AN ASSESSMENT OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM'S CURRENT OBJECTIVES AND TACTICS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-00915R000800230036-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 14, 1998
• Sequence Number: 36
• Content Type: REPORT

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AN ASSESSMENT OF INTERNATIONAL C OM U ISM'S CURRENT OBJECTIVES AND TACTICS
SUMMARY: The recent flurry of Soviet diplomatic notes
and letters to various governments and leaders of the
free world raises questions about the aims and the
course of international coummism in the year ahead.
Has the USSR adopted a harder and bolder line follow-
ing the meeting of Communist Party representatives in
Moscow last November? Presented here is a careful,
dispassionate analysis of the subject, based in part
on information not previously available.
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AN ASSESSMENT OF INTERNATIONAL COWUNISM'S CURRENT OBJECTIVES AND TACTICS
INTRODUCTION
In recent months, the unusual degree of activity shown by the
leaders of the international Communist movement has raised questions in the
minds of observers concerning the course to be taken by the movement in the
near future. The measure of this activity is to be found in the formal diplo-
matic notes and letters sent by the Soviet government to various governments
and leaders of the free world, in the less formal but authoritative texts of
interviews granted by Soviet leaders to correspondents and publishers of free-
world newspapers, and even in the offhand and apparently spontaneous comments
of Nikita Khrushchev at diplomatic cocktail parties. These various statements,
while full of claims, contentions, and even threats, have not always been con-
sistent on such matters as the conditions under which the Soviet leaders would
participate in a "summit conference." For the non-Communist observer it is
important to determine whether the maxked activity of the Communist leadership
of late, despite apparent confusions, falls into any definite pattern indica-
ting the objectives to be sought and the tactics to be used by the internation-
al Communist movement in the months ahead.
Tentative conclusions on this problem can be drawn from a careful
analysis of the circumstances, the proceedings, and the outcome of the meet
ings of the Communist Party representatives from around the world held in
Moscow last November in connection with the observance of the I+Oth Anniver-
sary of the Bolshevik Revolution. Two basic documents issued from these
meetings: a Twelve-Party Declaration adopted at a meeting on November 114-
16 of representatives of the Communist Parties in power -- Albania, Bulgaria,
China, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Mongolia, North Korea, North
Vietnam, Poland, Rumania, and the Soviet Union (the Yugoslav party did not
join in this action); and a Peace Manifesto adopted at a meeting on November
16-19 of the entire body of Communist parties represented in Moscow for the
anniversary celebration. Both these documents, but particularly the Twelve-
Party Declaration, deserve close study in the context of what is known about
the Moscow meetings which produced them and the subsequent activities of
Communist Parties around the world.
It is standard practice with the Communists, of course, to publish
only partial and frequently misleading accounts of international Communist
meetings. For example, statements published after the founding meeting of
the Cominform (September 19+7) concealed completely the severe criticism to
which CP Italy and CP France had been subjected by the Soviet, Yugoslav, and
other delegations. The general direction prescribed by the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union (CPSU) for the international Communist movement was,
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however, clear: the Free World Communist parties were to organize maximum
pressure and violent assaults on local political structures while, at that
period, the Soviets were about to complete the subjugation of Eastern Europe
and the Chinese Communists aimed at gaining total power in China.
In the case of the Moscow meetings of November 1957, reliable in-
formation indicates that the Communist leaders had agreed not to publish
detailed accounts of the meetings. However, points of general significance
are clearly discernible in published statements by Communist leaders. Based
on these statements, the following provisional observations may be made.
THE MEETINGS IN PERSPECTIVE
The Declaration and Peace Manifesto issuing from the Moscow meetings
reflect the intention of the CPSU and the bloc Communist parties to efface the
after-effects of Khrushchev's secret (de-Stalinization) speech to the 20th
CPSU Congress in February 1956, the events of June and October 1956 in Poland,
and the uprising in Hungary. The evident aim is to integrate more closely
the activities of the entire international Communist movement in the Free
World with Soviet and Bloc policies and interests.
The need for countering a trend toward disintegration in the Commu-
nist movement was evident well before the Moscow meetings of Party leaders
last November. There were reports from mid-1956 on indicating that several
Communist parties repeatedly requested the Soviets to improve procedures and
techniques for the coordination of the movement. In March 1957 Communist
circles rumored consistently that the CPSU would render a decision on inter-
national problems. On 1 July 1957, prior to the announcement of the Malenkov-
Molotov Kaganovich purges, various Communist parties abroad were given, through
the local Soviet ambassadors, the CPSU version of the purge. This unusual pro-
cedure suggested that the CPSU recognized the need for improved international
coordination.
