THE AFRO-ASIAN SOLIDARITY CONFERENCE AN ANALYSIS OF COMMUNIST STRATEGY AND TACTICS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-00915R001000290045-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 102
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 17, 1998
• Sequence Number: 45
• Publication Date: October 1, 1958
• Content Type: REPORT

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THE AFRO-ASIAN SOLIDARITY CONFERENCE
AN ANALYSIS OF COMMUNIST
STRATEGY AND TACTICS
Distributed
October 1958
FROM FILE
CoP3 N$ 56
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THE AFRO-ASIAN SOLIDARITY CONFERENCE
An Analysis of Communist Strategy and Tactics
". . 'We are devoting all our efforts so that Mongols,,
Persians, Indians, and Egyptians should draw closer to
us and merge with us. We consider it our duty and in
our interests to do this,,, otherwise Socialism in Europe
will not be stable.** Our Party and its Leninist Central
Committee abide strictly by this advice."
E. M. Zhukov, Member,
USSR Academy of Science,
July 1957; Nt amber of Soviet
Delegation, Afro-Asian
Solidarity Conference.
(Extract from speech
published in International
Affairs, Moscow, September
1957, page 43)
*Lenin, Collected Works,
Volume 32, pages 5+x+7- 558,
(Also quoted by K. Bakdash,
Secretary General, CP-Syria and
Lebanon, in article in Pravday
14+ November 1957.)
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TABLE OF COM NTS:
I. INTRODUCTION
II. THE BASIS FOR THE CONFERENCE
III. ORGANIZING THE CONFERENCE
IV. THE CONFERENCE PROCEEDING
V. THE NON-COHMST PARTICIPATION
VI. THE COI'MUNIST PARTICIPATION
IN THE CONFERENCE
A. The Non Bloc Delegates
B. The Bloc Delegates
Vii. THE ISSUES
A. The Peace Strategy
B. The Strategy of the Economic
Struggle
.3
11
34
14
15
17
1.
The Role of National Communist
Parties
2.
The Role of Communist
Trade Unions
a. In the Independent Countries
21
In the Colonial Territories
22
3.
The Strategy Unified at Cairo
23
VIII. INTERNATIONAL COtJNIST FRONT ACTIVITIES
AT TEiE CONFERENCE
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M 00-
IX. COMMUNIST MANIPULATION OF
TAE PROt EDINGS
X. FUTURE ACTIVITIES SPONSORED BY
THE SOLIDARITY COUNCIL
29
A. Economic Study Organizations
29
B. Maass Organization Conferences
29
C. Trade Organizations
30
D. Cultural Bodies and Conferences
30
E. Education,,, Research, and
Investigative Bodies
30
F. Other Professional Bodies
30
XI. COMMUNIST GAINS FROM THE CONFERENCE--
A PRELIMENARY ASSESSMENT
33
XII. THE PROSPECTS
36
CQy1 RNKOPIM
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ow~e~inz.
A. GEL SURVEY
OF '7IE
CONFERENCE
Ct~!!l~1*!E"1*.~L
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A GENERAL SURVEY OF ME CONFERENCE
The Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference which convened in
Cairo on 26 December 1957 brought together a reported 476
delegates from 43 countries of Asia and Africa, as well as
observers from Europe and Latin America. Most of these
"observers" represented Communist international front
organizations. Ostensibly dedicated to the idea of bring-
ing together African and Asian peoples to provide coordinated
support for colonial struggles for independence, for
peaceful economic development, and for cultural growth., the
gathering mainly served the interests of Soviet Communism,
by endorsing programs long carried out by the traditional
Communist international fronts, by accepting the USSR as
an Asian state, and by providing a basis, in its resolutions,.
for future Communist propaganda. and agitational activity
throughout Africa and Asia.
The primary Communist objectives at the Conference
were to enlist Afro-Asian support for the peace campaign,
to generate pressure for adoption by the. independent states
in the area of the Soviet/Communist methods of "building
socialism",, to promote economic struggle between the West
and the Afro Asian world,, and to pave the way for the gradual
.economic integration of the Asian and Hear Eastern nations
with the Soviet bloc.
The Conference cannot be considered a complete success
from the point of view of any of the elements involved in
it.* Whatever the advantages the USSR and national Communist
parties may be able to derive from its resolutions, .the
alienation of a significant number of the Free World delegates.,
the disappointing of others who went to'the Conference with
high hopes, and the exposure of Communist aims and methods which
*For Communist gains from the Conference, however., see
Section XI.
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took place at the Conference--all constitute potential if
not actual setbacks for the Communist cause. There is,
evidence of some polarization among Conference delegates--
some have moved toward closer identification with the $oviet
bloc, while others have retreated from their erstwhile
uncritical endorsement of the Communist's concept of peaceful
coexistence.
However, as in other such instances involving the
traditional international fronts, the failure of dissenting
and opposition forces to take conclusive steps to counter
Communist initiatives gives the International Communist
Movement the time and opportunity to adjust to changed
conditions, and exploit to the full the tactical advantages
it has undoubtedly gained.
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II. THE BASIS FOR, THE COI'WERENCE
A prime objective of Communist strategy since the end
of 1953 has been to win over to the "Socialist bloc" the
nations and peoples of Africa and Asia. Confronted with the
accumulated distrusts resentments, and hatred engendered by
the destructive, deceptive., and often violent campaigns
waged by virtually all the Communist parties of the area
from 1946 until at least 1952, the new Communist campaign
to gain acceptance and organize unity of action against the
West was begun with difficulty. Steps such as the Moscow
Economic Conference of 1952 were taken by the USSR even
prior to the death of Stalin., but it was not until the
end of 1953 that a coherent program began to emerge.
