ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-00915R000900030086-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 23, 1998
• Sequence Number: 86
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2001/07/28 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000900030086-5
SECRET Nrgi111
t Asia the CP's are desirous
enc. and are presently
upon overt political action to gain broader
of militancy has corresponded undeviatingly
tactic. Terrorism and sabotage were corn-
area and in several SEA countries there were
s outbreaks of Communist paramilitary action
948-1951 when the CPSU line required such action.
sabotage and violence continued but with modi-
ft with a Cominform reminder to follow the
Communist revolutionists. Sabotage and
equendy, for the most part, restricted to
gets and to collaborators of the imperialists--
d security forces. Efforts were made to win
port among nationalist groups.
Afte
the Soviet call for use of the united front tactics
as rarely amplored by the Asiatic parties (except in
ya, Vietnam) and from early 1954 to 1957 there was
parture from use of peaceful, united front political
957 the Soviet tactic was modified again and called
Led but disciplined use of militancy.
r future Communists of the Asian Tree World
countries will be alert to exploit every issue possible to advance
their poLitical aims and influence; they will stage demonstrations
and other manifestations of protest which appear to support
workers' or nationalists' interests and they will probably carry
out frequent strike action; in most cases (except in areas where
a disturbed political situation already exists, as in Indonesia
for example) CP's will refrain from violence which will invite
police repression or cause loss of support. In colonial and
former colonial area. aggression of a more extreme form is
always possible in view Of the fact the Communists in these
areas must exploit to the ettniost every occasion to further
nationalist goals.
__Aka
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\
CA
In 1954 and 1956 there were two reports at continent-wide
plans existed for Communist sabot,age in Latin America to be under-
taken in the event of an international conflict. One of these reports
originated in Argentina and the other in Chile both are unconfirmede
tIRMIRMltelieved that the CP was Instigating
re. ro sabotage early 6 and that the Party was using foreign
? as Saboteurs. According to unconftrmed reports from Bolivia
weekly meetings were being hold in September 1957 to teach leaders
of CP Bolivia in university circles how to make "Molotov cocktail"
bombs.
ailway sabotage was extensive In certain areas of Brasil in
1004951 and in most instances Communists were found to be
vp.nstble. In 1951,there was violent strike action in Sao Paulo as
as a Communist attack on an arms and an ammunitions factory
In that city. Serious damage was done to oil pipelines in the dock
area at Santos, Brasil. in January 1957.
*Grans to an unconfirmed report the Social Action Com
p of Libersle and Communists in Colombia, was plan
6 to train sabotage team to work against the government.
o of the principal lawyers of the Partido Socialists Popular
et) was arrested in October 1954 on charges of pas
made bomb and Communist propaganda and of
impede elections. One Cuban Communist youth
orted to have received training in sabotage in C ?"
0 but this report also was never confirmed.
any has succeeded occasionally in stirring up
*testing the showing of anti-Soviet films, exploiting
ices or celebrating Communist holidays. Industrial
form of slowdowns and frequent strike action was
1957. The CP Uruguay had organized strong-sue squads
hese groups in November 1W? to protect Soviet instal**
ie. during the 7 November celebrations. The groups
11 being used in one industrial area in late November to break
certain other political parties. /n1952 in Venezuela
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eiCa0.914-.
the e were two cases of industrial sabotage but there was no proof
of Coratrturdst Party involvement. An unconfirmed report stated
that if an uprising had taken place in Caracas against the assumption
of the Presidency by Colonel Marcos PfallEZ Arnenez, Communists
Nvould have collaborated with the .A.ccion Democratic& in sabotage
action.
In Guatemala in July 1956 there were several attempts to blow
up railvaiy tracks and a tunnel, but there was no proof that Corrtrau-
tdsts were responsible. As of 1rebruary 1957 the Guatemalan COM
rountot Party's policy was "against recourse to coup and terrorism"
but to instigate partial strikes wherever necessary, protest demon-
strations, rallies and assemblies "to the extent possible without
committing provocations and without offering a target."
In s tarnary, while there are reports indicating that in several
area. the Communist parties of Latin America are maldng prepara-
tion, for more aggressive strike action as wall as for eventual
tags and other forms of violence to be used in the event of an
rnattonal conflict, it does not appear that terrorism and sabotage
employed in most areas in the near future. Since many Latin
countries are still considered by Communists to be
nature, if not in political status, every incident or local
grievance probably will be the occasion for the staging of protests
and demonstrations in order to further nationalist and leftist aims.
In most instances, however, demonstrations probably will be con-
tained in order not to provoke police repression.
SEMI
Approved For Release 2001/07/28: CIA-RDP78-00915R000900030086-5