PROSPECT OF COMMUNIST EXPLOITATION OF THE POLITICAL CRISIS IN BURMA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-00915R000900110004-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 2, 1998
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: July 7, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

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PROSPECT OF COMMUNIST EXPLOITATION
OF THE POLITICAL CRISIS IN BURMA
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CON
PROSPECT OF COMMUNIST EXPLOITATION
OF THE POLITICAL CRISIS IN BURMA
I, Introduction
The struggle for power in Burma between the factions of the
ruling AFPFL coalition may be lost by either of the rivals, but there
will be only one real winner, the Communists. Prime Minister U
Nu's narrow victory over the Kyaw Nyein-Ba Swe group in the June
9 vote in the Chamber of Deputies was made possible only by the
votes of the 42 deputies of the National, United Front (NUF), the
Communist-dominated opposition front. It is hardly to be believed
that this Communist support would have been given unless the NUF
expected to benefit in some way from a Nu victory. It is true that
Nu has denied making any deal with the NUF and has announced his
intention of ''disowning" NUF support in future elections, but he
may discover, as have other non-Communist political leaders who
have attempted to "use" Communist support for their own purposes,
that it is easier to get into an alliance with the Communists than it
is to get out of it again.
One of the most disturbing things about the present course of
events in Burma is the extent to which. they seem to be following a
pattern which we have already seen in other Southeast Asian countries
in which Communism has made significant gains. In Indonesia,
President Sukarno has relied. upon Communist support to maintain
his position against increasing opposition from other non-Communist
elements. He has thus further estranged himself from these non-
Communist groups and finds himself increasingly dependent upon
Communist support and upon the pro-Communist advisers who sur-
round him, In alliance with the popular Sukarno, the Communist
Party of Indonesia has won great support among the Indonesian
people and. a Communist electoral victory in Indonesia in the not
too distant future is, as it stands now, not inconceivable. It is a
cause of real concern for the future of Burma that U N.u, as a con-
sequence of his rivalry with other non-Communist leaders, should
be turning in the same direction that Sukarno did and exposing him-
self and Burma to the same dangers.
CONTIAL
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NTIAL
II. Background of the Political Crisis in Burma
The Anti-Fascist People?s Freedom League (AFPFL) which
took power, in Burma as the successor to the British, was com-
posed, after the expulsion of the Communists in 1947, of the Burma
Socialist Party (BSP) and a group of non-party "independents" among
whom U Nu was the principal figure. U Nu served as prime minis-
ter of the coalition government, but the BSP filled most of the
cabinet posts. This coalition has governed Burma since independence
and has not faced serious opposition, at the polls. It won the general
elections in 195], and 1956 by substantial majorities. A combination
of BSP organization, Nu?s wide popularity in the country and the
absence of an effective opposition until recently have contributed to
the AFPFL political dominance.
Strains developed within the coalition, due partly to personal
rivalries and partly to BSP resentment of Nuts free-wheeling
methods which often ignored party and government channels,
particularly in the conduct of foreign policy. Nu also sometimes
adopted a more sympathetic attitude towards the Communist bloc
than was agreeable, at least to the more conservative faction of
the BSP led by Kyaw Nyein.
The strains were kept under control due to the need to present
a front of AFPFL unity to the country and to the BSP need for the
support of Nuts popularity and Nu's need for the services of BSP
ministers in the cabinet. However, following the election of April
1956 the struggle came into the open. Under BSP pressure Nu
resigned the premiership and was succeeded by Socialist U Ba Swe,
although it was generally felt that Kyaw Nyein was principally
responsible for forcing the issue. At least Nu?s resentment was
chiefly focused on Kyaw Nyein.
On stepping down, Nu agreed to return to office in one year '
"if he was needed". He seems, immediately to have begun prepara-
tions for a return to power. In March 1957, Nu made his bid for
a return to office. The BSP did not feel ready for a test of strength
and acquiesced. An important factor in the BSP's acquiescence
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was the fear that Nu might turn to the legal opposition National
Unity Front (NUF), a Communist-dominated coalition which in
the 1956 elections had won some 50 seats in the Chamber of
Deputies. The leftist alliance might have threatened AFPFL
control of the government, and the BSP, for the time being at
any rate, elected to place AFPFL unity above its desire to keep
Nu out of office.
This uneasy. coalition, however, could not last. In early
1958 the struggle broke into the open again over the secretaryship
of the AFPFL., currently held by Kyaw Dun, a Nu adherent. Un-
able or unwilling to reconcile differences, the two factions agreed
to a showdown. The issue was twofold: Which faction was to continue
under the AFPFL name and control the assets of the coalition,
presumably including the mass organizations of peasants and labor?