The Soviet Union then began its efforts to achieve a
rapprochement with Yugoslavia. The Cominfor% under Soviet
con:tols, conveyed the essentials of the policy to the
Communist parties of the Free World. Communist China, dis-
engaged from its unsuccessful aggressive war in Korea,, began
its conciliatory campaign to gain acceptance among the
peoples of Asia. The World Peace Coruncil, in which the
Communist parties of the bloc combined with national front
groups sponsored by the Communist parties of the Free Worlds
launched its campaign for the lessening of international
tensions. The first stage of this campaign in Asia cul-
minated in April 1955 with the Conference for the Lessening
of International Tensions held in New Delhi and, one week
later, with the Bandung Conference in Indonesia. Here
Communist China was afforded an opportunity by a group of
independent Asian states to demonstrate its ability to
act as a responsible state, willing to make and honor
solemn commitments in its relations with other states. It
subscribed there to the now well.- "Bandung principles",
foremost among which was a solemn commitment not to inter-
fere in the internal affairs of other states.
But such interference was already in progress and
continued thereafter without visible interruption, National
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Communist parties remained responsive to directions from
Moscow and Peiping, and the traditional international
Communist fronts continued their attempts on the national
scene to create and organize popular pressure for acceptance
of Communist policies.
A new instrument, the Asian Solidarity Committee, emerged
from the New Delhi Conference. At about the same time in the
Near East a parallel effort resulted in, the convening of the
second Arab People's Conference. Both of these gatherings
were designed to serve as vehicles for Communist unity campaigns
in the respective regions, but in. the two years that followed
neither venture registered any politically significant gain.
The de-Stalinization and liberalization campaigns within the
Soviet bloc failed to dispel the distrust of these Communist-
inspired and dominated groups, and until the end of 1956,
neither had succeeded in finding a therm with sufficient at-
traction to overcome this distrust.
But in. December 1956 the decision apparently was made
to exploit the Middle East crisis as the basis for a merger
of both these unity campaigns. The attention which bad pre-
viously been directed--without visible success--at enlisting
the cooperation of the South Asian countries was now shifted
to the Arab countries. With the endorsement by Egypt in
January 1957 of the proposal that an Afro-Asian people's
conference be held in Cairo, the stage appeared set for
another step forward. But again the movement lost momentum.
For six months no concrete steps were taken to organize
the projected conference. No date was set, no preparatory
body was organized., no local campaigns to organize delegations
or generate interest in the gathering took place.
However, the small group of persons who had taken' the
earlier initiatives in the campaign continued to work
diligently. Plans and preparations were made for exploiting
the Conference once it was organized. 'Reliable cadres and
easily manipulated Communist sympathizers already active
in the Peace Movement and other fronts could be brought
together with comparative ease. But again its appeared that
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the indispensable attractive theme which could
invoke widespread interest and participation had
not been found.
Eventually it was in the creation of the
European Common Market in march 1957 and the announce-
ment of plans for a major European program of economic
development in Africa, that the organizers recognized
their opportunity.. For more than a year authoritative
Communist publications such as the CPSU theoretical
journal, I{ot, had been stating that the main
future efforts in the anti-imperialist struggle were
to be centered in the economic field; and Marxist
politico-economic doctrine was peculiarly suited to
sustain such a campaign. The Soviet bloc,. national
Communist parties, and international fronts promptly
attacked these Eurafrican plans as part of their anti-
colonial agitation, alleging among other things that
the plans involved
a. a decision by the Western states to
reduce their economic dependence upon., and
commitment in, the independent countries of
.the Near East and Africa;
b. a Western determination to use punitive
economic measures instead of armed aggression
against those countries which persisted in
Adhering to neutralist policies and in expanding
their relationships with the Socialist bloc;
c. a Western decision to strengthen their
hold over the resources and peoples of colonial
Africa, to compensate for their losses elsewhere.
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Again, as was the case with the Communist
reaction to the Marshall Plan, the Atlantic Pact,'the
UN action in Korea, the European Defense Community,
etc., constructive and defensive measures taken by
Free World nations in response to aggressive Soviet
bloc initiatives were maligned, denounced--and then
promptly adapted to serve Communist ends.
It now appears that the most significant factors
exploited to generate maximum participation by re-
sponsible citizens of the independent countries of
Afro-Asia in the Solidarity Conference in Cairo
were
a. the fears generated by Communist-
inspired interpretations of the significance
of the Common Market and Eurafrican plans,
and
b. the hopes and interest connected with
proposals for the creation of an Afro-Asian
common market, development fund, combined market-
ing systems, etc. In this regard it was anti-
cipated and inferred--although never authori-
tatively stated--that participating countries
of the Soviet bloc would be major contributors
of aid, profitable trading partners, and willing
participants in equitable multilateral commerce.
The arguments advanced in support of the European
programs were, by analogy, equally attractive when
transferred to an Afro-Asian context.
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With such participation provided for, the appeal to individuals
from the colonial territories of Africa was virtually assured of
some success. These groups, together with dissident opposition
elements from a number of the Middle Eastern states, made up the
bulk of the participation at Cairo.
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r+nay ATi .
III. ORGM IZ Co NCE
Once the chances for winning non-Communist participation in
the Conference looked promising, preparatory work began. 'An
Egyptian Committee was set up under the leadership of Anwar Sadate
This group, working closely with the Egyptian Government, issued
the formal invitations to a preliminary meeting to organize the
Conference. At this meeting a preparatory committee was set up,
an agenda was drafted., financial arrangements for handling the costs
of the actual Conference were made, and formal invitations were
sent out asking that national delegations be organized.
But the preparatory meeting in fact did little more than
approve the activities and proposals of the original organizers
and vest them with authority to act in the name of a multinational
body. Attempts by some participants- parcticulaarly the Turkish
delegate--to take up substantive questions at the preparatory
meeting were rapidly defeated. Once the preparatory meeting was
over, the main responsibility for preparations fell upon the
original organizers. The Asian Solidarity Committee figures took
primary responsibility for organizing in the Soviet bloc and in
South Asia, while the Egyptian group took on the task of organizing
in Africa and the Arab World.
