BELGIUM I. STATUS AND STRENGTH OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-00915R000900030088-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 23, 1998
• Sequence Number: 88
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2001/07/28 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000900030088-3
eugth of
M.
~n CPts estin-mted memberebip is U, 000. The Paarty
4,108 votea (3.57%) in the last nationsl parliamentary
1954. The industrial and mining areas of Liege
provinces remain the centers of Party strength. Marne
4d locals with an a stixmat ed strength, of not more
000 ea st in the Socialist labor organization, particularly
ervlce workers, dockers in Antwerp, metal workers,
. Presum ly, in common with most
e st, the Belgian C p is equipped with organized militant
cups which could be activated upon short notice.
on wit
Terrorism, etc.
'T'here to no evidence that Belgian Communists have been or are
being trained in sabotage, terrorism, etc. within Belgiu=ar.
There is no -evidence that Belgian Communists are being trained
in Communist bloc countries for future sabotage action sponsored by
the Belgian
CP .
i . SabotaIse 'arge:ts
US and or US Allies Personnel installations
No available information shows Communist sabotage directed
rkers. The two Communist unions for stone
ers were estimated to total not more than 1,500
information available about Party units responsible
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against U S. personnel or installations in Belgium.
b. Other Sabotage Targets: Widespread Strike Action Causin
Belgian Communists fell into line with the CPSU/Cominform
call for use of aggressive tactics and engaged in more militant
m in early 1948. Coal minors and other workers were
t for higher wages which were apparently Justified and
nists exploited their grievances by urging the spread and
continuation of strikes while non-Communist trade union leaders
were trying to persuade miners to go back to work pending nego-
tiations with the government. S groups of Communist agita-
going from pit to pit, urged walk-outs. On 12 February a
Social Democrat trade union leader was beaten up by Communists.
ry 1948 the strikes spread to several gas and
electricity plaits where Communist-led unions refused to withdraw
strike orders issued the previous day. Having no power, many
factories were forced to close.
16 February thousands of miners went back to work but
Conumnists were trying to provoke a strike among streetcar
employees, and prepared for a general strike to take place on
bruary. Leaflets distributed in industrial regions read:
ask (the Premier) means Misery" and "Marshall Plan means
Unemployment." Agitators were able to get about 800 streetcar
workers out of a total of Z, 500 to strike.
There is no evidence of Soviet direction or support of specific
Belgian CP sabotage or violent action, other than the fact that the
Belgian C? initiated such action after .' ahdanov's call for greater
use of militancy at the Founding Conference of the Cominform in
September 1947.
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the Belgian CP's very small membership sabotage
olent action would probably be initiated (as in the past)
only in response to a Soviet global requirement. In view of the
centers of Party strength, and in view of the events of lg4W, it is
probable that most vulnerable areas are certain mining and industrial
*"*a (Liege and Hainaut), come public transport systems,
Antwerp dock areas and some segments of the metallurgical industry.
Approved For Release 2001/07/28 : CIA- vl i.. ' 000900030088-3