SOVIET USE OF INTERNATIONAL FRONT ORGANIZATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-00915R000900070002-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 13, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For lease 2001/11/01 : CIA-
P78-0091 5R0000900070002-3
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SOVIET USE OF INTERNATIONAL FRONT ORGANIZATIONS
1. From the Soviet point cf view, the international Communist
fronts serve three basic purposes:
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a. Kfamake possible unity of action with ncn-C m hem
elements in order to exol)it current issues and influence
,public opinion.
b. They provide vehicles through which national Communist
parties can extend their local influence and receive
mat-eerial and organizational assistance and propaganda
lines from the Soviet bloc and other Communist parties.
c. They provide a suitable environment for the cultivation,
recruitment, and covert exploitation of agent personnel
for both intelligence and political action purposes.
2. Since late 1957, in particular sine November of that year, the
international fronts appear to have four specific functions in support
of current Communist strategy:
a. To contribute, through unity-of-action campaigns in connection
with the "struggle for peace", to the extab'lishment of
Communist influence over Socialist groups thrnughbut the
world.
b. To generate in all strata of societ.' in the West opposition
to the strengthening of Western unity and to the nuclear
deterrent strategy.
Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP78r00915_R000900070002-3
 Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000900070002-3
c. At the regional level particularly in the Afro-Asian and
Latin American areas), to serve as the instruments through
which Communist; influence can infiltrate and manipulate
national liberation and anti-Western forces, in order to
induce local &overnments, especially in the independent
countries, to shift from neutralism to a breaking of political
and economic ties with the West, and to accept Soviet
connections in their place.
d. To provide national Counist parties in the !fro-Asian and
Latin American ar?eas,and the specialized trade union (WFTU)
and youth (IAFDY-IUS) front affiliates, with coordinated programs
of action and support. The Fen rating of riots, demonstrations
and violent clashes directed against
pro-Western governments or local elements currently identified
withthe West a ,:pears to be a recorn.mended tactic.
.. dnring 1956-57 the fronts appeared willing to make major coneessiona
to non-Communist :xnd even anti-Cornmun` st groups in order to achieve at
leas. contact with lead'ng represenatives and active woikers, but there
is now evidence of a hardening of attitudes and an insistence upon certain
minimal requirements ~ for the unity
gatherings; acfpane of Chinese Communist pa-t.icipation, or
inclusion of certain organizations in which Communist influence is
substantial. In the preparations for the 7th World Youth Festival to
be held in 1959, the Bloc student and youth groups are less generous with
exonom.ic aid to national delegations.
Approved For Release 2001/11/01 Cif- 8;: ,9~ 15R000900070002-3