Three types of local effort were noted. First, in Nadia,
Japan, Burma, and the Bloc the national Asian Solidarity Committees
approached selected individuals and receptive groups, including
in most Instances-political parties in opposition to the existing
governments or at least to some policies being carried out by those
governments. Second, in a number of instances contact was established
with national affiliates of the World Peace Movement, which were asked
to organize national preparatory groups. This type of effort was
noted in colonial territories and also to some extent in the cases
of Iraq and Jordan. Third, where no Peace Partisan groups existed,
travelling representatives of the Egyptian body made personal
contacts, advised and assisted by the Egyptian Government, with
national governments or local personalities, requesting that they
undertake the organizing task.
In a number of instances Peace Partisan groups cut back their
organizing initiatives when it became apparent that non-Communist
parties and personalities had accepted the Egyptian proposals. In
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some instances they withdrew entirely from the organizing work
when they realized that they might alienate other interested parties
who were suspicious of Communist motives. In others, they supported
or joined with the organizers in selecting delegations. In Lebanon,
Morocco, Tunisia, and the Sudan there were disagreements over the
composition of the delegations; but in every case a settlement was
achieved. In many instances participation was assured only when the
Egyptian representatives made the concession demanded by those non-
Communists whose cooperation they sought.
In the course of this effort, one of the more interesting
developments was the placing of a significant new topic on the agenda--
the question of the European Common Market. There is no evidence
that this addition--which was first revealed by one of the travelling
Egyptian representatives before the Conference--had been approved
in advance by the full preparatory committee.
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IV. THE CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS
When the Conference convened, the program called for
a. An initial series of plenary sessions, at which
leaders of national delegations were to deliver addresses.,
and conference procedure was to be agreed upon.
b. The organization of commissions to deal with each
major section of the agenda. It was apparently originally
intended that the commission work would involve first a
series of speeches; then a presentation of a draft report
and recommendations by a predesignated national delegation;
thereafter draft resolutions embodying the recommendations
were to be approved.
c. A final series of plenary sessions to endorse the
draft resolutions.
Problems arose in the two main commissions., the Political
and Economic Commissions. In spite of opposition, subcommittees
were formed, within each of which specific draft resolutions
were worked out. The subcommittee question appears to have
been introduced in both instances by Arab delegates. The argument
advanced by those who favored subcommittees was.. in the Political
Commission., that special attention had to be given to the problems
of Palestine and Algeria. In the Economic Commission it was
argued that the distinction between the economic problems of the
independent nations and those of the still-dependent countries
bad to be recognized and provided for. Although the Soviet,
Chinese., and pro-Communist delegates all appeared to oppose the
creation of subcommittees,, they adjusted effectively to the
situation. In fact the creation of the subcommittees enhanced
the influence of individual pro-Communist Arab delegates upon the
specific language of the final resolutions, prevented coordinated
action by the proponents of such proposals as those advocating
the creation of a common bank., a common market, a common develop-
ment hind., etc.., and reduced the effectiveness of potential sources
of opposition to the general trend of the Conference. The fact
that the Conference resolutions fitted neatly with the Communist
programs for action in both the independent countries and the
dependent territories is also a reflection of the work of the
subcommittees.
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V. THE NON-COM Sfi PARTICIPATION
Available evidence strongly suggests that other forces
besides those under Communist control did in fact make a contri-
bution to the size and apparent impressiveness of the gathering.'
But it is also clear that none of these forces were capable
of preventing Communist' control of the gathering or were able
to exploit it to serve their own purposes. Three other evident
forces were
a. Arab nationalists who support President Nasser's
policy of positive ' neutrality, but at the sane time appear
to oppose Communist control and manipulation of local
movements.
b. Elements, largely centering around Japanese and
Indian non-Communist nationalists, whose participation was
motivated by their interest in maintaining peace and
generating cooperative effort in economic and political
development of Africa and Asia,
C. Nationalist forces, particularly in colonial
territories of Africa, which sought tangible'aid and support
for their efforts to win political independence.
The failures of these elements were directly related to
the effectiveness with which Communist, instrumentalities gained
control of key positions, dominated the deliberations; coordinated
their activities at the Conference, injected reports, organizational
proposals, and well-prepared draft resolutions, and in general
successfully applied, at a major international popular gathering, the
time-honored and effective techniques that Communist parties in
the Free World have employed for thirty years.
But Communist tactics were by no means the only factor. Many
participants were disappointed at their failure to accomplish their
own ends, but at the same time many of them have publicly demonstrated
their satisfaction with the "moderate" nature of many of the
Conference resolutions. What criticisms they have made of Communist
actions at the Conference dealt mainly with the fact and character
of Soviet participation. Some of the more observant have also
criticized the absence of substantive discussion and the obviously
prearranged procedures by which prefabricated resolutions were
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run through the Conference. In one instance a leading delegate--
ICamal Jamblatt of Lebanon--withdrew from his delegation and
denounced the Communist seizure of control of the national group,
but this unique event was brought on largely by the nature and
strength of the Lebanese Communist effort to win control of the
delegation.
There is convincing evidence that most of these delegates
lacked (and still lack) an appreciation of the Communist objectives
at Cairo. Equally important, they appear to lack an appreciation
of the role which the CPSU expected the Cairo Conference `to play
in its general global strategy. There has been no acknowledge-
ment by this element that their mere participation aided Communist
exploitation of the Conference. The Japanese delegation alone--
the second largest group after that of Egypt--accounted for over
10 per cent of the attendance. Only fifteen of the fifty-eight
in the Japanese group subsequently extended their travel to include
a visit to the USSR and China., while the remaining forty-three, who
can be reasonably assumed to represent the bulk of the non Bloc
oriented element, returned directly to Japan. The failure of the
Conference to endorse any substantive proposals for multilateral
economic organization has also gone unchallenged by those delegates
whose primary motive in attending was to gain acceptance .of such
proposals. Above all., so far as their immediate interests are
concerned, these elements failed to recognize or acknowledge the
relationship of the Conference to the actions of their national
Communist parties and, front groups.
