THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE INTER-PARTY DEVELOPMENTS AT AND AFTER THE RUMANIAN WORKERS PARTY CONGRESS - BUCHAREST, 20 - 25 JUNE 1960

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 55
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 20, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

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25X1A2g
THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE
INTER-PARTY DEVELOPMENTS AT AND AFTER THE
RUMANIAN WORKERS PARTY CONGRESS-BUCHAREST,
20-25 JUNE 1960
Copy N? 32
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THE SING-SOVIET DISPUTE
INTER-PARTY DEVELOPMENTS AT AND AFTER THE
RUMANIAN WORKERS PARTY CONGRESS- -BUCHAREST,
20-25 JUNE 1960
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 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240001-1
THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE
INTER-PARTY DEVELOPMENTS AT AND AFTER THE
LtUMANIAN WORKERS PARTY CONGRESS---BUCHAREST, 20-25 JUNE 1960
The background of the dispute (1957-1960)
1. The present dispute between the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Communist Party of China (CPC) has
its origins in differences which date back at least three years--
that is, to the summer of 1957. On the Chinese side, antecendent
resentments may date as far back as the formative period of the
CPC in the,twenties, when Stalinys policy of alliance with the
Kuomintang drove the CPC to disaster, as well as to the war and.
early post-war period, when-Soviet support for the Chinese Corn-
munist cause was minimal and did not inhibit the stripping of
Manchuria. There is clearly no single cause for the current
dispute. Rather, it would appear, an accumulation of Chinese
policies and actions increasingly displeased and challenged
Khrushchev and, presumably, a majo:ri.ty of the Soviet leadership.
In the field of domestic policy, it is now known that Mao's "Let
a hundred flowers bloom" program aroused Soviet doubts about
its usefulness. The program for the "great leap forward"
beginning in early 1958 and the communes program, adopted by
the CPC in May 1958, were readily recognizable as a considerable
irritant in Sino- soviet relations by the silent treatment which
they received in the Soviet Union.
2, Disagreement over foreign policy manifested itself in
August 1958 when Khrushchev, after four days of discussion with
Mao Tse-tung, publicly rejected, on 5 August, Western proposals
for a summit meeting within the U. N. Security Council on the
crisis in the Middle East--proposals which he had accepted in
July. Nevertheless, on 23 August the Chinese began shelling of
the off-shore islands. On 23 May 1958 the Commander of the
Chinese"',kir Force puiedicted that China would make atomic bombs
"in the not too distant future" and the Chinese press ceased to
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refer to Khrushchev's earlier plan for an atom-free zone in
Asia. Khrushchev revived his concept of an atom-free one
for "the Far East and the entire Pacific Basin" at the 21st
CPSU Congress in February 1959. Chinese reactions were
not enthusiastic, and, from April 1959, on, reference to the
plan disappeared altogether. In the light of these and other
indications, it can be fairly assumed that Soviet unwillingness
to deliver atomic weapons to Chinese control had become a
serious issue. It is now known that the Soviets cited as the
reason for their 'reluctance their apprehension over Chinese
policies and pronouncements in the external field which were
in conflict with Khrushchev's "peaceful coexistence" tactics,
which affirmed that global or limited war need not be avoided,
and which objected to Khrushchev's aid programs for "bourgeois"
regimes in underdeveloped countries on the grounds that they
would delay revolution. Chinese objections to peaceful coexistence
tactics manifested themselves after 1957 in the deliberations of
the International Communist Front organizations, especially
within the World Peace Council and the International Union of
Students--two organizations which were ost directly and in-
tensely engaged in building their appeal on the unity campaign
so typical of the peaceful coexistence period. They desired to
involve bourgeois and nationalist groups in mass action and
therefore advocated informal conversations, negotiations,
and concessions to such groups. The Chinese refused to "sit
around the table" with them except in formal meetings of
designated representatives, and resisted Soviet efforts to
broaden the scope of concessions on program and organization
questions. Chinese resistance was particularly manifest after
the Soviet decision of June 1959 concerning Khrushchev's visit
to the United States.
3. In August 1959, the Chine-se overran the Indian border
post at Longju and reopened the border dispute with India, after
eight years of quiet. The Soviet position on this dispute signifi-
cantly failed to give full endorsement to the Chinese claims,
although earlier Chinese repressive actions in Tibet had been
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promptly supported as just and as an "internal affair. "
Khrushchev, as was known later, did not interpret the reopening
of the dispute as a mere attempt to register opposition to his
trip to the United States, but as an un-Marxist blunder which
needlessly undermined Indian neutralist attitudes and potential
value in the peace and disarmament campaign and impaired the
appeal of CP India. When Khrushchev visited Peiping, after
his trip to the United States, for the October anniversary cele-
brations in 1959, the Sino-Insian dispute was one topic of discussion
and it is virtually certain that Khrushchev presented his views on
improving USSR-U.S. relations. Sino-Soviet discussions were
unsatisfactory, however, and no communique was published.
According to three widely separated and reliable sources, in
October 1959 the CPSU sent a letter to at least the bloc parties,
holding fast to Khrushchev's views on USSR-U. S. relations.
In November 1959, V. Ilyitchev, Chief of the Agitprop Department
of the CPSU, published an article in Problems of Peace and
Socialism that justified the policy of peaceful coexistence as e'I