It is not unlikely, however, that the Soviets postponed attacking
this complex and thorny problem on an international scale until they were in
a position to galvanize the international Communist leadership into action
with announcements of their achievements in rocketry and space travel. The
November meetings were apparently staged to deal with the problems of coordi-
nation, as well as the confusion and ideological dislocations created by the
20th CPSU Congress and its aftermath, in an atmosphere benefiting from these
scientific achievements and from the celebration of the 40th Anniversary of
the Bolshevik Revolution.
The line of action laid down at the November meetings complements
current Soviet Bloc efforts to achieve a shift in the balance of power. The
general direction prescribed for the international Communist movement in the
documents of the November meetings is intended to contribute to and acceler-
ate this shift through a variety of united front tactics. Depending upon
local circumstances, these tactics may include, for example, direct action
or political maneuver, insurrection or parliamentary methods, united action
or popular fronts. In adjustment to a new set of circumstances, the movement's
general directive line is aimed militantly at increasing disunity, conflict and
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polarization within the Free World. The tempo of this increase obviously will
be contingent upon local factors, such as the strength and status of the local
Communist party, as well as the aid received from the Bloc. It is precisely
to conceal the militant and aggressive character of the Communist action line
that the full minutes of the November meetings have been kept secret.
The November meetings did not, of course, solve all problems and
disagreements with which the international Communist movement has had to cope
since the 20th CPSU Congress. However, they were first, and exceedingly impor-
tant, steps toward achieving real unity and effective international coordination.
Their effect has been to formalize the basic outlines of global Communist tac-
tics and to create the foundation of a new structure for the international
Communist movement within and outside the Communist bloc -- in brief, to weld
together the Communist movement in the spirit, although not in the form, of
the prewar Third (Communist) International, or Comintern.
MECHANICS AND AGENDA OF THE MEETINGS
Available data on the mechanics and organization of the meetings
suggest, first, that the problems of international Communism received a thor-
ough airing, and secondly, that the CP$U had distributed key roles to reliable
delegations and leaders in order to maintain its on control and keep the
meetings on the desired track.
The preparatory stage took place in Moscow. Prior to the formal
sessions a "comprehensive exchange of opinions within and among delegations"
was held for about one week. Communist accounts also refer to "commissions
established by Communist and Workers' Parties" in connection with the meetings.
According to Communist practice, these "commissions" may have concerned them-
selves with the drafting of the documents published. They may also have dealt
with more specific problems of doctrine and organization.
For example, it is reliably reported that a conference of all Latin
American delegates was held under the chairmanship of the Soviet specialist
for Latin American affairs of the CPSU, and attended by Chinese Communist
delegates. The conference permitted the representatives of significant Commu-
nist parties in the area to discuss their problems. Those selected to speak
were delegates from Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Cuba, and Guatemala,
the latter also representing the Communist movement in Mexico and the Caribbean.
This conference well illustrates the thoroughness with which Commu-
nist area problems were discussed. The Soviet chairman laid before the meeting
a specific action program for the Latin American Communist parties which was
accepted. It included requests for: (a) increased efforts to fan and exploit
anti-U.S. sentiment; (b) revival of the Communist-controlled peace movement
through a Latin American peace conference to be held in Argentina in 1958;
(c) renewed efforts to attack the Organization of American States through a
Communist-controlled conference in defense of culture to coincide with the
next OAS conference; (d) support for the Communist movement in Cuba through
organizing a week of solidarity with the people of Cuba; and. (e) promotion of
the Soviet economic offensive in the region through organizing a Communist-
controlled conference on the regional economy. At the same time, the
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Confederation of Workers of Latin America (CTAL) came in for some criticism,
and ways and means of strengthening or reorganizing the CTRL were discussed.
The chairman of this meeting also requested that the Latin American
Communist parties improve and intensify the coordination of their activities.
Specifically, he requested that a Northern Conference be held to include Commu-
nist parties from Canada to Panama. CP Mexico and CP Cuba were charged with the
organization of this secret regional conference which, it was believed, could
be held in Canada. A secret regional conference of Communist parties in southern
Latin America had been held previously in Brazil.