In fact, few of the non-Communist delegates demonstrated any
critical interest in the resolutions which did not directly involve
their own national interests. There was very little contact and
cooperation between non-Communist delegations, although a few
individual delegates did seek to establish personal contacts
with others who might later prove worthwhile. Sightseeing and
organized entertainments in general kept these people occupied
outside of the formal sessions of the Conference, while the
Communist delegates used the free periods purposefully and to good
advantage, consulting with others of their kind on matters relating
to the Conference itself and cultivating non-Communists. Scholarship
offers, invitations for trips, gift-giving, and flattering interviews
by Bloc press representatives were all extended during such periods.
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In spite of the presence of many individuals with parliamentary
or legal experience, there was no indication that the glaring
weaknesses in the constitution and charter of the secretariat
were challenged. Contradictions between the Conference's resolutions
and the domestic and foreign policies of the respective governments
of the participants were also ignored, except in one or two Instances.
In relation to the international front participation, the
tthonored guests` were officially identified in Conference publicity
material only by the countries of their origin, and their identifica-
tion as leading functionaries of the whole range of international
Communist fronts was never brought under open discussion. The
absence of observers from the United Nations organizations dealing
with non-governmental activity of international significance, who
logically should have been extended an invitation by a body
which professed its support for the concept and organization of
the UK, was nowhere remarked--nor, for that matter, was the
absence of delegations from a significant number of Afro-Asian states.
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VI o 7E CONMLJ [CST PARTICIPATION IN C2NM E
The Communist. forces comprised the delegations (and unofficial
participants, such as translators and journalists) from the
participating countries of the Soviet bloc--the USSR, Chinas,
North Korea, Mongolia, Viet Nam. They also included, however,
more than ninety members of the delegations from 'non Bloc
countries. The identified total group susceptible to at least
some degreee of Communist control amounted, therefore, to l)+o, or
over 30 per cent. This group was supplemented by an additional
twelve Soviet nationals, who, accredited as journalists and
translators, participated in the activities of the Conference.
The members of the non-Bloc group, whose reliability and
witting devotion to the interests of the International Communist
Movement varied widely, included on the one hand a number Of
fully indoctrinated, dedicated, and competent members and leaders
of national Communist parties, and, on the other hand a number of
individuals who have participated in the past, at the national
or international level, in more than one identified Communist
front organization. Some of the latter cannot and should not be
classed as Communists; but whatever their motives have been,
their witting and repeated participation in such activities,
in more than one context, and under widely varying circumstances,
suggests that in the opinion of the Communist movement at
least, they are characterized as "objectively progressive elements"
whose cooperation has proved productive in the past. Their
participation at Cairo suggests strongly that their cooperation
has also been of appreciable current value, and there are no indi-
cations to date that any of them have significantly modified their
attitude toward such cooperation since the Conference ended..
A. The Non-Bloc Delegates
All the non Bloc Communist and pro-Communist delegates have
been active in front and unity of action programs in the past.
Bloc friendship societies, the Peace Movement, the International
Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL), and bodies for the
promotion of Bloc trade were the main areas of their earlier activity.
Not all of them played leading roles at the Conference, however.
Virtually none of the lawyers' contingent were prominent.
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On the basis of available evidence, it seems likely that
Communist-inspired initiatives were taken mainly by about ten
persons, distributed more or less evenly among the Egyptian,
Syrian, Sudanese., and Japanese delegations. Most of these indi-
viduals had been involved in solidarity activity as far back as
early 1955? Another four or five, drawn mainly from the Indian
and Egyptian delegations, appear to have concerned themselves
mainly Frith organizational and procedural questions--guiding the
selection of presiding heads of subcommittees., serving as
rapporteurs, guiding discussions, etc. The balance of the group
appears simply to have made appropriate speeches and voted
properly on procedural points and resolutions.
one of the most interesting facts about the Communist and
pro-Communist delegates was that the most significant Communists
among them did not engage in any newsworthy activity--or
concealed their activity very well. Mustafa Amin of Syria, Puad
Nasser of Jordan, Abd al-Qadr Ismail of Iraq, Romesh Chandra of
India, Tokusaburo Dan of Japan, all of whom are at least of Party
Central Committee stature, remained completely in the background.
Of this group, only A. K. Gopalan of the CP India was named in reports
of the Conference. He participated in the Drafting Committee of
the subcommittee on Imperialism in the Political Commission.
B. The Bloc Delegates
The Soviet delegation included four persons with records of
extensive front activity in the past. Of these, only two--
E. M. Zhukov and A. V. Sofrouov--played significant roles. Zhukov,
who has long been a leading authority on Communist party strategy
in the Afro-Asian area, worked closely with Arzumaniyan; and
Sofronov participated in the work of the Political Commission
and of the Organizational Commission which was composed of the
heads of delegations* The head of the Soviet delegation,
Sharaf Rashidov, was present at the latter gathering, but
Sofronov carried the burden of the activity.. Both Rashidov and
the much better-known Soviet Moslem front personality Mirza Turzun
Zade bore no major responsibility for Conference tactics.
The Chinese delegation, which took virtually no initiatives
except in the Cultural Commission, was quite impressive. Most
of the group had participated in international front activity in
the period since 1950 (the fields of peace, women's activities,,
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youth, labor, culture, friendship, journalism, and trade
promotion). Of equal if not greater interest is the fact that
at least seven of the delegates, in spite of well-documented
records of collaboration with the International Communist Move-
ment and the Chinese Communist party going back well before
World War II, both in China and abroad, have never publicly
acknowledged their membership in the Chinese Communist party.
Most of this group in fact were active in Nationalist China up
until?1949, when at critical moments they "defected" to the
Communist regime. All of them have had long and varied experi-
ence in clandestine activity.
The Mongolian and Viet Nam delegations appeared to have
merely representational duties; and only one man, Han Sul Ya,
in the North Korean delegation was noteworthy for his activities
in the.Algerian subcommittee.
A leading figure in the Chinese delegation, Burhan
Shahidi, of the China Islamic Association, stayed in Cairo for
several weeks after the Conference and participated in the creation:
of a new Chinese Egyptian Friendship Society. The Soviet
delegation also remained for at least two weeks exploiting contacts
opened up at the Conference and visiting universities, govern-
ment offices, the National Science Council, etc.
