japan, 1951, to control C P activities and to exploit Soviet contacts with the US Counter-Intelligence Corps. SOKpL.V,. Georgiy Aleksandrovich. Counsellr So 4mbassy Washington, 1948. Former Chief Resident, in Tokyo. In the US in similar position. 4.ry TOLOKONNIKOV, Lev S. First Sec %', Soviet Embassy, Washington. With N. V. NOVIKOV, directed -C8!"ase. ry VINOG ADOV, Konstantin. Sect, Soviet Embassy, Stockholbj 1947. Involved in Hilding Andersson case. VLADYKIN,, Nikolai A. Counselor of Sov Embassy, Washington. Replaced!PA"MHKIN a j r jVt in the US . YAKOVLEV, Anatoli Antonovich. Vice Consul at Soviet Consulate, New York City until 1946. Received reports from Harry Gold, Sep 944. until De 946. ZHUKOV, Ivan Vasilievich. Chaufar, Soviet Embassy, Oslo, until Jazz 4. Involved in Asbjornf Sunde espionage case. ZUBILIN Vassili M. Third, then Second Secf 'Ioviet Embassy, Washington. Directed atomic espionage in the US *Er from 1942 to 1944. KHARKOVETZ, Georgiy Ivanovich. Press Attache, Canberra, February 1951 to ' 1 April 1954. RIS assignment: to develop agents among contacts in correspondent, government worker and diplomatic circles. MESHEVITINOV, Boris. Cultural Attache Oslo, 1950-1954. Declared png Feb. 1954. Target: military data JW (C-olonel. Head MITSKEVITCH, V.P. of the "intelligence oup" in VOKS. PJr1Ov, bla11suly M. P& K PLAITKAIS, Yanis+ Eduardovich. Attache, Soviet Embassy, Canberra, January 1953 to April 1954. RIS assignment: work among Russian emigres. TSHERNOV, Feodor. Attache, Soviet Embassy Stockholm; Target: military and transportation informs a-'NCi . VYSSELSKY, fnu. Pr Attache and later a Third Sec Embassy in Canberra. kReturned to USSR in Nov(. 1950. S - - 2i .?- Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 I Approved For Relgaj(t;$99/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 T L 43 gb ~ cd co a~i u 0 4-) 4-1 to) C40) 47, 4) r~ 0 4 N O rl 0 t4 f. 0 zcdb W. I! t2 0 CO U 00 43 ~2a 1:0 ~D f. H ? U) ?O. 0 I cc C\t 43 r~ ?rI ? CS cd 0 0 00"g -H rd QH so 4) r- r 0 H v to ra cd ?ri ?rl Q?~ rI ta) r8 Q E) ? r i 4-1 ~4 co P.4 m r-I 0) ON O M '-z U cd ?rl ?.r1 ~9) Z H Lr\ O H d 4 ) WMH4 0 Or qV so 6) I N 10 tto ~ W 4-1 4) g v cd c P to ?w 3 y V u A e) O . - A~a) IL4 O HCd ? Lr\ H cd r-I 43 14 Ir, O rl r rI V 43 I -I.U) 0 a C cd 4) . P % W r~ J y am C -I ) ?y ri $-i 0 0 43 App red For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915 7-6 Approved For Rele, ss 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 TASS Representatives ALKAYEVA, Leila. Worked for Soviet Naval Intelligence, Turkey, 1942. ANISIMOV, Viktor. Exposed as RIS operative, 1951-1952, in Stockholm. ANTONOV, Viktor Nikolayevich. TASS correspondent in Australia, 1952- 1954. RIS target: newspaper men, members of Parliament. CHUGUNOV, Konstantin Alekseyevich. RIS agent in the US under TASS cover. JANOVICZ, Nikolai V. TASS employee at Soviet Embassy, Oslo. Involved in the Asbjorn Sunde case xbiatwams exposed in 1954. KUDRYAVTSEV, Sergey. GRU functionary under TASS cover, Berlin, 1941. MEDVEDEV, fnu. Used alias, MOROZOV. GRU Colonel under TASS cover, Ankara, 1942. MIKHAYLOV, Vladimir. GRU officer under TASS cover, Ankara, 1942. NOSOV, fnu. S functionary NmPk1qqg under TASS cover in Australia until August 1950. OKOROKOVA, Augusta. RIS agent under TASS cover, Turkey, 1942. Later was translator and typist in Soviet Consulate. ~~ ~,, PAKHOMOV, Ivan Mikhaylovich. TASS PC and worker in Australia, arriving PISAREV, Leo C. TASS correspondent, The Netherlands. RIS target: military and civilian defense data. Declared png, February 1953. SAMOYLOV, Sonin A. GRU Colonel. TASS correspondent in Japan, date not determined. VISHNYAKOV, Pavel. Chief of TASS Bureau, Ankara, 1942. ,~G2 officer. S YEGOROV, fnu., Captain. TASS correspon- dent, Tokyo. GRU officer. YUDIN, fnu. Alias TARASOV. RIS officer using TASS cover, Berlin, 1941 ZHEVEINOV, Nicolai. TASS i g, Ottawa, 1945. GRU agent. Target: Canadian Army DOMNITSKIY, Andrey Ivanovich, Colonel. Chief of Soviet Mission, Tokyo. Used this position as cover for espionage. KOTELNIKOV, Anatoliy Fedorovich, Colonel. Chief, Consular Section, Soviet Mission, Tokyo. RASTVOROV, Yuri., Lt. Colonel. -MR(officer assigned to Soviet Mjssion, Tokyo. ---)TIKHVINSKIY, Sergey Leonidovich, Colonel. t M ssion in apa i - Chief o ,emuv e :. /~" He has also used TASS as cover. VASHKIN, Ivan., Colonel. Chief of - group at Soviet Mission, Tokyo. R issiani Red Cross BALAYAN, fnu., Colonel. Head of the "intelligence group" in the Russian Red Cross. Has been abroad many times under Red Cross cover. Soviet delegations SMIRNOV, Andrey, Colonel. Member of Skating delegation to Japan. RIS officer. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Use of Soviet Official Installations Abroad for Subversive Purposes 15R00070;0260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RQUPON Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 THE SHAMEFUL YEARS THIRTY YEARS OF SOVIET ESPIONAGE IN THE UNITED STATES DECEMBER 30, 1951 Prepared and released by the COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES, U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES WASHINGTON, D. C. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JOHN S. WOOD, Georgia, Chairman FRANCIS E. WALTER, Pennsylvania HAROLD H. VELDE, Illinois MORGAN M. MOULDER, Missouri BERNARD W. KEARNEY, New York CLYDE DOYLE, California DONALD L. JACKSON, California JAMES B. FRAZIER, JR., Tennessee CHARLES E. POTTER, Michigan FRANK S. TAV1NNER, Jr., Counsel Louis J. RUSSELL, Senior Investigator JOHN W. CARRINGTON, Clerk of Committee RAPHAEL I. NIXON, Director of Research Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 CONTENTS Foreword ---------------------------------------------------------- I Introduction------------------------------------------------------ 3 Soviet espionage activities in the United States between World War I and World War II: Ludwig Martens----------------------------------------------- 5 Aritorg Trading Corp------------------------------------------ 5 Nicholas Dozenberg-------------------------------------------- 7 Albert Foicrabend --------------------------------------------- 11 Moische Stern------------------------------------------------- 11 Corp. Robert Osman------------------------------------------- 12 Valentine Gregory Burtan -------------------------------------- 13 Gaik Badalovich Ovakimian____________________________________ 13 Mikhail Nikolaevich Gorin_____________________________________ 19 The Far Eastern Fur Trading Co ----------------------- 20 Soviet espionage in the United States During World War If ------------ 22 Soviet Government Purchasing Commission----------------------- 22 The Canadian spy case_____________________ ----------------------------------------- 24 Ignacy Witczak----------------------------------------------- 25 Vassili M. Zubilin---------------------------------------------- 28 Steve Nelson ---------------------------- 29 The Nelson-Zubilin meeting--------------------------------- 3Q Nelson-Weinberg ------------------------------------------ 31 Arthur Alexandrovich Adams___________________________________ 32 Clarence Francis Hiskey----------------------------------- 33 John Hitchcock Chapin------------------------------------ 35 'I he Arthur Adams apparatus_______________________________ - 36 Espionage activities of Soviet officials____________________________ 38 Gregori Markovich Kheifets__...--------------------------------- 39 Martin Kavid Kamen-------------------------------------- 39 Isaac Folkof---------------------------------------------- 40 Louise Rosenberg Bra.nsten--------------------------------- 40 Haakon Maurice Chevalier_________________________________ 41 Andrei V.Selievchenko----------------------------------------- 42 Gerhart Eisler----------- ------------------------------- 42 The assassination of Leon Trotsky------------------------------- 45 J. Peters 55 Alger Hiss---------------------------------------------------- 56 The Silvermaster-Perlo groups_________ ________________________ 58 William Walter Remington ------------------------------------- 61 Philip Olin and Mary Jane Keeney______________ 63 Soviet espionage activities in the United States since the close of World War II: Judith Coplon------------------------------------------------- 65 Klaus Fuchs and Harry Gold___________________________________ 67 III Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 THE SHAMEFUL YEARS Thirty Years of Soviet Espionage in the United States FOREWORD The most shameful and sordid period in the relatively short history of our great country is the more than 30 years during which Soviet espionage has been allowed to spread its tentacles over the United States. The Committee on Un-American Activities of the House of Repre- sentatives has prepared this report in order that the American public might have a better understanding of the true purpose of the Soviet Government toward this country. In November 1933, out of deference to the Russian people, the Soviet Union was accorded diplomatic recognition by the United States. It is questionable whether the Soviet Union could have sur- vived without this. Surely, it would not have grown into the mon- strosity that it is today. This report will show that, as early as 1919, the present government in Russia established an espionage apparatus in the United States which has been used to secure information pertaining to all of our industrial and defense installations. During the past 30 years, there have been nations that have been considered as enemies of this country. The United States fought determinedly to stem the onslaught of nazism and fascism as exem- plified in Germany and Italy. We stemmed the tide of Japanese im- perialism in the I'ar East. In these causes, thousands of Americans lost the wonderft 1 future that might have been theirs. The United Sates had no alternative other than to successfully stein the tide against German, Italian, and Japanese aggressors. But this furnishes little consolation when it is considered that we did not deter the growth of the equally insidious Communist movement. The committee is aware that the dismal record compiled by this country in dealing with Soviet espionage is not caused by lack of facilities. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and other Govern- ment intelligence agencies are to be commended for the manner in which they have ferreted out Soviet espionage activities. However, due to administrative decisions and inadequate legislation, there has been an alarming lack of prosecution in cases of espionage that have been discovered from 1919 to the present date. The committee, after a review of the facts set forth herein, is con- vinced that drastic steps must be taken to stem espionage activities in the future. The committee feels that it is incumbent upon Congress to initiate steps in this direction. It is, therefore, suggested that a joint com- mittee. composed of five Members of the Senate and five Members of 1 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 -the House be authorized to study the problem of espionage and propose legislation which will afford adequate protection for this country against espionage before it becomes too late. Espionage must be considered for what it is. The laws of this country provide that a person who takes the life of another may be given capital punishment. Espionage, which has the ultimate purpose of taking the lives of many, should be considered no less an offense. While this committee is deeply concerned with maintaining the rights of the individual, it feels that the provisions for the admissi- bility of evidence in espionage cases should be broadened. This report will clearly show that with the admissible use of such techniques as wiretapping, microphones, censorship, and other practices now in- admissible, successful prosecutions could have been had in many instances. The committee does not feel that espionage agents should have the protection of the laws of the very country which they work night and day to destroy. The committee possesses a great deal of additional information con- cerning Soviet espionage that has not been set forth in this re- port because it desires to avoid jeopardizing present and future investigations. 2 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 . INTRODUCTION It must first be understood that international communism has b..t one goal, and that is to place the free peoples of the world unner the complete and dictatorial control of the Soviet Government. It must be remembered that the governing body of the Soviet Union is the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. During such periods when the Presidium is not in session, the controlling power is the Council of People's Commissars. This Council, as well as the Presidium, is composed of members of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolshe- viks. Since this relationship exists between the governing body of the Soviet Union and the All-Union Communist Party, it must natu- rally follow that all espionage activities performed for the Russian Government are closely related to the activities of the Communist Party throughout the world, including the United States. During the entire period covered by this report, Soviet espionage activity within the United States has been dependent upon the Com- munist Party, U. S. A., for assistance. It has been found that, with the exception of high party officials, Communists pressed into duty for espionage have been instructed to withdraw from open activity in the Communist .Party while so engaged. The espionage system for the Soviet Union has been one of the best-planned operations devised by the Russian leaders. Communism, as we have found, operates almost exclusively on the principle of in- filtrating and undermining its enemies. It is therefore of prime im- portance for international communism and the Soviet Union to be continually aware of the strength and weakness of its enemies. The Soviet Union has established for its espionage activities two principal intelligence' agencies, the NKVD and the Intelligence De- partment of the Red Army. Information developed by the agents of these organizations is coordinated in Moscow and there disseminated to the interested departments of the Soviet Government. The NKVD, or People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, was established on July 11, 1934, by a decree of the Council of People's Commissars. It incorporated the Department of State Security, which had been known as the GPU or OGPU (Obeyedinenoye Gossu- darstuennoye Politicheskoye Upravlyeniye), which had been a part of the All-Union Department of Political Administration. The OGPU bad been formed in 1.922 to succeed the Cheka, which was also known by the. imposing title Extraordinary Commission to Combat Counter Revolution, Speculation, and Sabotage. The Cheka, which had origi- nally been established in 1917, had been primarily responsible for the enforcement of Soviet decrees within the U. S. S. R. The OGPU and NKVD, as will be shown, established foreign branches which operated in countries outside the U. S. S. R. The Soviet Military Intelligence organization, which operates sep- arately from the NKVD, was established in 1921, and was originally Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R0007c0260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 referred to as the Fourth Department of the Red Army. Eventually, however, the Fourth Department of the Red Army was reorganized into the Intelligence Department of the General Staff and within the past 1.0 years into the Intelligence Department of the Red Army. There has been considerable friction existing between the NKVD and the Soviet Military Intelligence organization. Each organization has endeavored to minimize and even to discredit the espionage efforts. of the other. In every important Embassy or consulate of the Russian Government there will be found representatives of both organizations It will usually occur that some relatively obscure military or naval attache will represent the Soviet Military Intelligence organization, and an equally obscure consul will be the representative of the NKVD. In many instances these representatives have greater power than the Ambassador or consul. It has been discovered that in operating its espionage apparatus in the United States, the Soviet Government has frequently interchanged its agents between Canada, Mexico, and this country. Frequently fraudulent Canadian passports have been utilized to gain admittance by Russian agents into the United States. Also, it has been found that undercover addresses or mail drops in Mexico have been used in the course of Soviet espionage activities. For the purposes of clarity, this report has been divided into three sections: Soviet espionage between World War I and World War II; Soviet espionage during World War II; and Soviet espionage in the United States since the close of World War II. This report, except where necessary, will not deal with aspects strictly relating to the organizational structure of International Communism. A separate report dealing with this aspect is in preparation by the committee. 4 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 SOVIET ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES BETWEEN WORLD WAR I AND WORLD WAR II LUDWIG MARTENS Soviet activities in the United States began on January 2, 1919, when Ludwig Christian Alexander Karlovitch Martens, a native of Ekaterinoslav, Russia, who was then residing in New York City, an- nounced that he was the representative of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Socialist Federated Republic in the United States. Martens submitted information to the Government of this country that he was a member of the Communist Party. Mar- tens stated that he believed in the indoctrination of the proletariat, and believed in the establishment of the Soviet form of government all over the world. He stated further that he, as a Communist, ap- proved of the activities of the nefarious Third International of the Communists and that he assisted in spreading the propaganda of the Third International. Working in the office of Martens during that time, as a "technical adviser" was one Arthur Alexandrovich Adams who, like Martens, was a native of Russia. Asa result of Martens' avowed revolutionary designs, an investiga- tion was instituted by the United States Departments of Labor and Justice, with the result that Martens and those working with him were deported on January 20, 1921. During the course of the de- portation proceedings, Martens was represented by Charles Recht, a New York attorney, who for many years has represented Soviet interests in this country. Voluntarily departing with Martens was Arthur A. Adams. The departure, as will be seen, did not deter Adams from returning to this country at a later date to continue his Soviet espionage activities. While Martens was the first known Soviet espionage agent in the United States, he was obviously not the only one operating at that time. This fact is brought out by a report made by Felix Dzerjinsky, head of the OGPU to the Council of People's Commissars in December 1924, in which he stated : The OGPU not only works energetically by paralyzing the espionage of foreign citizens in the U. S. S. R., but it has also succeeded in creating a network of infor- mation intelligence agencies in all other large centers of Europe and North America. Responsible workers of the OGPU are detailed to all the diplomatic and trade missions of the U. S. S. R. abroad. The total strength of the Foreign tepartment of the OGPU is 1,300, including the employees in the foreign section in Moscow. The OGPU has reportedly rendered service to the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and the staff of the Red Army in supplying secret information both of a political and military nature. AMTORG TRADING CORPORATION While it is true that this country did not establish diplomatic rela- tions with the U. S. S. R. until November 1933, commercial barriers 92555-51-2 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved - ~ 9 ( 4 7 QqJ q p1p260037-6 Corp. was established in the State of New York on May 24, 1924, through the merger of Products Exchange and Acros-American. Inc. With the founding of Amtorg, the Soviet Union had for the first time a legitimate cover for its espionage activities in the United States. This fact is further substantiated by statements made by G. Besse- dovsky, the former Charge d'Affaires and First Counselor of the So- viet Union in Paris, following his break with the Soviet Government in 1929. Bessedovsky, in a letter to the French newspaper Matin, explained that in 1926 the Soviet Government had sent to the United States two Comintern agents who had been charged with directing the activities of the Communist Party in this country as well as the Trade Union Educational League, which was then the labor section of the Communist Party in the United States. Bessedovsky stated that these Comintern agents had been furnished the sum of $10,000 in order that they might carry out their assignment. Bessedovsky further stated that he had learned from General I. Benzin, one of the most important figures in Soviet espionage, that there were two illegal organizations operating within the United States, especially in New York, and that contact with these organza- tions was made through the offices of the Amtorg Trading Corp. Also, according to Bessedovsky, Trillisser, chief of the Foreign Department of the OGPU, had stated that because the Foreign Department's budget was limited to $50,000 a year, he had not been able to develop extensive action in the United States, and was limited to the super- vision of Amtorg officials. The fact that the United States was early considered to be of great importance in the espionage plans of the Soviet Government is estab- lished when we find that at early periods Vyzcheslav Menzhinsky and Genrich Origorievich Yagoda headed Soviet intelligence in the United States. Menzhinsky later became head of the OGPU in Moscow, and Yagoda was the first head of the NKVD, with headquarters also in Moscow. While the Amtorg Trading Corp. had been established through the merger of Products Exchange and Acros-American, Inc., Acros had at an earlier time played an important role in Soviet espionage. This organization had originally registered as a British company through which the Soviet Government carried on trade relations with Great Britain. It was not mere coincidence that the Acros offices were lo- cated at 49 Moorgate, London, which was also the address of the Russian Embassy and the headquarters of the Soviet Trade Delega- tion. British authorities had established in 1920, through letters found on a Soviet courier, that one Jacob Kirchenstein was operating in Great Britain as a Soviet espionage agent. Kirchenstein, who had first entered Britain in 1922, posed as an American citizen and was using Acros as a cover for his espionage activities. Having estab- lished this fact, British authorities, on May 12, 1927, conducted a raid on the offices of Acros. Simultaneously with this raid, another raid was conducted at the office of Anton Miller, who was Kirchenstein's assistant, as well as a cipher clerk at the Soviet Trade Delegation. Documents found in the possession of Miller established that Kirchen- stein was the leader of a secret Soviet organization which was op- erating under the direct orders of, head of the Finance Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved F)qra JmqA$ 9 rl?Wa q .R Ps7,4gQjQ9a WQQP7,QQ260037-6 ments showed, was in charge of secret propaganda activities, indus- trial sabotage, and espionage. It operated from the Baltic and other Northern European ports, using seamen aboard Acros vessels, and through the Red International of Labor Unions in the United States. The documents seized by the British authorities furnished irrefutable proof that the chiefs of the Soviet Mission to Great Britain, as well as the Russian Embassy, were completely aware of the espionage ac- tivities of Kirchenstein and Miller. It also developed through this raid that there had been three other Soviet espionage agents operating under the cover of Acros. These were Karl Bahn, one Melnichuk, and one Jilinsky. Miller had endeavored to destroy the papers and ciphers in his pos- session; however, the British were able to seize certain papers before he was completely successful. Among the seized papers were found the names of certain undercover addresses in the United States. Among these were Joseph Brodsky, 799 Broadway, New York; Max Bedacht, 3101 North Nordica Avenue, Chicago, Ill. ; and International Seamen's Club, 26 South Street, New York, N. Y. Among the special cipher designations found in Miller's possession were those for William Z. Foster, Charles Ruthenberg, Daily Worker, and Joseph Brodsky. Ruthenberg and Brodsky are now deceased, but for a number of years were active in Communist affairs in the United States. Max Bedacht, formerly a member of the National Committee of the Communist Party, USA, was influential in the af- fairs of the International Workers' Order, a purported insurance or- ganization, whose true purpose is to control foreign-language groups in this country for the Communist Party. The IWO has been desig- nated by the Attorney General as a subversive organization. As a result of the discoveries made by British authorities during the Acros raid, there was a temporary break in diplomatic relations between Great Britain and the U. S. S. R. This action, however, was not the conclusion of the espionage activities of Jacob Kirchenstein, who later engaged in similar activities on the European continent and in the United States. The facts concerning Acros established that there was an international link in the Soviet espionage activities in which persons in the United States were involved. The committee's investigations have shown that there was a more direct espionage ring operating during this same period in the United States. One of the principal individuals involved in this ring was Nicholas Dozenberg. Nicholas Dozenberg was born November 15, 1882, in Riga, Latvia. After his arrival in this country in 1904, he became active in various Lettish organizations. Later, Dozenberg became active in the Social- ist Party, principally in the Lettish Workers' Club of the Socialist Party. In about 1921 or 1922, Dozenberg became the business man- ager of the Workers' Publishing Society, and eventually business man- ager of the Literature Department of the Workers' Party of America, which was the predecessor of the Communist Party in the United States. The headquarters of the Workers' Party of America, at that time, was located in Chicago, 111. Dozenberg continued his connections Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/0812 ?CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 it until a o NV ith out 1926, at w lic time, upon the decision of William Z. Foster, then head of the Workers' Party, the headquarters were moved to New York City. Dozenberg was assigned to handle the liquidation of the party assets in Chicago and the transfer of the publi- cation office to New York. In 1927, or early 1928, Dozenberg, accord- ing to his own statement, was recruited into the Soviet Military Intel- ligence organization by one Alfred Tilton, who was identified to Doz- enberg as the head of Soviet Military Intelligence in the United States. For his duties, Dozenberg was paid $35 per week, which money was furnished by the Soviet Government. The appointment of Dozenberg to the espionage apparatus was done with the knowledge of the members of the Control Commission of the Communist Party, USA. According to Dozenberg's testimony, he was required to receive permission from the Executive Committee of the Communist Party in order to accept the espionage assignment. He was instructed to withdraw from all open connections with the Com- munist Party, and to direct his efforts exclusively to Communist espionage activities. Shortly after his initial contact with Tilton, Dozenberg learned that Tilton was living in New York City, under fraudulent Canadian papers, in the name of Joseph Paquett. Later, Tilton secured other fradulent papers from Canada, this time under the name of Martin. It was Dozenberg's understanding that these Canadian papers were obtained by Tilton, through the assistance of Tim Buck, then secretary to the Communist Party in Canada. Dozenberg also learned that Canadian passport papers were obtained for several prominent mem- bers of the American Communist apparatus in a similar manner. Dozenberg has advised the committee that on one occasion, during his association with Tilton in New York City, Tilton had informed him that he had spent one entire night photographing secret plans for the British warship, Royal Oak. Dozenberg advised that Tilton had in some manner intercepted these papers while they were in passage to Washington, D. C., from an undisclosed place in Canada. Dozenberg also learned that Tilton secured the money to carry on his espionage operations through seamen couriers. The meetings with these couriers were generally made in the offices of Dr. Philip Rosenbleitt, a New York ity dentist. In 1928, Dozenberg came into contact with Lydia Stahl, who was one of Tilton's assistants and an expert photographer. One of Lydia Stahl's duties was to obtain technical and similar books which Dozen- berg forwarded to special mail drops, usually in Scandinavian coun- tries. For their photographic operations, Tilton and Stahl used the photographic studios of Joseph Turin in New York. Their work must have been quite voluminous, because the Soviet Military Intelli- gence operation purchased a large photostating machine which was installed in one of Turin's back rooms. The operation of this machine was done exclusively by Lydia Stahl. During the latter part of 1928 or early 1929 an individual named Dick Murzin arrived in New York City to be the assistant to Mark Zilbert, who was soon to relieve Alfred Tilton. It has been estab- lished that Murzin was Boris Devyatkin, and it was under this latter name that he first established a cover or front for future espionage activities by taking office space in the Wesson Travel Agency, where he was ostensibly engaged in a real estate or insurance business. 