As the Latin American conference, among others, illustrates, the pre-
paratory work for the plenary meeting of Party representatives was under the
control of the CPSU and the Bloc parties, which in this fashion assumed policy-
making powers. According to the account of Friedrich Ebert, politburo member
of the East German Communist Party (SED), the "sister parties from the capital-
ist countries" (i.e., from the Free World), were only "consulted" at this stage,
even though these discussions centered around the drafting of the Twelve-Party
Declaration, which contains a general directive for the Communist parties in
the Free World.
The meeting of the twelve Communist parties in power was opened by
Khrushchev. Mao Tse-tung was the first speaker on the draft of the Declaration,
which had been prepared jointly by the CPSU and CP China. Walter Ulbricht
closed the debate. The Declaration was adopted unanimously, although Gomulka,
and possibly Kadar, may have had reservations ca language concerning the leading
role of the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia did not attend this meeting. The twelve-
party meeting represented in effect the session of a small but powerful policy-
making executive -- an international Politburo or Presidium.
The meeting of Communist representatives from sixty-five countries
was a plenary session on the order of an international Central Committee. It
met "a few hours after" the conclusion of the twelve-party meeting, "in the
same place." It was again Khrushchev who opened the meeting with a speech
which emphasized that "consolidation and preservation of peace (is) a prin-
cipal task of the present time." Suslov welcomed the meeting briefly.
Allotments of speaking time were reduced to twenty minutes, but not all the
delegates were permitted to speak, while others, such as the French and
Italian delegates made lengthy speeches. Mao Tse-tung talked for two to
three hours, apparently about the internal problems of China.
The meeting centered about the draft of the Peace Manifesto which
according to Ebert had been drawn up "upon the initiative of the CPSU and the
Polish Workers' Party," though Gomulka himself, in a 28 November speech to the
Warsaw Aktiv, claimed exclusive credit for the initiative.
The meeting of representatives of sixty-five countries also discussed
the Declaration "decided upon by the representatives of sister parties of the
socialist countries." Again, there are no indications that it was brought to
a formal vote, but it may be presumed that at least a majority of the Communist
parties of the Free World represented there accepted the Declaration.
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A bulky written report by Suslov had been circulated prior to the
meeting in order to speed up the discussion, and may have been considered by
the earlier twelve party meeting. This report must obviously have been dis-
cussed at the larger meeting also. Available references suggest that it dealt,
among other topics, with an assessment of the strength of the Communist movement
in the Free World. The report appears to have contained some frank admissions
of existing weaknesses and damages sustained. Judging from Ebert's account,
the latter included admissions of "some damages at individual points of the
Communist movement" as a result of the Korean War, the events in Egypt, and
the Hungarian revolt. This admission points to Europe, since the report claimed
that "in Asia and Africa, however, and also in some Latin American countries,
some of the sister parties have considerably grown."
The difficult situation of non-Bloc Communist parties, which was
referred to in the Suslov report, was apparently elaborated upon in speeches
made by representatives of those parties. Ebert stated, "their reports on their
parties' struggle show the full impact of the difficult stand they have ~acin7
the imperialist rulers." Ebert referred particularly to needy Communist parties
in Latin America and the Near and Middle East, and the small European Communist
parties were also considered by Moscow. The result appears to have been an
acknowledgement of the needs of the weak Communist parties of the Free World.
Ebert postulated: "It appears to be a matter of greatest urgency to devote
more attention to the sister parties which are working under such difficult
circumstances and above all to grant them more moral and political help within
the framework of the cooperation of the Communist and workers' parties of all
the world." The implementation of this policy is bound to increase security
problems in many countries in the Free World where Communist parties are out-
lawed or have lost ground.
one of the most important items on the agenda, a subject extensively
discussed, was the problem of the organizational integration of the Communist
movement under the leadership of the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc parties.
The position taken on this subject, and its implication for the CPSU and the
Communist movement as a whole, are worth noting in detail.