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VII, THE ISSUES
The two primary interests of the Communist initiators and
participants in the Conference were
a. to tie the aspirations and campaigns for national
liberation of colonial territories to the Soviet peace
campaign;
b. to guide the Afro Asian preoccupation with national
economic development into channels and courses of action
which would both complete the breaking of ties with the
West and lay the groundwork for eventual integration of
Africa and Asia into the economic system of the Soviet bloc.
The relevant issues were dealt with in the Political and Economic
Commissions of the Conference.
The Peace $!Late
Both the declaration issued by the twelve Communist parties of
the Soviet bloc in November 1957 and the Peace Manifesto endorsed
at the, same time by sixty-four Communist parties state that
the "struggle for peace is the foremost task" of these parties-
but the Twelve-Party Declaration makes it abundantly clear that
the peace campaign is a stratagem, not an objective, when it
states that the "tasks confronting the Communist parties of the
world necessitate closer unity . . . rallying the working people
and: progres i mankind, the freedom and peace-loving peoples
of the world." The purpose of the strategy emerges promptly
in the succeeding text. After portraying Communist parties as
"loyal defenders of the national and democratic interests of the
peoples of all countries," it is pointed out that in many countries
"still confronted with the historic tasks of struggle for national
independence the struggle against war is spearheaded against the
big monopoly groups of capital as those chiefly responsible" for
the threat of war. In independent countries.* the declaration
states, "objective conditions are being created for uniting under
the leadership of the working class and its revolutionary parties,,
broad sections of the population to fight for peace." Here, and
in the subsequent discussion of the Communist interest in seeking
power by "peaceful" means, the role of unity of action in the
peace struggle is clearly shown to be that of facilitating
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the Communist party's gaining of power--and the alternative presented
is violent s e. As the declaration states,, "In this case
5violent stain the degree of bitterness and the form of class
struggle will depend . . . on the resistance put up by reactionary
circles, on these people using force at one or another stage of the
struggle for Socialism.`
The Peace.. Manifesto, on the other hand, is a less ,fundamental
document which is aimed at promoting unity of action in pursuit of
short-range. objectives--the cessation of atomic and hydrogen
weapons testing and unconditional prohibition of the manufacture
and use of these weapons. It is toward these objectives that
the peace struggle activity in the Afro Asian Solidarity Conference
was directed., as the Political Commission. agenda, deliberations, and
resolutions show The immediate aim was to promote participation
by Afro-Asian elements in World Peace Council-sponsored projects
such as the Stockholm Congress for Disarmament and Peaceful Coex-
istence in July 1958 and the Fourth World Conference Against
Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (August 1958).
B. The Strate r of the Economic Struggle
As far back as February 1956, at the 20th Congress of the
Communist Party of the Soviet union, in discussions concerning the
character of the struggle to advance the cause of Communism
outside the Soviet bloc, attention was focussed on the importance
of the economic area. But in January 1957 in a mist article
entitled "The Disintegration of the Colonial System of Imperialism
and Questions of International Relations,." the Soviet view of this
matter was further clarified. Starting from the premise that the
winning of political independence is only the first major step
toward complete independence, it states:
". . Now that the overwhelming majority of the nations
of the East have . . . ended the hateful colonial bondage,
new tasks await them.
"Imperialism, colonialism stand.as a barrier on the
path to accomplishing plans for economic and cultural ad-
vancement. . . .
"The disintegration of the colonial system . is an
entire stage of acute conflicts, numerous battles over all
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questions of economies and politics. . . . At the moment
the center of the struggle has moved to the economic sphere.
The disintegration of the colonial system of imperialism
is entering a new and higher stage.18
The article later made the point that although "the domination
by finance capital could not have been eliminated in the past
by any changes in the sphere of political democracy," the ability
of the Soviet Loc to provide powerful economic support to these
countries "has fundamentally changed the objective situation of the
countries of the East fighting against colonialism*,* The article
makes it clear that this assistance is justified insofar as it aids
the extension of state-owned economic enterprise, development
programs, and the elimination of foreign capitalist controls,
and emphasizes that it supports the already existing trend in the
East toward socialism.
The article also comments on the role of Communist parties
in these countries. Calling for national unity campaigns on
economic issues, it states., "The experience of China shows that
development of the countries of the East toward socialism-is
fully possible within the framework of a coalition of political
parties. . . . Peaceful development does not at all precludes- but
on the contrary, presupposes class struggle,, the struggle of
the supporters of social progress against the reactionary and
exploiter forces seeking to go back to agreement with imperialismt"
Soviet bloc aid is nowhere described as the main element
in this economic struggle or as a substitute for local action.
Nationalization of foreign-owned enterprise has long been a
policy advocated by such mature Communist parties of the area
as those of India and Syria; and as early as the summer of 1956
the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, a small but
highly significant Communist front organization, made the propriety
of nationalization one of its central themes. In November 1957 the
TALL Conference in Moscow claimed credit for having issued a
report endorsing nationalization of foreign-owned enterprise prior
to the Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal.
It is now clear that this IADL campaign played a part in
laying the groundwork for the economic deliberations at Cairo. In
May 195T a conference was organized in Italy by the IADL which dealt
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exclusively with this question, and Syrian and Egyptian representa-
tives participated in the deliberation. Again in early November 1957
the topic was a major theme of the Afro Asian Lawyers Conference in
Damascus, where its significance had been enhanced by the Indonesian
steps to nationalize Dutch-owned enterprise as a part of its campaign
for the annexation of West Irian. It is interesting to observe that
two of the Egyptian lawyers who played key roles in these activities-
Mahmoud elHinnawi and Salad Abdel Hafez- went to Moscow to !attend
the IADL Conference in mid-November 1957 and subsequently were
members of the Egyptian delegation to the Cairo Conference. At
Moscow too the Egyptian All Badawi, an ex-Minister of Justice,
was elected" a vice president of the IADL.
