THE CURRENT COMMUNIST CAMPAIGN IN THAILAND

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-00915R000800180002-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 4, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: REPORT

pi
Approves or Release : CIA-RDP78-0091 W00800180002-2
THE CURRENT COMMUNIST CAMPAIGN IN THAILAND
Within the pa st two years, Thailand has become a major target of
the international communist movement. The Sino-Soviet bloc fs has
inaugurated
ant a manor effort in Thailand, subjecting the country to an
increasing barrage of words and actions. partieuUr, Gne Chinese
c~p~~ia(ly,
Communists
,,have expanded theft efforts against Thailand, and appear
? Jead.LVLI
to be the element in the development of the ex-
panded and integrated communist campaign against the country.
The current intensified communist interest in Thailand has
two major purposes. The primary Qnd .eritg-Communist objective ix
is to persuade or force,, the Thai Government to change its present
pro_i lru foreign policy to one more in harmony with the Sino-Soviet
objectives in the area. The secondary objective is the development of
a< fertile ground within the country for the future development of
q'A &
CommunisI'i(called "Socialism" in the Communist lexicon)A to plant the
seeds for the future development and acceptance of a communist ideology
and organization.
s
The current Communist campaign in Thailand kx emphasize four
specific purposes which the international communist movement
is attempting to a ieve in he immed at futur Thes fit- pacific
immediate withdrawal 1
2. The development of Thai trade relations with the Communist plop
w i1A a 'view 7"0
countries, particularly with Communist China, and the development of
a tl
Thais?economic&dependen`ro on
such trade#u
GtA.
3The promotion apW st' of interests among Asian
L
countries, Th the Asian Solidarity Committee, 4-sim
r ~?
4. The development of a "people to people" relationship---Apeoples
diplomacy"--to replace or supplement regular official and diplomatic
relations and contacts. Simultaneously, such "people-to-people"
contacts are used to"Opromoteft and Aadvertisd", the "achievements" and
"peaceful intentions" of communist countries.
four
Of the pxzpzxw mentioned above, the principal and overriding mm
purpose of the current communist campaign against Thailand is the first
e h d '
one listed--the severing-of Thailand's foreign policy aliggment with t' he
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000800180002-2
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Free Worl inrttDTftMr i immediate withdrawal from the SEATO Pact,
and the Adep*k-en of tk a "neutralist" foreign poltcy.The remaining
purposes are in support and secondary to this Aane_ : minant..purpe-se.
The Sino-Soviet campaign in Thailand is a n important element of
its global tactical objective--to reduce the ability of the FreeWorld
to rally and unite its defenses against Sino-Soviet aggressive and
subversive intentions, Consequently,
in Southeast Asia, the destruction of the SEATO Pact is the objective,
and the defection of Thailand from the Pact is the specific target.
However, boo means does this i4ply that the eommunist4vement 1&5
A^%dei,ed
fargatrting its ultimate intention to achieve power within the country by
any and all zRz=X available means. Thailand's withdrawal from the SEATO
Pact br the development of a Thai "neutralist" foreign policy would place
Thailand in a vulnerable position. To the_iternational communist
is a%e u.~.~~ 4IL vev$
vement a "neutralist" foreign policy furors the SinoiLSoviet objectives.
To the nternatthonal mmunist ovement, as indicated at nkx the 20th
?- reuTAat I;Ty
Party Congress of the CPSU in 1956, "--_-} 1" --
.__.:. _.. R 0. Vi V21
s a temporarily acceptable -~~~ ofn? unistuleaders have made
no secret of their belief in the "invincibility of the cause of Socialism
(Communisih)7I throughout the world, nor have they changed their view that
a "bourgeois nationalist" regime is merely the first stage in the
conquest of power in the countries of Asia and the Middle East.
In Thailand, the
ternational' ommunist
vement is employing a z
number of well developed techntquesn successfully used in
other countrle`& and tailored to the particular mod-requirements. 1
The principal techniges are:
1. The overt and covert support and promotion of groups and in-
dividuals favoring the Sino-Soviet positionaand causes. For example,
in the Burmese elections of April 1956, the Chinese Communist Government
gave subs$antial financial aid to the National United Ftont, which
was
according to the Burmese Go
ve t re mainly responsible for
the election gains of thl$,. nti-Burmese Government, anti-West.
Epent,-
2. The exchange of semi-official delegations and cultural groups.
hgMC
in the Southeast Asia area the Chinese Communist5in particular haves
been extremegly active in promoting such exchanges as pa rt of lama "Ih 2~r
"peopleAppr!'ve `PC( Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000800180002-2
 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915ROO0800180002-2
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000800180002-2
 3. 1nflOWation and mantpulation of the ! lnese and Thai language
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-009158000800180002-2
press and the ,,1
c dDisseemination of ommunist propaganda and antra anti-West state-
ments. C_J- Items sew releaded by the Soviet Embassy, TAN, and
by the
NCNA (New China News Agency) or broadcast Chinese Communists and
Soviet Union are frequently available without charge for !e}tiblica*en
by Thai publications.
4. The Promise of "huge profits" to promote trade with the Sino-
Soviet bloc. -Hawavor several countries, e.g. Burma and Japan, have
found the "huge profits"to bd non-existent. The Chinese Communist;
'after a propaganda fanfare announcing the signing of trade agreements
with Japan, have xt not fulfilled any of t*e pledged/trade quotas.
urma has found that its rice?delivered under trade agreement with the
,'Chinese Communists and the USSR, has been to compete
xftkxVwmnvnoudhrm= with Burmese rite in Burma Is~'4r gular market.
5.
The use of official installations for espionage and intelligence
1 urpose lt s
p d?-t~? pia s "`been no cnown-ueage p#'.,. 1 tall-
41L, U4,4.w.
purgoses' '?
ixxxtar aZ=XjLXW ltifger
inaU.llati-ons-,..--sueh-as exist in Thailan
&?, . _ III
delegation to '{ 'FE, Exports
4
Soviet Fhbass$, TASS, Soviet
or intelligence and espionage
Within the immediate future, no change is foreseen in the
4
tc dmunist objectives and targets in Thailand. The Sino-Soviet
bloc will undoubtedly continue their ir,}tensi efforts to induce of
force Thailand to change
foreign policy and to
withdraw from the SEATO Fact,,
'he fstF of f ort l "' h 3srnd ..i reintly-bandleapped, by-the
;,,??,.he law has prohibited the organization of
a "legal" Communist party, and of national affiliates of the inter-
national ammunist front organizations such as the International Union
of Students and the World Federation of Democratic Mouth. Consequently
~.,,k1 &I fen AVA
thereAprobably be an in nsified campaign to- repea) h*5 - t
taw in order to permit the organization and devk1opment of such instruments
of the lj.ternational ommunist vement in Thailand.
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000800180002-2