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MEETINGS FOR THE CPSU
The pattern for the integration of the Communist movement under CPSU
control was defined as early as 1920 in Article 14 of the "Conditions of
Admission to the Comintern," which stated, "Each Party desirous of affiliating
with the Communist International should be obliged to render every possible
assistance to the Soviet Republics, in their struggle against counter-
revolutionary forces." The Moscow Declaration of the twelve parties provides
a modernized version of this position, taking into account the enlarged area
now under Communist control:
"At bedrock of the relations between the countries of
the world socialist system and all the Communist and
workers' parties lie the principles of Marxism-Leninism,
the principles of proletarian internationalism which
have been tested by life. Truly the vital interests
of the working eo le of all countries call for their
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support of the Soviet Union and all the Socialist coun-
social progress." (Underlining supplied
Within the bloc of Communist-controlled countries, the Soviet Union
continued to be singled out for the leading position. The Twelve-Party Decla-
ration referes-to "the indivisible camp of Socialist countries headed by the
Soviet Union." There are some indications that the Polish party leader,
Wladislaw Gomulka, who has had an aversion for using the term "the Socialist
camp led. . . " or "headed by the Soviet Union," may have objected to this
language of the Declaration. However, Friedrich Ebert, in his report on the
twelve-party meeting, related that Mao Tse-tung defended the assignment of
the leading position to the Soviet Union and its party, on the grounds that
the Soviet Union was powerful, could protect the other Communist countries,
and had, since Stalin's death, improved its working methods. Mao is reported
to have said, "From all this results the leading role of the CPSU in the com-
munity of the Communist and Workers' Parties and the leading role of the Soviet
Union at the head of the states of the Socialist camp."
Aside from its implications for the discipline and effectiveness of
the international Communist movement, the adoption of this position seems
intended to have the effect of strengthening the position of the CPSU within
the Soviet Union. Khrushchev's aim has been to replace the one-man dictator-
ship of Stalin by the dictatorship of the CommunistParty, which is also the
basis of his personal strength. The propagandistic treatment of the November
meetings in the press and radio of the Soviet Union indicates that a stren-
uous effort is being made to "sell" the CPSU and to strengthen its authority
internally on the grounds of the increased international stature and prestige
gained at the November meetings.
At the meeting of the Moscow Party Aktiv (leading Party functionaries)
on 26 November the CPSU Presidium member Furtseva, stressed this point at least
five times. As reported in Evening Moscow of November 27, she contended that
Soviet leadership of the world movement Uis very important to emphasize because
revisionists in certain foreign Communist parties applied much effort to dis-
credit the successes of the Soviet Union, undermine the authority of our
party. . . This is why the position put on paper in the Declaration about the
leading role of the Soviet Union in the family of Socialist countries, about
the need to defend and support the Soviet Union as the first and most powerful
Socialist power, is so important for further strengthening of the whole Commu-
nist movement."
The purported increase in prestige which resulted from the November
meetings was likewise publicized by a number of other leading Soviet figures.
The Soviet writer Korneychuk spoke in this vein at the 2 December plenum of
the Central Committee, CP Ukraine. At the same meeting Soviet Marshal Chuikov
stressed that "Soldiers, non-commissioned officers, officers and generals of
the Okrug are studying the Declaration and Manifesto with a feeling of great
pride in the dear Communist Party. . . ."
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The internationalization of CPSU internal propaganda for the purpose
of raising the prestige and authority of the Party is only one aspect of the
"leading role" of the Soviet state and the CPSU in international Communist
affairs. The other is the commitment inherent in the claim to leadership, i.e.,
to guide, assist, and strengthen Communist parties abroad. The CPSU is now
irrevocably committed to undertake actions which are bound to conflict with the
posture of "peaceful coexistence" and non-interference in the internal affairs
of the Free World countries.
SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CORMUNIST MOVEMENT
As previously noted, the November meetings represented only the
first stage in the organizational integration of the movement. The Declara-
tion stated tersely, "After exchanging views, the participants in the meeting
arrived at the conclusion that in present conditions it is expedient besides
bilateral meetings of leading personnel and exchange of information, to hold,
as the need arises, more representatives' conferences of Communist and workers'
parties to discuss current problems, share experience, study each others' views
and attiJ.;,udes, and concert I.e., coordinate7 action in the joint struggle for
the coniion goals -- peace, democracy and socialism." From the documents issued
by the meetings and from Gomulka's speech of 28 November to the Warsaw Aktiv
and Ebert,'s report to the SED, only a few tentative conclusions can be reached
at thi time concerning the organizational principles and procedures laid down
at the meetings. Among the more iimportant are:
1. Agreement in principle has been reached to the effect that the CPSU, as
head of the international Communist movement, will give due consideration
to the views of Communist parties, especially of those in power. Both
Pao and Gomulka expressed their satisfaction that the CPSU leadership would
behave properly.
2. For the time being, the CPSU is willing to be correct in its dealings with
forei i Communist parties and to foster the impression that "collective
leadership" prevails in international affairs. Furtseva, in her report to
the :Moscow Party Aktiv, emphasized that the documents issued by the meetings
had. been "collectively worked out."