8 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Shortly before Tilton's departure for the Soviet Union in early 1929, Mark Zilbert arrived in the United States and assumed from Tilton all activities as head of the Soviet intelligence apparatus in the United States. Later in 1929, Dozenberg again heard from Tilton. Upon this occasion,,Dozenberg was invited to visit the Soviet Union, and did so on funds furnished by Tilton. Upon his arrival in Moscow, Dozen- berg was introduced to General Berzin, head of the Soviet Intelli- gence Department. General Berzin instructed that, upon Dozenberg's return to the United States, he was to assist one Kirchenstein, a Soviet military intelligence agent, in establishing an American background. According to Dozenberg, Alfred Tilton had made arrangements to enable Kirchenstein to obtain the citizenship papers of a deceased American veteran, Frank Kleges. This deception was made possiblet through the aid of an undertaker in Brooklyn, N. Y., who was also. able to furnish Kleges' naturalization certificate. Dozenberg assisted the false Frank Kleges through establishing an office in New York and placing him in contact with various American, firms. Arrangements were made through J. Lovestone, a since de- fected Communist leader, for Kleges to be introduced at the Irving; Trust Co., New York City, thus enabling Kleges to establish credit. Kleges' next step was to proceed to Paris, France, where lie estab- lished a business under the name of Anonymous Society for the Importation of Dried Beans, which was then used as a cover for the activities of the Soviet Military Intelligence. . During this period, Mark Zilbert was the head of the Soviet military apparatus in the United States. As previously indicated, Zilbert was assisted in his activities by Boris Devyatkin, alias Dick Murzin. The committee's records disclose that Devyatkin was born in St. Peters- burg, Russia, on December 27, 1888, and that he entered the United States from Winnipeg, Canada, on September 23, 1923. He was natu- ralized in Chicago, Ill., on June 27, 1929. Devyatkin, as late as 1947, was employed by the Soviet Purchasing Commission in Washington, D. C. Dozenberg has testified that he had very little personal contact with either Zilbert or Devyatkin. Dozenberg has advised the committee that after 1931 he traveled extensively throughout Europe, in Russia, Germany, and Rumania. On his return to the United States from Rumania, Dozenberg, acting upon instructions which had been given him in Moscow, established the American-Rumanian Film Corp. This firm was incorporated un- der the laws of the State of New York, and its sole purpose, according to Dozenberg, was to furnish a cover for the operation of the Soviet Military Intelligence in Rumania. The corporation papers indicate the officers of this corporation were Nicholas Dozenberg, president; Valentine Gregory Burtan, vice president; Herbert J. Newmark, secretary. During the year 1933, while the negotiations were under way which led to recognition of the Soviet Union by the United States, Dozenberg was residing with his first wife in Moscow. During the latter part of 1933 or the early part of 1934, Dozenberg was instructed to go to China and establish a business cover for Soviet military intelligence activities in that country as well as against Japan. Dozenberg then proceeded to Peiping where he made arrangements. to represent an American radio corporation in China, and where he 9' Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 met a Soviet agent who gave him $10,000 in Chinese currency. Dozen- berg then established the Amasia Sales Co. in the British concession in Tientsin, China. Dozenberg's time was solely occupied with the running of affairs of the business in order to make satisfactory cover for Soviet military intelligence activities later on. . In 1937, there came to Tientsin, China, a Joseph Freund, an Aus- trian by birth, to relieve Dozenberg, who was to return to Moscow. Dozenberg remained in Moscow 4 months, during which time he submitted a report on his business-commercial activities in China, and was instructed to endeavor to establish a similar business over in the Philippine Islands. Dozenberg left Moscow in the middle of 1937. Upon his arrival tit New York City, he was given $8,000 by a Soviet agent. After making arrangements in this country to represent a motion-picture equipment corporation in the Philippine Islands, he left for Manila. The diffi- culty of setting up a business cover in Manila was greater than had been expected. Dozenberg ran out of funds and returned in July 1938 to Washington, D. C. In March 1939 Dozenberg was met by the same man whom he had met before who gave him instructions to go to Moscow and furnished him with $1,000 for living and travel expenses. Dozenberg was in Moscow for approximately 31/2 months. His former superiors in the Intelligence Department were no longer there and he dealt entirely with persons strange to him. He was requested to go to China, but when he indicated that it would take not less than $100,000 to set up or acquire a representative business concern at that time, he was asked to return to the United States to establish :a business cover for Soviet agents in the United States, which he refused to do. Subsequently, he was given the sum of $600 to cover travel costs and told to return to the United States. To this day it remains a mystery to Dozenberg as to why he was allowed to leave Moscow after his refusal to abide by instructions. In 1939, after his return to the United States, Dozenberg was ar- rested for obtaining a passport under false pretenses. He entered a plea of guilty and was given a 1-year sentence, which he has served. Dozenberg, since that time, has been living a quiet and respectable life under an assumed name. He found it necessary to alter his iden- tity, knowing that his break with the Soviets could very well result in dire consequences to himself if he should be located by Soviet agents. Dozenberg was an active part of the Soviet Military Intelligence from 1927 to 1939. Among the individuals he recalled as having been active in the Soviet espionage activities during that period were Albert Feierabend, a Latvian Communist who was active in Boston, Mass.; Richard Bassow, whom Dozenberg knew to be in charge of Soviet espionage activities in. Vienna, Austria; and Alexander Burkan, a Soviet military agent, who Dozenberg believed was active in the United States during 1932 and 1933. Dozenberg also knew Burkan under the alias of Purkan, and "Patrick." He believed Burkan was associated with the Amtorg Trading Corp., which has already been identified as having been set up as a. cover for Soviet espionage activities. Another person known to Dozenberg was An- thony Wesson, owner of the afore-mentioned Wesson Travel Agency. Further information concerning the activities of Wesson is contained later in this report. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Regarding Albert Feierabend, the records disclose that this person was arrested in New York City on April 10, 1933, on a charge of illegal use of a passport. The facts were that Feierabend had endeavored to enter the United States through the port of New York, using a passport in the name of Ksavier Augustus Szpokas, which he had obtained fraudulently in Boston, Mass., in September 1930. At the time of his arrest Feierabend was found to have in his possession $28,700. Also found in his possession was a message contained on a small white ribbon which carried this significant inscription : "The bearer of this credential is thoroughly trustworthy and should be given all possible support so that lie may effectively accomplish the mission he is engaged in." This message was signed, "Fraternally yours, Max Bedacht, for the Secretariat." Due to the dismal lack of adequate legislation to cope with the obvi- ous aims of Feierabend toward this country, he was allowed to plead guilty to the illegal passport charge and was fined $1,000 and.placed under a 2-year probation. Nothing has been heard of Feierabend since 1933. It has previously been indicated that shortly after the departure of Alfred Tilton from the United States, his duties were assumed by one Mark Zilbert. Investigation and descriptive detail now indicate that Zilbert was identical with Moische Stern. In 1931, William Disch, a loyal American who was employed as a draftsman at the Arma Engineering Co. in New York, was approached by Moische Stern. The Arma Engineering Co. was then engaged in the manufac- ture of confidential mechanisms for the United States Navy. Stern, using the alias "Mr. Herb," made the initial contact with Disch through an intermediary in the person of Solomon Kantor, a former employee of the Arma Engineering Co. Stern advised Disch that he was interested in obtaining the plans for fire-control apparatus and other confidential Navy plans. He indicated that he was willing to pay Disch the then substantial amounts of $1,500 to $2,000 a year to secure this information. Disch, who has appeared before the committee, immediately made Stern's approach known to the Government. Under the direction of proper authorities, Disch furnished certain carefully screened infor- mation to Stern. The meetings between Disch and Stern were always made under the utmost secrecy. During the course of his contacts with Disch, Stern frequently drove an automobile which was registered in the name of the afore-mentioned Anthony Wesson. For some un- known reason, Stern came to doubt the sincerity of Disch as a contact and soon discontinued contacts with him. During the same period, however, Stern was known to have been in frequent contact with Lydia Stahl, whom Nicholas Dozenberg has identified as an assistant of Alfred Tilton. Although the Stahl woman's espionage activities within the United States went undetected, the committee has learned that she, along with Marie Martens, the wife of Alfred Tilton, was later arrested and con- victed in Finland on charges of. Soviet espionage. Also among the United States contacts of Lydia Stahl was Henry Felix Mins, of New Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000701O260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 York City, whose home was utilized as a meeting place by this espio- nage. apparatus. Another person contacted by Moische Stern, who on this occasion used the alias of Kotasky, has testified before the committee. When Stern contacted this person in 1931, he found a person much more amenable than William Disch. This individual testified that he had joined the Soviet espionage organization from a purely practical standpoint, and that ultimately he wished to go to the Soviet Union as an aviation instructor. It appears, however, that his aeronautical ambitions were deterred because during 1931 and 1932 Stern had him trained as an expert photographer. During this period, he was occupied photographing numerous United States military reports from various bases and establishments that had been secured by mem- bers of the Soviet espionage ring. Again, in this instance, the funds to carry on this operation were brought into this country by seamen couriers from Europe. During this same period of 1931-32, the individual stated that he had made at least two trips to the vital Panama Canal Zone for the purpose of furnishing instruction's to a United States Army corporal, Robert Osman. These instructions concerned the obtaining and furnishing of vital military informa- tion relating to the Canal Zone to Soviet agents in New York for eventual transmission to the Soviet Union. As in all previously cited instances, this individual was not to be detected and punished for his espionage activities in the United States. In 1933 he and his wife left the United States for France. There, upon the instructions of their Soviet superiors, they established new con- tracts for the Soviet espionage system and also collected, photo- graphed, and forwarded materials furnished by already well-estab- lished espionage contacts. However, as in the case of Lydia Stahl, once outside the comparative security of the inadequate laws of the United States, the individual and his wife ran afoul of the law. In 1933, they were arrested by French authorities on charges of Soviet espionage. At the conclusion of their trial in 1935, they were re- leased on the basis of the evidence that they had furnished against their French espionage associates. Eventually, in 1938, the individual and his wife returned to the security offered by this country and are now living a model life. As previously stated, the individual mentioned in the preceding paragraph testified that during 1931-32, he had made at least two trips to the Panama Canal Zone for the purpose of furnishing instructions for Soviet espionage to Corp. Robert Osman. On June 20, 1933, at Fort Sherman, Panama Canal Zone, Corp. Robert Osman stood court martial on charges of having illegal possession of secret documents relating to the national defense of the vital Cristobal, C. Z., and attempting to transmit these documents to one Herman Meyers, Brook- lyn, N. Y. On October 30, 1933, Osman, as a result of the court martial, was sentenced to be dishonorably discharged from the United States Army, and to be confined to hard labor for a period of 2 years, or given the alternative of a fine of $10,000. However, upon appeal, Corporal Osman's case was reviewed by a general court martial and, on May 21, 1934, he was found "not guilty" and discharged from the Army. 12 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For, Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 The records of the general court martial of Corporal Osman re- vealed that he had been visited, dtiring 1932-33 by one Harry Duryea, who gave his address as in care of a doctor in New York City. Osman, according to his own admission, received $400 from Duryea. Osman subsequently substantiated the facts related, and added that the name of the doctor in New York City had been given him as a con- fidential mail drop to be used in sending papers to Soviet agents in New York City. The doctor involved in this case has been identified as a New York physician who later became a lieutenant colonel in the United States Army. Regarding Herman Meyers of Brooklyn, N. Y., mentioned in the court martial of Corporal Osman, it has been determined that Meyers resided at an address used by Moische Stern while in the United States. It was also significant that the document that Corporal Osman was endeavoring to transmit to Herman Meyers was a copy of the highly secret Army "white plan," which set forth the proposed plan of opera- tion of the United States troops in the Canal Zone in the event of riot or revolution. VALENTINE GREGORY BURTAN Valentine Gregory Burtan was born in Odessa, Russia, September 25, 1898. Records disclose that he came to this country with his par- ents in 1907. He was naturalized on July 21, 1922, before the supreme court of New York County, N. Y. In January 1933, Burtan was arrested by the United States Secret Service in New York City on a charge of possessing and passing coun- terfeit $100 Federal Reserve notes. On this charge Burtan was tried in Chicago, Ill., and was convicted on May 25, 1934. He was sentenced to serve 15 years and to pay a fine of $5,000. Burtan steadfastly re- fused to tell United States authorities the source of some $100,000 in counterfeit currency which he had endeavored to. pass. Walter G. Krivitsky, who died under very mysterious circumstances, either by his own hand or that of an assassin, during the course of relating his experiences as head of the Soviet Military Intelligence in Western Europe, slated that the Burtan counterfeit money had been printed under direct instructions of Moscow. Burtan, as previously reported, was the vice president of the Ameri- can-Rumanian Film Co., of which Nicholas Dozenberg was the presi- dent. Dozenberg has stated that Burtan told him that his sole pur- pose in passing the counterfeit money was to raise funds for the American-Rumanian Film Co., which has already been described as a cover for Soviet Military Intelligence activities in Rumania. It is also known that before his arrest, Burtan was closely associated with Jack Stachel and Max Bedacht, national figures in the Com- munist Party in the United States. GAIK BADALOVICII OVAKIMIAN One of the most .extensive espionage operations conducted for the Soviet Government against this country, prior to World War II, was directed by an individual named Gaik Badalovich Ovakimian. Attention to this ring originated through an investigation con- ducted in London by the British Government. This investigation disclosed that one Willie Brandes had been engaged in espionage 13 Approved FoiRetease 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 activities as an agent of the Soviet Military Intelligence in Great Britain. It was revealed that Brandes had entered England in Janu- ary 1937, bearing a Canadian passport No. 22247, which had been se- cured through the use of fraudulent Canadian naturalization papers. After arriving in England, Brandes represented himself as a com- mercial agent for the Phantom Red Cosmetic Co. and the Charak Furniture Co., both Nev tYork City concerns. Brandes recruited Percy Edward Glading and other British sub- jects to secure secret military information for him from the important Woolurich Arsenal. After operating for a time, Brandes realized that the investigation being conducted by the British was pointing perilously close to him. He escaped arrest by fleeing the country. Glading and two confederates were subsequently arrested and sen- tenced to prison for espionage activities. Following this episode, Canadian authorities conducted an investi- gation to determine how Brandes had been able to secure a fraudulent Canadian passport. This investigation disclosed that an individual, who must remain anonymous because of security reasons, also pos- sessed a fraudulent Canadian birth certificate and Canadian passport and had been primarily responsible for Brandes' securing his Cana- dian papers. Brandes and his associates were engaged in a business known as Round-the-World Trading Co. Associated with him in this company were Arthur Wolf and one Herman Jacobson, who at one time had been bookkeeper and export manager for the Amtorg Trad- ing Corp. At the time that the Canadian authorities made this discovery, the person described anonymously herein was residing outside Canadian boundaries. In August 1940, he applied for reentry permits to enable him and his family to proceed to Montreal, Canada. Canadian au- thorities allowed him to return and, in November 1940, after having closely observed his activities, he was placed under arrest. After being arrested, this individual was found to have been born in Poland in 1903. Sometime around 1920, he went to the Soviets Union where he worked as an engineer for the Soviet Government Oil Trust. In 1933, while in Russia, he was approached by a representa- tive of the OGPU with the proposition that he obtain information concerning the oil industry throughout the world. In furtherance of this proposition, the individual came to the United States in 1934 and was assigned to work in the apparatus headed by Gaik Ovakimian. He continued in this capacity until 1936, when he returned to Russia for the purpose of bringing his family to the United States. This individual and his family returned from Russia late in the year 1936. He was then introduced*by Ovakimian to Willie Brandes, alias Wil- liam Hoffman. Shortly after this meeting, Brandes departed for Great Britain with fraudulent Canadian papers, which had been se- cured for him by the Ovakimian apparatus. Among those operating in the Ovakimian apparatus was one Robert Haberman, whose duties included operation in Mexico as well as in the United States. Another person operating under the supervision of Ovakimian was Eda Wallance, who had also used the names Leah Kriloff, and Eda Olulsky. The committee has ascertained that Wal- lance left the United States, ostensibly for Poland, carrying a fraudu- lent American passport. Accounts of her whereabouts since 1936 have been meager, but it is not believed that she has ever returned to this. country. Approved1~or Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Another person associated with Ovakimian was Fred Rose, who later was to figure in a startling disclosure involving atomic espionage. Rose, who was a prominent Canadian Communist, later became a mem- ber of Parliament in Canada. He subsequently was exposed as an atomic spy through the revelations made by Igor Gouzenko, former Russian code clerk stationed in Canada. Other Canadians involved with Ovakimian were Aaron Marcovitch and Adolph Stark. These individuals were apprehended by the Cana- dian authorities in November 1940.' At the time of their apprehension,, these individuals had in their possession the names of nearly 200 per-- sons who had made application for passports, naturalization certifi- cates, and similar documents. Stark and Marcovitch were in the busi- ness of securing fraudulent papers for Soviet espionage rings on a wholesale basis. Also operating for the NKVD under the supervision of Ovakimian was one Mark Jonas, who, using the name of Robert Haas, entered the United States from Vienna, Austria, in 1936. Using this name, he and his wife remained in the United States until March 1937, when they assumed the identity of Mr. and Mrs. Mark Jonas, after which they remained in the United States using fraudulent Canadian passports which had been supplied them by Aaron Marcovitch. Jonas and his wife dropped from sight some time around July 1937 and are believed to have returned to Europe. During the time Jonas or Haas was residing in New York City, her was in contact with one Charles Peter Atkin, who has been identified as an NKVD agent. It has been learned that Atkin, who sometimes used the aliases Peter New and Abraham C. Seatole, was furnished fraudulent Canadian papers by Ovakimian. These papers were sup plied by Marcovitch and Stark. Atkin left the United States during the summer of 1937 and is not known to have returned to this country. One of the most important contacts made by Ovakimian during his espionage activities in this country was a Simon A. Rosenberg. This. individual was born in Poland in 1889 and came to this country in. 1925. On May 9, 1930, Rosenberg became a naturalized citizen of the- United States. During this same year, Rosenberg accepted employ- ment in the Amtorg Trading Corp. which has previously been described: as a cover agency for Soviet espionage operations. Rosenberg remained in Amtorg employment in New York for the. next year and in 1931 went to the Soviet Union as an engineer. Until this time, Rosenberg's employment was entirely legitimate. However, once in Russia he was contacted by officials of the OGPU and forced to become an espionage agent. The OGPU resorted to a means which is native to them whenever they can employ it-extortion. Rosenberg was given the choice of meeting the demands of the OGPT7 or having his sister who was living in Kiev, Russia, killed. Having no alter-. native, Rosenberg agreed to their demands and returned to the United States in 1932. Rosenberg's first duties for the Soviets were under the- direction of a Soviet official named Eremin. For the next 6 years Rosenberg obtained much information for the Soviet Government. Most of this information consisted of industrial plans that he secured: from various engineering companies. This information was of a gen- eral industrial nature and did not deal with military or naval plans. Rosenberg first became acquainted with Gaik Ovakimian in 1932, during his return trip from the Soviet Union to this country. Upon, Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 leaving Russia, Rosenberg was instructed by the OGPU that en route he should stop at the Atlas Hotel in Berlin, which instructions Rosen- k erg followed. At the Atlas Hotel, he was contacted by Ovakimian who furnished Rosenberg, $1,200 in United States currency as 4 months' salary. From 1934 through 1938, Rosenberg was associated with one Feld- tan who was directed and controlled by Gaik Ovakimian. Feldman has since disappeared. One of Rosenberg's duties consisted of accompanying William Hoff- Yuan, alias Willie Brandes, who has been mentioned herein before, for the purpose of securing a fraudulent Canadian passport. Other contacts of Rosenberg were the afore-mentioned Eda Wal- lance and Mark Jonas. During the course of the Soviet espionage activities of Gaik Ovaki- mian, he was in contact with Jacob Golos, who was also known as Jacob Baisin, president of World Tourists, Inc. Golos and World Tourists, Inc., were convicted in March 1940 for failure to register as agents for a foreign government as provided for by the Foreign Agents' Registration Act of 1938. The court found that Qolos was an agent for the Soviet Government. Recent informa- tion concerning the activities of Golos developed from the testimony -of Elizabeth T. Bentley, a self-confessed espionage courier who has appeared before the committee upon numerous occasions. One of the contacts used by the Ovakimian ring in the United States 'was an employee of the United States Department of Justice. This individual furnished Ovakimian with information from reports of the Federal Bureau of Investigation which were available to him as ail attorney of the Department of Justice. This information was alleged to have been channeled to Ovakimian in 1937 and 193.8. The employee of the Department of Justice was suspended on June 17, 1941, for negligence in disclosing information contained in the Department's files. On October 31, 1941, he was permitted to resign. Following this action, he became employed by the Office of Price Administration. The committee is interested in this phase of Soviet espionage because since 1941 it has been disclosed that two other Soviet espionage agents, Judith Coplon and Alger Hiss, have been employed by the Department of Justice. The security of this country would suffer a severe blow if the confidential reports of the Federal Bureau of Investigation were available to the Soviet Government. The committee at the present time is pursuing its investigation of the third instance involving the Department of Justice mentioned above. To continue with the activities of Gaik Ovakimian, it appeared in the spring of 1941 that Ovakimian was making plans to depart from the United States. In April 1941, the household goods of Ovakimian, as well as his automobile, were loaded on the steamship Annie Johnson, a ship operating under charter for the Amtorg Trading Corp. This ship was scheduled to sail for Vladivostok, Russia, via the Panama Uanal. On May 5, 1941, Ovakimian was arrested by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in New York City. He was charged with violation of the Foreign Agents' Registration Act. At the time of his arrest, Soviet officials insisted that Ovakimian had immunity as a Soviet official. Ovakimian was subsequently released on $25,000 bail Approved'or Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approves i ~j l e a / t jqP7Ar 9 ,FgPP7Ag260037-6 Ovakimian never canine to trial in this matter. Instead; an agree- ment was reached between the Soviet Government and the United States Department of State whereby Ovakimian was allowed to return to the Soviet Union. He departed from San Francisco, Calif., aboard the Soviet vessel Kim on July 23;1941. Of particular interest in the case of Gaik Ovakimian were the un- usual terms of the agreement that secured his release for return to the Soviet Union. Ovakimian was given his release with the understand- ing that the Soviet Government in turn would release three United States citizens who at that time were under arrest in the Soviet Union and permit them to return to the United States. In addition, no doubt to show their magnanimity, the Soviet agreed that three other individuals who, though not under arrest in the Soviet Union, but who had not previously been permitted to leave the Soviet Union; would be given exit visas. The generosity of the Soviet Government became somewhat sus- picious when the final results were examined. The records of the De- partment of State disclose that the following six persons were the in- dividuals the Soviets claimed they were releasing : Mrs. IIetmann liabicht, wife of an' American citizen, supposedly under arrest ofa unstated charges; Dr. Michael Devenis; American citizen under arrest and internment on the non- specific and innocuous charge of being a bourgeois capitalist,;" Mr. Wasyl Cisiecki; American citizen, arrested in Poland in 1939, and sentenced to 5 years at hard labor for illegal possession of firearms; Mrs. Robert Magidoff, wife of an American citizen, not previously permitted to leave the Soviet Union for unstated reasons; Dr. Witold PtttkoWXski, American citizen, not previously permitted to depatt from the Soviet Union; The sixth was supposed to be a minor named Wagshal, an American citizen, who, with his inbther; a Polish citizen, had not previously been permitted to leave the U. S. S. R. These are the persons involved in the Soviet's agreement which se- cured the release of Gaik Ovakimian. In order to understand the perfidy of the Soviets, it is necessary to examine the later activities Of the six persons