The role of the IADL in the Cairo Conference is further sug-
gested by the statement, made by IADL president D. N. Pritt at Moscow
in November 1957, that he had, had an opportunity to "strengthen
relationships with Indonesian.. Indian, and Syrian lawyers" at a
meeting held in China in September 1957. Pritt was one of the "guests"
at Cairo, and was, therefore, in a position to exploit these
"strengthened relationships" both with long-standing colleagues in
the World Peace Movement and members of the Lawyers Association, many
of whom were key figures in the national delegations.
1. The Role of National Communist Parties
Perhaps the best description of the current Communist
program for exploiting the economic issue at the national level in
the independent countries of Afro Asia is that written by Ajoy Ghosh,
Secretary General of the CP of India ("For A Mass Paarty", in New Ae,
February 1958). Under the subtitle, "Crisis of the Second P1za
(referring to the second Indian Five-Year Plan for economic develop-
ment), he wrote-
"Conditions are getting created for the establishment
of proletarian hegemony in our national movement. ',. .
Our Party, while supporting the aims and objectives of
the plan, while declaring itself in favor of the
emphasis on industrialization and extension of the'
public sector, laid bare the contradictions between the
aims of the plan and the methods by which they were
sought to be implemented. . . . But the most menacing
feature of the situation is the activity that is being
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conducted by extreme reactionary circles. . . .
They seize upon the difficulties of the plan with a
view to pushing their own anti-national policies. . .
The campaign against our foreign pol.icyy ? the campaign
against the progressive features of the second Five-
Year Plan, the campaign against the kashmir Government?
all these campaigns are not unrelated. The driving forces
behind these campaigns are in the final analysis the
same. The imperialists, the landlords the big 'anti-
national monopolists, and extreme reactionary circles
who fear the people and hate democracy. . . . It is
the patriotic duty of every Indian, respective of
the Party to which he belongs, to unite against these
forces, to unmask them, to wage'a determined battle
against the path along which they want to push the
country. Our Party has to play a major role in.
achieving this uuity.11
A. K. Gopalan,, a member of the Politburo of CP India a
delegate to the Cairo Conference, and deputy leader of the Indian
Communist Parliamentary bloe) is one of the prime figures
in this national cassapaigno which was: intensified in August-
September 1957. The relationship between this program,,which is
reflected in the activities of tIbnal Communist parties through-
out the Afro Asian world, and.t resolutions of the Afro-
Asian Solidarity Conference is ob ous., In the article quoted
above the Secretary General of the Indian Party stated that it
was "necessary for Party units to move into action in a big and
effective way on such big developments as the historical Cairo
'
,.Conference.
2. " the Role_ Communist wade Unions
In the Independent Countries
Another major step in the elaboration of this
strategy was set forth in October 1957 in the speech delivered at
the Fourth Congress of the WFTU in Leipzig by S. A. Lange? another
leading Indian Communist and international front figure for many
years. Elements of this speech, ""Trade Union Tasks in the Fight
Against Colonialism, were subsequently accepted at the annual
session in late December 1957 as the basis for the current policy
of the All-India Trade Union Congress. The speech focussed
attention, as did.Ghosshas article, on defending the aims of the
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second Five Year Plan, and on criticizing the methods used to
carry it out, but added, necessarily, a further point. "The trade
union movement., while cooperating in genuine plans for development
that would benefit the people, and allowing legitimate gains to
the bourgeoisie, should refuse to give up its claims for a just
share of the national income for wage increases, for better work-
ing conditions, and democratic rights."
Dange also called for trade unions to participate in the
struggle for peace and to agitate for support for the liberation
struggle in colonial territories.
b. In the Colonial Territories
But Dange's speech at Leipzig differentiates clearly
between the program to be followed in independent countries! and
that applicable in colonial territories. The following excerpt
reveals the plan for work in the colonies
"The problem for the colonies as such is markedly
different. Naturally for these countries the fundamental
task is to achieve national independence. At present
many of them are faced with brutal wars and armed,
repression. Under such circumstances, the economic
and social problems of the workers are extremely serious.
"In these countries the big enterprises all belong
to foreign monopolies--the greater part of the
cultivatable land has been seized by foreign colonialists.
"In many of these countries the colonial authorities
carry out so-called economic development plans which are
in fact intended to increase profits for the monopolies
and to intensify the exploitation of the peoples
"Their (the workers) single most urgent demand is
for the improvement of their hard living conditions.
The source of their hardships is in the common scourge--
colonialism. Consequently the trade union movement is
confronted with the double task of fighting against
the direct political rule of the colonialists and-in
defense of the workers' interests."
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Perhaps the most interesting phrase in this excerpt is
S. A. Dange ? s term "direct political rule" --which cannot be
construed as a .simple alternative to the terms "right of self-
determination"' or "independence"" which have long been well-
established as Communist slogans. The introduction of this term
suggests that, in some circumstances a mere loosening of the ties
between a colony and its controlling power may be the proper
tactical policy for a Communist trade union to advocate., rather
than calling for immediate and complete independence,. This
interpretation gains in credibility in view of the recent endorse-
ment by the Communist-infiltrated trade union organization in
French West Africa of a plan for a federal union between France
and the territories of French Africa.
30 The Strater Unified at Cairo
The main elements of the strategy were finally and
clearly brought together by the speech of the Soviet delegate
Ar. yan at Cairo. Although he continued to call attention to
Soviet willingness to give aid "within the capabilities of the
Soviet economy," the main emphasis in his presentation was on
the proper methods for carrying out a national economic development
program and for financing it in large part through the Soviet
techniques used in "building socialism" in the USSR.
The Conference resolutions did not incorporate many of the
Arzumaniyan proposals, but they reflected his basic assumptions,
endorsed the propriety of nationalization, and provided a basis for
Communist agitational and unity programs at the national and
regional levels.
The main points of the blueprint for internal economic
development presented by the USSR were published almost verbatim
by the Communist Party of Tunisia in its newspaper., Al Taliya, on
22 December 1957, before the Conference convened,, as the program
which it advocated for the nation.