Instead of creating a "central management" (i.e. another Comintern) for the
international Communist Movement, a coordination procedure was adopted.
The main vehicle for coordination will be "conferences of a large number or
even of all Communist and workers' parties." According to reliable data
these meetings will apparently be of two kinds:
a. International or lep nary) meetings of all (or a great majority) of
Communist parties, on the model of the meeting of Communist party
representatives from sixty-five countries, which would be able to pass
decisions binding for all. Such meetings are scheduled to be held at
least once a year. The CPSU will convoke these meetings.
b. regional meetings of Communist parties with common problems. Such
meetings would apparently not have policy making powers and would deal
only with "practical problenl$" on an informal, ad hoc basis. Ulbricht,
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at the November meetings, emphasized the need for regional consulta-
tion and coordination of the anti-NATO campaign within the Bloc. Prior
to the November meetings indications pointed to increasing regional
consultations on the NATO problem between CP France andother European
Communist Parties. Regional consultation meetings between Scandinavian
Communist parties were held twice in 1957. In the future such regional
meetings should increase on the basis of need.
4+. This coordination procedure complements but does not supersede bilateral
relations and meetings. The CPSU, therefore, can, as before, coordinate
directly with those Communist parties which are more subservient or de-
pendent than others.
5. Some constitutional and procedural terms apparently agreed upon in con-
nection with the international (plenary) meetings, would be designed to
provide guarantees for protecting the authority of Communist parties. The
following points emerged from Gomulka's 28 November address: (a) "As a
rule, such conferences must be participated in by Party leaders" (thus
preventig the CPSU from manipulating secondary leaders in order to put
pressure on the top). (b) "The questions to be discussed must be known
in advance to all its participants" (ensuring that national CP leaders
would be able to anticipate and reply to criticism and other pressure).
(c) "The problems existing in the internal policy of each party. . .
cannot be decided by interparty conferences" (although this restriction
is not to apply to the internal problems common to all parties if they
can reach the same views on these problems).
These affirmations suggest that Communist parties will accept plenary
conference decisions as binding only with their consent. The Declaration
itself has already been formally accepted by Central. Committees and party
Aktivs in the Bloc. Outside the Bloc the Declaration has been accepted
by CP France and CP Italy, among others. The significance of these pro-
cedural safeguards remains to be tested by practice, however.
6. The principle of subordinating the interests of Communist parties in capi-
talist countries to the anti-colonial struggle was also discussed, as
illustrated by the debate on the Algerian question. The French represent-
ative, Maurice Duclos, defended, with little success, the CP France position
that the rebellion in Algeria was counterproductive. All Yata, Secretary
General of the Moroccan CP, speaking in behalf of all Arab CPs, objected.
The Syrian delegate appears to have recommended strongly that the interests
of the Communist parties in imperialist home countries, and in France in
particular, be strictly subordinated to the interests of the struggle against
colonialism. This position was supported by the Dutch delegation. In sub-
sequent meetings with CP Morocco, the French CP apparently accepted All Yata's
position and can be expected to render more aid to the Communist-supported
insurgents.
Among the other organizational and procedural questions discussed were
the problem of speeding up and improving content of propaganda about the Bloc in
the Free World in order to increase the appeal of the Communist system, and the
right of the international body to criticize member parties publicly. It is
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likely that the question of organizing illegal CP apparats for the eventual
overthrow of governments came up. There is also good reason to assume that
the CPSU discussed its subsidization of foreign Communist Parties. According
to standard practice some delegates returned with secret funds, as usual in
small U.S. bills. There are also firm indications that even small and politi-
cally insignificant Communist parties were given secret communication channels
with the Communist parties of the Soviet Union and China, and made arrangements
for the training of their leaders in those two countries.
As to the establishment of a permanent headquarters and the publica-
tion of an official organ for the movement, the action taken at the meetings
is not yet fully known. Thus far only the issuance of a "theoretical journal"
for the Communist and workers' parties has been announced as agreed upon.
Contributions to the journal will be submitted on a voluntary basis. As a
preliminary step to issuing the journal a press agency may be set up, proba-
bly in Prague.