involved. Wasyl Cisiecki was not "released by the Soviets. In the latter part of 1943, Cisiecki was still being held a prisoner by the U. S. S. R. Dr. Witold Putkowski did not return to the United States. In.July 1941, he was reported to be residing in a Soviet-occupied area of Po- land. This sector was invaded by Germany in August 1941. In Oc- tober 1942, the American Legation at Berne, Switzerland, learned that Dr. Putkowski was practicing as a physician in a community near Wat saw, Poland. Norman _"Wagshal, the minor previously referred to, was born in Brooklyn, X. Y.; NovembeF 27, 1930. In 1931, when f of quite a year old; he was taken to Poland by big parents. In 1938, the father, Jacob W. Wagshal, returned to the United States leavin' his wife and son in Poland. They were later interned by the oviet Government at Lwow Poland. After the German occupation: of Lwow, Norfhan Wagsh d and his mother were reported to have been interned by the Germans in the Lwow ghetto. Thus three of the persons used as ransom for O'vakimian nev r reached the United States. Three of the six, ho'we/er, did ultimate r arrive in the United State`s. One of these was Dr. Michael Devenrs 17 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 ApprovedZorRRelea~sue 11999108i/24 :CC.IA RDdP7h8~0~09n5R0D0700260037-6 with his wife, had been visiting his native Lithuania. During his visit, the Soviet Government occupied Lithuania and Dr. Devenis was imprisoned because he was a property owner and therefore a "bourgeois capitalist." He was sent to an NKVD prison camp located in the northern region near the Arctic Circle. Devenis was released from prison by the Soviets on May 6, 1942, and returned to this country. Dr. Devenis has always been highly regarded in his com- munity and there is nothing to indicate that he has been sympathetic to the Soviet Union. Pelagrya D. K. Habicht, Mrs. Hermann H. Habicht, was a native Russian who married Hermann Habicht, an American citizen, while he was a United Press correspondent in Moscow. Mr. Habicht, when allegedly released by the Soviet Union, joined her husband in the United States, who had been employed by the United States Govern- ment. At one time, he was employed by the Foreign Economic Ad- ministration. Mrs. Habicht, since her arrival in the United States, has been an ardent apologist for the Soviet Union and has persistently curried favor with Soviet representatives. She has been frequently in contact with Mrs. Robert T. Miller III, wife of Robert T. Miller, one of the contacts of Elizabeth T. Bentley, self-confessed espionage courier. Mrs. Habicht also has been closely associated with Shura Lewis, a Russian national in this country through her marriage to an American citizen. Mrs. Lewis is known to have been in contact with Mr. and Mrs. Vas- sili Zubilin, both of whom have been identified to the committee as agents of the NKVD. In fact, investigation has disclosed that at the time of the contact Vassili Zubilin was directing NKVD operations in the United States. Mrs. Lewis also received considerable publicity at a later date when she addressed a high school group in Washington, D. C., and extolled the merits of Soviet Russia as compared to the United States. Neonila Shevko Magidoff, the third party of the Russian bargain to actually arrive in the United States, was born in Byelorussia. Fol- lowing her alleged release by the Soviet Union, she arrived in the United States as a nonquota immigrant and the wife of an American citizen, Robert Magidoff. Robert Magidoff is a naturalized citizen of Russian birth, who married Neonila Shevko while he was assigned to Moscow as a radio correspondent. During 1942, less than a year from the time she was released by the "oppressive Soviets," Neonila Magidoff commenced lecturing for Russian War Relief and later for the National Council of American- Soviet Friendship. .Mrs. Magidoff also was an acquaintance of Mr. and Mrs. Vassili Zubilin, Pelagrya Habicht, and Mr. and Mrs. Robert T. Miller III. The committee has also learned that, after Neonila Magidoff had arrived in this country, Robert Magidoff made a trip to Russia and took with him messages for some of Mrs. Miller's friends there. Mrs. Miller, as a result, received a reply from Mrs. Arthur A. Adams, who has previously been described. Neonila Magidoff was naturalized on May 21, 1945, and soon there- after she was given a United States passport. In August 1945, she left this country for the Soviet Union as a newspaper correspondent for the Courier-Journal of Louisville, Ky. 18 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved ikF anl d fd { -RDPt7"R1MQQp7Q0260037-6 and allowed to depart for the Soviet Union in exchange for six per- sons, three of whom never arrived, and three others, only one of whom seemed to be truly an American hostage of the Soviet Union. MIKHAIL NIKOLAEVIOH GORIN The activities of Mikhail Nikolaevich Gorin were originally dis- closed in a most unusual manner. The first light shed upon his es- pionage activities developed from the curiosity and subsequent alert- ness of a truck driver for a cleaning establishment in Los Angeles, Calif. Mikhail Gorin was a Soviet citizen who arrived in the United States in 1936 to be associated with the Amtorg Trading Corp. Later, Gorin was transferred to Los Angeles, Calif., where he took charge of the Los Angeles Bureau of Intourists. Intourists was a Soviet organization which supervised the travel of foreigners traveling in the Soviet Union. In the course of these duties Gorin was closely associated with the Russian consulates in Los Angeles and San Francisco. While in Los Angeles, Gorin became acjuainted with Hafis Salich, an employee of the Office of Naval Intelligence at San Pedro, Calif. Salich was born in Moscow, Russia, in 1905. Ile became a natural- ized American in 1929. From 1926 to 1936, Salich was a member of the Berkeley, Calif., Police Department and was on leave of absence from that employment to join the Office of Naval Intelligence. In the initial contact Gorin brought Salich a letter of introduction from Nikolai Allavdin, Soviet vice consul in Los Angeles and Gorin advised Salich that the Soviets had investigated Salich's relatives in the Soviet Union and found that they were all right. He then re- quested Salich to assist him in obtaining information concerning Japanese activities in the United States. This obvious effort to intimidate Salich through the implied threat of harm to his relatives was unsuccessful and Salich refused to com- ply. However, Salich soon after this contact suffered financial dif- ficulty and Gorin advanced funds to him from time to time until Salich was unable to refuse to assist him. Salich was then paid money by Gorin, the sums depending on the value of the information furnished by Salich from the files of the Office of Naval Intelligence. This arrangement continued until the afore-mentioned truck driver picked up for cleaning a suit of clothes belonging to Mikhail Gorin and found in the suit documents pertaining to the United States Navy obtained by Salich. On the basis of this information, Salich and Gorin were arrested on December 12, 1938, and charged with violations of the espionage statutes. Gorin's first action following his arrest was to telephone K. Ouman- sky at the Russian Embassy in Washington, D. C. Russian officials obviously considered Gorin important because M. I. Ivanushkin, Rus- sian vice consul of New York, flew to Los Angeles to consult with Gorin and ascertain if he was receiving "proper treatment" at the hands of the United States authorities. Traveling on the same plane with Ivanushkin was J. Michail, general consul for the Amtorg Trad- ing Corp., of New York. Too much has already been shown concern- 19 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved i pTh[W#M i ~r,A -~7 TqQ J5 QA ,0 260037-6 give credence to the statement of Michail that his arrival in. Los Angeles at that time was mere coincidence. Gorin was ultimately released under a $25,000 cash bond supplied by the Soviet vice consul in Los Angeles. At the conclusion of the trial on March 10, 1939, Gorin and Salich were found guilty. Salich was sentenced to 4 years in prison and a fine of $10,000. Salich served his sentence. Gorin received a 6-year sentence and $10,000 fine which he immediately appealed. On Janu= ary 13, 1941, the conviction was affirmed by a unanimous opinion of the United States Supreme Court. On March 22, 1941, the United States district judge at Los Angeles, upon the recommendation of the State Department and through the authorization of the Attorney General suspended the original sen- tence of Gorin and placed him on probation. The new sentence was conditioned on the payment of the $10,000 fine and court costs and required that Gorin leave the United States within 48 hours and never return to the United States. On the same date that the sentence was handed down the fine and court costs were paid and Gorin sailed from Los Angeles for Vladivostok, Russia. THE FAR EASTERN Fun TRADING CO. It has already been shown that the Amtorg Trading Corp. was used extensively by the Soviets in carrying out their espionage activities. From time to time, however, it was necessary for the Kremlin to establish new cover media. One such cover was the Far Eastern Fur Trading Co. which was operating in London, England. This company operated under the direction of two Austrians, Uscher Zloczomer and Rubin Glucksmann. When World War II commenced, the only officer of the firm in Lon- don was Glucksmann and, as an enemy alien, he was ordered interned by British authorities. Following his internment, British authorities made an examination of the boots and records of the Far Eastern Fur Trading Co. which showed that members of that company had been in correspondence with the afore-mentioned Frank Kleges, who was now operating the firm known as the Anonymous Society for the Importation of Dried Beans in Paris, France. Other evidence found in this examination prompted British authorities to interview Rubin Glucksmann. They ascertained from him that the Far Eastern Fur Trading Co. was, like Kleges firm in Paris, a cover for Soviet espion- age activities. Both firms were associated with the firm of Wostwag in Berlin, Germany. Wostwag was the principal business cover for Soviet espionage in Europe. Glucksmann informed the British au- thorities that among the individuals whom he had met during the course of his operations for the Far Eastern Fur Trading Co. were Max Rothstein, Ernst Czuczka, Jacob Knoebil, and Dr. Philip Rosen- bleitt, the afore-mentioned American dentist, whom Glucksmann knew as a director of Wastag. It is ironical that, after furnishing this information, Glucksmann was sent to Canada for internment on the steamship Arandora Star and was among those lost when that ship was torpedoed in Septem- ber 1940. 20 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 The Dr. Philip Rosenbleitt mentioned here had previously left the United States for Europe prior to World War II and is not known to have returned. Certain of the other persons are known to have come to the United States and although there has been no indication that any of them have engaged in espionage activities it must not be forgotten that they at one time were associated with the Soviet Military Intelli- gence operation in Europe and could at some time in the future be used by the Soviets. 21 Approved For Releas"999/08/24 CIA-R-DP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 SOVIET ESPIONAGE IN THE UNITED STATES DURING WORLD WAR II Upon the entry of the United States into World War II it might have been assumed that the Soviet Union as an ally would discontinue its espionage activities within the United States. However, the opposite was the case. The Soviet Union intensified its espionage activities in this country. The success of the Soviet espionage during this period may be at- tributed to a variety of circumstances.- Principal among them was the fact that some Americans who while not actual members of the Com- munist Party, but previously sympathetic to it, adopted the view that because the Soviets were allies they should have access to any and all information and that they were merely facilitating the Soviets in making information available. Another principal circumstance which materially aided the Russians was the sudden influx of Soviet nationals into this country to serve as employees of the various purchasing com- missions and missions. It has previously been shown that the Soviets had long utilized the Amtorg Trading Corp. as a cover for its espionage operations; how- ever, with the opening of the immigration gates at the beginning of World War II, literally thousands of Russians entered the United States principally as employees of the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission. In addition to these the Soviets increased and strengthened their espionage agents in the embassies and consulates. SOVIET GOVERNMENT PURCHASING COMMISSION Considerable information concerning the espionage operations through the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission has been fur- nished by Viktor Andrievich Kravchenko. Kravchenko, formerly an inspector for the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission, broke with the Soviets in April 1944. He has advised the committee that each employee of the Soviet Purchasing Commission was required upon his return to Russia to furnish a comprehensive report of what he had seen and heard in the United States. While it is true that there were considerable limitations because of language and custom, for many of the Russian employees, it will be seen that many of the em- ployees fraternized fully and were unquestionably successful in gath- ering information which has been and is now of great value to the Soviets. One instance cited by Kravchenko was the case of Semen Vassilenko, an employee of the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission, who flew from Washington to Moscow in February 1944 with six pouches of material dealing with new and extremely secret developments in war industry in the United States. Kravchenko was able to come by ApprovOFor Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 this information because he had been a close personal friend of Vas- silenko for more than 15 years and prior to his departure Kravchenko had assisted Vassilenko in packing the pouches. Kravchenko stated that Vassilenko's mission had apparently been viewed as a successful one because he learned that subsequently Vassilenko was appointed to the Supreme Council of the Ukrainian Soviet. Kravchenko also stated that Gen. Leonid Rudenko, then chairman of the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission, was in charge of collecting secret information to be transmitted to Moscow. On March 30, 1944, Rudenko told Kravchenko that his office safe contained very valuable information regarding tank motors, navigation instruments, and secret airplane devices that he and his subordinates had obtained through sources in the United States. This material; Rudenko told Kravchenko, was to be transmitted by diplomatic pouch to Moscow at the earliest opportunity. The title of General as applied to Rudenko was misleading, accord- ing to Kravchenko, since Rudenko was actually a political rather than military officer. Rudenko had been chairman of the Executive Cog, mittee of the Communist Party in Rostov, as well as a member of the State Political Bureau of the Communist Party, prior to assuming his duties with the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission. Kravchenko claimed that the success of the Soviet espionage opera- tion in the United States was so extensive that Moscow had complete information on the industrial organization within the United State's. Through this operation, stated Kravchenko, Stalin had information concerning United States industry as complete and detailed as that in the possession of the United States Government. It must be understood that the above-described operations were independent of the operations of the NKVD which at the same time was carrying through its own operations. As previously stated, the NKVD representatives usually outrank all other Soviet representa- tives, including Ambassadors and consuls. One exception, according to Kravchenko, was Mikhail V. Serov, who held the unimposing osi- tion of assistant chairman of the Soviet Government Purchasing Com- mission. Actually, Serov was the representative in the United States of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bol- sheviks holding a title equivalent to that of Party Organizer for the Central Committee. In other words, according to Kravchenko, Sero'y outranked all representatives of the Soviet Union except those repre- sentatives of the NKVD, who were representing Stalin directly. Kravchenko testified that there were NKVD agents attached Ito every Soviet office in the United States as well as many other NKVD agents not attached to any specific Soviet office. He also stated that he had learned that in the early war years there was a great mass of refugees who entered countries in the Western Hemisphere and that among these refugees were numerous agents of.the NKVD. This knowledge of Kravchenko is borne out in great part by subsequent findings particularly with regard to the case of Gerhart Eisler. A logical reaction to this information would be to question, the propriety of allowing such a large mass of Soviet' nationals to have freedom and access within the United States, particularly when the ratio of representation was so completely one-sided. While the Russians had representatives and nationals totaling thou- sands in this country, the United States had only a relative handful 23 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 in the Soviet Union totaling little more than a hundred. While the Americans in Moscow, were virtually under h,quse arrest, the Soviets in this country were given so much freedom that ever} fora period of time this Government did r}qt male an attempt to ascertain the "arrivals and departures of Russian personnel. Eventually, upon the insistence of agencies charged with security, the Russians were re- quired to furnish data concerning Russian personnel in this country. However, this matter was left to Soviet officials with the result that list any information could be furnished, truthful or ptherwisp. Tiui CANApIAN SPY QASii On the evening of September 5, 1946, in the city of Ottawa, Canada, there commenceed a chain of events, the repercussions of which are being felt'to the present" day. On that evening there departed from the Russian lA~mbassy a hitherto obscure i}idiyidual named Igor Sugeievitch Gouzenlto. Now, this of itself was not earth shaking }for for that matter unusual, hecause Gouzenkod" been 'accustomed to leaving the Russian Emk~assy in Ottawa fox' mgre than 2 years, in as- much as ~e was employed"there s a code clerk. T e difference on September ?, 1946, was the indiyidual net his actions. Qouzejiko had made a ,decision. He was going to break with the "'Russ srans. 6ouzenlio and hi family had' been ordered back to Russia and being a man who could appreciate the values ' of freedom he had given considerable thought to what he would return to. rue there were relatives and f riencls and Gouzenko knew only too well that there would be reprisals but also there was his imiqediate faintly. IJow could he he sure that at a f ut}ire date sQnie mingr fault or defec- tion would not bring about the carne result. It must also be under- stgod? that Gouzenlto in his previous attitude and conduct must have iir}pressed the Soviet authorities with his complete subservience to communist principles, otherwise he would never have been given his assigninent in Canada. 'What then caused hi s decis}on to hreak with the Russians ? There is iothirig that can ex lain this more aptly thall the statement Gouzenkp made to tie Ca}ialian authorities: iavlpg arrived in Canada 2 years ago I was surprised during the first days by the complete fr'eedoip of the individual which ggis s lp Cgiiada put does not exist in Russia. The false representations ,out the democratic cgpntrles which are increasingly propagated in Russia were dissipated daily, as no lying propaganda can stand up against facts. * * * During my residence in Canada I have seen how Canadian people and the r Government, sincerely wishing to help the oviet people, sent supplies to the Soviet Union, collected ipopey for the welfare of the tussiap people, sacrificing the lives of their sops in the deliygry of these supplies across the pecan, and Instead of gratitude for the help rendered, the Soviet Government is developing espionage activity in Canada, preparing to deliver a stab in the back of Canada-all of this without the knowledge of the ssian peQple. onvi ced that such double-faced politics of the ?oyiet Goyerr}mept toward the democratic countries do not conform with the interests of the Russian people and endanger the security of civilization, I deckled to break away from the Soviet regime and announce my decision openly. I alp glad that J foi}nd the ?trength within p ysel tq take thi? step and to warn Canada and the other delnQ r,tic eonntries o the, ai} ei which 4apgs over the p. ouz ago. Approved Por Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved Fqi~- , lga&961 ?gp/g?IZ. rAPRl , I 0A97bQ0260037-6 corhe discouraged with his new resolve. He was rebuffed in all quartei* before any df the Canadian authorities were willing to accept his. story. When eventually and ft ttufiately diplofnatic formalities were put- aside, Gouzenko unraveled facts that were of sufficient importance to have the Prime Minister of Canada journey to Washington, D. C., to confer with the Presidef t of the United States. There unfolded a record of deceit and intrigue that established one of the most ifnportant Soviet espionage rings operating until that tithe - an espiofiage ring that encompassed the Westerin Hemisphere and had a its goal the securing of all atoifiic data in existence: It involved persons in high as well as low places, nuclear scientists; a member of the Canadian Parliament, and eventually uncovered a Soviet agent operating in this cotititry under the fiafi`ie Igtracy Witczak. IGNACY WITCZAK The case of Ignacy Witczak approaches the fantastic for to this day there is no information as to the, identity of the false Ignacy Witczak and little more information as to his means of departure from this country or present whereabouts. The case of the false Ignacy Witczak could probably have happened only in the United States. Gouzenko recalled that at one period there was considerable traffic in messages between his superiors and Moscow relative to the passport of a Mr. W. From iformation he gathered, Mr. W. was operating on a Canadian passport that had originally been issued to another person. It wag obvious that there were certain manipulations within the Passport Office that would be necessary before the false Mr. W. could operate with impunity; It was of sufficient importance to the Kremlin that $3,000 were au- thorized to be expended to properly rectify the passport file. It fur- ther developed that Moscow was certain that the real Mr. W. had died in Spain in 1937. Gduzenko then recalled communications referring to a. Witczak. Examinations by Canadian authorities of the passport files disclosed a record of Ignacy Witczak with some very unusual discrepancies. The folder disclosed that the original copy of a 1937 file copy de- scribed a man born October 13, 1906, a farmer by occupation, and described as 5 feet 9 inches. The file further contained a passport application presumably dated also in 1937 but which showed the birth date to be October 13, 1910, a merchant by profession, and described as 5 feet 8 inches. While in the same year he had gained 4 years and lost an inch iii height, Witczak acquired a wife named Bunia Witczak. Also added at some time from 1937 was an uncertified photograph of Ignacy and Bunia Witczak. The reader's confusion regarding these circumstances are infinitesi- mal compared to those of the real Ignacy Witczak; whom Canadian authorities found living in the vicinity of the same address furnisheq in his 1937 passport application. They found Igfiaey Witczak still a farmer; still single; and still 5 feet 9 inches tall. The true Ignacy Witczak had come to Canada from Poland in 103k He had been employed principally as a farm laborer and in 1936 2~- Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 App roves+ap ~#%ai uJa'liJA?/?4 @IA I~PJAeQ099 0gp?Qp260037-6 break of the Spanish Civil War, he decided to join the forces of the Republican Army in Spain and applied for and received a passport in 1937. With this passport the real Ignacy Witczak proceeded to Spain and joined the International Brigade. After joining the International Brigade, Witczak and several others were relieved of their passports by an officer who advised them that they could not risk having their passports lost or destroyed in front-line action. When the time came for Witczak to return to Canada, he requested the passport returned. Brigade authorities told him that it would be impossible to regain his passport, because it, as well as others, had been destroyed when the truck carrying the passports had been bombed. Witczak returned to Canada as best he could and soon forgot the incident of his lost passport. The Soviets again resorted to the same tactics they had previously employed in the case of Frank Kleges; that was to have one of their agents assume the identity of a dead veteran. In this instance, how- ever, there was a mistake-the veteran was not dead and his eventual location by Canadian authorities uncovered one of their espionage agents working in the United States. The United States immigration records disclosed that on September 13,1938, the steamship Veendam arrived in New York City from Bou- logne, France. Among the passengers arriving on this boat were a man and woman calling themselves "Ignacy and Bunia Witczak" and carrying Canadian passports. On September 19, 1939, in the course of the alien registration pro- gram, there was registered in Los Angeles, Calif., one Ignacy Samuel Witczak, who described himself as a merchant. This registration reflected that this person had first arrived in the United States on September 28, 1938, at Detroit, Mich. At the same time there was registered a Bunia Witczak, who furnished substantially the same information. On September 11, 1951, there appeared before this committee a witness named Dr. Arnold D. Krieger. In cooperating with the com- mittee, Dr. Krieger readily admitted past membership and activity in the Communist Party, particularly in the area of southern California. Dr. Krieger advised the committee that he had first become ac- quainted with the individual he knew as Sam Witczak while they were both attending the University of Southern California. Krieger stated that from a casual acquaintance there developed a close personal friendship between himself and Witczak. The two were soon dis- cussing politics and also the writing that Krieger was then doing. In the course of these discussions Witczak suggested that Krieger might be interested in going to China to act as a correspondent. Witczak explained that he had a friend in China who had a newspaper and since Krieger was opposed to the Japanese aggression in China, he believed Krieger could write articles for his friend's paper. Witczak later informed Krieger that he had contacted his friend in China and that the friend wanted Krieger to come to China to write for his paper. 2.6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved F '4a el6 1. t b E 7'$ ll Tk 7 260037-6 ni e t it ores. e es i e t o hste as a ca e in t r after he had been in the Air Corps a little more than 2 months he received a medical discharge. Shortly after this he was married. Krieger was again contacted by Witczak, who proposed that Krieger go to Japan rather than China and he explained that everything was arranged and that the trip to Japan would make an excellent honey- moon for Krieger and his new bride. Witczak eventually began to explain to Krieger what would be expected of him in Japan and it developed that Krieger was to act as a cover address or "mail drop" which we have seen is frequently used by the Soviets in their espionage activities. Krieger testified that he accepted this proposition, but did not ex- plain the true purpose of the trip to his wife. All arrangements were made and passage was booked for Japan. Krieger and his wife boarded ship, but could proceed only as far as San Francisco, where Government authorities prohibited them from proceeding. The ex- planation given Krieger was that the State Department would not permit anyone to proceed to Japan at that time who had not had prior business there. After Krieger had returned to Los Angeles he was again approached by Witczak, who this time proposed that Krieger undertake a similar venture-in South America. This proposal was refused by Krieger. Regardless of this refusal Krieger and Witczak remained on friendly terms and Krieger testified that he was from time to time in receipt of'other proposals by Witczak, all of which he refused. Then in 1944 Witczak went to Dr. Krieger's office and suggested that Krieger set up an office in which Witczak could! utilize space and which would in effect serve as a front for Witczak. Krieger took no action on this suggestion and at a later time was again contacted by. Witezak. On this occasion Witczak stated that Krieger was back in the good graces of the powers in Moscow and that he, Witczak had received money to set up an office for Dr. Krieger. Again Dr. Krieger declined the suggestion. Dr. Krieger did not see Witezak again until the fall of 1945, when the Witczaks had a party to celebrate the arrival of a new baby. At this party Witczak informed Krieger that he was leaving for New York and wanted Krieger to accompany him, because there were some "higher ups" that he wanted Krieger to meet. Krieger stated that he later learned during the course of his testimony in the Canadian spy case that actually Witczak had been given instructions by his superiors to get out of the country. One of the interesting high lights of Dr. Krieger's testimony before the committee were the instructions given him by Witczak in order that contact be made with the apparatus in Japan. Krieger was instructed that upon his arrival in Japan he was to mail a post card bearing an unimportant message which he was to sign with the initial S, to the Russian Embassy, which Witczak ex- plained would identify him and let the Russians know that he had arrived. Krieger was to wait for a period of 4 or 5 days, then proceed to the flower department of a certain department store. There he was to ask for a particular flower. Witczak advised him that there would be a ? person there who would be interested in this same flower and who would engage Krieger in conversation. concerning the flower. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 ApprovedKF a gp P~ 1i9 /4leaqj* ,7TQWI&fi P9Q&P260037-6 would follow him and that in this manner his contact would be established. During the period of his studies at the University of Southern California the person using the name Ignacy Samuel Witczak excelled as a student and attained marks and honors to the extent of being be- stowed with a Phi Beta Kappa key. During the entire period that the false Witczak operated in the United States, he was cloaked in mystery. The conclusion of his case is, sadly, just as mysterious. Following the defection of Igor Gou- zenko, Witczak displayed a visible agitation and nervousness to his associates in Los Angeles. Then one day, just as mysteriously as he arrived in this country, he departed. The full circumstances have never been disclosed but the committee has received information be- lieved reliable that Witczak vanished on a barren stretch of beach of the Pacific Ocean in southern California. At first glance it might even appear that Witczak had done away with himself, however, later reports have indicated that Witczak was aboard a Russian vessel when it docked in Poland. From the standpoint of power and importance, there have been but few, if any, representatives of the NKVD in the United States su- perior to Vassili M. Zubilin. Vassili Mikhailovich Zubilin, who also used the aliases V. Zarubin, Vassili Luchenko, "Peter," and "Cooper," was born January 22, 1900, in Moscow. His first official arrival in the United States was in Janu- ary 1942, when he assumed the position of Third Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, in Washington, D. C. Ile later was elevated to the rank of Second Secretary. He remained in the United States until August 27, 1944. With him while in the United States were his 12- year-old son and his wife, Elizabeta Yurevna Zubilin, who upon at least one occasion used the alias "Helen." Zubilin's positions in the Russian Embassy again exemplifies the fact that frequently an obscure diplomatic official is an important offi- cial of the NKVD or Soviet Military Intelligence. Zubilin was re- portedly a general in the NKVD and had been one of the Soviet offi- cials who directed the occupation of Poland in 1939. While in the United States, Zubilin was the head of administration of the NKVD Foreign Information Service and as such had complete charge of the movement of Soviet espionage agents into and out of the United States. The great importance of Zubilin is stressed by testimony given the committee by Hede Massing, self-admittedly a former Soviet espio- nage agent and the former wife of Gerhart Eisler. Mrs. Massing testified that in 1937, following the assassination of Ignaz Reiss, one of the leaders of a Soviet espionage group operating in Western Europe, the Soviet officials became suspicious of the loyalty of Mrs. Massing and her husband Paul. Both of the Massings had been close to Reiss, who presumably was assassinated on orders from Moscow. Mrs. Massing testified that in 1937, she was contacted by her Russian superior, a woman whom she then knew only as "Helen," who requested the Massings to return with her to Russia for a "visit." Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved F~a~~~Qtl~o~d-s[7~'~~QiQ~Q260037-6 the Russians, the fear and strength carried over from Communist discipline caused her to agree to go to Russia. Once there the Mass- ings were subjected to lengthy questioning by an NKVD official, then known to them only as "Peter." The Massings subsequently learned that "Peter" was actually Vassili M. Zubilin and "Helen" was Eliza- beta Zubilin. Zubilin, after. his arrival in the United States in 1942, made many and varied contacts with individuals in this country. Unfortunately, little is known about what transpired in the majority of these meetings, but it is hoped that they were not all of the importance of a meeting that occurred in Oakland, Calif., on April 10, 1943. On that date Zubilin visited the home of Steve Nelson and for the purpose of iden- tity Zubilin used his cover name "Cooper." STEVE NELSON Steve Nelson is now a member of the National Board of the National Committee of the Communist Party, U. S. A. He is on trial in Penn- sylvania on State subversive charges. He also is one of the individual leaders of the Communist Party charged with violation of the Smith Act. Nelson has used the aliases, Stephen Mesarosh, Steve J. Mesa- rosh, Joseph Fleischinger, Louis Evans, and "Hugo." The latter name is the code name employed by Nelson when he would contact the Soviet Consulate in San Francisco, Calif. United States immigration records reflect Nelson was born in 1903 in Yugoslavia. Nelson entered the United States June 14, 1920, at New York using an illegal and fraudulent passport under the name Joseph Fleischinger. On November 21, 1922, the Immigration Serv- ice legalized this entry and on November 26, 1928, at Detroit, Mich.,. Nelson was permitted American citizenship by naturalization. Almost immediately thereafter Nelson commenced to show his ap- preciation of and loyalty to his American citizenship by perpetrating frauds and engaging in espionage activity for the Kremlin. It is obvious that the only purpose of taking American citizenship was be- cause of the leniency and protection offered by American laws. Nelson in the 1930's attended the Lenin. School in Moscow, which is reserved for only the most promising and worthy Communists. The committee has learned that the Lenin School stresses instructions in revolutionary espionage and sabotage. In August 1931 Nelson applied for a United States passport and willfully made the fraudulent statement that he had been born in Rankin, Pa. In July 1933 Nelson renewed his passport for a 2-year period with the American Consul at Vienna, Austria. At the time of this renewal Nelson stated that he had resided in Russia from Septem- ber 1931 to May 1933, and from that time until July 1933, he had resided in Germany, Switzerland, and Austria. Nelson was in China for 3 months in 1933 working for the Shanghai branch of the Comintern. One of Nelson's coworkers in Shanghai was Arthur Ewert, a seasoned Comintern agent, who was imprisoned in Brazil for the part he played in the Communist revolution there in 1935. Nelson, during the entire time he was outside the United States, performed espionage work for the Soviet Government. The exact time that Nelson returned to the United States is not known but the com- 92555-51-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approves % l~ ~bgt~iZ4e~~aj~ffgW9260037-6 Party Organizer, then the official voice of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, U. S. A. Nelson next came to public view during the Spanish Civil War.. Here again Nelson exhibited the qualifications that make him a trusted agent of the Soviets. Considerable publicity was given Nelson because he rose through the ranks to become a lieutenant colonel in the Inter- national Brigade of the Loyalist Army. It was in Spain that an event occurred which undoubtedly had a, great bearing on Nelson's being selected for the mission that occa- sioned the meeting with Zubilin in 1943. In 1937 in Spain, Nelson met and befriended a woman who had gone to Paris, France, to meet her husband who was a member of the International Brigade. The husband, however, had been killed in action and Nelson assisted the wife in returning to this country. The woman, upon her return to the United States, moved to Berkeley, Calif., where she became acquainted with and eventually married one of the leading physicists engaged in the development of the atomic bomb. Nelson, through his acquaintance with the scientist's wife, believed that he could gain access to secret atom data. An idea of Nelson's loyalty to the United States may be gained by a statement made by him in November 1941. It must be remembered that this was immediately prior to the United States' entrance into the war in which Russia and England were already engaged with Nazi Germany. Nelson said : Roosevelt and Churchill are fine men, but we cannot expect them to promise socialism. We know there will be quarrels, but now we must defeat Hitlerism? Fascism. We may have to take guns against the United States and England later. The foregoing explanation has been given in order to explain the nature and character of the participants in the meeting in Steve Nelson's home in Oakland, Calif., on April 10, 1943. Here then was a meeting of a top official of the NKVD and a prominent officer of the Communist Party, who had a lengthy record of Soviet espionage activity. Following the introduction and proper identification, Nelson ex- plained to Zubilin that he was engaged in work for the Soviet espi- onage apparatus upon instructions delivered to him by courier from New York. Nelson explained that Earl Browder, then head of the Communist Party, USA, was fully aware that he, Nelson, was en- gaged in secret work for the Soviets. Nelson outlined completely for Zubilin the character and person- alities of the various individuals engaged in activities for the Com- munist apparatus on the west coast, and in most instances used their code names in referring to them. Nelson expressed dissatisfaction with the contacts that were being made with Japanese Communists interned in the relocation centers and also with the handling of liter- ature and documentary material which was being furnished points in the South Pacific area by means of Communist seamen couriers. Nelson also discussed with Zubilin the matter of "Russian activ- ities" which he distinguished from purely political and propaganda work for the Comintern apparatus. Nelson explained that with re- gards to the "Russian activities" that there were a number of Com- 30 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 ApprOVeC n i t r o ciIl 9i 9LTa /for ia, wno liaaPxp$e00~91a15R0 0au00260037-6 Soviet representatives were directly approaching rank and file mem- bers and giving them specific assignments of an espionage nature and instructing the members not to say anything to their party superiors regarding their assignments. It was Nelson's suggestion that the Soviets choose, in each important city or State where espionage activities might be necessary, a trustworthy contact and allow.that person to handle direct contact with the Communist members to be given special assignments. Also at this meeting Nelson complained about the inefficiency of two of the persons operating in the apparatus. The identity of these individuals was established as Getzel Hochberg and Mordecai Rap- paport. Following this meeting these two persons were relieved of their apparatus assignments and transferred to different cities, Hoch- berg from New York to Detroit and Rappaport from San Francisco to Los Angeles. The events that transpired at the April 10, 1943, meeting between Steve Nelson and Vassili Zubilin in Nelson's home have been accounted for. However, a short time prior to this meeting another meeting had taken place in the Nelson house, which although not attended by Zubilin, was directly related to Zubilin's being on the west coast. One evening in March 1943 a man identifying himself as "Joe" kept an appointment with Nelson which had earlier been arranged through Nelson's wife. Upon "Joe's" arrival at the Nelson home, Nelson was not there and did not return until well after midnight. When Nelson finally did arrive, "Joe" greeted him by stating that he had some information he believed Nelson could use. "Joe" then furnished Nelson with some highly confidential data regarding the nuclear experiments then in progress at the radiation laboratories at the University of California at Berkeley. The experiments at the University of California had then reached the experimental stage of the atom bomb. The "Joe" mentioned herein has been identified in other reports released by the committee as Joseph W. Weinberg. Several days after this meeting with "Joe," Nelson arranged with the Soviet Consulate in San Francisco to meet Peter Ivanov, a vice con- sul. Nelson suggested the meeting take place at some place where they could not be observed. Ivanov suggested the meeting would be safe in the "usual place." Government agents subsequently observed a meeting between Nelson and Ivanov that took place in the middle of an open park on the grounds of St. Francis Hospital in San Francisco. The Government agents observed Nelson passing an envelope or pack- age to Ivanov. It was shortly after this meeting that Vassili Zubilin arrived at the Russian Consulate in San Francisco and subsequently met with Nelson. The committee, during the course of its investigation into the con- tacts between Nelson and Joseph Weinberg, learned certain facts concerning the instructions given Weinberg by Steve Nelson. Nelson, a member of the National Committee of the Communist Party, U. S. A. instructed Weinberg, a research physicist engaged in development o? the atomic bomb, that Weinberg should keep Nelson advised of prog- ress in this development in order that Nelson could in turn furnish this information to the proper officials of the Soviet Government. 31 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved F ersRewea o9 1.999p/08o24 : CPA-RDP778 009h15R000r70t0260037-6 engaged in atomic research so that when all reports were correlated the Soviets could assemble the atom bomb. We do not know whether the Soviets were successful in assembling the atom bomb from this operation; however, there is no question that the information gathered from the Nelson group materially assisted the Soviets toward this goal. The committee in endeavoring to ascertain all facts concerning this apparatus questioned Steve Nelson and Joseph W. Weinberg. Nelson under oath refused to answer whether he had given Weinberg such instructions and also refused to answer whether Weinberg had given him information relating to atomic research. Weinberg, when questioned by the committee, denied the allegations that he had furnished any information concerning the atomic bomb to Steve Nelson. Later, when he appeared before a Federal grand jury in Washington, D. C., Weinberg refused to answer similar questions on the grounds that to do so might tend to incriminate him. The committee's investigation was intensified toward ascertaining the facts relating to a meeting which was held in the home of Joseph W. Weinberg in Berkeley, Calif., in August 1943. This meeting was attended by the following persons: Weinberg; Steve Nelson; Ber- nadette Doyle, who had been secretary to Steve Nelson while he was a Communist Party organizer in California, and who later was a candidate for office in California on the Communist Party ticket, and is presently under indictment under the Smith Act; Giovanni Rossi Lomanitz; Irving David Fox; David Bohm; and Ken Max Manfred, formerly known as Max Bernard Friedman. With the exception of Doyle and Nelson, these persons were all associated with the radiation laboratory of the University of California. During the course of the committee's investigation all of these persons were identified as being members of the Communist Party. The committee questioned Nelson, Lomanitz, Fox, Bohm, and Man- fred, who declined to answer pertinent questions, basing their refusal on the statement that to do so might incriminate them. Joseph Weinberg, when questioned concerning this meeting, stead- fastly denied that such a meeting had ever occurred. The committee also introduced witnesses who had been agents of Government intelligence agencies who testified that this meeting; had been covered by the Government. Weinberg persisted in his denials. ARTHUR ALEXANDROVICH ADAMS Mention has previously been made of the fact that the committee's records show that while Ludwig Martens, the first known Soviet agent, operated in this country from 1919 to 1921, he was assisted by Arthur Alexandrovich Adams. Adams, along with Martens and others, de- parted from this country voluntarily on January 20, 1921. This action, however, did not deter Adams from frequently returning to this country. How often he actually returned is not known; however, the committee has learned of several of these occasions. He returned to the United States in 1927 representing himself as being engaged in official Soviet business dealing with the Amo Motor Co., the. first, automobile works constructed in Russia. Again, in 1932, he was in this country as a member of a Russian purchasing commission sent 32 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 by the Soviet Government to purchase airplanes from the Curtiss- Wright Co. In 1936, Adams, this time accompanied by his wife, visited with -the sister of Mrs. Adams in New York City. According to the sister, Mrs. Adams and Arthur left the United States in 1937 with the stated purpose of returning to. Russia. From subsequent events, it is certain that in each of these visits Adams was engaged in Soviet espionage missions. Although these first entries of Adams into the United States had been accomplished with relative simplicity, his next return was gained under entirely different circumstances. In 1938, Adams returned via the Dominion of Canada and through the medium of a fraudulent Canadian birth certificate. After gaining admission to this country, Adams obtained the right to permanent residence which was facilitated by false statements made by Samuel Novick. Novick later became president of Electronics Corp. of America, a firm which originated in 1942. During World War II, Electronics Corp. of America had Government contracts amounting to $6,000,000 and had exclusive contracts to produce cer- tain highly secret items for use in radar installations. The committee has also learned that Adams' fraudulent entry into the United States was assisted by one M. S. Milestone of Toronto, Canada, who for many years had been a member of the Communist underground in Canada. Very little is known concerning the personal history of Arthur Adams, except that he was practically a charter member of the Com- munist Party in Russia. He participated in the Russian revolution ,of 1905 and as a result was imprisoned by.the Czarist Government. He claimed that he suffered for many years following his imprison- -ment from the beatings that were administered to him. Upon his arrival in the United States in 1938, Adams set up a busi- ness with the name Technological Laboratories. In this, he was .associated with one Jacob Broches Aronoff, a Russian-born attorney. Later, Adams used the offices of Electronics Corp. of America, as well as the offices of Keynote Recordings in New York City, as a cover for his espionage activities. The committee has also learned that as another security precaution Adams, sometime in 1941 or 1942, gave $1,875 to one Samuel J. Wegman. Wegman, who is now deceased, was operating a business in Hollywood, Calif., and New York City. Adams requested Wegman to use these funds to pay Adams $75 per week and forward this sum by check to Adams at the Peter Cooper hotel in New York City. Through this ruse, Adams represented him- self as being employed by Wegman as a machine designer and used Wegman's Hollywood address as his business address. Before his .death, Wegman explained his association with Adams and explained that he had first met Adams through Julius Heiman. CLARENCE FRANCIS HISKEY During the early part of World War II, it was discovered that Arthur Adams was actively engaged in espionage activities for the soviet Government. His principal activities were directed toward .securing information with respect to the steps then being taken by American scientists to utilize nuclear fission. One of the American 33 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 scientists active in this work was Clarence Hiskey at the University of Chicago. On April 27, 1944, Hiskey received notice that he was being called to active duty as an officer in the United States Army. On April 28, 1944, the day following the receipt of this information, Hiskey was visited by Adams at the Hiskey home in Chicago. From the ensuing developments, it became obvious that Hiskey had for some time been supplying Adams with secret information regarding atomic research. Immediately after seeing Adams, Hiskey flew to Cleveland, Ohio, where he contacted John Hitchcock Chapin. Chapin, through the urging of Clarence Hiskey, agreed to take over Hiskey's contacts with Adams. There is cause at this point to pause and give consideration to the principles involved. Arthur Alexandrovich Adams, as has been shown, was unequivocally dedicated to serve the Soviet Government and he had been a part of the original revolutionary activity of the Communist Party in Russia. Hiskey and Chapin, however, are men from an entirely different pattern. Here, as in so many similar in- stanceq, were young men, native-born Americans, who had received some of the greatest advantages and benefits offered by this country and still worked to the detriment of this country. Their plan, if suc- cessful, would have led to the oppressive rule inflicted by the Soviet Government over all of its victims. In Clarence Hiskey, Adams undoubtedly found a docile and willing pupil in his espionage indoctrination. Clarence Francis Hiskey was born July 5, 1912, in Milwaukee, Wis. From 1929 to 1933 he attended LaCrosse State Teachers' College. In 1935 he received a B. S. degree from the University of Wisconsin. In 1939, he received a Ph. D. from the same university. It was during the period of his attendance at the University of Wisconsin that Hiskey met his first wife, Marcia Sand, who also figured in the atomic espionage activities of Arthur Adams. The fact that Hiskey displayed an early susceptibility is borne out in a military intelligence report dated June 5, 1945: Hiskey was active in Communist movements while attending graduate school at the university. * * * Allegedly Marcia, subject's wife, was a Communist. It was reported Hiskey had stated "that the present form of government is no good, the Russian Government is a model and that Russia can do no wrong ; if the lend-lease bill is passed this country will have a dictator." * * * Also remarked that the United States Government should look to Russia for leader- ship. Hiskey reportedly urged radical-minded young men to take ROTC train- ing to provide for "possible penetration of the Communist Party in the Armed Forces of the United States." In various lectures he discussed communism. * * * Investigations conducted in 1942 revealed Hiskey read the Communist publications Daily Worker and In Fact, and he had definite communistic lean- ings. * * * Hiskey and his wife lived for approximately 2 years with- whose brother was later president of the Young Communist League (cited as subversive by the Attorney General) at the University of Wisconsin. * * * It was reported that subject and his wife associated with other alleged Com- munists or Communist sympathizers. Hiskey was said to be an active member of the Communist Party. Realizing the gravity of the charges concerning Clarence Hiskey and Marcia Sand the committee called them to appear before it on September 9, 1948. Both refused to answer any questions concerning their Communist affiliations and membership while attending the Uni- versity of Wisconsin, basing their refusal to answer questions on the fact that to do so might incriminate them. Marcia Sand, however, testified that she was not a member of the Communist Party on the 34 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00~1~5000h7Q~0260037-6 date of her testimony September, 9, 1948, but when as e 1 she a ever been a member of the Communist Party, she refused to answer "on the grounds that it may degrade or incriminate me." Hiskey's progress following the completion of his formal education was of the nature that would naturally place him high in the considera- tion of those engaged in atomic research. From September 1939 to 1941, Hiskey was employed as an instruc- tor in chemistry at the University of Tennessee at Knoxville. For a short period in 1941, he was an associate chemist with the Tennessee Valley Authority aluminum nitrate plant at Shef.,eld, Ala. Hiskey has testified that he then attended Columbia University, New York, where he was engaged as an instructor from September 1941 until September 1942. Hiskey, in 1942, upon the recommendation of Harold Urey, a prominent physicist, was requested to do research work in connection with atomic energy in a laboratory at Columbia University, known as the SAM laboratory. The importance of the SAM project may best be understood by realizing that this project developed the K-25 plant at Oak Ridge, Tenn. This was one of the important steps in the development of the atomic bomb. In September 1943, the laboratory in which Hiskey was engaged was moved to the University of Chicago. Hiskey remained an employee of the Metallurgical Laboratory at the University of Chicago, until he was ordered to active duty in the United States Army on April 27, 1944. As previously stated, Hiskey, following receipts of orders to report for active duty in the United States Army, flew to Cleveland, Ohio, where he contacted John Hitchcock Chapin, and urged him to take up the contacts with Arthur Adams. Chapin was in Cleveland on assignment from the Metallurgical Laboratory of the University of Chicago. JOHN HITCHCOCK CHAPIN John Hitchcock Chapin was one of the few individuals involved in the Adams apparatus, who, when questioned by the committee, cooperated by answering rather than claiming constitutional privilege. Chapin was adamant in denying that he had ever been a member of the Communist Party. He conceded, however, that he had possibly received Communist or pro-Communist publications. In his statements to the committee, Chapin substantiated the meet- ing with Clarence Hiskey in Cleveland, Ohio, in April 1944. He further substantiated the fact that he had acquiesced to the proposal of Hiskey that he, Chapin, carry on contacts with Arthur Adams, whom Hiskey identified as a Russian agent. Chapin testified that in order that a positive identification might .be effected, he, Chapin, had given Hiskey a key, which Hiskey was in turn to give Adams. Upon the completion of his assignment in Cleveland, Chapin re- turned to Chicago.. Once there he directed a letter to Marcia. Sand, then the wife of Clarence Hiskey. Marcia then wrote a letter to Clarence Hiskey, who was at that time stationed at White Horse, Yukon Territory, Canada, advising him that she had received a letter from Chapin which she had forwarded to Arthur Adams. Chapin advised the committee that this letter to Marcia Sand was 35 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 a preconceived signal to notify Adams of Chapin's return to Chicago. In the fall of 1944, Arthur Adams called at Chapin's apartment. Rather than meeting him in the apartment, Chapin testified that he went downstairs to meet Adams. Upon meeting him, Adams fur- nished Chapin the key that the latter had given Clarence Hi.skey. Thus with the identification established, Adams suggested that Chapin meet him within a few days in Adams' hotel room. Chapin advised the committee that a day or so later he went to Adams' hotel room and there conversed with Adams for approxi- mately an hour and a half. Chapin denied that he gave Adams any information during that conversation. Chapin's testimony was extremely candid, compared to that of Clarence Hiskey, who, when posed with similar questions, refused to answer on the grounds that his answers might incriminate or degrade him. This was the response of a person who had reached the depths of degradation by soliciting fellow countrymen to become alined with Soviet agents. While John Hitchcock Chapin cannot be excused from an episode of deviation in his loyalty to his country, it is recognized by the com- mittee that he had the courage to admit his defection and his coopera- tion with the committee and intelligence agencies must be taken into consideration. THE ARTHUR ADAMS APPARATUS The reader might justifiably wonder how it is possible for a Soviet espionage agent to operate in this country with obvious freedom. This is made possible because he is a part of a trusted apparatus. If an agent has set up around him a barricade of tried and trusted asso- ciates, he may carry on his activities and seldom expose himself. Such a group was associated with Arthur Adams. A person with Adams' physical peculiarities and disabilities would soon become quite obvious, and it was necessary for him, to a great extent, to use others to help carry out his espionage activities. The so-to-speak outer guard of the Arthur Adams apparatus was, at best, a polygot of personalities. They consisted of Victoria Stone, Julius Heiman, Eric Bernay, Samuel Novick, and Dr. Louis Miller. Perhaps