And which was to continue in control of the government?
The issue might have been decided in the Supreme Council of
the AFPFL itself, but for a variety of reasons, both parties agreed
to put it to the test in the Chamber of Deputies on the basis of a
no-confidence motion against Nu's government, The motion was
tabled by Ba Swe do 5 June and the vote taken on g June. U Nu won
a precarious victory by 4 vote, according to press reports, of
127 to 119. This narrow majority included, presumably, the 42
votes of the NUF, the 6 votes of the Arakan National Union Organi-
zation led by U Kyaw Min who has been rewarded with the Finance
Ministry in Nu?s new cabinet, and a majority of the votes of the
minority groups. Apparently, then, within the AFPFL organization
itself, as distinct from the governmental structure, Kyaw Nyein
and B a Swe had a majority.
III, Possible Future Developments
Whether Nu elects to attempt to govern with the present
Parliament and a majority of a few votes or to dissolve Parlia-
ment and hold new elections, he is likely to find himself depen-
dent, to a greater or lesser degree, upon the continued support
of the NUF. It is true that the new cabinet includes no members
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of the NUF. Nevertheless, whether in the government or not, the
solid NUF bloc in the Chamber will still be in a position to exercise
a decisive Influence upon the policies of the government.
In a new election, an alliance between the NUF and U Nu
would almost certainly win a decisive victory. The personal popu-
larity of U Nu throughout the country has always been one of the
principal assets of the AFPFL and it will not be forgotten that in
1956 the NUF, even though then opposed by Nu, succeeded in. winning
almost 40 percent of the total popular vote although it entered can-
didates in only approximately half of the total number of election
districts.
Nu has already disclaimed any intention of making such an
electoral alliance, but his victory in Parliament with NUF support
has undoubtedly identified him sufficiently with the NUF in the popu-
lar mind that the NUF will be able to capitalize on his popularity
even in the absence of a formal alliance. The result might well
be three more or less evenly balanced groups in a new Parliament
the NUF, the Nu faction, and the Kyaw Nyein faction. In this event,
Nu would be even more dependent upon the support of the NUF if he
wished to continue as head of a new government. Neither be nor the
NUF might, in these circumstances, feel still bound by earlier
commitments that no NUF members were to be included in the
cabinet.
IV. The Nature of a Nu/NUF Government
As noted above, the cabinet formed by U Nu immediately
following his parliamentary victory over Kyaw Nyein does not in-
clude any NTJF members. After an election in which the NUF had
made significant gains Nu might find it impossible to avoid taking
them into the government. Even if he did not care to take the risk
of an unfavorable public reaction by including members of the Burma
Workers (Communist) Party which leads the NUF, there are pro-
Communist splinter parties in the NUF whose opportunistic leaders
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such as Aung Than could be appointed. The in Pe Myint, Communist
intellectual, would also be available, as would left-wing Socialists
such as Thaki.n Tin (now in the cabinet) and former Socialists such
as Bo Letya who has maintained contact with the insurgent BCP. A
pro-Communist cabinet might thus be created which would serve
the purposes of the NUF without including any avowed Communists.
This is much the way In which the Indonesian Communist Party has
worked to establish its influence in the government and around
Sukarno without, as yet, seeking actual participation in the govern-
ment by Party members.
The Mass Organizations Under a Nu/NUF Coalition
Much of the AFPFL, strength has been derived from its
mass organizations, particularly the All-Burma Peasant Organi-
zation (ABPO) and the Trade. Union Congress (Burma) (TUG (B)).
These organizations have benefited greatly from the fact that they
have enjoyed government support. Government loans to peasants,
for instance, have been channeled through the ABPO, providing a
s.trong inducement to peasa_-its to be members in good standing.
Should. the control of such patronage plums pass into the hands of
a pro.-Communist government, the anti-Communist orientation
of the ABPO and the TUG (3) might suffer a rapid change. Several
member unions of the Ba Swe-controlled TUC (B) have already de-
fected to U Nuts group. The approaches of the Communist-con-
trolled peasant and labor organizations looking towards workers
unity and merger would probably receive a more sympathetic
hearing than in the past. It will not be forgotten that control of
mass. organizations has been a major source of strength to the PKI.
The Armed Forces. Under a Nu/NUF Coalition
The PKI benefited by its infiltration of the Indonesian armed
forces, which was largely effected while pro-Communist Iwa Kusa-
mansumantri occupied the Ministry of Defense. It is not difficult
to foresee a similar process taking place in Burma. With a 'Leftist
or pro-Communist replacing U Ba Swe as Minister of Defense, a
weeding out of anti-Communist officers could be begun. Communist
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sympathizer General Kyaw Zaw might even be brought back from
his enforced retirement to succeed Ne Win as Commander--in-Chief.
