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December 9, 2016
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September 23, 1998
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PDF icon CIA-RDP78-00915R000900030086-5.pdf297.95 KB
Approved For Release 2001/07/28 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000900030086-5 SECRET Nrgi111 t Asia the CP's are desirous enc. and are presently upon overt political action to gain broader of militancy has corresponded undeviatingly tactic. Terrorism and sabotage were corn- area and in several SEA countries there were s outbreaks of Communist paramilitary action 948-1951 when the CPSU line required such action. sabotage and violence continued but with modi- ft with a Cominform reminder to follow the Communist revolutionists. Sabotage and equendy, for the most part, restricted to gets and to collaborators of the imperialists-- d security forces. Efforts were made to win port among nationalist groups. Afte the Soviet call for use of the united front tactics as rarely amplored by the Asiatic parties (except in ya, Vietnam) and from early 1954 to 1957 there was parture from use of peaceful, united front political 957 the Soviet tactic was modified again and called Led but disciplined use of militancy. r future Communists of the Asian Tree World countries will be alert to exploit every issue possible to advance their poLitical aims and influence; they will stage demonstrations and other manifestations of protest which appear to support workers' or nationalists' interests and they will probably carry out frequent strike action; in most cases (except in areas where a disturbed political situation already exists, as in Indonesia for example) CP's will refrain from violence which will invite police repression or cause loss of support. In colonial and former colonial area. aggression of a more extreme form is always possible in view Of the fact the Communists in these areas must exploit to the ettniost every occasion to further nationalist goals. __Aka Approved For Release 2001/07/28 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000900030086-5 25X1 X7 Approved For Release 2001/07/28 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000900030086-5 \ CA In 1954 and 1956 there were two reports at continent-wide plans existed for Communist sabot,age in Latin America to be under- taken in the event of an international conflict. One of these reports originated in Argentina and the other in Chile both are unconfirmede tIRMIRMltelieved that the CP was Instigating re. ro sabotage early 6 and that the Party was using foreign ? as Saboteurs. According to unconftrmed reports from Bolivia weekly meetings were being hold in September 1957 to teach leaders of CP Bolivia in university circles how to make "Molotov cocktail" bombs. ailway sabotage was extensive In certain areas of Brasil in 1004951 and in most instances Communists were found to be vp.nstble. In 1951,there was violent strike action in Sao Paulo as as a Communist attack on an arms and an ammunitions factory In that city. Serious damage was done to oil pipelines in the dock area at Santos, Brasil. in January 1957. *Grans to an unconfirmed report the Social Action Com p of Libersle and Communists in Colombia, was plan 6 to train sabotage team to work against the government. o of the principal lawyers of the Partido Socialists Popular et) was arrested in October 1954 on charges of pas made bomb and Communist propaganda and of impede elections. One Cuban Communist youth orted to have received training in sabotage in C ?" 0 but this report also was never confirmed. any has succeeded occasionally in stirring up *testing the showing of anti-Soviet films, exploiting ices or celebrating Communist holidays. Industrial form of slowdowns and frequent strike action was 1957. The CP Uruguay had organized strong-sue squads hese groups in November 1W? to protect Soviet instal** ie. during the 7 November celebrations. The groups 11 being used in one industrial area in late November to break certain other political parties. /n1952 in Venezuela Approved For Release 2001/07/28 : CI 915R000900030086-5 Approved For Release 2001/07/28: CIA-RDP78-00915R000900030086-5 eiCa0.914-. the e were two cases of industrial sabotage but there was no proof of Coratrturdst Party involvement. An unconfirmed report stated that if an uprising had taken place in Caracas against the assumption of the Presidency by Colonel Marcos PfallEZ Arnenez, Communists Nvould have collaborated with the .A.ccion Democratic& in sabotage action. In Guatemala in July 1956 there were several attempts to blow up railvaiy tracks and a tunnel, but there was no proof that Corrtrau- tdsts were responsible. As of 1rebruary 1957 the Guatemalan COM rountot Party's policy was "against recourse to coup and terrorism" but to instigate partial strikes wherever necessary, protest demon- strations, rallies and assemblies "to the extent possible without committing provocations and without offering a target." In s tarnary, while there are reports indicating that in several area. the Communist parties of Latin America are maldng prepara- tion, for more aggressive strike action as wall as for eventual tags and other forms of violence to be used in the event of an rnattonal conflict, it does not appear that terrorism and sabotage employed in most areas in the near future. Since many Latin countries are still considered by Communists to be nature, if not in political status, every incident or local grievance probably will be the occasion for the staging of protests and demonstrations in order to further nationalist and leftist aims. In most instances, however, demonstrations probably will be con- tained in order not to provoke police repression. SEMI Approved For Release 2001/07/28: CIA-RDP78-00915R000900030086-5