Dr. Miller, as a man of medicine, could, if he so chose, furnish a psychiatric description of these individuals. However, without his assistance, it would appear that Victoria Stone became a part of this group as a frustrated and emotionally unstable person. Heiman, as a person of wealth, who, like so many of similar estate, felt that he was justifying his station in life by helping the "peasants." Bernay, Novick, and Dr. Miller were what might be termed "feather- bedders" or opportunists, who, feeling the strong possibility that the Communist revolution might be successful, chose to assist its progress, especially since they were not alarmed by the inadequate punitive legislation this country has for such action. Victoria Stone is the daughter of a Polish immigrant to the Dominion of Canada. She was born Rebecca Victoria Singer, in Mon- treal, Canada, in 1905. In the early 1930's she was married to Harry Stone. While quite young she moved to Philadelphia, Pa., and there received her early education. The committee has information that at an early age Victoria Stone exhibited a pronounced affinity for radicalism. Of the afore-nien- 36 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/2a IA-RDP7 Q g 00700260037 -6 tioned group, Victoria Stone first ecame closely assac Julius Heiman, who had been instrumental in the advance of Earl Browder within the Communist Party, U. S. A. She stated that she had first become acquainted with Julius Heiman in Philadelphia prior to moving to New York in about 1928, that she had a close social and business association with him and that Heiman had advanced the money for the jewelry business she operates in New York. Victoria Stone testified before the committee that through her asso- ciation with Julius Heiman, she had met Earl Browder, who had been a frequent guest in Heiman's home. She added, however, that though she had maintained her association with Heiman, she had not seen Browder in the Heiman house since the time that Browder was ex- pelled from the Communist Party in 1945. With regard to her association with Arthur Adams, Victoria Stone admitted to the committee that she had been an intimate associate of Adams during the entire period he is known to have been engaged in atomic espionage. She was extremely vague in fixing the date that she had first met Adams. She did recall that Adams had worked for both Samuel Novick and Eric Bernay. It also developed that Dr. Miller was the personal or family physician for Adams, Stone, Hei- man, Novick, and Bernay. % Samuel Novick, when questioned by the committee, first claimed that he had met Arthur Adams in 1938, when Adams was a customer of his company, Wholesale Radio Service.. He was then confronted with a statement he had made to the Immigration and Naturalization Service on December 19, 1937, to the effect that Arthur Adams was a skilled radio engineer, who had been employed by him in Canada for 10 years. Novick could not recall when he first met Adams, nor whether the statement made on December 19, 1937, was correct. As an actual fact, Adams could not have been employed by Novick for a period of 10 years prior to 1937, because we have seen that dur- ing most of that period Adams had been employed by the Russian Government and much of that time he had spent in Russia. Novick, while admitting that he had known Adams for a number of years, endeavored to explain that his relationship developed solely from business dealings. Novick has a long record of membership and association with Communist fronts, as well as having been a substantial financial supporter of Communist organizations and endeavors. Eric Bernay, who is presently engaged in a business manufactur- ing phonograph records, admitted to the committee that he had been advertising manager of the Communist publication, New Masses, between 1936 and 1939. He also admitted that during that same period he had been a member of the Communist Party. Bernay claimed that he had first become acquainted with Adams in 1941 or 1942, at which time Adams had been a customer in Ber- nay's record shop. He stated, that through conversations with Adams, he learned that Adams had a knowledge of the manufacture of records and as a result he had hired Adams as an engineer. Bernay claimed that he had never suspected Adams was a Com- munist, let alone a Russian agent; even though he claimed to know nothing of Adams' background, and also that he knew for a long period of time Adams was under constant surveillance. 37 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved F~r RelRa~se.1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 rom a t e Information available to the committee, it is unques- tionable that these persons who were associated with Adams were not only aware of his status as a Russian agent but also furnished him assistance in his espionage activities when called upon. In February 1945, Adams realized that the FBI had acquired knowledge of his espionage activities and that his usefulness was limited. With money advanced him by Eric Bernay, Adams pro- ceeded to Portland, Oreg., where he endeavored to board a Soviet vessel. He was prevented from doing so by FBI agents, even though they were powerless to arrest him, because of limitations imposed by the State Department. Adams then returned to New York City but before the necessary wheels could be put into action to effect his arrest, he vanished. There is no certainty as to his present whereabouts, but the com- mittee has information indicating that he successfully returned to the Soviet Union. No prosecution was had of those associates who assisted him, be- cause, as in almost all other similar instances, the evidence concern- ing their activities is considered inadmissible under present statutes. ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES OF SOVIET OFFICIALS It has already been indicated in this report that Soviet officials frequently took a direct part in espionage activities. Vassili M. Zubilin, Mikhail V. Serov, Gen. Leonid Rudenko, and Peter Ivanov are some of the Soviet officials who have been so engaged. The committee has learned that there were many Soviet officials, in addition to those named above, who took part in espionage activities. Igor Gouzenko, the former Russian code clerk in Ottawa, Canada, has stated that during World War II, the head of Red Army Intelli- gence activities in the United States, was Gen. Ilya Saraev, the military attache in Washington, D. C. Saraev's two principal assistants were Pavel P. Mikailov, acting Soviet consul general in New York City, and Col. A. I. Sorvin of the Tank Department of the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission. The committee has also learned that important Red Army Intel- ligence, and NKVD officials frequently came to the United States posing as diplomatic couriers. One such ruse was used by Mikhail Milsky and Gregori Kossarev. Igor Gouzenko has described Milsky whose true name is Milshtein, as the Deputy Chief of Red Army intelligence in 1944. Kossarev was described as an inspector for the NKVD. In the spring of 1944, Milsky and Kossarev, traveling as diplomatic couriers, made a joint inspection of Soviet intelligence facilities in the United States, Mexico, and finally Canada. The records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service dis- close that Mikhail Milsky and Gregori Kossarev entered the United States through the port of New York on April 3, 1944, as diplomatic couriers of the U. S. S. R. The records further disclose that these two individuals departed from the United States for Mexico City, at Laredo, Tex., on April 15, 1944. They reentered the United States through El Paso, Tex., on May 10, 1944. Milsky and Kossarev then spent from May 11 to May 22, 1944, inspecting the facilities of the Soviet consulate at Los Angeles, Calif., following which they went to San Francisco, Calif. 38 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved WiFlqit#pea,als%%&(A$1 ~eQkAtfPP7 PQM QQQZG0260037-6 in San Francisco, Kossarev made a similar inspection in Portland, Oreg. They departed together from San Francisco on May 29, 1944, and arrived back in New York City on June 2,1944. They then went to Ottawa, Canada, Milsky returning to New York on June 16, 1944, and Kossarev on June 21, 1944. During most of July 1944, Milsky and Kossarev divided their time between New York and Washington, D. C. Finally, on July 23, 1944, they departed from the United States via plane from Great Falls, Mont. The committee has learned that while Milsky and Kossarev were satisfied with the facilities set up by Red Army Intelligence and the NKVD in Canada, they were greatly dissatisfied with operations in the United States. This inspection resulted in the recall of a number of individuals operating in the United States, who were then replaced by more vigorous espionage agents. It is also interesting to note that in October 1945, Gregori Kossarev again visited the United States, this time accompanied by one Serguei Fomitchev. After visiting Canada, these two eventually departed from the United States on November 3, 1945, and visited Mexico City, Balboa, C. Z., Medellin, Colombia, and were to return to Mexico City on November 25, 194.5. GREGORI MARKOVICH KHEIEETS Gregori Markovich Kheifets, who used the code name "Mr. Brown," was the vice consul of the Soviet consulate at San Francisco, Calif., from 1941 until he was recalled by the Soviet Union on July 6, 1944. Kheifets, who was born in Moscow, May 15, 1899, like Arthur Adams and Vassili Zubilin, was a seasoned veteran in Soviet activi- ties. From 1934 through 1938, Kheifets was in Germany performing special work for the Soviet Government, which resulted in the identi- fication and punishment of persons involved in actions the Soviets: considered subversive. This investigation finally resulted in the no- torious "blood purge" in the Soviet Union in 1938. Kheifets made, the claim that at one time he had been the secretary to the widow of V. I. Lenin. Kheifets was one of the Soviet officials who moved freely and con- spicuously in the company of American citizens. The persons whom Kheifets had occasion to contact form an interesting picture of Soviet espionage in action. The committee has learned that among the principal espionage con- tacts of Kheifets were the following persons: Martin David Kamen, alias Martin David Kamenetsky, a natural- ized citizen of Russian parentage, who, at the time of his contact with Kheifets, was employed at the vital Radiation Laboratory of the Uni- versity of California. Martin Kamen was born in Toronto, Canada, in 1913, and was brought to this country when he was 3 months old. From 1936 to 1944, Kamen was a staff chemist in the Radiation laboratories at the University of California, Berkeley, Calif. Within that period, from 39 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved fRr5?J jka"m1eR9w9/08/2gn4e.4 01& a t 00 g5ROp0$0260037-6 as asst trict's atomic bomb project. Kamen's scientific capabilities are unquestioned. He participated in some of the most important developments toward perfection of the atomic bomb. On July 1, 1944, Kamen proceeded from Berkeley to San Francisco, Calif., and there met Gregori Kheifets, who was destined to leave the United States within a few days. Kheifets was accompanied by Gregory Kasperov, who had been selected to succeed Kheifets as vice- consul of the Soviet consulate in San Francisco. The three men roceeded to a San Francisco restaurant, where, dur- ing the course ofpa dinner, they conversed freely. In fact, the con- versation, which was monitored by a Government intelligence agent, was so free on the part of Kamen, that an expert has testified that much of Kamen's conservation dealt with classified information deal- ing with the development of the atomic energy necessary to develop the bomb. Kamen has not been identified as a member of the Communist Party, however, he unquestionably knew the seriousness of carrying on such a discussion with a person who not only was not associated with the atomic project, but was known to him as a representative of a foreign country. Such acts as these make the work performed by security agencies doubly difficult. Isaac Folkoff, who has used the aliases Cam Falconvitch, and "Pop," is a naturalized American citizen of Latvian birth, who has been en- gaged in the clothing business in San Francisco. Folkoff has long exerted a strong influence on Communist Party leaders in the San Francisco area, and has been reported to control the strings of the party's secret funds there. During the course of meetings between Kheifets and Folkoff, Gov- ernment agents frequently observed that Kheifets would depart from the meetings with an envelope or package that had been carried to the meeting by Folkoff. Folkoff is also known to have been in attendance at secret meetings with a group which included Steve Nelson, Haakon Chevalier, and William Schneiderman, head of the Communist Party in California. Folkoff also held clandesine meetings with Louise Bransten. LOUISE, ROSENBERG BRANSTEN Louise Rosenberg Bransten was born October" 10, 1908, at Berkeley, Calif. She is independently wealthy through inheritance and receives an income of approximately $40,000 annually. She was formerly married to Richard Bransten, alias Bruce Minton, a former editor of the Communist publication New Masses, who was, expelled from the Communist Party because of differences over the expulsion of Earl Browder as head of the party. Louise Bransten first met Gregori Kheifets in 1942, and soon after- ward commenced an intimate association with him. In fact, Bran- sten was unquestionably the closest associate of Kheifets, and he fre- quently confided in her. While Louise Bransten's open activities appeared to have been re- lated principally to the American-Russian Institute, a Communist- 40 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 App rove#oFpXrF,9J p,19/$W 4e C]AmRO &US48R0G0M00260037-6 uals mentioned in this report : Among her contacts were : Haakon Chevalier, professor of Romance languages at the University of Cali- fornia; Joseph North, editor of New Masses; Earl Browder; his. brother, William Browder: Lement Upham Harris; Gerhart Eisler;, and Nathan Gregory Silvermaster. During the organizing conference of the United Nations in San, Francisco in the spring of 1945, Louise Bransten entertained Dmitri Manuilsky, the head o7 the delegation from the Ukraine, U. S. S. R.. Manuilsky is better known as a member of the inner circle and prin-- cipal spokesman for the Comintern. Louise Bransten has since moved from San Francisco to New York City. Shortly after moving to New York, she established contact with+ Pavel Mikhailov, who at the time was head of Red Army Intelligence, activity in the New York area. Bransten., who has since married Lionel Berman, a Communist Party official, appeared before this committee and refused to answer questions regarding her associations on the ground that to do so, might tend to incriminate her. HAAKON MAURICE CHEVALIER Haakon Maurice Chevalier is an American citizen having been born in New Jersey of French and Norwegian parentage. In 1927, he, commenced employment with the University of California, as an as- sociate professor of Romance languages. During the conference of the, International Labor Office in Philadelphia, Pa., in 1944, Chevalier acted as translator for the French delegation, and also for the Latin- American Communist labor leader, Vincente Lombardo Toledano;. During the United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco, Calif., in the spring of 1945, Chevalier again, served as a translator. In October 1945, ,Chevalier received an ap- pointment to act as traislator at the trials of the German war criminals. Mention has previously been made of a meeting between Steve Nelson and Peter Ivanov, the vice consul of the Soviet consulate in San Francisco. The committee has learned that in the latter part of 1942, Ivanov was a principal in another meeting of interest. On this occasion Ivanov contacted one George Charles Eltenton and requested him to obtain information concerning some highly secret experiments on the atomic bomb that were being carried on at, the Radiation Laboratory of the University of California. After this contact by Ivanov, Eltenton in turn approached Haakon: Chevalier and requested him to assist in obtaining the desired infor- mation. Eltenton explained that he had a direct contact with am official of the Soviet Government and that this official had explained that since Russia and the United States were allies, the Soviet Gov- ernment was entitled to any technical data that might be of assistance to that country. Chevalier following this approach of Eltenton, contacted J. Robert Oppenheimer, the director of the atomic bomb project, and told hint of the conversation he had with Eltenton. Oppenheimer told Chevalier that he considered such acts or such attempts to obtain information on this project as constituting trea son against the United States. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999 G&(24r CA&MUS-0091 Andrei V. Schevchenko was born at Kharkov, Russia, on November 24,1906. He was a student at the Aviation Institute at Moscow in 1936 and 1937, and later was employed in the Peoples Commissariat of Aviation Industry in Moscow. On June 19, 1942, Schevchenko entered the United States as an en- gineer in the aviation department of the Soviet Government Pur- chasing Commission. Until September 15, 1945, he acted as liaison between the Bell Aircraft Corp., Buffalo, N. Y., and the Soviet Pur- chasing Commission. During this period of time, the Bell Aircraft Corp. was conducting experiments on the use of jet propulsion as power for aircraft. The importance of such experiments may best be illustrated by the use of this means of velocity in present-day aviation. Shortly after Schevchenko's liaison with Bell Aircraft Corp. be- gan, that company opened a new plant in Buffalo, N. Y., which had provisions for a library. The librarian was Mrs. Leona Vivian Fra- ney, who, along with her husband, Joseph John Franey, has furnished the committee with valuable information concerning the operations of Andrei Schevchenko Mrs. Franey testified that soon after the facilities of the library were available Schevchenko became a frequent patron of the library. While at first there were certain classified articles in the library Schevchenko made no attempt to secure them. However, Schev- chenko endeavored through glowing depictions of Soviet life to indoc- trinate the Franeys. Soon thereafter, Schevchenko put aside the screen of his disinterest in classified material. In fact, according to Mrs. Franey, he was ask- ing for information on aircraft development almost before the en- gineers had started their experiments. At almost the same time the Franeys learned that the Federal Bu- reau of Investigation had ail interest in the activities of Andrei Schev- chenko, and upon being contacted by FBI agents they agreed to as- sist them in this investigation. From that point, tie Franeys supplied Schevchenko with voluminous material, all of which had been cleared by Government experts. For this information the Franeys were paid sums by Schevchenko ranging from $200, which they turned over to the Government. Actually, Andrei Schevchenko was paying for information which he could have secured from periodicals dealing with aeronautics. In fact, at that time his financial contributions were probably the only return of lend-lease that this country was receiving.. from Russia. The policy of appeasement then in existence prohibited the arrest of Andrei Schevchenko, and he was allowed to return to Russia. How- ever, in his case there is a strong possibility that his Soviet superiors have not looked too kindly upon the miserable manner in which he carried out his assignment, and it is improbable that Schevchenko is enjoying the glorious benefits of the. Soviet life he so glowingly de- picted to the Franeys. GERHART EISLER One of the dark pages in the history of Soviet espionage in the United States deals with the activities of Gerhart Eisler. 42 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved lmRe esJ&9?=J2*i: 1 7260037-6 must be considered along with that of V assih M. u ilin' ; for fire" Zubilin, Eisler was an official of the International Communist move- ment. Gerhart Eisler ostensibly first arrived in the United States on June 6, 1941, at the port of New York, aboard the steamship Evangeline, in transit to Mexico. Accompanying him was Brunhilda Rotstein, whom he described as his fiancee. Eisler stated that he had been born at Leipzig, Germany, on February 20, 1897. He informed immigra- tion authorities that he had never before been in the United States. The passage of Eisler and his fiancee was paid for by the Spanish Refugee AN Society, 156 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y. Eisler denied to immigration authorities that he was, or had ever been a member of the Communist Party, or sympathetic to Communist causes. Following the immigration hearing, Eisler became the object of an investigation conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.. Par- tial results of this investigation are contained in a report furnished by J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the FBI, to the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, dated October 16, 1946. This report spotlights Eisler's activities until that date and is in part its follows : At a hearing before the Board of Special Inquiry of the Immigration and Naturalization Service at Ellis Island, N. Y., on June 14, 1941, Eisler denied that he was or had been in the past, a member of the Communist Party, denied membership in any Communist organization, and stated that he had never been sympathetic to the Communist cause, all of which statements were obviously false, in view of Eisler's long-term activity as an important international Com- munist and responsible representative of the Communist International. Almost immediately after his release by the Immigration and Naturalization Service in 1941, Gerhart Eisler became active in the, American Communist move- ment and in recent years he has been a figure of cosiderable importance in con- nection with the policies and operations of the Communist Party, USA. It is of particular significance to note that through the investigation of Gerhart Eisler, it has been ascertained that he is identical with an individual previously known as "Edwards" who, from approximately 1933 until approximately 1938, was the representative of the Communist International to the Communist Party, USA, by virtue of which position he was responsible for and instrumental in the determination of American Communist policy and the control and the direc- tion of American Communist operations. During the period he served in the capacity of Comintern representative in the United States under the name "Edwards" he was recognized by party leaders as a figure of primary importance and also unlimited authority. A number of individuals who knew "Edwards" have definitely identified Gerhart Eisler as "Edwards." In addition, persons who have been acquainted with Eisler for a number of years have reported that he has served as a Comintern representative and a Soviet agent in other parts of the world also. By virtue of his position as Comintern representative in the United States, Eisler or "Edwards," was, of course, actually the liaison between the Comintern and the authorities in Moscow and the Communist Party, U. S. A. Since 1941, Eisler has contributed regular articles to the official press of the Communist Party, many of which articles have been instrumental in formu- lating or solidifying the Communist Party line with regard to particular subjects. He has been a regular and frequent contributor in this connection to the Daily Worker, recognized Communist newspaper in New York City, and to Political Affairs, formerly known as The Communist, the official theoretical organ of the Communist Party, USA. His articles in the Daily Worker have been appearing since 1941, and his articles in Political Affairs, formerly The Communist, since early 1942. It should be noted that all these articles have been written by Eisler under the pen name Hans Berger, and that Eisler has consistently denied his identity as Hans Berger. In the role of Berger, Eisler has been an important publicist and analyst of party policy for the past several years. 43 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved Flove ea c1M91Q; 24is 9JAZF P7?nQA9slARgg9P7b00260037-6 Important Communist functionaries, many of whom are strongly suspected of involvement in Soviet espionage operations. Although, Eisler, tinder his pert name, is comparatively unknown to the rank and file of the Communist Party,. the investigation of him reflects without doubt that he is and has been in recent years a figure of paramount importance in the determination of party policy. Whether he is still engaged ii activity as an actual operating Soviet agent, as hem is known to have been in the past, is not completely clear. However, his known contacts, his clandestine activities, and the care with which he has concealed and protected his, identity, raise the very definite possibility that iii addition to. his other activity Eisler may be involved in intelligence work as such. The entire pattern of Eisler's activities since his arrival in the United Staten In June 1941, as previously summarized is one of apparent evasion and duplicity coupled with clandestine but no less important activity. Ile has been in con- stant contact with important Communist functionaries and _has frequently beem in touch with individuals identified as or strongly suspected as being Soviet espionage agents. In addition, as noted in greater detail above, Eisler was for many years an important representative of the Comintern. During a recent interview, Gerhart Eisler unequivocally denied his activities as outlined above,. which denials obviously were false and unfounded. For the past several years Eisler has made regular daily. visits to the office, of the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, a well-known Communist-front organization in New York City, and it is indicated that Eisler may have been regularly employed by this organization although he has frequently described himself as unemployed. Contacts with Eisler have been made by numerous indi- viduals, including important Communist Party functionaries through officials of the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee and on many occasions at the offices of the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee. In this connection, it appears' that Eisler has been extremely careful about any visits to Communist Party headquarters. Through the investigation of Eisler, the possibility was developed that Eisler is identical with one Julius Eisman, who is known to have been receiving for- a considerable period of time, regular monthly checks from the Joint Anti- Fascist Refugee Committee in New York City in the amount of $150. Subsequently investigation has identified Julius Eisman as Gerhart Eisler_ It is known that the following checks were issued to Julius Eisman by the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee. All of these checks which were from the funds of the Joint Anti-Fascist Refu- gee Committee and were made payable to Julius Eisman were endorsed by Ger- hart Eisler. Further testimony indicating the importance of Gerhart Eisler was given to the committee by Louis Budenz, a former editor of the Communist newspaper, the Daily Worker. Budenz testified that he had been informed by Eugene Dennis that from time to time Budenz might receive instructions and communica- Lions from a Hans Berger. Dennis continued that Berger was "strictly underground" and that he, Dennis, knew Berger as a "respon- sible comrade" who had been in China and Spain and many other places "including the United States, as you, Budenz, may know." Dennis further informed Budenz that Berger's real name was Ger- hart Eisler and that he would use that name in contacts with German Communists in this country. Dennis stated that Berger was "Equiv- alent to a representative of the Communist International" and that Budenz was to consider him as such. In the course of his testimony; Budenz related his early experiences in the Communist Party and how he had come to learn that the real head of the Communist Party in the United States was the Inter- national Representative of the Comintern. Budenz said that this be- Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 name particularly apparent around the time that Budenz was ap- pointed labor editor for the Daily Worker, when he had atten jet :a meeting of the editorial board of the Daily Worker. At the be- ginning of this meeting there entered a man tJiex} knQwp to Puclenz as "Mr. Edwards." This person did not even introcli}ce himself to the editorial board, but cg}pmenced to administer a tongue lashin to AClarence gathaway, then Daily Worker editor., for tl}e way i wjich Hathaway was reflecting Communist policy in the Daily Worker. Budenz related that even though J-T thaway was then considered one of the important leaders of the Communist Party, V. S. A., he merely sat with a silly grin and took Edwards' tirade. Bndenz said that he then commenced to realize that the'Cq}ninunist I rty,'Ci. S. A., was not c94trgl1ed by the nominal heads of the party, much less by the mein- oership, but actually was controlled by international. r@prespptative of the Comintern. Gerhart Eisler appeared before the committee on Febri}ary, 6, 1947, and refused to be sworn as a w}}t~npss. 4s a result the col ip}ttee voted tq cite Eisler for coi}tei}1pt of Congress. Tn addition to the else passport charges, in 108, CTerhart Eisler was indicted and convicted for cQ}lten}pt of Con recs. .Op. JblAy 13, 1949, while free on bond furnished by the Civil Rights Congress, a Communist front, Eisler was smuggled aboard the Polish. steamship Batory. By the time that United States authorities had discovered this deception, Eisler was beyond the limits :qf tliq jurisdiction pf the United States. Not long thereafter Eisler became an official of the East German (Russian controlled) Gove"rpwerit and there is publicly carrying on his mission of hate against the f ree' countries gf the world. THE ASSASSINATION OF LEON TROTSKY Joseph Stalin hws never been known as a person who would brook opposition. For t, is reason his unmitigated hatred was'4ireetpd tq- Ward Leon Trotsky. Both Stalin and Trotsky had been instrumental in the successful Communist revolution in Russia. They were con- sidered as equals behind the leadership of V. T. Lenin. They were peers in ruthlessness; however, Trotsky. was the inferior .tactic`ian. Having seized a balance of power, Stalin quickly deposed Trotsky from the Comintern. Soon Trotsky's name became a despicable epi- thet. I1,q greater denunciation could be Inade by a Comm unist than t o refer to an individual as a 'rptskyite. Leon Trotsky, no matter how discredited, was still a thorn to Joseph Stalin and nothing short of his complete removal would be satis- factQry to the master of the Kremlin. 