Whether there will be a permanent international headquarters organ-
ization is not clearly discernible at this moment. A more permanent organ-
ization is bound to emerge from the pattern of plenary and regional meetings,
if for no other reason than to conduct business between sessions. According
to some reliable sources the CPSU objected to the creation of an international
headquarters organization because it desired to remain the sole organizational
center. If so, the Foreign Section -- or, as it is sometimes called, the
International Department -- of the Central Committee of the CPSU may assume
increasing significance.
The emergence of future regional coordination centers acting on
behalf of the CPSU can be anticipated, although evidence is not yet firm.
It stands to reason that certain Communist parties will assume a more formal
and dominant position in regional affairs because of their strength and ex-
perience and, in certain areas, because of their legal status. (A legal CP
could better control communications than could an illegal CP.)
The Communist Party of China is sure to be one such regional coordi-
nation center. It is known to maintain training courses for Communists from
South Asia and Latin America. The Communist parties of East Germany and
Czechoslovakia will be similarly used by the Soviets. Outside the Bloc it
would be advisable to observe closely CP France (for its activities in Western
Europe), CP Italy (for its activities in the Middle East), CP Finland (in
Scandinavia), CP Mexico, Cuba, and Brazil (in Latin America), CP Indonesia,
and obviously, CP Syria.
A most important trend, however, in the regional pattern will be the
further development of contacts between Communist parties in "capitalist" and
"colonial and semi-dependent" countries. Some Bloc Communist Parties (for
example, those of East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Soviet Armenia)
have shown great interest in international problems and may channel their support
through Communist parties outside the bloc. As for the CPSU, its increased
activity in the field of international coordination has become apparent. A large
delegation composed of CPSU propaganda specialists was sent to Italy, and a top
Soviet trade union organizer was dispatched to Cairo in January 1958.
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TACTICAL PROGRAM FOR FREE WORLD PENETRATION
In line with previous estimates by the Soviets, the Declaration re-
flects the view that opportunities exist particularly in "colonial and dependent"
countries (i.e., in the underdeveloped areas), whereas "relatively good economic
activity" in a number of "capitalist countries" (i.e., industrialized areas)
reduces the effectiveness of Communist leverage there for the time being.
In order to increase the opportunities the Declaration puts in the
center of Communist tactics the exploitation of a threat which, it alleges,
derives from "the presence of military danger created by imperialism, and
primarily by the imperialism of the United States of America, which has now
become the center of international reaction." By fanning war hysteria and anti -
Americanism the Communist movement will seek to mount increasing political and
other pressures on the local governments and political structures. The exploi-
tation of this issue could, in the Communist estimate, effect a change in the
balance of power in the country in which the party is operating, and therefore,
internationally.
The operational method selected for this purpose is the promotion
of united front on the broadest possible basis. "The Peace Manifesto clearly
defines the position of Communist and workers' parties, which consists of
offering su ort to every step taken by a state a party, an organization,
a movement, or an individual for the preservation of peace and against warms
for peaceful coexistence, for the establishment of collective security in
Europe and Asia, for reduction of armaments, and for banning the use of
atomic weapons and the carrying out of atomic tests." This position permits
and demands manipulation not only of "left" political groups but also, and
in some areas preponderantly, of "right" and nationalist forces.
This tactic of building up pressure in the Free World is, of course,'
not a new one. In the postwar period such attempts were intensified, partic-
ularly in periods when the Soviet expansion drive was frustrated. The Comin-
form-endorsed tactic of direct assault was adopted following the loss of
goodwill which the Soviet Union and Communist parties had accumulated during
World War II in many countries. When the aggression in Korea was halted, the
Cominform tactic of direct assault was transformed into the tactic of the United
National Front which closely corresponded to the current line, inasmuch as it
was also based on marshalling all anti-American forces on a minimum platform.
The current action line stems mainly from the frustrations suffered by the
Bloc as a result of internal pressures developing after the 20th Congress and
in the wake of the Hungarian revolt.
The fact that this action line is being re-emphasized indicates that
internal pressures are still operating in the Bloc. The emphasis of the Decla-
ration on the need for strict conformism with orthodox Communism and on the
priority of the need for combatting revisionism strengthens this impression.
Not for internal reasons alone, however, does the Soviet Union resort
to this artifice of the "war threat" --J itself a paradox in a period when the
"world system of socialism" proclaims superiority. This device also permits
the Bloc to provoke the U.S. and its allies into positions which can then be
"exposed" as proof of the thesis. For example, the Bloc can place the onus on
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the U.S. and its allies for failure to negotiate on Soviet terms; it can maintain
a climate of political pressure on Free World nations, and especially on under-
developed countries to alienate them further from the more developed and stronger
Free World ccountries. It can also make use even of the paradox implicit in the
war threat device, by alternately emphasizing the war threat and the peaceful
posture of the Soviet Union and the bloc.