The Burmese Armed Forces.,. like the police, have s.o far
remained aloof from the crisis, although their sympathies are
probably with Kyaw Nyein and Ba Swe. Whether they would, or
could, take action in any situation short of an open Communist
takeover is questionable, although this might be the last resort of
the anti-Communist faction after political. defeat, General Ne Win
and the Burma Army might find themselves in the same sort of
dilemma, as that facing anti-Communist General Nasution of Indonesia.
Policy of a Nu/NUF Government
The NUF has not, in the last year or two, taken sharp issue
with. the general outlines of Government of the Union of Burma (GUB)
policies. In the domestic field, NUF fire has been concentrated
upon the GUB refusal to deal with the Communist insurgents and
its continued military effort to stamp out the insurrection. In foreign
relations, the NUF has in general approved the neutralist policies
of the GUB, although voicing strong opposition on occasions when the
GUB has diverged from the Communist line such as the Burmese
protest against Soviet actions, in Hungary. The NUF has also opposed
GUB statements and measures against subversive activities of the
Communist bloc in Burma.
A Nu-NUF government, dependent upon NUF votes to remain
in power, would almost inevitably be driven closer to the NUF position
on all these issues. It is most unlikely, for instance, that the Bur-
mese protest and U. N. vote on the Hungarian question would have
taken place if such a leftist coalition had been in power. GUB measures
against illegal Chinese immigration, against subversive activities of
the Bank of China, etc. , could scarcely have been undertaken by such
a government.
As for the vital domestic issue of negotiation with the insur-
gents and legalization of the BCP, it would not be reasonable to
expect a government, including NUF elements who have always
CONFI13
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strongly advocated a settlement on BCP terms, to maintain the firm
opposition to such a deal which has characterized the present GUB.
It would probably be inevitable that such a government would enter
on the path of negotiation and compromise with Communist insur-
gents which the Royal Laotian Government has already followed
with such disturbing results.
Not only would a Nu-NUF coalition bel pressured in this direction
by its NUF elements, but there is some reason to believe that Nu him-
self has a softer attitude on these issues than the present GUB where
Kyaw Nyein's influence is present. Most of the initiative in the barter
trade deals with the Communist bloc came from Nu. He has professed
himself greatly impressed by the progress made in the Soviet Union
and in Red China, He has sometimes expressed a desire to work with
rather than against the legal leftist opposition. There have been rumors
of his carrying on negotiations with the BCP behind the backs of his
cabinet. He was chiefly responsible for permitting the NUF to send
delegates to the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference at Cairo? With such
a background it is. not likely that he would have the capacity to resist
the pressure of the NUF on these questions.
V. The Indonesian Parallel
There are many similarities between the political role of U Nu
and that of Sukarno under whose leadership Indonesia has drifted so
far toward Communist domination. Both carry the prestige of winning
independence for their countries. Both find the basis of their political
power in the wide popularity which they enjoy among their people,
rather than in party organization. Both enjoy large political. gestures.
and dramatic speeches and dislike the day-to-day drudgery of govern.
ment. Both have received the red carpet treatment on visits to the
Soviet Union and to Red China and have as a result acquired an in-
flated estimate of themselves as world statesmen. Both have per-
sonal ties with Communist leaders growing out of old associations
in the struggle for independence. Both are to some degree political
opportunists, determined to stay in power and. likely to seek help
from almost any source if necessary to that end.
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It would not be at all surprising if Nu, in a political situation
comparable to that in which Sukarno has found himself, should :follow
the same course and find himself the captive of the. leftwing support
upon which he would increasingly have to rely.
The Burma Communists in. many respects stand where the PKI
stood some years ago. The armed struggle having failed, they are
turning to legal action through a legal Party organization already in
existence. They are attempting to carry out political infiltration and
seeking to establish a united front with non-Communist elements as
a stage on their road to power. They would like to be able to exploit
the popularity of U Nu as the PKI has exploited Sukarnots. In alliance
with U Nu they would be in a position to carry out the infiltration and
control of the mass organizations and of the armed forces Which have
played so important a part in the success of the PKI.. In a united front
with Nu's independents and some elements of the BSP, the BWPINUF
could expect to reap some of the same benefits which the PKI has
achieved through its coalition with the Partai Nationalis Indonesia (PNI).
While such parallels can be pushed too far and there are many
points of difference between Burma and Indonesia which are not cata-
logued here, nevertheless the common factors between Burma in
the present crisis and Indonesia at the beginning of the rise of the
PKI, are sufficient to justify concern whether Burma may not be about
to enter upon the same unhappy path.
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