Another anticipation occurred in a commentary on a book,
Development in Free Asia, in the October-December 1957 issue of
the Asia-Africa Review. Dr. Gyan Chanel*,, in his article focussed
yon an erstwhile economic adviser to the Government of
India, was a delegate to the Moscow Economic Conference of 1952, deputy
leader of a peace delegation to Peiping in 1952, and a leading figure
in the creation and activities of the India-China Friendship Association
from 1952 ono
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attention on the same problems and tasks of national economic policy
that the Soviet delegate's speech subsequently explored. 3his
discussion was introduced with the statement, ". . . . The Asian
countries have to face the stark fact that resources for their
economic development would have to be made available through their
own almost unaided exertions; state trading, nationalization of
foreign enterprise,, development of state-financed cooperatives$
balanced development of industry, etc."
In summary., the general strategy for exploitation of economic
issues which emerged during the period of the Afro Asian Solidarity
Conference appears to involve the following main elements.'
In the Independent Countries of Africa and Asia
A. Continuation of Soviet aid, "within limits."
B. Pressure on economic issues by the Communist
ties and fronts, especially for the adoption of socialist
i.ee,, Soviet) techniques for achieving national economic
developmeent, including the nationalization of foreign-'caned
enterprise.
C. Exposure and discrediting of national elements which
oppose the socialization of the economy, the modification of
governmental economic structure along socialist lines, and
ever closer identification with the Soviet bloc policies in
the foreign trade sphere.
D. Pressure for active governmental support of colonial
liberation movements.
In the Colonial Territories
A. Organization of trade union unity on purely economic
grounds (wages, etc.).
B. Extension of trade union influence in the national
liberation movement, based on opposition to colonial develop-
ment plans and to foreign ownership of major sectors of the
local economy.
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C. Development of a propaganda campaign addressed
to nationalist leaders and local businessmen based upon the
rosy prospects for future aid and profitable trade--if these
territories succeed in freeing themselves from the economic
control of the "colonialists".
It was in fact observed that at Cairo the Soviet economic
delegation at one point informed a group of the delegates from
Black Africa that a billion dollars worth of aid could be made
available to them by the Soviet bloc; the precondition for getting
such aid was, of courses obvious. The impact of such offers"
is clearly propagandistic only.
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VIII. INTERNATIONAL CC INIST FRONT ACTIVITIES AT THE COME NCE
There was extensive participation in Conference delegations
of persons long iderLtified with the numerous international Communist
fronts (see attachments A and B,q which identify such delegates).
But.. in addition,, most of the central organizations of these fronts
sent. representatives to Cairo as observers. This observer group
was composed of key figures from the fronts.. who had many contacts
among the delegates.
The following list identifies these individuals:
James G. Endicott of Canada Vice President of the World
Peace Council
D. N. Pritt of England
Member of the Bureau of the
World Peace Council
President.. International
Association of Democratic
Lawyers
.Mrs. Jorge Zalamea of Colombia Secretary of the World Peace
Council
Carmen Zanti of Italy
Secretary9 Women'sInterna-
tional Democratic Federation
President of the Youths'
Federation
Renato Mieli of Italy Delegate of the Anti-Colonial
People's Conference
Cheng Chi Ming of China Secretary of the International
Union of Students
Saadati Babak of Iran Secretary, Colonial Bureau of
the International Union
of Students
Bernini of Italy President of the World Federa-
tion of Democratic Youth
S. Majumdar of India
Secretary of the World Federa-
tion of Democratic Youth.
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Near the end of the Conference Kamel al-Din Bindari,, ex-
Egyptian Ambassador to the USSR and chai'rm of the Egyptian
Peace Committee, gave a reception which attended by active
participants. in the Peace Movements AccOrdtng to Tass (3 January
1958) persons attended from the delegations of Syria, Jordan., Iraq
Lebanon. USSR. India, Cameroons, Zanzibar,, Sudan, Kenya, Nigeria,
Uganda., and. Chad. D. N. Pritt, Mrs. Ra eshwari Nebru, M. I. Kotov,
George Hanna (Lebanon), and Drs Felix Moumie were singled out for
special mention among the guests. This gathering is particularly
noteworthy because for some time the Egyptian Peace Partisans
have been maintaining pressure on the Egyptian Government in order
to win official recognition. Prior to this reception, however,
they had had little visible success. The organization in fact
remains without official governmental recognition, although the
activities of its leading figures are not significantly hampered.
Little is known of the activities of these observers,. but
Mr b Babak, secretary of the Colonial. Bureau of the IUS, circulated
extensively among students in the various delegations. Ira: Renato
Meili, who represented the Anti-Colonial People's Conference which
convened in Athens in late Ocotber 1957, presented a message from
the president of the Greek Anti-Colonial League, Mrs Nikos
Pouliopoulos, the character of which is clearly reflected in the
following extract.
"And in this sense, I am sure that the Congress will
not only condemn slavery., terror, and the tortures of
British colonialism against liberation fighters, but that
they will legitimize armed struggle' for liberation...."
This organization., in which a number of West European Left
Socialists are active, has never endorsed Soviet actions. But the
Yugoslav Co ist-controlled, Socialist Alliance participated in
the October 1957 gathering, together with a number of other
proponents of unity of action between Communists and. Socialists.
W.Mieli himself is a member of the C st party of Italy and
in the past has served on the editorial staff of the partygs
newspaper. LL0
Since the close of the Conference virtually all the interna-
tional Communist fronts have given international publicity and
approval to its resolution, declared their intention of supporting
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and aiding its programs and initiatives. and welcomed its
support of their activities. In fact., the bulk of the publicity
given to the Conference since the end of January 1958 has eftnated
from the international fronts and their national affiliates.