As an artifice, the "war threat" issue is in constant need of arti-
ficial stimulation. It is probable that the Communist leaders assembled in
November were xposed to fabricated or distorted evidence of alleged ""imper-
ialist plots." Since the events in Hungary in 1956, Bloc and Communist media
in the Free World have used this tactic in order to keep their followers prop-
erly agitated about the alleged "threat of war."
As an operative directive, the war threat as the central issue for
the United Front tactic is a signal for intensified disruptive action in the
Free World. This signal appeared previously in the August 1957 (#12) issue
of Korrnnunist in an article by Ponomarev, and was apparent in the "Theses"
issued in September by the Central Committee of the CPSU on the 0th Anniver-
sary of the October Revolution.
For "colonial and dependent" countries the Declaration prescribes
a united anti-imperialist and anti-feudal front exploiting peasant unrest and
the grievances of the middle class, as well as aspirations of "patriotic demo-
cratic forces." That the Declaration calls for increasing pressure emerges
from its position on neutralist governments of underdeveloped countries ---
the "zone of peace." It defines as "the peace-loving countries of Asia and
Africa" those"taking an anti-imperialist stand and forming together with the
Socialist countries, a broad peace zone." In this definition there is no
longer, as there had been in the Khrushchev statement to the 20th CPSU Congress,
any reference to "peace-loving European states." More important, the "anti-
imperialist stand" is emphasized as the chief criterion. "Non participation
in blocs" is no longer mentioned as a chief characteristic of a neutralist
country. This language suggests that the Soviet Union now requires a closer
alignment on the part of neutralist governments prior to considering them as
useful adjuncts to its foreign policy aims. Local Communist parties may
therefore exert greater pressure on their governments to force their align-
ment, or to bring them down.
Pressure on the more developed capitalist countries can also be
expected to mount. This is indicated in the Declaration by the call for
attacks on the "big monopoly" groups -- the traditional signal for intensi-
fication of infiltration and unrest in labor and other fields.
For those "capitalist" countries which are closely allied with the
U.S., the Declaration also prescribes the foundation of a broad united front,
based on unity of the working class (i.e., united action with Socialists) in
order eventually to "overthrow the rule of the monopolies who betray national
interests." The Democratic Socialists, particularly in the Far East, remain
a key target for the united front attack.
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The 40th Anniversary Theses flatly declared that without a Communist-
Socialist united front "the working class cannot win power." The Declaration,
however, is not so strongly worded and emphasizes the incompatibility of (Demo-
cratic) Socialist and Communist doctrine. It is entirely possible that Khrushchev
and the CPSU considered that opportunities exist for a "united front from above,"
i.e., agreement with Socialist leadership, whereas leaders of Communist parties
abroad, especially those from Europe, pointed to the practical difficulties
involved. The Declaration suggests that the tactic of the "united front from
below" (i.e., infiltration and splitting of the rank and file from the Socialist
leaders) has been agreed upon as the most practical one, especially in Western
Europe.
The Declaration also makes perfectly clear --- clearer, perhaps,
than the 20th CPSU Congress --- that the purpose of the united front tactic
is the gaining of state power. Reviving Dimitrov's formulae of the 7th (Comin-
tern) World Congress, it permits a variety of "transitional forms" to this end
i.e., a "popular front" based on "a united working class" (unity with the
Socialists), or "other workable forms of agreement and political cooperation
between the different parties and public organizations." The latter formula
obviously pertains to situations such as in Egypt, Syria, Indonesia or any other
country where political fermentation is spearheaded by nationalist ("anti-
imperialist") forces. It is a formula which permits Communist parties in the
Bloc or the Free World, as well as the Soviet espionage services engaging in
covert political action operations, to suggest and make deals with any indi-
vidual or opposition group which could weaken a government unfriendly to or
insufficiently committed to the Soviet Union.
The Declaration restricts the "parliamentary road to Socialism"
to "a number of capitalist countries," and postulates that a Communist
majority in a parliament must be employed so as to"smash the resistance of
the reactionary forces and create the necessary conditions for peaceful
realization of the Socialist revolution." In case of resistance to this
scheme, the Declaration warns, "the possibility of non-peaceful transition
to Socialism should be borne in mind." The intensification of the united
front pressures in the Free World will, of course, vary from country to
country.