'The removal of Leon Trotsky could not be accgniplished :wily. Re was living in 1Vlexicq and w s closely guarded by individua s who had remained loyal to him. How- ever, Leon Trotsky was considered an enemy of Joseph Stalin, and to the NKV that was a sufficient order for his removal. On August 20, 1940, t eon Trotsky, the political rival of Joseph Stalin, was murdered in his home near Mexico City by a person using a mountain ax. The killer, after his apprehension, was found to have 14 his possesgign a fraudulent Canadian passport, which' had been altered through the substitution of a fictitious 44r4 p, Frank Jacspn: The passport was originally issued to a Canadian, who was a member 5 Approved' For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 of the MacKenzie-Papineau Battalion of the International Brigade in Spain. When arrested by Mexican authorities, the killer later gave his name as Jacques Mornard Vandendreschd. However, his true name and identity have never been established. Jacson's, or Van- dendresclid's, trial continued for 3 years. On April 16, 1943, he was sentenced to 191/2 years for assault and an additional 6 months for carrying a pistol. He pleaded self-defense during the trial. Leon Trotsky died the day following the attack, but before his death he stated his killer was most likely sent by the Russian secret police. Investigations conducted since his assassination have indicated that Trotsky's beliefs were well-founded. The Committee on Un-American Activities instituted its own in- vestigation concerning the Trotsky assassination in order to establish, if possible, what part the Russian Government and the Communist Party played in the murder of Trotsky. On November 11, 1950, Louis Budenz, former managing editor of the Daily Worker, submitted to the Committee on Un-American Activities a notarized affidavit setting forth his knowledge of the Communist Party's participation in the Trotsky assassination. This affidavit is reproduced in its entirety and is as follows : STATEMENT BY Louis FRANCIS BUDENZ OF THE PREPARATIONS FOR ASSASSINATION OF LEON TROTSKY "Rather early in my activity in the Communist Party, while I was still. labor editor of the Daily Worker, I was called to the ninth floor of the Communist Party headquarters in New York City. Jack Stachel, powerful member of the political bureau of that Soviet fifth column, had telephoned down to the eighth floor (the offices of the Daily Worker) that he wished to see me. "The conference to which Stachel called me was with one Jacob Golos, then chairman of the Control Commission of the Communist Party and conducting Soviet espionage activities under cover of World Tourists, Inc. Another man present at the conference had been known to me only by the name of Michaels, and I have never learned his true and correct name. "Stachel and Golos advised me that it was important that I go with the latter almost at once `to meet some friends of importance, from abroad.' I was reluctant to do so, since I was busily engaged on a large editorial on the CIO and had a speaking engagement that evening. Stachel stated that `nothing could be more important than this assignment,' saying that 'a substitute could be found for my speaking appointment. "Accordingly, I went with Golos to a restaurant not far away, on East Four- teenth Street, facing Union Square. In a far corner of the restaurant I was introduced to a man sitting in one of the cubicles, who gave the name of Richard or Richards. It was clear that this was a fictitious name and his Russian accent emphasized that fact. During the course of my 10 years in the party, particu- larly as I came to be a member of the national or central committee, and a con- stant attendant on political bureau meetings, I met many other Soviet agents going under such first names or adaptations of first names. "Richards advised me that he wanted my cooperation in getting information in regard to the Trotskyites and their movements, in order to offset any plots against the life of Stalin and against the Soviet Union that might be planned. This was the period of the great purge trials, and I agreed to help. "From that time forward I met with Richards in various restaurants in New York, on the average of several times a week. I obtained for him lists of Trotsky- ites and also information in regard to the `left' Socialists who were following Norman Thomas at that time. On one occasion, in his anger, Richards even declared that he would place me on the political bureau in Stachel's post, since he felt that the latter was not doing all that was. possible to penetrate the Socialists. This offer I rejected, though Browder and Stachel both were cognizant of it and even called me into a special conference to ask if there was anything at all that they could do to assist me. Approvedl6or Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915ROO0700260037-6 "This gives some Idea of the high standing in the Communist conspiracy of the representatives of the Soviet secret police (now called the MVD) with whom I was thus dealing. "My first meeting with Richards occurred around December 1936, or slightly earlier. From that time on I met him several times a week at various Child's restaurants in New York City. At his instructions we always agreed on the next place of meeting, but the time could be changed by telephone. That is, he would sometimes call me at the Daily Worker under his fictitious name and make certain that I could get away. "In the spring of 1937 Richards introduced me to another member of the Soviet secret police, whose name was said to be Michaels or Michael. (He is not to be confused with the first Michaels who was with Golos on the ninth floor.) Both Richards and Michaels impressed upon me that we were engaged in trying to halt Trotskyite plotting against Stalin. I therefore collected and took them all the available information I could obtain in regard to the movings of secret Trot- skyites, Trotskyite couriers, and their relations to the left-wing Socialists. At that time, I had a number of agents for the Stalinist group planted in the Trot- skyite camp, that being one of my first assignments with the Communist Party, and from them I obtained this information. Prominent among these concealed Stalinists acting as Trotskyltes was Bill Reich, who later openly announced his Communist Party affiliations. "The agent Michaels met with me for a short time only, when suddenly in 1037, very shortly after I first met Michaels, both Richards and he introduced me to another and clearly more important agent, who went by the name of Robert or Roberts: "This man was a very intelligent person, fatherly in his manner, and immedi- ately"proceeded to organize new activity on my part. He instructed me to intro- duce to him various Stalinists who were penetrating the Trotskyites or might be useful along that line because of their work.or associations. "I should state here thaJafter 5 years' investigation on my part, and after examining hundreds of photographs of men connected with Soviet espionage in one form or another, or with the conspiracy as a whole, I now know that this man Roberts was in reality Dr. Gregory Rabinowitz, or Rabinowitch, head of the Russian Red Cross in the United States. He was a physician and also a surgeon. "It is significant that the Soviet dictatorship has been so unscrupulous in its dealings with the American Nation that it would use the International Red Cross (with which the Russian Red Cross was then connected) to advance espionage activities of various sorts in the United States. It is ironical that the Kremlin would use, or misuse, an organization devoted to the saving of lives for the pur- pose of destroying the lives of its enemies by assassination. "Among those whom I introduced to Roberts was Ruby Well, whom I had known as a member of the Conference for Progressive Labor Action, of which I had been national secretary prior to becoming a Communist. Miss Well had secretly joined the Communist Party shortly after I had entered it openly, and had been assigned to a secret training school or unit for infiltration. This assign- ment had been given her by Comrade Chester, whose correct name is Bernard Schuster or Zuster, the notorious underground agent who directed infiltration of the National Guard and other organizations in the New York and New England areas for the Soviet fifth column. "In addition to her knowledge of infiltration methods, Miss Well had been on very friendly terms with Hilda Ageloff, sister of Leon Trotsky's secretary, Ruth Ageloff. Hilda was also sister to Sylvia Ageloff, a Brooklyn social worker who devoted vacation periods and other free time to Trotskyite courier work. "Roberts and I agreed that he should be known as `John Rich' to Miss Well, and as such I introduced ihm to her. Before I had introduced him to her, Roberts had given me a considerable sum of money in cash to present to Miss Well for expenses. This was for the specific purpose of enabling her to be dressed well. and to keep up telephone and other connections. She was reluctant to take the money, but upon learning its purposes, agreed to do so. "In the course of time she met not only with Roberts, but also met with me both as long as I was in New York and then in New York after I had moved to Chicago (November 1937) to become editor of the Midwest Daily Record. "Miss Well was persuaded also that we were engaged in stopping Trotskyite plottings against Stalin's life. One incident that made us both think this was the case further was my assignment to cheek on the residents of a certain apartment house in the Stuyvesant Square area in New York. Roberts considered it of great importance that the exact names of these people be obtained, and it is Interesting to note that he was aware of some Communists who lived there. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915ROO07VO260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Later on, this turned out to ,be the headquarters of a passport mill which fur- nished the false,passport to the agent Robinson-Itubens, whose case became famous Because the Soviet Union announced his arrest in Moscow. "To any knowledge both from these conferences with !Roberts and Miss Weil, I learned that she was being sent to Paris and that she had persuaded Sylvia Ageloff to accompany her, o' rather tXiat she was accompanying Miss Ageloff. The occasion for the trip was a Trotskyite International Congress in the French .capital, and Ruby Well went along on ttie plea that she was interested in Trotsky- ism and also that she could visit her sister in England. "I .was on one occasion specifically requested by Roberts .to make a special.trip :to New York from Chicago, ,to pers~xacle Miss Weil .to _go throu_gh with this ar- xarigement. After having agreed enthusiastically to the .plan, she had become disturbed. Already friends of hers wbo were Coulzit}ipists had noted her once or twice of the Ageloft sisters and bad reported her to the secret -conspiratorial apparatus as being of dubious lgyalty to the communist _cau~e. This had come to my attention, apd I had sent word to the section organizer in her section of the party, tbat she was engaged in important secret work. 'This protected her from any official action, but' niy reipoitcould not be eyialained to her fellow Communists in the lower ranks. This was .what ?listurljed ,her specifically. "Of the various conferences between Roberts and Miss Weil I can only testify from what was told me by each one of .tbetn? After her yptuxn from Paris, hough I did not see her then, Roberts told me ghat she had done a splendid piece of work for the Soviet secret police .there. "After the assassination of Leon Trotsky, in 1940, Miss Well came to me in great distress to tell me of her part in this act. Although I was .aware 'that assassination had been used against oviet agents who hod turned sour,-I was not inclined to give full credence to her account until a year later when she was able to sit down and tell me the whole story. She had in the:meantime been in' a tuberculosis sanatorium and thus had been precluded from discussing the matter Pith -me fully. "However, I did report her first visit to Earl Browder who was aware all along of my activities with the Soviet secret police. He agreed that if any attelript was made to arrest any MVD man here, or to bring matters to public notice in the Trotsky case, that the Communists would make 'another Tom Mooney case of it,' alleging frame-up. "As Miss Well filled out the story of her Paris visit to me, it ran as follows : Before going to Europe, Roberts had sent her to see a member of the Communist cogspiratorial apparatus residing in Greenwich Village and known by the name of Comrade Gertrude. As Roberts had on one or two occasions mentioned this ;Gertrude to me, I knew that she existed. The plan was that Gertrude would be in Paris at a certain address when Ruby arrived there and that she would give Miss Weil the instructions which she should follow, and also introduce her to the persons (Stalinist agents) whom she should introduce to Miss Ageloff. "In this manner, Miss Well was introduced to the man Jacson, who eventually killed Trotsky. In turn, Jacson was introduced to Sylvia Ageloff, and immedi- ately Jacson instituted a whirlwind courtship. Representing himself to b8 a 'Jacques Mornard, a descendent of Belgian counts, he won Miss Ageloff's favor and she smuggled him into Mexico and into the Trotsky household. "The events which took place thereafter have been recorded in public records. "After her return to the United States, and her release from the tuberculosis sanatorium Miss Well approached me in regard to continuance of her membership in the Communist Party. This had been temporarily dropped during her in- filtration work, as is frequently the case. Upon bringing up the question with Jacob Golos, with whom I had been in constant contact, he stated that he would .first have to consult the Soviet consulate officials, or MVD agents located in the consulate. After conferring with them, he reported that Miss Well could not have a Communist Party card and she was forbidden to go near the party head- quarters or to visit my home. I conveyed this information to her, and she was gravely disappointed. "(I might state that this close control of the party by the Soviet consulate and Embassy, through their espionage agents has come to my attention on scores ,of occasions. It completely refutes the various efforts to show that any Com- munist Party decisions of any importance are made by any native 'leader' or that Soviet policies in any country are influenced by the native Red leadership in that country. In the minute and rigid manner, Russian Soviet agents, or other alien agents subject to them, direct the acts of the native 'leadership.') Approved Ir Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 App roved "FQrg to ea .J 919a9i1 ,l naQIA-R 78t10Q91V1 ',0 0260037-6 York, upon my coming in from Chicago to persuade her to go on wi h e a ?i trip, was held in the Grand Central Terminal. It took place from 10:30 to 11: 30, in the evening, after I had called for her at the People's Press where she was Working. Our conference continued until I caught the late train to Chicago. "Another person whom I introduced to Roberts was Sylvia Franklin also known as Sylvia Caulwell and whose maiden name was something like Sylvia Kallen. "When I went to Chicago, under Roberts' instructions I got in touch with Jacli Kling, head of the Young Communist League in that area. The purpose of this consultation was, in the name of the National Committee of which I was a member, to get hold of some Stalinist agent infiltrating the Trotskyites, who could be moved to New York and put into the Trotskyite national office. "Jack Kling introduced me ' to Sylvia Franklin, a Chicago social worker who was successfully infiltrating the Trotskyites. Her husband, Irving Franklin, had been in Spain working in secret work and had then boon sent into Canada to aid in espionage activities there. "After a number of consultations with Sylvia Franklin, I advised Roberts that he could meet her in Chicago if he wished. to do so. He made a special visit to Chicago for that purpose staying at the Hotel Stevens where he registered under the name of Rabinowitz. He was obliged there of course to register under his legal name in this country, and this fact I mentioned in my book, This is My Story, written in 1946. It was a fact that he was thus compelled to use his correct name of Rabinowitz that enabled me to check with Miss Bentley and learn definitely that he was Dr. Gregory Rabinowitz. "In Chicago, Roberts gave Sylvia Franklin $300 as an initial expense account to make the trip to New York where he had arranged her employment with a woman doctor, who was connected with the Soviet secret police. "Ile also arranged that her husband, Irving, who had returned from his espio- nage work in Canada, should be located in a special apartment in the Bronx, so. that Sylvia could visit him there from time to time. She was to represent her- self to the Trotskyites as unmarried and was set up in a separate apartment of her own in Manhattan. "By first volunteering to do secretarial work in the national Trotskyite offices in New York, Sylvia Franklin under the direction of Roberts-Rabinowitz, grad- ually made herself indispensable to James Cannon, then head of the American Trotskyites. She became his secretary and served in that capacity for some time. Roberts-Rabinowitz advised me that she had proved to be invaluable in bringing copies of all of Trotsky's mail and other Trotskyite communications to him for his information. "It may be said here that another valuable source of information established through the information I gave them, enabling the Soviet secret police to be minutely acquainted with the Trotsky household and his own ideas and move- ments, was obtained through taking advantage of the good will of Leigh White, now the well-known anti-Communist newspaper correspondent. I had made his acquaintance through one of the Communists working in concealment for the Soviet secret police. "I asked him the simple question : `Where does Trotsky's mail go, concerning. his book?' At that time, Trotsky was preparing the book and Leigh White was employed by the publisher who had originally agreed to publish the work on Stalin. Mr. White advised me that all mail was going to Sara Wolf, who had been Trotsky's. secretary and was the wife of a New Jersey professional man. Roberts-Rabinowitz advised me that in this manner, intercepting the mail through means of their own, they had kept in touch with all correspondence from Trotsky to New York. "There are many more details to the account of the preparations for the as- sassination of Trotsky in Mexico City. For instance, one of the considerable items which caused the Soviet Union to be able to demand that Norway move Trotsky out of that country was the visit of A. J. Muste to Trotsky in Oslo. Upon Muste's return, I visited him at the suggestion of Roberts-Rabinowitz, and expressing great interest at how Trotsky reacted, learned that Trotsky said that only a revolution by violence within Russia against the Stalinite dictatorship, organized from without, could achieve anything against the Bonapartism in Moscow. Roberts-Rabinowitz let me know that this information had been of great value in private representations made by the Soviet Union to Norway, on the contention that this proved that Trotsky was using Oslo as a base to attack Soviet Russia. 0 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915ROO0700260037-6 Approved ForhRe a B~~LO I r: o p [ a tl$~9o1t 000 00 60037-6 whom I introduced to Roberts-Rabinowitz. "The above gives the substance of the methods employed to bring about the ..assassination of Leon Trotsky. "As to Roberts-Rabinowitz, I bade farewell to him in 1939-after Miss Well's -trip to Paris but before the actual Trotsky assassination. He got in touch with me (as usual) through Jacob Golos and asked me to meet him at the Bronx apartment of Irving Franklin. There he told me he was leaving for the Soviet Union, laughed about the comic papers he had to take with him for his son (whose name I believe was Boris) and said a fine piece of work had been done here. We took a walk, at his suggestion, around the block in the Bronx in the evening and then parted. "Should other details be required on this Trotskyite case, and there are a num- =ber which I have not covered, I hold myself always in readiness to be of such service to Congress as I can." 'STATE OF NEw Yoax, County of Westchester, ss: I, Louis Francis Budenz, of Crestwood, N. Y., being duly sworn, do hereby state and declare that the attached account of the preparations for the assassina- tion of Leon Trotsky, former Soviet leader, constitute a true version of those ,preparations, insofar as I was cognizant of them. I am at this time under subpena of the Committee on Un-American Activities, United States House of Representatives, and submit this affidavit and statement at the instruction of that committee. Louis F. BuD.Ei7Z. During the years 1942 and 1943, a number of letters from Mexico 'City to New York City, and from New York City to Mexico City, were intercepted by the United States Office of Censorship. After laboratory examination of the intercepted letters, it was determined that these letters contained ciphered messages in invisible ink. When the messages were deciphered, they were found to relate to the efforts of persons in the United States and in Mexico to free Frank Jacson from imprisonment. Further investigation disclosed that an elaborate system of mail drops, both in Mexico and the United States, was used in the handling of this correspondence. Subsequently, each' of these -mail drops was investigated to determine the scope of his activity as a part of the conspiracy to release Frank Jacson. Jacob Epstein, 958 Madison Avenue, New York City, was identified as the head of the group in Mexico City. This individual is of Russian 'extraction and was born Jacob Eppstein, November 10, 1903, in Brook- lyn, N. Y. He attended public schools in New York City and grad- uated from Cornell University in 1924. Mr. Epstein is a veteran of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade and participated in the Spanish Civil War in 1938. The mail drops in Mexico City through which Epstein received correspondence from the United States were Mexicans and refugee Spaniards, all of whom were identified as members of the 'Communist Party. Ciphered messages between New York City and Mexico ceased in November 1943. Shortly thereafter, Pavel Klarin, vice consul of the Soviet consulate general, New York City, was trans- ferred to Mexico City. Pavel Klarin is a known close contact of Y-assili Zubilin, who at that time was head of the NKVD (Russian secret police) in the United States. Investigation disclosed that Jacob Epstein contacted Pavel Klarin upon numerous occasions in Mexico 'City. Mr. Epstein appeared before the Committee on Un-American Activi- ties in executive session on October 18, 1950. In the course of the ,examination of the witness, he admitted being a former member of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade. He also stated that he had resided in Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approveoefiq- Ieggg,l iQ8 4c,'IQA& 78go! X00260037-6 Party, he declined to answer the question on the groups o self- incrimination. Epstein also declined to answer any questions pro- pounded to him regarding his part in the Communist, conspiracy mentioned herein on grounds of self-incrimination. Other persons interrogated by the committee (residift in United States) who acted as mail drops were : Lydia Altschuler, 97 Perry Street, New York City : This individual was born in Charlottenburg, Germany, and acquired citizenship by virtue of her father's naturalization. She attended New Jersey Col lege for Women, Toledo University, and Hunter College. Her present occupation is that of a writer. She at one time was employed by the Welfare Counsel of New York City, where she was editor of a weekly publication called Better Times. From September 1937 to December 1944, she was education director of Consumers' Union, Ins., in New York City. Consumers' Union, Inc., was cited as a Communist front by the Special Committee on Un-American Activities on March 29, 1944. She was a member of the Committee of Women of the National Counsel of American-Soviet Friendship, an organization cited as Com- munist by this committee on March 29, 1944. Former Attorney Gen- eral Tom Clark cited this organization as Communist on September 21, 1948. Lydia Altschuler appeared as a witness before the Committee on Un- American Activities on October 18, 1950, at which time she was af- forded the opportunity to affirm or deny her part in the Communist conspiracy to release Frank Jacson from imprisonment in Mexico. On this occasion she refused to answer all questions relating to her partici- pation in this underground movement, on the ground that to do so might incriminate her. She likewise refused, on the grounds of self- incrimination, to answer questions regarding her membership in the Communist Party. Barnett Sheppard, 47-14 Two Hundred and Sixty-first Street, Great Neck, Long Island, N. Y.: Mr. Sheppard was born in Syracuse, N. Y., February 27, 1908. He attended Syracuse public schools, Manlius Military Academy, Cascadella Prep School, and attended night school at Syracuse University. He appeared before the Committee on Un- American Activities October 19, 1950, at which time he stated he was unemployed. Sheppard, just as other witnesses in this case, refused to answer all questions propounded to him relating to his Communist affiliations on the grounds of self-incrimination. He likewise refused to answer, on 'the grounds of self-incrimination, questions regarding his Communist Party membership. Fanny McPeek, 846 Prospect Place, Brooklyn, N. Y.: Mrs. MePeek was born in the city of New York, November 10, 1908. She received her elementary education in New York City and attended Hunter College for a short period. From 1934 to the summer of 1950, she was em- ployed as a clerk at the Washington Irving High School in New York City. Mrs. McPeek testified before the Committee on Un-American Activities on October 19, 1950, and when asked questions regarding Communist Party membership she declined to answer questions on the grounds of self-incrimination. She also refused to answer ques- tions concerning her participation as a mail drop in the Communist effort to release Frank Jacson from prison in Mexico. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved Fo a aka 11 9i / i 5: 1 741P 97Q60037-6 N. Y.: Mrs. Baskind was born in New York City on August 16, 1914. She was graduated from Hunter College in New York City, and re- ceived an M. A. degree from Columbia in 1938. Mrs. Baskind was employed by the New York Board of Education from 1936 to 1941 as a substitute teacher, and then again from 1947 to 1949 as a full-time teacher. She testified before the Committee on Un-American Activities on August 18; 1950, at which time she was asked if she had voluntarily participated in any conspiracy involving the receipt of mail from one source and its subsequent transmission to another source. She de- clined to answer the question on the ground of self-incrimination. She likewise pleaded self-incrimination when asked if she was a mem=ber of the Communist Party. Mrs. Frances Silverman, 134 St. Johns Avenue, Yonkers, N. Y.: The above individual was born in. New York City on July 16; 1913. She attended New York City public schools and was graduated from City. College School of Business, in 1935. She was last employed by the Board of Education, New York City, from which position she resigned on February 1, 1950. Mrs. Silverman testified before this committee on October 18, 1950. Just as the preceding witnesses, she declined to answer questions re= garding Communist Party membership and her participation in the afore-mentioned Communist conspiracy to release Frank Jacson from imprisonment in Mexico. Ethel Vogel, 137 West Eighty-second Street, New York City; N. Y.: Mrs. Vogel was, born in Worcester, Mass. She attended public schools in New York City and was graduated from. New York University in 1929. Mrs. Vogel appeared before the Committee on Un-American Activities on October 19, 1950. She pleaded self-incrimination when asked questions regarding Communist Party membership and gave the same answer when asked whether or not she acted as a'mail drop" in the conspiracy to release Frank Jacson from prison. Helen Levi Simon Travis, 5450 North Road, Armada, Mich.: Mrs. Travis was born in New York City on September 3, 1916. She was: graduated from Barnard College in 1937. Mrs. Travis appeared before the Committee on Un-American Ac- tivities on August 30, 1950. She testified that she had been employed by the Ford Instrument Co., Long Island City, for a short period of time in 1943 and 1944, and by the Chrysler Corp. in Detroit, Mich., in the summer of 1948. When requested to list additional employment she refused to do so on the ground that it might tend to incriminate her. Mrs. Travis was formerly employed by the Daily Worker, the official Communist Party newspaper in New York City, writing under the name of Maxine Levi. In addition to the identification of the "mail drop" used in the conspiracy to release Jacson, the information in the possession of the committee reveals also that the group in Mexico requested funds for the use of a "money drop" in Mexico. Shortly after the interception of this request by Federal authorities, Helen Levi Simon transferred $3,700 to one Enrique de los Rios, the "money drop" in Mexico City. This transaction occurred on February 21, 1944, at which time Helen Levi Simon executed in her own handwriting an application with Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 the Chase National Bank in New York City to transfer the said amount to the account of the afore-mentioned individual. The appli- cation setting forth the foregoing transaction was entered into the testimony of August 30, 1950, of Helen Levi Simon Travis as "Travis Exhibit No. 5." Mr. Philip A. Schmitz, a document analyst employed by the Identi- fication and Detection Division, Veterans' Administration, Washing- ton, D. C., testified in executive session before this committee on July 26, 1950. Mr. Schmitz testified that he had compared the handwriting appearing on "Travis Exhibit No. 5" with other documents bearing the known handwriting of Helen Levi Simon Travis which had been supplied to him by this committee. After adequate examination, he reached the conclusion that the handwriting appearing on said docu- ments was written by one and the same person. Mrs. Travis, in testifying before this committee on August 30, 1950, declined to answer all questions relating to the above transaction on grounds of self-incrimination. Anna Vogel Colloms, Park Trail, Mount Airy Road, Croton-on- Hudson: Mrs. Colloms was born in New York City on August 6, 1902. She received her elementary training in New York City public schools, was graduated from Cornell University in 1921, and attended Colum- bia University, where she took graduate courses. Mrs. Colloms appeared before this committee on October 19, 1950, at which time she testified that she was then employed by the Board of Education, New York City, and assigned as a teacher to Washington Irving High School. Investigation of Anna Vogel Colloms by a Government intelligence agency disclosed that, in addition to acting as a "mail drop" in this conspiracy, she was also a courier in the attempt to free Frank Jacson to cross over into Mexico with this box of stationery. The stationery box was retained by a Government agency which substituted other sheets of paper for the original ones bearing the secret messages. While in Mexico, Mrs. Colloms made a half-hearted attempt to con- tact Jacob Epstein in Mexico City. She reentered the United States on September 3, 1943, at which time the stationery box was returned to her by United States customs officials. Upon her return to New York City she gave the box of stationery to Ethel Vogel, who in turn trans- mitted it to Ruth Wilson Epstein, wife of Jacob Epstein. Mrs. Colloms, in her testimony before this committee, followed the same course as all other witnesses who were subpenaed in connection with this case and refused to answer all questions relating to this matter on grounds of possible self-incrimination. She also refused to :answer, on the same grounds, the question of whether or not she had ever been a member of the Communist Party. Sylvia Ageloff testified before the Committee on Un-American Activities on December 4, 1950, at which time she stated that she had been a member of the Trotskyite party or movement and, while a member of this group, had met Frank Jacson, the assassin of Leon Trotsky, under the name Jacques Mornard, in Paris, France, in June- On August 12, 1943, Anna Vogel Colloms departed from New York City for Mexico City, carrying an apparently new box of personal stationery. This stationery box contained five sheets of paper com- pletely covered with messages in cipher. Mrs. Colloms was not allowed Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-009158000766260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 1938, through one Ruby Weil, who had made the trip from New York to Paris on the same boat with her. She further testified that Jacques Mornard had, according to her recollection, illegally entered the United States through a forged passport during the month of Septem- ber 1939, which contained the name Frank Jacson. According to Sylvia Ageloff, Mornard then proceeded to Mexico. Sylvia Ageloff testified that in January 1940 she went to Mexico and while there contacted Leon Trotsky and spent a half hour with him. During this conversation, according to her testimony, she mentioned to Trotsky that she knew Frank Jacson was in Mexico City and was using a false passport. She said that she then asked Trotsky if he considered it advisable for her to see Jacson. According to her testimony, after she left Mexico City, she learned that Frank Jacson had met Leon Trotsky and had, upon one occasion, conveyed Mr. and Mrs. Trotsky to Vera Cruz, Mexico, via motorcar. Miss Sylvia Agel- off testified that, in her opinion, Frank Jacson would never have been permitted to enter the home of Leon Trotsky if she had not made known to Trotsky that she had met Frank Jacson. On December 4, 1950, Miss Hilda Ageloff, the sister of Sylvia, also testified before the committee and stated that she had first met Ruby Weil in 1936. She said that at this time both she and Ruby Well were members of the American Workers' Party. She said that it was she who had told Ruby Well about her sister Sylvia's proposed trip to Europe. Hilda Ageloff further testified that she had met Frank Jac- son upon his arrival in New York City and was aware of the fact that her sister Sylvia had met Jacson in Paris through Ruby Weil. She also stated that she knew that Jacson had entered the United States illegally. Hilda Ageloff further testified that she had been in Mexico several times ; that upon one occasion she was there with her sister, Sylvia; and that upon this occasion she met Leon Trotsky. She stated that after the assassination of Trotsky it became obvious to her that Jacson was a member of the NKVD or OGPU. Ruby Weil also testified before the committee on December 4, 1950. During her testimony, she stated that she had traveled to Europe on the same boat with Sylvia Ageloff during the summer of 1938, and that she introduced Sylvia to Jacques Mornard in Paris. She testi- fied that she had never known Mornard under the name Frank Jacson, and first heard of Frank Jacson when she read of his part in the Trotsky assassination in the newspapers. She testified that she had joined the Communist Party in 1936 and ceased relationship with it in 1937. She further testified that she had known Louis Budenz as a member of the Communist Party and had considerable contact with him during the time she was a member of the Conference for Progres- sive Labor Action. She denied the allegations of Louis Budenz that she had been assigned to infiltration work for the Communist Party. With reference to the testimony of the Ageloff sisters, it is pointed out that, as a result of their names being mentioned in connection with this matter by other sources, they have suffered hardships. The committee would like to state in their behalf that they cooperated fully with the committee and furnished valuable information during this particular investigation, despite the personal risk involved by so doing. Other individuals who were named as "mail drops" and as members of this group were : Ruth Wilson Epstein, wife of Jacob Epstein, who Approved or Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 served as a nurse in Spain on the Loyalist side during the Spanish Civil War in 1937; and Louis S. Bloch, who in 1943 and 1944 was em- ployed as a motion .picture operator in New ,York City. Mr. Bloch was born in Lithuania and is a naturalized citizen of the United States- He presently resides on the west coast. In addition to being named as a "mail drop".in this case, he was named in the secret messages: as a contact for couriers. These last two individuals were not sub- penaed for appearance before this committee. Because of the alertness of United States Government intelligence, agencies, the attempt to release Frank Jacson from imprisonment in,. Mexico never materialized. However, in analyzing the intelligence information in the possession of the Committee on Un-American Ac- tivities and the testimony of the witnesses, this case demonstrates that the Soviet Government was directly interested in the assassination of Leon Trotsky and the subsequent attempt to release his killer from prison. The committee feels that the American aspects of the assassination of Leon Trotsky are important in the annals of Soviet espionage in this country because of the number of Americans involved. J. PETERS A report dealing with Soviet espionage activities within the United States would be incomplete without mentioning J. Peters, alias Alex- ander Stevens, alias Goldberger. Peters was one of the most furtive characters engaged in Soviet espionage in the United States. The true name of this individual is probably Goldberger, and avail- able information indicates he was born in Hungary. He entered the United States in 1928 from Czechoslovakia, and he claimed to have received a law degree from the University of Hungary. Fol- lowing his arrival in this country, he was for many years manager of the Communist-Hungarian language newspaper Uj Elore. Peters" most noteworthy literary endeavor was The Communist Party-A Manual on Organization which was published by the Workers' Li- brary Publishers, New York City, in July 1945. This manual is re- ferred to and quoted as the guide of Communist organizers. Whittaker Chambers, then a senior editor of Time magazine, has related to the committee that his initial contacts with the Communist apparatus in the United States Government in Washington, D. C.,, were at the behest and under the direction of J. Peters. Chambers has stated that he was first introduced to Peters through Max Bedacht, then a Communist functionary, in about 1931. Cham- bers stated that from 1931 until approximately 1935, he acted as a courier carrying messages and articles between J. Peters and another individual known to Chambers only as "Arthur." Sometime in 1933, Chambers was given instructions by Peters to contact Harold Ware in Washington, D. C., and act as liaison be- tween Ware and Peters. In addition to these liaison duties, Cham- bers was required from time to time to give pep talks to animate the Ware group. This underground Communist apparatus was organized by Harold Ware, a son of the notorious and now deceased "Mother" Ella Bloor. This group acted as an adjunct of the NKVD of the Soviets. The principal function of the group was to obtain information desired Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000760260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 by the NKVD particularly with regard to individuals. Chambers stated that frequently he turned over to Peters sizable sums which he had collected from the Ware group. Chambers has identified John Abt, formerly with the Agricultural Adjustment Administra- tion, later with the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, and with the LaFollette Senate Civil Liberties Committee as having been a member of this group. Most recently Abt has been repre- senting the Communist Party as cocounsel with Vito Marcantonio before the Subversive Control Board. Following the death of Har- old Ware in an automobile accident, John Abt married Ware's widow, Jessica Smith, who at one time was a secretary in the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D. C. Later, when she became editor, of Soviet Russia Today, she was one of the few persons ever to register as a Soviet agent. Other members who comprised this group were Lee Pressman, formerly with the Agricultural Adjust- ment Administration, and later general counsel of the Congress of Industrial Organizations; Henry Collins, at one time a member of the Forestry Service of the Department of Agriculture; Nathan Perlow, an economist, and when known to Chambers was connected with tfie Brookings Institution in Washington, D. C.; Charles Kramer, who was also employed by the La Follette committee while Cham- bers was in contact with him ; Alger Hiss, who held employment with the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, the State Depart- ment, the United Nations Organization, and finally was president of the Carnegie Foundation. for International Peace. This was the formidable group organized by J. Peters, and the committee believes that this was the original group organized for the Soviets in. the United States Government. The committee has learned that for a period of time a brother of J. Peters, Emmerich Goldberger, was employed as a chauffeur by the-Soviet Government Purchasing Commission and Amtorg. Upon the basis of information in committee, files, Peters was called to appear before the committee in August 1948, and refused to answer pertinent questions. Although the committee was power- less to effect a prosecution of Peters, the disclosure of information concerning him minimized his future effectiveness in this country and he finally departed from this country of his own volition rather than be deported. ALGER HISS One of the most startling revelations concerning the record of Soviet espionage was that relating to Alger Hiss. It was particularly amaz- ing because Hiss had dissipated an exceptional background of appar- ently creditable Government service and a promising future as a career Government employee. It was extremely difficult for many of the persons who had been associated with Hiss to believe that he could have participated in such treachery against the country that had given him such great opportunities. Alger Hiss came alarmingly close to escaping the retribution due him for his guilt. Except for one factor, it is likely that Alger Hiss could have convincingly upheld his innocence. On August 3, 1948, the committee heard Whittaker Chambers, then a senior editor of Time magazine. Chambers testified that from 1931 to 1938, he had been a member of the' Communist Party, and during Approved5Oor Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 the period 1934-37 was associated with a Communist apparatus which was operating in the United States Government. The com- mittee knew that as early as 1939 Chambers had disclosed the opera- tion of this group to Government officials, yet, for some unaccountable reason, no action was taken by them. The committee, because of the lack of necessary executive clearance, could not examine the Government files to discount or verify the infor- mation Chambers had furnished. Chambers, a quiet person, without any show of emotion, told the committee that Alger Hiss had been a member of the Communist Party, and that from 1934 to 1937, Hiss had been a part of the Commu- nist apparatus in the Government. Also identified by Chambers as having been a part of this apparatus were Harold Ware, Nathan Witt, Harry Dexter White, Henry Collins, John Abt, and Lee Pressman. Two days later on August 5, 1948, Alger Hiss, who was then presi- dent of the Carnegie Foundation for International Peace, was given the opportunity of answering the charges made by Whittaker Cham- bers. Hiss categorically denied that he was or had ever been a Com- munist, and further denied that he had ever seen Whittaker Chambers. Had the matter ended there, it is quite likely that the great majority of people would have believed Alger Hiss. While it is true that Whittaker Chambers had lived a respectable and creditable life dur- ing the preceding years, it is also true that on his own admission he had once worked against his Government. On the other hand, Alger Hiss' entire background was exemplary. He was considered one of the most capable experts on foreign affairs. Fortunately, the committee did not allow this matter to end there. Many hours of exhausting investigation followed. The members held executive meetings at unusual and long hours, hearing both Chambers and Hiss. Finally, on August 17, Hiss admitted for the first time that lie had actually known Chambers during the period in question. However, he claimed he had known him only as George Crosley. Following this, the committee heard Lee Pressman, John Alit, Henry Collins, and Nathan Witt, all of whom refused to answer questions on grounds of self-incrimination when asked if they knew Chambers or Hiss. Alger Hiss was probably his own worst enemy when it came to vindicating himself. Hiss had invited Chambers to make his charges without the cloak of congressional immunity. He threatened that if Chambers would make these charges publicly, then Hiss would insti- tute libel proceedings against him. On August 27, 1948, while appear- ing on a radio program, Whittaker Chambers, in response to question- ing, reiterated substantially the same allegations concerning Hiss. Hiss' reaction was anything but spontaneous, and it was only after considerable goading by newspapers that his attorneys finally took action. On November 17, 1948, a deposition was taken from Whittaker Chambers. In addition to this action, the Hiss attorneys requested Chambers to furnish any documentary evidence in his possession to support his statements concerning Alger Hiss' membership in the Communist Party. It was unquestionably a shock to them when Chambers produced a thick envelope containing four pages written by the hand of Alger Hiss. There were also a great number of type- written documents which Chambers claimed were typed on a type- writer owned by Alger Hiss. This material was not immediately 57 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 sufficient to cause the prosecution of Hiss and it was necessary for the committee to proceed further in its investigation. As the result of a subpena by this committee to produce all docu- ments in his possession relating to the Hiss matter, Chambers produced the now famous "Pumpkin papers." Actually, this consisted of five rolls of microfilm which contained photographic reproductions of a number of confidential and secret documents from the State Depart- ment and the National Bureau of Standards. This was the final piece of evidence needed to substantiate the charges of Whittaker Chambers against Alger Hiss. Alger Hiss brazened it out. When he was brought before a Federal grand jury in New York City, he denied he had ever turned over the questioned documents to Whittaker Chambers. On the basis of these denials, Alger Hiss was indicted on December 15, 1948, on charges of perjury. The first trial of Alger Hiss ended in a hung jury, eight jurors voting guilty and four voting for acquittal. Finally, in January 1950, a second trial ended with the result that Hiss was found guilty of perjury. The great pity was that Alger Hiss could not be confronted with the substantive offense, espionage, rather than the much simpler offense of perjury. However, because of the outmoded provision permitting the statute of limitations to apply to espionage violations, Alger Hiss has never been punished for his treachery but only for his untruthful state- ments. The committee wishes to commend the Federal Bureau of Investi- gation for its work in bringing this case to a successful conclusion when all the odds were against it. The location of the typewriter and certain pieces of other evidence needed during the trial of the case was amazing. In order for their espionage apparatus to function as an over-all unit it was necessary for therRussians to establish contact within the various departments and bureaus of the United States Government. The success with which this was accomplished was attested to in tes- timony given the committee by. Elizabeth T. Bentley in July 1948. Miss Bentley stated that for more than 11 years she had engaged in Communist Party activity as well as Soviet espionage. Prior to 1938, she had been an official in various capacities of the Communist Party in New York City. In 1938, she became acquainted with Jacob Golos, then head of World Tourists, Inc., an organization previously de- scribed herein which was being used as a cover for Soviet espionage activities. She stated that she started having regular contacts with Golos shortly after meeting him and later when lie organized U. S. Service & Shipping, Inc., she became an official of that company. Miss Bentley testified that U. S. Service & Shipping, Inc., which was organized by Golos. in 1941, was also a cover for Soviet espionage activity. She testified that under the direction of Golos, until his death in 1943, she acted as courier and in a liaison capacity between individuals engaged in Soviet espionage and Golos. Even after Golos died in November 1943, she continued to act in the same capacity under the direction of Earl Browder, then head of the Communist Party, U. S. A. This arrangement continued until late in 1944, when upon the insistence of Soviet officials Browder consented to Approved-Vor Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 turn over the groups which Bentley was contacting direct to Soviet agents. Elizabeth Bentley was able to identify only one of these Soviet agents whom she knew under the code name "Al." She was later able to identify this individual as Antole Gromov, First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C. Gromov was unquestionably the successor to Vassili M. Zubilin as head of all NKVD activities in North America. Miss Bentley has stated that all the individuals working in the Apparatus were under the direction of the NKVD. These espionage groups with which she was working were composed primarily of in- dividuals employed in the Government in Washington, D. C. The head of the most important and active group with which Miss Bentley had contact was Nathan Gregory Silvernaster. Silvermaster, who has a record of numerous Communist-front affiliations, also has a lengthy record of Government service. He was employed in the Department of Agriculture, Labor, and lastly with the Treasury Department. Another member of this group was William Ludwig Ullmann, who resided with Silvermaster. Ullmann, who was a major of the United States Army Air Force stationed at the Pentagon Building in Wash- ington, D. C., was primarily responsible for obtaining and photo- graphing classified war plans as well as reports of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which had been furnished to Army Intelligence in the Pentagon. It is interesting to note that Ullmann maintained a photorecord camera in the basement of the Silvermaster home in Washington, D. C. This expensive photographic equipment is only practical for the reproduction of books or documents, on a 35 mm. film, which Bentley has stated was of the type frequently furnished her. Others named by Elizabeth Bentley as members of the Silvermaster group were: Solomon Adler, Treasury Department ; Norman Burster, Department of Justice ; Frank Coe, Assistant Director, Division of Monetary Research, Treasury ; special assistant to United States Ambassador in London ; assistant to the Executive Director, Board of Economic Warfare and successor agencies ; Assistant Ad- ministrator, Foreign Economic Administration ; Lauchlin Carrie, Administrative assistant to the President; Deputy Adminis- trator of Foreign Economic Administration ; Bela Gold (known to Miss Bentley as William Gold), assistant head of Division of Program Surveys, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Agriculture Depart- ment; Senate Subcommittee on War Mobilization; Office of Economic Pro- grams in Foreign Economic Administration ; Mrs. Bela (Sonia) Gold, research assistant, House Select Committee on Inter- state Migration ; labor-market analyst, Bureau of Employment Security ; Divi- sion of Monetary Research, Treasury ; Abraham George Silverman, Director, Bureau of Research and Information Services, United States Railroad Retirement Board ; Economic Adviser and Chief of Analysis and Plans, Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Materiel and Services, Air Forces; William Taylor, Treasury Department. The head of another important group contacted by Elizabeth Bent- ley was Victor Perlo, then an employee of the War Production Board. She first met the members of this group at the apartment of John Abt, then general counsel for the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America-CIO. Abt was later to figure in the testimony of Whit- taker Chambers as will be shown later in this report. 599 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Another person mentioned by Bentley, who was to figure in the Chambers testimony, was Alger Hiss. Bentley stated that members of the Perlo group had informed her that "Hiss" of the State De- partment had taken Harold Glasser of the Treasury Department and two or three others, and had turned them over to the direct control of Soviet representatives operating in this country. The members of the Perlo group who were named by Miss Bentley were : Victor Perlo, head of branch in Research Section, Office of Price Administration; War Production Board, Monetary Research, Treasury ; Edward J. Fitzgerald, War Production Board ; Harold Glasser, Treasury Department ; loaned to Government of Ecuador ; loaned to War Production Board ; adviser on North African Affairs Committee in Algiers, North Africa ; Charles Kramer (Krevitsky), National Labor Relations Board; Office of Price Administration ; economist with Senate Subcommittee on War Mobilization ; Solomon Lischinsky, United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration ; Harry Magdoff, Statistical Division of War Production Board and Office of Division, EPB ; Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce ; Allan Rosenberg, Foreign Economic Administration ; and Donald Niven Wheeler, Office of Strategic Services. Miss Bentley also testified that Irving Kaplan, an employee of the War Production Board at the time, was associated with both groups, paying dues to the Perlo group and submitting information to the Silvermaster group. She identified the late Harry Dexter White, then Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, as another individual who cooperated with the Silvermaster group. Miss Bentley further testified that there were certain individuals employed in the Government who cooperated in obtaining information from the files of the Government for the use of Russian agents but who were not actually attached to either the Silvermaster or Perlo groups. These individuals, as named by Miss, Bentley, and the governmental agency with which they were employed during the period concerned in the testimony are as follows : Michael Greenberg, board of Economic Warfare ; Foreign Economic Administra- tion ; specialist on China ; Joseph Gregg, Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, Assistant in Research Division ; Maurice Halperin, Office of Strategic Services ; head of Latin American Division in the Research and Analysis Branch ; head of Latin American research and analysis, State Department ; J. Julius Joseph, Office of Strategic Services, Japanese Division ; Duncan Chaplin Lee, Office of Strategic Services, legal adviser to Gen. William J. Donovan ; Robert T. Miller, head of political research, Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs ; member, Information Service Committee, Near Eastern Affairs, State Department ; Assistant Chief, Division of Research and Publications, State Department ; William Z. Park, Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs ; Bernard Redmont, Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs ; Helen Tenney, Office of Strategic Services, Spanish Division. William Remington of the Department of Commerce was men- tioned by Miss Bentley before the Senate investigation committee as having been associated with this group. Certain of these individuals have denied the allegations concerning themselves either through a personal appearance before the committee or by communication with the committee. These are Lauchlin Currie, Harry D. White (deceased), Bela Gold, Sonia Gold, Frank Coe, Alger Hiss, Donald Hiss, and Solomon Adler. 