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DCe COMMIM QX MFR C
r ~ a:v ~+~... ~ a~~dre
In spite of the. participation of im rea'sive delegations
from five of the countries of the Soviet %i6c the main Coma mist
initiatives at the Conference were taken by Syrian,, Egyptian,
Indian, and Japanese representatives with Communist and pro-
Communist records., whose proposals received esement and
support from the Soviet bloc delegates. ? the Arzumaniyan
speech and the invitation to the Writers* Conference in Tashkent
in October 1958 can be construed as mmmajor. initiatives by Soviet 'bloc
delegates. Specific condemnations of colonialism,, regional pacts,
racial discrimination., and unfair economic practice proposed. by
other non-Soviet delegations to the Conference were endorsed and
supplemented by general, expressions of Afro-Asian support for
national liberation movements and, for the territorial claims of
independent Afro Asian countries a But the truly significant
resolutions of the Conference, from the Communist point of view,
were those which
a. endorsed activities of the international front
organizations (the World.Peace Councils Congress of Peoples
for Diserm ntg. the Fourth World Conference Against Atom
and Hydrogen Bombs, August 1958)j
b. embodied proposals,for future organization and
action; and
c dealt with economic questions.
9C. COIL
Xd FUTURE AClI S SPONSCPJP .. ?91P A
The following activities were called for in the resolutions
endorsed at the Conference
A. Economic ay orgaalzations
1. An Afro Asian Economic Committee--to pool data
and facilitate economic relations between independent
countries of Africa and Asia.
2 A committee within the Cairo Secretariat, to
study the economic problems of dependent countries.:
o lass orgWzgetion conferences
1. A joint cooperative and trade union conference.
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2. Youth organization conference.
3. Student organization conference.
4+. Women's organizations conference.
Note: In the case of the women's group, the
creation of an Afro-Asian Feminists' Union is
envisioned. In other instances proposals for the
creation of Afro Asian bodies already are circulating.
C. Trade_ Organizations
r r.r r 1. A Chambers of Commerce Conference (announced
for Cairo, December 1958).
D. Cultural Bodies and Conferences
1. A Committee on Cultural Exchanges (within the
Cairo Secretariat Bureau).
2. National bodies to support cultural exchanges.
3. Writers' Conference - Tashkent, October 1958 (endorsed).
4+. An Afro-Asian Artists' Conference.
E. Education, Research, and Investigative Bodies
1. An Afro Asian university.
2. An Afro Asian historians group.
3. An Afro Asian educators group.
F. Other Professional Bodies
(Lawyers, doctors, scientists, etc.)
The very number of bodies and gatherings called for may suggest
that these projects were .merely gestures; but a glance at the
composition of the main Communist-controlled and influenced delegations
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suffices to demonstrate that the nucleus of a competent Communist
fraction existed for virtually every endeavor 'named. Further,
the honored guests of the Conference included key representatives
of all the major international fronts except the World Federation
of Trade Unions, Only the Chinese affiliate of the WF was repre-
sented, in the person of Tung Hsiau.
These individuals in a number of instances already have
specific projects, sponsoring groups, and tentative dates toward
which to work,, in which further Egyptian or Afro-Asian initiative
is not required. For example
1. The Soviet offer to held the Second Asian Writers'
Conference in Tashkent in October 1958 was endorsed at the
Asian Writers 2 Conference in New Delhi December 1956. Modi-
fied to include African participation, it is now being
sponsored: by the 'union of Soviet Writersp in which A. Sofronov
of the Soviet delegation to Cairo is a key figures The
Progressive Writers" Association in India, dominated by
the CP India, and parallel organizations in Japan and other
Afro-Asian countries are equipped to cooperate in the campaigns,
using the Solidarity Committees as a vehicle. A preparatory
committee is to be established in Tashkent in August; until
then preliminary work is being carried on by a small group
which convened in Moscow,. 2-4 June 1958.
2.. The Second Afro Asian Student Conference was scheduled
to be held in Japan in the summer of 1958, under joint sponsor-
ship of the Communist-infiltrated Japanese National Federation
of Students Self -Government Associations and the All-China
Students Federation. However, it has now been announced that
a youth and student conference is to be held in Cairo in
February 1959. A preparatory committee is to be set up in
Cairo in. late 1958.
3. The Women9s International Democratic Federation has
convened its first congress since June 1953 and. has included
support for the main themes and results of the Cairo Conference
in ? its program. This meeting was bald in Vienna in June
1958-
4. Other AfroAsien gatherings (such as the Afro Asian
Women's Conference which was held in Ceylon in February 1958)
are tentatively scheduled. They provide, like the first
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Asian Writer's Conference held in India in December 1956.9
a target for Communist attempts to infiltrate and dominate
the proceedings. Even where such meetings successfully
resist Communist attempts to dominate them, the inclusion
of Soviet bloc delegations permits them to be exploited'
effectively as opportunities for cultivating new acquaintances
and contacts who may subsequently be willing to abandon
opposition to Communist desires and designs.
5. Other regional gatherings, such as the African,
Popular Conference scheduled for October 1958 in Accra,
a newly-projected Arab Popular Conference planned for September
1958, the Festival of African Youth scheduled to be held
in Bamako, French West Africa, in September 1958, and
many other less inclusive meetings are also exploitable in
the development of the Communist version of Afro Asian
solidarity.
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XIS COMMUNIST GA33S FROM THE CO ENC P E i NARY. ASSESSMEBT
Although the extent to which the permanent organization
created at Cairo will serve Communist ends remains unclear, the
Conference itself appears to have rendered the following services
to current Communist objectives&
as It endorsed the claim of the USM to acceptance
as an Afro Asian states, entitled to participate on a basis
of equality with other states of the area..
bO It provided in its resolutions a formal identifica-
tion of the main enemy, a statement of aspirations, and
proposals for future action which;, while ostensibly enjoy-
ing widespread popular Afro-Asian support, in fact constitute
a well-tailored framework within which Communist parties
and international front affiliates of the area (particularly
in the independent countries) can carry on the programs
and national unity strategies to which they are already
committed.
as it provided the Communist parties of the Soviet
bloc countries with extensive propaganda ammunition which
can be and has been used in a deceptive manner to convince
their own nations of the successes achieved through current
Bloc foreign policy$ the extent of popular support a d
endorsement which Communism, enjoys in the Free World, and
the weak and, disorganized state of the opposition to the
further. growth of Communism.
dl It provided a basis upon which the Communist
parties and peace movements of the principal Western states
can mount pressure campaigns against the unity and determina-
tion of democratically constituted Western g