Generally, however, Communist parties in Free World countries will,
for the time being, pose as "defenders of peace and constitution," as "pa-
triots" interested only in reforms, and as nationalists who are more nation-
alistic than non-Communist nationalists. Under such cover Communist parties
can be expected to build up their potential for subversion and disruption.
Undoubtedly one of the reasons the proceedings of the November
meetings have not been made public is an operational one. The meetings
evidently succeeded in establishing a preliminary program and a procedure
for the tactical integration of the Communist movement. The programmatic
statement issued in the Declaration shows that the CPSU considers that oppor-
tunities for increasingly aggressive action have improved since last year and
that, given increased discipline and unity, these opportunities can be ex-
ploited. Publication of the proceedings would be certain to reveal that
international Communism, in concert with the Bloc, has been called upon to mount
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a political offensive, and would expose the Peace Manifesto signed by the Com-
munist parties from 65 countries as propaganda. The true significance of the
Peace Manifesto lies in the simple fact that communist parties have been in-
structed to act more independently of the international Communist front group,
the World Peace Council, and that the latter organization, criticized at the
meetings, is in for overhauling. The current flurry of Soviet notes and letters
illustrates the intensification of the "peace" campaign which can be expected
from all Communist parties.
The November meetings of Communist leaders in Moscow perpetuated
and generalized the hardened and bolder line of the CPSU and Soviet foreign
policy which has been characteristic of the period following Khrushchev's
victory in the June Plenum of the Central Committee. They resulted in a first
step toward increased organizational unity within the international Communist
movement.
Various intra-bloc conferences, held after the November meetings, in
the field of ideology, science, and particularly, long-range economic planning
indicate the determination with which the CPSU pursues its objective of in-
creasing cohesion in the Bloc.
Whether the current tactical line of the world Communist movement
will be maintained depends, of course, on its success, particularly on the
ability of the Soviet Party and government leaders to dramatize convincingly
their claims for the total superiority of the Soviet system on the basis of
partial successes in the field of rocketry, and to play up at the same time
their allegations of a war threat to such an extent that masses of people will
be activated to join the Communist movement in one way or another.
Mao's long speech at the plenary session was organized around the
war threat and the superiority of the Bloc. He contended that the imperialist
powers were moving toward atomic wary and called upon the Communist delegates
to do their utmost to disaxm the Free World completely. Khrushchev in confi-
dential discussions with foreign CP leaders in Moscow, also appears to have
imbued them with a fighting optimism.
Whether or not Khrushchev and Mao divulged their true estimates of
the strength of the Bloc to the international Communist leadership cannot be
ascertained. In any case their talks were clearly designed to strengthen
Communist morale and to inspire action designed to create serious trouble in
the Free World.
For the moment the official Soviet prognosis is extremely optimistic.
The Soviet writer and Khrushchev protege, Korneychuk, addressing the plenary
session of the Central Committee of the Ukranian Communist Party on 2 December,
spoke of the great increase in the prestige of the Soviet Union abroad "since
our country launched the artificial earth satellite," and made the claim that
"new hundreds of millions of people" would be "organized around the invincible
banner of peace." His statement clearly indicates an expectation that the
Communist movement, in stirring up the fear of war, can ride in on the coat-
tails of increasing Soviet prestige.
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The year 1958 should provide the Soviets with a series of tests.
An intensive and apparently well coordinated action program of communist front
organizations is unfolding. Its main targets are in Asia, Africa, the Middle
East and Latin America. The Permanent Council and Secretariat, left behind by
the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in Cairo, is to breathe new life into,
and expand the chain of local Afro-Asian Solidarity committees and energize
Afro-Asian youth, labor and women fronts. The World Federation of Democratic
Youth has announced that it will concentrate on Arab youth. The International
Union of Students will attempt to revitalize its activities looking toward the
holding of its fifth Congress in Peking in September. The Communist-controlled
International Federation of Democratic Women has convoked its fourth Congress
for June, in Vienna. The World Peace Assembly scheduled for mid-1958 (and
sponsored by the Communist-front World Peace Council) will be preceded by
strenuous efforts to enlist a great number of new faces.
The next plenary meeting of the international Communist leadership
may well be held under the cover of one or the other of these major front
gatherings, possibly the World Peace Assembly. On such an occasion the Soviets
may be expected to carry out a general review of their tactics -- and possibly
to revise their estimates.
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