DISSENSION IN THE 'PEACE' MOVEMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-00915R001000330004-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 20, 1998
• Sequence Number: 4
• Content Type: REPORT

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1. Concerning statements made from time to time that
the disagreements in the WPC during 1958 reflected a Soviet-
Chinese divergence, we have seen no firm, direct evidence that
such was the case. Existence of conflict between the Western
"peace" partisans from "imperialist" countries on the one hand
and the Afro-Asians -- and, more importantly, the Chinese
Communists -- on the other hand, was definitely observable, and
was openly acknowledged by Kuo Mo-jo. *
2. The article by Romesh Chandra in New Age, 15 March
1959, points to a substantial gain for the "anti-colonialist" faction
of the WPC as against the West Europeans at the Moscow Bureau
meeting in February, insofar as the WPC is no longer "a large
European movement... [but rather,-/ a truly international move-
ment" in which anti-imperialism is accorded an importance at
least as great as the "peace" campaign in the West.
' "We can say for certain that as long as colonialism exists,
there can be no lasting peace in the world... Some friends
think that the movement against colonialism and for national
independence hinders the movement for peace. We think
these friends have not taken into account all the aspects of
the question. The anti-colonialist movement is not merely
a movement to be carried out in colonies or semi-colonies,
it should also become a movement within the colonialist
countries. " (Speech to Stockholm Congress, 18 July 1958.)
Kuo repeated this argument in a speech in Peking on 6 August
1958.
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3. But the Bureau decisions also include elements of com-
promise. The Westerners may no longer impose "over-simple"
formulae and a "single centralized action", but, on the other
hand, they, like the Afro-Asians and Latin Americans, are to
build their "peace" movements on "issues most deeply affecting
the masses" in their own countries. It would also appear that
the opposing factions were unable to agree upon a single candidate
for the presidency of the WPC and were obliged to fall back upon
a "Presiding Committee", backed up by a "more effective and
political world Secretariat". Thus, although the Westerners lost
their key organizational position by the death of Joliot-Curie, they
are not further humiliated by the selection of an Afro-Asian
president. Of course, the extent to which the "anti-colonialists"
have gained depends partly on the composition and organization
of the "Presiding Committee" and of the beefed-up Secretariat.
It would be significant if the Asians (et al.) moved into a stronger
position in the Secretariat than the Westerners, but it is unlikely
that the Soviets would surrender their ultimate control (whether
exercised overtly or from behind the scenes).
4. Another indication of compromise at the Warsaw meeting
concerns the question of "regionalization" of the WPC. A proposal
to develop regional "peace" .councils was rejected at the Stockholm
Congress on the ground that it would weaken the WPC. At Moscow,
according to Chandra, it was decided that "the universal move-
ment and the regional movements acting together, complementary
to each other, could help to carry the peoples forward. "
5. It is difficult to translate the conflict between the
Westerners and the "anti-colonialists" into a direct Soviet-Chinese
conflict. The Chinese attitude toward Algeria, which was at
issue between the Westerners and the Afro-Asians at the New
Delhi meeting, for example, is, an uncertain indicator. Does the
Soviet failure to recognize the "provisional government" of the
FLN, in contrast with Peking's precipitant recognition, represent
a real divergence, or merely a nuance of tactics? Given the grow-
ing sophistication of the International Communist Movement, there
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seems to be no compelling reason for the Chinese Communists
to follow the Soviet lead in their treatment of De Gaulle and
Algeria, nor for Moscow to copy Peking, for that matter. No
doubt in a crisis, circumstances might force both of them to
adopt an identical line, and also, to some extent, elements of
the international movement are disturbed or embarrassed by
the tactics of the USSR on the one hand or the CPR on the other.
Nevertheless, in existing circumstances, this difference between
the two seems more tactical and complementary than basic, in
the same sense that Khrushchev so. adriotly combines and
alternates threats with "peace" gestures without departing from
a single line of strategy.
6. Another feature of the conflict in the WPC during 1958
was the bellicosity of the Chinese representatives. Kuo Mo-.joss
speech at the Stockholm Congress in July ("we are not afraid of
war") shocked some of the delegates and became known as the
"bomb" speech. It really was no departure from Mao's "paper
tiger" line dating from 1946, and Mao himself had said "we are
not afraid" of war in his report "On the Correct Handling of
Contradictions Among the People" in February 1957. It is easy
to see why the Chinese line upsets the Western "peace" partisans,
and it is true that quantitatively, Chinese propaganda has
exceeded the Soviet in sword-rattling, but again, these. are
ambiguous indicators for the problem of significant Sino-Soviet
disagreement. The decline in the volume of "paper tiger" pro-
paganda since November-December 1958 should not obscure the
fact that, on the one hand, Chinese Communist policy statements
continue to be profoundly anti-Western and intransigent, or on
the other, that Soviet statements (e. g. , at the 21st CPSU
Congress) differ (if at all) only in tone and not in substance,
from the Chinese.
7. From all this, and lacking conclusive contrary evidence,
it is hardly possible to deduce that a significant disagreement
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currently exists between Moscow and Peking. * It is clear that
the "anti-colonialists" have won a point against the Westerners
in the matter of the role and character of the world "peace"
movement. The latter may rankle, and future events (brought
close, perhaps, by the Soviet-UAR quarrel over Iraq) may
revive the conflict, but meanwhile, the Westerners may be
consoled by the compromise line adopted at the Moscow Bureau
meeting.
8. By taking on the "anti-colonialist" line, the "peace"
movement is perceptibly revolutionized. This is a significant
departure from Stalin's well-known stricture in 1952 of the role
of the movement. It is achieved by interposing struggle for the
goal of "national liberation" -- the first stage of the Chinese-
style two-stage revolution -- as a legitimate function of the
movement.
The same can be said for the disagreements within the IUS
and WFTU during recent months. The unprecedented dis-
agreement over the presidency of the IUS and the extreme
(as compared to the Prague Congress in 1956) "politicaliza-
tion" of the IUS line as it emerged from the Fifth Congress
in September 1958 attest to considerably increased Asian
influence in the IUS and to rivalry between the Asians and
the Europeans, but there is no evidence as yet that the
Soviets and Chinese were in direct opposition to each other.
The various divergences within the WFTU in recent years
(e. g., concerning the Common Market) likewise reveal no
Soviet-Chinese conflict. There are difficulties, no doubt
(e, g. , Dange's request at the recently concluded Warsaw
Executive Committee meeting for clarification of the
tactical line vis-a-vis the "national bourgeoisie"), but it
seems reasonable to go along with Grishin's latest denial of
disagreements reaching a "crisis" stage. Soviet support of
WFTU was a keynote of his speech to the AUCCTU Congress.
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