60 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approvedre)##?qeS'M2(97e00260037-6 11 Communist Party as well as contacts described by Elizabeth Bentley or Whittaker Chambers. These were Alexander Koral, Henry H. Collins, Victor Perlo, Abraham George Silverman, Nathan Gregory Silvermaster, William Ludwig Ullmann, John Abt, Nathan Witt, and Charles Kramer. Sometime later Lee Pressman appeared before the committee and admitted his past membership in the Communist Party but denied membership in any Communist apparatus. Duncan Lee and Robert T. Miller admitted knowing Miss Bentley but denied involvement in the apparatus. Norman Bursler, Allen Rosenberg, Solomon Lischinsky, Mary Price, Donald Niven Wheeler, Edward J. Fitzgerald, Harold Glasser, Joseph Gregg, Rose Gregg, and Irving Kaplan, have not appeared before the committee to affirm or ' deny .the charges made concerning them. The committee does not feel that this investigation is by any means closed and is proceeding to determine all aspects of it. WILLIAM WALTER REMINGTON The testimony given by Elizabeth T. Bentley in 1948 regarding the participation of William Walter Remington in the Communist ap- paratus was not initially received by the Committee on Un-American Activities but rather by a Senate committee which conducted the in- vestigation because of Remington's then employment in the Depart- ment of Commerce as an economist. As the result of hearings before the Senate committee, Remington was suspended froin his position in the Government in August 1948. However, the Loyalty Review Board ordered Remington reinstated to his position on February 10, 1949, on the basis that "the evidence does not establish reasonable grounds for belief that William Walter Remington is disloyal." This committee, recognizing the near escape from punishment of Alger Hiss, and believing in the veracity of Elizabeth T. Bentley, instituted an independent investigation concerning Remington. Hear- ings on the Remington case were held by the committee in April, May, and June of 1950. Elizabeth T. Bentley was recalled at that time and she furnished testimony as to her initial contact and sub- sequent liaison with Remington and her Soviet principal in New York. Miss Bentley recalled that there were certain persons whose prin- cipal duties were the recruitment of individuals for the Communist apparatus in the Government. One of these individuals, Miss Bentley described as Joseph North, "a lookout man for Russian intelligence." Miss Bentley recalled that when Jacob Golos, her superior in the espionage apparatus, had referred to Remington, he had stated, "he [Remington] has been in the party some years, and I have checked him and he is O. K. He, was referred to me by Joe North, and he is O. K. In addition to that he is a highly respectable person." Miss Bentley further testified that she had met with Remington on at least 10 or 20 occasions in various places in Washington, D. C., such as "on park benches, in drug stores, at street corners, and in front of the Mellon Art Gallery." She stated that she had also 61 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved FcSfiepJt9S9jo/2Jeti1194-RD(P8T00911R~0700t~60037-6 receipts for these dues. Following Miss Bentley's testimony, William Walter Remington appeared before the committee and categorically denied that he had ever been a member of the Communist Party. He did admit having a close association with certain individuals who were members of the Young Communist League or the Communist Party. Reming- ton admitted having been introduced to Elizabeth T. Bentley but claimed that he had known her as Helen Johnson. In describing his meeting with Miss Bentley, Remington stated that Joseph North, whom he identified as a family friend, had introduced him to Jacob Golos and had described Golos as a writer interested in the work being performed by the War Production Board. Remington stated that in turn Jacob Golos had introduced him to Elizabeth T. Bentley, alias Helen Johnson, saying that "he would appreciate it if I chatted with her about this kind of problem." With regard to meeting Elizabeth T. Bentley, Remington admitted that he had seen her in Washington from time to time and discussed various matters with her, still believing that she was a writer and the matters he was discussing with her would be of value in her literary pursuits. He also admitted that on one occasion he had furnished leer with a, formula for the production of synthetic rubber and gaso- line. Remington endeavored to minimize the seriousness of such unauthorized disclosures by stating .that the formula was of little or no value and was not intended for use by the War Production Board. Remington also admitted that there were times when he had fur- nished money to Miss Bentley but claimed that he believed this money was to be used for "refugees from Hitler" and did not consider that he was paying Communist Party dues. The committee heard Kenneth McConnell, who admitted under oath that he had been a member of the Communist Party from 1935 to 1939 and that he had served as an organizer for the Communist Party. Mr. McConnell identified Remington as a member of the Communist Party in Kne:;ville, Tenn., during a portion of that period and fur- nished the committee names of other individuals whom he knew to be Communist Party members at the same time. Among these were Merwin Scott Todd, whom the committee learned had at one time been a roommate of William Walter Remington. Todd, when ques- tioned by the committee, refused on grounds of self-incrimination to answer whether he had or had not been a member of the Communist Party and on the same grounds refused to answer whether he had roomed with Remington. Another individual named by McConnell was Howard Allen Bridg- man, who admitted membership in the Communist Party from Decem- ber 1938 to September 1939. Mr. Bridgman admitted that he was a member of the Communist Party in Knoxville, Tenn., and among other individuals named by him as members of the Communist Party at the same time was William Walter Remington. On the basis of disclosures concerning William Walter Remington before the Committee on Un-American Activities, Remington was called before a Federal grand jury and nersi-ted in his denial of Communist Party membership. As a result of these denials Reming- ton was indicted for perjury on June 8, 1950, for denying his Com- munist Party membership. He resigned from his position with the Commerce Department on the following day. 62 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved"9IG8/241tZI1 DRT UQ945R000MO260037-6 guilty of perjury and was sentenced to 5 years in prison. However, a United States court of appeals said that the jury had been improperly charged by the trial judge and ordered that a new trial be held. The matter is still before the courts. However, the committee feels that the case of William Walter Remington clearly illustrates that per- sistent investigation and hearings by congressional committees can and does furnish valuable assistance to the executive branch of the Gov- ernment, as well as to the courts. For this reason the committee is resolved that other aspects of the testimony given by Elizabeth T. Bentley and Whittaker Chambers shall be fully explored. PHILIP OLIN AND MARY JANE KEENLY During the course of the trial of Judith Coplon and Valentine Gubitchev, the defense counsel was successful in having the introduc- tion of certain FBI reports from which Judith Coplon had made ex- tractions that were found in her possession at the time of her arrest. Contained in one of these reports was a reference to Mary Jane and Philip Olin Keeney. According to this report, Mary Jane Keeney was described by a confidential informant in August 1946 as being well known on the east coast (of the United States) for her Communist and espionage activities. The FBI report then proceeded to describe one Sergei N. Kournakoff, who also used the alias Colonel Thomas. It was stated that Kournakoff was a Russian national, who had come to the United States as a stateless citizen on October 21, 1921. Kournakoff, according to confidential informant of the FBI, became affiliated with the Russky Golos Publishing Corp. and wrote articles for the Daily Worker and New Masses magazines, both of which are Communist pub- lications. The report indicated that prior to Kournakoff's departure from the United States in January of 1946 he was a close associate of Mary Jane and Philip Olin Keeney, who according to a confidential informant of the FBI were members of the Communist Party. Philip Olin Keeney was born February 3, 1891, at Rockville, Conn. From 1931 until 1937, Philip Keeney was an employee of the Univer- sity of Montana, at Missoula, Mont., where he held a position of librarian. On September 1, 1937, Keeney was dismissed for incompe- tence. Following his dismissal from the University of Montana, Keeney and his wife, Mary Jane, resided at Berkeley, Calif. They remained there until 1.940, when Mr. Keeney came to Washington, 1). C., to take. a position with the Library of Congress, where he re- mained until September 1943. From 1943 until. 1945, he was employed with the Foreign Economic Administration in Washington, D. C. In December 1945 Philip Keeney was employed by the War Department and sent to Tokyo, Japan. however, on June 9, 1947, he was relieved of his duties with the War Department. When appearing before the committee, Keeney stated he was tunable to ascertain the basis for his discharge from the War Department, and efforts by the committee to ascertain the information from the Department of the Army failed. Mary Jane Keeney was born February 28, 1895, at Woodstock, Ill. On October 24, 1942, she obtained employment at the Board of Eco- nomic Warfare of the Office of War Analysis, Washington, D. C. For a short period in 1942 she was employed as a voluntary assistant to the executive secretary of Russian War Relief, Inc., Washington, D. C. 63 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved Forr Release 19r/98/24 :CIA-RDP78-00915ROO 00260037-6 n ovem er 1945 became a member of the staff of the nited States representative to the Allied Commission on Reparations. When, in March of 1946, the Commission was absorbed by the Depart- ment of State, Mrs. Keeney continued in her employment. in that De- partment until she resigned on July 15, 1946. In July 1948, Mrs. Keeney secured employment in the Document Control. Section of the United Nations Secretariat. Both Philip and Mary Jane Keeney have a record of association with known Communists and with individuals identified in this re- port as having been en-aged in Soviet espionage activity. Among them were Haakon M. Chevalier, Nathan Gregory Silvermaster, and William Ludwig Ullmann, as well as Gerhart Eisler. Also during the course of the trial of the United States v. Judith Coplon an FBI report reflected that in March 1946 Mary Jane Keeney was aboard the steamship Mit Victory when that vessel arrived in the United States. The report indicated that FBI agents had observed that the vessel was met by Jules Korchein, whom Mary Jane Keeney was observed meeting upon her departure from the vessel. These two individuals were placed under FBI surveillance and were observed to enter the apartment of an individual named Wasserman. Later, on the same date, FBI agents reported Keeney at a meeting with one Joseph Bernstein, at which time Keeney was observed passing a manila envelope to Bernstein. Bernstein was subsequently observed by FBI agents meeting Alexander Trachtenberg, Communist Party official, at which time a manila envelope, believed identical with the one origi- nally carried by Keeney, was passed to Trachtenberg. Mary Jane Keeney appeared before the committee and denied mem- bership in the Communist Party or complicity in Communist espio- nage. Philip 0. Keeney, declined to answer questions pertaining to Communist Party membership when he appeared before the com- mittee. 64 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 SOVIET ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE THE CLOSE OF WORLD WAR II JUDITH COPLON On March 4, 1949, on a side street in New York City, special agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation brought to. a close the espio- nage activities of Judith Coplon and Valentin Gubitchev. This was the culmination of many months of investigation by the FBI, much of which was conducted in the very building which houses the FBI headquarters in Washington, D. C. The investigation was not a routine one for the FBI because, in a sense, the security of the FBI as well as the country was at stake. The FBI had learned that someone was leaking information from FBI files to the Soviet Union. Information concerning highly confi- dential investigations being conducted by the FBI concerning Soviet and Russian satellite diplomats was finding its way back to these individuals. It did not appear that the information was coming from any Ameri- can contacts and therefore must have been coming directly from Moscow. This then was the pattern-someone, having access to FBI files was channeling the information to some person who in turn was furnishing it directly to Moscow. Once there, the Kremlin examined the material and then, through courier or diplomatic pouch, was notifying the Soviet Embassy and the various consulates. Because of the disclosures of Elizabeth T. Bentley regarding her contacts with Anatole Gromov, the Soviets realized that the FBI would be giving the closest scrutiny to even the most minor Soviet officials. It was necessary for the Soviet to secure some person who could be trusted to secure the information, and another person to transmit it. There are not many people who have access to. FBI reports. The FBI, fully aware of this, quietly set about locating the leak. After being completely satisfied that the leak was not inside the FBI, atten- tion was turned to outside sources. FBI reports were frequently forwarded to the Department of Jus- tice. This was necessary because in many instances reports would disclose possible violations of various statutes and the Department could not, of course, come to a decision without examining the in- formation developed by the FBI investigation. Reports concerning Soviet diplomats were frequently furnished for consideration of pos- sible prosecution under the Foreign Agents' Registration Act. Naturally the FBI could not discontinue sending reports to the Department without immediately tipping its hand to the guilty party but, unless some method could be devised of locating the person leak- in" the information, the leak would continue indefinitely. I rom the nature of the information being furnished the Soviets, it was ascertained that the leak must be coming from the section in which Judith Coplon was employed. 65 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 There followed weeks of investigation during which the FBI watched every move of Judith Coplon. There was no indication, even during the subsequent trial, that she suspected that she was being investigated. When it was definitely established that Coplon was fur- nishing information to the Soviets, it became necessary for the FBI to find the middleman who was submitting the information to Moscow. It was known that the home of Judith Coplon was in Brooklyn and that she made frequent trips to New York. A short time after it was determined that Coplon was in contact with the Soviets, she made a tri to New York. On this occasion, as on all others during the preceding weeks, Judith was observed by the FBI. Instead of going to Brooklyn, Judith re- mained in Manhattan. There she was observed in some unusual maneuvers with a swarthy individual. It is difficult to determine whether the swarthy individual and Coplon. had become suspicious or whether all meetings were the same, but, after establishing that Coplon was in contact with another Soviet agent, the FBI moved in and ar- rested Coplon and her associate. Judith Coplon, after her arrest, was found to be carrying type- written cards containing extracts from FBI reports. She later claimed that she had made these because she was writing a book and the cards were source materials. She also claimed to have started work on the manuscript, but unfortunately had destroyed it. Now to examine the man that Coplon had met in New York on March 4, 1949. We must recall that the Soviets were unquestionably aware that a close scrutiny was being made of embassy and consulate per- sonnel. For this reason, they went outside the official diplomatic ranks for this particular contact. What could be a better place to locate an individual than in the organization set up to maintain peace, the United Nations? The individual selected by the Russians was Valentin Gubitchev. There can be no question that he had been placed in the United Nations Organization for the sole purpose of contacting and receiving informa- tion from Judith Coplon. During the course of the trial, Judith Coplon claimed that her meetings with Gubitchev were merely lovers' trysts and that the unusual maneuvers employed in meeting him were caused by fear of detection by Gubitchev's wife and of the Soviet secret'police. The Government discredited the love angle by showing that Judith was obviously bestowing her favors in other quarters. During the course of the trial, Gubitchev did not testify and must have been somewhat confused to hear Judith Coplon and her attorney accuse him of being a part of a conspiracy to frame her. If such an arrangement were in existence, then this country for the first time put something over on the Soviets, because arrangements were made after Gubitchev had been found guilty to return him to the Soviet Union. The return of Gubitchev was accomplished without an exchange of persons from the Soviet Union as was the case with Gaik Ovakimian. On March 9, 1950, having heard all of the testimony, a jury found Judith Coplon guilty and she was sentenced to imprisonment for a period of 15 years. On December 5, 1950, the United States Court of Appeals reversed the conviction on the basis that her arrest was made without a warrant. This court, however, did not dismiss the indictment and stated that the 66 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : cIA-IDP7s 0091.5R000700260037-6 guilt of Judith Coplon was plain. ~cgard ess o the seriousness 01. her offense, Judith Coplon remains free, because of legal technicalities. KLAUS FucTis AND IIARRY GOLD The reader, in reviewing this report, might consider from the cases cited that Soviet espionage has dissipated itself and, since the end of World War II, declined. The committee wishes that this were true, but unfortunately it is not. We have seen that with the beginning of World War II the Soviets accelerated espionage activities ; also, that during the same period the Russians cultivated and left behind persons in the United States who, while they were not utilized, were available for espionage activities. During the period since the first successful experiments with nu- clear fission, the Russians have bent every effort toward maintaining pace with atomic development through espionage. This report has illustrated that for the Soviets one successful espionage agent has been worth more than. many Soviet scientists. Whereas the scientists might have labored indefinitely without the proper information, the Russian espionage apparatus has furnished practically everything that would enable inferior scientists to assemble the atom bomb. The case that we now consider, even though it had its origin prior to the conclusion of World War II, illustrates the fact that Soviet espionage has operated and surely shall continue to operate in the United States unless adequate laws are enacted. On February 3,11950, on the basis of information furnished by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, British authorities arrested Dr. Emil Julius Klaus Fuchs, a naturalized Briton of German birth. Fuchs was charged with having betrayed atomic research secrets on at least two occasions, specifically in 1945, while in the United States, and again in England in 1947. Dr. Fuchs' position with regard to nuclear research ivv England was comparable to that of Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer in the United States. When it first appeared that scientists could produce the atomic bomb, the three countries then foremost in atomic research,, Canada, Eng- land, and the United States, reached an agreement to pool the acquired knowledge of atomic explosives. It was agreed that because of facili- ties and "security," future experiments should be carried on in the United States. Dr. Klaus Fuchs, as the leading British atomic expert, was one of the individuals selected to represent Great Britain in this research. One of the mysteries in the selection of Fuchs was the failure of British authorities to notify the United States of all facts in their possession concerning the background of Dr. Fuchs. It was learned that as early as 1941 the British Government knew that the German Gestapo had named Klaus Fuchs as a German Communist. Even though the British had no way at that time of verifying the accuracy of the Gestapo charges, it is difficult to understand why there was no notification of this at the time Fuchs was permitted to enter this country. Fuchs, after his arrest, stated that he had developed a sympathy for communism while in college. Fuchs further confessed that while in England he had associated principally with Marxians. Notwithstanding these defects in his background, Fuchs came to the United States and, after assimilating the knowledge he lacked, fol- 67 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 lowed the progress being made in atomic research with unusual affinity. Fuchs was instrumental in the development of the first atomic bomb and was present at Los Alamos, N. Mex., on that memorable moment on July 16, 1945, when the first atom bomb was exploded. In all, Fuchs was in the United States from 1943 to 1946, working on atomic research. Later, he attended top-level conferences on atomic matters in which the United States, Canada, and Great Britain par- ticipated. Maj. Gen. Leslie R. Groves, in charge of, the Manhattan Engineering District, has identified Fuchs as one of the few scientists who had access to the United States plans for future atomic develop- ment. Fuchs had also learned of the plan for development of the hydrogen bomb. It is of interest to note how Fuchs turned over his atomic informa- tion to the Russians. Naturally, Russian impatience would not abate until Fuchs could return to England. Therefore, an arrangement had to be made by the Russians to have him contacted in the United States. We have read earlier that in arranging positive identification for the meeting between John Hitchcock Chapin and Arthur Adams, the middleman, Clarence Hiskey, had taken a key from Chapin, which was later produced by Adams when he met Chapin. In the. same manner, some means had to be devised'for Fuchs to recognize the Soviet agent he was to meet and furnish atomic secrets.. the Russian superiors, not being certain as to the. individual who would meet Fuchs, instructed him to expect to make contact at a certain location in New York City's lower East Side. In the history of secret or clandestine meetings, there have been a variety of identifying signs and countersigns but probably few surpass the novelty of that devised by the Russians for Klaus Fuchs and his contact. On an afternoon in January 1944, although it was hardly season- able for tennis, especially in the lower East Side section of New York City, Dr. Klaus Fuchs was in that vicinity carrying a tennis ball. The tenni.s'ball was the sign which, by prearrangement, would. iden- tify Fuchs. Having carried out his own instructions, Fuchs next was to watch for a person whom he knew would be wearing gloves and carrying a book with a green binding. His viggil was rewarded for there ap- peared a short pudgy man bearing the necessary signs of identifi- cation. This person identified himself to Fuchs simply as Raymond and for 3 years this was the only name under which Fuchs knew this Soviet agent. The two men then proceeded to a restaurant in New York's Bowery where Fuchs readily identified himself and proceeded to outline for "Raymond" the information he had secured up to that time regard- ing the developments in atomic research. After this meeting, Fuchs resumed his duties with the Manhat- tan Engineering District. "Raymond" took a train to Philadelphia, Pa., where, under his true name, Harry Gold, lie was employed in the laboratories of the Pennsylvania Sugar Co. On May 23, 1950, Harry Gold was arrested by FBI agents in Philadelphia on charges of espionage. Gold confessed when con- fronted with the mass of evidence the Government had accumulated against him. He confessed that over a period of time he had-been used by the Soviet Intelligence Service as an intermediary in im- 68 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approveplrfa,R( ROW ellag. q? 4a,,,cpIA tQF178x I?RNQ7eo0260037-6 had met Fuchs at various places in the United States anal that Fuchs had on these occasions provided him with both written and oral in- formation. On June 15, 1950, the Department of Justice announced the arrest of Alfred Dean Slack on espionage charges. Slack admitted turning over to Harry Gold samples and highly classified information re- garding the processes employed in manufacturing certain explosives. Gold confessed that he turned this information over to Semen M. Semenov, an employee of the Aintorg Trading Corp. Gold, upon Semenov's instructions, discontinued his contacts with Slack in view of the more important contacts with Klaus Fuchs. Upon Semenov's. departure from the United States in September 1944, Gold's espionage contacts were continued through Anatol] An- tonovich Yakovlev, a vice consul of the Soviet consulate in New York City. Yakovlev left the United States on December 27, 1946. The investigation proceeded and on June 16, 1950, David Greenglass was arrested in New York City on espionage charges. During the summer of 1945, Greenglass had been attached to the Second Pro- visional S. E. D. Unit at Santa Fe, N. Mex. The records at Los Alamos reflect that Greenglass, while stationed there, worked on highly confidential material in connection with atomic energy research. Harry Gold, in his confession, stated that he had gone to Albu- querque, N. Mex., during the summer of 1945, and there received highly classified material from David Greenglass. Gold stated that he had turned this mnaterial over to Anatoli A. Yakovlev. The subsequent investigation by the FBI disclosed that Greenglass had been recruited for his espionage duties by his brother-in-law, Julius Rosenberg, who was arrested. July 17, 1950, in New York City on charge of conspiracy to commit espionage. The investigation dis- elosed?that it was at the instigation of Rosenberg that Greenglass made secret atomic data available to both Rosenberg and Harry Gold. Further, in addition to bringing Greenglass and Gold together, Rosen- berg had given Greenglass specific instructions as to what type of information was desired by the U. S. S. R. Rosenberg had been employed by the War Department from 1940 to 1945, when he was removed by the Secretary of the War Depart- ment, upon the recommendation of Rosenberg's superior, who had received information indicating Communist Party membership on the part of Rosenbergg. . On July 29, 1950, the FBI arrested Abraham Brothman and Miriam Moskowitz on charges of obstructing justice. The investigation had disclosed that in 1941 Semen M. Semenov had arranged a meeting between Abraham Brothman and Harry Gold, at which time the three discussed the type of information that Brothman and Gold were to secure for the Soviet Government. Gold later testified that a Russian official had told him that the work Brothman was perform- ing for Russia was equivalent to the efforts of at least one and possibly more Soviet Army brigades. Gold also confessed that in testifying before a Federal grand jury in New York in 1947, he had been induced by Brothman to testify that the two had met through Jacob Golos, the then deceased Soviet agent. Gold said that he falsely testified to that effect on Brothman's 69 . Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 insistence in order that their stories would be consistent rather than truthfully stating that their meeting had been arranged by Semenov. Gold had been employed as a chemist from February 1946 to June 1948 by Abraham Brothman and Associates, consulting engineers. Miriam Moskowitz for a number of years had been secretary to Abra- ham Brothman and eventually had been made a full partner. From 1942 to 1944, she was employed by the War Manpower Commission in New York City. On August 18, 1950, FBI agents in New York City arrested Mrs. Ethel Greenglass Rosenberg on a charge of conspiracy to commit espionage. She was charged with having conspired with her husband, Julius Rosenberg, and others, and of having recruited her brother, David Greenglass, to obtain secret atomic information for transmis- sion to the Soviet Union. The final link in this chain of Soviet espionage was forged on August 18, 1950, with the arrest of Morton Sobel] at Laredo, Tex. Sobel], who had fled to Mexico after the arrest of David Greenglass, was deported by Mexican authorities. Sobell was charged with con- spiring with Julius Rosenberg and others in sending national defense. information to Soviet Russia. An electrical engineer, Sobell was employed on highly confidential work dealing with radar research for the United States Navy at the General Electric Co. plant, Schenectady, N. Y., during the period from 1942 to 1947. Previously from 1939 to 1941, lie had been employed at the Bureau of Ordnance, United States Navy, Washington, D. C. For their parts in this betrayal each of these individuals was found guilty and received the following sentences: Julius and Ethel Rosenberg received the death sentence. Morton Sobell-30 years. Harry Gold-30 years. David Greenglass-15 years. Abraham Brothman-7 years. Miriam Moskowitz-2 years. Q 70 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 25X1 C3b1 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Abbreviations used in Text of Study or the Appendix Asst. - Assistant CP - Communist Party fnu - first name unknown GRU - Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravleniye (Chief Intelligence Directorate) MA - Military Attache NA - Naval Attache png - persona non grata RIS - Russian Intelligence Services TASS US - VOKS - Telegraphic Agency of the Soviet Union - Vsesoyuznoye Obshchestvo Kulturnoy Svyazi Zagranitsey Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78?-0.A915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6